ENGOS AND ENVIRONMENTAL BARGAINS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREST CONFLICTS IN TASMANIA AND BRITISH COLUMBIA

by

Julia Affolderbach Diplom, University of Cologne, 2003

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Department of Geography

© Julia Affolderbach 2008

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Fall 2008

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author. APPROVAL

Name: Julia Affolderbach Degree: Doctor·of Philosophy Title of Thesis: ENGOs and Environmental Bargains: A Comparative Analysis of Forest Conflicts in Tasmania and British Columbia

Examining Committee: Chair: Dr. Nick Blomley, Professor of Geography

Dr. Roger Hayter, Senior Supervisor Professor of Geography, Simon Fraser University

Dr. Trevor Barnes, Supervisor Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia

Dr. Alex Clapp, Supervisor Associate Professor of Geography, Simon Fraser University

Dr. Christian Schulz, Supervisor Professor of European Sustainable Development and Analysis, University of Luxembourg

Dr. Peter Hall, Internal Examiner Assistant Professor of Urban Studies, Simon Fraser University

Dr. Greg Halseth, External Examiner Professor of Geography, University of Northern British Columbia

Date Defended/Approved:

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Last revision: Summer 2007 ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and their roles in forest conflicts in Tasmania, Australia, and British Columbia (BC), Canada. ENGOs challenge vested economic interests in order to give greater priority to environmental values. These challenges are often highly conflictual especially with regard to resource use. ENGOs use conflicts and more cooperative forms of behaviour to create environmental bargains with other institutions, notably business, government, labour, and Aboriginal peoples, to achieve their goals. This thesis compares and contrasts environmental bargaining in the forest economies of Tasmania and Be. Conceptually, the thesis elaborates on the theme of environmental bargaining from an institutional perspective that identifies ENGOs as central actors. Environmental bargaining is context sensitive and features the integration of multiple perspectives, dimensions, and voices. Processes and outcomes are interpreted along two dimensions, distribution of power between actors and forms of decision-making ranging from non-participatory to participatory forms.

Empirically, the thesis draws upon interviews with over 80 representatives of ENGOs, companies, governmental agencies, and other NGOs in Tasmania and Be. In both places, environmental bargaining was characterized by high levels of conflict and played out on multiple spatial levels led by increasingly global ENGOs. While ENGOs in BC increased their bargaining power through international markets campaigns, Tasmanian environmental groups used national and international support to strengthen their power base. In BC environmental bargaining became more consensual and participatory over time leading to considerable changes in management practices and conservation but also changes in underlying values and perspectives. In Tasmania bargaining was dominated by non­ participatory forms of decision-making that did not reduce conflict potential even though the remapping of Tasmania's forests from industrial uses to protected area status has been relatively greater. In general, ENGOs are important in restructuring and remapping resource peripheries from economic to environmental imperatives as reflected in the bargaining outcomes. Moreover, environmental bargaining is contingent on place and a

iii closer look at the cultural, economic, and political characteristics of the two regions offers explanations as to why environmental bargaining and outcomes differ.

Keywords: Forest conflict; environmental bargaining; remapping; environmental economic geography; Tasmania; British Columbia

Subject Terms: Forests and forestry -- British Columbia; Forests and forestry - Tasmania; Economic development -- Environmental aspects; Forest conservation -- Political aspects

iv Fiir Beate und Martin

In Dankbarkeit fur all das was ich von Euch lemen durfte und fUr Eure uneingeschrankte Untersriitzung, Ermutigungen und Liebe wahrend der letzten funfJahre.

For Beate and Martin

Without your support, encouragement and love this work would not have been possible.

v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many people for their support of this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to sincerely thank my senior supervisor Dr. Roger Hayter for his guidance, encouragement, and support as well as my supervisors Dr. Trevor Barnes, Dr. Alex Clapp, and Dr. Christian Schulz for their critical feedback and suggestions throughout the process of my thesis. I am also grateful to Dr. Greg Halseth, Dr. Peter Hall, Dr. Ben Bradshaw for their time and valuable comments. A big thank you goes to the staff at the Geography Department for their help and advice, particularly to Marcia Crease and Hilary Jones. Cyrille Medard de Chardon helped with the maps included in the thesis.

This work is based on the information collected in hours and hours of interviews and meetings with people from Tasmania and British Columbia who were willing to take the time to meet up, share their perspectives and knowledge with me, and show me around. I am particularly grateful to Frank Strie and his family, Gwenda Sheridan, Geraldine de Burgh Day and her family, and Barry Chipman for their hospitality and help. I would also like to thank my travel mates Richard Hoerner and Musty for their company during my fIrst visit to Tasmania. The fIeld work would not have been possible without the generous fl11ancial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

A big thank you goes to my fellow graduate students from the Geography Department, my friends, and family for their encouragement, support, and help including endless hours of babysitting. In particular, I would like to thank my parents Beate and Martin Affolderbach, Rini Sumartojo, Tomasz Majek, Cristina Temenos, Julia Mackenzie, Sarah Paynter, Dr. Mike Gismondi, and Pascale de Rotrou. Finally, thanks to Cyrille and Gaelle Medard de Chardon for their patience and love and for reminding me every day that there is much more in life besides writing a thesis.

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ii Abstract iii Dedication v Acknowledgements vi Table of Contents vii List of Figures x List ofTables xi List of Images xii Abbreviations xiii Chapter 1: Introduction 1 1.1 Economic Geography, Environment, and Institutions 4 1.2 Environmental Conflicts 8 1.3 Environmental Bargaining 12 1.4 Research Questions 15 1.5 Research Methods 16 1.5.1 Selection of Case Studies 17 1.5.2 Sources of Information 21 1.5.3 Data Analysis 25 1.6 Outline of Thesis 27 Chapter 2: Remapping Resource Peripheries Through Environmental Bargaining 28 2.1 Environmental Bargaining from an Institutional Perspective 29 2.2 Bargaining 32 2.2.1 Economistic Bargaining Approaches 33 2.2.2 Political and Institutional Bargaining Approaches 34 2.3 The Distinctive Nature of Environmental Bargaining 35 2.3.1 The 'Remappers': Acresavers and Seachangers 38 2.3.2 Environmental Strategies: Modes of Bargaining 42 2.3.3 Remapping Regions 48 2.4 Analyzing Environmental Bargaining 51

vii Chapter 3: At the Periphery - Case Studies from BC's Great Bear Rainforest and the Tasmanian Bush 55 3.1 Resource Regimes 55 3.1.1 British Columbia 56 3.1.2 Tasmania 59 3.2 Rules of the Game 61 3.2.1 British Columbia 62 3.2.2 Tasmania : 65 3.3 Environmental Voices 67 3.3.1 British Columbia 68 3.3.2 Tasmania 73 3.4 The Conflicts 78 Chapter 4: Remapping the Rules ofthe Game - BC's Great Bear Rainforest 80 4.1 Building up Environmental Bargaining Power, 1995-1999 82 4.1.1 Environmental Strategies and Tactics 85 4.1.2 Actors 87 4.2 From Confrontation to Collaboration, 1999-2004 89 4.2.1 Strategies and Tactics 91 4.2.2 How to Make it Happen - Forces behind Collaboration 93 4.2.3 Bargaining Dynamics 97 4.3 Govemment-to-Govemment Negotiations, 2004-2006 101 4.3.1 Environmental Strategies and Tactics 102 4.3.2 Outcomes 103 4.4 Conclusion 110 Chapter 5: Remapping the Rules ofthe Game - Forest Conflicts in Tasmania 112 5.1 A Brief Overview of Forest Conflicts in Tasmania 113 5.2 The Post-RFA Landscape, 1997-2001 116 5.3 Pre-Election Campaigns, 2001-2004 120 5.3.1 From 'Old-Style Campaigning' to 'Fuzzy Feel Good Stuff' 122 5.3.2 Bargaining Dynamics 129 5.4 Post-TFCA - Business as Usual? 2004-2006 134 5.4.1 Outcomes 136 5.4.2 Continuing the Fight 143 5.5 Conclusion 146 Chapter 6: ENGOS and Forest Conflicts in BC and Tasmania - A Comparison 148 6.1 Actors 149 6.2 Strategies 153 6.3 The Regional Context: Legislation and Social Norms 156 6.3.1 Community Structures and Demographic Factors 162 6.3.2 Importance of Place and Space 166 6.4 Outcomes 169 6.5 Conclusion 173

viii Chapter 7: Conclusion 176 7.1 Conceptual Considerations 176 7.2 ENGOs in Tasmania and BC 178 7.3 Directions for Future Research 182 Appendices 184 7.4 Appendix A - Sample Letter 184 7.5 Appendix B - Statement of Consent 185 7.6 Appendix C - Sample Questionnaire 186 7.7 Appendix D - Fieldwork Schedule 188 Reference List 191

ix LIST OF FIGIJRES

Figure 1.1 Environmental bargaining and forest resource regime 14 Figure 1.2 The Great Bear Rainforest. 19 Figure 1.3 Forest resource types in Tasmania based on the Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement 21 Figure 1.4 Number of respondents by sector 24 Figure 2.1 Environmental bargaining qua remapping 36 Figure 2.2 Conflict potential and dispute resolution 43 Figure 2.3 Modes of environmental bargaining 45 Figure 2.4 Actors and strategies over time 53 Figure 2.5 Power and decision-making 53 Figure 4.1 Environmental bargaining in the Great Bear Rainforest 82 Figure 4.2 Actors and strategies - Phase I 84 Figure 4.3 Bargaining power and interest groups - Phase I.. 84 Figure 4.4 Actors and strategies - Phase II 90 Figure 4.5 Bargaining power and interest groups - Phase II 90 Figure 4.6 Bargaining power and interest groups - Phase III 102 Figure 4.7 UK Press ad September 9th, 2005 104 Figure 4.8 Actors and alliances in the Great Bear Rainforest 1995-2006 111 Figure 5.1 Selected forest conflicts in Tasmania 115 Figure 5.2 Actors and strategies in Tasmania - Phase I and 11.. 121 Figure 5.3 Bargaining power and interest groups in Tasmania - Phase I and II 121 Figure 5.4 Actors and strategies in Tasmania - Phase III 135 Figure 5.5 Bargaining power and interest groups in Tasmania - Phase III 136 Figure 5.6 Implicit environmental strategies in Tasmania 147

x LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Interviewed institutions (number of respondents in brackets) 25 Table 1.2 Coding categories 27 Table 2.1 Environmental bargaining strategies/tactics 44 Table 3.1 Selected organizations promoting forest protection and conservation in the Great Bear Rainforest 69 Table 3.2 Provincial land base under Protected Areas Status in BC 71 Table 3.3 Protected land area in Tasmania 75 Table 3.4 Selected ENGOs promoting forest protection and conservation in Tasmania 76 Table 4.1 Time line of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign 81 Table 4.2 Reflections on cultural change of stakeholder groups, selected interview quotes 109 Table 5.1 Time line of the forest conflict in Tasmania 1997-2007 114 Table 5.2 Characteristics of selected forest conflicts on public land in Tasmania 115 Table 5.3 ENGO-industry relations in Tasmania as viewed by industry, selected interview quotes 133 Table 5.4 Overview of the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement.. 137 Table 5.5 Informal changes in Tasmania as seen by respondents, selected interview quotes 142 Table 6.1 Social norms in BC and Tasmania, selected interview quotes 161 Table 6.2 At logger heads - ENGOs vs. industry in Tasmania, selected interview quotes 173

xi LIST OF IMAGES

Image 5.1 Logging coupe in the Arve Loop, southern Tasmania 118 Image 5.2 The road blockade in the Weld Valley. Tripod (left) and Weld Ark (right) are parts of the camp blocking the logging road 0- une 1, 2006) 127 Image 6.1 Logging contractor car with bumper stickers in Deloraine, northwest Tasmania 163

xii ABBREVIATIONS

AAC Annual Allowable Cut

BC British Columbia

CCLRMP Central Coast Land and Resource Management Plan

CFCI Coast Forest Conservation Initiative

CORE Commission on Resources and Environment

EBM Ecosystem-based management

ENGO Environmental non-government organization

FAN Forest Action Network

FFIC Forests and Forest Industry Council of Tasmania

FIAT Forest Industries Association of Tasmania

G2G Government-to-Government

JSP Joint Solutions Project

Interfor International Forest Products Limited

LRMP Land and Resource Management Plan

MOF Ministry of Forests

NCLRMP North Coast Land and Resource Management Plan

NGO Non-governmental organization

RAN Rainforest Action Network

RFA Regional Forest Agreement

RSP Rainforest Solutions Project

xiii SWAG Save the Weld Action Group

TCA Timber Communities Australia

TCFA Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement

TCT Tasmanian Conservation Trust

TNC Tarkine National Coalition

TWS The Wilderness Society

VDP German Paper Association

VDZ German Magazine Publisher Association

WFP Western Forest Products

xiv CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the role of environmental bargaining in contemporary forestry conflicts in British Columbia (BC) and Tasmania from an institutional perspective. Institutions are defIned and classifIed in many different ways and there is no single institutional approach Gessop 2001). This thesis is rooted in the tradition of old, radical, evolutionary or dissenting institutionalism that is associated with Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and others writing at the turn of the 19th century. Veblen's defmition of institutions as 'settled habits of thought' is widely cited, including in economic geography (Barnes and Gertler 1999; Barnes 1999; Hayter 2004), and usefully elaborated in terms of the distinction between the 'rules of the game' (laws, social norms) and the habits (routines, conventions, values) of formal organizations, such as business, and inter-organizational relations. In both BC and Tasmania, forest conflicts in recent decades have centred on attempts to change the rules of the game and organizational routines to remap forest resources from industrial-dominated imperatives. Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have been a vital force in these conflicts. This thesis compares and contrasts the roles of ENGOs to bargain and remap forest resources in BC and Tasmania.

In recent decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in general and ENGOs in particular have grown rapidly as new powerful organizations that seek to influence economy and society by changing the behaviour of other institutions, notably business and government, but also labour and consumers in favour of environmental imperatives (Doyle 2000; Ekins 1992). ENGOs are non-profIt organizations with a distinctive legal character that "strive to protect or promote the natural integrity ('health') of ecosystems or components of ecosystems" (Gardner 1993, 19). They exhibit a diverse range of characteristics, in terms of philosophy, tactics, size, and geographic scale of operations and are now widely present - virtually omnipresent - in debates in support of environmentally appropriate development and land use from the most global to the most local of forums. ENGOs engage in power struggles to achieve enhanced environmental outcomes and (greater) influence in decision-making processes. ENGO interaction with other institutions

1 is often rooted in conflict as ENGOs represent values and engage in tactics antagonistic to existing or 'vested interests', especially but not exclusively the vested interests of business. At the same time ENGOs seek solutions through negotiation and collaboration. From this perspective ENGOs oppose and cooperate with vested interests in 'environmental bargaining' processes that seek to enhance environmental values in society's decision-making forums.

In general, the idea of bargaining features negotiations between two or more individuals, groups or organizations over some specified processes and outcomes in which they have mutual interests that typically both overlap and are rivalrous, or are shared and adversarial. Within economic geography and related disciplines, bargaining has been analyzed, implicitly and explicitly, from different theoretical perspectives and various contexts, for example, between individual consumers and suppliers in open markets, core [ums and their suppliers in relational markets, governments in trade negotiations and the determination of market regulations, and between business and labour regarding employment relations. The nature of bargaining processes and outcomes vary considerably. Thus haggling over prices in open markets is typically voluntary, extremely short in duration, involves a specific good, and the actors then disengage from one another. In contrast, unionized labour-management bargains, especially in the West, are typically highly structured, long in duration, involve conflict in the form of strikes and lock-outs, and agreements have long lasting effects on both parties, including on subsequent bargaining, and there are significant implications for local development. The role of ENGOs in bargaining has been largely ignored in this literature, perhaps because ENGOs are seen as 'non-economic' actors. Yet their activities have profound economic consequences and this thesis argues their role in bargaining requires greater attention. In this regard, environmental bargaining is frequently highly adversarial and shares characteristics with adversariallabour­ management bargaining. However, environmental bargaining is distinctive and differs from labour-management bargaining in various ways, not least because of ENGO tactics, their engagement with multiple other institutions, and because overlapping interests, especially in economic terms, are not clear, and may even not exist. For example, one difference, and significant theme and expression of environmental bargaining, is captured in the idea of 'remapping' resources from industrial to conservation purposes (Clapp 2004; Hayter 2003).

2 With its focus on ENGOs, the thesis contributes to the development of an 'environmental economic geography'. Reference to an environmental economic geography is relatively recent (e.g., 1st International Conference on Environmental Economic Geography 2004; Soyez and Schulz 2008) and Bridge (2008, 76) describes this development as a 'loose grouping' of research activities that "addresses the reciprocal relationships between economic organisation and environmental outcomes." Conceptually, this thesis addresses these reciprocal relations by drawing on work in economic geography that advocates an institutional approach in the tradition of radical institutionalism (Barnes 1999; Hayter 2004; 2008; Hayter et al. 2003; Martin 2000). The environment itself is not an institution. However, implicit and explicit evaluations of the environment are captured by property rights and supporting laws, and by prevailing social attitudes and policies toward nature. Further, environmental values and interests are mainly and most effectively represented by ENGOs. Theoretically, institutional approaches emphasize that the economy is socially and politically embedded or in the older words of Myrdal (1957) that economic behaviour and structures are shaped by non-economic as well as economic factors. An important feature of an institutional approach is that it allows the integration of multi dimensions, multi perspectives, and multiples voices (Martin 1994). ENGOs represent environmental (non-economic) interests and perspectives advocating more appropriate forms of property rights in relation to other institutional voices, such as those of business and government. Environmental bargaining lies at the centre of the relations between ENGOs and other institutions.

The overall objective of this chapter is to introduce and briefly explain the methodology and goals of this thesis. The rust section (Section 1.1) introduces institutional approaches as a conceptual framework to integrate ENGOs as representatives of the environment into economic geography thinking. Section 1.2 discusses environmental conflicts, especially their causes in the context of natural resources and the primary sector, while recognizing the role of ENGOs as powerful, central actors. Section 1.3 introduces the idea of environmental bargaining and its general characteristics in terms of forms, actors, and outcomes. As one goal of environmental bargains, resource remapping is introduced. Section 1.4 presents the research questions followed by an overview over the methods used (Section 1.5) including an explanation of case study selection and brief introduction of the

3 two study areas, as well as details of how and what information was selected and analyzed. The Introduction concludes with an outline of the thesis (Section 1.6).

1.1 Economic Geography, Environment, and Institutions

Until recently environmental issues such as resource degradation and environmental politics have been viewed as 'extra-economic' lying outside or "peripheral to, economic geography's field of vision" (Bridge 2008, 77). Economic geographers in the so-called space­ society tradition have been willing to leave environmental issues to the domain of colleagues working in the nature-society tradition (Hanson 1999) to such an extent that scholars have referred to an environmental blindness within the discipline (Castree 2000; Soyez 2002). Fortunately, economic geographers have begun to integrate the environment more systematically in their thinking, beyond its consideration as a mere locational factor (Angel 2000; Bradshaw 2007; Bridge 2002; Castree 2002; 2003; 2004; Coe et al. 2007; Eden 1996; 1998; Florida 1996; Florida et al. 2001; Gibbs 1996; Gibbs and Healey 1997; Hayter and Soyez 1996; Heidkamp 2008; Soyez 2002) including contributions towards an emerging environmental economic geography (e.g., Gibbs 2006; Hayter 2008; Soyez and Schulz 2008). However, research on environmental organizations is still largely missing from this growing field. Considering the leverage ENGOs ~xert on existing institutions, particularly economic processes and structures, and their remarkable 'Raumwirksamkeit',l it is surprising how little attention economic geographers have paid to ENGOs. Within the literature in economic geography on environmental issues, only few have recognized the importance of environmental organizations in their work (Angel 2000; Bradshaw 2007; Bridge 2002; Bryant 2005; Eden 1996,45-49; Gibbs 2002; O'Riordan 1976,252-255; Ofienbriigge and Sandner 1994) and even fewer have incorporated environmental lobby groups into their research agenda (Barker and Soyez 1994; Clapp 2004; Hayter 2003; Hayter et al. 2003; Hayter and Soyez 1996; Soyez 1996; 1997; 1998; 2000).

Even though interest in environmental issues is growing environmental economic geography is still largely 'fragmented' (Soyez and Schulz 2008). One major challenge economic geographers face when integrating the environment into their research agenda

1 The German term "Raumwirksamkeit" stands for the impact any actors, decisions or activities may have on the existing spatial order or system, for example, the modification and change of places.

4 relates to the meaning of 'environment'. There is no consensus on what should be understood as environment or environmental. Broadly speaking, environment refers to all biophysical elements that are part of ecosystems and environmental change. One important strand of literature associated with the deep ecology movement and inspired by the work of Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson amongst others perceives the environment as something external to human life, a purely natural environment where human beings are absent and do not interfere. According to this literature, humans and their societies are not part of the natural environment.2 Most scholars disagree with this view and argue that it is hard to draw the line between the natural and unnatural (i.e., human) environment and to defIne environment in relation to human beings. Eden (1998,425), for example, rightly refers to the "unbounded character" of the environment.

Many geographic approaches to environment-economy relations perceive humans as internal part of the environment. Thus, Wagner (1960) stresses the interrelatedness of humans and nature and how societies impact their environment in different ways. Further, the absence or removal of humans and their associated impact will not restore lost ecology but rather create a new environment (e.g., Neumann 2002). Similarly, Clapp (2004) points out that nature or wilderness should not be understood as 'empty' of human influence. The 'production of nature' approach put forward by Smith (1984) and elaborated by Castree (2000) emphasizes society's domination and control over nature. It argues that capitalism has changed human-nature relations reaching a stage where the distinction between internal and external, fIrst and second or human and non-human nature has become obsolete as human (capitalistic) activity impacts the environment everywhere depriving it of its 'flrstness' (Smith 1984). In this view the transformation or production of nature is not necessarily a deliberate goal of society but accompanies human activity as mainly integral side effects.

The institutional perspective underlying this thesis recognizes this human influence but emphasizes the mutual reciprocity of humans and nature in environment-economy relations rather than the dominance of one over the other. Humans both change the environment and are changed by their natural environments. Biophysical differences such as resource endowment allow and limit human behaviour and economic development. Despite

2 This division is also reflected in geography as a discipline where 'nature' and 'human/society' have been treated as distinct issues that are not interrelated (Hanson 1999; Whatmore 2002).

5 humans' omnipresence and impact on ecosystems, nature is still distinguished from the human built environment. Even though views differ considerably among individuals, cultures, religions, regions, etc. the environment is still perceived by some as pristine wilderness.

In his sympathetic critique of environmental economic geography, Bridge (2008) acknowledges the difficulties of defining the complex and unbounded character of environment. He suggests environmental economic geographers should combine their efforts to understand "the difference that 'environment' makes to processes we have traditionally considered to be (purely) economic" (Bridge 2008, 78/79, emphasis in original). From this perspective, an understanding of ENGOs is vitally important. ENGOs are powerful institutional voices representing environmental values that need to be given greater priority in economic geography.

An institutional approach to the environment allows a sensitive analysis of its unbounded character allowing multiple perspectives and multiple voices. In recent years, economic geographers have advocated an institutional turn emphasizing its value particularly in respect to regional development (Barnes 1999; Hayter 2004; Martin 2000). Economic geographers have used institutional approaches to analyze the embeddedness of the economy, the importance of evolution, and the role regions playas in Barnes and Hayter's (2005) 'local models' and Storper's (1997; Storper and Salais 1997) 'worlds of production'. Institutional approaches advocated by economic geographers are based on the conception that all economic action is a form of social action and economic activity is socially and institutionally situated. Rooted in the work of Veblen and Commons, 'old institutionalism'3 seeks to account for diversity and interrelatedness of complex problems. Institutionalists argue that understanding the institutional structure will help unravel the underlying forces and processes of change. Economic activity "has to be understood as enmeshed in wider stroctures ojsocial, economic, andpolitical roles, procedures and conventions." (Martin 2000, 79, emphasis in original) Many economic geographers have used institutional concepts such as embeddedness, path-dependency, and evolution in a wide variety of studies and contexts to

3 In the following the terms institutionalism/institutional approaches are used to refer to 'old' institutionalism, approaches aligned with the work of Veblen and Commons that have also been described as, for example, evolutionary economics or dissenting institutionalism. 'Old' institutionalism differs considerably from 'new' institutionalism that embraces neoclassical ideas.

6 analyze the ways in which social structures can promote or hinder economic growth. However this literature is generally biased towards themes covering the secondary sector/manufacturing, clusters, core regions, and business-labour (and government) relations.

In respect to environmental issues institutional approaches help integrate environmental perspectives, dimensions, and voices into economic geography. Human behaviour in general and economic activity in particular are shaped by human-made institutions and their complex interactions (under the influence of environmental factors). Institutions are understood as 'habits of thought' such as norms, rules, or beliefs that are either formal (e.g., organizations, legislature) or informal (e.g., conventions). They represent shared thoughts, norms, values, and/or habits of individuals or groups ofindividuals that are relatively persistent. Institutions are classified in many different ways. In the following, I distinguish between 'rules of the game' (including laws, social norms, codes of conducts) and 'formal organizations' and their relationships. Rules of the game create constraints and opportunities that shape human choice and behaviour. Formal organizations describe different actors, their internal organization and routines as well as inter-organizational relationships that both follow and establish the rules of the game. Organizations hold different degrees of power and can engage in alliances with each other to increase their power and influence. Institutions can't be understood separately as they constantly influence and change each other.

Powerful 'vested interests' represented by business, government, and labour organizations have dominated economic processes and development often without considering community or social interests. Indeed, NGOs exist because of market failure and they seek to replace or modify markets to better serve non-economic interests. ENGOs along with other types of NGOs are civil society institutions that seek to serve social interests not well represented by the dominant market institutions. More than other institutions ENGOs use persuasion and lobbying to increase their influence. Their actions are almost always media-centred and directed at other institutions. They engage in complex relationships with other institutions that are important actors in environmental conflicts notably government and private corporations but also First Nations and organized labour. For example, ENGOs oppose government behaviour, lobby governments to pass

7 regulations, and take on a policing/watchdog role acting as quasi-governments that are often recognized by governments. While ENGOs generally oppose corporate interests, they at the same time have discovered private companies as powerful allies. In respect to organized labour, ENGOs might share some interests but usually have less of a stake in economic gains than workers. ENGOs often try to conflate their views with those of Aboriginal peoples, for example, in organizing joint opposition to large-scale resource exploitation. Together with Aboriginal peoples and other NGOs they challenge existing rules of the game and inter-organizational relationships in order to increase their power and influence. At the same time Aboriginal peoples and ENGO interests are not always compatible but antagonistic. As part of a wider social movement all ENGOs share certain key values and beliefs regarding the environment. However, within the movement, ENGOs vary widely according to their size, focus, beliefs, internal organization, objectives, and how to pursue their goals. Their willingness to bargain and negotiate depends on their position and perspectives but also on the institutional structure they are embedded in (i.e., constraints and opportunities to achieve their goals).

1.2 Environmental Conflicts

Environmental conflicts occur when there are disagreements among two or more actors in respect to how parts of the biophysical world (species, ecosystems, resources) are treated or used. They emerge, for example, where economic and environmental interests clash and more often than not are initiated by environmental organizations that oppose economic behaviour. Environmental conflicts are multifaceted covering many different issues from the protection of endangered species, pollution control, questions of social equity to green consumerism and technology. They are complex and are never solely environmental but also political, socio-cultural, and economic. Geography is important as environmental processes and conflicts are both place-specific and multi-scalar. Environment-economy relations are a product of local situations. Thus, conflicts are contingent on geography, dependent not only on biophysical but also cultural, economic, and political characteristics.

That human society and physical environment are intertwined and cannot be separated becomes even clearer when the causes of conflicts are examined. Environmental

8 conflicts are often caused by human induced environmental degradation. "The term environmental degradation understood as a human-made environmental change having a negative impact on human society expresses rather precisely what we mean by an environmental cause of conflict." (Libiszewski 1992, 4) In general, environmental degradation takes the form of overuse and depletion or pollution. But environmental degradation might not directly lead to conflict. It can produce several causally interrelated social effects that translate into dispute. Similarly, conflicts are triggered by other factors. Homer-Dixon (1991) sees resource/environmental scarcity as the major cause of resource conflicts resulting from an increase in supply, demand, or access inequalities. In this case conflict is initiated by, for example, population growth or changed consumption patterns rather than environmental degradation. Changes in legislation, standard of living, or flow of information influence existing perceptions and attitudes causing 'delayed' conflict formation. Further, Dorcey (1986) points out that conflicts are rooted in differences in knowledge or understanding, differences in values, differences about distribution of benefits and costs, or differences due to personalities/circumstances ofinterested parties.

Environmental conflicts are particularly frequent and severe around natural resources. Resource conflicts emerge around decision-making processes on the use and allocation of natural resources (Mitchell 2002). Hanink (2000, 239) argues that "(n)atural resources economies are unsustainable in both environmental and economic terms because the practice of rent maximization requires that any resource deposit be exploited until it no longer holds any economic reserves." This trend is not only inevitable for exhaustible resources but is frequently true for renewable ones such as fishery and forestry (Clapp 1998). The understanding that resources just serve economic interests collides with other perceptions.

How the physical environment and society interact and whether nature becomes a resource depends on societies' values and demands. "[f]he environment viewed as resources is a function of human wants and abilities." (Zimmermann 1933, 3) "Resources are not, they become." (Hanink 2000, 227) They are continually revaluated through new demands driven by changes in society, politics, economy, and new technologies. "In short, social institutions will serve to determine what natural resources are regarded by society as having value as well as the principles of valuation to be employed in considering the worth

9 of specific resources and in resolving value conflicts relating to the use of these resources." (Young 1982, 8) Natural resources have to be set in context for their evaluation as they are value-laden and a function of socio-cultural, historical, and political circumstances (Young 2000). Young (1982) refers to these factors as 'resource regimes' that serve to order the actions of those interested in the use and management of natural resources. These regimes are defmed by recognized patterns of behaviour around which expectations converge, manifested in established rules (e.g., markets), formal rights (e.g., property rights, use rights or entitlements), or socio-cultural practices and values. Resource regimes consist of a large variety of formal institutions including governments, private companies, and NGOs that reinforce, negotiate, and change these recognized patterns and rules. In other words, resource regimes are developed within specific regions, economic sectors, economic practices, and times that are tied together by well established institutional arrangements. While some institutions are resistant to change, none of them are permanent. For example, rules and norms in respect to resource use change over time driven by different and conflicting ideas concerning the value and role of resources and which values should be treated as the primary - or even only - one. Similarly, individual organizations such as private companies and ENGOs come and go.

Since the industrial revolution economic extraction has been the predominant interest concerning forest resources. Through industrialization of the forest industry the exploitative system has become more and more dominant. Princen and Finger (1994) characterize this neoliberal system as 'short-term decision-making' with a 'grow-at-any-price imperative' accompanied by a tendency for ever more creative means of externalizing costs. However, the diminution of forest stock and supplies has triggered a revaluation of forests. Forests are no longer equated with wood as economic resource alone but are now valued for ecological, socio-cultural, and aesthetic reasons. The once dominant forest industry is facing new, formerly nonexistent or silent, counterveiling powers in the form of ENGOs that fight for the recognition of the non-industrial values of forests. While not all interests are mutually exclusive, economic and environmental interests in particular are typically considered as opposing values (Mol 2003) even though a number of scholars have emphasized the potential of win-win solutions through ecological modernization (Buttel 2000; Gibbs 2000; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000; Murphy 2000).

10 Changes in perception regarding the value and role of resources have grown louder with the rise of modern environmentalism. Today, ENGOs are powerful, central actors in environmental conflicts. They generally understand nature as a mosaic of ecosystems that are destabilized by human activity resulting in environmental degradation and seek to reduce human impact on the environment. ENGOs are part of social movements that grow out of broader societal shifts in values and perceptions. Social movement theories originate in the sociological theory of collective behaviour and collective action that seek to participate, influence, and change existing structures and decision-making processes. But environmental activism, especially cross-border and transnational forms, is not only about existing structures and processes but also about creating and inventing new ones. ENGOs view themselves as implementing a social licence for change as their power base stems from public concerns regarding the existing status quo. They are professional groups that are skilled in turning moral concerns and perceptions ('high-mindedness') into a capacity to act (Bryant 2005). With their attempts to change existing resource regimes ENGOs themselves institutionalize the environment.

The environmental movement is often described as divided between 'technocentrists' (weak sustainability) and 'ecocentrists' (strong sustainability) although many positions exist in between the two (Castree 2000; Gibbs 1996; O'Riordan 1976). While technocentrists have an anthropocentric view that gives priority to human interests and assumes that human activity even improves the environment through continuous development of science and technology, ecocentrists argue that nature has its own raison d'etre and does not exist to serve human needs. The latter assume that the natural order is most delicate and perfect when no human interference exists. The different moralities of the two approaches have important policy implications. Ecocentrism pleads for low-impact, preservation, and demands behaviour and stability based upon ecological principles. Technocentrism assumes that "man is supremely able to understand and control events to suit his purposes" (O'Riordan 1976, 1). Bryant (2005) points out that ENGOs are not necessarily rooted in an anti-capitalist perspective. Rather "the social and environmental issues to which they respond are notably a manifestation of capitalist and allied state practices" (Bryant 2005, 12). Like most dualisms, the distinction between technocentrism and ecocentrism oversimplifies the values and objectives of the environmental movement. The distinction is rather blurred and has become even more so in recent years. In general,

11 the 1970s and 1980s were dominated by environmental objectives that excluded other interests. Since the 1990s the environmental movement has adopted a more reformist objective reflected in objectives and campaigns of organizations like Greenpeace. Some groups have even started to work collaboratively with businesses with the goal to enact deeper transformation in policies of particular companies or sectors.

1.3 Environmental Bargaining

Environmental bargaining is the process through which environmentalists, mainly ENGOs, seek to change existing systems and in particular to actively participate in decision­ making in order to influence outcomes in favour of environmental goals. It often arises where environmental conflicts occur. Environmental bargaining includes all actions and interactions of ENGOs with other institutions such as private corporations, government, organized labour, consumers, and Aboriginal people in order to achieve environmental objectives. Environmental conflicts are part of environmental bargaining. Environmental bargaining takes on confrontational, non-participatory as well as collaborative forms of interactions and does not necessarily seek agreement between actors. While environmental bargaining ultimately seeks to end conflict in favour of the environment, it often fuels and intensifies disputes in the short-term. For example, ENGO-Ied consumer boycotts or blockades are common antagonistic behaviour aimed at other institutions to force change rather than negotiate. Environmental bargaining is characterized by a multiplicity of actors represented by formal organizations that interact in different ways using different strategies that follow but also at the same time change the rules of the game. Forest conflicts, for example, are rarely bilateral struggles between economic and environmental interests. In Tasmania and Be, the debate is both highly political and fiercely contested including multiple voices. Aboriginal groups and local communities have criticized the 'elitist' environmentalism of a largely white urban middle class as they have the large-scale corporate resource extraction dominated by multinational corporations.

Environmental bargaining differs from other forms of bargaining especially business­ labour bargaining. First, in environmental bargaining, non-economic values lie at the centre of conflict. Environmentalists often fight for non-human (selfless) interests although not always exclusively (e.g., NIMBY activism). Second, moral issues are a central part of the

12 debate. ENGOs frequently draw on moral judgements to strengthen their position in policy debates. Third, environmental bargaining involves multiple actors. ENGOs negotiate and fight with multiple other institutions such as First Nations, organized labour, government, and private corporations that represent a diversity of interests. Fourth, environmental bargaining and environmental conflicts are highly localized even more so than union-based labour bargaining. ENGO activity both shapes and is shaped by locality. Bargaining parties are deeply embedded in social structures including a broad spectrum of factors ranging from norms, conventions, beliefs, family and community structure, adherence to ethnic and religious groups, socio-economic indicators to the stability and legitimacy of political institutions, which are all highly place-specific. Fifth, environmental bargaining includes a wide variety of forms of action and interaction different from those of government-labour bargaining as ENGOs use multiple (and new) strategies and tactics. For ENGOs strategies refer to overall long-term plans on how campaigns are to achieve organizational goals and objectives while tactics are the actual activities and ways in which the strategies are executed. For example, ENGOs are often effortless in jumping between different spatial scales and geographic locations when lobbying their cause. Sixth, even though ENGOs are involved in site-specific behaviour they seek to change underlying structures beyond the local scale. ENGOs fight for systemic changes such as general shifts in values or consumption patterns addressing not only business and government among others but the general public. Environmental bargaining often takes the form of controversies that are conducted publicly and need public attention. Finally, one important part of environmental bargaining is changing land use patterns through remapping.

Remapping is one geographical expression of environmental bargaining that describes outcomes and processes in which existing resource rights and allocations are debated, adjusted, and new arrangements are generated emphasizing stakeholder objectives. Institutional interests are recognized and formalized in maps showing boundaries that define rights to access, use, and management. Remapping is about changing existing and creating new boundaries, property rights, and forms of management in favour of environmental (or other marginalized) values in specific places. ENGOs, for example, use different strategies and campaigns to redraw boundaries according to their interests. Boundaries or protected areas as well as policies, laws, and codes of conduct are not permanent and from an environmentalist perspective, "remapping creates a window of opportunity in which the

13 injustices and resource mis-allocations of the past can be redressed, if not fully resolved" (Clapp 2004, 840).

Figure 1.1 Environmental bargaining and forest resource regime

._._--_._...__.. _---_....._-_.__ ..__ .._._-' RESOURCE (FOREST) REGIME : [ (context) I ~ I ~ r INSTlTUTIONS_ RULES OF THE CAME I ,---O-R-C-A-NlZA--T-I-O'-N-S----, (laWl, sodal norms, rules i L(lntemll routines, IDter­ of conduct) i ol'&lnlzadonai reI.ldonl) ""=~~~"i~~~j:T .,.... f20NFL1cr;----- i

Figure 1.1 places environmental bargaining in a broad institutional perspective. Resource regimes are set in context and should be understood as region-specific rules of the game and formal organizations. Traditionally, resource regimes have been dominated by big business, government, and labour unions. They constitute vested interests that are challenged by ENGOs and other institutions leading to a state of conflict. ENGOs initiate environmental bargaining drawing on a wide range of actions, confrontational and collaborative, in order to enhance environmental outcomes. Environmental bargaining will lead to changes in institutions; it eliminates old ones and creates new rules of the game and organizations that defme a new resource regime.

14 1.4 Research Questions Much public attention has focused on conflicts around tropical forests that are depleted rapidly due to contesting Western demands of tropical timber and local demands for farmland and pasture. ENGOs mainly from outside the region have criticized these practices. Boreal and temperate regions of industrialized countries such as Canada, the United States, and Australia, however, are also where forest resources are bitterly contested so much so that they have been titled 'forest battles' or 'war in the woods' (e.g., Hayter 2003). This thesis addresses the role of ENGOs in forest resource conflicts with particular reference to resource peripheries of Tasmania, Australia, and BC, Canada. These remote resource peripheries developed as specialized, export-oriented, and externally controlled industry. Hayter (2003) argues that more than core regions stich resource peripheries are ruled by powerful external (urban and global) forces that defIne and allocate land and resources. At the centre of the conflicts lies the apparent contradiction between the prevalent regime of economic extraction and the imperatives of environmental protection and conservation. Resource conflicts involve multiple interests from various spatial levels that seek to remap resource peripheries according to their interests. In Canada and Australia, conflicts emerge(d) between industry (and within the sector between foreign and local/regional investment as well as different sub-sectors), state regulation, ENGOs, indigenous people, labour forces, and local communities trying to gain power over the forest resources through often long lasting battles. These regions provide excellent contexts in which to understand environment-economy relations in general and environmental bargaining and ENGO behaviour in particular.

Conflicts in these regions are part of much broader trends across the resource sector. Shaped by colonial and later fordist forms of resource exploitation and located peripherally from markets, forest regions typically became highly dependent on cheap unprocessed timber exports. It has been extremely diffIcult for most forest regions, particularly as resource peripheries, to escape this 'staple trap' and to overcome the belief of limitless timber supplies and of their ability to renew themselves. At the same time, Canada and Australia have experienced a change in societal attitudes and values regarding the environment that has led to severe conflicts around resource management and allocation. In both regions, environmental activism together with changes in the market place have put

15 considerable pressure on forest industry and have turned the environmental conflict into a political battle. However, in contrast to forest conflicts in developing countries, Tasmania and BC offer scenarios where conflicts can be analyzed without mherent North-South inequalities and dependences that complicate the already complex character of these conflicts. This thesis draws on forest conflicts on public lands fought out in BC and Tasmania between 1995/1997 and 2006.

The overall objective of this thesis is to understand environmental bargaining in resource peripheries, especially in relation to remapping. The specific objectives are to analyze environmental bargaining in the forest conflicts ofBC and Tasmania. In order to understand environmental conflicts and to formulate recommendations (e.g., for win-win solutions) it is crucial to understand the causal relationships between processes and outcomes. In this thesis environmental bargaining is analyzed by focusing on ENGOs, the strategies they employ, and the institutions that regulate their behaviour. How do ENGOs achieve bargaining power and what strategies and tactics do they use? Do ENGOs reach their goals and bring along the anticipated change? How does environmental bargaining affect the forest industry? Similarly, do regions and their institutions limit or empower ENGOs in their attempts to remap existing structures and if so to what extent? Finally, the analysis of forest conflicts seeks not only to understand processes but also to compare and to formulate recommendations in order to reduce or avoid conflicts as well as fmd solutions for win-win and positive-sum gains. ENGOs are both local and global institutions and their analysis leads to questions of the transferability of processes, conflicts, and solutions among different regions.

1.5 Research Methods This study employs a comparative case study approach and semi-structured qualitative interviews with key actors from ENGOs, industry, government agencies, and other organizations. Interviews with ENGOs outnumber representatives from other groups as ENGOs are identified as central actor and driver of change. But ENGOs are not isolated institutions and in constant exchange with other actors be they industry, government, the public, labour, Aboriginal groups, and others. In order to understand environmental bargaining multiple perspectives, motivations, and rationales of the actors need to be taken into consideration. Environmental conflicts are shaped by real-life contexts. As Tesch

16 (1990, 2) points out, conducting "scientific investigations is not a matter of following recipes. Research does not take place in a neutral environment." Case study methods are valuable in providing a detailed picture of complex evolving relationships while also allowing for detailed contextual analysis. Yin (2003, 11) defmes a case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context" particularly when the phenomenon is embedded and boundaries are blurred. Similiarily, De Vaus (2001) and Stake (1995) stress the importance of contextual analysis in case study research in contrast to focusing on only a number of selected variables. Case studies feature larger numbers of variables often relying on multiple sources of information. Comparative case studies help explore context specific differences, reveal the importance and differences of regions, and help formulate recommendations and predictions.

1.5.1 Selection of Case Studies This study focuses on the relation between ENGO activism, conflict, and conflict resolution in the forestry sector on private lands in Tasmania and BC over the last ten years. BC and Tasmania were chosen because they both gained public prominence through intensive environmental campaigns around the protection of their old-growth temperate rainforests during the last three decades and also still actively engage in environmental bargaining processes. Both regions share a broadly similar immigration history of European settlers during the 19 th century, even though Tasmania, as British penal colony, is somewhat distinct from other British colonies. In more recent times both regions experienced a flow of 'new settlers', people from mainly urban areas on the Australian mainland, the United States, and Europe in search of a life in harmony with nature. Early European settlement led to the suppression of Aboriginal populations and in Tasmania to the deportation of all Aboriginals to Flinders Island.4 Today, Aboriginal groups in both countries are fighting for recognition and self-governance adding cultural voices to the forest debate. Politically, the two regions are characterized by similar democratic and legal traditions such as a Westminster style government. Both areas are part of the same trade networks along the Pacific Rim, dependent on changing demands, mainly from Japan,s the United States, and China. Moreover, BC and Tasmania hold intrinsic importance as contested resource

4 The last full-blood Tasmanian Aboriginal died in 1876 (Robson 1985). 5 The softwood chip export from Be to Japan started in the mid 1960s, the hardwood chip export from Tasmania to Japan in 1972 (Gee 2001).

17 peripheries (Bradshaw 2007; Hayter et al. 2003) featuring unique, place-specific conflicts through their individual histories and cultures that provide the focus to a comparative research approach.

For Be the selected case encompasses the central and north coast, dubbed by environmentalists the Great Bear Rainforest. The Great Bear Rainforest is located along BC's mainland central and north coast covering an area of 6.4 million hectares (see Fig. 1.2). The area encompasses the Mid Coast, North Coast, and Kingcome Timber Supply Areas as well as four Tree Farm Licences and consists largely of Crown land. The area is covered by dense, productive forests dominated by £oniferous trees such as western redcedar and western hemlock and contains some of the largest untouched tracts of temperate rainforest worldwide. The Coastal Western Hemlock biogeoclimatic zone makes up for more than half of the region's vegetation and provides most of the timber harvesting land. The region is an important wildlife habitat for salmon, - more than 20 percent of the world's wild salmon population - bears, wolves, eagles, and numerous other species. It is also home of 20 to 30 communities with First Nations making up about half of the area's population. Archaeological records indicate that humans have inhabited the central and north coast for about 10,000 to 14,000 years but Europeans didn't arrive in BC until 1778. Today, the Great Bear Rainforest region has a population of 35,000 (Riddell 2005) with the majority living in the larger communities of Prince Rupert, Bella Coola, and Bella Bella. The primary sector, with forestry in particular, is the largest contributor to the economy with the forest products industry supporting 5,000 direct jobs. However, private companies operating in the coastal forest often bring in their workforce from outside the region reducing benefits for local communities.6 The region, particularly the central coast, is of major importance to a number of forest companies as they have key strategic holdings of licences and rights to timber in the area which are critical components of their long-term business plans (Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management 2004). Forest operations in the area account for seven percent of the Province's total annual allowable cut (AAC) and 24 percent of the coastal AAC.

6 Along the Central Coast, more than 95 percent of the employment is held by people living outside the region. Unemployment among Aboriginal residents reaches up to 80 percent.

18 Figure 1.2 The Great Bear Rainforest

...... _~._. __ .._-_._.•..\ I I I

+N

.-.--.----.-...•.•....- ... "·'1 C:::] Graal Bear Rainforest British Columbia Bounds

_:::':_=~-:"';':~~="'-­ o 25 ~o 1(.10 150 2'DO ------Kilometens

Source: Modified from 'Tree Farm Licence (fFL), Timber Supply Area (TSA), & Forest Districts Location', BC Ministry of Forests June 2006, used by permission. Cartography: Cyrille Medard de Chardon.

The island ofTasmania is Australia's smallest and most isolated state located southeast of the Australian mainland and separated by Bass Strait averaging 240 km in width. Humans arrived 40,000 years ago but European settlement didn't begin until the early 19th century with the establishment of a penal colony in the southeast of the island. Today, Tasmania has an estimated resident population of around 480,000 of which 15,000 claim Aboriginal status (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006). With a total area of 6.8 million hectares (mainland Tasmania 6.4 million hectares) it equals the size of BC's Great Bear Rainforest. About 49 percent ofTasmania's land mass (3,353,000 ha) is forested which makes it Australia's most forested state (Figure 1.3).7 Native forests make up 94 percent of

7 ,-\t the time of European settlement an estimated 59 percent of the state's area was forested (,-\ustralian Bureau of Statistics 2005). Over the last decade the decline in forest area has been reversed due to a considerable increase in plantation forest albeit at the expense of native forest that according to the Tasmanian Forest Practice .A uthority has decreased by 1.2 percent from 1996 to 2001 (Forest Practices Board Tasmania 2004).

19 the forested area dominated by dry and wet eucalypt forest as well as rainforest. Tasmania's economy traditionally depended heavily on agriculture and resource extracting industries.

The forest industry claims to be one of the largest employers in Tasmania and the conflict has often been publicized stressing the antagonism between job security or development and conservation. The environmental movement, however, identifies forest destruction and management practices as core problem. While exact figures on forestry are not publicly available "as part of the secrecy that surrounds Tasmania's logging industry" (Bonyhady 2004, no page number) about 90 percent of the timber extracted from Tasmania's forests is woodchipped. Tasmania's old forests account for about 70 percent of Australia's woodchips to Japan. Hay (2000, 4) describes the institutional context of Tasmania as follows:

"An economy devoid of dynamism, a persistent cargo-cult mindset that yearns for a single whopper industry that will turn sleepy hollow into a thrumming engine of industry, an elite based upon old pastoral money, an unimaginative, intellectual conformity that has remained constant since the totalitarianism of convictism, a robust and in-your-face indigenous movement, an electoral system that conduces to minority representation, and a magnificent temperate wilderness - these are the contrary ingredients that fashioned, against the odds, Tasmania's extraordinary, volatile politics."

Focusing on public land where conflict is most vivid, four examples have been selected to illustrate differences and effectiveness of environmental campaigns in Tasmania. Campaigns included in this case study contain the Styx Valley, Tarkine Wilderness, Weld Valley, and Blue Tier. Analysis will also touch on the pulp mill proposed by Gunns Ltd. at Bell Bay north of Launceston.

20 Figure 1.3 Forest resource types in Tasmania based on the Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement

<­ ...... , ',' .-..

..-..

------­ -~-- ---I LEGEND I 1 i ! • MIlan Eawt'''' ! 1·'''''''_'''_'-1I i 1._..__,.... i

·­:-:J ...-­.. 1 i

I

Source: 'Tasmania Regional Forest Assessment Forest Resource Types', Commonwealth and Government of Tasmania/RFA, 1996. Used by permission.

1.5.2 Sources of Information Both primary and secondary sources are used. The main primary sources are personal semi-structured, open-ended interviews, formal and informal meetings with numerous respondents in Tasmania, on the Australian mainland, Be, theUnited States, and the Netherlands as well as attendance of conferences and talks. The main secondary sources encompass published and unpublished papers, newspaper articles, graduate theses, books,

21 reports, media releases, fllm/radio pieces and information from websites. The Great Bear Rainforest along BC's central coast has received a lot of attention and detailed research studies, literature, and reports in respect to resource planning and management are available (Barnes and Hayter 1997; Braun 2002; Cashore et al. 2001; Clapp 2004; Cullen 2006; Dempsey 2006; Hayter 2003; Hoberg et al. 2004; Howlett 2001; Marchak et al. 1999; McGee 2006; Mortenson 2005; Sranko 2004). In comparison Tasmania's forest sector has been less researched and more emphasis was put on collecting data on the Tasmanian cases. One challenge regarding data collection in the two case study regions is related to the comparability of gathered information. In order to maximize the comparability of collected information all interviews should be conducted under similar conditions. The ideal of conducting interviews under similar conditions, however, was necessarily modified. In particular, the relationship between researcher and interviewees differed between the two regions in so far as the researcher was affiliated with a BC university and could be seen as 'insider' by respondents from BC but as 'outsider' by the Tasmanian community. However, as all respondents gave remarkably frank responses possible distortion of findings due to the difference in researcher-interviewee relationships is considered to be insignificant. Further, interviews were triangulated and included multiple respondents from the same and from different sectors and organizations.

In a first step to identify potential interviewees a list of institutions actively involved in forestry issues in Tasmania and BC was compiled including ENGOs, industry associations, private and public companies, governmental agencies, political parties, scientists and non-environmental NGOs such as labour unions and Aboriginal groups. Even though the latter playa prominent role in the forest conflict in BC, strong emphasis was placed on environmental organizations, government/political institutions, and industry, as a satisfactory representation of Aboriginal interest would have exceeded the scope of this thesis. Within the identified institutions representatives were selected by rank and responsibilities and contacted via email (see Appendix A for a sample letter). Individuals willing to participate in the research project were sent a statement of consent (Appendix B) and questionnaire (see Appendix C for sample questionnaire) prior to the actual interview. However, in some cases this was not possible as interviews were sometimes scheduled shortly after initial contact or where respondents had only shared their telephone numbers. For organizations that played central roles in bargaining more than one individual was

22 contacted. Further, the snowball technique based on recommendations and suggestions from interviewees helped gather more information and perspectives where needed.

Fieldwork was carried out in two phases. Phase 1 comprised the fieldwork undertaken in Tasmania and the Australian mainland between May 2005 and February 2006. Phase 2 focused on BC where data was collected between July and December 2006 (see Appendix D for fieldwork schedule). Both phases followed announcements of two major forest agreements in the two regions: the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement in Tasmania (May 13, 2005) and the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement (February 7, 2006).

Phase I started in May 2005 in Launceston, Tasmania, where I attended the Timber Communities Australia (TCA) National Forest Conference. The conference together with a three-day field trip organized by TCA provided a good firsthand experience of the forest conflict in Tasmania as well as the opportunity to meet a wide range of stakeholdersH additionally to those contacted prior to arrival in Tasmania. Respondents from government institutions included the (three) major political parties, ministries, and agencies responsible for forestry issues as well as the University ofTasmania. On part of industry, representatives belonged to industry associations as well as private and public corporations (CEOs, directors, and foresters). Additionally, I interviewed representatives of 18 ENGOs (forest campaigners, community campaigners, founding members, and field activists) that were/are running campaigns on Tasmanian forest issues as well as three NGOs (elected spokespersons) representing social or Aboriginal interests. From May 2005 to December 2006, I met with 73 stakeholders and experts and conducted formal, semi-structured interviews with 65 individuals (Fig. 1.4). Interviews took mainly place in Tasmania but also outside the state in Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, and Amsterdam. One interview was conducted on the telephone with a representative based in the United States. All but six interviews were recorded. In addition to the 65 interviews I had eight informal meetings with foresters, scientists, and environmental activists that, in some cases, carried on over a few days including guided field trips and site observations.

8 Including representatives from federal and state governments (both Australia's Premier John Howard and Tasmania's Premier Paul Lennon), private corporations, industry associations, unions as well as scientists and private landowners.

23 Figure 1.4 Number of respondents by sector

70

60 • Respondents TAS 50 • Respondents Be

I- Ql -­ .Q 40 E ::::I 30 Z 20

10

0 GOV NGO IND total Sector

Interviews with stakeholders involved in the Great Bear Rainforest were conducted between July and December 2006. Compared to the Tasmanian experience BC actors were less responsive and available for interviews. Contacted individuals mentioned negative experiences with media, personalization of the conflict, and burnout as reasons for the reduced willingness to participate in research projects. Many also felt 'over-researched' pointing out that they receive requests for interviews frequently and that they had already engaged in numerous studies. Respondents encompassed 17 representatives from nine ENGOs, government, and industry including independent consultants. Thirteen were interviewed in person and four on the telephone. All but one respondent were located in Be.

For this thesis a total of 82 individuals were interviewed. All interviews followed a standard set of questions (see Appendix C). Questions were modified depending on the context and information available and also over time where refmement was needed to better understand the case. Interviewees were guaranteed personal anonymity if they wished so. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours resulting in a total of 62 hours of recorded interview material. Table 1.1 lists the institutions that participated in the research project with the exception of names of private companies and individual activists to protect their identity. Appendix D provides a fieldwork schedule.

24 Table 1.1 Interviewed institutions (number of respondents in brackets)

TASMANIA Environment Industry Government / Aboriginal Australian Conservation Foundation (1) Construction, Forestry, Mining and Australian Labor Party (1) Doctors for Forests (2) Energy Union (1) Department of Infra­ Environmental Defenders Office (1) Forest and Forest Industry Council structure, Energy and Forest Stewardship Council (1) (1 ) Resources (1) Friends of the Blue Tier (2) Forest Industry Association of Forest Practices Board (3) Friends of the Earth International (1) Tasmania (2) Liberal Party ofAustralia Gondwana (1) Forestry Tasmania (3) (1) Greenpeace Aus tralia-Pacific (1) Southern Tasmanian Beekeepers Private Forests Tasmania Huon Valley Environment Centre (2) Association (1) (1) Rainforest Action Network (1) Tasmanian Country Sawmillers' The Tasmanian Greens (2) Reedy Marsh Forest Conservation Federation (1) University of Tasmania (2) Group (2) Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers' Aboriginal Housing Save the South Sister (1) Association (1) Services (1) Save the Weld Action Group (1) Tasmanian Forest Contractors' Tasmanian Aboriginal Tamar River Action Committee (1) Association (1) Land and Sea Council Tarkine National Coalition (3) Timber Communities Australia (2)2) (1) Tasmanian Conservation Trust (1) Tourism Council Tasmania (1) The Wilderness Society (4) Private companies (contractors, Timber Workers for Forests (1)1) saw millers and tourism WWF Australia (1) operators) (6) Individual Activists (4)

BRITISH COLUMBIA Environment Industry Government David Suzuki Foundation (1) Coast Forest Conservation Ministry ofAgriculture and Dogwood Initiative (1) Initiative (1) Land (1) Ecotrust Canada (1) Private companies (2) Ministry of Environment, Forest Ethics (1) Lands and Parks (1) Greenpeace Canada (1) Ministry of Sustainable Rainforest Action Network (1) Resource Management Rainforest Solution Project (3) (1 ) Sierra Club BC Chapter (1) Tides Foundation (1)

I) Timber Workers for Forests is an incorporated body representing the interests or wood workers i.e. they are an industry organization. It has been classified as ENGO here as the majority of actors in Tasmania see Timber Workers for Forests as environmental organization that clearly opposes the status quo. In contrast to the Southern Tasmanian Beekeepers Association that has represented beekeeper interests over 50 years, Timber Workers for Forests was founded with the goal to change forest management practices in Tasmania in favour of environmental interests. 2) Timber Communities Australia describes itself as grassroots community-level organization representing timber community interests. It has been classified under industry as TeA has a pro-timber industry agenda, is mainly industry sponsored, and has a mandate to protect the status quo of timber towns.

1.5.3 Data Analysis All interviews were transcribed verbatim. Where interviews could not be recorded due to the wishes of respondents or unfavourable recording conditions (field visits), detailed

interview notes were taken. Interviews were then coded and analyzed using MAXQDATM. Coding ofinterview passages was structured using aggregated categories that follow the structure of the questionnaire and research questions and are listed in Table 1.2. With the

25 help of the coding categories, the interview material was analyzed by content and respondent groups. Interviewees were grouped into three categories distinguishing between environment, industry, and government (see Tab. 1.1). To allow for clear referencing in the analysis section, each interview has been labelled according to its affiliation in respect to the three categories (ENV, IND, and GOV), case study region (BC and TAS), and numbered in chronological order of interview date (e.g., ENV BC 01 for the fIrst BC environmentalist interviewed or IND TAS 05 for the fIfth respondent representing the Tasmanian industry). Environmental actors were identifIed as institutions that are non-profIt, non-governmental organizations with an environmental mandate that challenges the existing status and institutional regime. The industry group comprises economic institutions, private and public, with vested economic interests (capital and/or labour). Government includes governmental agencies such as ministries, public research institutions as well as political parties. However, it is important to point out that boundaries between the three categories are blurred. Interests and objectives often overlap and not all institutions fIt only one category. Examples are wood workers, beekeepers, and tourism operators who all have vested interests but at the same time question existing practices and norms and call for changes in forest management practices as well as expansion of protected areas. Further, individuals often move from one institution to another crossing boundaries or even wearing multiple hats at a time, for example, scientists employed by government who are openly supporting either ENGOs or industry interests. As mentioned before, Aboriginal groups were not surveyed due to the huge number of bands and clans with varying interests and objectives. A proper representation of Aboriginal voices would exceed the scope of the thesis.

26 Table 1.2 Coding categories

CODE CATEGORY CODE CATEGORY (continued) 100 Personal infonnation 430 ENGO ­ ENGO relations 110 Nationality 440 ENGO ­ Industry relations 120 Education 450 ENGO ­ Government relations 130 Employment 460 Other Actors 140 Motivation 461 Aboriginals 150 Affiliation 462 Labour 160 Responsibilities 463 International 200 Institution 464 Media 210 History 465 Individual actors 220 Organizational structure 466 Community 230 Objectives, philosophies 470 Science (role of) 300 Institutional setting 500 Outcomes 310 Environmental 510 Causes of outcomes 320 Industrial 520 Changes - behavioural 330 Political 521 Internal (IND, GOV, ENGOs) 340 Socio-cultural 522 External (relations) 350 Comparison BC-Tasmania 530 Changes ­ on the ground 400 Processes - bargaining 540 Solutions 410 Conflict / causes of conflict 550 Furure Outlook 420 Campaigns / strategies

1.6 Outline of Thesis The thesis follows in three thematic parts: conceptual framework (Chapter 2), introduction to the selected case studies (Chapter 3), and empirical analysis (Chapter 4 to 6). Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical concepts that guide the research. In order to elaborate the meaning of environmental bargaining, I draw on institutional approaches and their contributions to economic geography as well as social movements theories. The concept of environmental bargaining is introduced as environmental attempt to 'remap' resource peripheries. Environmental bargaining differs from other forms of bargaining or conflict resolution by its actors, modes of bargaining (strategies and tactics), and the importance of regions. Chapter 3 introduces the regional context in Tasmania and BC touching on the regions' history, political, socio-cultural, and economic structures as well as characteristics of their environmental movements. The empirical analysis follows in three chapters. Chapter 4 examines the case of the Great Bear Rainforest, Chapter 5 analyzes selected disputes in Tasmania, and Chapter 6 compares the two regions identifying overlaps and potential of transferability of processes and outcomes. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion reflecting on the contribution of an environmental bargaining approach to the field of economic geography, summarizing key fmdings, and formulating future research directions.

27 CHAPTER 2: REMAPPING RESOURCE PERIPHERIES THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL BARGAINING

Resource economies are often dominated by powerful vested interests that advocate large-scale industrial resource exploitation. Environmentalists challenge these existing structures and conflicts emerge where their interests diverge from existing practices. Interests and values are socially constructed and explanations of conflicts have to be sought in the behaviour of all participants and the underlying social systems. For the field of political ecology Watts (2000, 259) underscores the importance of "sensitivity to environmental politics as a process of cultural mobilization, and the ways in which such cultural practices - whether science, or 'traditional' knowledge, or discourses, or risk, or property rights - are contested, fought over, and negotiated." Hayter (2003) and Clapp (2004) refer to these processes as 'remapping' in the context to BC's forest resources. '''Remapping' can be both a metaphoric reunderstanding and a literal cartographic exercise that reveals previously unseen social, economic, or environmental processes. New 'maps' can create the spaces within which new subjects, economic processes, or understandings of the environment can exist." (St. Martin 2001, 123) But how do ENGOs attempt to remap resource peripheries? What are the actual outcomes of their efforts and regional implications? Remapping not only means changes to boundaries but also changes in behaviour, values, and political and economic structures. Outcomes are a product of environmental strategies and of the institutional context where conflicts are played out.

The complex nature of forest conflicts requires a conceptual framework that is actor­ centred, context-sensitive, and process-oriented. It needs to encompass economic and environmental but also social, political, and historical factors. Institutional approaches that developed out of the 'old' institutional economics of Veblen and Commons as advocated by some economic geographers (Barnes 1999; Hayter 2004; 2008; Martin 2000) have much to offer in this regard. Such approaches are open to multiple perspectives and voices within social and regional differentiated systems. These approaches emphasize socio-cultural, and political institutions and their interaction in the maintenance and constitution of the

28 economy. Institutional concepts help develop custom-made approaches tailored to understand environmental conflicts in context including geography and history.

This chapter develops the theme of environmental bargaining in an institutional perspective. The following section introduces institutional approaches highlighting elements that are central to environmental bargaining processes. After a short juxtaposition of traditional bargaining concepts, the remainder of the chapter elaborates on the distinctive nature of environmental bargaining taking a closer look at three identified features: actors, strategies (modes of bargaining), and regional context.

2.1 Environmental Bargaining from an Institutional Perspective Institutionalism emerged as a critique of mainstream or neoclassical economics rejecting the idea of an all-embracing concept of economics. Drawing on the work of Thorstein Veblen and John Commons, among others, and further developed by Geoffrey Hodgson, it emphasizes the importance of socio-cultural factors in economic decision­ making using a number of common concepts9 and technical tools to analyze historically and geographically specific situations. To distinguish it from 'new institutional economics' that is strongly aligned with neoclassical theory it has been referred to as 'old' institutionalism (Hodgson 1998), 'neo-Veblenian' institutionalism (Martin 1994), 'dissenting' institutionalism (Hayter 2004), and 'evolutionary' economics (Hayter 2008). Institutionalism sees economic behaviour as shaped by human-made institutions and their complex interactions rather than based on individual rationalism (e.g., homo economicus, rational choice theory). Human behaviour is to be understood as a social product that is reinforced by 'habits' and embedded in specific 'institutions' (Hodgson 1998). Habits are defined as non-reflective, self­ sustaining, and repetitive behaviour (Hodgson 1998). They result from choices made earlier on and are shaped by cognition, knowledge, beliefs, and learning. The concept of habits is central to the definition of institutions. Based on Veblen's (1899, 132) description of institutions as "prevalent habits of thought" Hamilton (1932, 84) defines institutions as "a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the

9 Many of these concepts are from other disciplines such as politics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and evolutionary biology. Similarly, recent behavioural approaches in economic geography have incorporated models from other disciplines to stress the importance of social and cultural values and constraints in human decision-making (Strauss 2008).

29 habits of a group or the customs of a people."lo This view encompasses formal institutions, for example, corporations or legislation and informal institutions such as social conventions, routines, customs, and traditions that are often supported by formal institutions. Institutions create an interconnected web of formal and informal constraints and opportunities that shape human choices. Organizations (e.g., ENGOs) are understood as a subset of institutions that have specific command and coordination structures. Institutions form around common conceptions and routines and are sustained by shared conceptions and characteristics that make them relatively persistent through time (Hodgson 1998). Habits and institutions are therefore mutually entwined and reinforcing. "Institutions mold, and are molded by, human action." (Hodgson 1998, 181) Actors exchange information within institutions preserving knowledge and skills (embedded in habits) that are particularly valuable where knowledge is only accessible to members (e.g., non-codified or tacit knowledge). Hodgson (1998, 180) refers to institutions as 'transmission belts' that pass on knowledge through time. Institutions incorporate values and processes of normative evaluation. They therefore reinforce their own moral legitimization as they often enforce what is seen as morally just. At the same time, they are themselves subject to continuous change and are 'wrestling' constantly between forces of continuity and discontinuity (Hayter 2004). In contrast to neoclassical theory that assumes that the economy is oriented towards an equilibrium state, institutionalism sees the economy as a dynamic process stressing evolution and innovation. However, institutional power such as corporations, state, church, and labour may not respond to social interests for example when they map property and

access rights or rights to use. In the case of resource peripheries, controlling 'vested interests' often conflict with community and/or social interests. Such un- or underrepresented interests initiate the formation of new institutions (e.g., social movements, ENGOs) that seek to countervail power inequalities and remap the landscape to recognize their interests.

Institutional approaches focus on the context in which phenomena occur. They examine how habits and norms that influence decision-making are embedded, reinforced and/or changed. Rather than generating universal models, institutionalism suggests specific

10 North (1990,3) defInes institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, [.'OJ the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."

30 and historically located approaches that allow content-specific analyses of 'real world behaviours' (Hayter 2004, 96).

Institutional approaches provide a number of valuable concepts that help unravel the forces and dynamics behind forest conflicts. First, an institutional ana!ysis of the organizations involved in forest conflicts helps identify the actors, their power and skills and the geographical constitution of institutions. Institutions are constructed in particular places and spaces and differences exist between regions. While some regions foster the growth and strength of institutions others might hinder their development. Amin and Thrift (1995) introduce the idea of 'institutional thickness' as the capacity of places to develop, consolidate, and transmit economic structures of representation, interaction, and innovation. Institutionally thick regions have a strong institutional presence, a high level of interaction amongst the network of institutions, and clear hierarchies. Institutional thickness, for example, leads to increased trust and reciprocity, high institutional flexibility and innovation capacity, persistence oflocal institutions, and increased commonly held knowledge. In less favourable cases institutional thickness leads to institutional lock-in and inertia. How environmental conflicts are played out depends to a certain degree on the institutional thickness of the environmental movement and of other actors.

Second, institutionalism emphasizes the role of evolution stressing the dynamic nature of the economy and the impact of historical structures and processes on today's decisions. As Putnam et al. (1993, 8, emphasis in original) point out, "Institutions are shaped by history. Whatever other factors may affect their form, institutions have inertia and 'robustness'. They therefore embody historical trajectories and turning points. History matters because it is 'path dependent': what comes first (even if it was in some sense 'accidental') conditions what comes later." Even though institutions have a self-reinforcing effect, they are dynamic and caught in a continuum of cause and effect. Innovations, both technological and institutional, "are vital for understanding capitalist dynamics both in terms of its destructiveness and creativity, its potentials for resolving environmental problems and for meeting development aspirations" (Hayter 2008, 837, emphasis in original). Innovations considerably transform some institutions while others remain resistant to change. Equally, some institutions learn better from experience than others, enhancing their organizational

31 reflexivity. While fonnal institutions can change over night informal institutions tend to have greater survival tenacity (North 1990; Schamp 2003).

Third, embeddedness refers to the reciprocal links between economic and social institutions, a symbiosis between economic and non-economic factors. It predicts that behaviour and institutions are constrained by social relations and cannot be analyzed independently (Granovetter 1985). "[M]ost behaviour is closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relations" and these social structures or networks are crucial in generating trust that influences decision-making processes (Granovetter 1985, 504). Social relations and networks develop in place and through space and are influenced by institutions and history. Social and cultural embeddedness varies between different spatial scales and localities.

The concepts of institutions, evolution, and embeddedness illustrate how geographically based vested interests are self-reinforcing and can dominate resource economies (Barnes 1999). They also help construct a context sensitive bargaining approach to analyze environmental conflicts. As the analysis of conflict in Tasmania and Be shows, the persistence particularly of infonnal institutions is crucial to the ways conflicts are fought out. An institutional analysis or inventory identifies the actors involved in environmental bargaining; the concepts of evolution and embeddedness are central to understanding bargaining processes and the role of place and space. Not all bargaining approaches, however, encompass these factors. Economistic approaches have been particularly hesitant to incorporate non-economic variables in their equations.

2.2 Bargaining

Bargaining has received attention in a variety of disciplines including industrial relations, political science, and social psychology but it has been mainly identified with economics (for an overview over economic bargaining theories see Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Young 1975). At the centre of almost all bargaining theories lies the bargaining problem, which involves antagonistic interests of the bargainers and their need to reach some fonn of agreement. Bargaining involves two or more parties that have some divergent interests but also some degree of mutuality (i.e., the possibility of joint or non-zero sum gains), outcomes and strategies that are dependent on bargaining powers and, most likely than not, changing conditions over time. "Theories of bargaining begin with the simple and

32 obvious notion that bargainers compare the costs and benefits of no agreement with the costs and benefits of particular setdements." (Bacharach and Lawler 1981,4) No single theory of bargaining exists but all approaches conceptualize bargaining as means through which purposive actors reach specific setdements or outcomes under conditions of "strategic interaction" or interdependent decision-making (Young 1975).

2.2.1 Economistic Bargaining Approaches Economistic or neoclassical approaches highlighted by game theory are prevalent in the economic literature and have contributed to a more general understanding of bargaining. Game theoretical approaches to bargaining search for (determinate) solutions of bargaining problems in the form of predictable setdements that parties will agree on. The deductive models often assume a high mutual dependency of the parties involved (e.g., in the bilateral monopoly model) and are based on the demand of each party for resources that the other

. possesses. I I All game theory models share a number of important features (Young 1975). First, they assume that both the number of players and their identity are fixed and known to everyone. Second, the players are fixed and each player knows that the others are rational. Third, the payoff function of each player is fixed and known at the outset and, fourth, the role of communication among the players is highly restricted. Game theoretic approaches suggest that bargaining is calculated and predictable. The search for determinate solutions has produced a number of special models applicable to specific types of interdependent decision-making such as John Nash's strategic one-move solution that will generate the maximum payoff with only one optimized interaction of the parties involved (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Heap and Varoufakis 1995). Solutions are divided into zero-, negative-, and positive-sum games referring to the measurable reward each bargaining party receives that is the amount of wealth.12 Zero-sum games stand for situations where one party cannot advance its interests without the other party suffering a corresponding loss whereas positive­ sum games refer to situations where all actors can gain or increase benefits.

II From a new institutionalist perspective North (1990) distinguishes between institutions and organizations comparing them with game theory. He argues that they must be clearly differentiated as rules (institutions) from players (organizations). 12 Win-lose, win-win, and lose-lose situations refer to gains and losses relative to the parties' expectations.

33 Although game theories have extended the understanding of bargaining by stressing the interdependence of actors and role of uncertainty they have major limitations and drawbacks. The assumptions upon which the models are based ignore a number of problems that are important in actual contexts of bargaining. Game theories are static models that focus on outcomes whereas bargaining in reality is a process. Similarly, they are unable to explain the circumstances and context under which bargaining takes place (Hodgson 1998). They therefore fail to produce good predictions in empirical terms and too often do not distinguish between potential power and its actual implementation.

Other economic models of bargaining are relatively specific in dealing, for example, with wage determination in labour-management negotiations or price setting mechanisms. In contrast to game theoretic models they are dynamic and consider bargaining as convergent over time including the factor of learning. Among themselves they share some important features that, as in the case of game theory, restrict them to a considerable extent. To mention just a few, they tend to focus on interactions involving only two parties and do not allow collective or corporate entities in negotiations. Firms, labour unions, and nation states therefore are treated as homogenous entities. Further, these organizations preferably deal with bargains around single issues (e.g., money). All economistic bargaining models are heavily restricted in terms of applicability and they exhibit a mechanistic quality that stems from the fact that they abstract away all manipulative activities commonly associated with bargaining. Moreover, neither has yielded predictions about bargaining in "analogous real­ world situations" (Young 1975, 303).

2.2.2 Political and Institutional Bargaining Approaches Political and institutional approaches to bargaining are directly concerned with the conditions and realities of actual bargaining processes without prescribing pre-conceived outcomes. With regard to location choice, Kobrin (1987) lists three elements of the bargaining power model of multinational corporations (MNCs) and host countries, namely the demand of resources by one party controlled by the other, the constraints on how this relative power can be implemented, and the ability to influence and change the behaviour of other parties. His analysis recognizes that tactics are uncertain which makes the bargaining outcomes less predictable. In the context of Iceland and the aluminium industry Skulason and Hayter (1998) show that location factors are created through negotiations and are

34 subject to change in the course of bargaining. Regional competition for industrial investment and state intervention through the provision of incentives are examples of how bargaining and location choice are interrelated. Vernon (1980) emphasizes the temporal dynamics of the process and the role of uncertainty in his 'obsolescing bargain model' that predicts that power relations change over time as MNCs lose part of their bargaining power once they have made ftxed investments at a speciftc location. Bargaining around labour is also part of locational decisions whether on new capital investment or established locations. More complex multiple stakeholder bargaining processes include not only business and governments but also labour, suppliers, consumers, ethnic groups, ENGOs, and other institutions (Hayter 1997). The role of the state is crucial in so far as it can change bargaining by reducing negative externalities and producing positive ones seeking to create good social bargains, for example, providing incentives for ftrms in less favourable regions but also in social terms, for example, assuring through legislation that certain standards (minimum wages, pollution standards) are met.

To conceptualize environmental conflicts in a real world context a multi-faceted, institutional understanding of bargaining is needed. An institutional approach to bargaining recognizes the political, socio-economic, historical, and environmental context, the parties' evaluation of each other's bargaining power, and tactical action. It acknowledges that bargaining is a dynamic process between multiple actors in time and space. Institutions and bargaining power change constantly as actors try to transform the bargaining context to their advantage.

2.3 The Distinctive Nature of Environmental Bargaining One goal of environmental bargaining is to describe the process through which ENGOs seek to change resource regimes. Bargaining often includes remapping where ENGOs aim to change boundaries (property rights, land use, etc.) of deftned regions (i.e., the geographic expression of bargaining). But remapping is not necessarily the sole goal of environmental bargaining even though it often is a central part of environmental conflicts. In environmental bargaining processes environmental groups usually ftght for a reduction of human impact on the environment and larger recognition of non-economic values. In order to achieve the highest returns, they use strategies that cover the whole spectrum from confrontation to collaboration. ENGOs do not only ftght for changes in boundaries such as

35 increase in protected areas. They struggle for influence in decision-making processes through reform of existing institutions.

Figure 2.1 Environmental bargaining qua remapping

Environmental Bargaining => Remapping

As a conceptual point of departure it is useful to interpret environmental bargaining in terms of three components; actors, modes of bargaining (strategies), and regions as illustrated in Figure 2.1. While the three components mark distinct features they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, boundaries are blurred and actors, strategies, and regions transform and are transformed by environmental bargains. There exists significant difference between environmental bargaining and more conventional forms of bargaining, such as between business and labour or business and government. First, environmental bargaining shows an unrivalled multiplicity of actors with specific assets and behaviours but is initiated and characterized by environmental movements. Thus, environmental bargaining is largely shaped by ENGOs as central actors that serve environmental interests and largely advocate common property rights. Generally, ENGOs support public property and oppose exploitation of resources for private profit. At the same time they are critical of open access resource use that leads to overuse and depletion (see Hardin 1968) and in some cases fight

36 for restricted access and land uses through, for example conservancies and land trusts that exclude public use. In conventional bargaining parties seek to enhance their (private) property rights based on self-interest. While in labour bargaining one party may intentionally hinder economic activity temporarily (e.g., strike, lock-out) both sides are interested in maintaining economic activity in the long-term. ENGOs do not have this commitment. Rather they are ascribed the power of refusal and prevention (Soyez 1998). Indeed, some ENGOs may even regard the total collapse of an economic activity as successful. Finally, in labour bargaining both sides have direct interest in outcomes that improve their economic status whereas the rewards to ENGOs are not that tied. Business and labour have mutual interests to settle but ENGOs often do not.

Second, ENGOs employ a wide range of strategies and tactics when engaging in bargaining processes that take distinct forms and are less apparent in conventional forms of bargaining. As with conflict management and resolution in general, environmental bargaining includes mediation and negotiation between the parties in conflict13 and goes beyond consensus building to include adversarial, confrontational action. Confrontation and conflict are frequent and important components that are often crucial to change even though they may, at ftrst, further consolidate antagonistic interests. Usually bargaining parties only make concessions when a conflict becomes unavoidable since conflicts are more costly than agreements based on concessions. ENGOs on the contrary often seek conflict and the maintenance of conflicts empowers them more than any other institution. ENGOs differ considerably from other actors in terms of their willingness to negotiate as well as their strategies and tactics. For example, they often see environmental goals, particularly conservation, as incompatible with other interests. As Kellow (1989, 130, emphasis in original) points out, "wilderness tends to be a 'lumpy' good, so that an area must be preserved in toto rather than the compromise of limited development within the area being possible. Compromise solutions are thus not readily attainable". Their low willingness to accept trade-offs and make concessions is even more reduced by the fact that ENGOs rarely have anything to lose.

13 A variety of terms have been used including environmental mediation/negotiation/conciliation, (alternative environmental) conflict management, consensus building, alternative/environmental conflict resolution, and environmental dispute settlement. All share the key feature of collaborative problem solving.

37 Third, the regional context is central to bargaining and in tum bargaining affects regional development. Both, formal organizations and the rules of the game develop and are embedded in a regional context. Remapping means concrete changes on the ground, for example, rezoning as well as reform of local and global institutions. Further, environmental bargaining is multi-scalar involving different spatial levels from the local to the global. At the same time resource conflicts are always place-specific linked to particular places.

Environmental bargaining is no guarantee for best solutions and maximum payoffs but this limitation doesn't mean that environmental bargaining is restricted to zero-sum games. On the contrary, ecological modernization and evolutionary institutionalism argue that the incorporation of environmental goals leads to positive-sum gains and win-win situations with mutual benefits for all bargainers that account for non-quantifiable, non­ economic values (e.g., Buttel2000; Freeman 1992; Gibbs 2000; Mol 2000; Murphy 2000; Murphy and Gouldson 2000).

t 2.3.1 The 'Remappers : Acresavers and Seachangers In practice environmental bargaining involves multiple actors including among others business, governments, indigenous groups, farmers, labour groups, ENGOs, and other NGOs (e.g., human rights, local communities). Further, business, government, labour, NGOs, and others are themselves highly differentiated. Hayter (2003) and Hayter et al. (2003) conceptualize the conflicts within resource peripheries as intersections between different institutional dimensions which they summarize as 'industrialism', 'environmentalism', 'aboriginalism', and 'imperialism'. Of these dimensions, environmentalism is the central driver and often initiator of bargaining processes that challenges existing structures, practices, and rules of the game. The increasing scope and scale of environmental conflicts is related to growing environmental consciousness in general and an explosion of the number of formalized environmental organizations in particular that lobby the environment. Lobbies are non-governmental actors that aim to influence decision-makers of political, administrative, and economic systems according to their interests using different strategies. Young (1982, 93) points out that "[...] individual actors are typically unable to exercise much influence over the character of the regime on their own." Environmental interests are more effectively expressed through formal

38 environmentalism like ENGOs (Doyle 2000; Ekins 1992).14 However, as the case studies in this thesis show, success of ENGOs is sometimes directly linked to certain individuals such as founders or charismatic personalities.

ENGOs are part of larger social movements that draw their power base from 'non­ member' or public support. In his 'Movement Action Plan' Moyer (1987, 3) defmes social movements as "collective actions in which the populace is alerted, educated, and mobilized, over years and decades, to challenge the powerholders and the whole society to redress social problems or grievances and restore critical social values." Scott (1990, 6) and Sutton (2000, 14-15) lists four characteristics of social movements: (1) they are 'collective actors'; (2) with a 'common identity'; (3) the ability of mass mobilization; (4) and the shared goal to 'defend or change society'. Scott (1990, 6) identifies the ability of mass mobilization or the threat of mobilization as the prime source for social sanctioning and as the movement's major power base. Even though social movements may not constitute a large and broadly­ based group of people themselves, they are successful in raising support amongst the non­ committed, inactive public that will provide them with sufficient supporters and a social licence to act. Bryant (2005, 11) describes how new social movements construct moral and cultural visions and derive power from their "ability to 'speak the truth' to different actors in different social settings".

Social movements operate through organizations that may differ in terms of organizational structure, issues of concerns, participants involved, and value orientation. The contemporary environmental movement or 'new' environmental movement that started to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s consists of a wide range of ENGOs, formal and informal ones, that vary considerably in size, scope, and philosophy. Over the last few decades the movement has changed significantly from being "part of a broader movement of social change" that together with, for example, the peace, female emancipation, and anti-nuclear movement opposed many developments in Western societies pushing for radical environmental reforms that required a complete restructuring of the system (Mol 2000, 48). Since the 1980s the environmental movement has grown more and more into a 'one-issue' movement that has focussed merely on environmental issues neglecting its solidarity

14 While during the 1970s and 1980s ENGOs have been the central environmental agents, they have in recent years experienced considerable 'competition' by, for example, state initiatives, the private sector such as environmental consultants and the utility sector, and scientific institutions (Mol 2000).

39 networks and shared agendas with other social movements. Similarly, environmental ideologies have changed, and even though radical, anti-regime positions are still found, the majority of groups today push for reforms and 'fme tuning' of existing institutions to allow for environmental change (Mol 2000). More and more groups have started to engage in dialogue and follow established rules to influence decision-making processes. The majority of contemporary ENGOs, networks, and coalitions were started in the 1980s (princen and Finger 1994) and a considerable number of ENGOs look back on a tradition of over 30 years. O'Riordan (1976, 255-256) was already aware of their importance as early as in the mid 1970s stating that:

"[t]he influence of pressure groups in environmental politics is probably underestimated. Most informed commentators agree that these watchdog organisations play an essential role in mobilising political concern, raising citizen awareness of the inadequacies of the political and administrative system, and inducing changes in policymaking arrangements and the law to help alter the whole shape of the political culture and set vital precedents for future citizen participation."

ENGOs are environmental lobby groups that act exclusively on a normative basis that is not especially concerned with monetary or profitable intentions and is not beholden to governments or profit making agencies (Soyez 1997). In most cases, their objective is to advance a particular moral vision on behalf of nature (e.g., in the form of endangered species) that lets them appear as moral and altruistic actors (Bryant 2005). ENGOs are very willing to make moral judgements and enter policy debates. They act on agreed value schemes and on strategies and structures of how to pursue their goals. Their objectives include externalities - immediate ones like pollution or long-term externalities such as resource overexploitation - that are not covered by market mechanisms (e.g., polluter pays principle) and hence are neglected by industry and governments. ENGOs institutionalize the environment and give it a voice. The conflict itself is part of their goal. They often attach non-monetary values (e.g., forests as carbon sinks) to win public support but also monetary values to environmental 'goods' or consumption. ENGOs seek to internalize externalities that negatively impact the environment into regulatory or market mechanisms, for example, the introduction of pollution control, polluter pays principles, and fmes through remapping. They are self-appointed and independent and "[a]lthough connected to green parties in various countries, ENGOs are not usually democratically elected, and their

40 activities depend on volunteers and professional staffs funded by individuals, and increasingly, by foundations" (Hayter 2003, 711). With their agendas and campaigns ENGOs institutionalize the environment according to their values and stated missions.

ENGO activity is crucial in initiating environmental bargaining often by creating and reinforcing conflicts that are seen as precursor to change. But ENGOs are a heterogeneous group and their objectives and strategies vary widely. The functions ENGOs perform are directly related to the way they behave and how they are structured (pross 1993) The effectiveness of ENGOs in terms of meeting their goals and achieving outcomes is closely related to their level of organization, strategies, and tactics. Sewell et al. (1989) differentiate between 'institutional' groups that have elaborate organizational structures, stable membership, and extensive knowledge of the branches of government that affect their interests and 'issue-oriented' groups that are usually concerned with the resolution of one or two issues or problems and are not as well organized or permanent. Local, endogenous ENGOs are typical issue-oriented groups that defend their immediate surrounding (i.e., not in my back yard philosophy) and are deeply embedded in local structures. They often lack the resources and professionalism of larger ENGOs (mostly institutional groups) that in actual conflicts are more often than not exogenous, that is, intruders in the target regions. As invaders in contested regions, they can be guided by misleading stereotypes of the community. More importantly they often lack non-codified local knowledge as they are excluded from local information networks (Storper 1997; Storper and Salais 1997; Watts 2000). In respect to organizational structure and participation, organizations vary widely from participatory groups that include their members in decision-making and authoritative leadership groups that promote the aim without consultation of members (Lowe and Goyder 1983).

Princen and Finger (1994) describe ENGOs as legitimate, transparent, and transnational. They gain their legitimacy from their narrow focus on the environment and their non-compromising positions on environmental matters in contrast to government and industry that seek to balance the environment with other issues. ENGOs are idealized as institutions "through which people help others for reasons other than profit or politics" (Fisher 1997, 442). Mol (2000) points out that the growing acceptance of environmental views and positions by the public and experts leads to changes in ideology and stricter

41 environmental foci of ENGOs. ENGOs are viewed as independent stakeholders in so far as they are undetermined by economic (profits) and governmental interests (territorial claims and representation), that is, free of vested interest of existing power regimes (Falkner 2003). Transparency in environmental conflicts is reached through the collection and provision of information, documentation, and monitoring of processes and agreements. But Princen and Finger's (1994) statement should be viewed critically. Convictions and strategies, for example, cover a wide range and are not always consistent with democratic rights. Whatever their history and social background, ENGOs are biased and some interests may be privileged over others. ENGOs incorporate values and processes that reinforce their own moral legitimization in the belief that what they do is just. But whose interests do ENGOs represent in respect to civil society? Critics have pointed out that environmentalism emerged out of the white Western middle class (Barton 2002; Lowe and Goyder 1983) and represents a form of 'urban elitism' (Lee 1994). Environmental interests tend to represent western values that manipulate the interests of minorities and discriminate against Aboriginal land uses; an aspect has also been referred to as 'recolonization' (e.g., Clapp 2004). Watts (2000) points out that activists may be guided by self-centered interests of program building that rest on misleading stereotypes of the community. "ENGOs are prone to authoritarian thought, empowered by their single-issue focus and global scope." (Hayter 2003, 712) Because of their often narrow focus they are prone to ignore wider implications of their activities that can lead to 'unintended consequences' including negative impacts on the environment (Giddens 1984). Their efforts to remap are subject to uncertainty and not all outcomes are necessarily intended or anticipated.

2.3.2 Environmental Strategies: Modes of Bargaining Environmental conflicts are played out and resolved in many different ways. They "can no longer be interpreted as following predictable paths with static opposing parties and interests" (Mol 2000, 54). ENGOs use environmental bargaining to remap property rights and land use, and change existing power relationships and decision-making structures. Environmental bargaining is explicit and implicit. Explicit bargaining takes place where ENGOs are formally recognized and accepted as bargaining parties by vested interests and they directly participate in negotiations, as typically in labour bargaining which follows well­ established rules for conduct and appeal. Implicit bargaining occurs where environmental

42 interests are marginalized and excluded from formal negotiations and decision-making processes. Economic and political bargaining traditionally is explicit whereas environmental bargaining often takes an implicit mode. Environmental interests lie at the centre of the conflict but are often not explicitly included when solutions are sought and negotiated. In this sense, environmental claims remain unexpressed and unvoiced in formal negotiation processes and un- or underrepresented in existing maps. To gain leverage and reach their goals ENGOs want to be recognized as explicit participants in the bargaining process even though sometimes they prefer to play an implicit role. Often, confrontational action is crucial to building up bargaining power, raising attention, and opening the door to explicit bargaining. Many activists consider belligerence as a necessary part of bargaining processes and conflict as inevitable to change.

Figure 2.2 Conflict potential and dispute resolution

LOW CONFLICT POTENTIAL HIGH ... •

Collaboration Negotiation Litigation Coercion Persuasion Facilitation Arbitration Fight Inducement Mediation Violence or Inaction

EXPLICIT ENVIRONMENTAL BARGAINING IMPLICIT • DIRECT INDIRECT DIRECT Co-Management Recognition Boycott Direct Action Joint Negotiation Market place Protest decision-making Lobbying Legal action

ENGO strategies and tactics range from collaboration to confrontation. Figure 2.2 shows different forms of conflict behaviour and environmental bargaining along a conflict continuum. Where conflict potential is low, divergences between stakeholders are often perceived as negligible and usually little opposition to existing practices arises. Where

43 stakeholders are willing to collaborate they interact through explicit modes of bargaining. Larger disagreements are solved through negotiation where actors comply to defined rules of conduct or with the help of a neutral third party through facilitation, mediation, and arbitration. High conflict potential is often expressed through violence, fight, and coercion and corresponds to implicit modes of environmental bargaining. ENGOs frequently use implicit modes of bargaining and play an 'outsider' role to raise awareness and build up a profile of the issue at stake. Table 2.1 lists common ENGO strategies and tactics.

Table 2.1 Environmental bargaining strategies/tactics

Production of books, videos, and other public relations material Scientific research and reports Education of public, customers, consumers, e.g., leafleting, talks Galvanization of supporters through, e.g., letter writing campaigns Mobilization of volunteers to block logging roads, prepare expert briefs, run offices, build trails, and participate in advisory processes Enlistment of pro bono assistance of lawyers and other specialists Endorsements from royalty, politicians (abroad)

Strategic alliances with Aboriginal groups, companies, NGOs Oocal to global) Lobbying of politicians Conservation financing Legal opposition/law suits Markets campaign Shareholder and financing campaign Rallies, protests Direct action, e.g., tree sits, blockades, tree spiking, sabotage of machinery

Implicit modes of bargaining can be further divided into 'direct' and 'indirect' forms while explicit bargaining always means direct interaction between bargainers (see Fig. 2.3). Direct modes often take the form of (non-violent) direct action that enforces conflict. It is used by ENGOs to stop certain economic activities or considerably restrain economic interactions and profitability. Indirect action is a frequent and very effective bargaining strategy when environmental interests are only implicitly accounted for (which is usually the case in resource conflicts). Indirect action aims to increase the opponents' willingness to negotiate without direct interaction. Examples of indirect action are ENGO-Ied consumer

44 boycotts of main retailers and processing industry, public awareness raising, and lobbying. ENGOs seek strategic alliances with institutions that do not necessarily participate in the bargaining process themselves but give them considerable leverage. Through coalitions and networks, ENGOs strengthen their bargaining power and manipulate their opponents' range of action. One distinct feature of implicit bargaining is its fluidity in respect to geographic scale. Implicit bargaining frequently proceeds via scale jumping, that is on different spatial scales at the same time or successively; the latter is specifically prominent in indirect forms of implicit bargaining. The game theoretical assumption that bargaining requires each party to negotiate with the other is not valid in the case of implicit modes of bargaining. Instead, ENGOs have shown that they can turn to other parties that might not even be affected by the conflict themselves whenever their direct opponents refuse to bargain according to their expectations or threats. New target groups are lobbied to stand in for environmental actors and mediate leverage to the original addressee (Hayter and Soyez 1996; Soyez 1996; 2000; Stanbury 2000).

Figure 2.3 Modes of environmental bargaining

It is their assets and skills that make ENGOs distinct from orthodox bargaining parties such as for-profit or regulatory institutions. While ENGOs lack traditional bargaining resources based on territory, property rights, or economic power they hold considerable power in shaping political agendas. ENGOs are particularly successful using "cultural skills to acquire the resources to act" even though "sometimes, through the shrewd use of those resources, they may alter cultural norms and practices" (Bryant 2005, 11). ENGOs are often perceived as grassroots representing community interests that are familiar with local institutions, conventions, and norms. Environmental pressure groups are the

45 most mobile actors in bargaining processes. They gain leverage through their ability to attract media attention, access funds, mobilize public support, and provide relevant information either through their own research or ties to scientific or local communities using embedded knowledge. ENGOs are also open to change and innovations. Castells (1997, 186) ascribes the success of the environmental movement to the "fact that, more than any other social forces, it has been able to best adapt to the conditions of communication and mobilization in a new technological paradigm" (see also Hayter and Soyez 1996). Technological and institutional innovations are crucial to the ability of a region to balance conflicting environmental and economic interests. Innovations not only alter the industrial structure in place but also the means environmental organizations have at hand. While ENGOs have been very receptive to innovations, other institutions have proven to be more rigid and locked-in to their habits.

ENGOs not only disagree on what has to be understood as environment and what role humans should play but also on the repertoire of action they are willing to apply. How ENGOs fight and what role they take on is highly context dependent and cannot be generalized. Which strategies and tactics ENGOs choose and how ENGOs bargain is determined by several factors. Matthews (1993, 230) lists four factors: (1) the structure of the decision-making process they seek to influence, (2) the country's/region's decision­ making style including the general attitude towards legitimate political behaviour, (3) the issues at stake and stage of policy process, and (4) the resources available to the group. The fewer the resources available the narrower is the range of ENGO strategies and tactics. History also influences what forms bargaining takes. Often, previous relationships determine whether bargaining parties are more likely to resort to conflict rather than to cooperation (Sidaway 2005). ENGOs choose different strategies according to the institutional setting. They behave like 'chameleons' (pross 1993) that adjust their behaviour to their surrounding. Pross (1993, 152) argues that issue-oriented groups don't vary much across space and that Canadian groups largely resemble Australian and American groups in the way they exploit the media. More established groups, in contrast, reveal major differences between regions as groups adapt to the policy system they seek to change.

Traditionally, ENGOs have played the role of a critical outsider using confrontational and uncompromising strategies; more radical groups like EarthFirst!,

46 Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth still prefer these strategies over others. ENGOs use non-bureaucratic channels where issues are not yet on the political agenda, where they belong to the realm of high rather than low politics or where decisions have already been made and environmental interests have been neglected or excluded (Matthews 1993). ENGOs have also switched tactics to an insider role when they are consulted - formally or informally - and give advice to governments and industry or take on a watchdog role. But ENGOs need to be close to government thinking to be able to overcome the barriers created by administrative secrecy and bureaucratic systems and need to be knowledgeable about where and when to intervene to change policy (pross 1993). ENGOs are not necessarily bound to one role or the other. They often use a combination of insider-outsider strategies to increase their bargaining power. ''With their annual meetings, their newsletters, their regional organizations, their informal networks, they have an ability to cross organizational lines denied other more formal actors, such as governmental departments. They can, therefore, act as go-betweens, provide opportunities for quiet meetings between warring agencies and keep the policy process in motion." (pross 1993, 155-156)

ENGOs employ different strategies and tactics according to different geographic scales and reveal particular space-specific behaviour. They often connect local conflicts with various global constituencies. Stakeholder relationships and the formation of coalitions depend on the extent to which interests are antagonistic or complementary. New networks emerge linking formerly unrelated institutions and/or regions creating new space for strategic interaction (Fisher 1997). These relations and networks are crucial to the course of bargaining. ENGOs successfully act through these relationships and it is often through networks that they gain most of their influential control. They thrive from informal networks taking advantage of what economic geographers call 'untraded interdependencies' (Henry and Pinch 2001; Mitchell 1995; 2000; Storper and Salais 1997). In contrast to early environmentalism, ENGOs today engage in strategic alliances with state and market actors but at the same time allow themselves the freedom to move through the spectrum of political parties and ideologies and stay independent (Mol 2000). While environmental groups cooperate with a wide range of actors including government agencies, the private sector, and other lobby groups, ENGOs themselves sometimes become opponents particularly when focusing on the same issues. Strategic networking is complex and often short-lived as ENGOs engage "in constant dynamic processes of coalition building with

47 rapidly changing opponents and partners, with the aim of maximising and safeguarding environmental gains" however they might defme them (Mol 2000, 49). Environmental campaigning at the same time has led to responses by governments as well as it has triggered counter-mobilization campaigns of industry workers or other interest groups. ''With a rise of pressure groups has come a tendency for institutionalized groups - the majority representing business interests - to dominate debate within policy communities." (pross 1993, 156-157) Bargaining processes are not only shaped by the actors and their assets but also their relationships with each other and their ability to engage with others on multiple spatial scales.

2.3.3 Remapping Regions Environmental bargaining around natural resources often focuses on resource peripheries. Using Markusen's (1996) terms, they are described as 'slippery spaces' in contrast to cores that are 'sticky places' where decision-making structures and power is located. Resource peripheries are slippery as they are transient, "there today and gone tomorrow" (Hayter 2003, 706). Labour force, equipment, and capital for industrial processes are mostly drawn from outside the region and disappear when companies move on after they have depleted the resource. Resource peripheries are often ruled by external and largely urban forces that map resources according to their values and needs. Critics link environmental problems to externality effects and property right regimes that are embedded in the economy and often dictated by these forces. Local, environmental, and indigenous interests have started to engage more and more with vested interests in efforts to remap land use and rights. They question the status quo illustrating the 'impermanence of boundaries' (Clapp 2004, 842). Remapping is both a social and technological process that is used by newly empowered groups and previously unheard voices such as local, Aboriginal, and/or environmental groups to contest boundaries in order to achieve a 're-defmition', re­ allocation, and 're-presentation' that recognize their interests (Clapp 2004, 844).

In his study on community resource management in fisheries St. Martin (2001) focuses on remapping as a method of revealing community interests, reclaiming rights to access to and use of resources, and the potential for community-based management. Peluso (1995, 384) talks about 'countermapping' undertaken by local activists and indigenous peoples in Kalimantan, Indonesia, where they sketch maps "to delineate and to formalize

48 claims to forest territories and resources" they traditionally have managed. But remapping is not restricted to changes in boundaries. It includes an "examination of the assumptions underpinning the political and economic regime embodied in the original map" (Clapp 2004, 840). Environmental remapping should be understood as a social mechanism that responds to industrial exploitation and resource depletion and recognizes alternatives to large-scale resource extraction (Clapp 2004; Hayter 2003). The actual cartographic exercise is only one component. Traditionally, remapping has been a government response to powerful vested interests such as industry, for example, in the form of tenures or provision of infrastructure. Recently, governments have responded more and more to the claims of new social movements. St. Martin (2001) argues that the recognition of non-economic factors raised by local communities or ENGOs is impossible without remapping the resource.

Environmental bargaining in general and remapping in particular are site-specific. Not only do environmental conflicts mostly occur around specific resource locations (e.g., ecosystems, species, etc.), the process itself is embedded in regional structures. Environmental problems are hard to detach or dissociate from geographic location. Hayter (2004) refers to regions as institutions where people share specific history and common culture but also where existing structures and forms are behaviour are contested. Actors are influenced by and embedded in their unique 'institutional context' with its own roots and history. Hayter (2003, 713) describes resource peripheries as "'meeting places' where locally based institutions are connected globally and globally based institutions are connected locally" and where these global-local dynamics reflect particular geographical and historical conditions. Equally, Schamp (2003, 151) conceptualizes regions as complex institutions that are 'meeting places' for both endogenous and exogenous processes where institutional habits, routines, values, and conventions are shared and debated (see also Holmen 1995). As meeting places, regions are space-time specific, limiting action. At the same time, they are dynamic and transform through internal and external forces. Bargaining is not only influenced by regional institutions it also transforms them. New boundaries are drawn and behaviour changes. Environmentalism adds an additional facet to regions when they become symbols for specific conditions and situations (Watts 2000). Just as Chernobyl stands for nuclear power plant disaster and Brent Spar reminds us of marine waste disposal, the Great Bear Rainforest in BC and the Franklin Dam in Northern Tasmania stand for

49 environmental success - a battle won by selfless activists to protect a fragile and rare wilderness.

Environmental bargaining takes place at multiple spatial scales and in different regions. Watts (2000) emphasizes how environmental issues display the 'politics of scale' encompassing different political arenas from the body to locally imagined communities, to state and intra-state struggles to new forms of global governance. ENGOs are both local and global players that reveal and create links between regions and scales that have formerly been unconnected. However, their ideological position and behaviour are strongly influenced by their origin (domestic influences). Bargaining also happens in space. Space shouldn't be understood as 'scaling up or down' from local to global and vice versa but more as multi-scalar networking where "social relations express themselves in and through political coalitions" (Bridge 2002, 372). Bargaining also means networking and building of coalitions between different institutions and scales not existent before. ENGOs have turned out to be very successful in strategic networking. They have learnt to offer what other institutions cannot achieve by themselves in pursuit of their interests. If ENGOs have additional "assets to offer - expertise, grassroots support, a transnational base or network, the ability to rectify information imbalances, and, above all, public legitimacy - they carry even more weight; they can actually bargain" (princen and Finger 1994, 38). ENGOs choose their alliance partners based on their needs in each specific conflict. The decision with whom to network varies from ENGO to ENGO who can be adversaries themselves rather than allies. ENGOs profit not only from alliances but are themselves valuable resources for other institutions strengthening their stance. Raustiala (1997) underscores how ENGOs reinforce nation states' abilities to control international environmental processes. They become important accomplices for other institutions to lend more force to their interests. ENGOs are well equipped to react on global environmental issues either as transnational institutions themselves or as part of a well-developed international environmental network. Where ENGOs lobby at multiple scales, bargaining becomes even more complex. There are various examples where ENGOs have proved their efficiency as transnational lobbies linking formerly independent places through new alliances and information networks (Barker and Soyez 1994; Hayter and Soyez 1996; Soyez 1996; Stanbury 2000). Despite the importance of global-local linkages the local and regional context always

50 remains essential as "[a]mid their wide range of translocal connections, all NGO practices remain discursively constructed through reference to the 'local'" (Fisher 1997, 454).

2.4 Analyzing Environmental Bargaining

An institutional approach to environmental bargaining includes multiple voices in society and takes into account the complexity of environmental conflicts, allowing the incorporation of environmental issues into economic geography. It emphasizes the role environmental movements playas well as the importance of context (institutional embeddedness and regional specificities) and change over time (evolution and path­ dependency). An institutional perspective also helps formulate specific research questions that guide the data collection and structure the data analysis of this thesis. First, what actors are involved in each case study and what are their objectives, assets, and relationships to each other? While emphasis is put on ENGOs as central actors, all interests need to be included and assessed. Environmental, economic, and other interest groups are diverse and it is important to capture their heterogeneity to understand bargaining strategies and dynamics. Second, how do actors, ENGOs in particular, bargain? What strategies and tactics do they choose, why do they choose them, and how do they change over time? How do actors engage with, address, and respond to each other? Inter-organizational relationships such as strategic alliances are often decisive factors in changing the distribution of power and decision-making structures. Third, where does bargaining take place and how do place and space affect the bargaining process and outcomes? This requires understanding of region­ specific institutions (arenas) including history, culture, politics, etc. Similarly, how are regions affected and changed by environmental bargaining? Does remapping go beyond a 'mere' change in boundaries and property rights to include changes in informal institutions such as values, beliefs, etc.? Does environmental bargaining eliminate formerly existing inequalities and lead to long-term solutions? Considering institutional differences between case studies, how can and do actors learn from experience and each other? Are solutions and collaborative forms of bargaining transferable between regions?

In respect to the evaluation of environmental bargaining processes and outcomes, the question of how environmental bargaining and their success can be measured needs to be addressed. Following Sidaway (2005) this thesis measures outcomes and success by (1)

51 the changes in conflict potential (Fig. 2.2, p. 43) that become evident in a shift from confrontational, non-participatory to collaborative, participatory approaches and by (2) the distribution of power between bargaining parties. Outcomes alone, including formal and informal institutional changes, don't necessarily mean success in terms of conflict resolution or environmental values. They only lead to solutions when they are based on a balance of power and are reached through open negotiations and participatory decision-making.

The bargaining process itself, particularly strategies and tactics employed, reflects the extent bargaining parties have been able (or willing) to move from confrontational to collaborative approaches. Over time, discourses can reveal specific trends, for example, towards collaboration. Figure 2.4 illustrates how actors involved and strategies employed are shaped by context (are embedded) and change over time (are path-dependent) using an imaginary scenario. The relative location on the vertical axis indicates the degree of confrontation/non-participation respectively collaboration/participation bargaining parties engage in. Modes of bargaining change over time and through space as actors adapt their behaviour to the ever-changing institutional context (rules of the game and organizations). While Actor A uses a collaborative approach, Actor Band C adjust their tactics engaging in both participatory and non-participatory action (measured on the vertical axis). Actor C is even shifting back and forth between outsider and insider strategies.

Central to the course and outcome of environmental bargaining are changes in bargaining power of parties and their access to decision-making. Based on Sidaway's (2005) work on environmental dispute resolution, Figure 2.5 illustrates how power (parity versus disparity) and decision-making (participatory versus non-participatory approaches) affect outcomes of disputes. Based on the assumption that remapping efforts stem from inequities, environmental bargaining should turn resource peripheries into pluralistic places including multiple (if not all) interests. Clapp (2004, 846) rightly refers to the big challenge of negotiating "compromises that can sustain both ecological and cultural processes in nature-society hybrids". Only where actors engage in participatory approaches based on parity in power will bargaining bring about solutions to the conflict (top right quadrant). Participation that is not based on parity in power will lead to unbalanced outcomes where, for example, environmental interests are disregarded (top left quadrant). Due to their uncompromising nature, non-participatory approaches are unable to deliver successful

52 Figure 2.4 Actors and strategies over time

Collaboration! dP pr '"''

• AclorA

• Actor B rn Actor C - _...... •-'

f------+ TIME 1995 2000 2005

q, • y' '",

Confrontation! Non-Participation

Figure 2.5 Power and decision-making

Collaboration! Participation

Negotiation and participatory Manipulation by planning powerful Tokenism Cooperation Power sharing

Disparity in Parity in Power Power

Conflict with potential for Conflict with radical change minimum change

Coercion or Stalemate or transfer of power? Concession to keep status quo?

Confrontation! Non-Participation Source: Based on Sidaway 2005, p. 199. Used by permission.

53 outcomes in respect to conflict resolution. However, they bring about considerable change (bottom left quadrant). A new park or nature reserve created in response to environmental pressure can discriminate against indigenous and local community interests to the same extent as commercial resource exploitation by multinational corporations marginalizes non­ economic interests. Where interest groups are equipped with similar (bargaining) power but prefer confrontation to collaboration no significant changes or solutions are expected.

Even though power parity and collaborative decision-making will lead to a remapping of regions that seeks to balance different interests, not all expectations will be met or included. Rather, outcomes usually take the form of compromises. Outcomes should be evaluated in relation to expectations of parties involved (i.e., as win-win, win-lose, or lose-lose). Outcomes should be assessed by differentiating between changes on the ground (formal) and behavioural (informal) changes of stakeholders. Changes on the ground are manifested in legislation regarding management practices, AACs, tenures and licences, and certification. They are mostly represented through formal institutions. In some cases, such as protected area and new legislation, they are relatively easy to measure. However, agreements often take a long time until they are implemented (due to identification of designated areas for protection and writing of new legislation) and are often interpreted differently by decision makers. Outcomes therefore not always are what they were expected to be by different parties. Changes in behaviour largely relate to informal institutions even though they may be represented through formal institutions. They reach from changes in stakeholder relationships and attitudes to decision-making processes. Changes in decision-making processes are defined by legislation but also happen frequently through informal networking and collaboration. Whether and to what extent attitudes and mindsets change is very hard to measure. In general, formal institutions are changed more easily while informal ones, such as traditions and habits, are harder to break (pelikan 2003; Schamp 2003). Habits and norms are learned behaviour that often have been taught for a long time but that can be 'unlearned'. Time factors need to be considered when measuring outcomes. Environmental bargaining might change the perception ofindividual actors but an institutional reform requires a change of prevalent habits and thoughts of all actors involved. The extent to which institutions are open to reform and innovation is to a considerable extent shaped by their regional context and history.

54 CHAPTER 3: AT THE PERIPHERY - CASE STUDIES FROM BC'S GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST AND THE TASMANIAN BUSH

This chapter sets the regional context for the subsequent examinations of environmental bargaining and remapping efforts by ENGOs. It explores the traditional forest resource regimes in BC and Tasmania including the different cultures and politics at work, the regional history, and explains how they are changing over time. The chapter draws parallels and identifies commonalities between the two case study regions. The fust section of the chapter introduces the traditional resource regimes focusing on the development of economic and political systems in BC and Tasmania in the last 150 years especially as they pertain to forest resources. The following section takes a closer look at the socio-cultural factors that shape social norms, traditions, habits, and other rules of the game that guide behaviour. These rules of the game provide explanations as to why the traditional resource regimes in the two regions are contested and changing. The third section focuses on environmentalism and introduces environmental organizations that are identified as important and central actors in the bargaining process to restructure the traditional resource regimes. The chapter concludes by summarizing the key factors that constitute forest conflicts in the two regions.

3.1 Resource Regimes

Forest resource regimes in BC and Tasmania developed under the influence of two main institutions: government and private economic interests. These two actors have dominated the rules of the game reinforcing the industrial imperative from the rise of the forest industry until the 1980s when environmental interests started to become more widespread. The evolution of BC's and Tasmania's forest economies have been shaped considerably by their geographic marginality to the world's markets and their relevance to the Crown for economic development. Initially, industrial development in the two regions was driven by demands from Britain that fluctuated depending on its wars and available

ss alternative sources shifting later to markets in the United States and in recent times to Japan especially in the form of lumber (BC) and woodchip (Tasmania) exports that started in the late 1960s. The prevalent perception that forests primarily serve the interests of large-scale industrialism stems from BC's and Tasmania's colonial history as resource peripheries where exogenous powers and incoming settlers perceived the region as empty land readily available to meet their demands (Braun 2002; Hayter 2000; Robson 1985). Resource exploitation in the peripheries developed to serve the demand of powerful export markets based on exogenous capital, know-how, and immigration ignoring Aboriginal interests and cultures. The two regions therefore sought to develop from the beginning of 'white' settlement as export dependent regions, a strategy that persists until the present day making them particularly vulnerable to exogenous forces. Even though both regions have access to domestic markets exports have always been a dominant share of sales.

The history of largely European settlement and export orientation, initially controlled by the United Kingdom, determined the characteristics of the present economic system, government body, social institutions, and land tenure system. Today, resource and environmental management in Tasmania and BC is situated in a regulatory system that is composed of a constitutional order that defmes which level or branch of government is responsible for specific legislative activities. Both countries function under a federal system with a Westminster style of parliamentary democracy that largely empowers the executive. While in both countries, the management of Crown forest is exclusively under regional jurisdiction (provincial in BC and state in Tasmania), the federal government holds authority over international trade and can influence decision-making through signing international treaties and agreements.

3.1.1 British Columbia In BC, small-scale settlement and the gold rush era stimulated some forest activities in the mid 19 th century. Large-scale exploitation of BC's forests started with the arrival of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in the 1880s that led to the growth of Vancouver and other settlements in BC, and provided access to Prairie and eastern Canadian markets. By 1913, forest production had become the most important industry in the province and continued to grow throughout the early 20th century. When BC joined the Canadian Confederation in 1871 the new provincial government gained ownership and introduced a system of leases

56 and licences to return income and royalties to the crown. Today the provincial government owns 95 percent of forested land (four percent are held by private interests and one percent by the federal government) but the forest resource is largely managed by logging companies under various forms of tenure. As is the case for other resource sectors, the forest industry in BC is dominated by a few large companies. In 2003, more than two thirds of BC's AAC was controlled by ten large integrated companies (Clogg 2007). The present tenure system in BC includes a range of different licences, agreements, and pennits that differ in terms of resource rights, duration, and responsibilities and are either area- or volume-based (Ministry of Forests and Range 2006).15 As of 2006 the coastal forest industry directly employed 12,000 workers and generated $250 million in direct revenues to the provincial and local governments (Ministry of Forests and Range 2007).

Prior to the onset of the post-World War II boom the Sloan Royal Commission established the policy basis for a resource regime of large-scale industrial forestry that catered to big integrated fIrms in close alliance with government, promoting foreign­ investment, and emphasizing forests as timber supply for mass production (Hayter 2000; Wilson 1998). The mandate of the Sloan Royal Commission was to establish sustained yield forestry in BC and to regulate timber extraction to secure stable timber supplies. The Commission's recommendations were based on the concept of the 'normal forest'16 and created a set of timber leases that granted long-term tenures in exchange for large-scale industrial development. It favoured large companies in the hope of promoting stability for timber dependent communities (Hayter 2000). The Commission largely excluded interests of small forestry operations, Aboriginal people, and non-timber forest values (Clogg 1997). The forest system established by the Sloan Commission didn't change until the mid 1970s with the report of another Royal Commission led by Peter Pearse. Pearse, whose recommendations were partly implemented in 1978 in a new Forest Act and Ministry of Forests Act, sought to address issues such as corporate concentration of harvesting rights, enhanced forest management through increased reforestation activities and resource access for small business in order to diversify th« forest industry and enhance multiple use of BC's

15 Tree Farm Licences issue a virtually exclusive right to harvest timber and manage forests in a specified area whereas Forest Licences allow the licence holder to harvest an Me in a specified area. 16 'Normal forest' is forest with even-aged fully stocked stands of different age classes that are harvested according to age at the same rate as regeneration occurs, guaranteeing a continuous cycle of sustained yield.

57 forests. The newly introduced legislation as well as the way it was enforced led to criticism from environmentalists. Retention of unsustainable AAC levels and sustained yield principles "eroded public confidence in government-industry forest management performance" (Wilson 1998, 162). Criticism also grew louder in respect to the influence and decision-making power of different ministries and governmental agencies that avoided conflict with the Ministry of Forests (M0F)17 and rarely spoke up or blew the whistle in a MOF-dominated planning climate (Wilson 1998). The recession that hit the forest industry in the early 1980s together with spending cutbacks of the Social Credit government resulted in the reduction of staff numbers in governmental agencies and greater responsibilities for forest management being handed over from the MOF to companies.

By the late 1980s, public concerns regarding forest management in the province and the close ties between industry and government grew louder. The NDP government elected in 1991 addressed the shift in public perception during their election campaign with the promise to double the amount of parkland in the province to 12 percent and to achieve long-term economic, social, and environmental sustainability. In order to achieve its goals the NDP created a number of initiatives such as the Protected Areas Strategy as well as a series of land use planning processes. The Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) commenced its work in 1992 as a regional multi-stakeholder land use planning process for four regions of the province and was abolished in 1996 after recommending a provincial land use strategy. Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) processes were initiated for the remaining regions including the Central Coast LRMP (CCLRMP) and North Coast LRMP (NCLRMP) that followed the same guidelines as the CORE plans. The CCLRMP, covering about 69 percent of the Great Bear Rainforest, commenced its work in 1996. It reached an interim agreement in April 2001 and finalized its recommendations in December 2003. The NCLRMP with over 1.7 million hectares held its first meeting in

tlt February 2002 and reached consensus after three years. On February 7 , 2006 the provincial government of BC together with First Nations signed an agreement over the future of 6.4 million hectares that included the CCLRMP and NCLRMP recommendations. The agreement makes considerable changes to forest practices along BC's coast. Not only does it protect two million hectares of forest from logging but it also prescribes the application of

17 Until the early 1990s the MOF managed most provincial Crown land. Presently, provincial land use planning operates under the Integrated Land and Management Bureau of the Ministry ofAgriculture and Lands.

58 sustainable logging practices in the form of ecosystem-based management (EBM) for the remaining area (to be implemented by 2009).

3.1.2 Tasmania In Tasmania, Aboriginals have lived in and used forests for at least 30,000 years. Their use of fIre for access and for hunting has changed the distribution ofvegetation types increasing the area of eucalypt forest and open grassland on expense of rainforests (Brown and Podger 2005). However, commercial extraction didn't start until the fIrst European permanent setdements in 1803 and export of Tasmania's 'tall' (eucalypt) forests to overseas markets started in the 1820s with a series of mainly coastal setdements that rapidly displaced Aboriginal society (Brown and Podger 2005). Tasmania served the Crown as penal colony and resource extraction took advantage of the largely male convict labour force while white setders cleared large areas of open woodlands mainly for agriculture. Forestry focused on the tall (eucalypt) forests and was centred on the establishment of a number of small sawmills that provided timber for construction and export to the mainland as well as the United Kingdom (Dargavel2005). During the 19th century the timber industry was largely unregulated even though control over resource access was crucial for the colonial administration to maintain the established social order during the convict era (Robson 1983). Royalties were low and didn't reflect the value of the forest. At the beginning of the 20th century about nine million board feet were shipped annually overseas. Interest in Tasmanian timber for paper manufacturing and for building started spreading during World War I leading to the construction of pulp mills.. During the early 1930s the forest economy was hit by a major depression. Even though management practices were considered to be poor and no replanting or reforestation occurred, the Tasmanian government extended harvesting rights to paper companies to overcome the downturn. Demand for timber increased further during World War II when the production of sawn timber averaged 80 million board feet per year (Robson 1983, 503).

Traditionally, timber was allocated by licences or forest harvesting concessions. The system was replaced in the 1990s by one of long-term sales linked to a legislated commitment guaranteeing a minimum quantity of saw logs to the industry each year (Dargavel2005). About 71 percent of Tasmania's forests are Crown land (state forest and parks) and 29 percent are privately owned; 16 percent of the latter are held by large industrial

59 companies.18 In contrast to BC, state forest is managed by the state (43 percent of forest land) through the publicly owned state enterprise, Forestry Tasmania. While forest operations in BC are concentrated in the hands of a few large companies, this trend is even more accentuated in Tasmania. "The general tendency towards corporatism in BC is even more enhanced here because you have basically one large public entity and one large private entity." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006) One single company, Gunns Ltd., processes over 70 percent of all the wood felled in the state and is also the largest private forest manager (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005). Norske Skog is the largest private softwood estate manager.

Since World War II, Tasmania's economy developed mainly based on large-scale primary resource extraction: cheap hydroelectricity and timber. In the late 1960s, hydroelectric development reached its peak. Around 1972 a large woodchip exporting industry developed, leading to a resurgence ofland clearing (Gee 2001). Continuing today, the majority of wood produced is pulped for paper mills including large volumes of woodchips for overseas markets, primarily Japan. Similar to the situation in BC, public perception started to shift in the late 1960s and early 1970s in opposition to hydroelectric development plans. The environmental focus soon shifted from hydro to forestry resulting in the ongoing conflict around Tasmania's forests. The Australian Regional Forest Assessment and Agreement program was started in 1992 to take forest issues off the political agenda (Dargavel1998; Lane 1999). Its main objectives were to agree on the long-term management and use of forests (on a regional level) including security of access to forest resources, conservation of environmental, heritage, and social values, while meeting the requirements of the governments, communities, and industry involved. In contrast to BC, the Commonwealth has played a considerable role in Tasmanian forest politics for a number of reasons. First, signing international conventions on biological protection and conservation gave the Commonwealth the power to intervene and protect land from state­ approved development or naming areas of world heritage status. Second, by holding control over foreign affairs and trade, the increasing stream of woodchip exports gave the Commonwealth constitutional power to licence the exports. Lastly, due to its weak

18 For state forest the decision whether land may be used for the purpose of forestry is decided in Parliament. In respect to private land the local government decides based on planning schemes.

60 economy, Tasmania has always been dependent on federal funds and the Commonwealth has frequently used fll1ancial incentives to realize national interests.

Even though Tasmania has recently experienced high economic growth rates it remains Australia's weakest economy and has the highest unemployment rate in the country with 6.8 percent as of 2004 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006). In 1995 the Commonwealth and State government signed the National Forest Policy Statement that prescribed planning on a regional rather than a state or national basis for a "comprehensive, adequate and representative network" of conservation reserves (Australian Government 1992, 8) and that provided the basis for the Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) process. The Tasmanian government signed its RFA in 1997 including a withdrawal of the Commonwealth from participation in forest debates (such as using its power to prevent export) once an adequate reserve system and guidelines for sustainable management had been established. The RFA failed to end the forest conflict and environmental lobbying for increased protection continued. The RFA also failed to take into consideration any indigenous rights in the forests. As before, the conflict continued to be played out to a considerable extent on a federal level. In May 2005, Prime Minister John Howard and Tasmania's Premier Paul Lennon signed the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement (TCFA), an ADS $250 million deal, in another attempt to bring the conflict to an end. The governments committed to the protection of 170,000 hectares of forest on public and

19 private land, reduction of clearfelling , phasing out of the conversion of native forests to plantations, and fll1ancial assistance to forestry and related industry.

3.2 Rules of the Game

The ways in which resource regimes are reinforced or challenged depend to a considerable extent on prevalent social norms, habits, and routines. This section briefly comments on the rules of the game in BC and Tasmania from a historical perspective that stresses the importance of their immigration histories and forest policies from the mid 1850s to the mid 1990s. The historical context is important for an analysis of contemporary environmental bargaining as the rules of the game that are currently in place developed out of traditional norms and habits under the influence of different socio-cultural values. In BC

19 The term 'clearfelling' is predominantly used in Australia while 'clearcutting' is used in Canada.

61 and Tasmania, norms, habits, and routines were primarily influenced by a number of factors such as the regions' immigration history where early settlement in the late 19th century until the present day has impacted resource use and forms of management. Given that resources are a function of human wants and abilities, people view nature (or resources) in different ways, mainly influenced by socio-cultural factors (e.g., education, family, religion) but also economic status. Historically, the large numbers of immigrants with diverse cultural and social backgrounds that arrived in the two regions after the mid 1850s strongly affected regional economic development and shaped the cultural identity of the regions as extractionist resource regimes. In recent decades, the arrival of 'new settlers' and the formation of a new middle class together with increased urbanization has led to changes in perspectives regarding the use of natural resources and to growing concerns regarding environmental values (Willems-Braun 1997; DargaveI1995). Public perception regarding the dominance of export-oriented resource industries didn't start to change until the late 1960s and early 1970s that marked the growing influence of a strong environmental movement. Further, the assumption that the land occupied by the early settlers and immigrants was empty, despite its reality as home to Aboriginal peoples had great implications for decision­ making processes and the way resources were valued from ftrst European settlement to the present day. Traditionally, the forest resource regimes ignored native resource uses and in some places within the two regions Aboriginal interests are still not considered. The long history of displacement and condemnation of Aboriginal peoples clearly affects today's politics. This 'new' reality is particularly evident in BC's treaty processes and forest conflicts, in recent compensation claims by Australia's so-called 'stolen generation' (Flanagan 2007a; McMahon 2007) and recent debates around Be's residential schools that in some cases were operated until the 1980s.

3.2.1 British Columbia The socio-cultural context in BC has been shaped by its immigration history that has brought in a diversity of cultural values, perceptions, and identities. Today's British Columbians are from multi-cultural descent and the province considers itself as one of Canada's most liberal and open-minded provinces. While the public has supported the industrial imperative until the 1980s, a shift in job opportunities and claims by ENGOs and Aboriginal people have led to a change in general attitudes particularly in the urban centres.

62 Another relevant aspect to the study of forest conflicts in BC is the history of Aboriginal rights and land title.

Historically, BC has been a province of immigrants and continues to be to the present day. Immigration patterns affect existing norms and routines as immigrants bring in a wide range of values, perspectives, and habits that are not necessarily in accordance with existing institutional structures and transform the rules of the game. The origin and destination (e.g., urban versus rural settlement) of immigrants and changes over time impact regional institutions to a considerable extent. As Barman (1996, 367) points out "British Columbia's diversity of peoples has become integral to the province's identity." The discovery ofgold in the Fraser River in the mid 1850s and later in the Cariboo region resulted in an economic boom of the region with thousands arriving. British descendents dominated early immigration reflected in the long-lasting privilege of British citizens to vote in provincial elections (Barman 1996). Despite this dominance the immigrant population has always been diverse descending from other parts of Canada, China, and to a smaller extent from mainland Europe and the United States. More recently immigrants have come increasingly from China and South Asia. While early immigrants were drawn by BC's natural resources and related industries, today the majority of newcomers settles in the urban centres, the service-oriented urban heartland of metropolitan Vancouver. In 2006 BC had the second-highest proportion of foreign-born individuals of all provinces. Foreign-born individuals accounted for 27.5 percent (1.1 million) compared to 19.8 percent nation-wide (Statistics Canada 2007) and 25 percent (one million) ofBC's population are visible minorities. BC's heartland is divided from a resource-based hinterland economy of the rest of the province that becomes not only visible in a stark contrast in income. This division is far more accentuated than in Tasmania with its considerable smaller urban centres, Hobart and Launceston. Greater Vancouver's service-orientation results in greater economic stability. The 'resource frontier' particularly resource communities and single-industry towns have been very vulnerable to market downturns. Due to its dependence on the extraction of natural resources, the hinterland has been (and often still is) characterized by a strong pro­ industry attitude that up until the 1970s and 1980s was shared by the large majority of British Columbians.

63 However, the perception that resource exploitation provides an inexhaustible source of wealth to the province has increasingly been condemned by environmental interests. Environmental concerns have mainly grown louder in urban Vancouver driven both by residents as well as increased numbers of tourists that have discovered BC's natural beauty and the opportunities for outdoor recreation and tourism. But the natural beauty of the province has also attracted many environmentally minded settlers in search of a healthy living environment. Many of them have chosen rural and remote locations such as the Kootenays or Gulf Islands that are known for their 'hippie' or 'alternative' communities.

Since European contact, Aboriginal control over land and resources, and basic human rights, have been eroded in many ways (e.g., it was illegal for Aboriginal people to own land and celebrate potlatches). First Nations have claimed their rights from the beginning of colonization and since the 1970s they have more and more used the courts to increase their influence and claim their legal and constitutional rights to control lands and resources - often much more successful than through participation at constitutional negotiating tables. Multiple governments failed to recognize Aboriginal rights as for example the Sloan Royal Commission. BC's forest tenure system has led to a massive reallocation of control over First Nations' territories and radical alteration of their lands and waters over decades (Clogg 2007). First Nations in Canada only received "continuous explicit constitutional status binding the actions of governments" through the Constitutional Act in 1982 that protects their Aboriginal rights (Hessing et al. 2005). In BC, First Nations have unextinguished treaty and Aboriginal rights that may include Aboriginal title, the right of exclusive use, and occupation of the land (Donovan and Griffith 2003). The BC Treaty Commission was established in 1992 to settle outstanding land claims of BC First Nations together with the federal government. The provincial government has the mandate to extensively consult First Nations when making decisions on resource management and to accommodate their interests in their traditional territories in the province. Both frameworks for the CORE and LRMP processes prescribe that land use decisions must not infringe on Aboriginal rights and that decisions should be made cooperatively with those groups whose rights or interests may be affected. In respect to the Great Bear Rainforest, the province engages in government-to-government negotiations with First Nations to settle any concerns.

64 When forest conflicts started to be played out on a national and international scale in the early 1990s First Nations found themselves again marginalized in a conflict that was framed largely as a bilateral struggle between ENGOs and industry with no regard to native cultures and territorialities, a persistent attitude Braun (2002) refers to as 'postcolonial'. Through their legislated rights, however, they play an important role in land use decisions today, which makes them powerful allies for other stakeholders. While some Aboriginal communities align their interests with ENGOs, others prefer to collaborate with industry or to remain independent.

3.2.2 Tasmania Similarly to Be, the rules of the game in Tasmania developed under the influence of a number of historical factors including Tasmania's immigration history. In Tasmania, social norms and cultural identity are strongly influenced by (1) its convict legacy and early settlement, (2) recent immigration patterns and changes in values away from strong support of extractive industries towards a sustainable position, and (3) its history of explicit oppression ofTasmanian Aboriginals that culminated in the deportation and genocide of Tasmania's native people. To a lesser degree, social history has also been influenced by its geographical location at the periphery, its island state character, and the harsh environmental conditions that reduced the rust European settlements several times due to starvation.

In May 1853, transportation of convicts from England ended after 50 years leaving "a legacy that was to have a profound influence on the ongoing development of Tasmania's social, political and resource management cultures" (phillips et al. 2002, 460). In 1836, the total population ofTasmania had reached 43,000 of which 75 percent of the people were convicts, had been convicts or were of convict ancestry (Robson 1985). The convict legacy haunted Tasmanian society many decades into the 20th century and was the cause of extreme social anxiety. Tasmanians were desperate to distance themselves from their convict past or what historian Henry Reynolds (1969) called the 'hated stain' - a collective shame of a community that descended largely from prisoners. Once deportations had stopped, the island was renamed Tasmania (prior Van Diemen's Land) in an effort to overcome the past. In the following decades, families denied their ancestors, ostracized convict relatives, and created fake genealogies with the result that today many Tasmanians don't know their roots (Hay 2000). The convict history has also been used to explain Tasmania's strong loyalty to

65 the Crown and their resistance to political and social change, and egalitarian, and democratic political views (Hay 2000; Phillips et al. 2002; Reynolds 1969). Phillips et al. (2002, 460) describe the political culture as dominated by paternalism, patronage, and vested interest. Equally, Reynolds (1969, 31) refers to the colony as "the most conservative, the most traditional and Anglophile, the most 'un-Australian' in outlook." The convict legacy has influenced Tasmanian politics far longer and more widely than has been the case on the mainland. Even today, Tasmanians seem to have retained a conservative position along with the conviction that they are always lagging behind the rest of Australia. In this conservative context, the rise of a strong environmental voice is particularly contested and has often been linked to the so-called 'new settlers' who have come to Tasmania since the 1950s mostly to escape, for example, urbanization, pollution, or the Cold War in search for a pristine, untouched place. One new settler explained: 'We are all running away from something we don't like, from traffic lights, the pollution, etc. and we ended up in this particular spot because [...] it's the sense of place that matters" (ENV TAS 09, June 2005). The value systems and political views of the new settlers often contradicted those of multiple­ generation Tasmanians and in many cases still do.

Tasmanian Aboriginals were displaced from their traditional lands right from the start of European colonization. Conflict between settlers and Aboriginals peaked around 1824 when governor George Arthur approved the deportation of all Aboriginals to Flinders Island, northwest of Tasmania, to 'civilize' and Christianize them. Aboriginals were also forbidden to practice their traditional lifestyle. Final deportation ended in 1831 and the last full-blood Aboriginal died on Flinders Island in 1876. Australia's history of oppression and racism continued long into the 20th century, as for example, in the 'stolen generation'. Up until the late 1960s the Australian government forcefully removed Aboriginal children from their families, as they were believed to be better off being raised in a 'white' context by foster families or even in orphanages. It also took the Australian government until 1999 to issue an official apology for past injustices to Aboriginals and in 2007 John Howard, Prime Minister of the day, was still accused of being racist (Flanagan 2007a). Tasmanian census returns didn't list any Aborigines until the 1970s when Tasmanians of mixed descent started to identify themselves again as Aboriginals (Robson 1985). Today, Aboriginal status is highly contested amongst the Aboriginal communities themselves and has made Aboriginal representation difficult. Of the 16,900 Tasmanians who claimed Aboriginal status in the

66 2006 census only about 9,000 are recognized by the Aboriginal community. The Aboriginal Land Act was passed in 1995 and 12 significant historic and cultural sites were returned to Aboriginal Tasmanians that are now administered by the Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania. Both, the Tasmanian Aboriginal Land Council, responsible for preserving Aboriginal culture and heritage, and the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre are representing Tasmanian Aboriginal interests. However, representation is contested amongst Aboriginals of different descent. Due to the challenges around recognition, the long-lasting oppression of their culture in Australia, their 'stolen generation', and restricted rights, Tasmanian Aboriginals haven't been able to build up bargaining powers to the same extent First Nations in BC have and are still largely left out of decision-making processes regarding resource management.

3.3 Environmental Voices

"There is the old saying the world is governed by those who turn up and the environmental movement is very good in turning up." (IND TAS 08, June 2005)

This section focuses on the value changes that emerged in BC and Tasmania with the rise of environmentalism since the 1970s and 1980s that have become particularly evident in the large number of ENGOs. Environmentalism represents the non-industrial values of forest resources. In BC and Tasmania environmental interests have focused on native forest types that differ in species and diversity. After briefly commenting on the different ecosystems, the section explains the rise of ENGOs in BC and Tasmania and characteristics of the environmental movements in the two regions.

In the last few decades, environmental conflicts in BC have revolved mainly around its temperate rainforests. Temperate rainforests are found in milder coastal climates of the mid-latitudes where rainfalls are high and seasonal climate changes are minimal allowing vegetation to grow year round. These forests have many canopy layers, tree sizes and ages, high numbers of epiphytes, and dense understory. Today only about half of the world's original temperate rainforests, once covering about 0.2 percent of the earth's surface, are left (David Suzuki Foundation 2007) including the world's largest tract of temperate rainforest, the Great Bear Rainforest along Be's central and north coast. North America is the only

67 continent where temperate rainforest is dominated by coniferous trees such as western hemlock (Tsuga heteroprylla), western redcedar (Th,!ja plicata), Douglas-fir (Pseudotsuga men::;.Jesiz), and Sitka spruce (Picea sitchensis) that can grow up to 80 metres in height and reach over 1,000 years in age. In Tasmania, temperate rainforest is the most ancient vegetation type made up of relic Gondwana species dominated by myrtle (Nothofagus cunninghamiz) but also sassafras (Atherosperma moschatum), leatherwood (Eucryphia lucida) , pencil and King Billy pine (Athrotaxis sp.), Huon pine (Lagarostrobus jrankliniz), and celery-top pine (Plyllocladus aspeniifolius) that survived various ice ages and can be mainly found in the northwest of the island, especially the Tarkine, where rainfalls are higher (Reid 2005). Even though it covers a smaller area than its Canadian counterpart at the Pacific coast, Tasmania's temperate rainforests are no less significant. Due to its separation from the mainland around 12,000 years ago Tasmania is home to various endemic species and its rainforest alone accommodates over 50 threatened and endangered species. But the temperate rainforest is not the only contested vegetation type in Tasmania. Its wet sclerophyll EucalYptus forests contain the world's tallest hardwood trees. Swamp gum (Eucalptus regnans) and stringybark (EucalYptus obliqua) can reach up to 90 metres (Reid and Potts 2005). However, these trees are also the basis of most of Tasmania's forest industry providing wood for saw logs, paper, pulp, and woodchips.

3.3.1 British Columbia Presently, the BC environmental movement consists of a heterogeneous mix of largely endogenous, local organizations (e.g., Raincoast Conservation Society, Valhalla Wilderness Society) and groups with international range such as Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) based in the United States. Table 3.1 lists selected ENGOs campaigning on the Great Bear Rainforest showing differences in size, objectives, and strategies. While the movement shares certain core perspectives, positions on priorities and tactics differ quite considerably. It has a long tradition with numerous hiking and climbing clubs, naturalist groups, and fish and wildlife clubs. Groups mainly concerned with environmental advocacy, however, only started to playa larger role from the 1960s on. The conservation movement in BC boomed during the 1970s and 1980s and by the early 1980s forest and wilderness issues became its major concern. The Green Party in BC was founded in 1983 but compared to Tasmania has only played a marginal role in forest

68 Table 3.1 Selected organizations promoting forest protection and conservation in the Great Bear Rainforest

Revenues BC Forest Campaigns Foun­ Geographic Name Membership 2005 (in dation range Regional CAD) Office Objectives Strategies / Activities Focus

David Suzuki 1990 US and 40,000 5,219,006 Vancouver Coastal BC Sustainable logging and land use Scientific reports and Foundation Canada practices publications; environmental education

Dogwood 1998 BC Na NA Victoria BC Sustainable land reform and Community support Initiative community empowerment . __~· · ,·__~ ·__m_·__·_~·__··• .. _ Ecotrust 1995 Be none - 5,000,000* Vancouver Coastal BC Building a conservation economy Community support, Canada environmental services, business planning and lending

Forest Action 1993 BC Network of NA Bella Coola Coastal BC 'Defending' the remaining ancient Non-violent direct action Network 500 activists forests and related ecosystems

Forest 1994 US, Na NA Vancouver BC Protecting endangered forests by Markets campaign, public Ethics" Canada, transforming the paper and wood education, publications, reports, Chile industry ads, lobbying -----­-----_._- ----, Greenpeace 1971 National -100,000 8,782,632 Vancouver Great Bear Protecting temperate rainforests Markets campaign, non-violent Canada Rainforest and promoting sustainable forest direct action, public education, management publications, ads, lobbying ------".,",,---­ Rainforest 1985 Inter­ -75,000 3,514,328 San Great Bear Protecting endangered forests, Markets campaign, public Action national Francisco Rainforest promoting sustainable economies, education, lobbying Network protecting indigenous rights

Raincoast 1990 BC NA NA Victoria, Great Bear Protecting marine and rainforest Public education, publications, Conservation Bella Bella Rainforest habitat along the coast scientific research, land Society acquisition, community support

Sierra Club of 1969 National 700,000 949,626 Victoria BC Protectmg wild places, promoting Public education, publications, Canada, BC (Canada) responsible resource use community support Chapter

69 Revenues BC Forest Campaigns Foun­ Geographic Name Membership 2005 (in dation range Regional CAD) Office Objectives Strategies / Activities focus -­ The Spirit Bear 1995 BC NA NA Vancouver Great Bear Saving BC's rare white Kermode Political 10 bbying, letter writing Youth Rainforest bear campaigns, school education Coalition ------~-_._---_.-_.._----_._._------Valhalla 1975 BC NA NA New BC Protecting the Kermode bear, Scientific research and repotts, Wilderness Denver wildlife conservation, watersheds letter writing campaigns Society ------_._---.------_.-_._.---'------._----_•. _---_ ••.._---_._--_.._­ West Coast 1974 BC Donors only 1,246,951 Vancouver BC Promoting progressive Financial and legal assistance for Environmental environmental law reform in BC citizens and groups to solve Law environmental issues ------_.. __._------_.... _------­ Western 1980 Canada 29,503 1,668,448 Vancouver, BC Saving wilderness and wildlife Research, education, rallies, Canada Victoria events, media, community Wilderness support Committee .- ._~ . ­ ------* refers to 2004 _. ** formerly Coastal Rainforest Coalition (until mid 2000)

Source: Information provided by the organizations

70 conflicts. Around the same time public perception really started to shift regarding forest management performance (Stanbury 2000; Wilson 1998). A public opinion poll from the mid 1980s indicated that 70 to 80 percent of BC residents viewed the forest industry rather critically and concerns regarding poor logging practices started to grow (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006). This included also concerns from loggers and contractors. As Table 3.1 shows, more than half of the ENGOs listed were founded in the 1990s. Plunder ofnatural resources has mosdy been attributed to outside interests such as multinational corporations even though British Columbians have equally exhausted their resources (Barman 1996).

Table 3.2 Provincial land base under Protected Areas Status in Be

Year million ha % protected 1970 3.1 3.3 1980 5.1 5.4 1991 5.7 6.1 1996 8.9 9.4 2001 11.9 12.5 2006 13.09 13.8 2008 14.07 14.9

Source: Be Ministry 0 f Environment http://www.env.gov.bc. cal soerptI 1protectedareasIgpercent. html and http://www.env.gov.bc. cal bcparkslfactsl stats.html

The Social Credit government (1976-1991) contributed to a rise of environmental awareness through its political course of promoting forest industry growth and empowering the MOF instead of further developing the interagency model of integrated planning that had started in the early 1970s. "A weaker, more transitory environmental movement might have been contained by the [government's] combination of resistance, minor symbolic offerings, and miniscule substantive concessions. But this was an ascendant movement with significant roots. [...] The intensity and sophistication of the movement's oversight activities increased as a result." (Wilson 1998,211) Even though the Social Credit government added more than 500,000 hectares to the park system in its final five years (see Tab. 3.2) and addressed some environmental issues, it wasn't able to solve most of the high-proftle wilderness conflicts. Following the election of the NDP in the early 1990s,

71 environmentalists extended their interests beyond protection of selected valleys to include forest practices and management issues. At the same time, groups with more radical perspectives became more prominent along with increased internationalization.

During the 1980s and early 1990s conflicts consisted of area-specific 'valley-by­ valley' battles that focused on selected areas slated for logging such as South Moresby, Stein Valley, and Meares Island in Clayoquot Sound on Vancouver Island. Campaigns covered a wide range of strategies. Environmentalists engaged in acts of civil disobedience using direct strategies such as road blockades or tree spiking while others used legal avenues against the forest industry (Hayter 2000). The conflicts climaxed in the summer of 1993 in what has been described in the media as Canada's 'largest act of peaceful civil disobedience' around logging in Clayoquot Sound. The Clayoquot Sound campaign on Vancouver Island was also Greenpeace's fIrst forest campaign. The logging protests around Clayoquot Sound came to an end in 1995 after the Province had announced the recommendations of the ScientifIc Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices. Up until the late 1980s, conflicts were played out mainly on a provincial or national level in order to build up public support often in alliance with First Nations but environmentalists already started to expand their campaigns beyond the Canadian border. Since 1990 the movement has become more professional along with increased internationalization. "The movement wisely chose to invest heavily in indirect lobbying, in approaches aimed at encouraging supporters to express their views to government. Increasingly, it augmented activities aimed at British Columbians with campaigns designed to shape the perceptions and responses of national and international audiences." (Wilson 1998, 340) The new environmental focus on forest practices since the 1990s required also a shift in strategies such as access to decision-making processes and participation in collaborative efforts like CORE and the LRMP processes. During the last three decades, the environmental movement has been successful in keeping forest conflicts constantly at the top of the Province's political agenda but Wilson (1998, 339) points out that "the BC wilderness movement has 'won some important battles, but not the war.'"

The strength of the BC forest movement is based on broad public support, a wilderness with species that are particularly appealing to the public, a large and intensely committed pool of activists, and (growing) access to important allies from inside and (particularly) outside BC (Wilson 1998). Weaknesses, especially in the earlier years, resulted

72 from limited access to key officials in government, lack of fmancial resources, and a certain amount of internal discord between ENGOs that has changed significantly through the Great Bear Rainforest campaign.

3.3.2 Tasmania Criticism of excessive and thoughtless exploitation of forest resources in Tasmania emerged as early as 1900 including warnings about ''wilful and ignorant destruction of fme trees" (Robson 1983, 269) leading to "a conflict between those who put immediate gain foremost and those who counselled a comprehensive system of forest management" (Robson 1985, 72). More dramatic and widespread changes in attitudes towards the environment have been more recent emerging in the late 1960s as a response to Tasmania's hydro-industrialization and the proposal to flood Lake Pedder, the 'jewel in the crown' of the southwest wilderness. The Lake Pedder Action Committee was formed in 1971 and ran a nationwide campaign to save the lake mostly lobbying the federal government. This led to the formation of the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian Group that later became The Tasmanian Greens and that unsuccessfully ran several state and federal elections (Sewell et al. 1989). Gee (2001, xii) comments on the efforts ofThe Tasmanian Greens: "Being branded a conservationist in exploitation-minded Tasmania was the political kiss of death." After the flooding of Lake Pedder in 1972 that destroyed a vast area of forest, activists involved in the campaign formed the South-West Tasmanian Action Committee. Two years later the Committee became The Wilderness Society (TWS), Tasmania's largest and most radical environmental organization. The environmental movement continued to focus on hydroelectric deVelopment projects such as plans to dam the Franklin River including the Franklin Blockade in 1982 with over 1,000 arrests.

The first campaign against export woodchipping got underway as early as 1971 (Gee 2001). Forest campaigns started escalating in the early 1980s showing a similar 'valley-by­ valley' character as in Be. Non-violent direct action including blockades and tree sits culminated in the late 1980s with campaigns such as Farmhouse Creek, Lemonthyme, and Jackeys Marsh. Blockades were followed by boycott campaigns, massive rallies, and other efforts to raise public awareness. Public perception of the forest issue in Tasmania has been "generally pretty crude" (Gee 2001, xiv). "[T]he inflammatory suggestion was made that many conservationists led idle and useless lives." (Robson 1985, 177) However, support has

73 been growing over the last three decades. Even though direct action continues until today, the 1990s saw increased national lobbying, markets campaigns, and the use of legal avenues. Since the Lake Pedder campaign, environmental activists in Tasmania have utilized growing support on the mainland (particularly the important electorates of Melbourne and Sydney), and later from abroad, to lobby federal politicians and the Commonwealths. Global support for the Tasmanian conservation movement rose in the 1970s with the Franklin River being the fIrst single wilderness preservation campaign to catch worldwide attention. Since the late 1980s environmental politics have been shaped considerably by federal-state relations. Just as the environmental movement in BC, the Tasmanian organizations have become more sophisticated and international. Hay (2000, 5) even claims that

"no community anywhere in the world has had the exposure to green values and aspirations that Tasmanians have had. Tasmanian politics has been continuously dominated by environmental issues since the Lake Pedder campaign [...]. The ideological fulcrum around which Tasmanian politics has swung for three decades is thus to exploit or to preserve, and the environment movement, as a consequence, is philosophically, tactically, and organizationally skilled - in the 1980s it was at the international frontier in this respect."

As a result of environmental activism, Tasmania has seen a considerable increase in protected areas over the last 40 years that in 2006 covered nearly 40 percent of the land area (Tab. 3.3).

Today, the forest movement in Tasmania is dominated by two endogenous organizations, the 'radical' TWS and the more moderate Tasmanian Conservation Trust (TCT), formed in 1968, which follow very different strategies. A multitude of small, grassroots groups consisting of only a handful of active members and a few national and international organizations are also heavily involved in Tasmanian forest campaigns. Table 3.4 gives an overview of selected ENGOs working on forest issues in Tasmania. Additionally, and in contrast to BC, the environmental movement in Tasmania has a highly active political arm, The Tasmanian Greens, who are represented on the state and federal level. In general The Greens have been less radical and ecological politics less volatile during the 1990s than 1980s as a consequence of shifting from rivers and forest barricades to parliament. Nonetheless, they have been very successful in keeping forests on the political

74 agenda and are often seen as close ally of the environmental movement in general and TWS in particular.

Table 3.3 Protected land area in Tasmania

Year million ha % protected 1968 0.288 4.2 1978 0.681 10.0 1986 0.948 13.9 1996 2.177 32.0 2004 2.590 37.9 2006 2.721 39.8 2008 No data available No data available

Source: Department of the Environment and Water Resources, Australian Government, 2004; Young, 2000.

The strength of the Tasmanian forest movement largely stems from the high number of highly committed activists from within and outside the state, many of whom have been engaged for over 30 years now. Public support for forest campaigns in Tasmania has probably been less pronounced than in BC but has grown considerably over the years as activists have successfully used endemic species as flagships for their campaigns. The Tasmanian public also appears to be more divided over forest issues. Just as the BC groups, the Tasmanian activists have been good in gaining support on the mainland and internationally particularly using federal politicians and the Commonwealth. However, they have been less lucky in finding support within the state. Considerable barriers exist particularly in respect to collaboration with governments and industry as well as fInancial support. The movement itself is also experiencing internal tensions and conflicts regarding strategies and goals that have threatened its effectiveness.

75 Table 3.4 Selected ENGOs promoting forest protection and conservation in Tasmania

Revenues Tasmanian Forest Campaigns Foun­ Geogra­ Name Membership 2005 (in dationt phic range Regional CAD) Office Objectives Strategies / Activities focus

Australian 1964, National 30,000 6,593,847 Can- State Protection of high conservation areas; Public awareness rising; Lobbying Conservation me. berra micro-economic reforms; FSC (mainland); Foundation 1966 certification for plantations

Doctors for 2001 Tasmania - 200 NA None State Reduction of health risk esp. through Lobbying, awareness raising and Forests chemical use (aerial spraying and education Oetters, media releases) other uses related to forestry)

Environmental ine. National NA 87,766* Ho­ State To increase public awareness of Legal representation and advice, active Defenders bart environmental laws and remedies role in environmental law reform and policy formulation

Friends of the -1994/ Local 5-6 active NA None Break Establishment of Nature Recreation Non-violent direct action (road camp); Blue Tier 1995, members O'Day Area "North East HigWands lobbying (state and federal); -2002 National Park" community activities; scientific studies

Friends of the 1971, Inter­ Federation of 3,500,510 Ams­ State Conservation of Australia's remaining Lobbying (local and international), Earth me. national groups (no terdam forests; promotion of FSC awareness raising, media releases International individual certification membership)

Gondwana -1998 Inter­ 10-15 core NA None State Creation 0 f an international, Lobbying national members in intercontinental sanctuary for the Tasmania world's southernmost forests

Greenpeace 1977, Inter­ - 130,000 15,185,353 Syd­ Styx Protection 0 f Styx Valley; Non-violent direct action (Global Australia-Pacific me. national ney Valley conservation biology and sustainable Rescue Station); icon campaigning; management practices media stunts; markets campaigns Oapan)

Huon Valley 2001/ Local - 80 NA Huon­ Weld Environmental education, protection Environmental education, community Environment 2002 ville Valley of the Weld Valley resource centre, fundraising Centre

Rainforest Action 1985, Inter­ - 75,000 3,514,328 USA, State 'Trees not Gunns' campaign Corporate lobbying, markets Network me. national Japan campaigns

76 Revenues Tasmanian Forest Campaigns Foun­ Geogra­ Name Membership 2005 (in dationt phic range Regional CAD) Office Objectives Strategies I Activities focus

Reedy Marsh 1992 Local -100;-5 NA None Deloraine Protect local area, particularly dry Letters, reports Forest Conser­ active forests In earlier years: direct action vation Group members

Save the South 2004 Local - 200; -20 NA None St Marys Prevention of logging the local Non-violent direction action (road Sister active mountain ('Save the South Sister' camp); applications and stop-work members campaign) orders; petitions, scientific studies

Save the Weld -2005 Local - 15 activists None None Weld Stop logging in the Weld Valley Non-violent direction action (road Action Group Valley camps, tree sits), media stunts, public awareness raising

.~-._--~------Tamar River 2005 Local 1,400 None None Tamar Against a chlorine-dioxide based pulp Rallies, petitions, public awareness Action Committee households Valley mill in the Tamar Valley raising and education

-----._-.---_....------. -_._ .. __._~-_.. _._--_..-_._-_.._-- Tarkine National 1994, Local - 150, -6 NA Burnie Tarkine, Protection of Tarkine Wilderness Community activities and education; Coalition InC. active NW Area and establishment of the lobbying (federal and state); tourism 2002 members Tasmania Tarkine World Heritage Area studies; support groups in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane

Tasmanian 1968, Tasmania 400-500 205,058* Ho- State Against advance of industry into Engagement and cooperation; lobbying Conservation InC. bart forests with focus on private forest Trust lands

The Wilderness 1976, National not publicly 10,580,875 Ho- State, Styx Protection of the Styx Valley; Anti- Non-violent direct action (Global Society inc. available, - bart & Tamar Pulp Mill Campaign Rescue Station); media stunts (fhe 8,000 in Valley World's Largest Christmas Tree); Tasmania rallies; public education

Timber Workers 2001 Tasmania 50 members, NA None State Reform of forest harvesring practices; Research papers and reports (incl. for Forests 150 associate secured supply of special species blueprint); media releases; lobbying; members and tim ber and high quality eucalypt; displays supporters waste issue

WWF-Australia 1978, National! - 80,000 15,964,120 Syd- State; Protection ofTarkine Wilderness; Scientific studies; opinion polls; InC. inter- supporters ney Tarkine reduction of land clearing; protection lobbying (federal and state); report national of biodiversity (WWF blue print) t Ifnot indicated otherwise, institutions are not incorporated; * referring to 2004. Source: Information provided by the organizations.

77 3.4 The Conflicts

In BC and Tasmania 'nature' and 'resources' have been constructed and defmed in different ways and these ways are contested and changing. But not only the way nature is seen but also the rules of the game and the organizations in place are challenged by ENGOs that seek to restructure the regions according to their interests. Up until white contact, Aboriginal cultures lived in and utilized the forests for subsistence. Since then, capitalism and market exchange have produced the idea of forest as a commodity. This is illustrated by the resource regimes in Tasmania and BC expressed in the forest as a form of market relations not only in forestry but also tourism or even conservation (e.g., Braun 2002). But nature is also seen as something 'separable and noble' that provides an escape from civilization expressed by many eady wilderness organizations such as outdoor and hiking clubs that started emerging in the late 19 th century and more recently as something holding intrinsic value in itself represented by the new environmental movement since the 1960s and 1970s and the immigration of new settlers who often hold different values regarding forest. These differences in values and beliefs lie at the centre of the forest conflicts in BC and Tasmania. ENGOs in both case study regions have proven quite successful in questioning the vested interests in "an apparent state of equilibrium" (Sidaway 200S, 49) by introducing new interests in an attempt to remap the use of forest resources. Wilson (1998) and Hayter (2003, 713) refer to the principal vested interests of BC's resource regime - the provincial government, big business, and unions - as 'exploitative alliance' that dominates BC's forest policy and that got under attack by demands from ENGOs and First Nations (through their land claims). As one industry representative from BC (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006) emphasized, "[e]arly on the conflict was around protecting areas and how much area should be protected, where should it be protected, those kinds of things along with some forestry practices. [...] Then the focus shifted to forestry practices between the protected areas and so that is where the focus has been [since]." Many actors involved in the process agreed that the Great Bear Rainforest conflict initially evolved around conservation and then shifted to management practices and EBM once the CCLRMP reached agreement. Equally, individuals in Tasmania explained the conflict about forestry as a debate about values between extraction, conservation, and alternative managemen~ practices. Environmental movements in both regions also object established power relations, the dominance of big business in close

78 alliance with the government, and the limited benefit for the public from Crown land. They seek to remap boundaries and institutions that reinforce existing structures according to their interests. But ENGOs don't necessarily agree on strategies and goals. In the BC context Hayter (2003, 713) points out that "The intensity and duration of this war in the woods reflects the engrained nature ofvested interests and because the remappers, while they condemn the status quo, differ on the contours of a new map." 'The following three chapters analyze selected forest conflicts in BC and Tasmania in respect to the process of environmental bargaining, actors involved, and spatial characteristics and implications keeping in mind the particular institutional context.

79 CHAPTER 4: REMAPPING THE RULES OF THE GAME ­ Be's GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST

In Be the nature of ENGO opposition to vested industrial interests has changed rapidly since the early 1980s and culminated in the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, the movement's most sophisticated and ambitious campaign. The objectives of the environmental movement were to change the rules of the game in order to protect old­ growth forests, to end clearcutting, to assist First Nations' land claims, and to change the political planning process. While the conflict mainly evolved around protection and how much of the area should be protected, emphasis shifted towards management practices outside the protected areas as the conflict matured. In respect to environmental activism, the Great Bear Rainforest campaign itself can be divided into three phases: (1) an early phase of confrontation from 1995 to 1999; (2) a transition phase marked by direct collaboration from 1999 to 2004; and (3) a post-process Government-to-Government (G2G) phase that led to the ftnal decision in 2006 (for a simplifted timeline of the Great Bear campaign see Table 4.1). Each phase is characterized by the key actors involved and their bargaining power, changing relationships between the bargaining parties, ENGO strategies and tactics employed, and the regional speciftcities that defme the places where bargaining is played out.

This chapter analyzes how ENGOs have challenged vested economic interests and sought to remap and change the rules of the game in respect to BC's Great Bear Rainforest. It assesses environmental achievements and institutional changes in respect to environmental objectives chronologically following the three distinct campaign phases. The chapter focuses particularly on the strategies and tactics ENGOs chose in order to change the institutional constitution (organizations and their internal routines and external relations) and regional context (rules of the game) in the region (see Fig. 4.1). In the case of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, environmental strategies and tactics cover the whole range of the conflict continuum from coercion, ftght, and violence to collaboration (see Fig. 2.2, p. 43) and include implicit and explicit forms of environmental bargaining. Environmental strategies describe the overall plan of ENGOs on how they attempt to achieve their

80 objectives, for example, non-violent direct action or markets campaign/pressure. Tactics describe specific activities that are chosen to execute the strategy such as tree sits and road blockades or lobbying of customers and consumers. The analysis draws on secondary data and data collected in interviews with 17 individuals between July and December 2006. The chapter first describes how ENGOs built up bargaining power, then explains the shift from confrontation to collaboration, and fmally analyzes bargaining during G2G negotiations between 2004 and 2006 (Tab. 4.1).

Table 4.1 Time line ofthe Great Bear Rainforest campaign

Date Event Building up bary,ainingpower 1995 Great Bear Rainforest campaign is launched. 1996 The BC government initiates the CCLRMP planning table as multiple stakeholder process ­ ENGOs refuse to participate. 1997 International markets campaign is launched. 1998 ENGOs and logging companies start informal negotiations. March 1999 ENGOs join the CCLRMP while continuing work in the marketplace. Aug. -Nov. Pressure from the market increases through buyers such as Home Depot and IKEA as well as 1999 the German pulp and publishing associations building up environmental bargaining power. Towards collaboration Nov. 1999­ ENGOs and industry negotiate for a moratorium on logging intact rainforest valleys in the May 2000 whole Great Bear Rainforest while negotiations are underway.

July 2000 ENGOs and companies form the Joint Solutions Project aSP) to fInd solutions. Apr. 4,2001 The CCLRMP table reaches an interim agreement. Nov. 1,2001 The newly elected Liberal provincial government endorses the April 4 CCLRMP agreement. Jan. 2002 The NCLRMP planning table convenes its work. Dec. 2003 The CCLRMP table reaches consensus recommendations for the southern portion of the Great Bear Rainforest. June 2004 The NCLRMP reaches conditional consensus agreement for the northern part of the Great Bear Rainforest. Govemment-to-Govemment negotiations July 17, 2004 The BC government announces acceptance of recommendations made during the CCLRMP and NCLRMP tables. Formal G2G negotiations between First Nations and the provincial government begin which will result in fInal decisions on the Great Bear Rainforest. Feb. 7,2006 The Province announces its land use decision including combined protected areas for the regions of two million hectares (approximately one third of the area) and commitment to EBM outside of the protected areas by March 2009. Source: Adapted from The Rainforest Solution Project (http:/ / www.savethegreatbear.ofJ,/thecampaign last accessed Nov. 4, 2008)

81 Figure 4.1 Environmental bargaining in the Great Bear Rainforest

Environmental Bargaining => Remapping

4.1 Building up Environmental Bargaining Power, 1995-1999

In 1995, after 15 years of continued environmental conflict in western Canada, the focus of ENGOs started shifting from Clayoquot Sound to the central and north coast of mainland BC, the 'Yosemite of the North', in realization of the vast unprotected tracts of temperate rainforest as well as "one of the last remaining opportunities to do something very dramatic. Here [...] you had large areas intact; literally an ecosystem that you might be able to manage in that totality." (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006) As Stanbury (2000, 137) points out, the environmental movement was in need of "a new symbol on which to revive and expand the campaign to stop the logging of old growth forests in BC" and the vast, untouched forests along the central and north coast encompassing high conservation value seemed ideal to build up a successful campaign. One industry representative remembered a conversation with an environmental activist in the mid 1990s who had said: "Clayoquot Sound is over, it's fmished. There is this new campaign, it's coming and it's the 'Yosemite of the North'." (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006) In contrast to earlier valley-by-valley battles in the province, the conservation movement was developing a 'grand vision' to protect the forests along BC's central and north coast in their entirety.

82 The early phase of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign was dominated by several groups of actors: (1) a highly active environmental movement led by Greenpeace and the local Forest Action Network through their markets campaigns and later the US-based Rainforest Action Network (RAN); (2) Private forest companies operating in BC including a number of largely reactive BC forest companies that were chosen by the ENGOs as key targets, for example, International Forest Products (Interfor) and Western Forest Products (WFP) but that transformed internally as a number of them initiated the Coast Forest Conservation Initiative (CFCI) in response to environmental pressure; and (3) European and United States buyer companies of BC forest products addressed by the markets campaigns. During the fIrst years the provincial government remained largely inactive. Similarly, First Nations didn't playa key role in the fIrst years of the campaign and unions were basically absent from the bargaining process (in contrast to traditional bargaining).

ENGOs used the early years of the campaign to create (public) awareness of the Great Bear Rainforest and to build up bargaining power. Even so ENGOs employed some direct action, such as the blockades in 1997, they chose mainly indirect bargaining strategies using the international market as catalyst to achieve their goals. Figure 4.2 plots the major campaigns and initiatives of the fIrst phase of the conflict in regards to their conflict potential over time. All campaigns initiated by ENGOs are non-participatory actions reaching from blockades over direct action in front of US stores to lobbying of buyer companies. Government and industry, as shown on the top half of the graph, have engaged in some collaborative efforts. Labour and First Nations did not take up any lead roles.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the initiatives and their conflict potential in respect to the power relationships of interest groups (horizontal axis). The insert in the right bottom corner shows Sidaway's (2005) four different discourse/outcome scenarios distinguished by the extent to which decision-making is participatory and by distribution of power between interest groups (see Fig. 2.5). Even though the CCLRMP was a participatory process, it wasn't based on a balance of power and was therefore unsuccessful in properly addressing the roots of the conflict between ENGOs and forest industry. ENGO strategies were initiated from weak bargaining positions that progressively led to more balanced power relations. This shift in power forced forest companies to become proactive and form the CFCI that was created specifIcally to collaborate with ENGOs.

83 Figure 4.2 Actors and strategies - Phase I

Collaboration! Participation

• Government lnithttcd

Industry initiated o ENGO I"itialed i l-­ 1--1-99-5-----1-99-6-----'-99-7-----'-99-8-----1-9-99--+ TIME

GBR Branding by ENGOs Green­ ENGOs Markets Campaigns peaee Europe Tour

ENGOs Markets Campaigns US

Confrontation! Non-Partleipation

Figure 4.3 Bargaining power and interest groups - Phase I

Collaboration! Participation

Disparity in Parity in Power Power r------­ I I I Manipulation Negotiation and : I by powerful participatory I I Tokenism planning I I I I I I ConDict with ConDict with I I potential for minimum I I radical change change f : I Confrontation/ I Power and Decillion making I Non-Participation I based 0" Sidaway 2005 I ------~I

84 4.1.1 Environmental Strategies and Tactics The first years of the Great Bear Campaign were characterized by confrontational and non-participatory environmental campaigning that primarily served to increase ENGO bargaining power and to raise the proftle of the forests along the central and north coast. ENGOs had recognized the ecological importance of the Great Bear Rainforest and the need for protection but the region was largely unknown to the public. ENGOs were faced with the challenges of having to build up a sufficient power base and gaining public support for a peripheral, unknown region. By branding the region the 'Great Bear Rainforest' ENGOs successfully raised the region's profile not only nationally but also internationally. Tzeporah Berman, former campaigner with Greenpeace, described a restaurant visit in San Francisco in 1996 where she together with other activists started building up the campaign. "[W]e were damn sure that 'Great Bear Rainforest' was going to solicit more concern than the 'mid coast timber supply area'" (Berman 2006, no page number). In fact, the local grizzly bear, black bear, and Kermode bear were used by many ENGOs to build up their BC campaigns and proved to be an effective ~trategy to market the protection of the area.

From their experience with the Clayoquot Sound campaign environmentalists had learnt that they could win the attention of the media but that the legislative and jurisdictional systems were too dependent on forestry to make an impression. Further pressure was needed. "[S]o the idea was to go to the market place." (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006) The Great Bear campaign took a highly international character building on green attitudes and environmental consciousness of buyers and the general public mainly in western Europe. Initially, the campaign to save the Great Bear Rainforest was led by the local FAN (Stanbury 2000). By 1997 international markets campaigns led by Greenpeace and FAN were in full force successfully mobilizing public and customer support in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In contrast to earlier environmental campaigns, the ENGOs gained their power base from abroad. "I remember looking at statistics where over 80 percent in Belgium knew where the Great Bear Forest was and 50 odd percent of British Columbians knew. It just wasn't our power base." (ENV BC 02, Aug. 2006) The strategies of ENGOs were designed to alter the business climate and put pressure on the industry through their buyers and the market place. Campaigns, for example by Greenpeace, focused on selected customers including lobbying of industry clients, customer education, and organized field trips but also some direct action such as blockades together with the Nuxalk

85 Nation on Roderick Island, King Island, and Itsa in 1997 against WFP and Interfor. Buyer companies in Britain announced to phase out their contracts on BC forest products as early as 1997. From an environmental perspective, the markets campaign proved successful adding considerable tension to the already strained relationship between ENGOs and the coastal forest industry.

In 1998, RAN and Greenpeace started focusing on new targets in the United States: 'big box' retailers such as Home Depot but also other corporations including AT&T and Wal-Mart (Stanbury 2000). Using media stunts in front of retail stores and through consumer education they sought to pressure BC forest companies to get certified, to phase out clearcutting, and stop old growth logging. The same year first informal negotiations between forest industry and ENGOs started. Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and coastal logging companies successfully negotiated a temporary logging moratorium on logging in intact rainforest valleys along the central coast in exchange for ENGO participation in the CCLRMP (see Table 4.1). The following year Home Depot and IKEA both announced to change their purchasing policies phasing out products from endangered forests followed by Lowe's and Menards, the second and third largest home improvement retailers in the United States (Hoberg et al. 2004). While the international market place seemed to be receptive to the environmental campaigns, a survey conducted for the Forest Alliance of BC in December 1999 found that 75 percent of British Columbians said they disapproved of the international campaign boycotting BC forest products (Stanbury 2000). Around the same time, the German paper association (VDP) and the German magazine publishers (VDZ) threatened to stop their contracts with their BC suppliers if government and industry refused to work together with ENGOs actively engaged in the markets campaigns. This was the result of a helicopter tour organized by Greenpeace Germany in August 1999 along the central and north coast with VDP and VDZ representatives. One industry respondent who went on the tour remembered:

"I won't recall it in detail everything that happened on there but it is divisive to say that in four days we travelled throughout the central coast into the north coast out into the Cariboo-Chicotin and then down Vancouver Island back to Vancouver. [...] And by the end of that the Germans were thoroughly pissed off. And they believed that they had been misled by industry and even more so by the provincial government." (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006)

86 Back in Vancouver the German delegates called for a meeting with all interest groups. Shocked by the management practices and feeling misinformed, they threatened to cancel their long-standing contracts with BC companies unless all actors addressed the conflict collaboratively including a change in management practices and protection of old growth forests. As a consequence, the forest industry realized that ENGOs had gained considerable power and that they had to react to the pressure from the market place by directly engaging with them. The Vancouver Sun (Mar. 17, 2000) quoted WFP's chief forester saying, "Customers don't want to buy their two-by-fours or their pulp with a protester attached to it. Ifwe don't end it, they will buy their products elsewhere." (Hamilton 2000, no page number) A respondent from the BC forest industry stated:

"It became apparently clear to me that there is no point in having a LRMP that doesn't have environmental groups involved in it. It's not going to have a least shred of credibility. [...] And so for me a key goal became fmding a way for the environmental groups to come to the table." (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006)

4.1.2 Actors During the fIrst phase of the conflict, multiple ENGOs were involved in the Great Bear Rainforest region. Table 3.1 (p. 69) shows the variety of groups ranging from the local Spirit Bear Youth Coalition that focuses on saving the white Kermode bear native to the region to international organizations like Greenpeace and RAN. While some ENGOs focus on the protection of the area others, such as Ecotrust, work in collaboration with First Nations on alternative forest management practices. Similarly, strategies vary from direct action (e.g., Greenpeace, RAN, FAN) over scientifIc work and education (e.g., David Suzuki Foundation, Sierra Club, Valhalla Wilderness Society) to legal assistance and land acquisition (e.g., Raincoast Conservation Society, West Coast Environmental Law). Even though some groups started to work on collaborative strategies, no alliances were formed during the earlier years and most ENGOs worked on their own projects and campaigns in the area.

While ENGOs were very effective in using the market, Internet, and advocacy ads for their cause, industry was slow to respond. Up until 1998, forest companies operating along the coast didn't approach ENGOs to address issues. In April 1999 however, one of MacMillan Bloedel's chief offIcers started initiating meetings with representatives from other companies operating along the coast with the goal to more effectively address the

87 environmental boycott campaign (Stanbury 2000). ''We brought in a guy named Dan Johnston and we had a session, a strategy session [...] to talk about what to do. And we crafted this idea of creating a Coast Forest Conservation Initiative and sitting down with the environmental groups." (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006) The Coast Forest Conservation Initiative (CFCI) was designed to engage directly with the ENGOs campaigning in the market place in an attempt to solve the conflict along the coast. CFCI was formed in Spring 1999 by six forest companies. Its composition, however, changed over time as individual companies dropped out, returned, and new ones joined. Today, CFCI consists of Canadian Forest

20 Products, Interfor, Catalyst Paper, WFP, and BC Timber Sales •

In 1996, the provincial government initiated the CCLRMP as a multi-stakeholder planning table for the central coast. The central coast process was designed to provide an opportunity for all interests, marine and coastal, to work together to produce a plan for Crown land and coastal resources that considers all resources and values, and the needs and interests of the people and industries who use them. Until its completion in 2003, more than 60 interested parties participated in the process, including local governments, federal and provincial agencies, 17 First Nations, several environmental groups, forest companies, and tourism and recreational interests (Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management 2004). Even though ENGOs had been invited, they refused to join the table and denounced the process as 'talk and log' exercise where logging operations continued while negotiations were underway. Rather than participation, they chose to stay outside of the official planning process well aware of the fact that participation would erode their newly gained bargaining power through the market place. The provincial government saw itself facing a similar situation like the forest industry. The conflict was out of control as it was being played out on an international level and the government initiated LRMP process proved ineffective as long as ENGOs refused to participate. The govemment "didn't have this little bunch of ENGOs to kind of push around and kind of disagree with at home. It had people in the international market place saying 'we don't buy your story anymore'" (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006). As already mentioned above, the conflict further escalated in August 1999 when the VDP and the VDZ sent a delegation to BC on the Greenpeace-led tour. An industry

20 BC Timber Sales is an independent organization within the BC MOF that started operating Spring 2003. Its mandate is to generate best financial returns on Crown timber, to set credible prices on timber harvested, and to create opportunities for small businesses. BC Timber Sales currently manages 13 percent of the provincial MC (BC Timber Sales 2007, http://wwwfor.gov.bc.ca/bets/ last accessed August 19, 2008).

88 representatives described the visit as a "profound moment", a turning point from confrontation to collaboration (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006). By the end of 1999, the ENGOs had managed to raise the profIle of the Great Bear Rainforest and increase their power to achieve a better bargaining position.

4.2 From Confrontation to Collaboration, 1999-2004

Phase II of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign is characterized by participatory, non-confrontational activities (Fig. 4.4) including a number of strategic alliances between actor groups, particularly ENGO-ENGO (Rainforest Solutions Project or RSP), industry­ industry (CFCI) but also a unique collaborative effort between the two that was formalized in the so-called loint Solutions Project aSP). Despite the shift from confrontation in Phase I to dialogue in Phase II, campaigns and initiatives varied in terms of openness and inclusiveness of stakeholders. Both government-led LRMP processes were open to all actors including First Nations, different levels of government, industry, labour unions, and environmental groups but not all actors agreed to participate in the decision-making process. CFCI and a coalition of four ENGOs called the Rainforest Solutions Project (RSP) were sector specific associations only open to forest companies and ENGOs respectively that shared a joint vision on how the conflict could be solved. Participation in lSP, again, required being part of either CFCI or RSP. One major weakness oflSP therefore was that it didn't represent the environmental movement and BC's coastal forest industry in their entirety.

89 Figure 4.4 Actors and strategies - Phase II

Collaborationl Participation

RSP 1---1-99-9----2-0-0-0----2-00-1----2-0-0-2----20-0-3---2-0-0-4-.... TIME

Markets campaigns against companies not GOH~rnment Involved in • initiated CFC1/JSP o ludU!ih")' initialed D I':.'IGO initialed ~ I.'ID·E:'OGO iniliated Confrontation! Non-Participation

Figure 4.5 Bargaining power and interest groups - Phase II

r------Collaboration! Participation Manipulation NCl:otiatlon and by powerful participatory Tokenism planning

Connlet with Conllict with potential for minimum radical change change

Iluwer and Decision making based on Sidawav 2005 I ------~-~ Disparity in Parity in Power Power

Confrontation! Non-Participation

90 The four groups comprising RSP and the CFCI companies dominated collaboration in Phase II, particularly outside the planning tables but also within the LRMPs. While foreign companies played a key role during Phase I of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, they were only passive actors in Phase II that were used by the ENGOs to keep the balance of power between industry and ENGOs. Figure 4.5 depicts the bargaining power of RSP­ groups and CFCI industry members in Phase II. It shows a relative balanced distribution for participants in several collaborative initiatives while some organizations, including ENGOs that were not part of RSP but also labour unions, local communities, and First Nations not listed in the figure, were left out.

4.2.1 Strategies and Tactics Between 1999 and 2004 there was a unique collaboration between ENGOs and industry in so far as it happened without mediation by government or other third parties. Forced by pressure from the market place, forest companies started to engage directly with some of the ENGOs. CFCI started formal talks in October 1999 with the Natural Resources Defence Council, Greenpeace, Forest Ethics (then the Coastal Rainforest Coalition), RAN, and the Sierra Club of BC over an 18-month standstill agreement in the region (Hoberg et al. 2004). The Natural Resources Defence Council soon withdrew from negotiations and in the summer of 2000 the remaining four ENGOs formed an environmental coalition, the Rainforest Solution Project (RSP) with the goal to explore conservation options and alternatives to industrial logging on BC's Central Coast, North Coast, and Haida Gwaii. Of the four member groups, RAN has always been a silent partner and over the years has largely withdrawn from any active engagement. In the following, the four RSP member groups will be referred to as RSP groups and all other environmental groups as non-RSP groups. During this time, the provincial government remained largely inactive. In March 2000 the CFCI talks with the ENGOs became public and soon after, CFCI came under attack by unions, First Nations, and ENGOs that had not been included in the process. Negotiations became more difficult when two CFCI members left the initiative. The process was supported largely by the BC public, with opinion polls showing that "70, 80 percent of the people approved the idea of industry and environmental groups resolving stuff. Without that, we probably couldn't have sustained this because the attacks we took from the unions and from some of the mayors [...] would have undone it" (IND

91 BC 02, Sept. 2006). Collaboration was based on a commitment from ENGOs to cease their markets campaign against CFCI member companies and to join the formal government-led planning process in exchange for a logging moratorium on intact rainforest valleys in the whole Great Bear Rainforest while negotiations were underway. Even though ENGOs agreed to stop their markets campaigns they continued educating and informing customers and public for the whole duration of the process. In Spring 2000 the two sides came to an agreement and ENGOs returned to the planning table. Soon, however, they realized that further off-table negotiations were needed to address the discrepancies between environmental and economic interests to allow a successful LRMP process. In June 2000, the RSP groups and CFCI formed the Joint Solutions Project aSP) with the goal to fInd innovative solutions to the longstanding conflict. JSP soon became an important institution informing the LRMP table. "What we saw emerging was some parallel work behind the scenes and then bringing it back" to the LRMP table (GOV BC 01, Oct. 2006). Even though JSP constitutes an alliance of ENGOs and industry one has to keep in mind that the relationships between the two sides remained strained throughout the whole process and that the collaborative approach didn't change the underlying conflicting value systems. ENGOs didn't completely abandon campaigning. For example, they relaunched their markets campaigns against Interfor in 2000 after the company left negotiations.

In April 2001, the CCLRMP reached an interim agreement on new protected areas (21 percent of the region), logging moratoria, an EBM framework for future planning, funds for economic transition and mitigation of impacts on workers and communities, and the establishment of an independent team of scientists, the Coast Information Team, to analyze options for land use and inform the EBM framework. The interim agreement was celebrated as win by ENGOs and endorsed by the provincial government in November 2001. In December 2003 the CCLRMP reached historic consensus recommendations for the southern part of the Great Bear Rainforest including the protection of over one million hectares of the region, and the adoption of EBM for the remaining areas. Half a year later the NCLRMP reached consensus on protecting 35 percent of the land base as well as endorsing an EBM framework.

92 4.2.2 How to Make it Happen - Forces behind Collaboration Collaboration between industry and ENGOs in the Great Bear Rainforest was unique and questions arise regarding the factors that led to changes in bargaining forms and made collaboration happen. The transition from confrontation to collaboration was only possible because of the newly established balance of power between the interest groups created by the markets campaigns. As pointed out by one of the activists involved, ENGOs and industry both had the power to hurt each other but they didn't have enough power to kill each other (ENV BC 09, Oct. 2006). Respondents mentioned different causes that helped create a power balance. One RSP representative, for example, referred to "the three 'Ms'. We had the moratorium, we had the money, and then we had the market place" (ENV BC 05, Aug. 2006). All agreed that the markets campaign had been a crucial factor in building up environmental bargaining power. "I think the thing that really enforced the conversation and enforced the issue clearly to everybody's mind was the fact that the environmental community sort of came upon that notion of this market campaign" (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006). Similarly, representatives from industry and government named the markets campaign as the key factor. "In my mind it was strictly the markets campaign. That was what triggered it. [...] The customers had a major influence on these external pressures. And also on government saying, so this is working, why aren't you helping?" (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006) Not only did environmental bargaining power rely on the strong support from Europe and the United States but it was also conceived at a time when "the forest industry had become very vulnerable to the markets campaign because of the downturn of the Asian economy" (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006). The market pressure affected forest operations throughout the entire province. The markets campaign "did not only impact wood coming from the central coast and later the north coast and Haida Gwai'i. It potentially impacted lumber and pulp coming from coastal British Columbia or even the coast and the interior." (GOV BC 03, Nov. 2006)

Respondents also stressed the important role a number of key individuals from industry and ENGOs played by initiating the collaborative course and acting as 'innovative leaders' throughout the process (ENV BC 03, Aug. 2006). "The reasons [collaboration] worked were the individuals. The willingness of the individuals to say, we are in a crisis and we have to fmd a solution to this." (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006) A few individuals who had been involved in previous environmental conflicts and who were looking for 'new solutions'

93 to the conflict started ENGO-industry negotiations. "Individuals played an important role and there are two people [...J who had gone through the Clayoquot Sound experience and [...J sort ofhad a conversion to a different way of thinking." (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006) The key individuals were not only familiar with environmental conflict but they also knew each other well mostly from the Clayoquot Sound campaign. This experience but also incidents where individuals met unrelated to their work allowed them to build up trust.21 An interesting commonality is that the individuals who advocated a collaborative approach were mostly women, a minority in the male-dominated forest sector. "You know, it was all women basically in Clayoquot Sound. It's women who negotiated Clayoquot Sound, it was women who negotiated the rainforest." (ENV BC 06, Sept. 2006) Another environmentalist (ENV BC 09, Oct. 2006) suggested that "[mJaybe some people can't shift. I would say that is the biggest challenge. And it's not just industry. It's government and First Nations. There is a lot of older men. It's not that I'm trying to be gender-specific but they are all men."

In respect to the collaborative process itself, participants stressed the importance of having people around the table (both JSP and at the LRMPs) who have been engaged for a long time and were able to draw on experiences and relationships from earlier involvement. One environmentalist (ENV BC 03, Aug. 2006) pointed out that "the same people we are talking about have been involved for ten years. And that link of commitment that they have seen, although they don't agree with that person, they see that she is honest and forthright and principled." Similarly, one government representative (GOV BC 01, Oct. 2006) stressed the importance of long-term involvement and experience as reflected in the following quote:

"But on the central coast, I think, by that time in the space of the few years after Clayoquot and through Vancouver Island Planning, the government, agency staff and the environmental groups and the industries had all kind of developed a relationship because of the necessity of dealing with each other on these other areas."

Further, respondents mentioned respect, honesty, trust, and the knowledge that people stick to their words as important factors. These factors resulted directly out of people's long-term engagement and experience but also required certain personal skills:

21 The term 'stroller diplomacy' has been used to refer to an incident where one industry and one ENGO representative who were both involved in the Clayoquot Sound conflict met as mothers on the street in their local neighbourhood pushing their strollers rather than as opponents (Svendsen 2000).

94 "And I believe that that capacity [to negotiate an outcome] is born from personal development and the transformation of consciousness and having a group of people who trust each other and who have enough relationships and complementary skills that they can act as a brain syndicate. And it's more like a heart and brain syndicate because you have to understand the emotional nuances and you have to be able to ftnd people who are capable of similar complexity and development in the other sectors who can buy in to your vision." (ENV BC 02, Aug. 2006)

Participants and mediators put considerable effort into creating a fair negotiation climate by talking "at ftrst about values that were respected and as little as possible about positions" (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006). 'Shared', 'credible', 'acceptable', and 'useful' information was seen as one 'enormously powerful' parts of the process (ibid.) Representatives spent many hours at the negotiation table and often paid a high personal pnce.

"On a personal level, most of the RSP leaders, you know their relationships fell apart. They all paid a high personal price for this. I at least didn't get a divorce. I mean, I didn't see my family much for a couple of years but at least I didn't get a divorce." (GOV BC 03, Nov. 2006)

Some respondents regarded the length of the process itself as relevant to the success of negotiations, as representatives of the different interest groups needed time to build up trust and to accept, understand, and coordinate multiple interests and positions. One of the participants explained:

"I know that this is what actually happens conversely at the land use planning tables is when people have spent three years of their life together and drunken in the bars together and eaten dinner together and talked about their kids with each other [...]. Three years later people whose interests are just getting trampled on but they have this sense of collegiality with people they sat at the table with and they will actually agree to things that they shouldn't agree to." (ENV BC 02, Aug. 2006)

With the negotiations dragging on over years participants were also more willing to agree on issues they might not have otherwise. The fact that they invested a lot of their lives and time into the process increased their desire to produce outcomes and make it work.

Next to the representatives engaged in negotiations, mediators were seen as key to successful outcomes. Skilled mediators facilitated both, JSP and LRMP negotiations, tracked and documented the process and held participants accountable to what they had said and

95 agreed to earlier. The continuity that people stuck to their word even if it was to become difficult, embarrassing or problematic later on was identified as another central factor in negotiations.

Some interviewees also stressed the importance of the conservation fmancing campaign. ENGOs were highly successful in raising funds with their Great Bear Rainforest campaign and were in a fmancially stable position able to hire staff and scientists. In addition to the funds available to advance their campaign, RSP groups managed to raise CAD $60 million from foundations (later to be matched by the Province and federal government) to fund conservation management projects and ecologically sustainable business ventures in First Nation territories. The grants and funds made available from foundations empowered the ENGOs but at the same time they were bound to expectations that they had to deliver outcomes on the ground and resolve the conflict. Foundations "were prepared to go in for the long-term but they expected changes. And they expected a constructive engagement in the sense of a managerial outcome or managing towards an outcome as opposed to managing theatre." (GOV BC 03, Nov. 2006) "[They] weren't interested in funding campaigns simply for the sake of having campaigns. They were interested in funding campaigns towards a specific outcome." (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006) To what extent conservation financing influenced the collaborative process is contested amongst stakeholders. Some representatives at the negotiating table agreed that having funding available for conservation projects was an incentive but that First Nations didn't make their decisions based on whether they could access the funds.

Another important factor that allowed the parties to come to an agreement was the region under negotiation itself. Even though ENGOs had a vision of protecting the Great Bear Rainforest in its entirety they were aware of the fact that their goal was overly ambitious. The sheer size of the area "allow[ed] everybody a little bit more ability to be creative" (ENV BC 05, Aug. 2006) and to move around protected areas and areas open to logging. This flexibility clearly wouldn't have been possible on a smaller spatial scale like a single watershed or valley.

96 4.2.3 Bargaining Dynamics Collaboration didn't come easy for all sides. Not only had ENGOs to compromise their goals and change their strategies, they also had to change internally and become much more disciplined and organized as one government representative explained:

"Traditionally, the environmental community has been consciously or unconsciously organized as a bunch of rebel cells, anarchy, and they realized that the only way that they were going to get results was to get really structured and organized and have an accountability so that people like Merran on the central coast represented this cascade of people." (GOV BC 02, Oct. 2006)

Most importantly for ENGO-industry negotiations, the four RSP-groups agreed on goals and strategies, developed a certain level of organization, and selected a number of individuals as representatives who engaged in negotiations and could be held accountable by the other stakeholders. Internally, the RSP groups had to build up trust amongst each other as the different groups had been campaigning from different perspectives until ENGO­ industry negotiations started. Especially "Greenpeace was always seen as the real outsiders, the ones that take a real hard line and lead the protest. Here they were approaching. Do people trust them?" (ENV BC 06, Sept. 2006). To engage, Greenpeace had to adapt its philosophy and commit to collaboration. A forest campaigner pointed out:

"Sometimes I hear people say the environmental movement has matured or Greenpeace has matured in this campaign and I don't actually agree with that. I think what happened is that the conditions were put in place so that we could sit down at the table. I don't think that Greenpeace has changed in that way. If the conditions change we won't be at the table any more." (ENV BC 05, Aug. 2006)

Through the markets campaign the RSP groups were perceived by the industry as major threat and therefore had established a 'hegemonic' position amongst the environmental community. They were the ones that received the major attention not only from industry but also from the funding community. "[T]he groups that were funded were these groups that have the hammer of the markets. You could go out there and say, we are Greenpeace, we are Sierra Club or we are Forest Ethics and we are going to beat you up in the market place." (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006) One respondent from the RSP groups (ENV BC 03, Aug. 2006) explained their strategy as "inside-outside strategy. Inside we were

97 negotiating and we had certain things we can't do and outside it would really be good to put pressure on these particular issues so trying to coordinate those". RSP groups were also using their influence to make sure that what "other environmental groups were doing would not hurt what was happening at the table" (ibid.).

ENGO-industry negotiations led to a split of the forest movement between the four RSP groups, also referred to as the 'Big Greens', and the non-RSP groups that didn't collaborate with industry. "[I]f you weren't part of them [RSP groups] you were against them." (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006) Most non-RSP groups disagreed with an approach that could compromise environmental interests and feared the RSP groups would negotiate environmentally unfavourable outcomes. As one environmentalist stated, "they [RSP groups] made a series of mistakes. They didn't play the inside-outside strategy very well. They all went inside too early. But given all that they still accomplished something that is potentially globally significant." (ibid.) Activist Ingmar Lee, on the other hand, didn't give the RSP groups any credit:

"We've found organized, institutional environmentalism [in BC] has failed over the last four years to accomplish anything. [...] The successes have come from individual grassroots efforts that have basically bypassed the entrenched, bureaucratic, environmental institutions that have been sucking up the enviro-buck and just not getting the kind of accomplishments we need." (Ingmar Lee cited in Blunt, 2007)

Respondents from RSP groups were aware of the hostility from within the movement and one environmentalist remembered that "sometimes it felt like we were being shot at from in front and behind and it was really challenging" (ENV BC 02, Aug. 2006). In general RSP members felt that the environmental community recognized their lead position in the Great Bear Rainforest campaign and acknowledged their work even though relationships within the movement were strained:

"If you look back in the late 90s and early 2000 there was some mud slinging back and forth in the media but generally basically it has settled down and settled down meaning there is recognition that the campaign is actually quite successful even though there are some problems with where things are and more needs to be done. So those tensions are there and will continue to be there, again internally and externally." (ENV BC 03, Aug. 2006)

98 Stanbury (2000) suggests that some staff-type ENGOs (such as for example FAN) didn't join the collaborative process as they depend on media coverage most easily generated by 'old ways' of campaigning for their revenues. One industry representative (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006) described these groups as "old style or old economy groups. They were still pursuing the same kind of behaviour from 20 years ago. We are talking about a new way of doing things." Many of the non-RSP groups also stressed the fact that they had been running their own campaigns and projects along the coast often in close collaboration with First Nation communities. The David Suzuki Foundation had originally started work with First Nations along the coast leading to the Turning Point process, Ecotrust Canada is actively working with local communities on sustainable business ventures and certification programs while the Raincoast Conservation Foundation is doing work on endangered species, particularly wolves, in the area. One respondent from a non-RSP ENGO stated:

"So if you go back three years all this money was just washing in, people [from the RSP groups] were running around you in a lot of the territory that we thought was our sort of purview. And I don't think they were particularly collaborative and I don't think they were particularly honest in a lot of ways about what their intentions were. And they sort of [used us] when they needed an example for the fact that it could happen and then parked us away when they didn't need us. And we got pretty resentful of that." (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006)

Some of the non-RSP groups clearly felt overridden and excluded by the JSP initiative and some stressed that they hadn't even been invited to participate. "[T]here is a real sense of betrayal in some cases, sometimes expressed as betrayal and in other cases just enormous frustration that other issues aren't getting the attention that people think they deserve." (ibid.) Many representatives from non-RSP groups criticized that they weren't consulted, that the RSP groups didn't feel accountable to the rest of the conservation movement and that the agreement therefore has really only been negotiated by a subset of the movement. "RSP is a success because those groups work together. But they didn't work together with anybody else very successfully." (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006) RSP representatives explained their behaviour referring to the integrity and vulnerability of negotiation processes with industry and other actors. ''We are not trying to hide any information but some of the negotiations were not terribly public so how do we draw the line between keeping everybody informed about what we are talking about and not

99 jeopardizing the negotiations." (ENV BC 06, Sept. 2006) Despite their criticism, none of the outsider groups was able to raise their proflle and achieve what the RSP groups achieved - build up a power base that was equal to that of the vested interests putting them in a powerful bargaining position. "[T]he people outside [RSPJ were just fmger pointers. [...J they had no alternative strategy." (ENV BC 07 Sept. 2006)

The gap in the environmental movement was further widened by the success of the RSP groups in receiving major attention from the funding community. Even though the environmental movement has been working for the same cause, competition around funding was fierce. Some non-RSP groups complained that funding had become scarcer and harder to access. They felt that the "coastal campaign has sucked up so much money and attention that their issues have just been degraded or forgotten about" (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006). Others emphasized the fact that the RSP groups raised the proflle of BC by creating the Great Bear Rainforest campaign and attracting more money than there has been before. They argued that even though increased funds were available, non-RSP groups were frustrated when they didn't receive an equal share from foundations ignoring the fact that foundations usually don't allocate funds evenly.

The split of the environmental movement hardly affected the collaborative work with industry as well as government relations. Even though RSP didn't include all ENGOs active in the Great Bear Rainforest, industry and government largely ignored non-RSP groups, their interests and demands. The forest companies' motivation to address environmental interests stemmed almost exclusively from the successful markets campaign run by the RSP groups. Other ENGOs targeting the area failed to build up the same bargaining power and therefore didn't pose a threat to the coastal forest companies. "If there was an alternative group that fonned an alternative Great Bear Rainforest strategy the industry would have been all over that" and open to negotiations (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006). On sides of the industry, the willingness to collaborate varied through the course of negotiations and membership of CFCI changed as companies left negotiations and others joined. However, RSP groups have been quick to relaunch their international markets campaign penalizing dropout firms like Interfor and WFP that left negotiations. As stated by representatives from both sides, negotiations wouldn't have been possible without the balance of power - the need of industry to have ENGOs stop campaigning and join the

100 table in exchange for logging moratoria. In their effort to solve the conflict, government equally focused on the RSP groups. "[I]t was important to the province not to de-legitimize those environmental groups, the RSP ones, in the context of giving more legitimacy to more radical environmental groups. They were there to make compromises towards a deal." (GOV BC 03, Nov. 2006)

4.3 Government-to-Government Negotiations, 2004-2006

The industry-ENGO alliance during Phase II lost its power in Phase III with the start of G2G negotiations. While governments had played a marginal role up until then and had largely been excluded from the collaborative efforts by industry and ENGOs through JSP that also dominated the LRMPs, they now took the lead. ENGOs reacted to the new decision-making structure by adjusting their strategies. Up until the summer of 2004, ENGOs had largely focused their lobbying efforts and campaigns on the forest industry. This was to change during G 2G negotiations when they shifted their attention to the provincial government in order to speed up the process on a [mal decision incorporating the LRMP recommendations. Figure 4.6 illustrates the changed power relationships in respect to decision-making in Phase III that is characterized by G2G collaboration. Even though ENGOs had previously achieved considerable bargaining power, the nature of the G2G process diminished the influence of industry (CFCI) and environmental groups (RSP).

101 Figure 4.6 Bargaining power and interest groups - Phase III

Collaboration! Participation

i Disparity in +- -+ • Parity in Power Power r------­

Manipulation I"egotilltion lind by powerful partlcipalory Tokenism 1 planning

Connict with Connict with potential for minimum radical change change

Confrontation! Power and Derision making Non-Participation ba~d un Sida""ay 2005 ------~

4.3.1 Environmental Strategies and Tactics In July 2004 after the two planning tables had reached agreement, the provincial government accepted the recommendations made by the CCLRMP and NCLRMP tables and started its formal negotiations with First Nations. The recommendations from the planning tables crafted by all stakeholders were to inform the G2G process that was to make the [mal decisions on the future of the Great Bear Rainforest. ENGOs and industry had been central actors in the LRMP processes dominating it through their collaborative effort aSP) but now the G2G process relegated them to a consultative position. Both, ENGOs and forest industry were unsatisfied with the new situation:

"[I]t has been very much a consultative process where government-to­ government has drafted stuff, brought it out to others and said, what are your comments, we will take it, we will consider it, we will ignore it, all that sort of typical arrangement. [...] So there has been some friction between JSP and government, First Nations because of that." (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006)

The provincial government was well aware of the tensions between the interest groups due to the new decision-making structure as one government representative expressed:

102 "I think there was just a growing frustration because partly in this new relationship that we have with the First Nation... The environmental groups and industry, in the planning process they had their own table really. And they were doing their own negotiating bringing it back and saying, this is what we are doing and we know it's helpful. Right now it's reversed and it's now government and First Nations doing their thing and then telling the industry and environmental groups what we are doing. [...]. But they are having a hard time with that new model and that's been part of their frustration and that has been expressed now in all the other things that are going on." (GOV BC 01, Oct. 2006)

In response to the changes in decision-making structures, ENGOs changed their strategies and drew on their newly gained powerbase, their alliance with the logging industry, to lobby an international audience. In September 2005, for example, the RSP groups placed an ad in the UK Press claiming "Time is running out" (Figure 4.7) and together with four other ENGOs they ran an ad in the New York Times entitled 'Who could be against protecting a rainforest when even logging companies are for it?' calling on readers to urge BC's Premier Gordon Campbell to sign off a decision. ENGOs also criticized the slow G2G negotiations in the local media.

4.3.2 Outcomes In February 2006, the Province announced its land use decision endorsing the recommendations from the LRMP tables including combined protected areas for the region of two million hectares and commitment to EBM outside of the protected areas to be implemented by March 2009. In respect to outcomes on the ground, ENGOs clearly have changed the rules of the game and economic practices and regional development in the Great Bear Rainforest in favour of environmental values. The Great Bear Agreement adds 1.3 million hectares to the one million hectares of protected areas and declares 297,000 hectares as no logging zones. Implementation of sustainable forest practices through EBM will be required for the remaining areas by March 31, 2009. Further, management of traditional First Nation territory has to involve the respective bands directly. Additionally, the conservation ftnancing campaign by ENGOs has created a $120 million package for coastal communities to fund sustainable development and conservation strategies.

103 Figure 4.7 UK Press ad September 9th, 2005

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kl... yUl'l9. ""''''1101111 ~ lD .....d ~I. ".,liw..' Rln6:l-.IIlil't., ~-.d CQlllll:lnof NdUdry, byt"'. b:.aI CDmll"Un....~ ..1~rrI.JClrp'"ub:l... en ... J*lhto f"nc:h",.1 klIlr1DfI. lcd!lll, tholllO~."" ,II h....1IJIIt*i b ~ de. lD two ",ih::l. h!lc8_ d lre..At bit• .lid Imp""'" aaui_R bit••iII""'''''' ~lll"'G"'" gut RarloR.

I-IDIIi'llIIII'r, c:renep,.lnIIIln.. TD •••lIl'1tlhMtt11 mlltDn • _lied. the GDllIlnI"""or Brbh Cdltn"b. 1"11'. "'Hil ttl CU1MII.,.... b pIdJIc1 Ih. '"-t IiMr RINIIbesI IIId -=t IJr U• ...t af s.,.1tlber :a:m5. OheM"e 111.11.1011:. oppa1u1tftW' lM,t. ...

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~1le1fH1'E'.4C£" (..1~~~ f.~1t'f1'Tlt'~

Source: Forest Ethics, www.forestethics.org

The announcement was celebrated by all stakeholders, but particularly by the RSP groups that referred to it as victory both in terms of protected areas (an area roughly the size of New Jersey) as well as considerable changes in logging practices, and was carried by over 350 media outlets around the world. About half a year after the announcement, most of the respondents viewed the decision as positive. "Everybody involved feels like it's historic! It's incredible that this happened!" (ENV Be 02, Aug. 2006) Most RSP respondents stated that outcomes exceeded their expectations or at least were sufficient. "I would have loved to see two thirds ofit protected but I would like to see world peace, too, and there are steps you

104 have to take along the way." (ENV BC 09, Oct. 2006) Only one of the respondents inside RSP said the achieved outcomes were not enough:

"And when we look at what we captured in the protected areas we did fairly well. So, on most things, on most species or ecosystems we actually did protect around 33 percent of their habitat. It means that in the 33 percent of the protected areas we got a fair representation of ecosystems. [...] It actually isn't enough. It actually leaves us at a place ecologically where we are still managing the system at a high-risk level." (ENV BC 05, Aug 2006)

Most non-RSP groups celebrated the outcome together with the RSP groups and many agreed that the outcomes were a success but not without emphasizing that increase in protected areas could have been better from an environmental point of view. "Whether they [RSP] admit it or not the agreement and the result was less than it could have been [...] [but the RSP groups] still accomplished something that is potentially globally significant." (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006) Non-RSP representatives accused RSP groups of having given away too much too early and felt that many issues were left unaddressed. "Unsustainable rights of fishing, black bear hunting, off-shore oil and gas exploration, and salmon aquaculture are all issues that still need to be addressed. The RSP process clearly delivered a piece, a considerable piece but didn't go far enough." (ENV BC 11, Dec. 2006) In respect to the process however, all actors recognized that "[i]nstitutionally, they did break some new ground. RSP by itself was a groundbreaking concept. JSP was as well." (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006) However, other non-RSP groups have openly criticized the agreement. The Spirit Bear Youth Coalition, for example, attacked the outcome and logging operations by a First Nation band in the Globe and Mail (Sept. 21, 2006) for threatening the rare Kermode bear (Hume 2006). Forest companies, on the other hand, viewed the outcome as largely restrictive to their operations along the coast, even though they generally welcomed that the agreement was setting an end to the 'war in the woods'. "At the end of the day there is winners and losers. And everybody ends up being a winner and a loser in one way or another." (GOV BC 02, Oct. 2006)

Even though the February 2006 announcement itself has been celebrated widely, respondents were more sceptical regarding its implementation. Stakeholders were well aware of the fact that they were still facing the challenge of implementing the components of the agreement, particularly developing an EBM framework. Critical voices in the environmental

105 movement are growing louder and one year after the agreement, RSP groups are 'cautiously optimistic' urging government and industry to pick up the pace if they want to meet their goal of full implementation by March 2009.22 "[N]ow sort of post-agreement, we are not seeing a lot of integrity being brought to that piece [the Great Bear Agreement]. And that could be for a number ofreasons. One is we just had this wonderful announcement to the world and people might feel that the pressure is off." (ENV BC 05, Aug. 2006) In March 2007, the RSP groups launched a website tracking the progress of implementation to inform forest product customers and the public.23 The progress tracker illustrates the slow progress of formulating logging standards as well as legislating protected areas. One respondent from a non-RSP ENGO expressed concerns regarding the practicability and implementation of EBM:

"[T]o some degree that EBM framework that has been negotiated thus far by the other environmental groups and by government and industry, I mean, it's a minimum framework I would have thought and it's not in all aspects even a practical framework. And so the more that there are impracticalities or faults in that framework the more room is there for government or industry to throw up their hands and say, 'This doesn't work so we are not going to do it.'" (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006)

Non-RSP groups like Raincoast, the David Suzuki Foundation, Valhalla Wilderness Society, as well as the Nuxalk Nation openly criticized the Great Bear Rainforest agreement and its implementations pointing out that "[t]imber companies have ratcheted up the rate of clear-cut logging to unprecedented levels and guidelines for sustainable logging are not being implemented." (Blunt 2007) They continue to criticize the 'Big Greens' for negotiating away environmental values and bargaining power by agreeing to set aside boycotts and protests as part of the Great Bear Rainforest agreement. One industry representative explained the slow progress with poor understanding and wrong expectations of the actors involved:

"And there is a, with all the proper intentions, there is a view that we would get to full EBM implementation by March 2009. And everybody said yes not knowing what that was entailing. Not knowing what the defmition of full­ EBM is because there are different views between government, industry, and ENGOs on what that means." (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006)

22 See RSP press release, http://www.savethegrt!atbear.org/ mediacentrt!/pat'C_02012001, last accessed August 19,2008. 23 The Progress Tracker can be viewed at http://www.savethegreatbear.ory,/solutions, last accessed August 19,2008.

106 A respondent from the BC government identified poor preparation, the bureaucratic nature of the decision-making body, and the G2G negotiations as factors that have slowed down the EBM process:

"We are aware that this is moving slower that anybody wanted. I think there is a few problems. First of all, there wasn't a lot of thought put into the amount of work that would be required to actually fully implement EBM. And you know it's often the nature of government announcement to make things look as if they are very easy to do. In retrospect, there were commitments made like having the legal objectives for EBM in place in six months. They just don't reflect the legal realities with the legal requirements and more importantly and we told this to the environmental groups as we have to the First Nations. The fact that we now have this new working relationship with First Nations has made it much more difficult to get progress." (GOV BC 01, Oct. 2006)

Additionally to the outcomes on the ground, the collaborative process also changed the rules of the game, inter-organizational relations, and behavioural changes. In other words it has led to a transformation of informal institutions. Collaboration opened doors to governmental agencies and companies enabling the ENGOs to directly contact key individuals with their concerns who are - in contrast to pre-process times - more responsive and willing to listen.

"There is a dialogue now established amongst the different groups so I think now you find that an environmental organization would call a forest company, they know who to call. They talk about an issue that is coming up. They have no problem calling the different First Nation leaders. There is a dialogue and it goes the other way around, too." (GOV BC 01, Oct. 2006)

In this regard, environmental bargaining has created new networks and spaces for engagement. It has not only enhanced the dialogue amongst actors but also has opened new opportunities for individuals working in the field. "The fact that I advocated certain interests at one time doesn't mean that I am incapable of working on behalf of another interest. And that probably wouldn't have happened in the past." (GOV BC 03, Nov. 2006) Respondents also felt that the process has taught them techniques and approaches that have proven successful in reaching consensus and that might be useful in the future.

"But at least now there are some tools and some approaches and some methods that are proven in terms of negotiating a moratorium on key areas, doing a science to map endangered forest, building a relationship with all the

107 different sectors, getting some market-based pressure. Like those pieces are now in place as effective aspects." (ENV BC 02, Aug. 2006)

In terms of behavioural and cultural changes within institutions, respondents were overall far more pessimistic. "[N]o one should be fooled into thinking that the values of all changed." (GOV BC 02, Oct. 2006). Many respondents, particularly from the environmental movement, are rather critical in terms of behavioural changes achieved within industry and government. Table 4.2 lists selected quotes from interviews with ENGO, government, and industry representatives reflecting their position of cultural changes (changes of habits) within government and industry institutions. Both, RSP and non-RSP groups were very negative in their judgements of industry. Only a few companies, for example, seem to have embraced environmental concepts and most companies remain highly sceptical regarding EBM; they "are still being dragged kicking and screaming into the

th 20 century and that was a century ago. They are not in the 21 st century yet." (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2004) Equally, mindsets and values of foresters and people within government still need to change. Clearly, it seems to take more than a decade of active lobbying to achieve a cultural change:

"I used to say that fIrst there was a power shift and that was what happened in the late 90s. Then there was an institutional shift, which was the institutions put people on this ftle to work out solutions, the personalities. And now what we need is a cultural shift and basically that is extremely diffIcult." (ENV BC 09, Oct. 2006)

Environmentalists are also aware that changes may not be long-lived and effects of their campaign limited. "I think that the changes that have occurred in the environmental movement are probably lasting changes and the changes that have occurred in government are much more opportunistic and could disappear in a vote or in a change of a public mood and will probably disappear in a vote or change of public mood." (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006) However, just as environmentalists would like to see deeper cultural changes within industry and government, the latter similarly accused the environmental movement for holding on to their old values (see Tab. 4.2).

108 Table 4.2 Reflections on cultural change of stakeholder groups, selected interview quotes

• ''But the cultural shift means companies have to embrace it. And do I think companies have embraced it? I think companies have embraced it the least of anybody." (ENV BC 09, Oct. 2006) • "The logging companies at the coast I would say that right now I'm not feeling very optimistic that corporate shift has happened." (ENV BC OS, Aug. 2006) • "I started personally to get the feeling towards the end that industry was just pulling our leg and stringing us along for the most part." (ENV BC 06, Sept. 2006) • "The only thing that I would say about companies is that what they have figured out is that green washing is a good, cheap way to at least have a very superficial makeover and to hang on to a bit of market share and everything else. [...] I have not seen any fundamental transformation in really any major forest company in British Columbia at the board level in terms of the makeup of the board. I have seen nothing around substantive commitments to the triple bottom-line. I have seen no substantive reinvestment or investment in truly moving to a different sort of business model in forestry." (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006) • "We are talking about a very different mindset of foresters and the application of their practices. And the forestry community is slow to change and it's slow to take people's heads and say, now you have to look at that land base from a 180-degree perspective. That takes time for that to happen. [...] There is a mindset in the ENGO community that has to change because conceptually this is great stuff but implementation is a whole lot different. [...] There is a mindset that needs to change in government. They are not there yet. The bureaucrats aren't there yet. They don't understand in what we are engaging. In some cases don't like it." (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006) • "I don't know whether you get business to say great, this was wonderful and we are prepared to export some of the product, the result everywhere. I think business would generally say, yes, working collaboratively with different viewpoints is good and in BC we seem to have had that kind of culture involved." (GOV BC 01, Oct. 2006) • "Yes, I think there has been a significant shift not as far as many enviros would want but there has been a significant shift overall by the bureaucracy but there are still the kind of timber beasts, as they have been called in the 50s and 60s. They still exist inside government. And they won't change. [...J Similarly the environmental community had to change. The environmental community has its own bell curve." (GOV BC 02, Oct. 2006) Source: Personal interviews

In respect to the process itself, all interviewed participants agreed that working together collaboratively with different interests was helpful. Non-RSP groups, however, thought that the process has been harmful to the environmental movement leaving it overall weaker. Some respondents, particularly those from RSP groups, suggested that the collaborative model including the protected area and EBM outcome would be transferable to other situations and regions and could serve as a model for conflict resolution. However, not all stakeholders agreed:

"I think we were something learning there but we are not in a position where we can even have a conversation about that learning because everybody is still fairly polarized about that. So you have people in cliques in response to what happened on the Great Bear and what we can take from/it and apply." (ENV Be 07, Sept. 2006)

109 Industry and government, in particular, clearly distinguished between the process and outcomes, which they see as region specific solutions that shouldn't be implemented elsewhere. "Like you will see in a lot of government documents no reflection of EBM in other parts of the province. That's not coincidental. That's intentional because some political people believe that EBM means the central coast." (IND BC 01, Sept. 2006) To what extent the collaborative model can be applied to other resource conflicts in Canada and other countries will require more research, particularly context-sensitive comparative studies.

4.4 Conclusion

The case of the Great Bear Rainforest provides an excellent illustration of the role ENGOs can play in resource conflicts. Here, environmental lobbying has considerably altered the existing resource regime along Be's central and north coast. ENGOs employed a wide range of strategies including their markets and conservation fmancing campaigns. They also proved highly successful in drawing on various strategic alliances and networks including their environmental allies, the public but also industry players from within BC and abroad jumping between and including different scales (Figure 4.8). Through their lobbying activity they manipulated and transformed institutions, created new ones, and remapped the forest resource. They have been successful in changing the rules of the game to make BC a more level bargaining field in respect to forest resources.

Outcomes on the ground such as changes in legislation are clearly manifested in the extension of the protected area system and EBM even though implementation is anything but straightforward and remains a challenge to be addressed in the future. As illustrated above, the environmental movement is wary about the slow progress in respect to implementation. While environmental governance considerably altered the institutional context and location factors for industry at the central and north coast, broader behavioural changes both within institutions as well as beyond the borders of the Great Bear Rainforest are harder to measure. Changes in behaviour and corporate culture towards greater environmental consciousness and adaptation of more inclusive decision-making processes are less apparent than one would have expected considering the groundbreaking character of the decision in 2006. Overall, the Great Bear Rainforest has been remapped including

110 environmental and First Nation interests but how deeply BC's resource regime particularly informal institutions have been changed remains to be seen in the future.

Figure 4.8 Actors and alliances in the Great Bear Rainforest 1995-2006

Phase I

International market

Phase II

ENGOs (RSP) Government (LRMP) Industry (CFCI) First Nations

Phase III

Public! Government ENGOs -+ International -+ (G2G) (RSP) market First Nations

111 CHAPTER 5: REMAPPING THE RULES OF THE GAME ­ FOREST CONFLICTS IN TASMANIA

This chapter examines the recent history of environmental opposition in Tasmania to the extractionist forest resource regime dominated by private economic interests. As in BC, ENGOs have challenged the prevalent resource regime in a series of conflicts in order to change the rules of the game and remap the resource. But in contrast to BC where early valley-by-valley battles culminated in one big campaign around the Great Bear Rainforest, the war in the woods in Tasmania is characterized by a multitude of conflicts that are scattered throughout the state. Most of the local forest campaigns in Tasmania are run by individual environmental groups that either target a specific area or work on specific issues (see Tab. 3.4, p. 76). Traditionally, forest campaigns in Tasmania have mostly targeted logging especially of old-growth forest, export woodchipping, and to a somewhat lesser degree management practices (such as clearcutting/clearfelling, the use of 1080 poison, and regeneration burns). More recent issues include the conversion of native forest into plantations and the proposed Gunns Ltd pulp mill in the Tamar Valley at Bell Bay north of Launceston.

The chapter analyzes how ENGOs have challenged vested economic interests and sought to remap and change the rules of the game in respect to four selected forest regions in Tasmania between 1997 and 2006: the Styx Valley, Tarkine Wilderness, Weld Valley, and Blue Tier. It assesses processes and outcomes chronologically distinguishing between three phases: (1) a post-RFA phase from 1997 to 2001, (2) pre-election campaigns from 2001 to 2004, and (3) a post-TCFA phase following the federal election and announcement of the TCFA in May 2005. Particular attention is given to environmental strategies and tactics and bargaining dynamics. In Tasmania, confrontation and implicit forms of bargaining prevailed and relationships between ENGOs and industry remained strained throughout. Unlike BC there was no shift towards collaboration between ENGOs and industry.

The chapter starts with a brief introduction to the selected forest conflicts in Tasmania included in the study before it analyzes environmental bargaining in the years

112 following the Tasmanian RFA. First, it examines the bargaining context set by the RFA. Second, it focuses on increased environmental campaigning in order to increase bargaining power mosdy in respect to the 2004 federal election. Finally, the chapter assesses bargaining outcomes achieved and analyzes changes in bargaining in respect to pre- and post-election campaigns. The analysis draws on secondary sources and data collected in interviews with 72 individuals and from informal meetings with experts and professionals between May 2005 and December 2006.

5.1 A Brief Overview of Forest Conflicts in Tasmania

Forest campaigns in Tasmania vary considerably and a number ofENGOs (and other actors) have been successful in gaining public attention beyond the state level using different strategies and tactics. Table 5.1 provides a simplified timeline of forest conflict in Tasmania since 1997. Within the scope of this thesis, analysis of environmental bargaining focuses on four selected target regions. Campaigns for this study include the Styx Valley, Tarkine Wilderness, Weld Valley, and Blue Tier. Table 5.2 gives a brief overview over the four regions; Figure 5.1 shows their geographic location. While the Styx Valley, Weld Valley, and Blue Tier are relatively confmed areas comprising up to 15,000 hectares, the conflict around the Tarkine Wilderness focuses on a significandy larger area of 377,000 hectares. In all four cases ENGOs sought to stop logging activities and extend the protected area network. ENGOs used different strategies and tactics, spatial levels, and drew on different resources and relationships to achieve their goals. In addition to the four forest areas, the analysis of Phase III includes Gunns Ltd's proposal of a pulp mill in the Tamar Valley (see Fig. 5.1).

113 Table 5.1 Time line ofthe forest conflict in Tasmania 1997-2007

Date Event

Nov. 8, 1997 The federal and Tasmanian governments sign the Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement that applies to both public and privately owned forests and runs for 20 years to ensure long-teon sustainable management of Tasmania's forests.

Mar. -Apr. Mother Cummings Blockade: residents and activists blockade a coupe at Mother Cummings Peak to 1998 prevent logging.

Dec. 1999 'lWS transfoons a 80m tall Eucalyptus regnans in the Styx Valley into the "World's Tallest Christmas

Tree" (repeated in Dec. 2003) 0

2000 The Tasmanian Government initiates the Tasmania Together process. Twelve goals and 143 benchmarks were enshrined in law (Tasmania Together Progress Board Act 2001) and used to guide decision-making in government, business, and community including the complete phase-out of clearfelling in old-growth forests by 2010 and increase in protected areas.

Dec. 2000 1,000 people rally against the proposed Southwood project, a woodchip facility

Mar. 2001 Tasmania: Whose Island?' rally attracts 3,400 people

Aug. 2001 'Save old-growth forest' rally, 4,500 people attend.

July 2003 4,000 people participate in an anti-logging rally to protect the Styx Valley.

Nov. 2003­ Greenpeace Australia and TWS run the "Global Rescue Station" from a 65m high tree platfoon in the Apr. 2004 Styx Valley to raise public awareness.

Mar. 2004 15,000 rally to protect Tasmania's forests in Hobart

Mar. 2004 Forest workers and industry representatives take part in a pro-logging rally in Launceston

Aug. 2004 lWS and the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) release a report called "Protecting Forests, Growing Jobs"

Oct. 9,2004 Federal elections; re-elected Prime Minister John Howard promises to protect about 170,000 hectares of forest, to end the use of 1080 poison on public land by Dec. 2005 and provides AUS$50 million for industry refoons.

Dec. 2004 Gunns Ltd. sues 20 individuals and conservation groups (the "Gunns20") in relation to campaigns to protect Tasmania's forests claiming $6.3 million in damages alleging that the defendants have interfered in the company's trade, business and contractual relations.

2005 Five year community consultation review of the Tasmania Together process May 13, 2005 The federal and Tasmanian governments sign the Supplementary Regional Forest Agreement, the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement.

Mar. 2006 RAN launches its "Trees not Gunns" campaign

Sept. 2006 8,000 people rally against the planned pulp mill by Gunns Ltd. in Launceston.

Oct. 4,2007 Government approves the planned pulp mill

Source: Based on Government and ENGO websites and Gee (2001).

114 Table 5.2 Characteristics of selected forest conflicts on public land in Tasmania

Target Geography Objective Main campaign Industry area groups

Blue Tier 24km E of Extension of reserve system by Friends of the Blue Forestry Tasmania, St. Helens 6,000 ha of ra1I1forest and tall Tier, residents contractors eucalypts into Blue Tier Nature Recreation Area

Styx Valley 90km W of Protection of 15,000 ha of TWS, Greenpeace Forestry Tasmania, Hobart rain forest Australia-Pacific contractors

Tarkine NW Protection of 377,000 ha (inel. Tarkine National Forestry Tasmania, Wilderness Tasmania 177,000 ha rain fo rest) Coalition, WWF contractors, saw millers

Weld Valley 25 kmNW Cessation of logging and Huonville Environment Forestry Tasmania, of Huonville protection of over 20 coupes Centre, Save the Weld contractors adjacent to World Heritage Area Action Group Source: Information provided by ENGOs through websites and personal communication.

Figure 5.1 Selected forest conflicts in Tasmania

Proposed Pulp Mill Site 1. Tarkine o 2. Blue Tier * Forest Conflict Area 3. Styx Valley 4. Weld Valley Onginal Map Source _la5.gov,au/ta,manI8onlirwt/aboull1Bsmap-' ZOO Ipg 5. Gunns Ltd.

115 5.2 The Post-RFA Landscape, 1997-2001

The Tasmanian RFA failed to meet its objective to end the forest conflict on the island. The years following the agreement were characterized by continued conflict. Voices from ENGOs, the Tasmanian Greens, and the non-timber forest industry grew louder that criticized the forest resource regime, particularly the rules of the game and organizations regulating forest resource management. This section provides insights in respect to the overall sentiment and motivation of the Tasmanian forest movement that lies behind their pre-election campaigns.

The Tasmanian RFA signed in 1997 aimed to end the forest conflict by providing certainty for conservation of environment and heritage values through the establishment of a comprehensive, adequate, and representative reserve system and by implementing ecologically sustainable forest management in exchange for deregulation, provision for future growth and development of the Tasmanian resource industries as well as certainty of resource access (Commonwealth of Australia and State ofTasmania 1997). The federal government agreed to assist the State with over ADS $70 million to restructure the forest industry, establish plantations and associated infrastructure (Flanagan 2003; Commonwealth of Australia and State ofTasmania 1997). In their Forest Fact Sheets, The Forest and Forest Industry Council (FFIC) called the RFA a ''balanced package designed to deliver scientifically based conservation outcomes and security for employment and investment" based on "the most exhaustive and rigorous assessment of land use ever carried out" (Forest and Forest Industry Council, no year). ENGOs, in contrary, criticized the scientific integrity as well as stakeholder participation of the process.

"I have always taken the view that it [the RFA process] was a waste of time, that no one would ever take the slightest bit of notice of whatever kind of consultation was done. However, the conservation movement went into the process in good faith and they made endless submissions [...] but at the end of the day no one took a blind bit of notice because it came down to a political decision." (GOV TAS 08, June 2005).

Equally, Lane (1999) describes the assessment process as centralized with minimal public participation and stakeholder involvement that failed to address the key dimensions of the dispute characterized by ideological dimensions. The environmental movement felt left out and was unsatisfied with implementation of the agreement both in respect to protected

116 areas as well as management outcomes. "Every single consultation process has been set up in a way to make sure that the outcome is always in favour of the timber industry and the government wishes to pursue the timber industry and the conservation movement has learnt that it is hardly worth putting pen to paper." (GOV TAS 08, June 2005) Instead of solving the environmental conflict, the agreement did little to change the overall hostile climate between interest groups. While the Tasmanian government and industry claimed 'world best practice', ENGOs described Tasmanian forest standards as benchmarked alongside Malaysia and Indonesia with large tracts of native forest open to logging (ENV TAS 28, Jan. 2006). Even though the government guaranteed security of resource availability in the RFA, the Tasmanian forest industry showed itself worried "that the resource available to the industry is shrinking and shrinking in a fairly dramatic way" due to the extension of the reserve system as pointed out by the Forest Industries Association ofTasmania (FIAT) (IND TAS 01, May 2005).

ENGOs, on the other hand, blamed unsustainable forest practices to be the sole cause of a shrinking resource. Their major concerns continue to be related to the conservation of species and ecosystems, forest practices, and timber processing. All site­ specific campaigns in Tasmania, including the Styx Valley, Tarkine, Weld Valley, and Blue Tier, primarily seek to protect forest from logging but also to ban certain forest practices such as clearfell, burn, and sow (see Image 5.1). Environmentalists criticized the industry for the large scale of logging operations and management practices. "Basically, you can't go anywhere in Tasmania without the logging industry getting in your face." (ENV TAS 27. Jan. 2006) Additionally, with six times more woodchips from native forests coming from Tasmania than the rest of Australia combined, ENGOs lobby for downstream processing of the resource. As one interviewee pointed out, Hobart is "the only state capital with old­ growth logs rolling down the centre of town every half hour" to be shipped overseas (ENV TAS 27, Jan. 2006). A specialty timber worker described Tasmania as "an island of some of the best quality timbers in the world" and argued that it was "ridiculous that we [Tasmanians] are buying into a low quality industry. And that is simply because we have been able to cut the place and so much of our forest has been replaced by plantations." (ENV TAS 01, May 2005) Another environmentalist agreed: 'What we have seen is this squandering by a rich, developed country of one of the greatest ecological treasures in the world for the absolutely most basic quarrying kind of approach of turning 80m high trees

117 into little pieces of woodchips for the Japanese to make pulp and paper." (ENV TAS 28, Jan. 2006) All ENGO representatives interviewed shared this perspective. Another issue at the centre of the conflict revolves around specialty timber being left on the ground to be burnt often in order to clear land for conversion into plantations.

