NAC, the News, and the Neoliberal State, 1984-1993

Samantha C. Thrift Department of Art History and Communication Studies McGill University, Montreal

August 2009

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communication Studies.

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Abstract

This study situates the National Action Committee on the Status of Women’s [NAC] activism and media strategies in relation to the emergence of neoliberal policy and political discourse at the federal level in Canada. The rise of neoliberal policies and political language during the 1980s and early 1990s in Canada created a new terrain on which political debates about women’s issues entered into public culture. Consequently, women’s organizations had to change advocacy strategies in order to participate in national political discourse and contest the terms on which women’s issues were being framed. While this story has primarily been told as the beginning of the end of Canadian second wave feminism, my dissertation investigates how Canadian feminism did not decline or die, as news media reported, but instead was forced to change strategies and, in the process, re-organize the movement’s shape, objectives and practice. My study uses qualitative, historical and discursive analysis to examine two sets of representations occurring around the NAC-sponsored federal leadership debates. The first set is drawn from representations of the organization’s interests and strategies produced through their own materials, policies and media tactics. This approach facilitates analysis of the internal dynamics informing NAC’s media strategy, so as to fully evince the organization’s keen awareness of the potential opportunities and constraints for Canadian women presented by a shift to a neoliberal federal framework. The second set is constructed in the English-language news media around NAC’s strategic media events in order to determine the ways in which the Canadian women’s movement was being discussed and historicized in the mainstream news media.

Abstrait

La présente recherche fait le point sur l’activité militante et les stratégies médiatiques du comité canadien d’action sur le statut de la femme (CCASF), en relation avec l’émergence d’une politique et d’un discours néolibéraux au niveau fédéral. Le développement des politiques néolibérales et du langage politique au cours des années 1980 et au début des années 1990, au Canada, a créé une nouvelle réalité dans laquelle les débats politiques sur les questions féminines sont entrés dans la culture populaire. Par conséquent, les organisations féminines ont été forcées de modifier leurs stratégies en matière de représentation des femmes, afin d’être en mesure de participer au discours politique canadien et de contester les modalités servant à formuler les questions relatives à la condition féminine. Même si ce sujet a été présenté principalement comme le commencement de la fin de la deuxième vague féministe au Canada, ma thèse explique pourquoi le féminisme n’est pas mort, comme l’avaient annoncé les médias, mais qu’il a dû modifier ses stratégies, et par la même occasion, restructurer la forme, les objectifs et les pratiques du mouvement. Ma recherche utilise l’analyse qualitative, historique et discursive pour examiner deux groupes de représentations qui ont eu lieu autour des débats parrainés par le CCASF. Le premier groupe est tiré de représentations relatives aux intérêts et aux stratégies de l’organisation, effectuées à l’aide de son propre matériel, de ses politiques et de ses tactiques médiatiques. Cette approche facilite l’analyse de la dynamique interne qui a influencé les stratégies médiatiques du CCASF, afin de démontrer pleinement que l’organisation était consciente des perspectives et des contraintes éventuelles qu’un changement vers une structure néolibérale fédérale créerait pour les Canadiennes. Le deuxième groupe est constitué à partir des informations provenant des médias anglophones sur les stratégies médiatiques du CCASF, afin de déterminer la perception du mouvement féministe canadien par les médias grand public, et la place qu’ils lui ont attribuée dans l’histoire.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Carrie Rentschler, for her unflagging support, enthusiasm and good humour. Dr. Rentschler’s commitment to academic excellence has been a constant source of inspiration during my years of study with her. Her perceptive comments and skillful guidance have significantly enhanced the scope and quality of this project – and I believe my future writing endeavors will always be informed (and made better) by the memory of her unremitting prodding to “say more.” As I move forward in my academic career, I will strive to become the mentor to my students that she has been to me. I would like to thank the members of my defense committee, Drs. Jenny Burman, Barbara Freeman, Becky Lentz, Suzanne Morton and Marc Raboy, for their invaluable feedback and critical commentary. Their insights both challenged and inspired me to continue my work on NAC and the Canadian feminist movement. I am grateful to have received financial support from several sources, including the Department of Art History and Communication Studies, the McGill Faculty of Arts, Media@McGill, the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, and the McGill Centre for Research and Teaching on Women (now the McGill Institute for Gender, Sexuality and Feminist Studies). The support provided by these agencies, in combination with a Social Sciences and Humanities Internal Research Grant and an Alma Mater McGill Major Fellowship, was of inestimable value to the successful completion of my dissertation, sanity intact. My research was facilitated by the expert and friendly assistance of the archival staff at the Canadian Women’s Movement Archives at the University of Ottawa. Resource personnel Lucie Desjardin, Linda Arsenault, and Jacqueline Petre-Pleacoff greeted my requests with interest and dispatch; their efforts helped me make the most of my time spent in the archive and I look forward to working with them again in the future. When I entered the program, Dr. Will Straw gave me an opportunity to conduct research at the National Archives of Canada on his behalf; until then, I was not aware of the addictive power of paper-sifting. I cannot thank him enough for his early guidance and ongoing support. I would also like to thank Dr. Janice Dickin, a University of Calgary professor who guided me through my transition to McGill from a distance. Her confidence in my abilities as a feminist researcher and “big thinker” during my MA degree inspired me to take the leap into the unknown territory of Canadian women’s movement history. Dr. Dickin exerted more influence on this work than she likely knows. Writing a dissertation is an isolating process, but I found certain relief during monthly meetings of the feminist working group established by Dr. Rentschler. I want to thank the women in that group for creating a safe testing ground for my ideas as well as for giving feedback on some pretty rough draft chapters. Providing some much needed non- academic support, my friends Karen Herland and the Other Sam (Diamond) have stood

by me throughout this grueling process and been wonderful distractions over the past several years. The last word belongs to my family, without whom this project would not be completed. My grandmother, Ileen Hunter, offered her encouragement through telephone calls and birthday cheques, which kept coming even into my thirties. It is difficult to recount the many ways in which my parents, Bill and Gayle, and sister and brother-in-law, Karin Erica and Colin, have supported me through this final chapter of my formal education. Suffice it to say that, despite the difficulties present in their own lives, they have always found time to be my sounding board, or to listen to something I’d just written, or to let me vent and cry about a “stupid chapter not working.” I couldn’t ask for more. The last LAST word is for Eric, my partner. I don’t know so many things about you – like how you made it through the past year of my writing, the past few months of my financial destitution, the past few weeks of my blind panic. You reminded me every single day that this was totally do-able (in fact, you even got me the t-shirt). What I do know is that I’m unbelievably lucky to have found you – and that I get to keep you when this is all over. I can’t wait.

For Guiniverious Imperious,

who witnessed it all.

Table of Contents

Preface………………………………………………………………….………………… 1

Introduction

NAC Amplifies…………………………………...... ……...………….………………... 17

Chapter One ‘We are the Gender Gap’: Heretical Discourse, Feminist Strategies and the 1984 NAC Leaders’ Debate on Women’s Issues.…………...……….………………… 51

Chapter Two Part I: The Gaffe……….………………………………………….……………………. 97

Part II: ‘TV Debate on Women’s Issues Tonite!’: Feminist Eventfulness, Collective Memory and the 1984 NAC Leaders’ Debate on Women’s Issues....………………….104

Chapter Three NAC, the Networks and the Neoliberal State: Excommunication and the 1988 General Issues Leadership Debate…………………..………..…………………. 152

Chapter Four Solidarity Amongst Diversity: Radical Democratic Feminist Citizenship and NAC’s Future Vision……………………………….…………..………………… 194

Conclusion Not Flatlining: Feminist Rhythms and Continuity…………………..………………... 219

Bibliography…………………………………………………………..………………. 224

Appendix A: Files Consulted in NAC Fonds………….……………..……………….. 235

Appendix B: Bibliography of Primary News Sources...... …………..………………. 244

Preface

“These waves are really suspect. I mean, who is deciding when the new surf’s up?”1

This project began at a Canadian Women’s Studies Association [CWSA] annual

conference in May 2005. I attended a plenary session led by Judy Rebick, former

president of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women [NAC], and

featuring two former NAC colleagues, Sue Colley and Barb Cameron, as well as the

youngest-ever NAC president, Denise Andrea Campbell. The panel – the only one at the

conference exclusively focused on discussing the history of the Canadian movement –

seemed remarkably representative of the generational paradigms with which

contemporary feminist debates are shot through: three older white women representing

the face of the “old guard” of second wave feminism compared with a twenty-something

year-old black woman, so symbolic of the diversity and youthful vigor of the “third

generation” of feminists. I wondered what ideological friction would spark between these

sides, despite their having cut their feminist teeth on the same national-level, institutionally organized form of feminist praxis at NAC.

For me, the most stimulating point of the plenary session occurred when

Campbell questioned two things: the narrative of Canadian feminism as being always already diverse, and the need to continue operations at NAC. While the older panelists were reluctant to admit to any institutionalized homogeneity in “their” feminist

1 A comment made by Afshan Ali, member of the Wench Collective (an organized group of young Canadian feminist women producing a radio show and zine), when discussing the value of the wave metaphor (Wench Collective 2006, 578).

movement, Campbell’s remarks regarding NAC’s bleak fate triggered critical discussion about the future of organized feminism in Canada. After some discussion, the other three panelists conceded Campbell’s point, agreeing that the past leadership had completed its tasks, NAC should die its long-anticipated death, and the next generation of young women should step forward to create a new, much-needed national feminist organization.

The proposed “matricidal” resolution to the generational debate that occurred during the plenary session underscored certain assumptions and erasures that were being perpetuated by the hegemonic model of feminist historiography known as the wave metaphor. What emerged from the discussion was the pervasive sense that a firm distinction needed to be drawn between the second and third waves of Canadian feminism, where one did not always exist, to facilitate the survival of the women’s movement. The tenor of this discussion raised my awareness around the ways in which we discuss and explain the decline of the second wave of feminism in Canada and how, in the stories I’d heard about NAC growing up, much of the ‘blame’ (because it was always about blaming) was laid at the feet of movement actors, even in the years of funding cutbacks leading up to the near-dissolution of the national organization.

In response, I posit that Canadian feminist historiography is better served by an alternative model of political activity than feminist oceanography; one that does not situate the Canadian women’s movement’s primary political struggle between competing streams of feminist activity, but with structures of oppression institutionalized by the state. The wave metaphor reproduces discourses of feminist failure and blame, while minimizing the role of state and media in demobilizing the women’s movement. I argue 3

in this dissertation that by asking who killed Canadian feminism, rather than presuming it had a terminal illness, we unearth the contemporary legacy of neo-liberal ideology within narratives of feminism and start to discover what ends they serve in this historical moment.

As a national-level organization that sustained its feminist advocacy throughout the 1980s and 1990s, NAC is exceedingly well-disposed to not be narrated according to the steady undulations of tidal metaphors suggestive of specific chronologies, single- issue agendas, and homogenous constituencies. Drawing on Ednie Kaeh Garrison’s re- imagining of feminism(s) as radio waves, the narrative of the Canadian women’s movement becomes one of modulated feminist frequencies which become more or less audible depending on the level of “interference” blocking their signals, including political-economic context and competing ideological claims. Not only does this alternate narrative de-center tales of feminism’s inevitable death, it more productively accounts for the shifting political orientations and representational plurality inherent to NAC, as it attempted (to varying degrees of success) to become representative of the nation’s cultural “mosaic” during the course of its lengthy tenure.

The Wave Metaphor

A substantial body of feminist literature investigates the discursive significance of the wave metaphor, particularly as it fostered discrete generational identities for feminist activism (Gillis, Howie, and Mumford 2007; Henry 2004; Dicker & Piepmeier 2003;

Siegal 1997; Heywood and Drake 1997). Within each wave of feminist activity, a particular identity and political campaign tends to become naturalized and representative 4

of an entire movement. This strategy “legitimates as movements many disparate

collectivities and cohorts, suggests historical continuity between collectivities and cohorts

constituted as ‘social movements,’ and proclaims discontinuity by naming each

‘movement’ differently” (Garrison 2005, 241). As dictated by the chronology of feminist

oceanography, then, the “first wave” revolved around “rights” discourse, particularly that

pertaining to the suffragists’ fight for women’s vote at the turn of the century. The

“second wave” popularly refers to the North American women’s liberation movement in

the 1960s and 1970s, which was preoccupied with passing equality legislation and raising

consciousness of “gender” and “sexism” as a viable categories of political analysis. Last, in the early 1990s, Rebecca Walker’s invocation that “I am the third wave,” signaled the presence of a younger demographic of feminist activists who wanted to engage issues of race, class and third world oppression alongside gender in their feminist analyses of the social order. Unlike their more neoliberal counterparts, the “postfeminists,” third-wavers typically acknowledge their historical indebtedness to the struggles fought and won by their feminist predecessors (whose involvement in the feminist movement is characterized as ended). In the oceanic narrative, feminist history is linear, progressive and cumulative. As Heywood and Drake (1997) note in their founding text, Third Wave

Agenda, “third wave feminists draw upon these histories and continue these struggles

[…] Our praxis is shaped by the questions that are our legacy” (23).

