INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES in JUDICIAL ELECTIONS By
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Independent Expenditures in Judicial Elections Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation Authors Ross, Joseph V. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 28/09/2021 18:13:54 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/202531 INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS by Joseph V. Ross ________________________ A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WITH A MAJOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2011 2 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by: Joseph V. Ross entitled Independent Expenditures in Judicial Elections and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ______________________________________________ Date: May 13, 2011 Chad Westerland ______________________________________________ Date: May 13, 2011 Barbara Norrander ______________________________________________ Date: May 13, 2011 John P. Willerton ______________________________________________ Date: May 13, 2011 Roger E. Hartley Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I herby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it might be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. _____________________________________________ Date: May 13, 2011 Dissertation Director: Chad Westerland 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED: Joseph V. Ross 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ...........................................................................................................5 LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................6 ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................7 CHAPTER 1: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGN REFORM AND A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ...................................................................................................................9 CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF INDEPENDENT SPENDING IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS..........38 CHAPTER 3: CATALOGUING INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES ..............................................50 CHAPTER 4: INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN FOUR NOTABLE STATES .......................66 CHAPTER 5: THE PREVALENCE OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN JUDICIAL RACES..............................................................................................................................93 CHAPTER 6: THE REGULATION OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS .................................................128 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS......................................................................................169 REFERENCES...............................................................................................................178 5 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.1 Total funds raised by all candidates by state, 1998-2008...............................61 Figure 3.2 Average funds raised by all candidates by state, 1998-2008..........................62 Figure 3.3 Total funds spent on television advertising by state, 2000-2009 ...................64 Figure 3.4 Total independent expenditures by state ........................................................65 Figure 5.1 Average Contributions and Independent Expenditures by PAC Limits.......125 Figure 5.2 Average Independent Expenditures by Term Length...................................126 Figure 5.3 Average Independent Expenditures by Incumbency....................................127 Figure 6.1 Predicted independent expenditures by contribution limit stringency .........167 Figure 6.2 Predicted independent expenditures by restrictions on candidate interactions with political parties and organizations ...........................................................................168 6 LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1 States categorized by type of election..............................................................63 Table 5.1 Summary of Expectations Regarding Independent Expenditures .................120 Table 5.2 Contributions to Candidates and Independent Expenditures by State...........121 Table 5.3 Independent Expenditures by State................................................................122 Table 5.4 Top Beneficiaries of Independent Expenditures............................................123 Table 5.5 OLS Regression of Logged Independent Expenditures per Candidate .........124 Table 6.1 Summary of Expectations..............................................................................159 Table 6.2 The Stringency of Contribution Limits..........................................................160 Table 6.3 Restrictions on Candidate Speech in Codes of Conduct................................161 Table 6.4 Restrictions on Candidate Fundraising in Codes of Conduct........................162 Table 6.5 Restrictions on Interactions with Political Parties and Organizations in Codes of Conduct........................................................................................................................163 Table 6.6 Disclosure Requirements for Independent Expenditures...............................164 Table 6.7 OLS Regression of Logged Independent Expenditures.................................165 Table 6.8 OLS Regression of Logged Candidate Funds................................................166 7 ABSTRACT In recent years, judicial elections have undergone a transformation: races once characterized by low levels of competition, interest and participation are now comparable, in some states, to races for governor or senator. Elections for the bench as a whole are now more expensive, competitive and politicized than ever before. Arguably the most influential change in the last ten years has been the emergence of independent expenditures by political action committees and other groups in races for seats on state supreme courts. Despite the growth of this type of spending, our understanding of independent expenditures is rather limited, as the distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates is rarely made clear. I address this in this dissertation by examining the patterns of independent spending in states with elected supreme courts. In doing so, I develop a theoretical framework to explain the decision of individual groups to support a judicial candidate independently. I argue that this decision is shaped largely by the campaign regulations imposed on judicial candidates and their potential supporters. Expectations from this theory are tested throughout the remainder of the dissertation using an original set of data drawn directly from state disclosure records. I find that independent expenditures have been concentrated in only a few states in recent years and that campaign regulations are influential in shaping this aggregate behavior. Contribution limits, in particular, redirect money from candidates’ campaigns to independent expenditures. This is particularly significant due to the unique nature of judicial elections and the role of a judge in American politics. The results of the statistical and case study analyses should give 8 pause to participants in the normative debates regarding campaign finance and judicial reform as they suggest that regulations can have unintended, but important consequences. 9 CHAPTER 1: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, CAMPAIGN REFORM AND A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE State courts have always played an important role in state politics and the American legal system, though their rise to public prominence is considerably more recent. Now state courts decide cases in salient issue areas, such as election law and capital punishment, and are drawn into policy battles with the legislature over issues like school funding and gay marriage. The expanding public role of state courts in policymaking has, correspondingly, led to dramatic changes in judicial selection, particularly in states with elected judiciaries. When Washington Supreme Court Justice Gerry Alexander retires at the end of 2011, he will end a nearly forty-year judicial career, having served through this period of tremendous change and controversy for state courts nationwide. Justice Alexander was first elected to the Washington