February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3

Radical in The Role of Radical Madrasas in Terrorist found that JI-linked attendance Attacks is associated with a greater role in JI Southeast Asia It is true that most madrasas are terrorist operations, decreasing the peaceful and serve a constructive role probability that a jihadist will take a By Scott Atran, Justin Magouirk and Jeremy Ginges in societies where education is often low level role on a terrorist operation a privilege rather than a right, and by more than 19% and increasing the senior government officials in where, as in Pakistan, the state has probability that a jihadist will play a the United States, United Kingdom increasingly released mass education major role by 16%.4 and France, among other countries, and student welfare to madrasas as it have repeatedly voiced concerns about continues to spend many times more Data was also analyzed from structured the threat to world security posed by on the military.2 Yet this overlooks interviews with more than 100 students Islamic schools that allegedly teach hate the fact that elsewhere, particularly in in four Indonesian madrasas (pesantren, and murder. In 2005, Peter Bergen and Indonesia and Malaysia, madrasas such or boarding schools) to attempt to Swati Pandey published an op-ed with as al-Mukmin, Lukman al-Hakiem and explain these associations, and striking the New York Times on “The Madrassah al- have been vitally important correlations were found between unusual Myth,” where they argued that most in furthering the mission of some of belief systems and radicalization. Two madrasas, or Islamic boarding schools, the most volatile terrorist groups, such of the schools, Darussalam and al- are moderate and are not associated as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), in efforts to Husainy, are associated with Nahdlatul with terrorism and political violence. attack American, Australian and other (NU), or Revival of Islamic After examining some high-profile Western-related interests. In fact, Scholars, a mass movement that had attacks, they surmised that: the majority of JI terrorist attacks— originally played a key role in the fight including the Christmas Eve bombings for independence against Dutch rule and While madrassas are an important of 2000 and Bali I in 2002, as well as which is associated with a traditional issue in education and development the Jakarta Marriott bombing in 2003 and non-dogmatic Indonesian form of in the Muslim world, they are not and the Australian Embassy attack in Islam influenced by Balinese Hinduism, and should not be considered a 2004 (which involved JI members but Buddhism and Sufi mystical beliefs. threat to the United States. The were not institutionally JI)—have been One school, Ibnu Mas’ud, is funded tens of millions of dollars spent staffed and led by individuals associated by the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia every year by the United States with radical madrasas. (MMI), or Council of Indonesian Holy through the State Department, the Warriors, an Islamist coalition whose Middle East Partnership Initiative, To explore these competing claims goal is to convert Indonesia into a and the Agency for International and to address the madrasa question strict Sunni state ruled by Shari`a law.5 Development to improve education systematically, data was recently The remaining school, al-Islam (in and literacy in the Middle East and analyzed from the ongoing Global Tengulun, East Java), was established South Asia should be applauded Transnational Terrorism (GTT) Project.3 in 1992 by the father of three of the as the development aid it is and Overall, the findings demonstrate main Bali bombing plotters ( Imron, not as the counterterrorism effort that attendance and other forms of Amrozi and Mukhlas) and modeled it cannot be. association (teaching, socializing or on the famous al-Mukmin school in attending lectures) with JI-linked Ngruki (Solo, Central Java) created by In an extension of this argument in radical madrasas are correlated with JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and his 1 The Washington Quarterly, Bergen and both participation and role in JI terrorist colleague Abu Bakr Ba’asyir. After Pandey conclude that we must eliminate attacks. By using aggregate level data Sungkar’s death in 1999, Ba’asyir the “assumption that madrassas produce on Indonesian education rates, it is became al-Islam’s patron and officiated terrorists capable of carrying out major clear that JI-linked madrasa attendance at graduation ceremonies. After the Bali attacks” in order to “shape more effective rates of the jihadists that took part in bombing, Ba’asyir said that he believed policies to ensure national security.” the Bali I, Marriott and Australian the victims of the bombing would go to Embassy bombings are 19 times greater hell,6 and that the bombers and plotters Overall, this analysis is a welcome than the highest estimated rates of the were heroic mujahidin.7 respite from the rash rhetoric that often general population. Using an ordered characterizes responses to terrorist logit statistical analysis of 75 jihadists After exploring attitudes toward Islam attacks such as 9/11 and the 2005 involved in the same operations, we and other religions, no significant London Underground bombings. Yet, in attempting to rectify the typical 2 Even before September 11, the ratio of defense spending 4 Justin Magouirk, “Connecting a Thousand Points of hysterical media responses to madrasas, to health and education spending in Pakistan was 239:1. Hatred,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31:4 (2008). the argument may go too far. See Stephen Burgess, “Struggle for Control of Pakistan,” 5 MMI is led by Abu Bakr Ba’asyir and has a member- in Barry Schneider and Jerrold Post eds., Know Thy En- ship that overlaps with but is broader than JI. emy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cul- 6 Cited in Indira Laksshaman, “Islamic Leader Warns tures, 2nd ed. (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing Com- Indonesia,” Boston Globe, October 17, 2002. pany, 2004). 7 Cited in Scott Atran, “The Emir: An Interview with 1 Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scape- 3 Undertaken in collaboration with Marc Sageman and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast goat,” The Washington Quarterly 29 (Spring 2006): pp. Dominick Wright, and under the auspices of the Air Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization,” Spotlight on Ter- 117-125. Force Office of Scientific Research. rorism 3:9 (2005). February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 differences between the NU and MMI radicals together, a point often missed Two others were tried in district court schools were found, whereas al-Islam by terrorism analysts. Association with on charges of aiding Ali Imron, one of stood apart on a variety of measures.8 At a JI-linked radical madrasa is a strong which was a relative of Ali Imron and al-Islam, 91% of the students (compared predictor of a jihadist’s role in terrorist the other a parent of a former student to 35% of students at the other madrasas) operations in Southeast Asia. For at al-Islam. The 2002 Bali operation is believed that it was their duty as Muslims example, both the spiritual guide of the not unique. “to fight and kill non-Muslims such as Bali operation, Mukhlas, and the field Christians.”9 At al-Islam, 74% of the commander, Samudra, attended Implications for an Anti-Terrorism Policy students (compared to seven percent of or associated with JI-linked radical From this data, a number of implications the students at other schools) believed madrasas, and built their financial, for an effective anti-terrorism policy that all people “were born evil but some logistical and operational network can be drawn. First, allied governments learn to become good.”10 Across all around madrasa ties. The same is true should hone their focus on a small schools, students who believed people for Dulmatin and Azhari Husin, the subset of radical madrasas. There is no are “born evil” were about 11 times more main bomb-makers in the operation. evidence that madrasas in general spawn, likely to believe it was their duty to kill The study found that association with or are even correlated with, terrorism; non-Muslims.11 Lukman al-Hakiem, a radical JI madrasa nevertheless, our research shows that, in Malaysia, increases the probability at least for Indonesia and Malaysia, Students were also asked to imagine that a jihadist will play a major role by there is strong statistical evidence that what would happen if a child born more than 23%. Based on this analysis, radical madrasas are correlated with of Jewish parents were adopted by a it can be surmised that JI-linked radical terrorism and support for violence religious Muslim couple. While 83% of madrasas are both production sites and against those who hold different beliefs. students from other schools thought that service centers for jihadists. These radical madrasas preach a jihadist the child would grow up to be a Muslim, version of takfiri ideology. Takfiris view only 48% of students at al-Islam shared The following page shows a social contemporary society as antithetical to that belief.12 This essentialist belief network diagram of the 2002 Bali Islamic values and consider the killing that a child born of another religion bombing that illustrates the connections of fellow Muslims to be justified in could never fully become a Muslim was between