The wave metaphor, however, also provides a framework of (dis)identification which fosters an adversarial dynamic between feminist generations.2 Too frequently,

2 Henry (2004) defines disidentification as “an identification against something” or a “refused identification” (7). 5

second and third wave feminisms are discursively constructed as oppositional forces similar only in their shared investment in women’s issues. From that point onward, the two sides are pictured as staring at each other across a vast canyon of disparate

experience, strategic practice and vision for the feminist future. In turn, feminism’s

“waves” have become iconic signifiers of generational resistance, refusal and difference,

as much as of political continuity, mentorship, and legacy. This dynamic was evident in

the CWSA panel’s final consensus to let the younger generation assume “ownership” of

the feminist future by decommissioning NAC, the symbol of second wave Anglo-

Canadian feminism. This agreement implied that NAC’s absence would create the space

needed for the next generation to build their own institutions, their own strategies and

goals, their own movement. Further, this consensus also seemed to concretize the refusal

of second wave mentorship of younger feminists by way of the euthanization of its best

known institution, NAC. Astrid Henry (2004) argues that such cross-generational tension

is “politically emboldening” and fruitful for younger feminists’ development: “it appears

that for many younger feminists, it is only by refusing to identify themselves with earlier

versions of feminism – and frequently with older feminists – that they are able to create a

feminism of their own” (7).

Alternately, I argue that the adversarial logic inherent to the above scenario

unnecessarily situates emergent forms of feminist politics within an infantilizing

framework of filial rebellion, when the perceived generation gap could be more

productively conceptualized as a communicative failure that requires redress. This failure

is less about providing “translation” for groups that “speak different languages,” than it is

about a feminist epistemology that, intentionally or not, privileges discontinuity and 6

repudiation. As the dominant narrative informing feminist historiography, the wave

metaphor and its investment in difference impacts how we think about and what we know

of feminism: it shapes our experiences as feminists, and with other feminists. For

instance, Audra Williams, self-identified third wave activist, disclosed that, at a 2005

conference on the future of Canadian feminism, “it wasn’t individual second wavers who

we’d felt dismissed by. But once we were in a group of them, we felt we couldn’t

communicate in the same way they did, and therefore couldn’t make ourselves heard”

(2006). The oceanic metaphor teaches that each movement is separate, bounded and discrete from its predecessor in terms of its priority issues, membership and strategies. A feminist oceanographer, as Garrison notes, is one who “‘charts,’ ‘surfs,’ and possibly

‘makes’ and ‘draws’ the boundaries around what counts as the third wave” (2005, 238 emphasis added).

Although the wave metaphor helps legitimize specific periods of feminist activity as distinct movements, it fails to adequately account for feminists’ desire to engage in dialogue “across the ocean” (which is of particular importance now, as second and third wavers overlap in their activism). Much feminist scholarship has attempted to answer for this paucity with a communicative framework of intergenerational dialogue between established and emerging feminists. For instance, Rachel du Plessis and Ann Snitow

(1998) describe a prevailing theme within feminist historiography that sidelines veteran feminists so as to make room for the perspectives of younger feminists. The authors note that some younger feminists want older feminists to “let go” of their “seventies politics” and “to practice a little strategic forgetfulness” in order to maintain their relevancy: “Old rhetoric is like last decade’s clothes: nothing dates worse” (21, 22). In this vein, Lynne 7

Segal (1999) characterizes generational discourse as a “taming” device, used to discipline

older feminists. She states that “Yesterday’s visionaries are today’s scapegoats, when not

newly tamed and domesticated… Who wants yesterday’s slogans? Who wants

yesterday’s woman?” (1, 4).

Generational discourse, however, fosters age-ism that cuts both ways, as the third

wave agenda is challenged as non-political, theoretically uninformed and strategically

diffuse. Candis Steenbergen (2006), for instance, identifies a tendency amongst second

wavers to dismiss third wave feminists’ analyses of personal and structural forms of

oppression, noticing that veteran feminists too often “deem any comments or criticisms

of feminism or the women’s movement made by women under the age of 35 suspect. […]

Charges by the second wave that younger women are ‘reinventing the wheel’ have been

rampant, and have led many to believe that there is ‘nothing new’ about third wave

approaches” (43). In her review of Rebecca Walker’s To Be Real, Catherine Orr is taken

aback at third wavers’ apparently uncritical and ahistorical construction of an “image of

the monolithic, ideal, ‘mainstream’ feminism against which these young women battle”

(1997, 32). Where second wavers are cast as elitist, prescriptive and out-of-touch, third

wave feminism is situated as too cultural, uninformed and dismissive of earlier feminist

praxis. All too easily, generational discourse slips into a stereotypical strict mother- petulant daughter dynamic. With their riot grrrl music and “pleasure” politics overwhelming (what are deemed to be) their more “serious” political investments, third wave feminists are cast as the rebellious daughters in the filial logic of feminist reproduction. 8

Initially, when “third wave” identity was situated against second wave feminism,

the boundaries between the two signaled a productive disruption in feminism-as-usual,

with third wavers offering an alternative perspective on definitions of feminism that

would push the women’s movement in interesting, different directions. However,

generational discourse distracts from the third wave’s political analysis, by activating

contention between age-based cohorts regarding who is to be held responsible for the

“demise” of feminism and, in turn, who can rightfully claim “ownership” of the feminist

future. When subsumed by generational discourse at the plenary session, NAC’s

diminished political activity in the early 2000s was situated primarily as second and third

wave feminists’ failure to work compatibly, which elided the heavy toll exerted by the

state’s withdrawal of political and economic support. As I left the session, I couldn’t

shake the suspicion that the wave metaphor was not an especially helpful construct for

thinking about the national women’s movement, given its preoccupation with feminism’s

inevitable “decline” and the accompanying assignation of blame to some of its most

ardent advocates. In my estimation, feminists needed to identify a new “tactic of

memory” that would better account for the socio-political context in which Canadian feminism(s) developed, while toning down the adversarial rhetoric of generational discourse (Hemmings 2007).

A New Tactic of Memory

In “Telling Feminist Stories,” Clare Hemmings (2005) outlines her concerns around the telling of feminist stories in Western feminist theoretical tradition, specifically making note of the prevalence of oversimplified narratives of feminist advocacy that have 9

become bad habit shorthand for many feminist researchers. Functioning as “a kind of common-sense gloss,” researchers can quickly recapitulate accepted histories of feminist thought and then swiftly move to discuss their own insights as transcendent of this past

(117). Those research projects that attempt to recuperate and/or “correct” the story of feminist history may be viewed as particularly problematic, given the tendency to not only reinforce discontinuities between past feminist approaches (as opposed to a more productive envisioning of them as a “series of ongoing contests and relationships”), but also to be unmindful of the effect of current politics and power relations on re-tellings of past events (131).

According to Hemmings, feminist historiographers need to develop “tactics of memory that might allow us to challenge some of the political erasures that these stories effect” (2007, 75). Instead of writing corrective accounts of the feminist past (there will never be a “straight story” of feminism), which presumes that the problem is solely one of omission, feminist researchers need to investigate why certain narrative patterns are promulgated or repressed, and then reproduced and legitimated in feminisms’ own histories. For Hemmings, there is no “common history that can answer the problems of the political present. We can only know what kind of history might be useful by attending to the multiple erasures (historical and contemporary) of the present” (2007, 73).

With this in mind, my dissertation project does not aim to write a “what really happened” history of the national women’s movement. Instead, my study examines and challenges how commonly accepted decline narratives of the Canadian women’s movement, and specifically NAC, came to be promulgated in political news discourse. 10

By heeding the political erasures written into dominant histories of feminism, I challenge

the common sense narrative that second wave Canadian feminism, and NAC in

particular, could not self-sustain amidst internal conflict and an increasingly “diffuse” agenda – in other words, that the organization simply burned itself out. This narrative, which was reproduced at the CWSA plenary, ensures that NAC’s history conforms to the contours of feminist oceanography by relying upon stories of organizational disunity and external criticisms that were circulated and legitimated by news media.

What must be taken into account, however, is that the rise of neoliberal economic policies and neoconservative social rhetoric during this era created a new terrain on which political debates about women’s issues entered into and contributed to public

culture. As a result, women’s organizations, including NAC, had to change strategies in

order to participate in public political debate and challenge the terms on which women’s

issues were being framed. While this story has primarily been told as the beginning of the

end of Canadian second wave feminism, this project investigates how Canadian feminism

did not decline or die, as news media reported, but instead was forced to change

strategies and, in the process, re-organize the movement’s shape, objectives and

practices.

To access this history, I turn toward Ednie Kaeh Garrison’s reimaging of the

hegemonic wave metaphor as radio waves. Garrison (2005) argues that streams of

feminist activity are more productively conceptualized as simultaneous and modulating

sound waves that co-exist, resonate, and sometimes intersect with each other. The

traditional “waves” of feminism are no longer defined by age cohort, but in terms of 11

“different orientation[s] to the multiplicity and shifting constructions of feminism” (248).

For instance, third wavers’ investment in multiplicity and complex subjectivity is described as a shift in register: a different wave frequency “patched together by lines of alliance, crossover politics, shared resources, tools (conceptual and physical), people, political goals, ideological apparatuses, and sometimes aesthetic pleasures” (252-253).

As Garrison notes, issues of access and power still register in this analogy (244).

In the way that radio broadcasts are subject to government regulation, the Canadian women’s movement, and NAC in particular, has been vulnerable to government de- funding measures. Under neoliberalism, state financing was used as a means of regulation on the women’s movement’s activity, determining “who can transmit, how and where and what” (244). In response, feminist organizers in Canada shifted their advocacy strategies and tactics to circumvent new restrictions and changing circumstances. Seen from this perspective, our understanding of the feminist present and future is no longer framed as a generational battle, but as a political struggle between streams of feminist activism and conservative attacks on women’s issues and funding for women’s rights organizations.

This discursive framework also accommodates the role NAC played (and continues to play) in the Canadian feminist movement, rather than suggesting its impossibility, precisely because it does not sustain the notion of a radical generational

“break” between successive feminisms. Sound waves are “infinitely malleable” and, therefore, do not break; the shift between second and third wave feminisms, then, is a

“state of liminality, which doesn’t necessarily have to be a lull or ‘doldrums,’ if we 12

understand a wave frequency as an undulating carrier current through which we transmit

and receive, synthesize and morph, network and coalesce” (248).

To this end, I illustrate in the following chapters that during the era typically

theorized as the “trough” of feminist activity between the waves, NAC was really quite

active, responsive, and becoming increasingly representative of traditionally marginalized

groups in its advocacy. The shift to a “third wave” politics was not marked by a radical

gap – generational, strategic, or degree of activity. What does occur, however, is a re-

orientation within the organization toward a set of third wave feminist priorities, as they

were vocalized by member groups. This shift in focus situates NAC’s changing feminist praxis as a response to different streams of feminism (or “frequencies”) picked up by the

organization. Informed by their perspectives, NAC’s shifting construction of “national

feminism” thus demonstrates Garrison’s point that “radio waves are both a wavelength on

the spectrum of electromagnetic waves, and are comprised of multiple […] wavelengths

or frequencies within its own bandwidth” (248).

It also suggests, however, that NAC cannot be uncritically situated as a mere relic

of the second wave of feminism. NAC may be better conceptualized as an enduring

“transformer” of the nation’s women’s movement, connecting more and less “audible”

feminist voices across a vast geography and extended period of time. Acting as nodes on

a network, Garrison notes, transformers can take the form of unexpected coalitions,

individuals who build bridges between disparate streams of feminist activism, and

encounters between diverse constituencies (253). Even as Rebick characterized NAC as

‘a few smoldering cinders of its former self,’ the plenary evinced the political power 13

retained by NAC to engage in bridgework by drawing a diverse group of feminist practitioners, scholars, and educators together for the purpose of discussing the direction of national feminism in Canada.

NAC’s characterization as a transformer, as forging lines of communication between streams of feminist activity, also speaks to the heterogeneity of the organization’s membership – an aspect of second wave feminism which tends to be submerged in retrospective accounts in light of renewed understandings about diversity and representation. NAC was an umbrella organization representing a diverse coalition of women’s organizations, which invited unexpected alliances across different constituencies. The untidy mélange of Canadian feminisms concentrated within NAC carried a certain allure, particularly in terms of its imagining as a reflection of the nation’s self-proclaimed “mosaic” nature, shot-through with often contradictory viewpoints and partial narratives. As Hamilton and Barrett remark, “‘A belief in undivided sisterhood was never very marketable in Canada’” (in Vickers 1992, 43).

Competing nationalisms between English, French, and Aboriginal groups bump up against the “polite racism” of official multiculturalism. Regionalism conflicts with national interests, as different political investments prioritize urban over rural, central

Canada over the west, and neglect indigenous northern populations. These long-standing schisms add further complexity to feminist subjectivities constituted by race and ethnicity, class, ability, age, and orientation. All evidence the ways in which difference is endemic to the Canadian “mosaic” identity. Within NAC, our feminisms were to follow suit, contrary to the image of Canadian feminism posed at the CWSA. 14

Borne of the CWSA discussion, my dissertation is a recuperative history of NAC;

an effort to write into Canadian feminist narratives the strategies used to pursue the

women’s movement’s landmark achievements, for those strategies provide political

continuity between streams of feminism, both within and outside of organizational walls.

In her history of the Canadian women’s movement, Rebick argues that “much of the

experience of the second wave of feminism, that of my generation, is getting lost. Most

assessments focus on what was accomplished, which laws were changed, the number of

positions women now occupy. What is not mentioned is how those changes happened”

(2005, xii). Her point underscores a marked lack of a cohesive “movement memory” that

preserves the experiences, knowledge and activism of a generation of Canadian feminist

organizing. I argue that the loss of accounts of feminist experience in contemporary analyses of the movement speaks to a pressing need to re-historicize stories of Canadian

women’s struggles of the 1980s and early 1990s in order to avoid “disappearing” this

era’s feminism.

“The Nail in the Coffin”

The contemporary significance of projects that challenge the prevailing wisdom

about the discursive construction of feminist “failure” has been crystallized in recent

years. In 2006, the Canadian federal government drastically altered its mandate on

women’s rights issues, eliminating the funding of women’s groups that do advocacy, lobbying or general research, closing the majority of Status of Women Canada’s offices

and removing the term “equality” from their mandate (in favour of women’s

“participation” in the economic, political and democratic life of the country). Bev Oda, 15

Minister Responsible for the Status of Women Canada, justified the $5 million slash by

claiming that the cuts were made in the name of “women’s thrift,” since “Canadian

women know the value of a dollar. They know what good use of hard-earned money

means’” (Ditchburn 2006, A6).

These moves effectively silence women’s organizations’ participation in the

policy making process and dramatically impede their ability to communicate women’s

equality issues with the public. In press reports, Judy Rebick denounced these changes as

“the nail in the coffin” of a Canadian commitment to funding women’s and other equality

seeking groups that originated in the Trudeau era.

While my experience at the CWSA plenary session resonated with discourses re-

inscribing commonly accepted narratives of feminist waves of progress, decline, and

generational re-birth, the SWC funding cuts of 2006 speak to a narrative trajectory that

suggests an alternative history. As Rebick (2006) recounts, the “politically-motivated cuts

to the program [began] in the ‘80s under Brian Mulroney, at a time when the women’s

movement was one of the most important opponents of free trade. The Liberals continued

the cuts and quietly changed the program so that it was no longer funding operations but

mostly research.” By “following the money,” we can lay the blame for the silencing of

Canadian feminists’ voices at the feet of a succession of federal governments, thereby

side-stepping frequently cited, yet highly problematic sites of feminist “failure” that focus

on the movement’s “inherent” inability to thrive, such as essentialism, fragmentation and in-fighting, and radicalism. This orientation to the history of Canadian feminism traces a movement chronology that does not follow the expected peaks and dips of typical 16

feminist oceanography, but instead marks out a steady contraction of nationally-based

feminist activity in concert with ever-diminishing state support. The recent efforts to

revivify the National Action Committee on the Status of Women speaks to an even greater need to reconsider the organization’s past strategies for their continued use in the

contemporary recasting of political debates around the erasure of women’s issues from the federal agenda.

Feminist historiographies cannot continue to uncritically reproduce narratives of

feminist “death,” as occurred during the CWSA plenary. These decline narratives

coincide too readily with ideologically-driven political agendas that seek to regulate the presence of oppositional voices in national political discourse, by contributing to the normalization of feminist demobilization in the popular imagination. On the contrary, I argue that embracing a different narrative praxis, such as Garrison’s radio wave analogy, productively re-orients our ways of thinking about and engaging with past, present and future feminisms. No longer “terminally ill,” the Canadian feminist movement is active, purposeful and very alive. 17

Introduction: NAC Amplifies

In 1984, Chaviva Hošek, the charismatic newly-elected president of the National

Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), viewed the upcoming Canadian federal election as an invaluable opportunity to increase NAC’s visibility and apply pressure for concrete policy change on child care, pornography, employment equity and other “women’s issues.” In a move that ran counter to many feminist organizations’ typical wariness of mainstream media, Hošek organized a nationally televised debate among the three federal party leaders, where candidates responded to questions posed by representatives of women’s organizations. The high-profile strategy paid off, in terms of solidifying NAC’s public reputation as the voice of national feminism in Canada, increasing organizational membership and confirming their political influence.

“NAC, the News, and the Neoliberal State” examines the role of the nation’s news media in constructing cultural memory of the Canadian women’s movement between 1984 and 1993, through an in-depth study of NAC’s mainstream news media practices during the Mulroney years. I investigate how this organization’s attempt to innovative and extend its media strategy was effectively disciplined by neoliberal state interests. After 1984, NAC was unable to fully realize a second women’s issues debate, despite its intention to make the event a fixture in federal election campaigns. I argue that this was not a result of NAC’s “failure” as a feminist organization, but an effect of accumulated state and media power. Confronted with these combined interests, NAC was compelled to pull back its media strategy from the official political realm and pursue its goals through established media routines for social movement organizations. This project 18

seeks to untangle the complex set of relations existing between the Canadian state, the

nation’s news media and NAC (a federally-funded social movement organization), as they coalesced around the women’s issues debate strategy.

To do so, my dissertation investigates not only NAC’s media strategies and use of representations around the leaders’ debate strategy, but also the set of representations

constructed by Canadian news media around NAC and, consequently, the history of the

national women’s movement. The 1984 leaders’ debate is particularly significant to the

dissertation because it evidences NAC’s changing approaches to media and political

strategies. The debate marks a key turning point in movement narratives about NAC’s

role in Canadian feminism in light of the turn to neo-liberal policy discourse in the

country.

Neoliberal political ideology is founded on complementary discourses of

individualism and free choice; these are manifested in socio-economic policies that free market forces from government regulations, cut government spending and encourage free trade. This study situates NAC’s activism and media strategies in relation to the emergence of neo-liberal policy and political discourse at the federal level in Canada. As the U.S. and Britain heralded the rise of neo-liberal political ideology in the 1980s through the elections of Reagan and Thatcher, so too did it take hold in Canada through the election of Mulroney in 1984, whose economic and social policies encountered strong resistance from labour and other social movements, including the women’s movement.

While many women’s groups outside Canada suffered financially and politically from the rise of neo-liberalism, some Canadian feminists managed to gain momentum throughout the 1980s and NAC occupied its most influential position since its inception in 1972. 19

As this study traces the development of NAC’s “public face” over the course of a politically turbulent decade, it also evinces an episodic history of the nationalization of

Canadian “second wave” feminist activism. An overarching goal of my project is to investigate and challenge how commonly accepted decline narratives of the Canadian women’s movement, specifically NAC, came to be circulated and legitimated in news media. These accounts are typically built upon stories of organizational disunity and external criticisms that are circulated and legitimated by news media. Media preference for dynamic, conflict-driven stories has ensured that accounts of organizational conflict within NAC were given special emphasis and were widely reported. Movement actors must contend with these frequently unrealistic accounts by developing effective strategies that manipulate standard media practices to promote their feminist message, instead of rumours of backroom discord. Therefore, although feminist organizers tend to critique and eschew mass media channels, they also are willing to exploit such formats in order to articulate and popularize their feminist message.

“NAC, the News and the Neoliberal State” examines the organization’s media practice and the ways it evolved around significant strategic actions in order to situate it within the broader context of NAC’s feminist organizing logic (a logic that could be

described as inherently flawed, given the organization’s perpetual vulnerability to the

mercurial conditions of federal funding). My analysis of each episode in this ten-year

time period aims to complicate accepted narratives of feminism’s failure or decline by

triangulating NAC’s organizational perspective, news media discourses of feminism, and

state responses to NAC’s feminist agenda. By placing these discourses in conversation, 20

an alternative history of the women’s movement emerges; one which I argue eases the

burden of Canadian feminism’s decline from NAC’s back.

Method

To accomplish this, my dissertation uses qualitative, historical and discursive

analysis to examine three sets of representations occurring around NAC’s leadership debate strategies of 1984 and 1988, as well as the organization’s 1992 and 1993 Annual

General Meetings (which include reference to the debate strategy). These sets of

representations are situated in relation to one another in order to delineate the contest of

strategies that occurred between neoliberal politics and feminist organizing in Canada.

The first set consists of representations produced within NAC, created through its

own publicity materials, policy documents and planning materials. This information is

drawn from archival documents housed in the National Action Committee on the Status

of Women fonds in the Canadian Women’s Movement Archives [CWMA] at the

University of Ottawa. The NAC fonds provides a wealth of background information

about the ways in which the organization created “interesting and innovative networks for

expression” for feminist interests in national political discourse (Herbst 1994). The

collection is organized into nine series.3 In order to identify the feminist organizing logic

3 The series are: (1) Annual General Meetings, containing records of NAC’s AGMs from 1976 to 1994; (2) Campaigns, containing records of NAC’s priority actions and other women’s issue-oriented events not spearheaded by NAC; (3) Executive/Committee, containing NAC Executive and committee meeting minutes and files; (4) Financial Records, containing financial records of the organization such as fundraising information, expense claims, and bank statements; (5) Journals, containing correspondence received by NAC between 1980 and 1991; (6) Office/Administration/Personnel, including records from 1977-1994 pertaining to office procedure, activity reports, and personnel matters; (7) Publications, containing print copies and working drafts of NAC newsletters spanning from 1973 to 1988; (8) Penney Kome, containing Kome’s files from research and interviews conducted for her monograph Taking of 28; (9) Videocasettes, one box of unlisted videos. 21

behind these efforts, I prioritized those series and files in the archive that most obviously addressed NAC’s media practice in 1984, 1988, and 1992/1993.4 For instance, Series One

(Annual General Meetings) and Two (Campaigns) yielded government lobby transcripts, meeting minutes, AGM conference reports, and election campaign strategy documents detailing NAC’s priority campaigns (including the leaders’ debates) for 1984, 1988 and

1992/1993. Series Seven (Publication) contains official NAC publications, such as the organizational newsletter Status of Women News, which lends insight into how NAC leadership framed and promoted its campaigns to their member groups and individual supporters.

The preface to the inventory of NAC archive notes that it is only “partially arranged” and that the organization of the fonds remains at a “general level.” As a result,

I expanded my search to include files that reference (or seemed likely to contain documents pertaining to) NAC’s media strategies. Series Three (Executive/Committees) and Series Six (Office/Administration/ Personnel), for example, contained files labeled

“NAC Publicity Projects,” “NAC Communications Policy,” and “NAC in the media.”

These holdings include documents demonstrating different aspects of NAC’s media strategy, from the organization’s association with professional media services (like

Canadian News Wire) to its communication policy and collections of press clippings. The disorganization of the NAC fonds is challenging insofar as it means a researcher must diligently attend to the entire inventory in scrupulous detail, while weighing the chances of (some) ambiguously-titled files containing relevant information (in some instances,

4 Refer to Appendix A for a complete listing of the series, boxes, and files I consulted in the NAC fonds. 22

files were sometimes empty, contained material unrelated to its label, or were missing

altogether).

Despite these issues, however, the archive contains substantial content regarding

NAC’s media practice, particularly in the election years under examination here. The

scope of the collection parallels the organizational strength of NAC; as the activities and

size of the organization grew, so too has the collection. There are significant records

pertaining to NAC’s extensive committee work and campaigns in the 1980s, including

the 1984 and 1988 attempts to launch federal leaders’ debates on women’s issues.

(NAC’s hopes that the new leaders’ debate strategy would become an entrenched feature

of federal election campaigning likely motivated the preservation of its paper trail for

future reference.) In comparison, by 1992-1993, NAC was beginning to feel the brunt of

government funding cutbacks. Combined with an unfriendly political climate, NAC faced

an uphill struggle to stage a 1993 leaders’ debate on women’s issues. Given these

circumstances, little attempt was made to secure a third debate and, as such, less

documentation exists about that particular effort (as I describe further in Chapter 5).

Logically enough, the archive’s diminishing holdings during these years occurred

because of a perfect storm of circumstances.5 First, as the 1990s progressed, NAC could not fund as innovative or large scale media-based campaigns as it had in past years given its dwindling financial base and, as such, relied on established, already documented communication practices (such as press releases, interviews, and mailing campaigns).

Second, this scaling back to the basics of media relations meant that fewer documents

5 Of the nine series in the archive, only two are described as containing documents from as late as 1994 (Series One: Annual General Meetings and Series Six: Office/Administration/Personnel).

describing NAC’s media practice were produced.6 Third, fewer resources were available

for records management during these years, so we cannot be sure if what the archive

contains is a reliable representation of NAC’s media practice (that is, without conducting

interviews with members active during this time period).7

Ultimately, my analysis focuses on those years which are best represented in the

NAC archive. As a result, this study accesses a history of feminist media practice which

has remained under-examined until now. The documentary record tells us not only what

media strategies were undertaken by NAC, but also why NAC leadership chose them and

what battles were waged in order to see them through – aspects of Canadian feminist activism that tend to be elided in general histories of the movement.

The second set of representations is produced by the news media around NAC’s

media strategies and, in turn, the Canadian women’s movement. Although I had initially intended to conduct an independent search for news articles relating to the leaders’ debate

strategies for the years in question (via online databases and news archives), the NAC

fonds yielded what could be considered an unofficial archive of news clippings from national and local news media about these NAC-sponsored events as well as other organizational campaigns and women’s issues topics more generally. I viewed the

6 For instance, I found instructional documents (two pages) reminding members how to script a press release from 1992-1993. Strangely enough, however, I did not come across documents relating to the development of NAC’s website (www.nac-cca.ca), which represented an innovative communications strategy for the organization in the 1990s. I look forward to conducting further research in this area to determine the role of digital communications in NAC’s activism (particularly since the site went – and stayed – offline, despite the 2006 effort to reinvigorate the organization).

7 This study necessarily focuses on the documentary record of NAC’s media practice, as the NAC archive is an overlooked resource that gives voice to an alternative narrative of Canadian feminist organizing. Future work on this subject, however, would benefit from oral histories; specifically, the insights that could be gleaned through interviews with women working in NAC as well as journalists who covered women’s issues stories during these years. 24

presence of these holdings in the NAC archive as an opportunity to explore the evidence

of a discursive loop in the organization’s media practice: NAC could adjust their framing

of a particular issue in response to the news frames imposed on their original message.

Over the years, the organization relied on both informal and formal measures to

track its presence in news media. NAC’s member groups and committee members would

collect news coverage of the organization (or women’s issues), which aided NAC in

monitoring its growing visibility in mainstream coverage, particularly in its early years.

As the organization became more established through the early 1980s, NAC gained

“standing” in news media as the go-to source on women’s issues (Gamson 2004). In turn,

the tenor of the coverage becomes increasingly important as the organization strategizes

its counter-framing of a particular issue. While NAC continued to track (and disseminate)

women’s issues stories through Canadian News Wire services and through member

groups’ mailings, the organization also commissioned a news clippings service

(Bowden’s) to conduct extensive sweeps of nation-wide press coverage of specific events,

including the 1984 federal leaders’ debate on women’s issues. This accumulation of press

clippings – from Bowden’s, the Canadian News Wire, and members’ correspondence –

forms the basis of my news analysis, with the knowledge that NAC’s media strategy was

informed to some degree by this collection of articles.

The collection of news articles consulted for this study is extensive and was

compiled from several series in the fonds.8 While the 1984 leaders’ debate press clippings were almost entirely located within two boxes (630 and 779), news articles relating to the

8 Refer to Appendix B for a bibliography of the primary news sources included in this analysis (divided by Series and Box number). 25

subsequent two time periods under study were spread thinly across several boxes and

different series. Indeed, a majority of the press coverage included for analysis pertains to

the 1984 event, since that is when NAC commissioned Bowden’s Clippings Service to

collect media coverage of the debate. The articles represent both local and national

sources, and had been sorted by month in the archive. Other than by month, the clippings

were not ordered by any discernable system, resulting in a mishmash of debate analysis

pieces, opinion columns, editorials and letters to the editor in both French and English. In my initial pass over the collection, I imposed these genre-specific categories on the collection in order to develop a sense of its contents (I ultimately decided to exclude the

letters to the editor as well as French-language articles from my final analysis, as each

sub-category requires more extensive contextual treatment than could be provided in a

project of this scope). Approximately 389 articles from national and local newspapers

and news magazines (such as Maclean’s) covering the 1984 NAC leaders’ debate on

women’s issues have been examined. The 1984 NAC leaders’ debate was an exceptional

media event; the volume of clippings pertaining to the debate and its impact on the 1984

federal election attests to the newsworthiness of this unique moment for the public as

well as its import for the feminist organization which collected them.

In comparison, I identified approximately 38 news articles held by the NAC

archive that directly related to the second attempt to secure a women’s debate amongst

the federal party leaders in 1988. Due to the scope of this project, I excluded media

coverage of women’s issues that did not relate to NAC’s proposed second women’s

issues debate, including day care, abortion, and pension reform (as well as general

election coverage which did not explicitly address women’s issues, totaling 26

approximately 75 additional articles). Since NAC did not realize its goal of staging a

second, separate women’s issues debate, the same amount of news coverage was not

collected around the event and there are no records that the organization hired Bowden’s

at this time. My analysis of the 1988 debate focuses on these changed circumstances and

therefore relies on a combination of documents: the 38 media reports relating to the

organization’s attempt to secure the debate and NAC’s internal documents (such as the

correspondence with political parties and news networks, the committee meeting minutes,

and media workshop proceedings that demonstrate the evolution of NAC’s media

strategy at this time).

My final chapter draws on approximately 39 news items from 1992 and 1993,

years in which NAC’s turn toward anti-racist feminist praxis intersected with an

upcoming federal election. These reports reveal less about the organization’s request for a

third women’s issues debate than they do NAC’s public pleas for a “truly” democratic

Canadian society (in the face of Mulroney’s neoliberal-neoconservative regime).9 As mentioned earlier, the archival record indicates that NAC was relying on more established forms of public awareness-raising – press releases, protest rallies, mail campaigns – than difficult to produce strategies like the women’s issues debate, in light of its shrinking budget and the unfriendly political climate. At this time, NAC’s ‘radical’ anti-racist feminism (and the increasingly oppositional political stances it engendered) garnered the organization publicity more so than its ill-fated call for another women’s

9 The 1988 and 1992/1993 news articles are less disparate collections of news reports than the 1984 batch; a greater proportion of the clippings were from major publications, including the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star, or capital city newspapers, such as The Free Press (Winnipeg, MB) and The Province (Vancouver, BC). These collections did not contain the same variety of news genres, consisting primarily of analysis pieces or regular women’s issues columnists (like the Toronto Star’s Doris Anderson). 27

issues debate. The press clippings held in the fonds reflect this shift in organizational focus. My final chapter explores NAC’s re-invention as an explicitly anti-racist feminist organization through an analysis of its internal documents and corresponding media

discourses, as they emerged in advance of the 1993 election.

The third set of representations under analysis consists of state responses to

NAC’s feminist agenda, as they are documented in correspondence and news media reports held in the NAC fonds. These documents – including exchanges between NAC and the Prime Minister’s Office, the leader of the official opposition, the NDP, and lower-profile political parties (such as the Communist and Rhino Parties of Canada) – are interspersed throughout the files consulted. These documents are particularly useful since they not only help reconstruct the timelines within which the leaders’ debates were secured (or not), but they also provide a concrete, detailed record of the political parties’

utilization of news media as tool of negotiation; one which aided their efforts to circumvent social movement organizations’ “excessive” intervention in political discourse. The state’s perspective, represented in this collection of correspondence and news reports, is an integral component to my analysis as it helps define NAC’s motivation for adjusting its media strategy during these years.

My research strategy corresponds with Tarrow’s (1996) “contentious event analysis,” which refers to a trend in social movement studies to rely on textual sources, such as newspaper reports or archival documents, to trace a social movement’s (or social movement organization’s) patterns of activity in relation to its socio-political contexts, as opposed to pursuing movement actors or other individuals involved in movement activity 28

for their testimony (875). This approach allowed me to create a “temporal map” of the

changes and/or innovations made to NAC’s media strategy as the organization responded

to the shift to a neoliberal federal framework. Unlike studies of the “long rhythms” of

contentious politics (i.e., an extended historical treatment), my dissertation provides an

episodic history of the “short rhythms” of NAC’s media-based activism as it responded to

a particularly tumultuous decade of political change in Canada (Tilly in Tarrow 1996,

876).

I adopt an interdisciplinary approach to discourse analysis, drawing on three

distinct theoretical streams to guide my analysis of the media-movement relationship and

its impact on cultural memory of feminism. First, I utilize political science perspectives

on social citizenship to situate the evolving discourses that frame NAC’s claims-making

on the federal government in relation to the erosion of the Canadian welfare state under

neoliberalism (Brodie 2008; Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2004). Second, from

communication studies, I draw on feminist media studies for insight regarding the

representation of women’s and feminist interests in mainstream media, and specifically,

news media (Ross 2004; Ross & Byerly 2004; Bradley 2003; Rhode 1995; Douglas 1994;

Ryan 1991). In addition, a growing body of literature has investigated the changing

situation for women in the Canadian context, both as news producers and as political

subjects featured in reporting (Robinson 2005; Freeman 2001; Robinson & Saint-Jean

1998; Gidengil & Everett 2003, 2000). These literatures evince the hegemonic role

played by news media in marginalizing (and legitimizing) feminist discourse in the public

sphere. This perspective is particularly important to studies of oppositional movements that seek transformational societal change, since “the potential for democracy […] 29

requires the reconceptualization of the public sphere in consideration of the media”

(McLaughlin 1993, 613; Sreberny and van Zoonen 2000). Third, this project engages social movement scholarship on the structural opportunities and constraints for movement organizations’ dissemination of strategic discourses that aim to shape public discourse (Staggenborg 2005; Ferree et al. 2002; Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986).

Historical Context

In order to place my study in a broader historical context, the following provides a brief overview of NAC’s communications practice, from 1972 until the turn of the

millennium. This history focuses on the role of the mass media as NAC emerged as the

representative organization of the Canadian women’s movement. As such, NAC was

characterized by a dialectical relation, fostering both an “internal” oppositional identity

based on shared gender oppression, as well as an “outward” public expression of its

oppositional claims. For Lisa McLaughlin (1993), a problematic tendency in studies of

counter-public spheres is to neglect the means of communication: “a detailed focus on the

internal, oppositional functions of the community is achieved at the expense of

considering channels through which oppositional claims are directed outward and

expressed in the dominant form of the public sphere through the mass media” (600).10 In the following overview, however, I delineate three loosely-defined time periods that correspond with shifts in NAC’s media praxis – maintaining visibility, the emancipatory potential of media, and radical rhetoric – to situate the subsequent close analysis of

NAC’s communicative practice as it developed between 1984 and 1993.

10 See Felski (1989) and Fraser (1990) for examples of feminist counter-public sphere theory that does not fully elucidate the role of mass media. 30

Originally, NAC was formed as a precautionary measure to ensure the federal

government would implement recommendations made by the Royal Commission on the

Status of Women [RCSW] in 1970. The Royal Commission itself was established four

years earlier in part as a result of some unintentional media manipulation. Led by the lively Laura Sabia, a delegation of approximately 70 delegates representing 35 national

women’s organizations met with Justice Minister Lucien Cardin and presented their case

for the creation of a Royal Commission on women’s rights. Despite the publicity garnered by the colourful Sabia and the Committee for the Equality of Women in Canada

[CEW], their request was rejected. In the following days, a Globe and Mail reporter misquoted Sabia, who had jokingly suggested sending two million women to Ottawa in response to the rejection, by running a headline that read, “Two Million Women

Marching on Ottawa.” Sabia’s horror was quelled by the support she received from the other women’s groups: “‘…we sent a telegram to all the women’s groups, explaining what I had really said. But we needn’t have worried. I got no flak at all. They were delighted. That was the beginning of solidarity among women, when women stoped [sic] fighting each other’” (Kome 1985, 82). At the same time, an ally was found in Judy

LaMarsh, the second woman appointed to Cabinet and an avid proponent of women’s equality. For LaMarsh, who had worked for the implementation of such a review since she had been elected, this was a hard-fought victory made all the more difficult and drawn-out by negative press coverage:

Nothing was so hard to accomplish during all the time I was in Cabinet as

the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the Status of

Women… In early 1965, Pearson seemed at last to be prepared to accept 31

my advice and set up such a commission… When I mentioned a Royal

Commission to a national women’s meeting, there was an immediate and

scathing reaction from some of the most responsible press of the country.

Pearson backed off as if stung with a nettle. (Kome 1985, 83)

Having the Prime Minister’s ear after he had seen the headline, LaMarsh urged Pearson

to take Sabia’s comment seriously, saying, “‘if I know anything about her, she’ll make

good on her threat.’ The file was re-opened, Cabinet reconsidered, and they decided to create the Royal Commission” (Kome 1985, 82).

Once publicly released in 1970, the Commission’s final report made 167 recommendations that addressed an array of issues, including education, employment equity, reproductive rights, childcare provisions, taxation laws and pension reform. The impact of the report has been enduring and marks the advent of the modern women’s movement in Canada, since “it was a national exercise in public education, or consciousness-raising, to use a feminist phrase” (Kome 1985, 85). Feminist organizers pounced on the report’s recommendations and began prioritizing their issues, choosing to focus first on “three feminist issues [which had emerged] to capture the public interest”

(Kome 1985, 89). In these early years, the nation’s women’s movement is already seen

honing its media savvy by focusing their political efforts on high profile, “hot button” court cases, like Morgentaler, challenges to the Indian Act, and changing Canadian divorce law.

These examples demonstrate the emancipatory potential thought to be held by the nation’s news media for Canadian feminist women, who vowed to “stop fighting each 32

other” and consolidate their considerable energies in the name of a common cause:

improving the status of women in Canada. Spearheaded by NAC, the national women’s

movement emerged as a powerful example of feminist counter-ideology in Canada,

offering a collective critique of male-defined society. Early on, the national women’s

movement identified the mass media as an indispensible aspect of its advocacy strategy,

noting in 1972 that, “we cannot do without the media – we need them to maintain our

visibility.”11

Maintaining Visibility: 1972 – early 1980s

To counter government in action on implementing the RCSW report

recommendations, in 1971 the CEW re-united, dissolved, and re-formed as the National

Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Women; an organization intended to be “‘a

clearinghouse for the exchange of information about the activities and plans for action of

the participating women’s groups’ and to ‘spearhead a drive for the implementation of

those recommendations of the [RCSW] which are aimed at equality of opportunity for

women.’”12 By 1972, the National Action Committee (having dropped the “ad hoc” by

this time) arranged for a national meeting of women to determine an effective course of

action regarding the government’s failure to implement the Commission’s

recommendations.13

11 Report of Strategy for Change, 1972 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 655)

12 Draft NAC History, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

13 I have come across two first hand accounts of NAC’s decision to drop the “ad hoc” from its name. The first resides in the draft NAC history from 1992, where it states that the organization’s steering committee learned that the government would not fund “ad hoc” organizations – they changed the name in order to 33

The CEW (and then NAC) drew upon the collective awareness of women’s issues

created by the relatively favourable press coverage of the RCSW in order to lay the

groundwork for the national feminist movement. Barbara Freeman (2001) argues that the

Canadian news media of the 1960s was generally receptive to women’s rights discourse,

particularly since commission chair Florence Bird strategically framed “women’s issues”

in terms evocative of principle tenets of liberal democracy: equality of opportunity,

human rights, and democratic rights. Although there was resistance to ideas that

threatened to upend the dominant gender order, Freeman notes that media coverage of the

Commission recognized that Canadian women had real grievances (239). In addition, the

socio-political context in which the nation’s mass media functioned “was predominantly

and moderately liberal in its political sympathies […] More progressive ideas about

women’s roles in society began to gain credence as the economy expanded and their

increased participation in the workforce was needed” (239). Ultimately, the news media

coverage of the Commission not only publicized the issue of women’s status in Canada,

but helped “synthesize seemingly fragmented and unconnected situations and create what

appear[ed] to be a widespread phenomena (Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986, 81). The

secure the $15 000 conference grant. The second was told by Laura Sabia in her 1988 Toronto Sun column, where the name change was meant to foster organizational legitimacy:

I remember going to Ottawa to consult with Bryce Mackasey, minister responsible for the status of women, to try to get some money from government for a nation-wide conference on the status of women. Mackasey looked me straight in the eye and bluntly told me, ‘first change that silly name, ‘ad hoc committee’ – you’re either in business to improve the status of women or you’re not. Stop the ‘ad hocking.’ Call yourselves a national organization.’ I came home walking on air with a promise of $50 000 for a national conference and a new name for the organization, the National Action Committee (NAC).” (Laura Sabia, May 24, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

Unfortunately, the tenor of Sabia’s story suggested that NAC’s founders were themselves “silly” women who required a male politician to take control, point out their failed nomenclature, and properly name the feminist organization. 34

collective awareness of women’s status as a sympathetic, shared social problem was

integral to the National Action Committee’s mobilization of more than 500 women at the

Strategy for Change conference.

In line with my earlier characterization of NAC as a “transformer” organization,

the Strategy for Change conference of 1972 was the first manifestation of the

organization’s role as a point of connection (or “a communications link”14) between the

nation’s feminist women. The conference was attended by representatives of more than

forty women’s organizations, who were interested in determining strategic actions that impel the government to move on the RCSW recommendations. A draft NAC history written in 1992 described the diversity of women who attended and the type of information in which they were interested:

Delegates representing groups participating in the National Action

Committee, other women’s groups, aboriginal women, ‘ethnic groupings’

and ‘from wide-spread geographic areas’ paid a $5.00 registration fee and

attended workshops on Political Action, Mass Media Impact, Day Care

and Education, Economic Status, Direct Action Techniques, and

Community Organization.15

14 In 1973, the first issue of the organizational newsletter, Status of Women News, stated that, “‘NAC serves as an educational and communications link for women in Canada who are striving to improve their status and to change the traditional attitudes and habits of prejudice towards women’” (in Vickers et al. 1993, 74 emphasis added).

15 Draft NAC History, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

Although numerous constituencies of women were not well represented (including black

women, lesbians, the disabled), the Strategies for Change conference had demonstrated

that more than just the feminist “old guard” was seeking channels for productive feminist

engagement with the state.

This was most frequently articulated as the convergence of two streams of

feminist praxis (that would shape the internal dynamic at NAC for years to come): the

“conservatives” and the “radicals.” Kay Sigurjonsson, chairperson of publicity at the

convention, described the scene as “a union of the ‘jeans and suits,’”16 while Sabia

described her presence as ‘bringing the hobnail boots and the white-glove set together.’

The draft NAC history hesitantly suggested that these differences “might have appeared” to be generational: “on the one hand, stood the ‘old guard’ small-l liberals who for years had been the women’s movement; and on the other the ‘activists’ or ‘radicals’ emerging from the grassroots, the labour movement, and the rape crisis centres and shelters for battered women.”17 This difference was sharply manifested with the impromptu

formation of the Radical Caucus of Women, who prepared a separate conference report

calling for a systemic overhaul of structural forms of oppression in Canadian society as

opposed to the more conservative agenda of pressuring the government to implement the

RCSW recommendations. NAC’s reluctance to characterize the “jeans” and “suits” as a

generational difference underscores the inadequacy of feminist oceanography as an

explanatory framework, even for Canadian feminists operating in the midst of the

16 Draft NAC History, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

17 Ibid.

“second wave.” Instead, their description emphasized an interpretation of the divergence

as political dis-orientation between two modes of feminist consciousness and formative

experience. The Strategy for Change conference report even went so far as to state that,

“‘the generation gap’ was found to be a myth.”18

NAC strove to foster communication between – not elide – women’s different feminisms, while providing a permanent, non-governmental forum for strategizing change in pursuit of a common goal: improving “the status of women, all women, and thereby achieving a better quality of life for all Canadians.”19 In accordance with their

stated mission, “‘NAC will not duplicate nor supersede established organizations,’” the

founders adopted the umbrella structure used by other Canadian women’s organizations,

like the National Council of Women of Canada [NCWC] and the Fédération des femmes

du Québec [FFQ], in order to preserve the political integrity of individual groups. In addition to the Toronto-based NAC headquarters, provincial Status of Women agencies were established to help coordinate and maintain representation of local groups’ interests.

The Strategy for Change conference report demonstrated that, from its inception, NAC intended to become a diverse coalition “fully representative” of Canadian women.20 The umbrella structure fostered a women’s advocacy network that supported smaller, local organizers that were at risk of demobilization due to lack of resources. This

18 Report of Strategy for Change, 1972 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 655)

19 Ibid.

20 The report stated that “In order to achieve full representation of the national diversities among Canadian women, i.e., geographic, native, ethno-socio-economic groups, we recommend that funding for continued action by the National Action Committee be sought […] and that such funding be so administered that the operation of community organizing units be assured” (Report of Strategy for Change, 1972 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 655)).

organizational structure was also meant to strengthen NAC’s lobbying position with the state; veteran feminists knew from past experience that coordinating women’s groups’ different goals and presenting a unified set of priorities to the state was a more effective political strategy than having several women’s groups articulating competing (and often contradictory) agendas. However, since NAC’s agenda at this time did not include producing policy statements on behalf of its membership, there was no effort made by the steering committee in charge to ensure that the fledgling diversity evident at the conference was reflected in leadership roles throughout the organization. As a result, the national leadership was dominated by “old guard” feminists, who prioritized strategies of persuasion over popular protest.

Debates over NAC’s media practice tapped into competing visions of the organization’s identity, purpose and future direction, which in turn spoke to competing analytic understandings about how social change was effected. NAC’s early communications activities were dominated by the push-and-pull between dominant

“liberal” feminists, who saw the media as an indispensible resource for maintaining organizational visibility, and challenging “radical” feminists, who were selective about which media and journalists should be engaged by the organization and what message

NAC should be producing.21 For instance, in 1977, the purpose of the four-year old

Status of Women News newsletter was debated by the liberal and radical contingents of the coalition. The magazine was originally intended to be a communicative device

21 The statement issued by the Radical Caucus of Women at the Strategy for Change conference, for instance, suggested that “entertainment be provided by women concerned about the cause of women and be non-sexist in nature [and] that film crews and other media personnel be all-women, to promote the hiring of women in the field and to encourage understanding coverage” (Report of Strategy for Change, 1972 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 655)). 38

through which NAC encouraged member groups to pressure their political representatives

on women’s issues, thus reminding them of the power of the women’s lobby. However,

the radical women argued that the newsletter would better serve a consciousness-raising

function, to educate Canadian women with in-depth features and political statements. The publication should, they posited, became a Canadian Ms. magazine: a high-quality, mass distributed, informative, feminist periodical that would raise the movement’s profile and serve as a call to action (Vickers et al. 1993, 87-88). By 1980, the organization had shifted toward a leftist liberal feminist praxis, which resulted in the establishment of policy committees and an increasingly sophisticated media practice.

Social movement scholarship on the media-movement relationship generally acknowledges that movements tend to achieve their goals more readily when actors are informed about news media conventions and learn to exploit them (Staggenborg 2008;

Ferree et al. 2002; Ryan 1991; Keilbowicz and Scherer 1986; Tuchman 1978). For instance, Gitlin’s (2003[1980]) study of the SDS underscores the limits placed on media practice by the diffuse structure of a decentralized movement; a defined media strategy was not a central component to their political actions. When the unexpected, yet un- ignorable glare of the media spotlight hit, then, it generated a haphazard response from groups within SDS. Different elements within SDS tried to harness the power to advance

the anti-war message in grossly divergent ways, resulting in an organizational crisis:

[…] peripheral groups in SDS, groups left out of last-minute, under-the-

glare decisions, were uneasy, even angry. For the force of publicity was

straining the organization at its weak seams. If access to media was now a 39

source of power, it was also a source of dissension. Now that mass-

mediated image had willy-nilly become a political resource, who within

SDS was going to control it? And toward what end? (92)

Unlike the SDS, the archival record shows that by the early 1980s NAC

leadership was developing a consistent organizational media practice that would allow

them to “break into” the nation’s news media under the guiding hand of the NAC

executive.22 Although the creation of the RCSW suggested that “‘the federal government

clearly, and at one point in time, accepted and thus legitimized the social problem

definition of the status of women,’” NAC had to ensure that politicians (and the Canadian

public) remained cognizant that the “new official social problem” of women’s status still required political redress (Bégin 1997, 13). Like most social movement organizations,

NAC encountered substantial difficulty when it came to inculcating their political

analysis in national public policy discourse, particularly with respect to mass media

filtering out women’s issues as political news: “a major stumbling block to this effort was

the gate-keeping role played by the media with regard to the introduction of new issues

into the political agenda” (Vickers et al. 1993, 223).

In response, NAC formalized “media strategy” as an organizational priority by

creating the Media Relations Committee [MRC] (chaired by future NAC president,

22 I do not wish to imply that NAC did not have an organizational media practice prior to 1980; they did. Prior to 1980, NAC had elicited a list of all daily newspapers in Canada (with their addresses) from the Canadian Daily Newspaper Publishers Association (1975), and produced, in 1977, an 8-point procedure sheet for writing and issuing NAC press releases. The organization also developed a “Suggested Delivery Circuit” for NAC press releases (which were to be distributed by taxi, by volunteer with a car, or on foot when in Toronto). A handwritten “Proposed Schedule of Press Coverage” for the 1979 AGM detailed a month-long media strategy of press releases, telephone calls to “media friends,” and a “press kit.” However, the mini-proliferation of documentation concerning NAC’s media practice in 1980 signaled a concerted effort to centralize media strategy in organizational priorities.

Chaviva Hošek). The MRC developed budgets for NAC’s media outreach, developed

networking events to further NAC’s media presence, and strategized ways to assert their

framing of women’s issues in news coverage. For example, Committee members would

write letters of complaint to newspaper editors, television programmers, and advertisers

for inaccurate or distorted media coverage of women and/or women’s issues.23 The

Committee also recommended that NAC join the Canadian News Wire Service, to ensure

the fast and simultaneous delivery of their press releases across the country.24

NAC was also aware of which news conventions they could productively exploit,

such as journalists’ reliance on official “known” sources. In 1980, for instance, NAC organized a “Media Munch” for Toronto women journalists. The two-hour lunch meeting was designed to get “them [the journalists] into [the] habit of calling NAC for comment

[and to] stress our interest in ‘hard news’ re: women.”25 The organization was trying to

establish itself as part of the journalistic routine, as a recognized, authoritative source on

women’s issues. NAC also wanted to question the reporters about issues they covered,

including “from what perspective, depth of approach, and typical sources of information”

23 By 1982, the Committee began actively soliciting member groups for examples of misleading or inaccurate media coverage of women’s issues and the organization for collection in a “vile file” of “bad articles.” Positive or “well presented” articles were also to be collective in an unnamed file. These articles were to be used as samples of good and bad coverage in a press release issued by NAC (Media Relations Committee Memo to NAC Executive, June 20, 1982 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 698)).

24 Prior to this, NAC member groups in Atlantic Canada and the western provinces would receive press releases only as fast as the postal service could deliver them. This exacerbated the regional disparity endemic to NAC, which was quickly becoming thought of as representative of the “Toronto women’s movement” much more so than the Canadian women’s movement. As a representative from Labrador stated, “What may start as a gush from Toronto by the time it ends up at Goose Bay, Labrador, it’s just a little trickle” (Through Her Eyes: Politics and the Women’s Movement. (1990) dir. Jill Vickers. Carleton University: Ottawa, ON).

25 “Media Munch,” undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 699)

for news stories.26 (Indeed, as NAC workers developed increasingly extensive lists of the

nation’s news media throughout the 1980s, they also found that certain reporters were

“friendly” to their perspective and acted as points of access to the channels of mass

communication.27) This information would allow NAC to better “conform to media

norms and provide information or ‘stories’ in a format acceptable to media

organizations,” resulting in increased and more sympathetic coverage (Staggenborg 2008,

40).

While these types of practices familiarized organization workers with the routines

of news production, established newsroom practices also presented obstacles to NAC’s

ability to access news discourse. Although NAC situated itself as the authoritative source

on women’s issues with news workers, the organization resisted identifying a specific

media spokesperson to represent the organization in order to preserve the integrity of

NAC’s grassroots politics of non-hierarchical knowledge-sharing structures. Within NAC

there were ideologies at work that sought to prevent the hoarding of information and/or

abilities, so as to develop “an equality of condition” amongst members (Vickers et al.

1993, 176). One aspect of this was manifested in a desire “to avoid the development of

‘media stars’; hence, there was resistance to dealing with media and outside agencies

except in a collective manner” (177). Although NAC was willing to engage with news

media, they refused to conform to some of its most dominant conventions, like providing

26 “Media Munch,” undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 699)

27 For instance, the MRC sent one memo indicating that “NAC to plan meetings in Ottawa with Geoff Stevens, Richard Gwyn and other good columnists to give them angles on women’s issues” (Chaviva Hošek, “Followup [sic] on Media Relations Committee Meeting,” September 30, 1980 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 698 emphasis added)). Female journalists Michele Landsberg and Rosemary Speirs were also identified as sympathetic contacts early on (see Freeman (2001) for insightful analysis of a female journalist’s experiences covering the RCSW). 42

a sole media spokesperson, since it would compromise the equality-seeking dynamic central to NAC’s feminism. Charlotte Ryan (1991) identifies the crux of the issue, stating, “Social movement organizers must make media work a collective process. The key actor has to be a collectivity because an individual can be picked off or bought off.

We will fail if we focus on the individuals” (29). However, journalists working under tight deadlines preferred dealing with individual movement representatives who were readily identifiable and quickly locatable; regular sources were perceived by reporters to be more reliable and trustworthy (Gans 2004[1979], 129-131).

The Emancipatory Potential of Media: early 1980s – early 1990s

By the early 1980s, NAC had strengthened the feminist counter-public sphere in

Canada by creating a discursive arena defined by women’s collective identification as oppressed subjects. United under NAC’s umbrella structure, a cross-section of the nation’s women mobilized and sustained a sense of common purpose despite competing streams of feminisms that had vied for influence over the strategies and overall direction of the organization. As described above, with the shift in organizational goals around

1980, NAC began to actively develop policy positions and cultivate extra-organizational channels through which to broadcast them. As Felski (1989) argues, “insofar as it is a public sphere, its arguments are also directed outward, toward a dissemination of feminist ideas and values throughout society as a whole” (167 emphasis original). Despite lingering organizational reticence to dive head-first into the “vast, impersonal spectator sport” of public relations, by the mid-1980s NAC sought to extend the discursive space of the feminist counter-public into official national political discourse through its 43

unprecedented use of mass mediated communication channels; a “necessary corollary of feminism’s claim to embody a catalyst of social and cultural change” (Felski 1989, 167).

By transforming an existing political ritual with feminist organizing logic, I argue that

NAC redefined broadcast networks as mainstream channels for emancipatory activity.

Confronted with the looming specter of neoliberal political ideology and social conservatism, NAC sensed the time had come to firmly interject their feminist analysis of many issues relevant to women’s lives into public policy by working with the media elite: national television broadcast networks. As I detail in Chapter 1, the organization buttressed standing media guidelines, such as the “gain[ing] media coverage (ideally, a clip on the national news to highlight the key issues and the stature of NAC),” with a federal election strategy that was meant to make women’s issues “go viral” across the nation (Vickers et al. 1993, 217). Exemplified by the historic, nationally televised leaders’ debate, NAC’s election strategy relied on consciousness-raising activities that were infectious, eventful, and would capture the public imagination by way of a “logic of contagion” (Deem 2003, 638). In this vein, NAC’s 1984 leadership debate strategy was a feminist re-telling of a familiar political ritual that captured a larger audience share than that which viewed the Stanley Cup finals. As noted earlier, the highly visible strategy benefited NAC, by solidifying the organization’s public reputation as the voice of national feminism in Canada, increasing membership and confirming their political capital. During this era characterized by the “hyper-dissemination” of feminist discourse through Canadian society, NAC and its member groups played “a critical role in helping to restructure the public discourse on issues such as pornography, wife battering, incest and child abuse, rape, prostitution, day care, and pensions” (Vickers et al. 1993, 223). 44

At the same time, the leadership debate on women’s issues was subjected to a

process of collective forgetting, as news media generated a consensus report that the

encounter was a “non-event.” Memory work, including that done by mass media,

involves strategies of forgetting as well as remembrance; that is, “the selective erasure or reconstruction of past events or experiences in order to maintain or reconstitute one’s identity in the present” (Krupar and Depoe 2007, 138; see also Misztal 2003; Zelizer

1992). Press coverage of the debate drew on delegitimizing discourses to distance feminist interests from those of the Canadian mainstream. In Chapter 2, I examine this marginalization as a product of the contest of neoliberal and feminist discourses that played out on the pages of the nation’s newspapers during the planning, staging and review of the event. In contrast, I articulate NAC’s feminist organizing logic that shaped the debate’s “eventfulness” in order to recuperate the significance of the encounter both as a remarkable symbolic achievement of the Canadian women’s movement and as a prototypic strategy for feminist organizing in the media mainstream.

NAC viewed the leadership debate as a new action in their strategic repertoire, despite its rough reception by news media in 1984. Four years later, NAC was not about to relinquish access to broadcast news media. The increasingly chilly political climate for women’s advocacy work in Canada only encouraged NAC to utilize all means of public communication to raise awareness of the deleterious impact of the Mulroney government’s neoliberal economism and to buoy the spirits of a fatiguing movement under siege by federal demobilizing strategies. A second leadership debate on women’s issues would send a message to member groups and the “uncommitted” that the women’s movement was active, politically legitimate and authoritative. 45

To accomplish this, NAC considered adjusting the feminist organizing logic used to shape the 1984 debate format in order to produce a “media worthy” event. The media

“eventfulness” of the proposed debate was of particular importance in 1988, given the journalistic imperative for fresh stories. “Political news,” as Gitlin (2003[1980]) remarks,

is treated as if it were crime news – what went wrong today, not what goes

wrong everyday. A demonstration is treated as a potential or actual

disruption of legitimate order, not as a statement about the world. These

assumptions automatically divert coverage away from critical treatment of

the institutional, systemic and everyday workings of property and the

State. (271)

The first debate was fascinating for its novelty; it was a disruption of the legitimate political ritual of election campaigning. Lacking this caché in 1988, NAC tried to compensate for the “old” message of Canadian women’s oppression by proposing a

“new,” more professional television production. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how NAC addressed the ideological conflict that this compromise brought about, as well as the ways in which broadcast network and neoliberal state forces coalesced to circumvent

NAC’s proposal (and diminish its political capital), by “submerging” women’s issues in a three hour general issues debate.

“Radical” Rhetoric: early 1990s onward

Demobilizing strategies used by the federal government into the 1990s, including de-funding and rejecting NAC as politically legitimate voice for Canadian women, coincided with a shift in NAC’s feminist orientation. My final chapter addresses how 46

NAC sought to challenge the rise of the New Right in Canada by turning toward a

politics of diversity, which were manifested in the media with discourses of what I term

“radical democratic feminist citizenship.” While the organization had always represented a diversity of women, in the early 1990s NAC actively politicized this difference by adopting anti-racist feminist positions on organizational and public policy. As a result of

NAC’s opposition to several federal initiatives on these grounds, the organization became

situated as an extra-parliamentary body on federal policy issues; this further entrenched

the adversarial dynamic between the women’s movement and the state. Although NAC

proposed a 1993 leadership debate on women’s issues, the idea was quietly discarded by

the political parties. As Rebick remarks, “A lobby group has to maintain ties with people

in power at a certain level…we broke that rule” (Gottlieb 1993, 381).

This departure from a politics of negotiation was reported by media as evidence

of NAC’s increasing “radicalization,” an inflammatory description that undoubtedly

influenced public receptivity to its message. For instance, NAC’s withdrawal from the

federal Panel on Violence Against Women in solidarity with women of colour (who were

not represented on the panel, yet were deeply impacted by the issue) was a remarkable,

surprising move that engendered both backlash and support from other women’s groups

and the Canadian public. Then-president Judy Rebick commented that “We’ve paid

heavily in public opinion for what we did. I’m still getting attacked about it,” whereas

NAC executive member Shelagh Day pointed out the silver lining, noting that the

decision “‘[earned NAC] a lot of respect from the public for being something more than a

white, middle class organization’” (Gottlieb 1993, 375-376). Excited by controversy,

news media emphasized the conflict that emerged in the wake of NAC’s shift to a 47

different strategic approach, as illustrated by one Globe and Mail report that posed an ultimatum: “‘The rational women’s group has suffered racial rifts and seems to have lost the ear of the government. Is it a time for diplomacy or demonstrations?’” (Langstaff

2001, 25-26).

Demonstrations, Defunding, and Decline

At the point where my dissertation leaves off, NAC had taken a major step to centralize anti-racist feminism within the women’s movement, as Tanzanian-born Sunera

Thobani was acclaimed NAC president. The “racial rifts” to which the Globe and Mail reporter referred concerned organizational dissent surrounding Thobani’s acclamation as

NAC president in 1993. As the first woman of colour to lead NAC, Thobani anticipated scrutiny of her qualifications, but she did not expect to have issues of race undergird questions about the legitimacy of her leadership. While her presidency did encounter resistance from some groups within NAC, it was external attacks that revealed the depth of racism entrenched in Canadian political life. In the House of Commons, Tory MP John

MacDougall attacked Thobani as an “illegal immigrant” and denounced her ability to speak for Canadian women. He then petitioned the government that NAC’s funding be revoked, since it was no longer representative of Canadian women’s interests. News media circulated and legitimized these charges (even asking Thobani directly how she could best represent Canadian women), reflecting what Thobani referred to as white journalists’ “discomfort” with the direction NAC had taken.

Although questions about the legitimacy of her presidency plagued her tenure,

Thobani was not dissuaded from advancing a radical vision of democratic politics for the 48

organization. Thobani articulated an anti-racist feminist analysis of the deleterious consequences of neoliberal economic policy, which were resulting in the massive restructure of the Canadian welfare state. She remarked that, “The erosion of these programs would threaten equality, if equality had ever been achieved at all” (Langstaff

2001, 25). Under her leadership, NAC partnered with the Canadian Labour Congress to organize a 1996 national march against poverty. Inspired by the highly successful La

Marche du Pain et des Roses staged a year prior by the FFQ, the “Bread and Roses, Jobs and Justice” march culminated with 500 000 women arriving at Parliament, calling for an end to the federal government’s cuts to social programs, which had protected women against the inequalities produced by free market policy.

With the 1996 election of Joan Grant Cummings, member groups indicated support for the continuation of NAC’s anti-racist feminist agenda established approximately four years prior. The Canadian feminist counter-public initially represented by NAC had been conceptually reconstituted as, to borrow Iris Marion

Young’s term, a heterogeneous public sphere. As McLaughlin (1993) describes, a heterogeneous public accommodates “both the unity necessary for mobilization and the differences and the specific experiences of individuals and groups” (611). The timing of

NAC’s turn toward the politics of diversity is often associated with the beginning of the decline of the women’s movement in Canada; the organization was perceived as having too diffuse a political agenda and a fractured membership, as NAC could not realize in actuality its discourse of “solidarity amongst diversity.” 49

However, I argue that the organization had little opportunity to fully explore the transformative potential of anti-racist feminist organizing, as NAC directed its remaining resources into staving off organizational asphyxiation in the face of tightening federal purse strings. In a 1999 funding application submitted to Secretary of State Hedy Fry,

NAC protested the latest round of funding cuts, which reduced the organization’s operating budget by $400 000 over four years:

We believe that contrary to the analysis of SWC, the new funding

guidelines effectively prelude the demise of the autonomous, democratic

and independent nature of equality-seeking women’s groups…[the

guidelines] diverge considerably from the intent of the recommendations

made by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women and the

commitments by the federal government in the Beijing Platform for

Action. Specifically, the commitment to state funding of independent

women’s NGOs. (in Langstaff 2001, 27)

The funding cuts proved devastating to NAC’s survival. In 2001, NAC’s youngest president, Denise Andrea Campbell, was compelled to resign, being unable to sustain organizational operations in any substantial manner. While not officially decommissioned, NAC’s activities were reduced to a barely audible hum.

NAC’s “transformer buzz” has begun to grow louder, as a group of 60 women representing some of the organization’s 700 member groups met in 2006 to discuss ways of revivifying NAC as a prominent fixture in the Canadian women’s movement.

According to reports in feminist media, the organization intends to become financially 50

independent from the state, so as not to revisit past vulnerabilities. In the meantime, NAC has already reclaimed its public voice by protesting the 2006 federal funding cuts and mandate changes to Status of Women Canada. As the forthcoming analysis demonstrates, in the Canadian women’s movement, as one feminist wavelength dials down, another amplifies. 51

‐ Chapter One -

‘We Are the Gender Gap’: Heretical Discourse, Feminist Strategy and the 1984 NAC Leaders’ Debate on Women’s Issues

Canadian feminist scholars single out the importance of the mid-1980s as a pivotal chapter in the nation’s feminist history, underscoring the impact of the first major transfer of political power in the nation’s capital in approximately twenty years. The majority of these narratives identify the shifting political landscape, beginning in 1984, as a peripeteia in Canadian feminist history. In their political analysis of NAC, Vickers,

Rankin and Appelle note that the election of the Progressive Conservatives in 1984 constituted “possibly one of the greatest challenges facing NAC” (1993, 117). In 1986,

Sharon D. Stone argued that Canadian feminism was ‘in crisis,’ as a result of “external forces which threaten[ed] to undermine feminist victories and limit the movement’s viability” (in Gill 1988, 44). Donna Gill argues that Canadian feminism was ‘unmade’ in the 1980s, as evidenced by her analysis of three major newspapers’ frivolous coverage of feminist issues between 1981 and 1985 (1988, 44). Barbara Pirsch-Steigerwald (2002) brackets her doctoral study of the restructuring discourses in English-language media reporting on NAC and REAL Women between 1984 and 1996, signaling that these years demarcate an era of ‘great change’ in Canadian political discourse. And in her comparative analysis of the British, American and Canadian contexts, Sylvia Bashevkin asserts that while women’s movement activists were not terribly troubled by Mulroney’s ascension to federal power in 1983-1984, feminist groups became alarmed by the subsequent “economic damage and social conflict” that emerged in his wake (1998, 38). 52

In the federal government, the shift to a neoliberal federal framework did indeed erode the known terms of engagement that fostered mainstream feminism’s lobbying of the Canadian state. Coming into full bloom in the late eighties and nineties, the neoliberalization of federal policy slowly retracted the strategic foundation of mainstream feminist activism in Canada. At this moment of political transformation, however, NAC made its most overt foray into mainstream Canadian political life through the staging of the 1984 federal leaders’ debate on women’s issues.

In the early and mid-1980s, NAC engaged powerful rhetoric describing the organization’s pan-Canadian representativeness in order to solidify their political legitimacy in the public sphere. As an umbrella organization with hundreds of members,

NAC already could make significant claims about the diversity of women they represented. However, in advance of the 1984 election, NAC pushed these claims further, asserting that they “represented women better than any other political institution”

(Vickers et al. 1992, 132 emphasis added). If they were perceived as the group that could best represent the most Canadian women, they would profit through the accumulation of symbolic capital and be better equipped to effect change in the political field. These claims situated NAC as the proxy agency of an organized, collective body of politicized

Canadian women. This chapter argues that NAC’s claims to represent a collective, national feminist consciousness constituted what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as a “heretical discourse,” that is, a discourse that “exploits the possibility of changing the social world by changing the representation of this world which contributes to its reality”

(1991[1982], 128). Heretical discourse must not only help effect a break in the dominant order, Bourdieu argues, but “it must also produce a new common sense and integrate 53

within it the previously tacit or repressed practices and experiences of an entire group”

(1991[1982], 129). To these ends, NAC’s claim to pan-Canadian representativeness was heretical in two senses. One on hand, it was used to exert political pressure to rectify institutionalized gender discrimination through policy change. The demands would be made by NAC, but in the name of the millions of women across Canada who were politically invested and ready to vote en masse. On the other hand, their heretical discourse exerted hegemonic force on other national women’s organizations whose own claims to representativeness were delegitimized and subsumed by NAC’s newly

(self)identified role as “central coordinator and facilitator” of the English Canadian women’s movement (Vickers et al. 1993, 132). Within the feminist community, NAC’s claims to representativeness were not always appreciated or welcome, as they tended to deny the heterogeneity of the women’s movement as a whole.

With the symbolic strength of Canadian womanhood behind them, NAC brought their heretical discourse to life using three main strategies. First, the organization advanced a gender gap discourse in order to mobilize the nation’s women under the politically formidable banner of the ‘women’s vote.’ Second, NAC constructed a women’s issues agenda for the election, which acted as a common ‘language of women’s issues’ with which politicians had to become fluent during the campaign. Last, NAC developed ritualized political practices to foster the utopian vision of a widespread, pan-

Canadian feminist/NAC identity. They set forth these practices in their Federal Election

Kit and other promotional literature advocating the women’s issues agenda, which were widely distributed and publicized in news media. Combined, these strategies articulated a new discursive category of collective, politicized Canadian womanhood. They also 54

constitute what Bourdieu refers to as the “work of representation” that is necessary for

oppositional groups to engage in political struggle. The labour is constant by necessity; it takes diligent effort for challenging groups to “impose their view of the world or the view of their own position in the world – their social identity” (1985, 727). As a whole, NAC’s gender gap discourse, women’s issues agenda, and ritualized political practices formed a discursive structure that helped produce women as a viable, visible political category during the 1984 federal election campaign.

Bourdieu posits that there are particularly favourable moments wherein oppositional visions of social reality advanced through critical discourse hold the potential of effecting real change. Specifically, he outlines two preconditions necessary to bring about a “heretical break” with the established, dominant order. One is the presence of a critical discourse, such as the Canadian feminist critique of gendered structures of dominance. The second is a moment of “objective crisis” wherein a dissonance emerges between individuals’ subjective expectations of the objective structures of the social world. Nick Crossley (2003) describes this crisis as happening when “habitus falls out of alignment with the fields in which they operate, creating a situation in which ‘belief in the game’ […] is temporarily suspended and doxic assumptions are raised to the level of discourse” (44). At that moment, the ideologically-informed knowledge shaping social actors’ certainty about the social world, the naturalness of its structures of dominance, and their place within it is temporarily suspended, creating an opportunity in which individuals question naturalized (or doxic) assumptions about the world. Heretical discourse (a.k.a. heterodoxy) entreats people to critically reflect upon those assumptions and entertain the possibility of a differently organized social reality. 55

In 1984, Canada stood at the precipice of a profound ideological shift in its

political and socio-economic identity – was this the moment of crisis on which NAC

could capitalize? The national leadership was in a state of flux, as the Liberals were

facing the end of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s final fourth term, which was winding

down with lackluster approval ratings. Despite Trudeau’s accomplishments during this

term, including the patriation of the Constitution in 1982, opinion polls indicated that the

Liberal party required new leadership to reinvigorate sagging support. Fresh to the

political scene after almost ten years as a Bay Street attorney, John Turner was elected

party leader and became Prime Minister on June 30, 1984 – a mere ten days before

calling an election. Strategizing the Conservative return to power, Progressive

Conservative leader Brian Mulroney hoped to capitalize on the Liberal’s weakened

support base and untested leadership, as well as public fatigue with Liberal party policy.

Mulroney advocated neoliberal economic tenets of privatization, deregulation and individual initiative; a political platform that aligned the PCs with neoconservative counterparts Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States

(Bashevkin 1998, 37). In pursuit of a majority government, Mulroney also courted the francophone vote by emphasizing his Quebec roots and fluent bilingualism. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the New Democratic Party was committed to

Canadian social democracy, espousing ideals consistent with the New Left and stressing the importance of strong social support networks, usually in the form of universal social programs, a strong union movement, a dedication to job creation and the elimination of regional disparities. Although Ed Broadbent’s NDP was not going to win the election, they could secure enough seats to function as either a spoiler party during the vote or as a 56

strategic partner in post-election political maneuvering.28 During the 1984 federal

election, the high-profile of women’s issues made the NDP a bit of a wild card party;

growing numbers of women voters had been supporting the party since 1980, to the degree that the NDP achieved equal levels of support from men and women by 1984

(Bashevkin 1998, 46). What impact would this demographic shift have on electoral results, if any? This confluence of factors established 1984 as a liminal moment in the

nation’s political history, marked with the potential for a shift into the unknown.

The Canadian feminist movement was also in the midst of an identity crisis,

although not necessarily of its own making. Even though the movement had not lost

momentum or depleted its resources by 1984, women’s groups were dealing with the

unintended consequences of entrenching the Charter of Rights and Freedoms into the

Constitution. A general sentiment circulated in public discourse that feminism had won

its battle and that in 1982, “women had reached ‘the beginning of the end of the equality

fight’” (Gill 1988, 43-44). This conclusion was based on the tempting tendency to define

oppositional movements by single issues or political battles (which effectively delimit

contentious political activity to specific, temporary moments – or waves – within

mainstream society). It was, therefore, in NAC’s best interest to advance a new political

project to capture the public imagination and further their perceived political legitimacy

at this moment of “practical épochè” in the national psyche. For NAC, this was a critical

opportunity to produce a heretical discourse that advanced their vision of social reality, as

it could be, and of women as an identifiable group within it.

28 As they did in 1979, when the NDP and Liberal parties combined votes to end the PC’s brief return to power with a motion of no confidence, thus forcing an election. 57

NAC’s National Voice

Through mainstream publicity and organizational backchannels, NAC worked to cultivate a reputation as the premier national women’s group in Canada through the early and mid-1980s. Vickers et al. (1993) characterize this era as the time of NAC’s institutionalization, when the organization employed legitimizing strategies to advance its identity as “the group most representative of women – that is, of being a parliament of women” (135). These years were marked by organizational affluence, increasing membership (from women involved in labour and unions; immigrant and women of colour; disability groups; and lesbians), increasing regional representation as well as efforts to bring the FFQ and other Quebec-based women’s groups back into NAC’s fold

(Vickers et al. 1993, 132-154). The rise of anti-feminist groups at this time also had an unexpected beneficial effect on NAC as well, as stay-at-home mothers’ groups affiliated with the organization in order to differentiate themselves from neoconservative groups like REAL Women of Canada. NAC’s membership expansion and their conscious efforts to map a strong organizational presence across the country lent credibility to their representative claims. Indeed, NAC used their membership numbers as a constant reminder of their impressive standing on the national scene in promotional literature and press releases. A typical statement read, “The National Action Committee on the Status of Women, Canada’s largest feminist lobby organization, is holding its 12th annual general meeting and conference […] Delegates from NAC’s 290 member groups as well as close to 150 observers are expected to attend.”29

29 Press release, March 8, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 780) 58

NAC’s representative claims, which reached upwards of 2 million women during

this era, evoked the specter of a grand collectivity of politicized Canadian women united

under NAC’s nationalized banner of feminist action. When NAC publicized their plans for a federal leaders’ debate on women’s issues, they solidified their branding as the public face of Canadian feminism in media discourse. In turn, NAC unavoidably became implicated in the mobilization of other national level women’s organizations. Bourdieu

(1985) describes this as a process of transubstantiation, wherein the “spokesperson becomes the group that he or she expresses” (740). This person (or, in this case, umbrella organization) is “endowed with full power to speak and act in the name of the group […] he [sic] raises those whom he [sic] represents from the state of separate individuals, enabling them to act and speak, through him [sic], as one man [sic]” (740).30 Under

increased media attention, NAC’s assertion of a unified voice of the Anglo-Canadian

women’s movement activated broader dilemmas in the movement over the universality

and particularity of identity and representation. In the first example to follow, NAC’s

interaction with the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women [CACSW]

demonstrated how this heretical discourse was used to generate inter-organizational

solidarity (furthering NAC’s symbolic capital) so as to increase political pressure and secure the leaders’ debate. In the second example, the National Council of Women of

Canada [NCWC] refused the hegemonic force exerted by NAC’s heretical discourse of a

30 At the level of membership, certain organizations found it difficult to dispossess themselves of their political power in favour of NAC’s operating guidelines. For instance, in the early 1980s, while NAC benefited from the expansive membership numbers and networks of resources of large national groups, those organizations quickly became disaffected by their lack of authority in a system that endowed smaller, new grassroots collectives entering NAC the same voting power at the annual general meetings: one group, one vote. Vickers et al. note that although these groups maintained their membership, so as not to detract from NAC’s legitimacy, “they were not very actively engaged” (1993, 97).

unified women’s movement, reminding NAC of the intrinsic heterogeneity of Canadian

feminism.

The first example, illustrating CACSW’s unconditional support of NAC’s

leadership on the debate project, reveals the persistence of liberal feminist tenets of

sisterhood and solidarity in the name of movement viability and collective action within

the Anglo-Canadian feminist tradition. NAC’s spearheading of the proposed leaders’

debate on women’s issues inevitably elevated the organization above other national

groups, as the ‘go to’ source for the Canadian feminist perspective. One such organization, the CACSW, offered unwavering support of NAC’s leadership, despite having proposed its own “special program project” of a televised debate to the CBC a month prior.31 Lucie Pépin, CACSW president, corresponded regularly with Hošek about

the progressing debate plans. In a warm letter from July 11, 1984, she expressed her

organization’s support for NAC, stating, “What a stroke of genius! We, at the Council,

must have been hit by the same lightning bolt as on June 15, our Communications

Director and I made a presentation to the President of the CBC […] proposing a similar

televised debate.”32 Pépin suggested the two organizations pool their resources “since we

want to achieve the same goals, and because we have used a different yet complementary

approach.”33 With combined effort, the two groups could “bring this idea into being and

31 The CACSW was established in 1973 on recommendation from the RCSW report. The Council was an independent women’s group that reported to Parliament through the Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, although it retained the right to publish materials without ministerial approval. It was comprised of government-appointed members whose purpose was to advise the government and educate the Canadian public about women’s issues.

32 Lucie Pépin to Chaviva Hošek, July 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818 emphasis original)

33 Ibid. 60

to ensure maximum exposure to Canadian women.”34 Pépin forwarded a copy of the

CACSW “Special Program Project” proposal, which was remarkably similar to NAC’s

vision of the leaders’ debate:

A few weeks before the federal election and within the context of CBC

special programs, the CACSW proposes the production of a televised

program on the theme of ‘Canadian women face the federal election.’ This

program would unite the three party leaders and women panelists in each

of the provinces and territories.35

The well-developed proposal included a detailed nine point justification for the program,

format possibilities, the names of potential moderators, and discussion topics. Such

unguarded resource sharing situated the CACSW as a silent partner in the early planning

of NAC’s debate negotiations. The CACSW project had clearly been usurped by NAC’s

proposal to the CBC (CBC president Bill Armstrong wrote, “…we were in the process of considering the Special Program Project when the [NAC] proposal was made public”36),

yet feminist solidarity over a common objective superseded inter-organizational

tension.37 In fact, Pépin went public with the CACSW’s endorsement, issuing a press release pressuring the television networks to carry the event: “‘The CACSW urges

34 Lucie Pépin to Chaviva Hošek, July 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

35 CACSW Special Program Proposal, no date (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

36 Bill Armstrong to Chaviva Hošek, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

37 Another letter from Pépin states, “Chaviva, I wish to reiterate the Council’s full support in this project. NAC has invested time and effort in organizing the event. Should the Council be of any possible help, please do not hesitate to contact me. […] Please let me know as soon as possible if the Council can be of any help to NAC in negotiating air-time for this important event” (Lucie Pépin to Chaviva Hošek, July 13, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)).

