WIDER Working Paper 2014/067 The economics of marriage in North Africa Ragui Assaad1 and Caroline Krafft2 April 2014 World Institute for Development Economics Research wider.unu.edu Abstract: Marriage is the single most important economic transaction and social transition in the lives of young people. Yet little is known about the economics of marriage in much of the developing world. This paper examines the economics of marriage in North Africa, where asymmetric rights in marriage create incentives for extensive up-front bargaining and detailed marriage contracts. As well as describing the limited literature on the economics of marriage in North Africa, this paper draws on economic theories of the marriage market and game-theoretic approaches to bargaining to propose a unifying framework for the economics of marriage in North Africa. New empirical evidence is presented on the economics of marriage in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, illustrating how individuals’ characteristics and ability to pay shape bargaining power and marriage outcomes, including age at marriage, marriage, costs, consanguinity, and nuclear residence. Keywords: economics of marriage, marriage market, marriage contract, bargaining, North Africa, age at marriage, marriage costs, consanguinity, nuclear residence JEL classification: J12, J16, N37, C78 Note: Tables and Figures are at the end of the paper. 1University of Minnesota and Economic Research Forum,
[email protected]; 2University of Minnesota,
[email protected]. This paper was prepared for the ‘Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics’ authors’ conference in Beijing, 8-10 December 2013, implemented with UNU-WIDER. Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2014 ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9230-788-2 Typescript prepared by Anna-Mari Vesterinen and Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER.