African Perspectives EDITORIAL

A Foreign Policy Entrenching Egypt’s African Identity

By: Diaa Rashwan SIS Chairman

Throughout several regional and international forums, Egypt’s foreign policy always pays due attention to the Afri- can continent, thus entrenching Egypt’s identity and belong- ing to Africa, stemming from the fact that Egypt’s belonging to its African arena is a main component of the Egyptian “identity” throughout various ages, in addition to being a pivotal element in formulating the cultural features of the Egyptian personality. This is asserted in the text and pream- ble of 2014 Constitution. Moreover, the political address of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, whether domestically or abroad, asserts the historic and strategic importance of the Egyptian-African relations and shows Egypt’s pride of its African belonging “we are determined to restore Egypt’s status and to contribute effectively with the rest of the Afri- can countries in meeting the challenges that lie ahead, espe- cially terrorism, organized crime, epidemics andenviron- mental degradation.”

Within this context, the quantitative analysis of President Al-Sisi’s foreign visits and international meetings with foreign leaders and offi- cials since assuming office on June 8, 2014,refers to the priority which his Excellency gives to the Egyptian-African Relations. In this vein, out

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of 69 foreign visits, Al-Sisi paid Furthermore, the Egyptian ac- 21 visits to African countries; tion on the continental level re- thus representing more than 30% fers to several pivots and circles of the total foreign presidential in this respect: the African Horn, visits. Moreover, out of 543 meet- East Africa, the Nile Basin Coun- ings with leaders and officials tries, Central Africa Countries, from several states and interna- South Africa Countries, and tional organizations who visited West Africa Countries. This was Egypt in the last three years, Al- confirmed in Al-Sisi’s visits to a Sisi held 112 with African offi- number of African states, cials and heads of states. namely: Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Tan- In this respect, the Egyptian zania, Rwanda, Gabon, and political presence was not only Chad, in addition to the visits of confined on the active contribu- tens of African heads of states tion in the African summits and and governments, ministers and forums, but also extended to in- representatives, not to mention clude the contributions in the the miscellaneous ties and rela- various strategic, regional and tions between Egypt and its Afri- international forums with Africa, can arena on the cultural, media, salient of which are: the Africa- and religious levels in a manner EU Summit in Brussels in April that can be called “civilisational 2014, the Africa-US Summit in unity”. Washington in August 2014, the India-Africa Summit in October According to this vision for the 2015, the Forum on China-Africa international relations, Egypt’s Cooperation in December 2015, policy towards Africa is always and the Germany-Africa Summit keen to assert certain historic in 2017. and strategic constants, salient of

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which are: uphoisting the princi- manitarian potentials in Africa, ples of regional cooperation, and whether through sending thou- adopting an Egyptian role in the sands of Egyptian experts to Af- fields of humanitarian and eco- rica or through receiving thou- nomic developments in a manner sands of Africans who are being that the slogan “regional secu- trained in the fields of judicial rity, development and integra- cooperation, Police cooperation, tion” can be regarded as Egypt’s education, medical assistance, message to the African states on and food aid, in addition to offer- the one hand, and Egypt’s meth- ing courses for the African diplo- odology in international forums mats and providing training and on the other hand. cooperation in the media field.

Stemming from this vision, Moreover, through its member- Egypt hosted several key African ship in the African Peace and Se- summits and activities such as: curity Council and the Security the African Conference of the Council and its chairmanship to Three Blocs in 2015 (COMESA, the Committee on Climate SADC, East Africa), the Africa Change, Egypt was keen to adopt Investment Forum in 2016, and the African causes. In this vein, the meeting of the Sahel and Sa- Egypt sought to support the Afri- hara Ministers of Defense in can Peace and Security structure 2016. The role of “The Egyptian and intensified its partnership in Agency for Partnership for De- the UN Peace-keeping mission in velopment” had also been promi- Africa, thus restoring its position nent as an Egyptian- African as one of the top ten contributing mechanism for enhancing the hu- troops in this mission.

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STUDIES & African Perspectives ARTICLES

Elections and Democratic Transformation in Africa

Dr. Ahmad Amal Lecturer of Political Science Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University

Since the 1970s, several politicians regarded the electoral process as one of the major signs of political transformation. Currently, elections are the only accepted means for realizing peaceful trans- formation of power. On the other hand, after the lapse of around four decades since the begin- ning of the third wave of political transformation worldwide, it seems that there is an obscure relation between elections and political transformation. Despite adopting the competitive multiparty elections system, yet realizing tangible results in the democratic transformation is still questionable. It is also noticeable that in various African countries such as Kenya, Cameroon, Mozambique, among others, elections are held just to renew the legitimacy of the ruling party. First: Assessing the Relationship between Elections and Democracy in Africa As regards the African experience in the relationship between elections and democracy, several indicators should be put into consideration; including the acceptance of the political parties to the elections as the only means to trans- fer power to any of the competitive parties. The second indicator measures the impact of such elections on democratic transformation, as it monitors whether the elections had realized peaceful transformation of power or con- tributed to renewing the legitimacy of the ruling party. The third indicator measures the popular acceptance and the confidence of the masses in the electoral process through following the percentage of public participation in the electoral process since the beginning of the political transformation process till present. The fourth indicator measures one of the major characteristics of the democratic elections; sticking to the peaceful na- ture of elections and abandoning violence. 1. Systematic and Regular Elections Some believe that the systematic and regular form of elections will provide the state with further democratic specifications, as elections are the only ac- cepted means for distributing the executive and legislative posts on the vari-

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ous parties. In this respect, the rela- tion to control the political life. In tion between elections and democ- this vein, military coups emerged in racy in Africa can be measured four of the African countries that through a main indicator repre- had previously succeeded in ending sented in the regular run of elections the transitional phase. In two coun- and avoiding any setbacks that tries, the military institutions held might lead to resorting to alternative power, and then handled over power means – definitely non-democratic, after a new transitional phase to a in determining the political office- civil-elected authority. In Guinea, holders. Out of thirty African states upon the death of President Lansana that declared in the 1990s their en- Conte in December 2008, a coup trance in a transitional phase to d’etat had been declared; thus sus- achieve democratic transformation, pending the constitution and prohib- only 17 countries succeeded in run- iting any political activity. In August ning regular and organized elec- 2009, Moussa Dadis, the military tions, while the other 13 countries leader of Guinea, declared that the had suspended the process of run- presidential and parliamentary elec- ning elections either due to civil tions will be held in the first quarter wars or coup d’état. of 2010. Upon an assassination at- In other cases, the suspension of tempt against Camara in December elections was the main reason be- 2009, his vice-president Sekouba hind the eruption of civil wars. In Konate held power and pledged to Cote d’Ivoire two years after the run elections in December 2020. election of Laurent Gbagbo as the Such elections came with Alpha president in 2000, the first civil war Conde as president, while the legis- erupted for five years and led to the lative elections had been postponed disruption of elections that was sup- to 2012. posed to be held in 2005. Upon the 2. Elections and Peaceful Transfer disputes that erupted on the 2010 of Powers: elections results, the second civil war According to the pattern of the erupted between the supporters of transfer of power, elections is the both candidates Laurant Gbagbo main tool for the transformation and Alassane Outtara and ended from an emerging democracy to a with the intervention of the French deep-rooted one that is represented Forces in favor of Outtara. in a peaceful transfer of power Another case of the interruption of among competing parties for at least the electoral process is due to the twice. To see if such pattern had intervention of the military institu- succeeded in Africa, the outcomes of

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the electoral process should be taken serious consequences had resulted into consideration and whether or from such a choice. not did it lead to a peaceful transfer In many cases, such as in Uganda, of power. As mentioned before, the Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Equatorial analysis will be confined on the 17 Guinea, Zambia,, and Ghana, the countries that preserved their elec- reforms introduced by those cling- toral track, finding out that only six ing to power was their pretext for countries had preserved the peaceful running the country during the transfer of power from one party to transitional phase. This explains the another. reason behind the reelection of the Elections in several African coun- parties holding onto power. tries fail to achieve the transfer of In other cases, such as in the power; as out of 11 countries, eight French-speaking countries; Benin, of them had never experienced the Congo Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, peaceful transfer of power through Rwanda, Mali, and the Democratic elections. Congo, managing the transitional Such a phenomenon emphasizes phase was handled to a national con- the fact that in many cases, elections gress representing all political might not lead to a peaceful transfer trends. of power. For example, the begin- Nevertheless, the national congress ning of the democratic transforma- was not an insurance for a peaceful tion phase in Africa that took place transfer of power, as despite being in the 1990s began with an initiative mainly established to include all po- from the Authoritarian elite them- litical powers, the ruling parties had selves, so the participation of the succeeded to make use of such a con- representatives of such elite in the gress to ensure its remaining in negotiations on the method of select- power but under a partisan plurality ing a new authority is taken for system. granted, and an agreement had been As several African countries re- reached over the importance of the frained from excluding the ruling involvement of all parties in the po- parties from the political dialogue litical dialogue of the transitional during the transitional phase, such phase. parties participated in the post- Despite the huge benefit of the transitional elections. In 11 coun- participation of both the previous tries; Angola, Cameroon, Cote and the current elite in the transi- d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial tional phase for ensuring a peaceful Guinea, Gabon, Mozambique, Tan- and smooth transfer of power, yet zania, and Uganda, the ruling par-

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ties participated in and won the post Ethiopia that the ruling parties had -transitional elections and remained been dissolved and their leaders in power till present. While five were ousted from political life. In countries; Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, the Armed Forces arrested the Chad, Guinea, and Mauritius had president and the Transitional Com- witnessed a transformation from the mittee for the Salvation of the Peo- military to a multiparty system. In ple had run the transitional phase. this case, the first multiparty elec- In Ethiopia, the armed conflict be- tions had led to the victory of the tween the opposition fronts and the military ruler but in a civil form, one-ruling party under the leader- deriving his legitimacy from the ship of Mengistu Haile Mariam had electoral process. ended when Haile Mariam escaped The military leaders had nomi- and his party was excluded from nated themselves for presidency political life. within the framework of one of the 3, Voter turnout rates in presiden- new political parties, and had also tial elections succeeded in winning a legislative The voter turnout to participate in majority in all five cases. presidential elections by casting In nine African states; Burundi, their votes is one of the main factors Cape Verde, Congo, Malawi, Niger, on which the success of the elections Sao Tome, Principe, Sera lion, and and the legitimacy of the results de- Zambia, the pre-transitional ruling pend. In this respect, in order to party had failed to win the post- properly assess the electoral process transition elections, thus turning to in a number of countries in the Afri- the opposition bench. can continent, it is important to rec- As regards Benin, its ruling party ognize the disparity in participation did not participate in the legislative rates between different countries, as elections. However, its President well as to monitor the general trend Mathiew Kerekou participated in of these ratios since the resurgence the first multiparty presidential elec- of multi-party system in a large tions in 1991 as an independent, but number of countries in Africa in the lost by 32% of votes. It is also no- nineties of the twentieth century. ticeable that in five of such coun- In this context, some of the politi- tries; Cape Verde, Congo, Malawi, cal science researchers noted that Sao Tome, Principe, and Sera lion, there is a decline in voter turnout the pre-transition ruling party suc- rates in presidential elections, which ceeded to return to power in the fol- reflects the withdrawal of the public lowing elections. Only in Mali and from the effective participation in

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the political life and the lack of con- the elections cautiously putting in fidence in the entire political proc- mind that it may place them in the ess. "black lists" of the authoritarian They, also, depicted a decline in rulers. the rates of voter participation in The second reason is the intense the elections that followed the wave international monitoring and obser- of democratic transformation in the vation of African elections, which early nineties of the twentieth cen- made it difficult for local authorities tury. to falsify the result of the presiden- This confirms the existence of a tial elections. real crisis in Africa concerning the By reviewing voter turnout rates, voter confidence in the importance we could notice a decline in the per- of the electoral process. centage of the rates of participation Despite the clear increase in voter in the last elections compared to that rates, however supporters of the in the elections which were held just long-term institutionalization of a after the democratic transition, in democratic transition refuse to ad- the 17 African countries that have mit this fact asserting that the con- adopted multi-party system since tinuous holding of elections is of 1990. paramount importance in teaching However, the difference between citizens the principles and practices the two percentages varies from one of Democracy. country to another, where it was As for the justification of the de- very clear in some countries such as cline in voter turnout rates in presi- the presidential elections in Guinea- dential elections in Africa, Staffan Bissau, which has witnessed a de- Lindberg - one of the most impor- cline in the presidential elections in tant supporters of the New Mode of 2012 of more than 34% compared to Transition- gave two reasons. that in 1994. Similarly, Gabon wit- The first of these reasons is the nessed a decline in the participation newness of the multi-party system in rate, where it had amounted to 88% Africa, where the voters are not in the elections of 1993 but fell to used to participate in free and fair 34% in 2011. Also, Angola witnessed elections so they feared a reflux a decline in its legislative elections wave of democratic transition and that reached 28.5% compared to the the return of authoritarian prac- legislative elections of 1992. tices. Therefore, voters dealt with

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African countries that have witnessed a decline in the percentage of the rates of participation in the last elections compared to the first elections held just after the democratic transition

Country First multiparty elections Turnout Last elections Turnout after the transition

Seychelles Presidential 1993 86.5% Presidential 2011 85.3% Legislative 1993 Legislative 2011 74.3% Cameroon Presidential 1992 72% Presidential 2011 68.3% DR Congo Presidential 2006 70.5% Presidential 2011 59% Cote d'Ivoire Legislative 1990 42.5% Legislative 2011 36.6% Gabon Presidential 1993 88.1% Presidential 2011 34.3% Guinea- Presidential 1994 89.3% Presidential 2012 55% Bissau Angola Legislative 1992 91.3% Legislative 2012 62.8% Burundi Presidential 1993 97.3% Presidential 2010 77% Cape Verde Presidential 1991 61.4% Presidential 2011 59.9% Central Af- Presidential 1993 68.5% Presidential 2011 61.2% rica Chad Presidential 1996 77.7% Presidential 2011 55.7% Ethiopia 1995 94.1% 2010 93.4% Gabon Presidential 1993 88% Presidential 2009 44.3% Guinea Presidential 1993 78.5% Presidential 2009 67.9% Malawi 1994 80.6% 2009 78.3% Mozambique Presidential 1992 87.9% Presidential 2009 44.6% Uganda Presidential 2006 69.2% Presidential 2011 559.3%

Source: prepared by the researcher violence, where electoral practices have become so violent, thus contradicting with the main role of elections as a (4) The political and security problems mechanism for peaceful rotation of associated with elections power. Among the phenomena hindering the Moreover, the international recogni- new transition mode in the African con- tion of the election results made the tinent is the phenomenon of electoral elections a gateway for foreign interven-

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tion in the affairs of African countries, - The weakness of the opposition parties just as what happened in Kenya elec- in African countries, which failed to tions in 2007 and in Zimbabwe in 2008 gain voter confidence. where the two countries faced interna- - The divisions within opposition parties, tional pressure in order to reach an where the ruling regimes planned to agreement to share power between the ease the pressure which the opposition ruling party and the opposition. In addi- parties may impose by causing such tion, Cote D’Ivoire elections caused an divisions so that they can negotiate internal conflict on the results that lead with some of them and suppress the to French military intervention so as to others. end the fighting. - The inability of opposition parties to In this respect, we can classify African provide the funding necessary for the countries, according to the standard of continuation of their activity. In this electoral violence, into two categories. respect, such opposition parties could The first category include the countries no longer receive funding from their that has continuously witnessed elec- supporters including venture capital- toral violence since the democratic tran- ists and businessmen as the freedom sition, where elections have become they enjoy is closely related to how "seasons of crises", on top of which is much they support the ruling system. Kenya. The second category includes Third: The concluding observations and the countries that have witnessed elec- recommendations toral violence recently although they did Despite all the negatives related with not have any history of such violence electoral practices in Africa that hinder before, on top of which is Senegal. Africa's Democratic Transitions, yet it is Second: the interpretation of the na- important to mention the achievements ture of the relationship between elec- accomplished by African countries in tions and democracy in Africa the field of political elections. Many African countries witnessed In this context, the electoral practices electoral practice interruptions whether became something usual and all parties due to civil wars or unconstitutional involved have become more experi- seizure of power. However, some other enced. Also, African elections have wit- African countries regularly hold elec- nessed progress on more than one level, tions since the early nineties of the last including the following: century, even though they still suffer 1. The development of the mechanisms from fundamental problems based of election monitoring and observa- mainly on the following: tion adopted by both local and inter- - The decline in voter turnout rates. national organizations. This raised - The use of elections as a means to ex- the level of confidence in election re- tend the legitimacy of repressive re- sults. gimes. 2. The significant role played by the - The electoral violence that opens the independent electoral commissions, door to foreign interference. which have become an integral part

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of the electoral process in the African It's worth mentioning that such countries to cast away any doubt of process may take a long period of time, government intervention. but most often the results are guaran- 3. The evolution in media which played teed; especially, if it included the benefit a role in voter education during elec- from educational institutions in its early tion campaigns aiming to make the stages. electorate more aware and able to It is, also, important to protect the make the right decision on Election National Independence so as to secure Day. democratic transition since the elections Despite the great progress made by in some African countries caused for- the African countries in keeping on eign interference in their affairs. holding elections, however the basic And thus, African countries should values of democracy are still far away be more eager to secure the independ- from the political practice in the major- ence of the national decision and to em- ity of these countries. Therefore, if such phasize that elections have been and will elections are not able to secure the devo- always be an internal matter. And per- lution of power, it is necessary to give haps the Arab experience in recent due attention to cultural and cognitive years is a good example for that democ- dimensions of democracy values in these racy cannot be achieved with the lack of countries. national independence.

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STUDIES & African Perspectives ARTICLES

AU and Economic Development: Egypt and the COMESA as a Model

Dr. Zeinab Tawfeeq al-Sayed Elewa Assistant Professor of Economics, Faculty of Econ- omy and Political Sciences, Future University

For Africa, economic development is a necessity in order to face its problems in all walks of life, especially in the economic field. The economic problem in Africa is crystal clear. It is represented in the low growth rates, which, in turn, lead to deterioration in incomes, education and health care, in addition to an aggravation in debts and a decline in industrial production. As a result, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had proposed severe economic reforms known as the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) which had negative results on the African economy. In this vein, the statute of the AU had stressed on the integration and development of the African Continent. Africa and the COMESA: The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) which includes 20 states enjoys relative privileges that constitute positive factors in establishing a strong economic bloc against the other geographical regions. The COMESA lies on an area of around 12.4 km2, representing 41% of Af- rica’s area, with a population of around 467 million; i.e. half the population in Africa. On the geographical level, the COMESA possesses shores that ex- tend from Port Said in Egypt, passing through the Suez Canal, the western coast of the Red Sea and Eden Gulf, the Eastern coast of Africa on the Indian Ocean till Madagascar in the south. Such factors represent strategic privi- leges for the major powers, especially in light of the cold war. According to the 2010 statistics, the COMESA GDP amounted to $ 799 bil- lion, while the total value of its annual imports reached $ 32 billion and its total amount of exports reached $ 82 billion. In 2000, a free trade zone has been established between 11 states including Egypt; thus realizing a notice- able growth rate in the volume of trade among the COMESA countries; in- creasing from $ 3.32 billion in 2008; with Egypt’s share amounting to $ 2.8 billion; thus rendering it one of the biggest commercial gatherings world- wide.

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This reflects the integration strat- to adopt common stances on the in- egy of the AU that aims at building a ternational level, which, in turn, competitive regional economy for should contribute to realizing the improving the standard of living and objectives of the African Economic participating in the Africa Economic Community and to entrenching the Community and the World Econ- concept of the mutual economic in- omy. terests. It also aims at liberating the The COMESA includes Angola, custom cooperation and trade Burundi, Comoros Islands, the De- through establishing a special cus- mocratic Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, toms Union for the member states Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagas- that would eliminate all custom and car, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, non-custom obstacles and unify the Sichel, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, macroeconomic policies so as to Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Libya. In reach an African Common Market 1999, nine of these countries; Egypt, and to facilitate the gradual transfer Sudan, Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia, of currency so as to establish a Zimbabwe, Djibouti, Malawi and Monetary Union by 2025. Madagascar established a free trade However, the COMESA’s share of zone, then Rwanda and Burundi international trade remained limited joined them in 2004. The agreement due to several factors, including the includes a text that commits the sig- gaps among the COMESA Coun- natory states to join one of the Afri- tries as regards the population, the can organizations until they merge area, the GDP and the reliance on to form the economic unity by 2028. the international subsidies. More- The Treaty establishing the CO- over, the COMESA includes land- MESA had defined a number of ob- locked countries, thus complicating jectives in order to enhance eco- the process of commercial exchange. nomic cooperation among the mem- The COMESA countries are also ber states, salient of which are: poor in oil production; only Libya, boosting the wheel of development Angola, Sudan, Egypt with small in all walks of economic activities; amounts, and the Democratic Congo finding an encouraging environment export oil, while the rest are import- for the local and foreign investment ing countries. In this vein, only four and encouraging peace, security and countries, namely, Libya, Angola, stability among the member states Sudan and Zambia had realized a so as to enhance economic develop- trade surplus in 2011 as a result of ment in the region, to strengthen the mineral exports. relations between the COMESA Egypt and the COMESA: states and the rest of the world, and The COMESA member states en-

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joy a unique geographic location, million to Sudan, $ 10 million to neighboring the Arab World and the Kenya, $ 4 million to Djibouti, $ 3 mil- African Horn, especially the Nile lion to Mauritius, and $ 3 million to Basin Countries, thus constituting a Zimbabwe; with a total amount of ex- huge market for the Egyptian prod- ports that reached $ 108 million; ucts. Thereupon, Egypt was keen to around 96% of Egypt’s exports to the foster its relations with the CO- COMESA. In 2001, Egypt’s exports to MESA countries through being one the COMESA reached $ 113 million; of its members in 1991 upon the including $ 45 million to Libya, $ 34 to ratification of Abuja Agreement, Sudan, $ 20 million to Kenya, $ 5 mil- then officially on June 29, 1998. lion to Mauritius and $ 2 million to A. Egypt’s exports to the COMESA Ethiopia, with total amount of exports in comparison with its overall that reached $ 106 million; 94% of exports and the Most Important Egypt’s exports to the COMESA. In Markets: 2002, Egypt’s exports reached $ 113 Egypt’s exports to the COMESA million; including $ 70 million to could be divided into three phases: Libya, $ 35 million to Sudan, $ 15 mil- lion to Kenya, $ 4 million to Ethiopia, 1st phase: 1998-2002 and $ 2 million to Mauritius, with a Total amount of exports to the CO- total amount of exports that reached $ MESA in comparison to Egypt’s to- 126 million; 95% of Egypt’s exports to tal exports ranged between 2.3% to the COMESA. 2.8 %; around 3.3 % of Egypt’s to- Thereupon, it is clear that the largest tal exports during the first year of amount of Egypt’s exports to the CO- Egypt’s accession to the COMESA. MESA goes to certain countries, most Such a period represented one of important of which are Libya, Sudan, Egypt’s first stages of economic re- Kenya, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Djibouti form, the matter which, in turn, had and Zimbabwe, while the other coun- affected the amount of its exports to tries only receive small amounts of the COMESA, as during such pe- Egypt’s exports. riod, Egypt was laying the founda- 2nd Phase: 2003-2007 tions of penetrating the World mar- During this period, Egypt’s exports kets, including the COMESA. started to boom, with a total amount of $ Egypt’s exports during this period 6.2 billion in 2003 and kept rising to reach ranged between $ 3.2 billion and $ $ 16.2 billion in 2007; around fourfold of Egypt’s exports in the first phase. 4.7 billion. Concomitantly, Egypt’s exports to the In 2000, Egypt’s exports to the COMESA increased from $ 236 million in COMESA reached $ 113 million, 2003, to $ 535 million in 2007; around five- including $ 62 million to Libya, $ 26 fold of Egypt’s exports to the COMESA.

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3rd Phase: 2008-2012 ports to the COMESA. This phase represents a leap in B. Egypt’s imports from the CO- Egypt’s exports, especially with the MESA in comparison with Egypt’s COMESA. In this vein, total amount total imports and the major mar- of Egypt’s exports ranged from $ kets: 24.2 billion to $ 32.6 billion, while 1st Phase: 1998-2002 Egypt’s exports to the COMESA During the first phase of joining ranged from $ 1.6 billion to $ 2.6 the COMESA, Egypt’s imports from billion, thus showing a significant the COMESA in comparison to progress in this phase, taking into Egypt’s total imports ranged be- account that the minimum amount tween 1.2% to 2.7%; around $ 2.5 of exports to the COMESA was dur- million in 1998, including $ 1 million ing 2011; the year of the revolution from Libya, $ 15 million from Su- in Egypt and in other African coun- dan, $ 64 million from Kenya, $ 22 tries, with its accompanying politi- million from Malawi and $ 22 mil- cal, economic and security turmoil lion from Ethiopia; with a total that affected the export sector in amount of imports that reached $ particular. According to the CAP- 124 million; around 99% of Egypt’s MAS statistics, Egypt’s major mar- total imports from the COMESA. kets at the COMESA during this In 1999, total amount of Egypt’s phase can be summed up as follows: imports from the COMESA reached During 2008, total value of exports $ 197 million including $ 79 million to the COMESA reached $ 1.642 from Kenya, $ 57 million from billion. In 2010, total amount of ex- Libya, $ 37 million from Sudan, $ 14 ports to the COMESA reached $ million from Ethiopia, $ 6 million 2.412 billion. In 2012, amount of ex- from Malawi and $ 3 million from ports reached $ 2.581 billion includ- Zimbabwe; with a total amount of ing $ 1.477 billion to Libya, $ 477 imports from such states that million to Sudan, $ 289 million to reached $ 196 million, representing Kenya, $ 43 million to Uganda, $42 99% of Egypt’s total imports from million to Ethiopia, $ 37 million to the COMESA. Djibouti, $ 31 million to Mauritius, $ 2nd Phase: 2003-2007 26 million to Congo, $ 18 million to Total amount of Egypt’s imports Rwanda, $ 14 million to Burundi, $ from the COMESA in 2003 reached 11 million to Zimbabwe, $ 45 million $ 227 million, including $ 61 million to Zambia and $ 3 million to Ma- from Kenya, $ 37 million from lawi; with total amount of exports to Libya, $ 35 million from Zambia, $ such countries that reached $ 2.513 31 million from Malawi, $ 5 million billion; around 97% of Egypt’s ex- from Zimbabwe, $ 4 million from Zambia, $ 4 million from Djibouti, Volume 13 - Issue 46 - 2017 19

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and $ 3 million from Ethiopia; with from the COMESA. a total amount of imports from such In 2009, Egypt’s imports from the states that ranged between $ 180 COMESA reached $ 709 million, million; 99% of Egypt’s total im- including $ 212 million from Libya, ports from the COMESA. In 2004, $ 208 million from Kenya, $ 195 mil- total amount of Egypt’s imports lion from Zambia, $ 44 million from from the COMESA reached $ 199 Sudan, $ 17 million from Malawi, $ million, including $ 70 million from 16 million from Djibouti, $ 8 million Sudan, $ 44 million from Libya, $ 48 from Ethiopia, $ 5 million from million from Zambia, $ 21 million Uganda, and $ 3 million from from Malawi, $ 10 million from Eri- Rwanda, with a total amount of trea, $ 6 million from Ethiopia, $ 3 around $ 708 million; 100% of million from Zimbabwe and $1 mil- Egypt’s imports from the COMESA. lion from Uganda; with a total The previous illustration reveals a amount of imports from such states fluctuation in Egypt’s imports from that reached $ 194 million; around the COMESA, either from one coun- 97% of Egypt’s total imports from try to another or from a year to an- the COMESA. other. It also shows that the market 3rd Phase: 2008-2012 had expanded during this period to Total percentage of Egypt’s im- include more states; as Kenya and ports from the COMESA in com- Zambia won the biggest shares of parison to Egypt’s total imports Egypt’s imports in the last years. ranged between 1.3% and 2.2%, Challenges Facing Egypt’s Exports showing that, since the emergence of to the COMESA: the COMESA till that date, Egypt’s It is important to illustrate Egypt’s imports from the COMESA re- major exports to the COMESA as mained low. follows: building materials, chemical In 2008, Egypt’s imports from the and pharmaceutical substances, pa- COMESA reached $ 1.147 billion, per, medicine, aluminum, carpet, including $b599 million from Zam- moquette, ceramic, food stuff, furni- bia, $ 261 million from Libya, $ 210 ture, fertilizers, pesticides, rice and million from Kenya, $ 49 million textiles. Egypt’s major imports from from Sudan, $ 14 million from Dji- the COMESA are represented in; bouti, $ 12 million from Ethiopia, tea, coffee, cocoa, lentils, tobacco, and $5 million from Guinea, with a sesame seeds, leather, tanning mate- total amount of imports from such rials, aromatic extracts, livestock states that reached $ 1.150 billion; and copper. around 99% of Egypt’s total imports Major challenges that face Egypt’s

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trade with the COMESA are repre- addition to the high cost and the dis- sented in: challenges facing the tance of the journey. Thereupon, Egyptian product, challenges related most products of a definite expiry to transportation and shipment, date are spoiled unless exported challenges related to the marketing through other foreign shipment and promotion process, challenges companies, which, in turn, have related to the administrative proce- power over the commodities during dures and challenges related to the the shipment period. COMESA markets. This can be il- C. Challenges Related to the Mar- lustrated as follows: keting Process: A. Challenges Related to the Egyp- Such challenges are represented tian Product: in the lack of a marketing strategy This is represented in: deficiencies on the national level which follows a in advertising for the Egyptian strategy that regards both produc- product, the weak existence of the tion and marketing as an integrated Egyptian product in the COMESA system that begins with the produc- exhibitions, the lack of a marketing tion and quality and ends with mar- policy that advertizes for the Egyp- keting, selling and pre-selling ser- tian products in various media vice, the lack of the latest technologi- means, a shortage in the number of cal means to market for the Egyp- companies that meet the interna- tian products, or of a website for the tional standards needed for export- exports, in addition to the low- ing their products, the lack of a pro- efficiency of the Egyptian marketing ductive strategy for the exported companies as regards the sorting, agricultural products due to the in- packaging , packing, and storing, crease of the local consumption and thus compelling the importers to the shortage in the transformative refrain from buying such products. industries that would absorb the D. Challenges Related to the Ad- excess of the consumptive needs; ministrative Procedures: thus leading to a rise in wastage. Egypt’s exports suffer from a B. Challenges Facing Transporta- slowdown in the complexities of the tion and Shipment: administrative procedures, thus Such challenges are due to the leading to a rise in the cost of expor- nonexistence of organized shipping tation. Such complexities are repre- and air navigation lines between sented in the lack of the necessary Egypt and the majority of the CO- data over the COMESA markets as MESA countries, thus leading to a regards the commodities, the mar- difficulty in the shipment process, in kets, the exportation opportunities,

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the competitive prices, the prefer- tems, the absence of branches for the ences of the consumers, and the re- Egyptian banks and of a comprehen- quired specifications, the matter sive insurance system for the ex- which shows that the taken decisions ports, the scarcity of foreign cur- as regards the exportation process rency, the political instability of such are not well studied, not to mention states and the fears from nationali- the fragility of the commercial rep- zations or the likes. resentation body in activating the Addressing the Challenges Facing exports and assisting the exporters, Egyptian Exports to the COMESA: in addition to the multiple bureau- A. Activating the E-Trade Project: cratic constrictions. This would help provide all neces- E. Challenges Related to the CO- sary data for both the exporters and MESA Markets: importers as regards the commodi- Such challenges are represented ties and the signed agreements, in in the weakness of the economic addition to preparing data that in- abilities of several COMESA states, cludes detailed information about and their foreign trade with major the commodities produced in the economic groups, the strong exis- COMESA countries and the produc- tence of the international companies, tive capacities of the E-production in addition to the low incomes, companies, while distributing such which in turn, leads to a weak pur- data on the commercial chambers chasing power. Furthermore, the and the COMESA institutions. similarity of the production struc- B. Benefiting from the Egyptian tures, as several COMESA states Agents in the COMESA Countries: depend on exporting raw materials This should lead to marketing the and importing manufactured goods, products in order to increase the not to mention the deterioration in inter-trade. Agents should link the the terms of trade, the scarcity of trade points on the national level, foreign currency, the rise in the provide information to support the commercial and non-commercial trade policies between Egypt and the risks, and the rising cost of the in- COMESA, establish qualified exhi- surance on the exported products bitions and ITs, and pay due atten- while not covering the hazards fac- tion to organizing visits for business- ing several COMESA markets. men to get acquainted with the Other challenges include, among Egyptian products and industries, others, the fact that most COMESA while, in return, the Egyptian busi- countries lack efficient banking sys- ness associations should help in fos-

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tering mutual cooperation. D. Establishing Organized Maritime C. Financing the Establishment of a Transport Lines to the COMESA Clearing House: Harbors: Exchanging direct banking rela- This should enhance the existing tions, establishing branches for navigational routes to include the Egyptian banks , and increasing the largest number of harbors, and re- number of stores and direct selling operating Egypt Air Lines that had centers, as the nature of such mar- been halted with the COMESA kets needs this kind of centers that states in order to regain its position provide available commodities that in the continent, especially with the would penetrate the markets. landlocked countries.

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STUDIES & African Perspectives ARTICLES

Iranian objectives and interests in the Nile Basin countries

Dr:Mahmoud Diaa al-Din Issa PhD researcher- Faculty of Economics and Political Science-Cairo University

Iran's regional and international vision is based on several pillars. The most important of these pillars which influence political deci- sion-making in Iran are Persian nationalism, interest and sectarian dimension. In this respect, the institutions that contribute to the decision-making of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran are divided into two types. First, official institutions represented in the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the President of the Republic, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Supreme National Security Council, the Islamic Shura Council, the ministries, the executive institutions, the Judiciary and the Armed Forces. Second, the unofficial institutions represented in mosques, educa- tional and publicity institutions, craftsmen associations, workers organiza- tions, the media, the social media, political parties and wings, political fig- ures, non-governmental organizations, universities and academic centers. Although Iran has given due attention to Africa since the sixties of the last century concomitant with the independence of most of the African countries, however the internal problems in the wake of the Islamic revolution in 1979 followed by the war against Iraq in 1980 led to a decline in its role regarding the African arena. This situation has lasted until Mohammad Khatami took office in Iran in 1997, where the Iran-Africa relations have witnessed a quan- tum leap due to his keenness to open to the outside world, including the Afri- can countries taking advantage of the fact that a segment of the peoples of those countries embrace Shiite doctrine. This contributed to the infiltration of Iran culturally, economically and commercially in those countries in addi- tion to the creation of a climate more propitious for his successor "Ahmadinejad". Iran's policy to achieve its objectives and interests in the African continent relies on several axes. In this vein, it mainly focuses on the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin countries, as they are the key of Iranian movement for any future arrangements in the Middle East. This explains the distinguished and growing relations between Iran and most of the countries in the region.

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First: Iran's policy towards the Nile "This principle shall remain eter- Basin countries nally unchangeable." Since the 1979 Iran's foreign policy is too com- Revolution, Iran has been keen on plex to be identified within a certain combining its intellectual and politi- framework. Its dimensions are char- cal discourse within the directed dis- acterized by being ambiguous, course of the state. where the national and pragmatic Internal Determinants: revolution dimensions overlap. 1. Iran is one of the countries that Sometimes, it is a sectarian-based enjoy considerable weight in the policy and other times it changes to region whether in terms of geo- an interest-based policy. Such ambi- graphical area, or the number of guity is reflected on the nature of population, or the levels of devel- Iran's foreign policy towards the opment achieved. Actually, the countries of the Nile Basin. main element of its regional According to its origin and consti- strength is that it is the fourth tution, Iran adopts a Theocratic re- largest oil producer in the world gime, where clerics hold tightly the as well as it ranks the fifth in reins of power in the State. In this terms of proved oil reserves and respect, the Supreme leader is the the second in terms of natural gas highest authority in the state who is reserves. This, certainly, gives granted political and religious sover- Iran great financial capabilities, eignty according to the Iranian Con- which did have an impact on the stitution which states in Article V regional level. that , "During the absence (ghayba) 2. Iran's military power is one the of his holiness, the Lord of the Age, most powerful and experienced May God all mighty hasten his ap- militaries in the region. In this pearance, the sovereignty of the respect, most of the analyses indi- command [of God] and religious cate that the elements of its leadership of the community [of be- strength are related to its irregu- lievers] in the Islamic Republic of lar military capabilities, which Iran is the responsibility of the faqīh Iran uses in supporting some Af- who is just, pious, knowledgeable rican countries with which it has about his era, courageous, and a ca- close relations and interfering in pable and efficient administrator". some of their conflicts that by In Article 12, the Constitution states providing them with arms and that "The official religion of Iran is experts. Islam and the Twelver Ja‘fari school 3. Iran's ancient dream, also known of [shi‘ī] religion." confirming that as the revolutionary tide: The

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concept of exporting the Iranian open new horizons for investment revolution aims to end conflicts; and trade in these countries. This as the main reason for such con- contributed to strengthening the flicts is the absence of religion. economic ties between Iran and Therefore, as long as there are the African countries, the issue of struggles against dictators in any this study. spot on the globe, we are present. 6. Iran's objective to surpass the 4. Relying on the religious dimen- impacts of the long-term isolation sion to apply the Islamic Revolu- imposed upon it by Western tion model in the African conti- countries with respect to is nu- nent as well as the Middle East clear file. In this vein, Iran seeks through the Shiite minorities in to avoid being isolated once more many African countries, which by mobilizing the African sup- represent the main pillars for the port and activate its regional dissemination of the concepts of role; especially in the Nile basin the Islamic revolution. This is in region. Certainly, this precludes addition to the establishment of the American-Israeli attempts to communication channels linking spoil Iran's relations with the them to Tehran in order to accel- countries of the region. erate the implementation of 7. Adopting counter ideology to face Iran's plans that aim to expand and compete against the ideolo- the deployment of the revolution- gies of the Great powers. In this ary thought, which is regarded as context, Iran relies on raising re- the most important means of ligious slogans in the political penetration in the Islamic world. arena to gain enough public sup- 5. Strengthening economic interests port and thus legitimacy to pre- where the Nile Basin countries vent the penetration of the inter- hold large reserves of natural national of powers in the region raw materials and they, also, ex- and to get rid of the Zionist and port some metallurgical materials capitalist thought. To achieve this as well as crops to the Iranian objective, Iran, also, needs to market. Moreover, these coun- eliminate systems that cooperate tries represent, with their demo- with Israel and the United States graphic weight (about 460 million of America as well as their allies people) and vast area (9,025,744 in the region. Besides, Iran has to km2) a huge market for the Ira- support new systems that are nian products. In this context, loyal to the Iranian model and Iran has always been keen to ideology so as to end the phe-

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nomenon power politics sup- security environment through alli- ported by the west; especially the ance with some Arab parties, be- United States of America. sides the Lebanese, Palestinian and Regional determinants: Shiite factions that are deployed in 1.There is no doubt that the increase the region. of the Iranian role towards the 3.International determinants: achievement its ambitious goals 4.The decline in the strength and during the recent years, particu- effectiveness of the "United Na- larly since the beginning of the tions" after the increase of the in- third millennium, embodies Iran's ternational powers having an up- good investment of the current per hand on the United Nations; variables in order to dealing with especially the United States of crises and problems worldwide. America, in favor of policies that However, Iran has given priority support the reconstruction of the to the Vital area extending from International System. This high- the Arab region to South Asia as it lights the limited the effectiveness is rich in both wealth and power as of the UN Collective Security Sys- well as it is filled with the most tem in providing solutions to the threatening crises to international fateful issues in the region com- peace and security ; namely: ter- pared to its selective policies, rorism and the proliferation of where it issues resolutions that mass destruction weapons. contribute to the aggravation of 2.Iran took advantage of the situation in the region and the the developments in the regional establishment of new rules under systems, which reflect the impact the umbrella of humanitarian in- of the international developments tervention and the fight against on the region that targeted the terrorism disregarding the princi- Arab regime in favor of the estab- ples of national sovereignty as well lishment of a new regional system as the different traditions, religions on the basis of economic and po- and customs of the peoples. This is litical geography more than na- sound clear in the resolutions is- tional considerations. In this vein, sued concerning the Palestinian Iran aimed to make changes in the case, the Lebanese crisis, the situa- balance of power with respect to tion in Sudan and the fight against the influential regimes; namely: terrorism. Saddam in Iraq and the Taliban in 5.The reconstruction of the political Afghanistan in addition to their and economic alliances after aban- allies. It, also, aimed to provide doning the policies of unilateral-

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ism, isolation and boycotting aim-  Sino-African trade rose to around ing to rely on new policies based $ 200 billion. on cooperation and combination of  France seeks to regain its influ- various tools and means in dealing ence in Francophone countries. with crises and issues. This ex-  The French intervention in Mali plains the increasing rivalry be- in 2012. tween the World Great Powers  The International Organization of concerning the regions of influ- La Francophonie (OIF). It was ence, energy production and created in 1970 with the objective wealth; especially strategic materi- of promoting a dialogue to de- als, which are all found in the Afri- velop a political and economic can continent. solidarity between the French- 6.The International consensus on the speaking peoples. First inaugu- expansion of both the geopolitical rated as the Agency for Cultural and the geostrategic fields of the and Technical Co-operation Arab region, including Central (ACTC) and then as Intergovern- Asia and its Neighbors. This is mental Agency of La Francopho- clear in the intense international nie. presence in the Gulf of Aden and  The U.S. Africa Command the Arabian Sea; in addition to the (AFRICOM), which is responsible NATO's engagement in the re- for U.S. military operations and gional security system in the Mid- military relations with 53 African dle East and the Persian Gulf till nations except Egypt aiming to the Horn of Africa. Not to mention separate Egypt from its African the American plans to deploy an surroundings. anti-missile defense system, which  The Third India-Africa Forum include the construction of an um- Summit (IAFS-III) held in New brella extending from the Caspian Delhi, India from 26–30 October Sea along Turkey, the Mediterra- 2015, where the leaders discussed nean, the Red Sea, East Africa and significant aspects of the India- the Arabian Sea to the Persian Africa partnership with the objec- Gulf. tive of enhancing and widening its 7.The current international ap- ambit for mutual benefit. proach towards Africa, which is  The Russian anticipation to regain mainly economic. This is clear as influence in the African continent. follows: It focuses on its relations with the  Sino-African partnership. North African countries; espe-  Sino-African Forum, since 2000. cially Egypt in the wake of the 30

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June Revolution. salient of which are:  The Turkish endeavors to 1- Geographic Raproachment strengthen its presence on the Af- Iran seeks to take advantage of its rican level. In this vein, Turkey location near the Nile Basin and the obtained ''observer status'' in the Arab countries in North Africa in African Union in 2005. it, also, order to realize its national objec- held the Turkish African Summit tives, especially as regards its status in the same. on the Gulf arena (relation between  Israel's deep penetration of the the African Horn and the Arab Gulf African continent; especially the in securing the oil trade routes and Nile basin countries. threatening the Egyptian-Saudi in- 8. The decline in the volume of eco- terests), spreading its religious doc- nomic aid to African countries. trine, not to mention its economic This highlights the pressure im- interests (guaranteeing nearby mar- posed by the international finan- kets for its products, and obtaining cial institutions (the IMF, the its needs of raw materials especially International Bank for Recon- the strategic ones). struction and Development and 2- Conditions in the Nile Basin Donor states) on the ruling re- Countries gimes in order to respond to the - The deteriorating economic condi- requirements of democratic tions in the Nile Basin Countries, transitions and human rights. along with the spread of famine The best example of this is the and draught especially in light of freeze of the US aid to Egypt af- the worldwide rise in prices lead ter Revolution June 30, 2013 AD. to a rise in the foreign debts of such states. Second: Objectives and instruments - The political instability and the of Iranian policy toward the Nile rising African disputes and con- Basin countries flicts in light of several factors The strategy of the Iranian for- (border problems, civil wars eign policy pays due attention to the "Sudan", refugees, economic de- Nile Basin region as regards spread- trioration, draught, ethnic and ing the Iranian doctrine, restoring tribal conflicts "South Sudan") the Iranian status as a superpower provide a suitable climate for in the Middle East in General and penetrating such states and fulfill- the Gulf arena in particular and re- ing the Iranian objectives. alizing the Iranian economic inter- - African countries possess abundant ests, stemming from several tools, amounts of natural wealth, includ-

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ing raw materials, metals and en- Iranian presidents Mohammed ergy sources. Such countries need Khatemi and Ahmedinejad, in addi- help in the process of oil and tion to top Iranian officials had paid wealth prospecting, in addition to several visits to Africa where they their needs of industrial prod- signed several agreements of mutual ucts, not to mention the vast ar- cooperation in economy, trade, en- able lands that are not yet ma- ergy, agricultre and technical fields. nipulated. Iran's foreign policy strategy to- 3- Iran's International Position wards Africa can be summed up as Iran is attempting to benefit from follows: its relation with the Nile Basin 1- Political Objectives Countries for realizing its national - Iran is seeking to break its interna- aims of establishing the Universal tional isolation, secure a political Islamic Society. Iran is also trying to stance that backs Iran's orienta- pose its point of view concerning the tions, attract African support to- regional issues in the international wards its conflicts with the USA forums and organizations on the one and the West concerning its nuclear hand, and securing a political stance program, especially in light of the that supports its orientations and African influence in international attracts an African support against forums (53 states are members in its conflict with the USA and the the UN General Assembly, 3 are West as regards its nuclear program unpermanent members in the Secu- on the other hand. rity Council International Energy 4- Needs of the State’s Growth Agency, Human Rights Council), in This should be done through pro- addition to the convergence of posi- viding Iran's needs of raw materials, tions with some African states especially the strategic ones (Zimbabwe, Sudan, Eritrea), espe- (uranium) that are used in upgrad- cially in light of their similar ten- ing its nuclear programs on one sions with the West. hand and providing vincentt mar- - Iran aims to surround the Arab kets for its products on the other states; especially the African states hand. in the South with pro-regimes that Objectives of the Iranian Moves would help her realize the aspira- in the Nile Basin Countries tions of dominating the Middle East Iran is seeking to develop rela- in general and the Arab Gulf in tions with Africa in General and particular. with the Nile Basin Countries in - Iran is willing to Expand its rela- particular. In this vein, both former tions with pivotal countries through

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discussing new cooperation hori- mutual cooperation with zons with Uganda; being one of the neighboring states as a substitute effective countries in the Nile Basib for the decline in the volume of area (Uganda opened an embassy the western investments due to in Tehran, a mutual cooperation international sanctions, and open- project for establishing agricultural ing markets in such states for the projects in Uganda is under imple- Iranian products. mentation, implementing several - Providing a suitable climate for trade agreements and increasing boosting commercial and move- the Iranian imports of the Ugandan ment cooperation with the Nile tea and coffee beans). Basin countries. -Iran is willing to fulfill a role be- - Activating the cooperation and the yond the national and regional exchange of experiences in oil and frameworks, the matter which con- energy fields. tributes to possessing several tools - Iran is capable of preserving the that help her face the rising inter- prices of oil through maintaining national pressures through build- good relations with the African oil ing several pivots that might affect -rich countries, along with activat- the reformation of the balances of ing the "OPEC" Organization power. which represents the producing, - Iran is willing to entrench its politi- and not the consuming countries. cal influence with the third world - Highlighitng the national image of countries against the West. Iran as a developmental pattern. - Iran propagates for the principles In this vein, Iran refuses the idea of its foreign policy, along with es- of an only one way for develop- tablishing Iranian international ment; that which imitates the relations based on the principles of western pattern. It thus calls the the non-interference in the internal Basin countries to follow its pat- affairs of other countries, the tern in development, asserting equality, mutual respect, and that such countries can benefit eliminiating the causes of tension from the Iranian experience in with other states. various developmental fields. 2- Economic Objectives 3- Ideological Objectives - The Nile Basin area constitutes a - Boosting relations with the Shiite special importance as regards de- sects in east and west Africa in or- veloping the Iranian state, espe- der to serve its goals in disseminat- cially in light of the available ing the Shiite doctrine among the natural resources, establishing African Muslims, along with real-

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izing its political and economic - Enhancing the Iranian existence in objectives in Africa. the Uranium-rich areas (Darfur, - Exporting the Islamic revolution, South Africa, Niger). either through Iranian Islamic Or- - Fostering the Iranian existence in ganizations or cultural centers that the Nile Basin area (enhancing re- propagate for Shiite advertising lations with Ethiopia and Eritrea) materials and recruit citizens, in order to secure its oil trade and while taking advantage of the po- to impose its control over such tentials of the Islamic states and of routes as a kind of pressure the Iranians living in the eastern against the Gulf states and Egypt. African countries to realize its ob- - Securing the Iranian trade routes jectives. to mid and South Africa. - Developing military cooperation - Entrenching the Iranian existence relations with the African states, on land and in sea, especially along especially with the east and South the harbours that pose threat for African states in order to exchange the Israeli interests on the Red Sea experiences and to open markets in times of crises. for the Iranian military products, - Penetrating the Nile Basin security along with searching for loyal re- and regional systems; being a pas- gimes that would not participate in sage and a gate for the major sea any military operations against the lanes overlooking the Arab World. Iranian interests.

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The Reformation of the banking sectors in Africa: By the application on the banking sector in Uganda

Dr. Wesam Ismail Anwar Ismail Lecturer in economics - Cairo University Introduction

Most African countries -including Uganda- have suffered from high inflation, an imbalance in the balance of payments and a defi- cit in the general budgets of these countries since the early seven- ties of the twentieth century as a result of various internal and ex- ternal factors.The internal factors are represented in the economic mismanagement and the political instability that resulted from the civil wars in those countries, which had a negative impact on sav- ing and investment rates in the region. In this respect, Sub-Saharan Africa countries have weak local resources because of the narrow tax base. This made such countries go overboard in the printing of banknotes to fill the budget deficit, which led to excessive in- flation. The external factors are represented in the instability of the international economic order since the early seventies to the mid-eighties. These external factors affected Africa, in general, and The sub-Saharan Africa, in particu- lar. The most important of these factors is the Declaration of the United States of America on August 15, 1971 to suspend the convertibility of the dol- lar into gold; which reduced of the value of the US Dollar. This decision has affected the African nations reducing the value of their reserves as they are in Dollars.As a result, these countries not only bought less goods and prod- ucts but also became unable to meet their needs from imports, especially con- sumer goods.Also, Sub-Saharan Africa faced deficits in the balance of pay- ments due to the two "oil shocks" in the 70s.Then the African countries faced another set of external economic shocks, including the decline in commodity prices in the international markets, the rising in global interest rates and the weakness of foreign direct investment. In addition, the external debt crisis has escalated in many developing countries, especially African countries after 1982; when Mexico stopped repaying its external debt. This forced many countries including the African nations, which have stalled the repayment of its debt, to abide by the stabilization and structural adjustment programmes so as to obtain the help of the International Monetary Fund in negotiating with creditors to re-schedule their debt.

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Therefore, most Sub-Saharan Af- and directives from the mother rican nations adopted market-based countries of such banks in the system aiming to promote economic implementation of their policy. stability. It’s worth mentioning that 4.The banking sectors in Africa, one of the main stabilization and whether public or private, face a structural adjustment programmes number of difficulties including the is the reformation of the financial liquidity problem, which caused the and banking sector, where the bank- inability to meet their obliga- ing sector plays an important role in tions.The main reason behind this enhancing the economic perform- problem is the weakness of the credit ance of any country, as a whole. departments in those banks due to Unfortunately, the banking sec- the lack of banking expertise. tors in Africa are characterized by a 5. The central banks in African number of negative aspects that countries did not enjoy enough would hinder their effective influ- independence to set the appropri- ence on the economic performance ate monetary policy before the of the African nations. For example: application of the banking reform 1. The inefficiency of these sectors. program. Instead it has been con- This is clearly shown in the in- trolled by the African govern- ability of such sectors to mobilize ments, where they adopted direct savings and channel them into instruments of monetary control economically feasible projects. through the administrative deter- 2. High government borrowing mination of the interest rate and from the banking sectors. This setting credit ceilings. This re- caused crowding out the private sulted in the misallocation of re- sector and non-investment of the sources, which in return had an financial resources of these sec- impact on investment and eco- tors according to the banking nomic growth in those African standards. countries. 3. The concentration and weak Based on the above, the African competition of the banking sec- countries implemented banking re- tors in Africa, where a number of form program aiming to promote its foreign banks dominate these sec- banking sectors by increasing their tors. Each of these banks works, ability to mobilize financial re- mainly, for the benefit of its sources and channel them into in- mother country not for the coun- vestments that would to kick-start tries where it exists. This is the economy of these coun- clearly obvious in how these Afri- tries.However, such African coun- can countries take instructions tries faced a quite number of diffi-

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culties and challenges that stood as to the banking laws in addition to an obstacle in the way of economic the improvement of the supervi- development, salient of which are: sion and control systems of the 1. The deterioration of economic Bank of Uganda. conditions in those African coun- 2. Making institutional reforms tries. This prevented the develop- through the restructuring and the ment of the banking sectors prop- privatization of these banks, in- erly and did not improve per cap- cluding the Commercial Bank ita income in those African coun- and the Co-operative Bank of tries causing a decrease in the Uganda. level of savings. 3. Adopting financial liberalization. 2. The wide spread of poverty, un- This includes the liberalization of employment and disease, espe- interest rate, the removal of cially (HIV/AIDS).Also, most of credit trends, and facilitating the the persons who work in those ease of entry and exit into the countries are working in the in- banking sector (including foreign formal economy, which prohibit banks). them the right to get credit from The main objectives of the bank- banks for the lack of guarantees. ing reform program: 3. The lack of Infrastructure In Af- 1. Strengthening the Techniques of rican countries. This hinders the Monetary Control and applying expansion of a network of bank the precautionary principle to branches in rural areas and thus hedge banking risks before they the ability of Africans citizens to occur as well as to ensure the sta- get bank services. bility and integrity of the finan- Procedures of the application of cial sector in general and the the Ugandan banking reform pro- banking sector in particular. gram during the period from 1992 to 2. Restructuring the weak banks in 2001 order to boost the ability of the The banking reform program in banking sector to mobilize as well Uganda began in 1992, within the as to allocate financial resources. framework of stabilization and 3. Increasing competition in the structural adjustment programmes banking sector, improving finan- supported by the International cial services, and providing a va- Monetary Fund and the World riety of financial instruments. Bank. The programmeis based on 4. Developing the infrastructure of three main axes; which are: the banking market. 1. Strengthening regulatory and le- Financial and banking guidance : gal frameworks through the pro- 1. The Bank of Uganda issued finan- posal of legislative amendments cial guidelines for the protection

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of customers in 2011.These guide- period from 2001 to 2015 lines aim to promote fair and eq- It is clear from Table (1) that the uitable financial services by set- index of M2 money supply vs. GDP ting standards for financial ser- has increased in most years com- vice providers in dealing with pared to 2000, where it has reached customers, increasing transpar- its highest level during the first ency to encourage customers to phase of the Ugandan banking sec- request financial and banking tor reforms. As for the percentage of services on one hand and to boost the directed credit to the private sec- confidence in the financial ser- tor, it is clear that it has improved in vices sector on the other. They, the second phase compared to the also, aim to provide effective first phase of the reform. This is mechanisms for dealing with cus- clearly obvious in the rise in the per- tomers' complaints regarding the centage of each of the Domestic provision of financial products credit to private sector (% of GDP), and banking services. and the Domestic credit to private 2. Promulgating the Financial Insti- sector (% of GDP) compared to the tutions Act 2016, which repre- year 2000. Even though, this per- sents an amendment of the Fi- centage is still low and does not cope nancial Institutions Act with the new monetary policy, which 2004.According to this law the aims to encourage the private sector establishment of Islamic banks in to lead economic activity in Uganda. Uganda, is allowed. And thus, it is clear that the per- 3. Reforming the Deposit Insurance formance of the Ugandan banking Fund (DIF) to boost customer's sector has become more profound confidence in the sector. after the privatization of Uganda Evaluation of the Ugandan bank- Commercial Bank in 2001. ing sector performance during the

Table (1) The index of M2 money supply vs. GDP in Uganda, during the period (2001- 2015)

Year/Index 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 M2/GDP 16.1 19 17.2 19.9 23.6 22.9 20.4 22.3 22.9 Domestic credit to 7.1 7.9 8.1 10.1 13.9 3.3 13.7 14.4 15.2 private sector (% of GDP) Domestic credit to 6.6 7.7 7.6 10 13.8 13.3 13.6 14.3 15.2 private sector by banks (% of GDP)

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In conclusion, the study high- 2. Directing more credit to the pri- lighted that, although the perform- vate sector so as to boost the ance of the banking sector relatively Ugandan economy. This would improved after the application of the not be achieved except through banking reform program in 1992, the presence of efficient credit however more effort needs to be departments within the Ugandan paid in order to increase its capacity banks that are strong enough to to mobilize and allocate savings in study the creditworthiness of loan an efficient way. This could be applicants, upon which such achieved by the following: money will be directed to the eco- 1. Providing financial instruments nomic activities that would bene- that suit all segments of Ugandan fit the Ugandan economy, as a society, and thus increasing the whole. funds available for lending.