"I mean over 90 percent of the forests that are cut down go to the woodchip mills. As much, maybe twice as much is actually left on the forest floor raked up and burnt. There is estimates that there could be as much as 15 million tons of timber harvested in Tasmania, 5 millions which goes out as woodchips and 10 millions which is burnt when you include the biomass of the heads and the stumps which are rooted out with excavators and staked up and burnt." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006)

While the Tasmanian forest movement has been supportive of plantations in the past and actually promoted plantation establishment to prevent old-growth logging, it has changed its position on plantations over the last few years from support to a more critical stand including, in some cases, outright opposition.

Image 5.1 Logging coupe in the Arve Loop, southern Tasmania

118 The conflict in Tasmania is not only about resource use, logging practices, and processing as mentioned above but also about politics and power as essayist Richard Flanagan (2003, no page number) emphasizes:

"Yet in Tasmania the forest debate is not just about burning rainforests and threatened species. It is a disturbing story about the way in which information is controlled to benefit the very rich and very powerful, and about the way major political parties can become hopelessly compromised by their relationship with big business, or the extent of identifying the interests of their state with that of a billion-dollar monopoly."

Almost all ENGO representatives interviewed expressed frustration, anger, and felt powerless in respect to the way forest politics are played out in Tasmania. Environmentalists and representatives from non-timber industries blamed a small powerful elite consisting of individuals from industry and government to be responsible for the entrenched situation. Several interviewees called government but particularly "the big end of town, the timber barons ofTasmania, who carved up the resource for the last hundred years" (GOV TAS 11, Feb. 2006) "greedy and arrogant" (IND TAS 13, June 2005). "They [forest companies and government] feel they were god and if there was a tree there it's theirs. It didn't matter how much they were going to smash." (ibid.) This view is also shared by a large proportion of the public who feel that decisions regarding Tasmania's forests are largely made by a small group of private interests. Many also fear that government and industry are too close to each other to be able to ensure compliance with forest standards and legislation. In 2000, the Tasmanian government initiated the so-called 'Tasmania Together' process, a community consultation process to respond to criticism and determine long-term social, economic, and environmental goals resulting from Tasmanian citizen involvement in formulating goals and benchmarks to guide government. Again, this process failed to build up trust in the environmental movement. Unhappy with an RFA process that lacked public participation and stakeholder engagement - from an environmental point of view - and disappointed by the implementation of the agreement due to poor forest practices the environmental movement regained momentum to continue its fight focusing on the upcoming federal elections.

119 5.3 Pre-Election Campaigns, 2001-2004

The post-RFA and pre-election years in Tasmania's forest conflict have been dominated by confrontational action. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, ENGOs chose to engage in direct action ranging from rallies and media stunts like the World's tallest Christmas tree and Global Rescue Station staged for a national and international audience to blockades and camps with no noticeable shifts towards more collaborative approaches over the years. Collaborative efforts were limited to the RFA process as well as the Tasmania Together process initiated by the Tasmanian government. As outlined above, the environmental movement quickly condemned the RFA suggesting it stands for 'Robbery, Fraud, and Arson' (Gee 2001). Equally, it claimed that the Tasmania Together process was lacking proper implementation. Figure 5.3 illustrates these facts focusing on power relationships of stakeholders involved. Even though advertised as participatory planning process, the RFA failed to empower stakeholder groups. One could even argue that the nature of the process itself as participatory effort disempowered ENGOs as they were lacking leverage at the negotiation tables. In general, ENGOs have only been moderately successful in building up bargaining power during Phase II (Fig. 5.3). None of their campaigns led to a change in power dynamics in the state and even though ENGOs managed to raise the profile of Tasmania's forests on the mainland and abroad, forest industry and state government appeared to be rather resilient to any changes. With their combination of media stunts and mainland lobbying the environmental movement proved successful in making Tasmania's forests the number one environmental election theme. In response to growing support for the Tasmanian forest movement from the mainland, five days before the federal election the Australian Liberal Party announced a plan to invest ADS $ 800 million to protect high conservation value forests, end land clearing, and provide new employment opportunities based on existing plantations in Tasmania. The protected areas were supposed to be listed by an unnamed expert science panel by September 2005. Two days later, Prime Minister of the day John Howard responded with an alternative forest policy that would protect about 170,000 hectares of forest, ban 1080 poison on public land by December 2005, and provide an ADS $ 50 million package to undertake industry reforms. Despite these commitments from the two major Australian parties, ENGOs themselves didn't gain more bargaining

120 power. Their 'real estate campaigning' helped them win additional protected areas but didn't change stakeholder dynamics in Tasmania.

Figure 5.2 Actors and strategies in Tasmania - Phase I and II

Collaborationl Participation II Gu\oernmcnt Initiated D Indu:'iff)- initiated D ENGO initiated

1-.-9-9-7/-19-9-8------19-9-9-/2-0-00-----2-0-0-1/-21-.0-2----2-00-3-/2-0-0-4---+ TIME J>i-o-ind~tr),;r.nyl World I tallest Christmas TNC: communlty-orlented Tarklne campaign tree L­ -;:====~;:::::=~I~' '----­ ---.J I. ENGO rallies I 81 ue TI er e Id Blockade camp

