The Anglo-Irish Truce of 11 July 1921 Which Brought a Formal Conclusion to the Irish War of Independence
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University of Limerick Ollscoil Luimnigh The Anglo - Irish Truce: An analysis of its immediate military impact, 8 - 11 July 1921 Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc Ph.D. 2014 University of Limerick Ollscoil Luimnigh The Anglo - Irish Truce: An analysis of its immediate military impact, 8 - 11 July 1921 Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc Thesis presented to the University of Limerick for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Supervisor: Dr. Ruán O’Donnell Submitted to the University of Limerick, September 2014 Abstract This thesis is a study of the dynamics of the Anglo-Irish Truce of 11 July 1921 which brought a formal conclusion to the Irish War of Independence. Although this work explores the origins, character and significance of the agreement, its primary focus is an analysis of the effect the announcement the impending armistice had on the use of lethal violence in the final days and hours of the conflict. It uses empirical data to interrogate existing hypotheses, and test popular theories surrounding the cessation of the Irish Republican Army’s military campaign. Furthermore, it examines in detail the hitherto neglected subject of the reaction and responses of the British forces in Ireland to the agreement. This study also establishes the role the advent of the Truce played in fomenting ‘Belfast’s Bloody Sunday’, one of the most intense outbreaks of sectarian violence in modern Irish history. This thesis addresses key questions which are central to understanding the Truce and the conflict as a whole. The new research presented in this study challenges an established historical narrative. The empirical findings make a useful contribution to the development of a more complex and comprehensive history of the Irish revolutionary period. The research contained in this thesis arrives at a number of defining conclusions. The rank and file of both the IRA and British forces were taken completely unawares by the advent of the ceasefire and, contrary to previous claims; there was no premeditated or concerted national campaign by either side in an attempt to inflict as many fatalities on their enemies as possible immediately before the conflict ended. A handful of provincial IRA units issued orders to launch fresh military offensives after the announcement of the Truce but these had a desultory effect. Contrary to previous claims these units concentrated on regular military operations such as ambushes and barrack attacks rather than so called ‘soft targets’ such as the execution of civilians and assassinations of members of the British forces. The vast majority of IRA operations which occurred nationally in the final days and hours of the conflict were motivated by local factors rather than national political developments. Although the IRA continued to use lethal violence right up to the beginning of the Truce, almost all of these attacks were typical of those which had developed during the i conflict and were not specifically motivated by the announcement. The British forces in southern Ireland engaged in similar military operations but, like their enemies, there is no evidence to suggest that these operations were specifically motivated by the impending ceasefire. Only in Belfast, where there was sustained inter-communal violence in the final days of the war, can reaction to the Truce be said to have resulted in an upsurge. Even in that instance, negative loyalist reaction to the ceasefire was just one of a number of contributory causes, amongst which local factors predominated. Ultimately, the use of lethal violence in the immediate pre-Truce period, though often brutal, was largely typical of the conditions which had developed in that conflict. The events and killings in July 1921, often cited as having been conceived as a deliberate reaction to the announcement of the Truce, were infact almost wholly coincidental to the machinations which brought the conflict to a formal end. ii Acknowledgements I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Ruán O’Donnell, for his confidence in me and his support and assistance during the writing of this thesis. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Dr. John O’Callaghan for his invaluable help and advice during my research. Thanks are due also to other historians who have helped with my endeavours, including Dr. Seán Gannon, Dr. John Borgonovo, Dr. Andrew Bielenberg, Dr. William Mulligan, Dr. Philip McConway, Dr. Thomás Mac Conn Mara, Dr. Daithi Ó Corrain, Dr. Anne Matthews, Dr. William Sheehan, Dr. Gerard Noonan, Dr. Brian Hanley, Dr. Tim Horgan, Dr. William Kautt, Dr. Billy MagFhloinn, Fr, Brian Murphy O.S.B., Cormac Ó Comhraí, John Dorney, Tommy Graham, Donal Fallon, Barry Keane, Liz Gillis, Tom Toomey, Des Long, William Butler, Liam O’Duibhir, Jim McDermott, Seán Enright, Gerry White, Brendan O’Shea, Cormac O’Malley, Liam Hogan, Mike Maguire, Phil Flood and Kathy Hegarty Thorne. A special thanks to my parents Pat and Monica for their financial assistance during my time at university, and to my sister Deirdre and my brother Kevin for their support. Finally, thanks to my wife Anne Maria for all her encouragement, love and support. iii Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, represents my own work. Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc iv Table of Contents Abstract i Acknowledgements iii Declaration iv List of Tables ix Key to abbreviations x Chapter One: Introduction 01 Chapter Two: The political and military origins of the Truce and its transmission to combatants (I) Introduction 09 (II) Early peace initiatives 10 November 1920: Military developments, Roger Sweetman’s appeal and the Peace Resolution 14 Archbishop Clune’s negotiations with the British Government 19 The British cabinet divided, March - May 1921 26 (III) The failure of the Government of Ireland Act: political crisis and the British need to end hostilities 29 The Empire, international commitments and British military difficulties in Ireland 34 Stagnation of the military conflict, and the impetus for a Truce 38 (IV) The final negotiation of a Truce, July 1921 43 The question of IRA belligerency 48 Knowledge of the British and Irish combatants that a Truce was imminent 51 IRA ceasefire dispatches: orders to ground arms or escalate activity? 57 Chapter Three: The announcement of the Truce and the execution of suspected spies by the IRA (I) The intelligence war 61 The execution of suspected spies and informers: theories Comparison: ‘short shrift for spies’, British counter-intelligence in World War One 63 The announcement of the Truce and its impact on the intelligence war 68 (II) The execution of suspected spies immediately prior to the Truce 69 The killing of David Cummins 71 The killing of ‘Eric Steadman’ 76 The killing of Major George Bernard O’Conor 78 The killing of John Poynton 81 The killing of William J. Nolan 83 v The killing of John H. N. Begley 86 Failed IRA attempts to kill suspected spies 87 (III) Anti-Protestant sectarianism? 92 Ex-servicemen and former members of the RIC 107 The question of ‘guilt’ of those killed by the IRA prior to the Truce 113 (IV) Timing: A rush for justice? 118 Non-fatal punishment of suspected spies by the IRA immediately prior to the Truce 120 Assessment 123 Chapter Four: IRA attacks on off-duty British troops following the announcement of the Truce (I) Introduction 128 The Hague Convention of 1907 and guerrilla attacks on off-duty troops 132 (II) ‘Uniformed Spies’: IRA attacks on off-duty RIC personnel, 8 - 11 July 1921 134 Constable Alfred Needham 137 Constable Frederick Cormer 140 Constable Alexander Clarke 142 Sergeant James King 145 Planned attack on the Special Constabulary at Newry and the killing of Draper Holmes 147 Non-Fatal attacks on off-duty members of the RIC 150 The attack on Constable Farmiloe 151 The abduction of Constables Atwell and Doyle, and Special Constable Sinnamon 153 Other IRA actions taken against off-duty members of the RIC 155 (III) IRA attacks on off-duty British military personnel, 8 - 11 July 1921 156 The ‘Ellis Quarry shootings’: historiography 160 The ‘Ellis Quarry shootings’: factual narrative 164 The ‘Ellis Quarry shootings’: theories 167 Private Richard Edward Larter 170 Sergeant Edward Mears 171 Attack on British Army officers near Kilmallock 172 British troops captured by the IRA prior to the Truce and released unharmed 173 The Dublin ‘Hit Up’ 175 Assessment 178 vi Chapter Five: Pre-Truce offensives and IRA military operations, 8 - 11 July 1921 (I) Introduction 182 st The 1 Eastern Division IRA pre-Truce offensive 183 rd The 3 Tipperary Brigade IRA pre-Truce offensive 188 st nd The combined 1 and 2 Kerry Brigades IRA pre-Truce offensive 191 (II) Analysis of the IRA’s military campaign nationally between 8 - 11 July 1921 198 Pre-Truce military activity in the IRA’s 1st Western Division (Clare and Galway) 198 Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA’s Cork Brigades 201 Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA’s Limerick Brigades 206 Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Waterford 208 Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Connacht 209 Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Dublin and the southeast 211 Pre-Truce military activity by the IRA in Ulster 214 Assessment 216 Chapter Six: Fatalities inflicted by the British forces following the announcement of the Truce (I) Introduction 225 (II) The reaction of rank and file British troops towards the Truce 227 Offensive British military activities which occurred after the announcement of the Truce 230 ‘The Kilgobnet Mine Disaster’ 232 Attempted assassinations