The War on Drugs: Creating Crime, Enriching Criminals
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TheWaronDrugs: Creatingcrime, enrichingcriminals Theglobalwarondrugshasbeenfoughtforover50years, toachieveitsstatedgoalofa“drug-freeworld”�Yetdespite theeverincreasingresourcesspentonpoliceandmilitary effortstosuppresstheillicitdrugtrade,supplyhasmore thankeptpacewithrisingglobaldemand�Indeed,most indicatorssuggestdrugsarecheaperandmoreavailable thaneverbefore� Butbeyondthisstrikingfailure,thedrugwar’spunitive, enforcement-basedapproachhashadaseriesofdisastrous “unintendedconsequences”,asidentifiedbytheExecutive DirectoroftheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(1) (UNODC),theveryUNagencythatoverseestheglobaldrug controlsystem�Henotedthat: Contents Introduction ��������������������������������� 2 “The first unintended consequence [of the drug control system] is a huge criminal black market that now thrives • Theeconomicdynamicsofillegaldrugmarkets andcriminality��������������������������� 3 in order to get prohibited substances from producers • Makingabadproblemworse��������������� 4 to consumers. Whether driven by a ‘supply push’ or Thecrimecostsofthewarondrugs: a ‘demand pull,’ the financial incentives to enter this 1�Streetcrime������������������������������ 4 market are enormous. There is no shortage of criminals 2�Criminalisationofuse ��������������������� 4 competing to claw out a share of a market in which 3�Massincarceration������������������������ 5 hundred fold increases in price from production to retail 4�Organisedcrime�������������������������� 6 are not uncommon.” • Moneylaundering������������������������� 6 • Corruption������������������������������� 7 Thisbriefingsummarisesthecrime-relatedcostsstemming 5�Violentcrime����������������������������� 7 fromthewarondrugs,whichinclude: 6�Crimesperpetratedbygovernments/states���� 9 7�Economiccostsofdrugwar-relatedcrimeand • Organisedcrimearisingfromtheillicitdrugtrade, enforcement����������������������������� 10 anditsknock-oneffectsintermsofmoneylaundering, Aretherebenefits?��������������������������� 10 corruptionandviolence Conclusions��������������������������������� 12 www.countthecosts.org 1 “ Politicians cannot hope to win a war on drugs when their policies ensure that only the most efficient trafficking networks survive. Not only do they survive, but they thrive because law enforcement has destroyed the competition for them by picking off the unfit traffickers and letting the most evolved ones take over the lucrative trafficking space. The destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels, for instance, only created a vacuum for hundreds of smaller (and more efficient) operations. Now the police cannot even count the number of smaller cartels that have taken over – much less try to infiltrate and disrupt them.” Sanho Tree DirectoroftheDrugPolicyProjectattheInstituteforPolicyStudies 2007 • Street-levelcrimecommittedbydruggangsandby medicaluse,therhetoriconnon-medicaluseframesitasa dependentdrugusersattemptingtosupporttheirhabits threattothe“health and welfare of mankind”,anda“serious evil”whichtheglobalcommunitymust“combat”,settingthe • Thecriminalisationofusers,excessivelevelsof toneforthedrugwarthathasfollowed� incarceration,andcrimescommittedbygovernments underthebannerofthedrugwar TheConvention’sparallelfunctionshavealsoledtoparallel markets–oneformedicaldrugscontrolledandregulated • Theeconomiccostsofdrugwar-relatedcrime,andthe bythestateandUNinstitutions,theotherfornon-medical criminaljusticeresponsetoit drugscontrolledbyorganisedcriminals,insurgents, ThereisoverlapwithotherareasoftheCounttheCosts separatistsandparamilitaries�Thereisastriking initiative–humanrights(includingadetaileddiscussion comparisontobemadeinthelevelofcriminalityassociated ofprisonissues),securityanddevelopment,discrimination withproductionandsupplyintheseparalleltrades�The andstigma,publichealth,theenvironmentandeconomics� legalmedicalopiatemarket,forexample,accountsfor Forbriefingsandmoreresourcesonthesecosts,see aroundhalfofglobalopiumproduction(3)butentailsnone www�countthecosts�org� oftheorganisedcrime,violenceandconflictassociatedwith itsillicittwin� CounttheCostsisacollaborativeprojectbetweennumerous organisationsfromacrosstheglobethat,whilepossessing Bythemid-80stheemphasisandrhetoricofinternational diverseviewpointsandexpertise,allshareadesiretoassess drugpolicyhadshifted,fromitsearlierfocusondruguse, theunintendedcostsofthewarondrugs,andexplore towardsthegrowingconcernwiththeproblemsrelating alternativesthatmightdeliverbetteroutcomes� tocriminallycontrolleddrugmarkets�(4)Thistrendwas reflectedinlaw,specificallythethirdoftheUNdrug Introduction conventions,whichfocusesontacklingtheexplosionofthe The1961UNSingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs(2)–the “illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances” legalbasisoftheglobalwarondrugs–hastwoparallel