Markets campaign

Global Rescue Station, Confrontationl Styx rallies Non-Participation

Figure 5.3 Bargaining power and interest groups in Tasmania - Phase I and II

~~~~~~ r------­ Participatlon 'Vlanlpolation Negotiation Dnd by powerful participatory Tokenism planning

Conniet with Conniet with potential for minimum radical change change

PO\\ cr and Ilcch.lon mali.llIl( blllicd on SidllwIIll005 ------~-~ Disparity in Parity In Power Power

Confrontationl Non-Participation

121 5.3.1 From 'Old-Style Campaignin~ to 'Fuzzy Feel Good Stuff' The years leading up to the 2004 federal elections were characterized by a highly active environmental movement that directed its efforts to the Australian mainland, beyond the Australian border, but also engaged in the debate on a state level in Tasmania. Geoff Law (2004, 4), at that time TWS's Campaign Coordinator, even predicted that the "Summer 2003-04 [would] go down in history as the summer Tasmania's forests roared onto the national and international stage, capturing the attention of millions of people from Tamworth to Tokyo." While lobbying outside Tasmania was mainly aimed at winning powerful allies such as federal politicians, mobilizing the public in the urban centres of Sydney, Melbourne, and Canberra, and 'educating' customers in Japan or the public in Europe, campaigns in Tasmania were mainly designed to prevent logging on the ground but also to win community support using a wide range of strategies.

From three decades of campaigning, the environmental movement in Tasmania had learnt that "it's always more efficient to go up to the nation and wind up the nation, to put pressure on the federal government to put pressure on the state government to do something" rather than lobby in Tasmania (ENV TAS 02, May 2005). A representative from the Tasmanian Greens concluded:

"[E]very single campaign victory we have had in Tasmania has come as a result of mainland pressure being brought to bear through marginal seats. So the federal parties have had to respond to that national pressure by doing something about Tasmania. You will never ever win a conservation campaign in Tasmania." (GOV TAS 08, June 2005)

All campaigners interviewed agreed that the federal election was an opportunity to gain new commitments from the major political parties regarding the protection of Tasmania's old growth and high value forests that would go beyond the RFA, a strategy referred to as 'real estate' campaigning.

"There is a history of what I call real estate campaigning, using federal politics to win a national park, a world heritage listing, a big patch of bush somewhere, Kakadu, Daintree, southwest Tasmania, Franklin, whatever. If you look at the history of election cycles, those spikes of protection are manufactured by the environmental movement. It became clear to us that that was going to happen again with Tasmania." (ENV TAS 33, Feb. 2006)

122 For these reasons, ENGOs have nationalized (and internationalized their campaigns). Nationalization describes the elevation of environmental bargaining from the local and regional to the federal level achieved through, for example, campaigns that target mainland rather than state audience or focus on federal events (election), such as lobbying of federal politicians and public awareness raising on the Australian mainland.

Industry and state government representatives were equally aware of the success ENGOs had with their national and international campaigns.

"For the last some years the environmental movement has not been playing to a Tasmanian audience, it has been playing to a national audience and it's been doing that for many years, I guess, in Melbourne and Sydney, and the image and role of clearfell and poisoned animals has been quite powerful and so they judged and quite correctly that they have much more to gain by using those tactics than cooperative processes like the FFIC [Forest and Forest Industry Council] where they are one voice amongst many." (IND TAS 03, May 2005)

Representatives from government and industry often ascribed the (inter)nationalization of the conflict to a limited willingness of ENGOs to cooperate rather than rigid decision-making structures in Tasmania. ''You'll see that there are some people very genuine, others abused the debate to achieve political power and as a result of that we see the debate intensified particularly around federal elections." (GOV TAS OS, Jan. 2006) It came to no surprise for industry and government that the environmental movement intensified its campaigns in the years leading up to the federal elections, particularly in 2003 and 2004 focusing on the Australian mainland. But not all environmental groups were able to campaign on a higher spatial level. Particularly smaller groups didn't have the fmancial and human resources to get active on the mainland. Additionally to lobbying on the mainland and abroad, ENGOs also engaged in direct action in Tasmania. Almost all forest campaigns used direct action in some form including the Blue Tier, South Sister, Styx, Weld Valley, and many earlier campaigns. A representative of the Australian Conservation Foundation described the position of the majority of the environmental movement as follows: "We don't object to direct action. We basically do support direct action where appropriate. There is need to do direct action to get media. Getting media is the most important part of it. Quite often you don't have to shut down logging operation. You just go down there and do a protest." (ENV TAS 21, June 2005)

123 Styx Valley

Environmental campaigns in Tasmania have been dominated by its most powerful ENGO, 1WS, which not only by industry and government is seen as taking a radical stand. The Styx Valley situated 90km west of Hobart has been the icon campaign of1WS for over a decade. In an effort to protect the forest area not covered by the RFA, 1WS has branded the area as 'Valley of the Giants' dominated by E. regnans, E. obliqua, and E. delegatensis that .grow up to 96 metres in height and include "the world's last great unprotected stands of old­ growth Eucalyptus regnans" (Flanagan 2003, no page number). In its campaign characterized largely by media stunts to win public attention, 1WS has been joined by Greenpeace Australia-Pacific. As part of their campaign, 1WS has staged various actions such as decorating an E. regnans in the Styx Valley as the world's tallest Christmas tree in December 1999. Together with Greenpeace, it has set up the Global Rescue Station from a tree platform 65m from the ground where activists used the Internet to send pictures and messages to people all around the world. The Global Rescue Station was set up with the help of experts from the mainland (including window cleaners with experience working on high-rise buildings), trained and housed international activists for five months from November 2003 to April 2004, and attracted thousands of visitors including federal politicians such as Mark Latham (then Federal Labour leader) (ENV TAS 27, Jan. 2006, ENV TAS 28,Jan. 2006, ENV TAS 33, Feb. 2006).

1WS has also been successful in getting the general public involved with up to 15,000 participants in two anti-logging rallies held in the Styx and in Hobart in March 2004. Additionally, it organized initiatives on the mainland. In 2003, it set up a bill board in a Qantas waiting lounge at Sydney Airport showing logged and unlogged areas in the Styx reading the caption 'Visit Tasmania before 2003' (ENV TAS 04, May 2005). Due to unclear policy regulations regarding political statements, Qantas removed the board two days later. Independent conservationists supported by 1WS successfully staged a media stunt on the maiden voyage of the Spirit ofTasmania III at Sydney Harbour in January 2004 where they unrolled a massive banner that added 'Woodchipping the" to the ship's name written on the side of its body. The Styx campaigns, particularly the highly publicized Global Rescue Station, stopped logging in the Styx over the entire summer months (2003/2004) and postponed logging plans by Forestry Tasmania for the coupes in question. Additionally to

124 its media stunts, 1WS has approached forest industry customers in Japan, mainly the woodchip processing industry. Even though public attention has focused on the stunts on the ground, a Greenpeace campaigner stressed the importance of lobbying:

"Greenpeace is a many varied animal. We are known for these stunts that some people - and they are not - call direct actions. We are known for those up the tree and yet we probably spend more of our time and effort in parliament and lobbying and dressed up in suits and talking nicely to decision makers and doing scientific research and corporate research and rising reports and all that sort of back-end stuff which is less glamorous and less sexy and less obvious but probably takes up the greater amount of our time and effort." (ENV TAS 33, Feb. 2006)

The forest industry and Tasmanian government responded to the campaigns around the Styx with a number of public statements, newspaper releases, and a pro-logging rally in Launceston. While the forest industry claimed that 10,000 timber workers and 212 log trucks took to the streets (Montgomery 2005), 1WS reported on an estimated 1,200 to 4,000 protesters consisting of Forestry Tasmania and Gunns Ltd. employees that had been paid to attend the rally (Law 2004). A representative of FIAT said, "One of the concerns we have is that particular the dark green groups I was describing before, their campaigns are based on emotions with no regard what so ever on science." (IND TAS 01, May 2005) The National Association of Forest Industries released a fact sheet entitled 'Forests of Tasmania: The facts about the Styx and the 'Tarkine" to correct what they see as misinformation and lies spread by ENGOs. They emphasized that the Styx has been logged for decades and therefore cannot be described as wilderness. Further, they pointed out that the environmental movement has used the term

Weld Valley

Conflict in the Weld Valley west of Huonville evolved around threats to the values and integrity of the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area due to plans to log adjacent coupes. In late 2004 a group of five environmentalists set up a camp in the Weld Valley near

125 Fletcher's Eddy to oppose plans by Forestry Tasmania to build a logging road (Image 5.2). Construction work was scheduled to commence in January 2005 but was postponed due to direct action from environmentalists on a nearby coupe (BB21A) and logging road (Eddy Spur 2). The activists campaigning in the area called the Weld Forest in Southern Tasmania are not all members of a formalized group. They have themselves called at various times 'Southern Forest Alliance' or 'Rainforest Alliance', and 'Save the Weld Action Group' (SWAG)24. SWAG consists of a loose collection of people that participate in the 'Weld Valley Community Blockade' (HVOC newsletter summer 2006) including local residents, people from different parts of Tasmania as well as 'visitors'. The Weld campaign is different from other campaigns in Tasmania as - due to lack of fmancial and human resources - the camp, tree sits, and blockades depend to a considerable extent on these visitors who reach from tourists who decided to support the campaign while on their vacation in Tasmania to travelling activists who have come to Tasmania specifically to join the camp. As the activist network is quite small and news spread quickly, most mainland activists have heard of the camp through word-of-mouth and travelling activist influx has been between ten and up to 90 at a time (ENV TAS 26, Feb. 2006). The activists have engaged in several road blockades chaining themselves to tripods or forest machinery in order to stop logging operations. The group also sought to spread the word about the Weld through representation in Hobart with a stall at Salamanca Market and occasional actions.

24 SWAG will be used in the following to refer to the loose group of activists engaged in the Weld Valley campaign.

126 Image 5.2 The road blockade in the Weld Valley. Tripod (left) and Weld Ark (right) are parts of the camp blocking the logging road Oune 1, 2006)

Blue Tier

In the northeast of the island, The Friends of the Blue Tier are a small group of locals who started worrying about implications of the conversion of native forest into plantations and the associated impact of aerial spraying and logging operations on their groundwater and ecosystem. They described themselves as a "group of friends who live around this mountain" without structure, membership, or office (ENV TAS 08, June 2005) (see also Table 3.4). More than the other case study groups, the Friends of the Blue Tier are an issue-oriented NIMBY group. Unsatisfied with the RFA that only protected the area around the summit of the mountain, the group has fought for an extension of the reserve by about 13,600 ha to be used for recreation (see also www.biuetier.orf). The group argued that the proposed reserve would comprise less than four percent of the state forest (managed by Forestry Tasmania) available for logging in the municipality. In the last few years, the group has particularly focused on promoting the area as bushwalking destination, for example, by publishing a tracking brochure (10,000 copies) (ENV TAS 31, Feb. 2006). It also ran a

127 cover story in 'Outdoor Australia' Qune/July 2003) on hiking the Blue Tier, and contributed to various local papers reporting on the group's work to establish an eight-day walking track, the Alcheringa Trail. The Blue Tier campaign is characterized by its local actors who have sought support from the local community and have rejected involvement of 'outsiders'. ''We actually had a rule to have no ferals" (ENV TAS 08, June 2005) The term 'feral' is used for travelling activists who come mostly from the Australian mainland and abroad to join direct action. Many are highly skilled and trained for, amongst other, tree sits, climbing, non-violent direct action, and banner and poster design. Despite the fact that the local council called for a moratorium Forestry Tasmania announced its plan to start logging operations on one of the coupes in April 2004. The campaign included a petition signed by 2,000 local people to protect the area from logging as well as a five-week road blockade by five housewives in front of a boom gate on Anchor Road lasting from early March to mid April 2004 in order to prevent Forestry Tasmania from logging the coupe. Following the road camp that involved five arrests, they ran a rally for court. "It was the first on the news. That's a huge thing for a little community trying to make a stand." (ibid.) However, the 'domestic' campaign didn't change anything and even though the group was lacking particularly [mancial means, two members went to Canberra to meet with 15 politicians in parliament house. ''We can jump up and down in the forests but if we don't have any political decisions made in favour for the environment it's not going to change anything." (ibid.)

Tarkine Wilderness

The Tarkine located in the northwest of the state contains Australia's largest tract of temperate rainforest (177,000 ha). The area is largely unpopulated and nearly roadless (with the exception of the 'Road to Nowhere' built in 1996) and has been open to logging, mining, and grazing. The Tarkine National Coalition (TNC) has been fighting for protection of the area since 1994 initially with the objective to stop the Road to Nowhere. In 2001, the group went through a makeover based on a change in lead members, incorporation, and change in strategies turning away from direct action to promotion of alternative industries, particularly tourism. One of the members explains the rationale of their approach with the makeup of the local community.

128 "There is absolutely no question that there is a very, very strong redneck element in the northwest. So we sort of figured that it was pretty important to take the 'trade softly approach' and do 'fuzzy feel good things' that aren't going to put people off side in terms of the local community." (ENV TA OS, June 2005)

Activities included the promotion of tourism and development of a tourism brochure for the area, open days out in the forest, school talks, and free BBQs for the community to reach out to and connect with the community in the northwest that is not "overly sort of receptive to dreadlocks and standing in front of bulldozers" (ibid.). Apart from one protest at Eagle Hill TNC didn't participate in any direct action, and used "very community friendly means of campaigning" (ENV TAS 13, June 2005). TNC also sought the dialogue with the sawmillers dependent on timber from the Tarkine to discuss their goals and motivations. Together with their fuzzy feel good approach, TNC representatives also stressed the importance of lobbying, particularly in Canberra, using videos, DVDs, and information flyers.

"Lobbying is to me an essential part of any campaign. You know, it is the most important part. If the politicians don't know what you are doing, evaluating the media's view point of what you are doing or if they are only hearing the industry's viewpoint of what you are doing you are not going to win. But if you are sitting there talking to a politician and that politician, he might be dead against you, but if he thinks you are a reasonable bloke, that's worth its weight in gold and we had politicians coming down here, some of them secretly, some of them openly." (ibid.)

TNC has also been more successful than the groups around the Blue Tier and Weld Valley in receiving grants and funding from other organizations (e.g., to develop the tourism brochure). While TNC itself focused on local activities, they also worked together with the larger, more established groups such as TWS and Australian Conservation Foundation to promote TNC's interests on a larger scale. In this regard, WWF Australia has played a big role at the national level particularly with its coffee table publication (Ashton 2004) on the Tarkine featuring the work of photographers and writers.

5.3.2 Bargaining Dynamics The increased environmental campaign effort brought internal changes to the environmental movement. For example, TWS's supremacy and close relationship to The Tasmanian Greens together with their 'old-style' campaigning got under critique for being

129 ineffective, particularly on a community level. One respondent even compared The Greens to "the Nazi party [...] and The Wilderness Society [to] the brown shirts" enforcing "amongst the grassroots the ideological positions of [Greens Senator] Bob Brown" (ENV TAS 07, June 2005). ''What I see is that The Wilderness Society and The Greens [...] have got about maybe five percent of people who are really true believers in them. Maybe a bit more. But what they have to understand is that they have got to connect with a far greater number of percentage of population if they want to get anywhere." (ENV TAS 03, May 2005) The majority of respondents, though, stressed good relationships and positively commented on TWS's support for their campaigns. However, because ofTWS's confrontational campaign style and close link to The Greens, many ENGOs stated that they would prefer to be seen as not affiliated in any way as it might challenge their credibility and relationship in the community as well as with industry and government. An ENGO representative stated, "Ifwe get labelled as [...] funded by The Greens or TWS which they [industry and government] want to put us sort of in this black box [...] that does us a lot of damage." (ENV TAS 01, May 2005) Others claimed that industry lobbyists and government tended to paint all groups as 'radical front groups' established by The Greens in order to win public support. One politician from The Tasmanian Greens acknowledged, "[i]t's definitely the case that a lot of local campaigners believe that if they are seen to be associated with The Greens or TWS they won't be able to get support of the liberals or labour party." (GOV TAS 08, June 2005) Another point of debate amongst ENGOs revolves around their policies regarding travelling activists. While a few campaigns such as the Weld, South Sister, and Styx welcomed non-residents, many other groups feared that the affiliation with travelling activists would lead to mistrust from the public and other stakeholders as travelling activists are often seen as invaders. ''We had some mainland people come down who did a very small blockade in the Tarkine against our wishes. We felt that it was a poor campaign decision and threatened so much community building that we had done in this area." (ENV TAS 13, June 2005)

In terms of cohesiveness of the forest movement, ENGO respondents made different statements. Respondents from the four case studies responded positively when asked about cooperation and support between groups. One TNC member described the overall attitude between groups as following:

130 "basically all of our money, time, energy and so is always focused on the Tarkine but we will publicly support the other groups and say, you know, we agree that their objectives are good and conversely the other groups will usually say we agree with the objectives of the Tarkine National Coalition." (ENV TAS OS, June 2005)

Overall respondents found that interaction and communication between smaller local groups, particularly in the north, had increased over the last few years even though a few respondents were more critical. "Traditionally there has been a completely different approach between different groups. I want to save my area and you want to save your area and we can't get together and do it together." (ENV TAS 11, June 2005) A representative from The Tasmanian Greens agreed pointing out that tensions "tend to erupt in part because everybody thinks their issue is the most important and why aren't people focusing on my issue." (GOV TAS 08, June 2005) One other limiting factor has been associated to smaller groups being under-resourced and therefore unable to attend meetings, for example, in Hobart or Launceston. Despite the few critical voices, the Tasmanian forest movement has been very supportive of all forest campaigns and stood up together through statements, submissions, and reports published and signed by all groups. One TWS campaigner stressed that it usually have been "the sort of larger organizations [...] where you get more conflict" (ENV TAS 29, Jan. 2006). Just before the federal elections the forest movement went through an internal crisis caused by WWF's release of 'A blueprint for the forest industry and vegetation management in Tasmania' that caught the attention of industry and politicians but threatened the goals of other ENGOs.

"We knew that within the next six months there would be a federal election and both of these groups [WWF and TCT] came out with sort of policy positions that sort of advocated logging in some of the areas that some of the local environment groups had been thriving for because they as a group sort of decided that that was a reasonable sort of compromise. [...] It was really unfortunate that it had to come at that time but there was defInitely a split between to mention the names, TCT and WWF, and all the rest of the environmental groups." (ENV TAS OS, June 2005)

The Tasmania-based groups (with the exception ofTCT) felt betrayed by WWF's initiative and in a joint letter to the director of WWF asked them to withdraw from the Tasmanian forest debate altogether unless WWF aligned with Tasmanian forest conservation groups. Responses from Tasmanian environmentalists that were asked about the dispute

131 reflected among other an insider-outsider attitude of the movement in respect to origin and home base ofENGOs. "It was rather an arrogant thing. These guys [WWF] had not been involved in Tassie at all, came in, picked different groups, brains at different bits and pieces, and then decided to mix it all together, make their own thing and come in and fIx Tassie's forests" (ENV TAS 13, June 2005) To a certain extent the internal conflict became very personalized. A WWF representative recalled being told by activists, "This is our debate, you are on the mainland, go away" and "you gonna fly in, fuck up, and fly out" (ENV TAS 22, June 2005). Government and industry used the incident to criticize the Tasmanian groups and welcome the WWF initiative: "At a certain point WWF had quite a nasty complication with environmental groups on the island because environmental groups on the island saw that this group would broker in peace bringing along some good outcomes and this lot [Tasmania-based ENGOs] was left out completely." (GOV TAS 13, Feb. 2006)

Despite WWF's attempt, the environmental pre-election campaigns didn't establish a dialogue between ENGOs, industry, and state government. They actually weren't aimed to do so as lobbying had mainly targeted the mainland and international audience to bring change from a federal and international level. As their campaigning strategies reflected, ENGOs didn't believe a dialogue with industry in Tasmania could help them advance their goals or resolve the conflict. Equally, the Tasmanian forest industry didn't see any reason to engage with the forest movement. One representative from the FFIC described the ENGO-industry relationship as working "in parallel rather than in proximity" (IND TAS 06, May 2005). In general, industry representatives named the no-compromise position of ENGOs, particularly TWS, and the division within the forest movement to explain why they didn't engage in dialogue with ENGOs.

"To me, even so on the mainland TWS might be seen as a reasonable view and arbiters of good taste in forest management, that is certainly not my view. To me it is an extreme narrow view. But we do need ENGOs that are occupying a brokering, more reasonable view, and that work with multiple parties to fmd solutions. We haven't quite that in Tasmania." (IND TAS 03, May 2005)

Table 5.3 lists selected quotes of industry representatives that illustrate this perspective throughout the sector. Not all respondents mentioned particular reasons and gave the impression that cooperation had simply been ruled out upfront based on mutual

132 exclusiveness of interests and the history of the dispute. Not all businesses shared the position and some groups such as specialty timber workers and beekeepers have aligned themselves with the environmental agenda. One respondent stated: "As a wood user I would rather see our forest locked away than to be treated in a way that they are being treated. I'd rather close my business today" (ENV TAS 01, May 2005). With their "Save Your Leatherwood Honey" campaign25, Tasmanian apiarists seek to stop the clearfelling and burning of the remaining accessible leatherwood resource, essential to their businesses. Groups who advocate both environmental and economic interests seem to get caught even between the two fronts. "Unfortunately what happened, groups like mine, because we are seen as a threat to the industry [...] we get labelled as a green group and they [forest industry] started running a campaign against us." (ibid.) These groups often fmd it easier to engage with environmental groups than to establish a dialogue with the forest industry.

Table 5.3 ENGO-industry relations in Tasmania as viewed by industry, selected interview quotes

• "The Wilderness Society and illliess you can get them to the table it's not going to produce any change whatsoever. I don't think the other groups are strong enough in the public debate to marginalize TWS's extreme views because TWS has been seen to be the principal advocate group for environmentalism in Tasmania and will continue to be and guarded by The Greens [...J. It does make it difficult to engage with them [ENGOs] as well because if you are engaging with one organization you are not necessarily engaging with the others." (IND TAS 01, May 2005) • "We don't have any dialogue with The Wilderness Society for instance. Most of these organizations are just rilll out of senators' offices. They are very political because that's how they pay for the staff to do it." (IND TAS 06, May 2005) • "I can probably say now I can never see a benefit in talking to TWS but I suppose illltil months ago I would have said I would never see any benefits in talking to the WWF." (IND TAS OB,June 2005) • "We have never contacted environmental groups and we have never been contacted by an environmental group. It's mostly throwing rocks in each other's feet. That's how it works. I don't think the environmental groups... They certainly haven't contacted us." (IND TAS 12,June 2005) • "Whereas that area if you look at the Tasmanian Conservation Trust or The Wilderness Society of whatever, basically there statement is that we don't need timber industry, we don't need trees felled. We don't care. We are happy. Obviously that's the other extreme. So we can't and we won't sit down and negotiate with them because we know they are the extreme green groups." (IND TAS 14, Jillle 2005)

Source: Personal interviews

Just as ENGOs have used the media to gain bargaining power in the Great Bear Rainforest campaign, destruction ofTasmania's forests has been captured in the world

25 For more information see http://savryourleatherwoodhonry.mm/indexhtm, last accessed Nov. 1,2007.

133 media and featured in The Observer, The Independent, The Guardian, on the BBC, in Le Figaro, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, and The New York Times commenting on it as environmental catastrophe. While industry and state government criticized the international media, ENGOs were more concerned about the local press. Environmentalists viewed the Tasmanian media as rather reluctant to challenge the forest industry. One environmental activist criticized the local newspapers:

"[Y]ou should have seen this kind of stuff that was in the newspaper. They got car stickers now 'Greens tell lies'. They [forest companies] took out full­ page ads, there were three or four in every paper: 'The Greens lie about things'. Just absolutely shocking stuff] And a lot of people at home [...] they look at the paper and they think it must be true because it is in the paper." (ENV TAS 08, June 2005)

Industry representatives criticized the media for their sensation-seeking attitude that they felt, favoured environmental 'stunts' over industry achievements. ''We did a big press release when we achieved the Australian Forest Standard but it just got onto page 15 in the paper. But when we log an area it's on the front page." (IND TAS 20, Feb. 2006) Industry and labour unions were well aware of how well environmentalists used the media. ''With the television cameras the protesters are simply trying to go to initiate a swinger because that's great media." (IND TAS 09,June 2005)

"The conservation movement is extremely good in grabbing the 30 second image on the TV on the Sunday night news. A smoking coupe that has just been burnt with the corresponding emotional statement at the bottom of it. That's what people relate to. If the industry stands up and combats that, one, they reckon we are telling lies and, second, you can't do it in a 30 second drift." (IND TAS 10, June 2005)

In response to the environmental campaigns and associated media coverage, the Tasmanian forest industry not only released media statements but also launched a quarterly publication, the 'True Blue', to boost its public profile.

5.4 Post-TFCA - Business as Usual? 2004-2006

The post-election phase in Tasmania's forest conflict continued to be dominated by confrontational action as Figure 5.4 illustrates. While a few ENGOs continued their pre­ election campaigns using the same strategies, for example in the Weld Valley, others changed

134 their target areas and strategies. 1WS together with smaller local groups like the Tamar River Action Committee have been successful in making the anti-pulp mill campaign the number one environmental dispute in Tasmania. Other areas such as the Wielangta Forest have gained prominence due to, for example, Green Senator Bob Brown's lawsuit. Environmental campaigns seemed to cover an even wider range of confrontational approaches and resolution attempts than pre-election times reaching from road blocks, tree sits, and lock-on to machinery, over rallies, protests, and markets campaigns to legal action. Only participatory approaches seem to be absent from the environmental agenda. The forest industry equally didn't initiate any cross-party dialogue. So far, Gunns Ltd's decision to turn to the courts is an exception. Smaller companies preferred to engage in the usual 'rock throwing exercises' and mutual accusations between industry and ENGOs in order to win public support.

Figure 5.4 Actors and strategies in Tasmania· Phase III

Collaboration! Participation • Government Initiated

[]I Industr~' iuiUlllcd D ENGO illiti.ted

f----Z-O-O-4------Z-00-S------ZI-'O-6------Z0-0-7--+ TIM E

I RAN's Trees not Gunns campaign

Anti-pulp mill campaign

Weld camp Weld rallies & protests Confrontation! Non-Participation

In terms of changes in power relationships of the different interest groups, not much has changed. Even though real estate campaigning has altered the island's map through an increase of protected area, it hasn't brought along a change in existing power relations and

135 underlying institutions. The decision of the environmental movement to lobby on a federal level was never designed to increase its power base in Tasmania as ENGOs were playing the power in the hands of Australian politicians and voters rather than seeking to become part of the decision-making process themselves. Remapping, therefore, has only occurred to a limited extent beyond changes in land use. Figure 5.5 graphs the development considering power relationships and forms of conflict resolution. Just as in previous years, none of the initiatives undertaken by any of the stakeholders could be classified as participatory or successful in reaching an equilibrium of power between parties. The conflict in Tasmania appears as entrenched as before and one of the only lessons learnt from the latest agreement seems to have been to keep up fighting. "All you do is you put up a bigger shield and get a bigger rock." (IND TAS 08, June 2005)

Figure 5.5 Bargaining power and interest groups in Tasmania - Phase III

Collaborationl r ------­ Participation Manipulation Negotiation and by powerful participatory Tokenism planning

Connict with Conl1ict with potential for minimum radical change change

PO~'er and Decision making ba,.d on Sidawav 2005 ------~-~ Disparity in .- -+- • Parity in Power Power

Confrontationl Non-Participation

5.4.1 Outcomes In October 2004, Australians re-elected Prime MinisterJohn Howard who led the Liberal Party to its fourth consecutive federal election victory. Seven months later, Howard carried through on his promise. On May 13, 2005 together with Tasmania's Premier Paul

136 Lennon he jointly announced the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement (TCFA), also referred to as RFA supplementary agreement, in the Styx Valley calling it "a true balance between the preservation of jobs and the provision of hope and a future for the timber communities of Tasmania and the environment of Australia" (Howard 2005, no page number). To implement the TCFA and its environmental and economic objectives (see Table 5.7) the federal and state governments agreed to invest AUS $ 156.8 million and AUS $ 90 million respectively (Government of Australia and Tasmanian Government 2005). Referring to the governments' [mancial commitment Premier Lennon called the TCFA "a true cooperative agreement" (Lennon 2005, no page number).

Table 5.4 Overview ofthe Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement

Environmental features: Economic features:

• Additional protection of 170,000 ha of forest on • AUS $ 200 million in total to maintain supply public (135,450 ha) and private (45,600 ha) land; levels to the industry and to assist the industry to adjust to a future increase in the proportion of • Protection of old-growth forest increased to over logs from regrowth forests and plantations; 1 million ha; • AUS $ 115 million to fund additional plantation • Formal reservation of parts of the Tarkine and establishment and productiviry improvements in Styx Valley; existing plantations and native forests to ensure • Significant increases in reservation levels for a sawlog and veneer log supply targets are able to be number of old-growth forest types to meet met into the future; national reserve criteria targets; • Support of the Tasmanian hardwood industry • Reduction of c1earfelling of old-growth forest on with AUS $ 42 million to develop and revitalize public land; mills and other businesses and AUS $ 4 million for country sawmills; • Phase-out of clearing and conversion of native forest retaining at least 95 per cent of the 1996 AUS $ 11.4 million for special species and native forest extent and cessation of conversion of beekeeping industries; native forest into plantations by 2010. • AUS $ 4 million to build skills and training for the Tasmanian forest industry; AUS $ 10 million for Tasmanian softwood industry.

Source: Government of Australia & Tasmanian Government 2005, Fact Sheet No. 1.

The Mercury Gune 27, 2005, no page number) reported that the agreement "was welcomed by the timber industry and condemned by environmental groups" but interviews revealed less pronounced fronts. Asked about their ftrst impression on the TCFA and its objective to solve the forest debate, representatives from ENGOs, industry, but also government seemed fairly reluctant. One government representative described the TCFA

137 "almost a lose-lose announcement for some peak groups" (GOV TAS 04, June 2005). Both industry and ENGOs criticized the lack of consultation with communities as well as other interests. Environmentalists said that they thought that the name was wrong. "It's just like the Regional Forest Agreement. There is no agreement between the members of the community. The community had no say whatsoever." (ENV TAS 03,June 2005) Similarly an industry spokesperson argued that companies "weren't consulted in any way" and that they were "quite miffed about it" (IND TAS 01, May 2005). Only a few groups such as TNC stated that they had been consulted regarding specific outcomes and objectives of the agreement. Most other ENGOs, including TWS, Friends of the Blue Tier, and Weld activists criticized that they hadn't been included in the process. Disappointment of respondents was also linked to the political nature of the agreement. Stakeholders from industry and government agencies felt that the TCFA responded to 'public perception' or the 'big public debate' on the mainland rather than the interests of stakeholders without solving the actual conflict in Tasmania. "Some of the things adopted in that agreement were purely for public perception reasons only, not for good forest management or biodiversity reasons or any aspect. Just for public perception." (IND T AS 12, June 2005) One industry representative argued that decisions had been made on the mainland as the "latest decision ultimately comes down to the fact that there was a concern in relation to votes in the last federal election that certainly weren't here in Tasmania but they were in the cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide." (IND TAS 14, June 2005). However, others argued that the agreement was maybe not a win for the bargaining parties but "built to the average person on the street as a pretty good deal" (GOV TAS 04, June 2005). The political nature of the TCFA was certainly no surprise as it was an election campaign promise. ENGOs were well aware of the national power they could build up by mobilizing mainland voters and lobbying federal politicians. But not only industry commented on the politics and motivations behind the agreement. One Tasmanian ENGO representative remarked that

"if you listened to what the Premier was saying about the recent decision, what the markets are thinking was cited by him as justification to coming to this recent agreement. [...] He was far more concerned about what Japanese consumers are thinking than what federal electorates in Australia are thinking. And the announcement is important in that far that we have gone through the trouble of getting Japanese customers to express concerns in order to get an intention by our government. But that's the extent to which democracy doesn't work in Tasmania." (ENV TAS 02, May 2005)

138 The fact that the TCFA is also available in Japanese (but no other foreign language) backs this statement. The markets campaign launched in Japan by Tasmanian groups has been less central than in the Great Bear Rainforest, but it clearly has been noticeable to the Tasmanian forest industry. In 2004, Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Paper Mills, two of Gunns' Japanese clients, both announced they would stop buying woodchips from Tasmanian old-growth forest and Mitsubishi told Greenpeace Japan, that ''We want it to be clearly understood that we do not condone unsustainable logging from old-growth or high­ conservation value forest in Tasmania." (quoted in Macken 2005, no page number) A FIAT spokesperson admitted that the "campaign has had some effect. It's not to me measurable but it has constantly caused problems of relationships between our exporters and Japanese costumers. We have just lost some export contracts to Japan." (IND TAS 01, May 2005) Even though there were multiple driving forces behind the TCFA, the strongest consisted of votes from mainland electorates.

In respect to solving the conflict, the TCFA didn't change the entrenched situation in Tasmania. Premier Lennon called the TCFA a chance "to demonstrate to the world that the best forest practices in hardwood forest harvesting happen here in Tasmania. [...] Tasmania will be the largest protected place on the planet outside of Antarctica." (Lennon 2005, no page number) His speech was immediately followed by a press release of Greens Senator Bob Brown referring to the outcomes of the agreement as 'two parts poison to one part champagne'. Timber Workers for Forests, a specialty timber worker lobby group including boat builders and cabinet makers released a response to the TCFA a month after its announcement voicing concerns "that the agreement will result in an increase in clearfelling and continued waste of specialty timbers" (The Mercury June 27, 2005, no page number). Not all environmentalists took such a strong position. Some respondents from ENGOs admitted that the protection outcomes, particularly in the Tarkine but also the Styx, were clearly more than they had hoped for. Others, who had campaigned for the Blue Tier and Weld Valley, were disappointed, because their areas had been left out of the agreement. While some activists believed that campaign styles had an effect on what areas had been included in the TCFA or not, others were more cautious. They believed that extensions to the protective areas system depended more on economic considerations rather than environmental values or as some environmentalists argued, scientific evidence.

139 "There is no doubt that probably simply from the fact that the area [Tarkine] that we have been fighting for is mainly rainforest which is not as commercially valuable as the eucalypt forest was probably a big factor in the fact that we got it from the latest government announcement but I think probably our strategy in terms of involving the local community and not doing anything too divisive was probably extremely helpful especially when it came to the sort of political lobbying stage about six months before the election." (ENV TAS 05, June 2005)

One professor from the University ofTasmania backed this position pointing out that "the reason why the South Sister is not winnable [...] and the reason the Blue Tier is not winnable no matter how good a campaign they run [...] is that those are the forests that are required for the pulp mill." (GOV TAS 10, Jan. 2006) One TCA spokesperson strengthened assumptions that economic interests had been taken into consideration when negotiating an extension of the reserve system stating that "this time around our side of the fence may have been able to have some influence over what was reserved and where it was reserved and how it was reserved but the fact remains it was still reserved." (IND TAS 08, June 2005) In respect to management practices, environmentalists were also rather critical and felt disadvantaged over industry interests as the following quote illustrates:

"End of clearfelling is in the policy. Well, great, you want to see how it looks like? We are going to leave clumps of trees in the clearfells now and it says none of this is clearfelling. [...] And after you have done that by defmition, by leaving these clumps in the clearfells and saying we haven't clearfelled the old-growth forest, now it's no longer an old-growth forest, it's a highly disturbed forest. Now because it's no longer old-growth we can come back five years time and clearfell the remainder because it's no longer old-growth forest. So the policy will move more toward the industry direction. So, it's a bit of destruction by two stages now rather than one." (ENV TAS 21, June 2005)

At the same time industry representatives expressed their frustration regarding TCFA outcomes. "So it's going to be a reduction in [timber] quality and a reduction in total resource with an increase in costs through the introduction of aggregated retention harvesting." (IND TAS 01, May 2005) FIAT, contractors, and TCA named increased costs in logging practices, reduction in resource quality, and loss of resource through protection as negative implications for the industry. Particularly the forest contractors were worried about the fmancial implications of the agreement:

140 "things are imposed on the contractor because the companies that we work for typically won't give us any more money to do additional work. We are squeezed in the middle. And we are usually where the fmancial ramifications of these changes happen. If a prescription was changed and we couldn't clearfell and now we are going to selective log that is going to cost ten percent more to do that and we have to add the difference. [...] The problem is that [...] they have done it time and time and time again so it is getting very, very difficult to operate." (IND TAS 12, June 2005)

The minority of respondents believed that the outcomes were overall positive. The forest industry claimed that practices had been changed around issues that had dominated environmental campaigns such as the use of 1080 poison and clearfell. Comparable to the RFA process, the credibility of the TCFA has been questioned in respect to the role of science and stakeholder engagement. While ENGOs argued decisions were made in favour of economic interests, industry representatives felt they had 'lost' as reflected in the following statement of a TCA spokesperson: "Because the problem is, mate, whenever there is a debate about forestry we have to lose. We can't get national parks back. It's like this election. The industry, its community lost. There is another 170,000 ha of forest that will be reserved." (IND TAS 08,June 2005)

Whether to the satisfaction of stakeholders or not, the TCFA has remapped the forest sector, including a significant extension of the protected areas system and changes in forest management practices. Changes in attitudes and behaviour of stakeholders are harder to measure. All representatives, even government representatives, felt that the TCFA had failed to bring stakeholders closer together. "It is even as if the agreement hasn't happened." (IND TAS 02, May 2005) Relationships between ENGOs and logging industry are as tense as before and environmentalists blamed the timber industry for being greedy and incorrigible:

"So they [industry] have had $400 million taxpayers' money that could have solved the problems ten times over. On every occasion they use it to entrench conflict. So, I have no interest in this argument that our people [environmentalists] weren't prepared to talk and compromise. That is rubbish. They will never give up a single stem that is taken out of their clutching fmgers." (ENV TAS 27,January 2006)

Similarly, the industry described the ENGOs as intolerant regarding any other than their own interests.

141 "So every time we have tried that engagement it has ended in separation because for a number of reasons but primarily amongst which it doesn't deliver 100 percent of what environmental groups were chasing. And until we can deliver the close down of the native forest industry it won't change. And I even take that further and say once we settle the native forest issue the next one will be plantations." (IND TAS 01, May 2005)

Table 5.5 Infonnal changes in Tasmania as seen by respondents, selected interview quotes

Industry • ''The debate will continue and I think the reason it will continue is because it is the power base of the environmental groups particularly in their political wing and from that point of view they can never allow themselves to be satisfied. I think the only thing that would stop them attacking the forest industry in Tasmania is if the industry would close completely." (IND TAS 01, May 2005) • "I know you all want to hear about conflict and how we can deal. .. There will always be conflict and it won't matter whether we are the Country Sawmillers' Federation or whether it's the forest industry association or Gunns or Forestry or whoever. There will always be conflict when the perception of what we do is not the truth." (IND TAS 14,June 2005) • "Some of the harvesting techniques or prescriptions we are going to have to use in the future are less safe for my members and more expensive, not as good for forest regeneration, not as good for forest health, for anything, but there might be an argument for a bit biodiversity as well. I guess we would welcome them with open arms if we could have felt some recognition from the environmental movement [...J that the industry is going to wear a fair bit of pain. Frustration creeps in with the feel that we haven't changed any attitude out there at all." (IND TAS 12, June 2005) Government • "I believe it's this cabal of wealthy, well connected men who could not afford to have the transition occur. And that is why you won't have common ground because the people who control this island are absolutely connected to wealth generation in the forest industry, well, not just forest industry, the sweet of mining, logging, resort development, the whole exploitative approach." (GOV TAS 08, June 2005) • ""\s I said to you this debate has been going on for a long, long time in Tasmania and it is a continuing process that we don't see that there is ever going to be an end to it. It's just you have to keep on dealing with the issues as they come up. "\nd largely the debate about forestry in Tasmania is about values." (GOV TAS 05, June 2005) • "Well, in fact we can't have a win-win situation because the forest industry wants to exist on such a massive scale and that's why forest industry can't go back to saw logs." (GOV TAS 10,January 30, 2006)

Source: Personal interviews

Table 5.5 lists responses from industry and government respondents regarding behavioural or informal institutional changes following the TCFA. In contrast to the Great Bear Rainforest processes where cooperation was built on personal relationships between individuals, the Tasmanian case doesn't give any evidence that individuals had been successful in overcoming hostility and mistrust even though most actors knew each other. Respondents from industry and government stated that they have a 'great deal of respect' for individual activists, that they were intelligent and respectful persons who you 'just can't dislike' and that they had friends themselves who were quite involved in the movement.

142 They felt that "dealing behind the scenes with an individual" (GOV TAS 13, Feb. 2006) was always possible but that communication at an organizational level was considerably different.

5.4.2 Continuing the Fight ENGOs didn't abandon their campaigns in the post-TCFA landscape. Even though most groups continued their election campaigns, Phase III is characterized by a topical shift with the planned pulp mill proposed for the Tamar Valley as well as a shift in strategies moving from the forests and parliament to the courtrooms.

Up in the northwest, TNC continued its work focusing on establishing world heritage site listing for the area as, according to its website, despite the TCFA "30, 000 hectares of the Tarkine old growth forests continue to be logged." (see www.tarkine.org/lobby.html) One representative ofTNC also pointed out, that "[t]he greatest threat will be the mining industry and that will be the thing that will create a situation where the state government will not want national heritage status because that will preclude mining there" (ENV TAS 14,june 2005). The campaign in the northeast around the Blue Tier seemed to have lost momentum mainly due to the limited human and fInancial resources. One of the activists explained, " right now I'm in a mode where I don't know what to do. I exhausted every option." (ENV TAS 08, june 2005) Forestry Tasmania had pulled out a coupe containing a fat tree of its three-year logging plan but the TCFA hadn't brought any long-term protection for the Blue Tier. Forestry Tasmania's feasibility study on a Blue Tier hiking trail undertaken in October 2005 suggested that the proposed routes didn't hold enough scenic values and points of interest to sustain a multi-day walk or even individual single-day walks.

Down south in the Weld Valley, the campaign continued and even gained more strength as it received support from other ENGOs, particularly 1WS. Over the summer 2004/05 more than 200 people had visited the camp (Smith 2005) and even though activists agreed on closing the camp over the winter when road constructions are impossible they continued the camp in late September 2005. During the summer 2005/2006 the number of activists ranged from 15 to 20 consisting of experienced travelling activists from the mainland and Europe, international travellers, and locals who joined the camp for a few days to months according to activists at the camp. Environmentalists also initiated protests and media stunts outside the forests where, for example, in Hobart approximately 25 people

143 disrobed on the lawns of Parliament House to spread their message writing 'www.huon.org' with their naked bodies. In November 2006 the police broke up Camp Weld on Eddy Road including the Weld Ark (see Image 5.2). This was followed by a number of direct actions including tree sits and people standing in front of machinery leading to 17 arrests (Burling 2006). Despite the dismantling of the camp, protests in the Weld Valley continued with rallies, roadblocks, and other actions over the summer.

Not all election campaigns have been continued like the Weld and the Tarkine. The post-TCFA period is also marked by a number of new campaigns. TWS, for example, shifted its major campaign effort from the Styx Valley to the proposed pulp mill by Gunns Ltd in the Tamar Valley. With the ultimate goal to protect the resource from feeding into the pulp mill, IWS has addressed the whole community listing the negative impact on air quality, marine life and fisheries, wildlife, water, and climate. One TWS campaigner called the successful engagement of the Aboriginal community in an anti-pulp mill rally in December 2005 as "one of the biggest breakthroughs in Tasmania in the Tasmanian community" (ENV TAS 29, Jan. 2006). TWS is not the only ENGO campaigning against the pulp mill. The Tamar River Action Committee is concerned with the negative effects of the pulp mill to the local community in the north and local ENGOs such as the Friends of the Blue Tier have backed protests against the pulp mill with an eye on the upcoming federal elections in the Fall 2008. With the anti-pulp mill campaign ENGOs have intensified their attacks against Gunns Ltd. During the pre-election phase, ENGOs have mainly focused on state forests and even though the private forest sector has always been on the radar, Gunns Ltd has become the major target in recent years. In December 2004, the conflict has turned into a personal fight for some ENGOs and activists when Gunns Ltd filed lawsuits against 20 environmental organizations and individuals, known as 'the Gunns20', claiming injunctions and damages of ADS $ six million against Greens leader Bob Brown, The Wilderness Society, and the Huon Valley Environmental Centre amongst others for disruption of logging operations, corporate vilification campaigns, campaigns against overseas customers as well as targeting shareholders, investors, and banks.

Whether the writs would actually serve Gunns Ltd or further harm its already damaged reputation has been debated in the media. Many condemned Gunns' approach as intimidation strategy and called it a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP)

144 attack (Macken 2005). In November Gunns Ltd submitted its fourth version of their claims and by May 2007 had dropped allegations against four defendants. But not only Gunns Ltd has started using legal avenues. Environmentalists have also discovered the court rooms. In May 2005 Green Senator Bob Brown launched a case against Forestry Tasmania (Brown v. Forestry Tasmania) in the Federal Court alleging their forest operations in the Wielangta Forest were not in accordance with the RFA. Both, the Commonwealth and Tasmanian governments intervened in support of Forestry Tasmania. Despite their efforts, in December 2006 the court ruled in favour of Senator Brown. Similarly, TWS challenged decisions by the federal Minister for the Environment and Water Resources regarding the approval process of the Gunns Ltd pulp mill (The Wilderness Sociery v. Malcolm Turnbull and Cunns Uti). One representative from The Greens explained:

"The conservation movement right now is, as I said, fairly demoralized. It's taking stock after having put such a huge effort in that 12 months lead up to the federal election with the Global Rescue Station and all that terrific global work and national work and then now starting again to look at what to do in this totally hostile climate and that is why we start looking to the courts." (GOV TAS 08, June 2005)

Despite the Gunns Ltd law suit new environmental actors started to engage in Tasmania's forest debate after the TCFA. In March 2006 the US-based RAN, that had also been playing a lead in the early Great Bear Rainforest campaign, joined the debate with its 'Trees not Gunns campaign' against Gunns Ltd. Targeting mainly corporate supporters such as ANZ and Japanese buyers such as Nippon Paper and Oji Paper, RAN launched a high-profile markets campaign including a ranking report (Rainforest Action Network 2006) of global buyer companies ofTasmanian forest products.

The continued campaigning of environmental groups both in the forests and market place as well as the lawsuits seem to have (further) damaged the image of the Tasmanian forest industry and government. Both groups used branding strategy to brush up their reputation. The state government renamed and to a certain degree restructured the formerly known Forest Practice Board into Forest Practices Authority to stress its autonomy from industry. Initiatives such as a government operated pulp mill bus that is touring the state to inform communities on the proposal, however, leaves Tasmanians wonder to what extent the state government is really distancing itself from corporate interest. "Now here you have

145 a government that is actually going out of its own doing all the advertising, all the work, all the negotiating with the community on behalf of a private company." (Er--.-rv TAS 32, Feb. 2006) In an attempt to 'green' its image the forest industry in Tasmania is marketing itself as 'The New Forest Industry' to emphasize its commitment to "sustainable forest management, innovation and the value-adding and down-stream processing of our timber resources" (see http://www.ffic.com.au/).

5.5 Conclusion

Similar to the Great Bear Rainforest, environmental bargaining has led to considerable changes in the Tasmanian forest regime, both in respect to rules of the game and organizations. Clearly, ENGOs have been very successful in remapping the resource through an increase in protected area by 170,000 ha, the ban of 1080 poison, and phase-out of conversion of native forest into plantations. On the island ENGOs have employed solely implicit forms of bargaining (Fig. 5.6) including direct action and indirect approaches such as media and community focused events to educate and inform the public about their concerns and goals.

On the Australian mainland groups relied heavily on lobbying of politicians but also on media whereas campaigns outside Australia focused primarily on the Japanese markets place. In terms of power relationships and strategic alliances, ENGOs have mainly built on allies from within the movement connecting with local and international groups to support their stakes. The media has also served them well (even though some respondents might contest this). Unlike in BC, they haven't been able to build up strategic alliances with powerful actors outside the sector to increase their own bargaining power and leverage. As a consequence, stakeholder relationships haven't changed and the TCFA clearly hasn't brought any peace to Tasmania's forests. While both governments announced the agreement as solution to the dispute, the reaction of the majority of stakeholders has been rather sceptical. Increased pressure from ENGOs on private companies in Tasmania hasn't led to a 'new way' of dealing with conflict as organizations and rules of the game have proven quite resilient to environmental pressure. On the contrary, actors seemed to prefer a confrontational course choosing the courts over cooperation.

146 Figure 5.6 Implicit environmental strategies in Tasmania

Phase I

Forest Direct action, industry & I ENaGs I ---+ Media State government

Phase 11

Direct action, Forest Lobbying. Media, industry & ENaGs ---+ I 1---+ Markets campaign State government

Phose III

Direct action, Forest Courts, Media. industry & ENaGs ---+ I 1---+ Markets campaign Slate government

147 CHAPTER 6: ENGOS AND FOREST CONFLICTS IN BC AND TASMANIA - A COMPARISON

"And for many years we equated British Columbia and Tasmania. You know, they are sort of First World countries with Third World forest practices." (ENV TAS 28, Jan. 2006)

The analysis of forest conflicts in BC and Tasmania reveals many similarities in respect to actors, forms of bargaining, and outcomes. ENGOs have employed similar strategies in their campaigns such as direct action and markets campaigns and have adjusted and changed their strategies over time. In both regions they have turned away from the regional level and targeted a national and international audience that provided them with sufficient bargaining power to increase protected areas and reform the forest industry. Despite these similarities, considerable differences exist in approaches chosen to engage in discourse and to solve conflicts as well as in outcomes particularly regarding informal institutions. Most notably, in BC ENGOs and industry moved from non-participatory approaches to collaboration while actors in Tasmania did not collaborate. In both regions ENGOs successfully extended the protected area network. In 200614 percent ofBC's land area and almost 40 percent (!) ofTasmania's land area were under protection. But even though ENGOs in Tasmania clearly remapped the state they are unhappy with the outcomes and remain more critical than their colleagues in Be.

This chapter investigates similarities and differences between the two regions. In how far do campaigns and outcomes correspond or vary and how can similarities and differences be explained? More specifically, why were ENGOs in Tasmania unable to build up enough bargaining power to put pressure on industry and government when RSP groups were so successful using similar strategies? Further, why do Tasmanian bargaining parties restrain from collaborative efforts? This chapter provides explanations taking a closer look at the institutional context, particularly social norms and legislation, and regional specificities. It argues that attention needs to be directed towards socio-cultural practices that are closely tied to the history and geography of the regions to understand environmental bargaining.

148 The chapter starts with a comparison of actors and their relationships in the two regions before it turns to similarities and differences in respect to bargaining strategies. Due to the nature of environmental bargaining and the central role ENGOs play in it, the main focus of analysis is placed on environmental groups. The chapter then provides explanations for the identified differences looking at the regional context of the two case study regions. It examines legislation and social norms including community structures, demographics, and the importance of place and space before it discusses bargainingoutcomes in BC and Tasmania.

6.1 Actors

ENGOs in Tasmania and BC show a similar mix ofsmall, medium, and big players. Tasmania's environmental movement consists of a number of very small grassroots groups that were formed by local residents (e.g., Blue Tier, South Sister, Reedy Marsh, Tarkine) and focus exclusively on local issues, often NIMBY. In BC, these groups are on average bigger (e.g., Valhalla, Raincoast). Large professional groups such as Greenpeace and RAN have played a considerable role in both regions, the Styx and the Great Bear Rainforest, where they launched similar markets campaigns and media stunts. A RAN campaigner explained RAN's strategy of choosing campaigns naming two factors - a focus on endangered rainforests and the chance of campaign success. ''We go where we think we have the highest returns from our action." (ENV BC 10, Nov. 2006) BC and Tasmania meet not only RAN's criteria but also those of other international lobby groups as they have institutional structures in place that can enforce the political will generated by environmental campaigning.

Regarding internal relations and dynamics of the forest movement, both regions experienced a split between organizations within the environmental movement. In BC, RSP groups gained most bargaining power due to their successful markets campaigns that made them necessary bargaining partners for industry and other interest groups. RSP groups chose a collaborative approach negotiating directly with industry (in the form ofJSP) and with many other stakeholders at the LRMP tables while keeping the markets campaigns as leverage tool. The majority of non-RSP groups criticized them for having bought in, given up too much, and not having played the insider-outsider strategy well enough. One environmentalist rightfully stressed that even though the JSP and LRMP processes were

149 important collaborative efforts they had at the same time marginalized non-RSP groups and therefore had an anti-democratic component to them (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006). In Tasmania, the split in the forest movement happened between WWF (and to a certain degree TCT) and all other ENGOs triggered by WWF's blueprint that offered solutions to the conflict that differed and to some extent undermined the objectives of Tasmanian groups. Due to this, WWF was viewed as invader from the mainland that tampered with a Tasmanian issue. However, other mainland groups such as Greenpeace or the Australian Conservation Trust were not recriminated against by the Tasmanian forest movement. BC groups showed a similar level of ownership related to campaigning in specific areas. Particularly those groups who had worked in the Great Bear Rainforest for some time were seen as "very territorial" in respect to newcomers (ibid.).

In Tasmania, the divide in the environmental movement negatively impacted attempts of dispute resolution. The two groups proposing a more collaborative approach (WWF and TCT) didn't hold enough bargaining power to be worthwhile negotiation partners for government and industry particularly as their power was further undermined by other ENGOs. Instead, TWS, Greenpeace, and other more confrontational groups dominated the bargaining process. The fact that groups like Greenpeace and RAN participated in collaborative approaches in BC but didn't collaborate in Tasmania suggests that their campaigns and levels of success are influenced to a considerable degree by the regional contexts.

The power distribution within the environmental movement directly affected bargaining dynamics. The bargaining process was dominated by a few powerful ENGOs that often completely marginalized those who were unable to gain sufficient bargaining power. Government and industry in Tasmania were aware of the fact that engaging with one environmental group didn't necessarily mean engaging with others. "They [individual ENGOs] couldn't actually give you a guarantee that 'if you do that [they] will give you good approval here'." (GOV TAS 13, Feb. 2006) In Tasmania, this has prevented industry­ ENGO initiatives almost entirely. It is the combination of small groups lacking bargaining power and the 'no compromise' position held by the powerful ENGO 'elite' that has limited the movement to present itself as ally and negotiation partner. Many respondents saw the values and objectives of TWS, The Tasmanian Greens, and groups closely aligned with them

150 as major hindrance to explicit forms of bargaining as well as the diversity within the movement mentioned. Government representatives argued that "it has been a real problem trying to fInd people who can sit at the table and sort of represent the conservation movement" (GOB TAS 04, June 2005).

"The green movement has a whole line of values in it as well. That's what makes it so hard to do the negotiations with them. In the end the people like Alistair Graham [reT] who head up ENGOs cannot deliver anything. They can only speak for their own organization that has very few members." (GOV TAS 05, June 2005)

A large number of respondents mainly from industry and government criticized the objectives and values of ENGOs and "the way in which the debate got established and developed in Australia by environmentalists. They are largely of the view that there is no middle ground. It is all protection and so you can't log a stick or you allow logging to happen and then your ecosystem goes to hell." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006) Representatives from the forest industry also argued that the no compromise position of environmental groups was existential to them because without a forest industry debate "they don't have a reason for being. [...] They really can never be satisfIed because it will immediately cost them their power base or their political oxygen if you like." (IND TAS 01, May 2005) The timber workers who rely on high value species expressed more sympathy for the extreme position of the ENGOs. They see the vested interests of the forest industry as reason why ENGOs adopted a hard-line:

"Because the fIght has been so nasty for so long and forestry based upon clearfelling, burning, poising, destruction of water cycles all this stuff that we see, the conservationists went outside [of the formal decision-making process] and the only solution seems to be to lock it away from the timber industry. It is this long history of divisiveness, and anger and hatred that has made the environmental movement to lock it away. And I don't blame them." (ENV TAS 01, May 2005)

The environmental movement has countered the criticism claiming that it is promoting win-win situations that advance economic and environmental interests. Environmentalists argue that the forest sector is unwilling to change the way business is done to new forms that include a greening of the industry and sustainable practices.

151 Engagement between environmentalists, government, and industry seems to have occurred only on a smaller scale:

"Sometimes local environmental groups get into a negotlatlng, bargaining position with local managers and reach an agreement to modify boundaries, [...] the silviculture or to change the timing of harvest or to manage the land in a different way and that tends in Tasmania at least in my experience to happen between the local less formal ENGas and local managers but at a formal, corporate level there is no history of bargaining." (IND TAS 04, May 2005)

These negotiations are linked to very specific issues and are never transferable to other regions or a larger scale. In both case study regions, environmental leaders and representatives as well as other leaders have been active for many years. Individuals have been involved in the debate since Clayoquot Sound in BC and the dam campaigns in Tasmania. Many BC respondents perceived the shared history and experience of stakeholders as helpful or even crucial and identified them as main reasons why collaborative and participatory approaches were chosen. In Tasmania, however, the fact that actors have known each other for up to 20 or even 30 years didn't help to overcome the entrenched situation but was rather seen as hindrance to collaboration. "[T]here have been the same protagonists on both edges for so long that it has become personal, there is a lot of personal history and animosity and I don't think... well I think it does hinder a solution." (ENV TAS 22, June 2005) While individuals have been involved in the debate for a long time, not all of them have been working for the same organizations. Environmentalists have changed their affiliation over time just as government and industry representatives have with the latter two showing high job mobility between the public and private sector.

In both regions forest industry and government are seen as closely aligned in pursuit of a common interest.

"The problem then is that the democratic political structures don't actually ever elect governments most of the time where there is a substantial degree of sympathy for interest in or doing much about the environment. That creates, I think, both in BC in the 90s and particularly here in Tasmania kind of a corporatist approach to policy where industry, business, and government combine to exclude relevant other interests in the process of establishing policy which is designed to exploit the forest." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006)

152 Until recently BC was seen as a "company province" where "politicians were owned really by the companies" (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006). The situation has changed in the last years through incoming multinational corporations that are less interested in provincial politics and a government that has turned to First Nations and social movements (ibid.). In respect to Tasmania, Richard Flanagan (2003; 2007b) is one of the few journalists who openly reported on the relationship between government and forest industry, high levels of corruption, cover-ups, and concealment of key information of the sector (see also Hay 1996; 2000).

6.2 Strategies

In their campaigns around the Great Bear Rainforest and Tasmanian forests, ENGOs have employed similar approaches. Strategies, however, have varied between regions and over time. In both cases, ENGOs shifted their strategies from direct action (blockades, rallies, trees sits) to indirect forms of bargaining (markets campaign, legal avenues, banker campaign). This shift went hand in hand with a general change in objectives from a predominant no compromise position with focus on conservation to a more reformist approach. And while many ENGOs see themselves as 'paradigm shifters' there is still a considerable number of 'acre savers' who's primary goal it is to draw lines on a map to protect areas. While the Great Bear Rainforest saw direct action only in the early years of the campaign, Tasmanian groups have applied direct action throughout, in some disputes even with increased force.

In both regions ENGOs used intermediaries to build up pressure and to reach their actual target groups. In BC, environmentalists relied heavily on an international audience to put pressure on industry through markets campaigns. In Tasmania, ENGOs turned mainly to politicians and voters on the mainland and to a lesser extent the Japanese market, banks, and the courts to push through their interests. One main difference between BC and Tasmanian groups is that the BC environmental movement used the market pressure to build up leverage and, once negotiations were started, was able to maintain it and keep industry at the table. Tasmanian groups, on the other hand, couldn't increase their power through indirect forms of bargaining in order to gain leverage in decision-making processes. By focusing on the federal elections they lost their influence once the elections were over.

153 Even though the elections led to changes on the ground they didn't change power relationships between stakeholders. This strategy was therefore short-lived and didn't increase ENGO bargaining power in the long-term. It also didn't include ENGOs in negotiations and decision-making processes. At ftrst glance, the Tasmanian campaign might appear to be a poor strategic choice. Taking into account the experience and sophistication of the movement this seems unlikely. Based on the assumption that engagement on a state­ level would not increase their bargaining power and lead to explicit forms of bargaining, ENGOs focused on election campaigns:

"But it is also a mistake to think that change is only brought about through having nice conversations and chatting to people with power in parliament or wherever. Access is often falsely construed as power. Having the ear of government means shit in this country unless you have the threat of changing the outcome of an election." (ENV TAS 33, Feb. 2006)

The election campaigns were a response to the regional context and shared history and were seen by ENGOs as best strategy to achieve the greatest environmental outcomes. The Tasmanian markets campaign targeting Japanese customers was only partly successful. In the summer of 2005, Mitsubishi Paper Mills and the Nippon Paper Group responded to the campaigns by rethinking their procurement policies and cancelling Tasmanian contracts. Even though the two companies together purchased two million ofTasmania's ftve million tons of woodchips, the Tasmanian markets campaign didn't create the bargaining power ENGOs in BC achieved. Industry representatives mentioned that lobbying had negatively affected their trade relationships and that they had lost customers. Instead of responding to the issues raised by environmentalists and customers, industry accused ENGOs to be responsible for job losses linked to the plunge in demand. Infrastructure, Energy and Resources Minister of that time Bryan Green even suggested that "The result could well be that they'll [woodchip demands] be directed to countries where illegal logging leaves a trail of total devastation." (Clark 2005, no page number) Similarly, a campaign to persuade ANZ, Gunns Ltd's long-term banker, not to provide ftnancial assistance bore fruit in May 2008 with an offtcial ANZ statement that it will not participate in the provision of project fmance for Gunns Ltd's proposed pulp mill. Despite these developments, no collaborative efforts were undertaken on part of the industry.

154 Conflicting parties in BC, particularly industry and ENGOs, found collaborative ways to solve the dispute. Governments initiated participatory planning processes such as the LRMPs and TCFA. The LRMPs were set up as multiple stakeholder participation and ENGOs, particularly the RSP groups, successfully used the negotiations to influence outcomes. However, it has been argued that the process was largely dominated by ENGO­ industry interactions that took place outside of the LRMP. The TCFA process in Tasmania was criticized by stakeholders as G2G process between the State and the Commonwealth that only consulted a limited number of stakeholders and left out the majority of interests as pointed out by respondents from industry and ENGOs (comparable to the criticism on the G2G negotiations in BC).

"We would have preferred to have seen the state government and the federal government when they put the Community Forest Agreement together to get some sort of third party endorsement from the environmental side who said, I can see we have a win here, and sign off to it as well. I don't think that was even done. I don't think the government approached them purely because I don't think there would have been any outcome." (IND TAS 12, June 2005)

Tasmania's ENGOs and industry never reached a collaborative stage partly due to negative sentiment from past efforts including negotiations around the FFIC in the early 1990s and the RFA process. The majority of respondents from industry and ENGOs mentioned at least one of the two processes to explain why the other side could not be trusted and worked with. One professor from the University ofTasmania suggested that dispute resolution might just require time and that in that sense Tasmania is lagging ten years behind the development in BC:

''What I fmd interesting is that the degree of polarization that existed in BC, say in the early 1990s, is similar to the degree of polarization you see here in Tasmania today. And just as it was impossible to find much middle ground in BC over Clayoquot Sound you have similar ongoing issues here with not much middle ground found over the Styx Valley or over a number of the other areas." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006)

Rather than through directly sitting at the negotiation table, the Tasmanian forest movement influenced outcomes mainly through their successful mainland lobbying that made it hard for decision makers to ignore certain areas in the agreement. ENGOs managed to raise the profile of the Styx and Tarkine with an increase in protected area whereas the

155 Blue Tier and Weld Valley remained largely unknown to the public and were not included in the TCFA. Further, the Tasmanian forest movement never managed to present itself as potential negotiation partner or powerful ally to other actors that would have allowed it to move from implicit to explicit forms of bargaining.