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STUDIES & African Perspectives ARTICLES

Presidential Elections in Gambia

Dr:Bassem Rizk Adly Political Science Lecturer- Cairo University

In December 2016, voters had casted their ballots in the presiden- tial elections between President Yahia Jammeh and other candi- dates. Yahia Jammeh has been the President of Gambia since 1994. Lately, his relationship has soured with western powers such as Britain and the USA. Thereupon, he tried to compensate such rela- tions with other countries such as Turkey, Brazil, China and some Gulf states. Jammeh tried to adopt certain methods to remain in power, however, due to the internal tense conditions in his country, he was forced to run competitive presidential elections; the elec- tions that contradicted his hopes and became the main reason be- hind the escalation of tension in his country. Such elections can be analyzed as follows: First: Gambia Pre-Elections Yahia Jammeh took office in 1994 upon a military coup over Dawda Jawara who has been the president since 1965. Jammeh remained in power through 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections. Many believed that his terms of office were filled with suppression to his opponents, restrictions on the free- dom of press, and serious human rights violations. In 2011, he declared that he is capable of remaining in office for hundreds of years. The electoral system in Gambia relies on the plurality system that elects the president for a five-year term. The president tops both the state and the government. The Independent Electoral Commission which runs the elec- tions had previously received records from three political organizations rep- resenting the three presidential candidates. The first organization was the Gambian Democratic Congress which nominated Mamma Kandeh who was born in 1965. Kandeh was a member in the Pan-African Parliament. His can- didacy papers were accepted on November 7, 2016. Kandeh, with other for- mer prominent members of the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Con- struction had established the Gambia Democratic Congress in 2016. The Congress has entered into negotiations to join "Coalition 2016", but Kandeh had reservations over the orientations of some members of the coalition and was not pleased with his post, so he did not join such a Coalition. Thereupon,

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anti-Jammeh coalitions believe that Sheriff Dibba ranked the fourth, the Gambia Democratic Congress with 3.77% of the votes. However, had mainly aimed at dividing the the party did not obtain any seats opposition in favor of Yahia Jam- in the National Association elec- meh. tions, January 2002. The second candidate "Adama Bar- 6- The People's Progress Party, the row" is the candidate of "Coalition party of President Dawda Jawara 2016" which is sometimes known as who took office in 1964 and re- Gambia Coalition 2016 that is mained in power till the coup of formed of 7 political parties: Yahia Jammeh. Jawara was pro- 1- The United Democratic Party un- hibited from political action till der the Chairmanship of Adama 1977. He was also a member of the Barrow. National Alliance for Democracy 2- People's Democratic Organization and development in 2005. for Independence and Socialism, 7- Gambia's Party for Democracy whose candidate had only re- and Progress, headed by Henry ceived 3% of the votes in 2011 Gomez who lives in Germany. He presidential elections and gained 3 was willing to run for presidency seats out of 48 in the "National in 2006, but his candidacy had Association" elections, 2007. been rejected. 3- The National Reconciliation Party The third candidate in the elections of Hamata Bah who ranked the was Yahia Jammeh, the candidate of third in the 2001 presidential elec- "The Alliance for Patriotic Reorien- tions; with 7.8 % of the total tation and Reconstruction (APRC)". amount of votes. Leaders of 1994 coup had formed 4- The Gambia Moral Congress was this alliance which nominated Jam- established by Mai Fatty in 2009. meh in 1996 elections and backed This party raises the slogans of him to win 2001 elections by 52.8%. the popular power of human Such an alliance won 45 seats in the rights and economic justice. National Assembly in January 2002 5- The National Convention Party, elections. Jammeh had also won the main opposition party in 2006 elections by 67.3% and the alli- Gambia during the period 1975- ance won 4 seats in 2007 elections. 1994. Thereupon, it was banned Jammeh was reelected in 2011 by from taking any political action 72% and the Alliance won 43 out of since Yahia Jammeh's coup in 48 in March 2012 elections. Later, 1994; to re-enter the presidential the Alliance had also tried to win the elections in 2001. Its candidate majority of seats in December, 2016

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elections but failed, especially with thus guaranteeing judicial independ- the effots of "2016 Alliance" that ence. aimed at joining the forces of the He further asserted that " we opposition to back Adama Barrow. should put aside all the partisan, Electoral campaigns extended for tribal, religious differences, in addi- two weeks, during which several tion to all other kinds of differences" conferences and activities, weather in order to "unify a divided nation" in favor of Yahia Jammeh or other aiming at "encouraging and foster- candidates had been held. Yet, the ing democracy, rule of law, rational government was using its tools and governance and respecting the hu- controlled the media to affect the man rights for all the people." results of the elections. During such campaigns, Jammeh asserted that Second: Results of the Gambian "No protests shall be permitted after Presidential Elections elections; we are a state that does On December 2, 2016, Yahia Jam- not allow demonstrations". Further- meh announced his defeat in the more, various mobile applications elections, even before the results that allow social communications were officially declared, and even had been banned; internet and all congratulated Adama Barrow say- international calls had been cut off ing, "You have been elected as the during certain days. Furthermore, President of Gambia, I wish you all international observers from the AU luck." he also added "I do not have and the ECOWAS had been prohib- any grudges." He even suggested ited from monitoring the elections. organizing a meeting with Barrow to Adama Barrow had mainly relied discuss the means of the transfer of in his electoral campaign on high- power. He also appeared on the State lighting the points of weakness of Television declaring that he will help Jammeh's term of office, describing Barrow and work with him for a his as a "non-human dictator", and peaceful transfer of power; a sur- asserting that in case he won the prise for many, as everyone expected elections, he will return his country him doing his best to remain in to the Commonwealth and to the power. juridical scope of the International Upon declaring the results on De- Criminal Court. He also promised to cember 2, 2016, the Independent establish a new system allowing the Elections Committee presented a president to nominate himself for report declaring an amendment in only two presidential terms, and to the results of the elections due to sta- amend the Judicial Authority Law, tistical faults. On December 5, the

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final results were declared announc- Fourth: Regional and International ing the victory of Adama Barrow. Stances against Jammeh’s Attitude Regional and international or- Third: Jammeh Rejects the Presi- ganizations and governments had dential Results condemned Jammeh's stance against On December 9, 2016, Yahia Jam- the elections results. The AU re- meh appeared on the State TV an- garded this action as "Null and nouncing “I decided to reject the Void". The Senegal called for an elections results" due to "serious emergency session of the Security and acceptable abnormalities which Council, who unanimously adopted have reportedly transpired during a resolution on the inevitability of a the electoral process", and called for peaceful transfer of power. The running new elections "which will ECOWAS Chairperson (President of be officiated by a God-fearing and Liberia) tried to propose a negotia- independent electoral commission". ble solution on December 10, 2016, According to analysts, his defiant but his Plane was not permitted to announcement came after the Chair enter the Gambian atmosphere. of the country's new ruling coalition Later, a delegation of four African said that Jammeh would be prose- presidents, including the president of cuted for his crimes within a year of Liberia (the then Chairperson of the handing over the reigns of govern- ECOWAS), president of Nigeria, ment. former president of Ghana, and The Gambian military forces had President of Sera lion, had all visited been seen in the streets and across Gambia on December 13 to convince the Capital, Banjul. Jammeh asked Jammeh to hand over power. the Supreme Court to reconsider the Moreover, the AU had set another elections results. Such a court was delegation under the presidency of not functioning since May 2015 Idriss Deby, the President of Chad upon the dismissal of a number of and the then President of the AU. judges from their posts and at least Furthermore, Federica Mog- four judges were needed to recon- herine, the High Representative of sider the elections results. In this the European Union of Foreign Af- respect, Jammeh was the one who fairs and Security Policy, declared had previously tried to influence the that the AU asks Jammeh to respect sentences of this court. Thereupon; the results of the elections, while he detained a judge and dismissed Samantha Power, the US Ambassa- another for acquitting someone dor to the UN, described this stance against Jammeh's desire. as "a very critical moment."

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Upon the failure of the delegations Court set the date of January 10, to convince Jammeh to hand over 2017 to consider the appeal submit- power, the UN declared that in case ted from Jammeh's coalition; the that Jammeh insisted to remain in matter which compelled the power he will face severe punish- ECOWAS to announce that Special ments. Mohamed Ben Chambas, the Forces will be sent to Gambia if UN Representative of West Africa Jammeh did not hand over power at and Cote D'ivoir had also confirmed the end of his term and that such that Jammeh will not be permitted forces will be under the command of to remain in power after January 19, the Senegal. Jammeh criticized such 2017, saying that a military inter- stance, regarding it as a kind of vention might take place to force threat that contradicts the principle Jammeh to leave power. Ban Ki of the non-intervention in the inter- Moon, the UN Secretary General nal affairs of the member states and regarded that refusing the elections as a disrespect to the Gambian con- results is a disrespect to the will of stitution, asserting his readiness to the Gambian people. defend his country against any ex- The ECOWAS had also called ternal aggression. Barrow to complete the Oath Cere- mony in order to respect the will of Fifth: ECOWAS Intervention and the Gambian people, asserting that Jammeh Leaving Power it will undertake all necessary steps The ECOWAS had maintained its to save the elections results. stance against Jammeh by sending Despite all such pressure on Jam- its forces on January 19, 2017 to the meh, he asserted that he will only Gambian Capital Banjul. Upon such leave power when the Supreme pressure, Jammeh accepted to leave Court adjudicates the validity of the power in return for leaving the elections results, criticizing the country to be exiled to the Equato- stances of the international organi- rial Guinea. Adama Barrow came to zations against him. power, he reversed Jammeh's deci- Thereupon, he selected six new sions; an evidence of the power and judges to complete the formation of strength of the regional organiza- the Supreme Court; five from Nige- tions inside Africa. ria and one from Sera lion. The

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