sincethe1961SingleConvention� functions�Alongsideestablishingaglobalprohibitionof Overthelast50years,thethreattopublichealthfromdrug somedrugsfornon-medicaluse,italsostrictlyregulates usehasbeeninterwovenwiththethreattopublicsafety manyofthesamedrugsforscientificandmedicaluse� (andnationalsecurity)fromdrugwar-relatedcrime�“Drugs InstarkcontrasttotheConvention’slanguagedescribing andcrime”havebecomefusedtogetherinpoliticalrhetoric Thispriceincreasereflectsbothenforcementrisksbeing incorporatedintoillicitdrugpricing,andfromunregulated profiteering(see Figure 1)�Thisisthe“alchemyof prohibition”(5)bywhichlow-valueagriculturalproducts becomeliterallyworthmorethantheirweightingold� Druglawenforcershighlightthe futilityofdruglawenforcement “I invite you all to imagine that this year, all drugs produced and trafficked around the world, were seized: the dream of law enforcement agencies. Well, when we wake up having had this dream, we would realize that the same amount of drugs – hundreds of tons of heroin, Figure1:Howthepriceofdrugsisinflatedthroughtheillicitmarket cocaine and cannabis – would be produced again next year. In other words, this first dream shows that, while (the“drugthreat”),institutionsliketheUNOfficeonDrugs law enforcement is necessary for drug control, it is not andCrime,alongwithdomesticpolicyandlaw�Thishasled sufficient. New supply would keep coming on stream, toananomalousandmalfunctioningsysteminwhichdrug year after year.”(6) useisacknowledgedasprimarilyapublichealthissuebut Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the responsesarecriminaljustice-based,primarilydealtwith UNODC, 2007 bypoliceandmilitaryenforcementaimedatdrugusers, “If demand [for drugs] persists, it’s going to find ways to dealersandproducers� get what it wants. And if it isn’t from Colombia it’s going Ironically,astheUNODChasbelatedlyacknowledged, to be from someplace else.”(7) itisthesesamepunitivedrugenforcementpoliciesthat Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, 2001 arecreating,orfuelling,muchofthedrugmarket-related “As long as there is a demand for drugs in this country, criminalityinthefirstplace� some crook is gonna figure out how to get ’em here...”(8) The economic dynamics of illegal drug markets and George W Bush, US president, 2002 criminality “Over the past 10-15 years, despite interventions at Thelinksbetweendrugsandcrimearecomplex�However, every point in the supply chain, cocaine and heroin thereisaneconomicdynamicatplaywhichactivelyfuels consumption have been rising, prices falling and drugs thecriminalitythatenforcementissupposedtoeliminate� have continued to reach users. Government interventions against the drug business are a cost of doing business, Thesqueezingofsupplyinademand-ledmarkethas rather than a substantive threat to the industry’s twokey“criminogenic”effects,resultingmainlyfrom viability.”(9) enforcementincreasingprice�Thefirstisthecreationof UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Drugs Report 2003 avastopportunityforcriminalentrepreneurs(see “How much is the illegal drug trade worth?”,p�6)�Thesecondis acquisitivecrimecommittedbylow-incomedependentdrug userstosupporttheirhabits� 3 Making a bad problem worse • AccordingtotheUSDepartmentofJustice,900,000 criminallyactivegangmembers–athirdofthem DruglawenforcementcanalsohaveaDarwinian“survival juveniles(12)–in20,000streetgangs,inover2,500cities, ofthefittest”effect�Theleastcompetentcriminalsarenot dominatetheUSdrugstrade(13) onlycaughtmoreoftenbylawenforcement(especially • Low-incomedependentdruguserscommitlarge whendrivenbyarresttargets),butarealsomorelikelyto volumesofpropertycrimetofundtheirhabits�Astudy besuccessfullyconvicted,leavingthemarkettothemost bytheUKPrimeMinister’sStrategyUnitin2003stated powerful,efficientandruthless� thatdrugusersareresponsiblefor56%ofallcrimes, including:“85% of shoplifting, 70-80% of burglaries, Whilstenforcementcanshowseeminglyimpressiveresults [and] 54% of robberies�”(14) intermsofarrestsandseizures,impactsonthemarket • Low-incomedependentusers(mostlywomen)also areinevitablymarginal,localisedandtemporary�Indeed, oftenresorttostreetsexworktobuydrugs�TheUK astheUNODCacknowledges,oneoftheunintended HomeOfficeestimatedthat80-95%ofstreetsexworkis consequencesofthewarondrugsistheso-called“balloon drug-motivated�StudiesfromAsia,RussiaandUkraine effect”,wherebyratherthaneliminatingcriminalactivity, showinjectingdrugusersaremorelikelythanother enforcementjustmovesitsomewhereelse�When sexworkerstoengageinstreetsoliciting�(15)Drugusing enforcementdoestakeoutcriminals,italsocreatesa streetsexworkersalsofaceincreasedriskofarrest,and vacuum,andevenmoreviolence,asrivalgangsfightfor ofviolencefromclients,pimpsandpolice(16) control� Bycontrast,theseproblemsarevirtuallyabsentfromlegal TheCrimeCostsofthe alcoholandtobaccomarkets,underliningthattheystem WaronDrugs