The comparison of environmental bargaining in the forest sector in Tasmania and BC raises a few questions. Why did Tasmanian actors seem to have learnt less regarding dispute resolution from over two decades of conflict than their BC counterparts? What influenced the bargaining process and success of environmental campaigns in the two regions that put ENGOs in BC and Tasmania in different bargaining positions? Internal structures of the environmental movement affected environmental campaigning in both regions but limited their effectiveness only to a certain degree. The close ties between industry and government and pressure from the US softwood lumber dispute on BC companies similarly only explain parts of the bargaining process. Other factors need to be taken into account as one campaigner suggested: "you can't divorce the forest campaign in Tasmania and all that conflict from the mainframe politics and the social history" (ENV TAS 28, Jan. 2006).

6.3 The Regional Context: Legislation and Social Norms

The similarities between actors and strategies in the two case studies in relation to different bargaining processes and outcomes give rise to the questions regarding other more place sensitive factors that affect outcomes. Before taking a closer look at the informal institutions and behavioural norms shaping the conflict, differences and similarities of formal institutions that regulate the forest sector are examined.

In BC, the traditional forest tenure system was designed to grant long-term and relatively secure licences to private parties. The Forest Practices Code fIrst introduced in 1995 to regulate resource use and changes to the tenure system didn't alter the timber production orientation in the province. In 2001, the newly elected BC Liberal government announced a plan for a "New Era of Sustainable Forestry" to restore the competitiveness of the forest sector. Proposed changes to the legal framework included the establishment of a working forest land base, creation of a new market-based stumpage system, alteration of the Forest Practices Code to a results-based Code, the elimination of "cut control", decrease of

156 the forestry regulatory burden, and distribution of new timber rights in a more competitive way (Hoberg and Paulsen 2004). The Liberal forest policy agenda was strongly influenced by massive budget cuts announced by the government that affected the MOF reducing its funds by 35 percent.

The reforms represented a significant decrease in government intervention (deregulation) in an effort to be consistent with significant cuts in government resources and to reduce industry costs. It also showed a considerable shift towards market-based mechanisms particularly in respect to harvesting and milling decisions. The "Working Forest Land Base" for private timber companies on unprotected public forest lands was never legally implemented due to criticism from the public, professionals, local communities, and others. While the elimination of "cut control" has had important environmental and economic implications through the reduction of incentives to harvest during times where logging is uneconomic, the introduction of new legislations in the form of a results-based Forest Practices Code (the Forest Range and Practices Act was introduced in Nov. 2002, Regulations in Jan. 2004) and amendments to the Forest Practice Code (2003) have been criticized for not meeting their objectives: to strengthen the position of Be's forest industry in the market place. Further on, environmentalists have argued that ecological and social issues have been left unaddressed by these legal changes including issues around Aboriginal title and rights and high levels of clearcut logging that still account for 90 percent of harvesting (Clogg 2007). In particular, ENGOs are concerned about the implications of deregulation such as reduced government ability to enforce environmental standards, increased 'flexibility' to lower standards, and the replacement of legal requirements by self­ monitoring and voluntary compliance (West Coast Environmental Law 2007). Hoberg and Paulsen (2004) share the perspective that the Liberal government's plan shows an increased role of market forces and removes many regulations while changes to environmental policies have been very limited. They identify external forces such as US trade pressures and international market pressures as main forces behind the reform. In October 2007, the Ministry of Forests and Range released its Coastal Forest Action Plan as another attempt to enhance competitiveness and economic viability of the forest sector along Be's coast. With this plan the government sought to encourage investment, explored new markets and products, and modified log export policies. It also identified a need to focus on second­ growth forests. But environmentalists have again criticized the latest effort to support

157 accelerated rotation of second-growth forests, increase harvest rates, and continue raw log exports while environmental targets are left out.

In Tasmania, the legal framework has traditionally been developed at the state level. The fIrst major piece oflegislation was the 1920 Forestry Act that remains until today prescribing among others an AAC of eucalypt sawlogs (currently 350,000 cubic metres per year). Forest operations on all land tenures are regulated by the Forest Practices Act passed in 1985 "to ensure that forest operations are conducted in an environmentally acceptable manner" (Forest Practices Board Tasmania 2000, 1). The Forest Practices Code (ftrst announced in 1987, last revised in 2000) lists detailed forest practice requirements that apply to both public and private forestlands and is enforced by the Forest Practices Authority (formerly the Forest Practices Board). The Forest Practices Authority conducts both random and routine audits on public and private land to ensure that forest practices are carried out in accordance with environmental and cultural values. The Tasmanian RFA and TCFA represent the endeavours of the Tasmanian and Australian governments to integrate both state (and local) and federal (and international) forestry priorities seeking to achieve increased protection of old growth forest and rainforest, accelerated industry growth, and stable regional employment. "The primary strategy to achieve these goals is to balance an expanded reserve system with an increase in the area of plantation forest" achieved through conversion of native forest to plantations (McDermott et al. 2007, 11). The strong focus on plantations in Tasmania differs from BC's very limited forest plantation area. While the Tasmanian forest movement traditionally has been surprisingly supportive of plantation establishment, perspectives have changed in recent years and environmental criticism has grown louder particularly around the 'Plantations 2020 Vision' that promotes and subsidizes plantation establishment.

In their 'Global Comparison of Forest Practice Policies' McDermott et al. (2007) assess 20 countries in respect to policy prescriptiveness and performance thresholds based on written rules and formalized enforcement procedures not including on the ground measurement of implementation. In their study BC and Tasmania rank equally. The authors found that Tasmanian forest management practices are among the most prescriptive of the 38 jurisdictions included in the study and that Tasmania protects relatively more area under IDCN categories I and II than any other case study region. However, their study shows that

158 Be legislation, for example clearcutting and riparian policies, is more prescriptive and stringent than Tasmanian regulations. In respect to enforcement of legislation, McDermott et al. (2007, 16-17) point out that "as with all jurisdictions, policy application may be more or less restrictive than the written language implies, depending on the manner in which the policy is implemented and the frequency with which exceptions are granted." Proper implementation and enforcement of forest policies seems to be of particular concern in Tasmania. Many activists and citizens but also representatives from industry and governmental agencies including former Forest Practices Officer Bill Manning blame the Forest Practices Authority of misconduct and malfunctioning. Respondents from Tasmania particularly those with ENGO affiliation but also from industry and government commented critically on the close ties between state officials and industry representatives arguing that "the domestic industry and government are the same thing" (ENV TAS 02, May 2005). One forest campaigner stated:

"If I was a doctor of politics I would diagnose that that's essentially the illness in Tasmania. Because there is no separation between those people wishing to make money from the resource and those people allocating and managing the resour~e. And in those circumstances you are going to get bad environmental outcomes and I would argue very strongly very bad social outcomes as well." (ENV TAS 28, Jan. 2006)

Interviewees also saw part of the problem in the bipartisan forest industry in Tasmania claiming that "both the political parties in Tasmania are held hostage by the heavy hand of the industry" (ENV TAS 21, June 2005) where "the companies that dominate the industry basically have more power than the state government" (ENV TAS 11, June 25). Almost all environmentalists interviewed accused the state government and forest industry of corruption like this long-term forest campaigner: "There is no doubt there is massive level of corruption in the Tasmanian logging industry. There always has been." (ENV TAS 27, Jan. 2006) The close relationship between government and industry has been exemplified by many using Forestry Tasmania that was described as "fox in control of the hen house" because of its conflicting interests as regulator of the forest industry and market actor (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006).

"And Forestry Tasmania are probably 50 percent of the problem in Tasmania. They are an unaccountable government-business enterprise. [...] They are exempt from most of the processes of scrutiny under democratic

159 governmental processes and they are also not scrutable to the market. [...] There is no market oversight and there is no government oversight." (ENV TAS 28, jan. 2006)

The environmental movement has similarly criticized Tasmania's Forest Practices Code as being written, policed, and enforced by the industry. A lawyer working in Tasmania argued that there was simply not enough enforcement action from the government to make sure that the forest practices are actually being carried out (ENV TAS 17,June 2005).

In Tasmania, the government-industry dominated resource regime has been quite efficient in cutting off any critical voices that have emerged. Those who speak up risk unemployment and ostracism. "[p]eople don't work in Tasmania if they criticize the government." (GOV TAS 08,june 2005) Tasmanian forester Bill Manning who blew the whistle and testified in front of a Senate committee against Forestry Tasmania and the Forest Practices Authority is one example. Another is Richard Flanagan (2007b, no page number) who claims that "[t]he majority ofTasmanians appear to be overwhelmingly opposed to old­ growth logging, and only by the constant crushing of opposing points of view, and the attempted silencing and smearing' of those who put them, can the practice continue." One government representative admitted that the Tasmanian system doesn't allow criticism and that there is only a certain degree to which foresters or other industry employees could speak out about issues without jeopardizing their career. "Most foresters and managers, executive people in the industry we all know each other. If something happens everyone closes ranks. Protect the industry. That's how it seems to work here." (GOV TAS 06, June 2006)

Considerable differences exist in respect to the political culture of conflict and dispute resolution in the two case study areas. Respondents from BC and Tasmania pointed to fundamental differences between the two cultures regarding public affaires and engagement in politics. Table 6.1 lists selected quotes that reflect respondents' perspectives on social norms in BC and Tasmania. British Columbians were described as 'liberal', 'broad­ minded', and 'consensus-seeking'. Tasmanians, on the contrary, despite being seen as 'friendly' and 'generous' were seen as more belligerent and believed to choose 'adversarial approaches' over participation and negotiation. "That is the way how Tasmanians do public affairs: they go into the trenches and they shoot at each other. [...] There is never a lets find a win-win situation." (GOV TAS 10,jan. 2006) The statements in Table 6.1 generalize

160 attitudes and behaviour and don't apply to all Tasmanians and British Columbians. Nonetheless they provide an additional piece to the bigger picture that helps explain

Table 6.1 Social norms in BC and Tasmania, selected interview quotes

• "I suspect that in British Columbia we actually have a bit more of a liberal, [...J kind of broad-minded view of the world than in Tasmania." (IND BC 02, Sept. 2006) • "The reality is that the nation state of Canada has always had a significant irresolvable pressure point in the context of upper Canada-lower Canada or French-English etc. And there are elements there that you simply reach workable solutions but they are never a religious moment. They always follow compromise. [...J And I think the culture of the nation has both shaped and been shaped by some of the fundamental problems that it endures, distance and a bunch of other things [...J population density was less, climatic challenges were greater, distances were greater and often government was the only end at the other scale large enough to address issues." (GOV BC 03, Nov. 2006) • "In my humble opinions, Canadians as a culture are relatively good at consensus seeking in complex situations. I don't know about the Australians. My guess is a little bit less so." (ibid.) • ''The perspective on Tasmania and Australian society which is largely a uniform perspective but those are societies that are much more black and white [...J and they haven't really had a long tradition of trying to work things out with one another. [...J It's going to be much tougher to do it over a consensus-based approach." (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006) • "[110 get people sitting down and cooperating and working through different issues [...J has been exceedingly difficult here because of the polarization and reluctance on both sides. That the industry have felt that they have been forced to give up a lot of resource in the last few years, they have had a lot of additional constrains put on them. [...J And they are not in a mood to talk. They feel like every time they talk they lose something." (GOV TAS 04,June 2005) • "We [Tasmanians] are amazingly generous, friendly people but when we do public affairs we just go for the jugular. Exactly the opposite of how the Canadians do these sorts of things. We have this paradox of having the most generous formal political system in the world and the most ungenerous political culture. And I think this lack of generous political cultural stems from the days of convictism where you didn't know who is a snitch [...J. We don't know how to debate in a civilized way because totalitarian societies don't have debates. So I suspect a lot of the passion that we have in our forests and our forest debates actually come from these deeply engrained morphologies of how we do public affairs." (GOV TAS 10,Jan. 2006) • "I guess, at the end of the day there is a cultural difference between Canadians and Australians and how they go about political debate. [...] Politics around the world is kind of a vicious sport if you like but there really is an attitude of a no holds barred political culture in Australia [...J When Australians play sports they play sports to win. They don't understand the idea of an honourable loss or an honourable draw and they carry that mentality over into the political arena and that means the battles are just absolutely vicious and very, very personalized." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006) • "As I said before, we operate in this ideological framework of thinking that engagement and dialogue gets you somewhere. In Tasmania it does not." (ENV TAS 02, May 2005) • "But we are raised up to always think about an adversarial approach to everything." (ENV TAS 03, May 2005) • "I think also [in TasmaniaJ there is the mentality of all or nothing on both sides, which in any conflict will make resolution difficult." (ENV TAS 22, June 2005) • "In Tassie it's raw conflict. It's person to person, it's raw and you can be everywhere and it can come out of the field. In most other states the politicians and decision makers and the head of the industry like they don't come out and say, I never talked to a greenie. You can't see the conflict in the decision makers and the people who hold high positions whereas in Tassie you do." (ENV TAS 29,Jan. 2006)

Source: Personal interviews

161 bargaining outcomes. The historical lack of trust and resentment in Tasmanian culture paired with the fear to lose has increased the threshold for collaboration. Based on the assumption that conflict is needed to bring along change, it seems that ENGOs in Tasmania need to build up more pressure and bargaining power to convince adversarial parties to consider alternatives to conflict than their BC counterparts. One Tasmanian environmentalist suggested "that the only time industry responds to community outrage about forestry is when they are faced with a worse alternative then talking" (ENV TAS 28, Jan. 2006). A BC government representative concluded, "obviously you haven't come to a point in Tasmania where for both sides the alternative [to collaboration] is worse" (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006). One forester who came to Tasmania over ten years ago remembers being surprised by the tensions between industry and greens. ''You ask people [...] why don't you talk to each other? The greens talk through the newspaper, where is the industry responses? Basically, their response was, we don't bother." (GOV TAS 06, June 2005)

6.3.1 Community Structures and Demographic Factors "Most of the timber communities, in nearly all of them you find almost total opposition to industrial logging. I think of the bush towns as having actually three constituencies because the sea changers and the long-standing locals who are nonetheless opponents of industrial logging don't have much in common. The sea changers are educated; their houses are full of books. They actually live in a larger world. Whereas the locals who are opposed to industrial logging are in all respect similar to the locals who are in favour of it except that they are divided on this issue." (GOV TAS 10, Jan. 2006)

Over the last decades, industry lobby groups and even government authorities have fuelled an open hostility between environmentalists and forest industry by depicting green interests as threat to economic development and job security. This has led to a dualism between 'greenies' and 'loggers' that is particularly pronounced in Tasmania's rural communities. It is commonly expressed through stereotyping of the two groups as "redneck, beat, chainsaw wielding, hard head, bourbon drinking, four-wheel driving with a federal flag and a twelve gang shotgun at the back of the car" (IND TAS 09, June 2005) on one side and 'ferrals' and 'dreadlocks' on the other. "There is a big wedge that's been driven in the community and you know the pals are responsible for it because they want their industry and they want people to believe that you are either a hippie or you are a redneck."

162 (END TAS 24, Feb. 2006) One community campaigner described the situation in the communities as follows:

"In Tassie it's just the magnitude of that resistant hate and conflict. It's like there is no sense behind it. And it's kind of like you have to be this if you belong to this demographic of the community and you got to be this. If you see a greenie on the street you al~ays spit in their face sort of thing." (ENV TAS 29, Jan. 2006)

The use of bumper stickers with for example anti-green slogans such as "doze a greenie", "greens tell lies", "no greens", and "the only true wilderness is between a greenie's ears" is common among logging supporters and illustrates the divide in Tasmania (see also Hay 2000, 7) (see Image 6.1). But interviewed environmentalists also mentioned how bumper stickers have been used to express support and how support has grown visibly through the use of bumper stickers. "[R]emember the Tarkine bumper stickers on cars? You used to see one and then you would go, oh, there is such and such [...]. You would know the person. And there was a day when you would just go, who is that?" (ENV TAS 13,June 2005). The stereotype of environmentalists as belligerent seems to be just as engrained within the Tasmanian community as the 'redneck' logger. The head of the Tasmanian Forest Protection Authority, for example, pointed out in an interview that environmentalists are 'gentle' and 'like normal people' when you get to know them personally (GOV TAS 04, May 2005).

Image 6.1 Logging contractor car with bumper stickers in Deloraine, northwest Tasmania

Through this dualism in communities, the conflict often seems to have "become more about greenies versus loggers than a forest issue some times" (ENV TAS 30, ENGO,

163 February 1, 2006). The main issue dividing communities relates to the common assumption that environmental interests threaten jobs. Job loss through environmental campaigning has been readily picked up by the Tasmanian media fuelling as one university professor argued the "engrained job insecurity" ofTasmanians. According to The Mercury (Aug. 09, 2005) 400 jobs were likely lost due to a plunge in Asian woodchip orders and as a consequence "[m]any small country communities will be decimated" (Neales 2005a, no page number). In the same article, FIAT's executive director is quoted saying that "extreme environmental groups must accept responsibility for ruining the livelihoods ofTasmanian timber families and the communities in which they live"(ibid.). However, the same issue reported on a leading economist who blames rising prices as main cause for the slump in Asian orders. Similarly, Flanagan (2003, no page number) argues that "jobs are disappearing in old-growth logging not because of conservationists, but because of mechanisation" and that it is the misrepresentation of environment versus jobs that fuels the tensions. "Forest workers accept that it is legitimate to lose their jobs in the name of technological change because that's great progress but to lose their jobs in the interests of biodiversity values is not regarded as legitimate." (GOV TAS 10, Jan. 2006) Particularly environmental direct action like blockades are frequently played out between activists and workers and widen the gap within communities even though the argument lies between environmental groups and companies rather than activists and workers.

Another divide within Tasmanian communities relates to the origin ofindividual actors. Pro-industry constituencies often refer to 'greenies' as non-locals or new settlers that have moved to the community from outside the state/province, for example, in search of a life in harmony with or close to nature. Forest workers and industry see them as 'intruders' to Tasmania who shouldn't be entitled to have a say in the conflict. One environmentalist pointed out that a considerable number of activists have come from the mainland or from overseas. "The ironic thing so is if you look at the people in Tasmania who are active in these campaigns many of them are not from Tasmania originally." (ENV TAS 22, June 2005) Being a multiple-generation Tasmanian (the longer the better) seems directly related to a perceived entitlement to engage in conflict. All stakeholder parties seemed to implicitly be sharing this assumption as their representatives frequently referred to their generational status, for example, 'my family has lived in Tasmania for five generations now' or 'my grandfather has already worked in the Tassie bush'. A similar assumption about family

164 immigration history and the right to have a say became evident from interviews with BC forest campaigners who independently emphasized their status as second or third generation British Columbian to enforce their claims.26

The dualism in rural communities makes it hard for individuals to hold a neutral position and is reinforced by the Tasmanian mentality as one respondent observes:

"we are raised up to always think about an adversarial approach to everything. Ifyou don't believe this you must believe that [...] Right-wrong, pro-anti. Most people are neither pro nor anti. They are in the middle where they would like to see something that is more sensible, moderate. But that's not how we have been brought up." (ENV TAS 03, May 2005)

This divide has been somewhat overcome in BC through the collaborative process. In respect to dispute resolution, a number of people directly involved in the negotiation process around the Great Bear Rainforest mentioned the role of women and one of the mediators hinted that women might have been the key to successful outcomes. A large number of environmental leaders in the BC case study as well as one of the key industry representatives were women. Men hold most key positions in Tasmania and one female representative of The Greens27 linked the conflict to "all of Tasmania's wealthy men - I don't know of any Tasmanian wealthy women" (GOV TAS 08, June 2005). Bruce Montgomery, formerly employed by the FFIC to improve the image of the industry, resigned due to insurmountable resistance from within the sector regarding his recommendations for change that included new faces and voices of the industry. He equally argued, "there are no women anywhere there" (Neales 2005b). None of the Tasmanian respondents made any comments on the role gender might play in conflict resolution but several environmentalists emphasized the dominance of male representatives. The question whether and to what extent the gender of key actors plays a role in how conflicts are kept alive, dialogue is sought, and outcomes are negotiated is an interesting question that requires more focused research.

26 The opposite seemed to apply when conducting fieldwork. Coming in as 'outsider' to investigate the conflict in Tasmania seemed to have been an asset rather than hindrance as almost all people contacted agreed to give interviews within the next three to five days whereas a number of respondents complained about the unavailability of government officials, politicians, and industry representatives. 27 Peg Putt and Christine Milne, elected representatives of The Tasmanian Greens, are two of the few female key figures in Tasmania.

165 Another demographic variable that might positively affect collaboration is age. Differences in the age of actors are particularly interesting in cases where conflicts are deeply engrained in communities. Younger individuals in Tasmania viewed themselves and were seen by others as more moderate and open to collaborative approaches. One local campaigner in southern Tasmania found that "a lot of these young guys are more friendly to us than a lot of their parents. They are a lot more open to different ideas. But the older community is very entrenched in this sort of quite depressed culture down here" (ENV TAS 30, Feb. 2006). Young employees in both forestry and the environmental movement signalled higher willingness to engage with each other than their older colleagues. But no matter how reformist their approach might be, they are bound by the regional context and are facing considerable challenges. One young community campaigner who came from the mainland stated:

"So I thought, alright, I'm young I can actually go and talk to all these forestry dudes and say, this is what we want, this is what you want. Okay, this is a resource management issue and this is an issue that the whole community wants resolved so why don't we just resolve it. But I don't know I guess, I don't know whether this is going to happen whilst the key people are in key places as they are right now." (ENV TAS 29, Jan. 2006)

Others are similarly sceptical. They believe change won't be possible with the same people in charge. While some respondents argued the conflict could be solved with new actors, others thought it requires "another generation of different looking people" (ENV TAS 02, May 2005). No matter how far changes need to reach to bring an end to the war in the woods, it will require considerable time for healing and unifying communities.

6.3.2 Importance of Place and Space Political culture, behaviour, and individual activism are influenced by the history and geography of places where conflicts are played out. Both location and scale are central to how conflict and actors change over time. Bargaining processes that took place outside of the two regions have been shaped by external institutions, for example, from the Australian mainland, Japan, and Europe. ''You have to look at the culture of the leadership at the time. [...] The culture, the sociology, what is the culture that makes them do this that way." (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006) BC and Tasmania both share certain geographic characteristics. They are both located at the periphery far away from the political centres of the country and

166 contain large tracts of land that are hard to access. In the case of Tasmania, the state's island character further enforces its remoteness separating it from mainland Australia geographically and in identity. "The only thing doWn there [South] is Macquarie Island and Antarctica. We are an end of the world" (ENV TAS 11, June 2005). While Be is one of the most popular tourist destinations within Canada, only a fraction of Australia's tourists visit Tasmania. The state is often left out on geographic maps and is frequently overlooked by people. The small size of the island and of its population affect participation in environmental politics and shapes the form discourse takes.

"And so if you want to understand, I think, why you fmd so little middle ground [...] in Tasmania in particular it is related partly to the political culture and partly to the small island nature of Tasmania. So when a battle is fought lots of people get caught up in it and they are all local, they all know each other and there are scars that go back five, ten, 15, 20, 25 years. They just don't get forgiven. Every new battle is an opportunity to rip the scab off a scar and expose all the raw pain from before." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006)

The smallness of the state has led to fierce and personalized conflict between environmentalists and industry lobbyists in general and a number of key actors in particular. The different spatial dimensions and population sizes of the regions probably explain, at least to a certain degree, the impact individuals have had on the form or discourse. Be's size allows for a larger level of anonymity where individuals need to establish their reputation and earn themselves a name to be accepted by others. Environmentalists criticized how hard it was for them to get in touch with key people from government and industry. Personal relations proved to be valuable to help open doors and ears. Tasmania, in contrary, is a small place where everybody knows everybody and things get personal very quickly. Accordingly, the general public seems more reluctant to come out and openly support environmental campaigns because people are, as those who have chosen to speak up argued, "intimidated into not saying anything", "afraid of the consequences", and jeopardizing their job and career in Tasmania. The small population size also doesn't allow for anonymity. News travels quickly within the state.

"Maybe it's solidarity with local culture or something like that but most people aren't prepared to voice those [environmental] concerns loudly. They won't stand up against it because Tasmania is just so much of a small place. Ifyou are part of something people all over the state are going to know you.

167 They are going to see you in the paper and tell everyone else what you have been saying." (ENV TAS 30, Feb. 2006)

Respondents, particularly in Tasmania, pointed to differences in perception and behaviour between urban and rural areas. Urban populations are usually more supportive of environmental campaigns. Larger agglomerations also offer greater anonymity. Rural areas, particularly resource dependent towns, often represent pro-forestry constituencies. In 2001 47 percent ofTasmanians lived in urban centres (Australian Board of Statistics 2001 Census) compared to 85 percent of British Columbians with over 50 percent of the population living in the Greater Vancouver Regional District alone (Statistics Canada 2001 Census).28 Outside of the urban areas BC is sparsely populated and many communities are similarly remote and dependent on a single industry to the Tasmanian hinterland. In contrast to urban centres where the conflict mainly takes the form of political debates and rhetoric, these rural areas often experience open hostility between parties as illustrated by one Tasmanian environmentalist:

"It's easy for me. I'm in the middle of the city. I can write letters and do whatever I like. Gunns might try and sue me but it doesn't really make much difference to me. But if you are in the country making a sort of stand people will start shooting holes in your water tank or burning your barn down or things like that. It's like a civil war going on." (ENV TAS 03, May 2005)

A number of ENGO and industry representatives reported having been subject to blackmail and voiced concerns regarding sending their children to school in their community. An industry representative stated, ''Yes, that's been developed along with all the other standard blackmail the worst of which is the more recent habit of personally attacking the families of people who work in the forests by aggressive phone calls, sending them aggressive information in the post." (IND TAS 04, May 2005) Intimidation and violence are not uncommon. The leader of a lobby group against Gunns' proposed pulp mill reported having received 20 death threats in the ftrst three months of their campaign in 2005 (pos and Wade 2005) and gunshots had been reported near a anti-logging camp in southern Tasmania (The Mercury 2005b). Tensions between conservation and economic interests within BC's communities had been equally common but one BC government representative remembered

28 In Tasmania, urban centres are defined as agglomerations with more than 20,000 people, such as, Hobart, Launceston, and Devonport.

168 how early forest campaigns had received support from the general public including a large number of people from rural areas.

"And one of the things that fascinated me was that at the height of the early battles in the 80s, we polled people living in communities on Vancouver Island that were dependent on the forest industry and the overwhelming majority of the people we polled supported radical change in forest management even though it affected their livelihood because they recognized that what was going on was no longer sustainable" (GOV BC 02, Sept. 2006)

6.4 Outcomes

Through different forms of environmental bargaining ENGOs have been quite successful in remapping the forests in BC and Tasmania. The LRMP and TCFA processes changed boundaries and reformed legislation on forest management practices (even though implementation has been slow). In both regions, environmental conflict has led to a significant increase in protected areas. From 1996 to 2006 the protected area in BC was increased by five million hectares to a total of 13.9 million hectares representing 13.8 percent of the province's land area. Over the same period of time Tasmania's protected area network grew by 544,000 hectares to a total of 2.7 million hectares covering 39.8 percent of land area. In Tasmania, most of the addition to the protected areas system has been linked to considerable financial packages from the federal and state government to assist the forest industry. Since the RFA in 1997 AUS $350 million have been made available for compensation and restructuring of the industry. In BC, the provincial government announced its latest addition to the protected areas system on Earth Day 2008, a series of 11 new provincial parks (class A) and 66 conservancy areas29 that are mostly (48 of the latter) located in the Central and North Coast land use areas and fall under the Great Bear Rainforest agreement. These new additions total 985,000 hectares and make BC Canada's province with the largest protected area network including 14.7 million hectares (14.9 percent) of the province.

In addition to extension of protected areas, both governments further committed to changes in forest practices such as EBM for operations in the Great Bear Rainforest and a reduction of clearcutting, phasing out of native forest conversion into plantations, and the ban of 1080 poison in Tasmania. Despite these changes both governments have sustained

29 Conservancies allow some development, power lines, and logging under EBM standards.

169 their support for the forest industry, for example, through subsidization of operations or the governmental commitment in Tasmania (through the RFA from 1997) to provide the private sector with large volumes of logs harvested from Tasmanian public land to what critics regard as highly subsidized prices. Gunns' proposed Tamar Valley pulp mill is the latest example of the continued partisanship between government and industry on the island. Because of continued political support for forestry, "more Tasmanians are demanding a royal commission into the old-growth logging industry and its relationship with both major political parties." (Flanagan 2007, no page number) For example, the Tasmanian logging industry is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act and figures on the total woodchip production are officially secret "commercial in confidence" since 2000. Despite this, the two agreements also reflect a shift in governance structures towards increased stakeholder engagement even though only to a very limited extend in Tasmania.

How has the private sector responded to environmental campaigns? Can we see a restructuring of the industry in response to environmental demands? Are companies 'carriers of reform' taking the lead through value added production, downstream processing, and increase in their R&D activities or green practices? The forest industry in BC and Tasmania has proven itself rather rigid and resistant to change. It views the environmental movement as uncompromising and hostile, a threat rather than an ally for win-win solutions. The Tasmanian perspective that commitment to environmental reform will not lead to win­ win situations but will eventually mean the end of the industry is shared by many employed in the sector. While the BC industry has been part of the planning table for the Great Bear Rainforest and supported the decision, the Tasmanian industry referred to the latest TCFA government announcements as 'lose-lose' decision where a reduction in quality and reduction in total resource is paired with an increase in costs through changed harvesting practices. "Because the problem is, mate, whenever there is a debate about forestry we have to lose. We can't get national parks back. It's like this election. The industry, its community lost." (IND TAS 08, June 2005) To date it has been hard to see any clear signs of a restructuring of the forest sector.30

30 It is worth noting that ENGO representatives have pointed to the challenges of market-oriented conservation particularly in terms of economic viability.

170 Despite the generous extension of the reserve system in Tasmania environmentalists felt discouraged and disappointed with the outcomes of the fight. Fourteen percent of BC's land area is protected (including the latest addition in parks and conservancies) compared to 40 percent in Tasmania. Still, the Tasmanian forest movement is drawing a negative balance. One resigned environmentalist even compared the impact of the forest movement in Tasmania to the intense but fruitless research efforts of Douglas Adam's alien that in the end earned no more than a change in the description of the earth in the 'Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy' from 'harmless' to 'mostly harmless' (ENV TAS 02, May 2005). His perception that the forest movement's efforts have been insignificant contradicts the increase in protected areas and changes in management practices. But as Clapp (2004) reminds us, remapping is a continuous process and boundaries and protected areas are not permanent. Even though environmentalists have repeatedly pointed out that not all protected areas comprise high-value forests (e.g., button grass plains) their achievements still can't be denied. One industry representative pointed out:

"I was thinking [in BC] this is extraordinary like getting ten percent of your old-growth forest fully preserved and moving to 50 percent non-clear fell and a range of ENGOs saying this is a progressive way to move forward. But here in Tasmania, 87 percent of the old-growth forest protected, 80 percent of it non-clearfall but still no support from ENGOs. There's a different form of dialogue, it's a different dynamic, different political dynamic. (IND TAS 04, May 2005)

It is the 'different form of dialogue' as well as the 'different political dynamic' that cause the high level of discontent within the Tasmanian environmental movement. They are determined to a considerable extent by regional institutions. Outcomes of environmental bargaining in Tasmania are largely restricted to changes on the ground - boundaries, logging practices, replanting, chemicals, etc., manifested in formal institutions. Behavioural changes such as shifts in attitudes, values, norms, and, forms of interaction between actors are less apparent. Informal institutions are harder to change and more resistant to reform than legislation and boundaries (e.g., Schamp 2003). One Be environmentalist framed the underlying problem as follows:

''We don't have an environmental problem. We have a people problem. People have to change the way they relate to each other, to the earth and to themselves. [00'] If you create change in the world but you don't make any

171 change in those kinds of dynamics then it's not going to work." (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006)

In the case of the Great Bear Rainforest, actors actually thought that the collaborative effort brought bargaining parties closer together and has opened doors for all parties included. On the other side of the Pacific, Tasmanians felt that nothing really has changed. Institutions that regulate behaviour and rules of the game have persisted throughout the conflict and ENGOs have been unable to break the habits and increase their bargaining power towards a more balanced power distribution. The bargaining process itself regardless of outcomes is often directly linked to the level of satisfaction of actors involved. Stakeholders not included in planning and decision-making processes are in general less supportive and satisfied with outcomes no matter to what extent they meet their needs and objectives than participants.

In Tasmania, the post-TCFA era means business as usual and Tasmanians are wondering whether they are again heading back to the future where conflict will continue as selected quotes from interviews exemplify (see Table 6.2). The major challenge BC decision makers are facing relates to how and when changes from the Great Bear Rainforest agreement will be implemented. Protected areas and EBM need to be legally established through laws and regulation and fine-tuning and implementation of EBM in particular is a "non-trivial task" (Clapp 2004, 854). One RSP representative indicated that the groups would maintain leverage by not releasing their conservation financing funds (CAD 60 million) until management objectives have a legal base. ENGOs have voiced concerns about the timely and proper implementation ofEBM by March 31, 2009 and the continuation of unsustainable logging practices until details have been worked out. One ENGO representative claimed, "The companies did only give lip service to RSP groups. The reality we face now is an EBM-light." (ENV BC 11, Dec. 2006)

Whether acre savers or paradigm shifters, the work of the forest movement will continue. However, one BC environmentalist claimed that "the easy work has already been done". The government won't "give up another 30 or 40 percent of the province and make it into conservancies" (ENV BC 08, Oct. 2006). Other ENGO representatives agreed. They assume that wilderness-based campaigns that "draw a circle around some places and say that should be a park" like the Great Bear Rainforest or the Tarkine or the Styx are over

172 (ENV BC 07, Sept. 2006). An Australian campaigner made a similar observation in respect to Tasmania:

"And to be honest I think they [Tasmanian forests] are very worthy forests from a conservation value point of view but I think from a civil society, social movement point of view I think it is a crowded stand. There are more environmentalists per square metre forest outside the protection system than anywhere on earth maybe with the exception of Be. It just seems like there is a hell lot of greenies fighting for an increasingly limited amount of bush to put back in protection." (ENV TAS 33, Feb. 2006)

Table 6.2 At logger heads - ENGOs vs. industry in Tasmania, selected interview quotes

• "The environment lobby and the logging lobby in Tasmania are locked into a mutual need conflict. They both need each other to be where they are. The environment lobby needs an enemy that is evil, that's killing the trees and the logging industry needs the eco-extrernist, eco-terrorists who never recognize that we ever do anything sustainable. And they both need each other and they are locked into this conflict." (ENV TAS 07,June 2005) • "And I think, everyone believes in Tasmania from what I can see and that's coming back to the competitive nature of Australian politics. You do not give an inch. You do not give an inch because if you are giving an inch you might end up giving a mile. So there is no give at any front anywhere." (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006) • "because the Greens and the industrial forestry industry are at logger heads and there is no sort of dialogue as you sort of indicated... There is no real possibility of some forms of compromise and it's really just throwing grenades at each other." (ENV TAS 03, May 2005) • "The [environmental] leaders that emerged, I'm not saying the mainstream people, tend to be adversarial types almost like they are trained in the legal adversarial contest and the tools that they use like legal challenges, seeking injunctions, nitpicking on specific issues [...] are all adversarial tools and I can't see a future in that because that is not a way saying we sit down and working consensus." (GOV TAS 04,June 2005) • "You know, forestry can be conducted in an ecologically sustainable way and it would be great to see models of this happening here in Tasmania. [...] But it just seems that all the players aren't mature enough to sit down and actually work it out [...] and have a go for it." (ENV TAS 01, May 2005)

Source: Personal interviews

6.5 Conclusion The increase in protected area in Tasmania and BC is a win for the environmental movement but economic development doesn't go hand in hand with it. Ifthe environmental movement's objectives are a win-win situation, the outcomes in the two regions cannot be taken as clear win for any of the involved stakeholder groups in Tasmania while stakeholder groups in BC still await the implementation of their widely celebrated agreement.

Outcomes of environmental bargaining differ between regions and in relation to different actors. Conflict often is needed to change existing structures but does not

173 necessarily bring along the changes envisioned. To be successful, environmental bargaining has to reform the underlying institutional forces, the rules of the game, to bring peace to the woods. Changes in habits and values need to accompany legislation and voluntary action such as shifts in boundaries, introduction of certification labels, and sustainable practices. But while formal institutions and rules can be changed over night, informal ones have great survival tenacity and can take a long time to transform. This becomes particularly evident through the relationship of government and forest industry in Tasmania. Here the potential to resolve conflict is reduced by the (institutionally thick) government-industry complex that leads to an institutional lock-in, institutional inertia, persistence of hierarchical structures, and decision-making processes that prevent dispute resolution. Bargaining parties in both regions act in an arena that is defIned by different codes of conduct and norms. Environmental actors have changed their predominant no-compromise positions to a reformist perspective as becomes obvious from their shift in objectives from conservation to management practices and production processes. Through this ideological transformation they have also changed their role as opponents of industry and state agencies and made themselves powerful allies for other stakeholder groups, more so in BC than Tasmania. Together with a shift in ideologies and objectives, environmental strategies and tactics have changed. ENGOs in both regions have custom-tailored their strategies in order to maximize outcomes.

Outcomes of bargaining processes are a function of the complex mix of actors and strategies as well as regional and external forces (e.g., global market demands and international politics). The importance of place complicates transferability of bargaining approaches and solutions and interregional learning. Tasmanian bargaining processes have been limited by regional forces namely the institutional thickness and smallness of the state more than they have been shaped (and have benefIted) from external forces Gapanese market and federal government). Outcomes in BC's Great Bear Rainforest have been influenced positively (in terms of dispute resolution) by external institutions (international customers and markets) and events (US softwood lumber dispute). Additionally the shared history and experience of key actors has been crucial. Whether the forest conflict in Tasmania will be solved in the near future is uncertain considering the many factors that come into play. One respondent from Tasmania concluded, ''You know, it's hard to see but

174 again in Be it was hard to see solutions emerging, too, but they can emerge quite quickly given the right kind of confluence of structure and agency" (GOV TAS 12, Feb. 2006).

175 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This thesis explored the theme of environmental bargaining as a conceptual lens to analyze ENGO activism and selected environmental conflicts around forest resources in BC and Tasmania. This approach has helped to unravel the dynamics of the processes and forces at play in the forest economies of the two regions. The research stresses the importance of ENGOs in bargaining processes that seek to restructure and remap resource peripheries. Even though actors and environmental strategies in the two regions bore considerable resemblance, bargaining processes and outcomes differed, reflecting variations in regional context, including socio-cultural and historical factors. Environmental bargaining is a place-specific process. This conclusion stresses the importance of ENGOs and the potential of environmental bargaining research by outlining three sets of reflections. First, the contributions of the thesis to an environmental economic geography are considered, next, key themes from the case study comparisons of environmental bargaining in Tasmania and BC are noted, and [mally limitations are summarized and some directions for future research offered.

7.1 Conceptual Considerations

Recent initiatives to environmental economic geography (Bridge 2008, International Conference on Environmental Economic Geography 2004) have encouraged economic geographers to incorporate environmental issues into their research agenda. In response to this plea this thesis focuses on the role of ENGOs in regional development, specifically in the context of forest economies of Tasmania and Be. In Tasmania and BC ENGOs are powerful actors that influence the behaviour and decisions of business, government, and labour. This study contributes to the newly emerging field of environmental economic geography by proposing an institutional approach to environmental bargaining as a basis for analyzing environment-economy relations. It uses a two-dimensional model that considers the distribution of power between actors and the inclusiveness of decision-making processes (participatory vs. non-participatory) to measure ENGO activism and environmental

176 bargaining outcomes. ENGOs pressure and encourage ftrms to internalize environmental policies, show responsibility, and become 'good corporate citizens'. They persuade market actors to take different actions and create new forms of regulations establishing new relationships between regions and actors. ENGOs shape policies through lobbying and the provision of information, they mobilize the public, and help society to revalue the environment and resources.

ENGO activism is particularly obvious in the primary sector and in resource peripheries. In the secondary and tertiary sector ENGO activity may be less apparent and transparent. In these sectors the integration of ENGOs into economic geography can, for example, draw on and contribute to the literature on regional industrial change and industrial restructuring. ENGO behaviour is not necessarily adversarial or rooted in conflict. In some cases ENGOs focus on the provision of scientific evidence, professional services, and expert knowledge in close cooperation with government and industry. Further, they act as watchdog organizations or quasi-governments to ensure and accredit environmental standards revealing a transformation from opponents to enforcers of the rules of the game. Related to these changing objectives, many respondents, particularly from Tasmania, believed that conflict is central or the main reason for the existence of ENGOs. Once environmental conflicts are resolved regime-critical ENGOs become redundant as illustrated by the many short-lived issue-oriented groups that disappear once their objectives are met. Larger institutional groups, on the contrary, often persist either through shifting their campaigns to other issues and regions, by adopting an 'all or nothing' position, or by taking on a different role, for example, as watchdog.

The analysis of forest conflicts in Tasmania and BC reveals the importance of regional context to environmental bargaining and the value of comparative perspectives. Comparative case studies help identify catalysers and barriers to conflict resolution and successful environmental bargains. Regions can only be properly understood in their global context and ENGOs and environmental bargaining are now an important part ofglobal­ local dynamics shaping Tasmania and Be. ENGOs - maybe more effectively than any other actor group - jump between places and scales drawing from a wide repertoire of strategies and tactics. Environmental bargaining can also be applied when looking beyond the regional scale at multinational or global environmental issues and conflicts.

177 In respect to outcomes of environmental conflicts, an analysis of environmental bargaining contributes to and advances Hayter's (2003) and Clapp's (2004) notion of remapping. Through bargaining ENGOs do not only remap boundaries on the ground but also transform the institutions that regulate resource uses and create value systems and rules of conduct.

7.2 ENGOs in Tasmania and Be

To analyze environmental conflicts this thesis differentiates between three components or sets of factors - actors, strategies, and regions - that are connected through environmental bargaining (see Fig. 2.1). This section uses the three categories to highlight fIndings from the comparison of environmental bargaining in Tasmania and BC in respect to (1) the actors involved, (2) strategies/forms of bargaining employed, and (3) the regional context and outcomes.

First, both regions reveal a comparable mix of environmental actors including a number oflocal, issue-oriented groups and medium-sized ENGOs as well as Greenpeace and RAN as international actors. Of the former, Tasmanian groups are smaller in size and reveal a greater NIMBY-attitude. One major difference between Tasmania and BC relates to the coalitions between ENGOs in order to achieve their objectives. While the powerful RSP groups in BC engaged in negotiations with industry and other stakeholders, the ENGO alliance in Tasmania holding power did prevent attempts from other ENGOs to collaborate with industry and government. Vested interests in both regions are dominated by a small number of large companies in close relationship to government. But economic and government interests are as diverse as environmental interests and cannot necessarily be grouped together. That companies do not necessarily agree on resource and land use becomes particularly evident in the initiatives of the Tasmanian timber workers, beekeepers, and some tourism operators that align with the Tasmanian environmental movement rather than forest industry in order to strengthen their business interests. Considering that the forest conflicts in BC and Tasmania focused on public land, it is surprising that governments have played only marginal roles in the crucial earlier phases of environmental campaigning.

Second, how did actors, ENGOs in particular, bargain? ENGOs chose from a wide range of strategies and tactics that covered the entire conflict continuum from confrontation

178 to collaboration. In both regions they launched very effective markets campaigns that addressed buyers and consumers abroad. In general, Tasmanian strategies were dominated to a larger extent by direct action, confrontation, and mainland lobbying while in BC ENGOs used more innovative ways includingJSP and their conservation fInancing campaign. In respect to the Great Bear Rainforest strategies and tactics changed signifIcantly over time as the conflict matured. In Tasmania, no clear trend or shift in respect to the use of strategies was evident. Rather the conflict was fuelled and kept alive throughout the analyzed time period. Tasmanian strategies varied widely between different groups and local conflicts but not over time. The response of the forest industry to environmental campaigns also differed. BC forest companies approached ENGOs in an attempt to stop the markets campaigns and to solve the conflict together. Their Tasmanian counterparts, however, refused to do so and argued that past experiences had taught them not to cooperate.

Time clearly affected processes and outcomes both in terms of the duration and timing of interaction. Environmental bargaining in the two regions is a long, ongoing, and dynamic process. The composition of actors, their strategies, and bargaining power changed over time. The timing of events and actions was also crucial in changing power relationships and forms of bargaining as illustrated by the Tasmanian election campaign and Great Bear Rainforest markets campaign. In respect to the duration of bargaining, respondents in BC thought that the length of the bargaining process had increased the willingness to negotiate and come to an agreement. In Tasmania, in contrast, the long history of conflict was seen as inhibiting any form of collaborative approaches and joint decision-making.

A number of factors seem to promote collaborative efforts to conflict resolution even though institutional forces can outweigh their force. Many respondents named the role of individuals that acted as negotiators as crucial to solving conflicts. In particular, the person's personality (honesty, reliability), experience, interpersonal skills (particularly empathy), and history of involvement in respect to the conflict were mentioned. In regard to the latter aspect of involvement BC and Tasmania showed contradicting trends. While involvement in BC seemed an asset for successful collaboration, in Tasmania it was described as barrier. The success of key individuals in BC was also largely due to their willingness to try something new and be innovative. Further, demographic factors such as

179 gender and age were seen as affecting conflict behaviour. Women and young people were more open to consider other interests and to collaborate than men and older generations. The fmdings suggest that leaders, negotiators, and representatives need to be chosen carefully based on the history of the conflict and individual personalities and experiences.

Third, how do regions affect and are affected by environmental bargaining? BC and Tasmania share many similarities but also differ considerably in respect to formal and informal institutions that influence the course and outcomes of environmental bargaining. Almost all respondents from Tasmania including those born in the state and new settlers believed Tasmania to be a special and unique place mentioning, amongst other factors, its size and location, natural environment (or resource endowment depending on the perspective), and local history. As discussed in Chapter 6, the dualism of Tasmanian communities between labour/loggers and environmentalists that is fuelled and reinforced by the bipartisan forest industry, government but also environmentalists has limited collaborative forms of environmental bargaining. The smallness of the state and the duration of the debate have turned the conflict for many participants into a personal battle. As a result, environmental bargaining around Tasmania's forests has been largely adversarial and increasingly played out on the Australian mainland and internationally. In BC, however, deep-seated conflict has evolved into more cooperative forms of bargaining and has moved from an international scale to the regional negotiation tables.

The outcomes both in BC and Tasmania illustrate the large impact ENGOs and environmental bargains had on regional development in general and land use and property rights in particular. Both regions experienced a significant increase in protected areas and changes to forest management practices while informal institutional changes in values and beliefs were harder to achieve more so in Tasmania than in Be. In Tasmania, the Tarkine campaign based on community friendly events to reach out to the 'average bloke on the street' was celebrated as great success adding the largest area to the newly protected reserve system. In the rest ofTasmania, on the contrary, confrontational approaches and continued hostility between industry and ENGOs has only further deepened the conflict despite the positive environmental outcomes and fmancial package for the forest industry. The transition from implicit bargaining dominated by confrontational action (to build up bargaining power) to explicit bargaining through collaborative efforts is crucial to solving

180 environmental conflicts (given the right individuals are in place) while a delay of collaborative efforts and insufficient bargaining power hinders success. Participation and joint decision-making is most successful and will only lead to outcomes supported and endorsed by all actors when parties hold a balance of power. Where ENGOs were unable to build up a sufficient power base as in the Tasmanian conflicts, environmental bargaining will take implicit forms that are often dominated by confrontational action. The ability of ENGOs to increase their bargaining power is always affected to at least a certain degree by their institutional context. Social norms, legislation, and institutions need to be receptive to change and favourable to new forces. Particularly informal institutions that frequently take the form of learned behaviour (often transmitted over many generations) are hard to change and will need to be exposed to increased pressure. Strong ENGO coalitions that hold considerable bargaining power and that have also something to offer to other actors (particularly industry) are strong drivers of conflict resolution and regional reform as shown in the example of the Great Bear Rainforest. However, the inclusion of ENGOs and participatory approaches do not necessarily mean inclusive, democratic forms of decision­ making as they can easily marginalize others.

One of the research objectives of this project was to compare bargaining processes and to formulate recommendations based on the lessons learnt for practitioners, activists, decision makers and others. The thesis provides detailed information for each case study that can be used as a resource by practitioners, politicians, and ENGOs providing insights and explanations of causes and outcomes. The embeddedness of environmental bargaining in regional institutions (organizations and rules of the game) makes it hard to foresee and predict outcomes or transfer [mdings. Caution has to be used in respect to the generalization and transferability of case study findings on environmental bargaining. Explanations, lessons learnt, and insights gained need to be seen in context, as they are the product of multiple variables. Solutions cannot be used as blueprints or be easily applied to different resource peripheries. This underlines the significance of case studies and the need for more in-depths studies of environmental bargaining to provide a better understanding of the role ENGOs play in restructuring regional (forest) resource regimes.

181 7.3 Directions for Future Research

Despite the rich empirical evidence, the analysis and fmdings of this thesis should be treated with caution and a number of shortcomings considered. The main set of limitations relates to the conceptual framework and its practical application. An institutional perspective allows the inclusion of multiple voices and perspectives. This requires identification of all (important) actors. But data collection is usually limited by the availability of human and fmancial resources and priorities need to be identified. When using an institutional perspective, the researcher needs to decide how to sift through the large amounts of institutional detail and what parts to focus on. A priori conceptions are formulated that guide decisions regarding what is important and what data need to be collected empirically. In contrast to other approaches, however, what is important may not be axiomatic from an institutional perspective.

In respect to this thesis, a number of limitations of the empirical data can be listed. The data collected prioritizes ENGOs and ENGO behaviour over other actors and forces that might be influential to environmental bargaining in the two regions. For example, and as stated earlier Aboriginal interests were not included. Proper representation of this diverse group would have required extensive data collection that would have gone beyond the scope of this project. Further, empirical emphasis was put on Tasmania as less data was available and as a lot of research had already been conducted on the BC case. However, the data on the BC case drawn from secondary sources does not necessarily provide comparable information. It doesn't include site visits or interviews with local community members and non-timber forest dependent business. One other issue raised by some respondents relates to the time period chosen for the study that might not necessarily capture the same stage of conflict in the two case study regions.

These limitations together with the fmdings from the thesis help identify directions for future research. This thesis emphasizes the importance of resource peripheries, environmental conflict, and ENGOs in economic geography. Unlike core regions remote and rural areas have received little attention in economic geography even though the resource sector is a crucial component of the global economy - increasingly more so with diminishing resource availability. ENGOs, particularly in the case of the Great Bear Rainforest campaign have increased and broadened their skills and services that in turn have

182 made them both important adversaries and allies to industry and other actors. They are key actors affecting economic development and hence should be incorporated in future research. As Clapp (2004, 858) points out, "ENGOs, conservation territories, and an ongoing process of remapping" should be seen "as necessary parts of a pluralist future in resource peripheries and developing regions more generally." ENGOs should not only be incorporated in work on resource peripheries but generally into the economic geography resource agenda, for example, in respect to (urban) core regions as places of consumption (garbage production, energy use). Investigations of environmental conflicts in other sectors will help to shed light on the extent to which environmental bargaining is resource-, sector- or issue-specific as well as to what extent the concept of environmental bargaining is transferable.

In respect to forest conflicts more research from Tasmania and BC but also other regions is needed to better understand causal relationships and formulate recommendations. Additional case studies could include the campaign around Canada's boreal forest and Victoria's forests that would provide more information on Canada and Australia or could provide new cultural context through case studies from other regions (and climates) such as Chile, Indonesia, and New Guinea. Follow-up research on the two case study regions should reconsider what data is important and needs to be gathered. Factors that might deserve more attention are the impact of gender and age on conflict resolution and the inclusion of other actors such as Aboriginal people and buyer firms located outside Tasmania and Be. It would also be valuable to monitor implementation and outcomes of environmental bargaining in the two regions. Long-term projects allow to research environmental bargaining over time and to analyze whether general trends and patterns of bargaining can be identified.

183 APPENDICES

7.4 Appendix A - Sample Letter

Julia Affolderbach PhD Candidate Department of Geography Simon Fraser University 8888 University Drive Burnaby, BC, VSA 1S6 Canada

Date

Dear ...

I am a PhD student at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada, in the field of environmental economic geography. I am writing to ask a favour of you related to the research project I am conducting together with my supervisor, Dr. Roger Hayter (Geography Department, Simon Fraser University), and Dr. Trevor Barnes (Geography Department, University of British Columbia). Broadly speaking, the project is looking at the idea of contested forest economies within (regions of) Canada and Australia.

Within our project my research seeks to understand and evaluate existing patterns of interaction of multiple actors involved in forest conflicts and decision-making. My specific interests evolve around the role of environmental organizations in forest resource conflicts in selected areas ofTasmania, Australia, and British Columbia, Canada.

I will visit Tasmania/BC from ... until ... to conduct my research. I would be extremely grateful if I could meet with you and gain your insights on your organization's perspective and engagement with respect to Tasmania's forests. I know that you are busy but your help will be invaluable to my research. Ifyou have any questions for me please do not hesitate to ask.

Sincerely,

Julia Affolderbach

184 7.5 Appendix B - Statement of Consent

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

JULIA AFFOLDERBACH CLASSROOM COMPLEX, RCB 7233 Department of Geography Telephone: (604) 291-3321 8888 University Drive Fax: (604) 291-5841 Burnaby, British Columbia [email protected] V5A 1S6, CANADA I http://www.affolderbach.de

RESEARCH PROTECT ENVIRONMENTAL BARGAINS: THE ROLE OF ENGOS IN LOCAL FOREST REGIMES

STATEMENT OF CONSENT

I am a PhD candidate at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada, in the field of environmental economic geography. I am contacting you to request your feedback in form of a short interview in support of a research project I am conducting together with my supervisor, Dr. Roger Hayter (Geography Department, Simon Fraser University), and Dr. Trevor Barnes (Geography Department, University of British Columbia).

My research seeks to understand and evaluate existing patterns of interaction of multiple actors involved in forest conflicts and decision-making. My specific interests evolve around the role of environmental organizations in forest resource conflicts in selected areas of Tasmania, Australia, and British Columbia, Canada. An analysis of perspectives and engagement of different actors in different regions will help to understand how bargaining and institutional interactions shape forest conflicts and their resolution. Hopefully, my study will generate implications for policy that incorporate the interests of all stakeholders.

I sincerely request your valued input in the form of a short interview. I would like to ask you questions about your organization's objectives, perspectives and engagement in selected forest resource conflicts, interaction with other actors and changes over time.

In compliance with the Research Ethics Policy at Simon Fraser University I have to inform you that you are free to withdraw from participation at any time. I will also respect your personal anonymity if you wish.

If you have any questions or would like to obtain research results please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Roger Hayter ([email protected]) or myself using the address above. If you would like to express any concerns or complaints please contact the Chair of the Geography Department, Dr. Ted Hickin:

Simon Fraser University 8888 University Drive Burnaby, BC Phone: 604.291.3718 Fax: 604.291.5841 Email: [email protected]

185 7.6 Appendix C - Sample Questionnaire

PART I - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. What event/issue triggered the foundation of your organization? When and where did it take place? Who were the principal actors? Are they still involved today?

2. At present, (circa 2004/5) what are your organization's goals and overall philosophy? Have these goals/philosophy changed since foundation (e.g., single vs. multiple issues, shifts concerning target regions)?

3. At present, how do you mainly pursue your goals? What were your tactics at the beginning? How did your tactics and strategies evolve over time?

PART II - ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

4. How many members do you have by today? Tendency? Does your organization employ staff and expertise? Ifyes, please list number, prevalent skills available and previous occupations of the leading staff member.

5. How is your organization structured? Do you have an organizational chart indicating titles and

mandates 0 f leaders? How are decisions made within your organization and what groups are included in decision-making processes in regard to a) strategic priorities, b) identification of target areas and c) plans of action in respect to identified targets?

6. What were your funds and sources in 2000 resp. today?

7. During 2004/5 indicate the nature of your contacts with the following organizations: state government/ Ministry of Forests, opposition/Greens, federal government, labour unions, private

companies/ industry associations, ENGOs, Aboriginal groups, others. In each case please specify level of interaction, frequency, issue focus and purpose.

8. Do you cooperate with other agencies or institutions on a regular basis, e.g., participation in committees, boards, etc.?

PART III - FOREST CONFLICTS

9. At present, how would you describe the main problems concerning Tasmania's/BC's forests? Classify the major forest conflicts you have been involved in/are active from 2000 until today identifying a) location, b) time period, c) interests/goals, d) principal actors and e) key events in chronology

186 10. What tactics and strategies did/does your organization employ (e.g., confrontation, non-direct action, cooperation, consultancy)? What have been the main events/campaigns and where and when did they take place? Who is addressed by your action? Did your activities change over time? Ifyes, in how far?

11. What other actors have been/are involved? What role did/do they play? [Who have been/are crucial actors in other organizations?]

12. How can your relationship to the other actors be described in each specific conflict? Did/do you campaign or cooperate with other groups? What about contact and exchange of information with actors from outside the conflict area and outside Tasmania/BC?

PART IV - OUTCOMES / ASSESSMENT

13. How were conflicts tenninated (respectively resolved) in each case, if they were? In how far have environmental values been protected? Did the conflicts lead to new policies, formal and informal agreements? Did the conflicts lead to new forms of behaviour?

14. What are the results of your activity in each conflict? Did your organization achieve its goals?

15. Have there been any unexpected (in terms of not anticipated and endeavoured) outcomes in any way, e.g., by actions of other agencies during the conflict? Good and/or bad? What campaigns/activities have been most effective/ineffective?

16. Ifat all, what would you have done differently? What would you change in respect to your campaigns in the future?

17. Did the dialogue with other actors change your organizations perspective/behaviour?

18. What kind of behaviour would you like to see from other stakeholders/actors in a multiple stakeholder process? What form of dialogue?

19. Do you see any need for a general change in the course of environmental action and basic attitudes?

20. How do you value/judge the Tasmanian Community Forest Agreement/Great Bear Rainforest Agreement?

Do you have any further comments or recommendations?

187 7.7 Appendix D - Fieldwork Schedule

Date Location Contact Field work Region

May 11-13,2005 Northwest Tasmania INO TCA FieIdtrip TAS May 14-15, 2005 Launceston INO TCA Conference TAS May 16-18, 2005 East Tasmania Site visits TAS May 21, 2005 South Tasmania Site visits TAS

May 23, 2005, 9.15am Hobart ENGO Interview TAS May 23, 2005, 3.0Opm I Iobart GOY Informal meeting TAS

May 23, 2005, 3.45pm Hobart GOY Informal meeting TAS May 24, 2005, 2.0Opm Hobart INO Interview TAS May 24, 2005, 4.0Opm Hobart GOY Informal meeting TAS May 24, 2005, 7.0Opm South Tasmania ENGO Group meeting TAS May 25, 2005, 8.30am Hobart INO Interview TAS May 25, 2005, 10.00am Hobart ENGO Interview TAS May 26, 2005, 300pm Hobart INO Interview TAS

May 28-30, 2005 Northwest Tasmania Site visits TAS May 30, 2005, 7.0Opm Hobart ENGO Interview TAS May 31, 2005, 12.0Opm Hobart ENGO Interview TAS May 31, 2005, 3.0Opm Hobart IND Interview TAS June 1, 2005, 9.00am Hobart ­ surrounding INO Interview TAS June 1, 2005, 1.0Opm Hobart ENGO Interview TAS June 2, 2005, 9.30am Hobart GOY Interview TAS June 2, 2005, 11.00am Hobart IND Interview TAS June 2, 2005, 6.0Opm Hobart ENGO Meeting TAS June 3, 2005, 10.30am Hobart INO Interview TAS June 4-5, 2005 Northwest Tasmania Site visits TAS June 6, 2005, 1O.00am Launceston INO Interview TAS June 6, 2005, 1.0Opm Launceston ENGO Interview TAS June 7,2005, 10.00am Northeast Tasmania INO Interview TAS June 7, 2005, 4.0Opm Northeast Tasmania ENGO Interview TAS June 7, 2005, 6.0Opm Northeast Tasmania ENGO Meeting TAS June 8, 2005, 1O.00am Northeast Tasmania ENGO Interview TAS

June 8, 2005, 3.3Opm Launceston GOY Interview TAS June 9, 2005, 10.00am Oeloraine ENGO Interview TAS June 9, 2005, 4.0Opm Launceston GOY Interview TAS June 10,2005, 1.0Opm Burnie ENGO Interview TAS

June 10-12, 2005 Northwest Tasmania ENGO Site visits TAS

June 14,2005, 10.00am Launceston GOY Interview TA5

188 June 15,2005, 12.3Opm Hobart IND Interview TAS June 16,2005, 11.00am Hobart GOV Interview TAS

June 17,2005, 12.3Opm Hobart ENGO Interview TAS June 17, 2005, 3.0Opm Hobart ENGO Interview TAS

June 20, 2005, 10. DDam South Tasmania IND Interview TAS June 20, 2005, 1.0Opm South Tasmania ENGO Meeting TAS June 21, 2005, 9.30am Richmond IND Interview TAS

June 22, 2005, 10.0Dam Hobart ENGO Interview TAS

June 23, 2005, 10.3Dam Hobart NGO Interview TAS

June 24, 2005 Styx IND Site visits TAS June 27, 2005, 1.0Opm Melbourne ENGO Interview TAS

June 28, 2005, 1O.00am Melbourne ENGO Interview TAS

June 29, 2005, 10.0Dam Sydney ENGO Interview TAS

Dec. 17-18,2005 Amsterdam ENGO Interview/Meeting TAS Jan. 20, 2006, 10.00am Canberra ENGO Interview TAS

Jan. 20,2006, 12.0Opm Canberra ENGO Interview TAS Jan. 27,2006, 10.00am Hobart GOV Interview TAS Jan. 30, 2006, 10.00am Hobart GOV Interview TAS

Jan. 31, 2006, 1O.00am Hobart GOV Interview TAS Jan. 31,2006, 3.0Opm Hobart ENGO Interview TAS

Jan. 31, 2006, 5.0Opm Hobart IND Interview TAS Feb. 1,2006, 9.30am Hobart IND Interview TA5

Feb. 1,2006, afternoon Huonville, Weld Valley ENGO Interviews TAS

Feb. 2, 2006, 1O.00am South Tasmania IND Interview TAS Feb. 7, 2006, 11.00am Launceston ENGO Interview TAS

Feb. 7, 2006, 11.00am Launceston GOV Interview TAS

Feb. 7, 2006, 4.00pm Launceston/ surrounding IND Interview TAS

Feb. 8,2006, 10.00am Launceston/surrounding IND Interview TAS

Feb. 8, 2006, afternoon Northwest Tasmania IND Site visits TAS Feb. 9, 2006, 9.00am I,aunceston GOV Interview TAS

Feb. 9, 2006, 12.0Opm Launceston GOV Interview TAS Feb. 10,2006, 10.00am Launceston/ surrounding ENGO Interview TAS Feb. 14,2006, 5.0Opm Hobart IND Interview TAS

Feb. 16, 2006, 10.00am Sydney ENGO Interview TAS

July 19, 2006, 10.00am Telephone ENGO Interview BC Aug. 2, 2006, 4.0Opm Vancouver ENGO Interview BC

Aug. 18,2006, 9.30am Vancouver ENGO Interview BC

Aug. 18,2006, 11.00am Vancouver ENGO Interview BC Aug. 23, 2006, 5.0Opm Vancouver ENGO Interview BC

Sept. 08, 2006, 10.00am Vancouver IND Interview BC

189 Sept. 12,2006, 12.3Opm Victoria ENGO Interview BC Sept. 12,2006, 3.0Opm Victoria' ENGO Interview BC

Sept. 15,2006, 10.00am Nanaimo IND Interview BC

Oct. 4, 2006, 4.00pm Vancouver ENGO Interview BC Oct. 19,2006, 11.15am Vancouver ENGO Interview BC

Oct. 26, 2006, 3.0Opm Victoria GOV Interview BC

Oct. 26, 2006, 4.0Opm Victoria GOV Interview BC

Nov. 14,2006, 12.0Opm Vancouver GOV Interview BC

Nov. 21,2006, 10.00am Telephone ENGO Interview TAS/BC

Nov. 21, 2006, 4.0Opm Telephone IND Interview BC

Dec. 12, 2006, 9.00am Telephone ENGO Interview Be

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