the different jihadists that took their cause to purify the community strongly related to support for violence. part in the bombing. Note that 16 of the of alien influences. Takfiri jihadists Students with this belief were about 10 27 jihadists either attended or were reject standard Salafist teaching, which times more likely than other students associated with the radical madrasas proscribes the killing of fellow Muslims to believe that it was their duty to kill Lukman al-Hakiem or al-Mukmin,14 and the overthrow of states ruled by non-Muslims.13 Note that the difference including most of the leadership, Muslims because this would produce between al-Islam and the other schools planners and operators. division and discord (fitna) in the cannot be attributed to different levels community. In fact, the strict Salafist of religiosity, or even different levels of After the Bali I operation, most of the schools are generally the most virulent agreement with political Islam. Fewer individuals who helped hide Ali Imron, opponents of jihadism in Indonesia students at al-Islam (71% compared to one of the bombers, were students and elsewhere. Within JI there has 82% of students at the other schools) at or were associated with al-Islam, been a debate over whether attacks are believed it was “very important…that where he was a teacher. For instance, legitimate on Indonesian soil and, if a good government implement the laws Hamzah Baya (class of 1999), Eko Hadi so, whether the killing of Muslims is of Shari`a” (not a significant difference Prasetyo (1998), Sukastopo (met Imron allowed.16 It is clear from the data that statistically, P > 0.4). at al-Islam), Sofyan Hadi (1998), Imam the role of radical madrasas concerns Susanto (2001), Sirojul Munir (parent only the takfiri wing of JI, which allows Another finding is that radical madrasas of al-Islam student), Ilham bin Abdul both attacks on Indonesian soil and the in Southeast Asia are important not Muthalib (2001), Rusi bin killing of Muslims as well as foreigners only as tools of indoctrination, but also Salim (1998), Azhari Dipo Kusuma for the sake of . as “focal points” to draw like-minded (teacher at al-Islam at the same time as Ali Imron), Sumaro (1997) and Radical madrasas have provided 8 Median age at NU schools was 16, and 18 at the other Abdullah Salam (1999) were all arrested operatives for every major JI attack schools. Females comprised nearly half of the student (and released in 2006) for hiding or outside of the strictly local conflicts 15 body at the NU schools, five percent at al-Islam and none helping Imron flee after the bombing. between Muslims and Christians in 17 at the MMI school. Questionnaires were distributed only Ambon and Poso. Most of the Bali to males. Interestingly, at al-Islam 71% of respondents 14 Node size is based on the reputation of the individual. attackers and planners either attended said they joined the school through pre-existing social Reputation is derived from a mathematical algorithm networks of friends, whereas 70% of respondents at the that addresses both organizational role and attack his- into trouble. See Ali Imron, Sang Pengebom (Ali Imron, the other schools were sent there by their family. tory. Bomber) (Jakarta: Republika Press, November 2007). 9 Chi-square = 43.01, P < 0.0001. 15 Thanks to Sidney Jones for providing this informa- 16 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Background- 10 Chi-square = 38.39, P < 0.0001. tion. The al-Islam supporters were clearly not terrorists er: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix,” Sep- 11 Wald = 13.042, 95% CI for OR = 2.98-39.73, P = in the sense that the bombers were. Most of them were tember 13, 2004. 0.0003. members of KOMPAK, an Islamic charity linked to JI (as 17 There were more attacks in Poso between 2003 and 12 Chi-square = 36.166, P < 0.0001. well as other militant Islamic groups), but not part of JI. 2006 than in the rest of Indonesia combined. None of the 13 Wald = 9.139, 95% CI for OR = 2.3 - 49.7, P = 0.003. In his new book, Ali Imron deeply regrets getting them perpetrators there went to JI schools. February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 or were associated with one of three males.20 John Jay College of the City University of JI-linked radical schools—al-Mukmin, New York. Published in leading scientific al-Islam or Lukman al-Hakiem—and Efforts should also focus intelligence journals, such as Science magazine and similar radical madrasa representation gathering on radical madrasas that Behavioral and Brain Sciences, his work in other JI attacks indicates that the repeatedly produce terrorists. By has also been covered by news and print radical madrasa factor is not an isolated focusing on a select group of radical media around the world, including feature phenomenon or one restricted to madrasas, anti-terrorism efforts may be stories in the New York Times and Wall “unimportant” regional conflicts. able to disrupt networks that form the Street Journal. basis for future attacks. This includes Second, governments should focus neutralizing the hardcore group of Jeremy Ginges is an Assistant Professor of both foreign aid and counter-terrorism jihadists such as Bali bombers Mukhlas Psychology at the New School for Social funding on combating this small but and Imam Samudra, who are most Research in New York City. Dr. Ginges important group of radical schools. There often part of these networks. This is a received his doctorate from Tel Aviv are numerous social entrepreneurship realistic mission for two reasons. First, University and has had appointments at organizations, such as Ashoka, that the number of radical madrasas that the University of Pennsylvania and the act as venture capital firms and fund preach takfiri ideology is quite small— University of Michigan. He has published innovative education programs in our estimate is that under five percent widely on the psychology of terrorism and places like South and Southeast Asia, of Indonesians attend radical madrasas. intergroup conflict. where education is often a privilege for Second, within the small pool of radical madrasas, it should be possible to focus Justin Magouirk spent two years as the “Radical madrasas have specifically on those that have direct ties Manager and then Executive Director to JI, as these are the schools that have for the Global Transnational Terrorism provided operatives for funneled recruits to terrorist operations Project. He received his MA and Ph.D. in every major JI attack from 2000-2005.21 Sidney Jones, Political Science (focus on terrorism) from Southeast Asia project director for the the University of Michigan. Dr. Magouirk outside of the strictly local International Crisis Group, counts 30 currently works for a Seattle-based conflicts between Muslims such schools in Indonesia (out of about consulting firm. 22 and Christians in Ambon 14,000, or 2/10 of a percent). and Poso.” By focusing government aid and intelligence gathering on a small group of radical madrasas, lives and interests could be saved, with little if any effect the affluent. The effectiveness of such on the network of moderate madrasas programs should be considered, whose that provide masses of people with “soft power” to wean away potential and needed education in parts of Southeast future candidates for terrorism reliably Asia and elsewhere. produces wider and longer lasting results than direct diplomatic pressure Scott Atran is a political violence consultant or “hard power” alternatives that often for RTI International. He received his backfire or cause blowback. It may not be Ph.D. in anthropology from Columbia possible to dissuade the small group of University. Dr. Atran is currently research hardcore jihadists that hold unyielding director in anthropology at the National beliefs on the sanctity of their missions18; Center for Scientific Research in Paris, however, the number of jihadists that France, visiting professor of psychology and hold such unyielding beliefs prior to public policy at the University of Michigan their association with radical madrasas and presidential scholar in sociology at the or other focal points is relatively small. Accounts of the key Bali bombers show 20 The Bali examples support evidence that jihadists that radicalization occurred through tend to radicalize each other when they are isolated away association and attendance at radical from family and mainstream society. See Marc Sageman, madrasas and through militant training Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia, PA: University of Penn- 19 in Afghanistan and the Philippines. sylvania Press, 2008). Disrupting the radical madrasa source 21 JI could start to recruit from non-JI affiliated madra- through competition could eliminate sas, and if this occurs the counter-terrorism focus would key radicalization centers for young have to change. Although Noordin Top, the current at- tack leader of JI, has successfully enlisted operatives 18 Scott Atran, “Global Network Terrorism,” NSC brief- from outside the JI cadre of jihadists, he has still shown a ing, White House, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2006. strong tendency to rely on JI-affiliatedmadrasas . Accord- 19 See Sally Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords: On the ingly, this small group of madrasas still presents a good Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia (Sydney: place to commence counter-terrorism efforts. HarperCollins Australia, 2004). 22 Personal interview, Sidney Jones, January 18, 2008.