Canada’s broadcasters, in keeping with their role of informing the public, to take up this challenge.’”38 In her final correspondence to Hošek as CACSW president, Pépin explains

her organization’s steady encouragement of NAC’s sponsorship of the leaders’ debate in

strategic (though poignant) terms:

Chaviva, if I had to write a will to women’s groups, and were forced to

limit that will to one word, that word would be ‘Solidarity’. In their fight

to achieve equality, Canadian women and women’s groups cannot afford

to compete with one another. History has shown again and again that the

motto ‘Divide and conquer’ works. We have to be smarter than the

Conquerors – be they press or government! But you know that, Chaviva,

and hopefully the road will be easier from now on.39, 40

Pépin argues for the necessity of speaking with a united voice in order to seriously

challenge the established social order, which from her perspective is instituted through

state and media power relations. This echoes Bourdieu’s analysis, wherein “individuals

cannot constitute themselves as a group with a voice, capable of making itself heard in

the political field, unless they dispossess themselves in favour of a spokesperson in whom

they vest the right to speak on their behalf” (Thomson 1991, 26 emphasis original).

38 CACSW Communique, July 13, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

39 Lucie Pépin to Chaviva Hošek, July 19, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

40 For Pépin personally, NAC’s leadership opened the door for her to resign her CACSW presidency and run for office as a Liberal party candidate in the election. In a letter to Hošek, Pépin remarked she had “decided to practice what I have been preaching all these years [and] invest my energies in fighting the same battles from other angles” (Lucie Pépin to Chaviva Hošek, July 19, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)).

However, these are precisely the terms on which the National Council of Women

of Canada protested NAC’s leadership in the debate. In principle, the NCWC’s stance

against NAC’s hegemonic feminism questioned the “logic of homogeneity” that erased

difference in the name of equality (Laclau and Mouffe 2007). The NCWC’s refusal to

dispossess itself to NAC was a reminder to NAC of the shaky grounds on which liberal

feminism stood in terms of its uncritical celebration of sisterhood and solidarity.

The NCWC was (and is) an established fixture in the Canadian women’s movement, having successfully negotiated the vicissitudes of successive governments

and ideological shifts informing Canadian public life since 1893. In a terse letter, NCWC

president Margaret MacGee expresses her disappointment that “no consideration had

been given to inviting the National Council of Women of Canada, an organization with a

91 year record of speaking out and attaining change for women and the family, to

participate in the August 15th ‘Women’s Issues Debate’ in Toronto.”41 MacGee argued that the NCWC’s “participation”42 in the debate would only contribute to the event’s

legitimacy, stressing the “excellent” working relationship of her organization with the

federal government: “The government looks to our organization for logical, workable and

attainable solutions to problems. They recognize that when our Council speaks, it speaks

with the combined voice of our membership on policy which has been adopted by that

membership at the grassroots level.”43 Historically, the NCWC was a women-only

volunteer organization that offered women a venue in which information about public

41 Margaret MacGee to Chaviva Hošek, July 31, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

42 MacGee does not specify what the NCWC’s participation would entail.

43 Margaret MacGee to Chaviva Hošek, July 31, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818) 63

affairs could be found and debate could be held. Their goals, which sought to advance

“the broad interests of women as equal citizens with men in the community,” were pursued through close consultation with all levels of government (Griffiths 1993, 340).

By the 1980s, however, the Council’s mandate was not strategically aligned with more

‘radical’ platforms for women’s advocacy (such as affirmative action) being espoused by other women’s groups, including NAC. Author of The Splendid Vision: Centennial

History of the National Council of Women of Canada, N.E.S. Griffiths states that,

While there was no doubt that women who worked through Council were

accomplishing a great deal for their communities and for themselves, it

was also obvious that Council no longer held the position in Canadian

public life that it had occupied even a few years earlier. The temper of the

times encouraged the growth of NAC, which drew to it those

organizations most specifically interested in the rights of women, and

hindered the growth of volunteer organizations, whose major interest was

some form of service to the community. (1993, 337-338)

Although this assessment fails to acknowledge that NAC was, until the late 1980s, a volunteer organization and would most definitely have viewed itself as “serving the community,” Griffiths makes a valuable point regarding the inverse fortunes of the two organizations. By 1984, NAC’s two million members cast a dramatic shadow over the

NCWC’s 750 000. Despite springing from the head of a royal commission and being partially funded by the state, NAC’s strategic vision was confrontational enough to inspire and excite its membership and demonstrate that the state was not immune from close criticism. 64

For MacGee, though, the central problematic revolved around developing

inclusive political strategies that did not elide the particularity of different women’s

groups. MacGee referred to “the division which still exists between women’s

organizations.”44 She also refused to submit sample debate questions to NAC, concerned

that the NCWC’s viewpoint would be lost:

should NCWC submit questions to NAC for consideration and possible

inclusion by panelists unfamiliar with NCWC policy? The [NCWC] is a

federation of organizations, a women’s network, and we voice our

concerns personally through members. Our questions or concerns might

not be supported by NAC yet they are Canadian women’s issues.45

The NCWC is wary of the invocation of women as a political category, united under

NAC’s banner. Their point underscores Chantal Mouffe’s observation that members of a political community are bound together, but also different: “this togetherness cannot be just limited to what we have in common” (Laclau and Mouffe 2007). Womanhood,

MacGee seemed to suggest, was not enough to bind NAC and NCWC together. But how could the debate have been structured so as to preserve the particularities of each organizations’ political projects? How, as Laclau and Mouffe argue, can we articulate a productive relationship between the universal and the particular? In 1984, NAC had no

solution to this dilemma, aside from entreating the NCWC to send along their sample

debate questions. MacGee argued that NAC’s snub was symptomatic of a larger feminist

issue, in which “Women will never gain true equality with men until we as women can

44 Margaret MacGee to Chaviva Hošek, July 31, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

45 Ibid. 65

accept each other as equals.”46 Casting NAC’s refusal to invite the NCWC’s active

participation in the leaders’ debate as a failure of their feminism is dramatic, yet presages

the deepening challenges to be faced by the nationalized women’s movement in (a very

regionally and culturally diverse) Canada.

NAC’s Women’s Issues Agenda

The first strategy of NAC’s heretical discourse was the creation and

popularization of a common language of women’s issues through the promotion of the

women’s issues agenda. NAC identified priority women’s issues that politicians would be

required to discuss during the 1984 federal election campaign. The organization published this agenda in their Federal Election Kit, newsletters, pamphlets and it was

circulated through mainstream channels of news reports and candidates’ campaign

events. On the surface, these documents merely identified particular issues thought to hold particular significance for Canadian women; the Kit listed affirmative action, child care, divorce and maintenance, equal pay for work of equal value, job creation, native women, part-time work, pensions, property rights, reproductive rights and choice, survival, unemployment, video display terminals (i.e., industrial microtechnologies), and violence against women.47 The questions provided by NAC on each of these issues,

however, gave these subjects their decidedly feminist orientation. For instance,

‘affirmative action’ meant a call for mandatory affirmative action for employers who contracted with the federal government; ‘survival’ was shorthand for bringing pressure

46 Margaret MacGee to Chaviva Hošek, July 31, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

47 NAC Federal Election Kit, July 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.6)

on the government to declare Canada a nuclear-free zone and to ban cruise missile

testing; and ‘pension’ called for the expansion of the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan(s) to

better provide for the nation’s citizens, while making additional provisions for the elderly

poor and long-term homemakers.48 The feminist critique articulated in NAC’s women’s

issues agenda extended beyond the expected ‘soft’ politics of social policy usually

attributed to women’s groups by addressing subjects like nuclear proliferation,

technological development and foreign affairs.49

Superficially, the women’s issue agenda set forth by NAC can be read as evidence of their increasingly hegemonic presence, as they name and disseminate priority women’s

issues. There is formidable power in “naming the unnameable,” to “make public” that which had been kept private or gone unrecognized in the mainstream (Bourdieu 1985,

729). However, it must be remembered that the women’s issues agenda was not

determined by a single source. NAC’s priority election issues emerged from a dialogic process, between their hundreds of member groups, the public (through correspondence), and in response to government policy. When it came time to decide what questions to ask the political leaders during the debate, for instance, NAC requested member groups send submissions. As an extra-political organization, however, it was inevitable that unaffiliated citizens would seize the opportunity to have their issues publicly aired, their

48 NAC Federal Election Kit, July 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.6)

49 Vickers et al. (1993) note that NAC’s willingness to speak out on the impact of economic and foreign affairs policies on Canadian women was a “sin” in the eyes of the men involved in public policy precisely because NAC “had strayed outside the bounds of the more limited status-of-women framework expected of it” (274). 67

questions posed directly to the national leadership.50 Their correspondence demonstrates

that Canadian women (and a few men) were concerned about a variety of public issues,

which did not always conform to the strictly defined social policy arena considered the

purview of women’s issues:

As a mother and now a grandmother, I am most vitally concerned about the

two basic issues of our survival – peace among the nations, and the worsening

pollution of our earth, air, water and wild life which is now the inheritance of

our children and grandchildren.51

I have been advised by my lawyer to wait until late Fall to apply to

Family Court since, if we apply too soon, the amount [of my support]

may be reduced still further. That means, that by the time a decision is

finally paid, if my ex-husband continues to ignore his obligations, that

I shall have been without income for one year! In the meantime, my

ex-husband evidently has remarried and claims that he needs any

income he may make to support himself and his present wife who left

her job and is presently unemployed. […] The situation is ridiculous!

What are the rights of a marriage worth?52

50 My analysis here focuses on the letters sent by individual citizens who were not necessarily affiliated with a women’s movement organization. Correspondence from NAC’s member groups (including the Canadian Health Coalition, the Canadian Association of University Teachers, MediaWatch, and the Public Service Alliance of Canada) tended to make suggestions as to how to frame and phrase the questions during the debate.

51 M.B. to NAC, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818 emphasis original)

52 T.E. to NAC, August 5, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

Other women looked at NAC’s call for questions as an opportunity to further their

grassroots activism. An army wife lobbies to change a 1968 divorce law, while another

unemployed woman documents her struggle to return to the work force in a two-page letter:

I have been lobbying on behalf of myself and Canadian Armed Forces wives

who, with the passing of the Divorce Act 1968 lost their pension rights if they

were divorced […] I would ask that the three party leaders be questioned on

this issue during the August 16th [sic] debate.53

In view of the upcoming debate on ‘women’s issues’, I wondered

whether someone on your committee might be interested in the story

of one woman’s attempt to take up the federal government’s generous

offer to help women entering or returning to the work force. It is a

personal saga, but since I started job-hunting in March I have made it

my business to talk to other women in the same position, and since I

have had a lot of experience in problem-solving and handling staff, I

have come to my own conclusions about the efficiency or otherwise of

the federal government’s efforts to help women find suitable

employment. I am sending this to you because I feel that there are a lot

of women just as well qualified and just as desperate as me, but less

53 E.P. to NAC, July 30, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818) 69

articulate and bloody-minded, who are sinking without trace because

they are receiving the same kind of treatment as me.54, 55

Although the organization would come under fire for straying from the women’s agenda during the debate, these letters demonstrate that not only were Canadian women concerned with a broad spectrum of issues (not always directly related to their reproductive capacity), but they also gave NAC their proxy: the organization was representative.

Documents articulating NAC’s women’s issues agenda constituted an unofficial glossary of the new language of women’s issues. The Kit, especially, became required reading for the nation’s political elite during the election campaign. We can borrow from

Bourdieu’s concept of “linguistic exchange” to underscore the significance of this

54 B.T. to NAC, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

55 While the NCWC refused NAC’s invitation to submit debate questions, many member groups and individual citizens responded to the call quite readily. NAC became an unofficial archive of personal testimony, wherein storytelling became a political outlet for women from across the nation. The letters were collected in NAC’s debate planning file, and functioned as a quiet reminder to organizers that “events demand concerted action” (Polletta 2006, 19). Narrative has frequently been used in social movements to spur the formation of collective identity or actions, as well as to trace the trajectories of movements themselves, through the retrospective analysis of their documents. In this instance, the letters were brought into the midst of a current strategy conducted by an established group, were sent by non-movement or ‘unofficial’ (unaffiliated) movement actors, and were intended to aid NAC, but also carried the hope of being heard by the nation. Despite these qualities, the narrative aspects of the letters were ‘massaged out’ during the drafting of the questions. Each set of debate questions underwent numerous revisions and rounds of source checking, producing a ‘professional-political’ feminist discourse that would conform to expectations of a typical federal leaders’ debate. A question to Mulroney read, “you have called for the building up of manufacturing in Canada’s war industries as one answer to high unemployment. Should not Canada instead reduce its already large role in the arms race?”55 Again, this discursive style was viewed as a strategic move on NAC’s part; by quoting the leaders’ own statements, for instance, NAC could force them to “pay attention to our issues, and to keep their election promises in front of them throughout their candidacy.”55 The compelling use of storytelling in the political field (as opposed to the field of political protest) could not be guaranteed and constituted a big risk for NAC, who was trying to maintain legitimacy within an arena that valued more authoritative forms of discourse. As Francesca Polletta argues, “the ability to use such forms effectively is stratified not only because people have different levels of competence but also because doubts about the form’s credibility and value are more likely to be triggered by some users and on some occasions” (2006, 26). A heretical discourse can also be careful.

strategy. He draws a parallel between linguistic and economic exchanges, arguing that

communication is situated within relations of power that can generate symbolic capital for those endowed with enough linguistic competence. In this view, utterances are more than simple signs to be deciphered, “they are also signs of wealth, intended to be

evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed and obeyed”

(1991[1982], 66 emphasis original). Moreover, the value of an utterance “depends on the relation of power that is concretely established between the speakers’ linguistic competences, understood both as their capacity for production and as their capacity for appropriation and appreciation” (67). In other words, the greater fluency one has with the dominant language, the more value their speech carries. As a result, the more linguistic capital a social actor possesses, the more that speaker can profit from an exchange.

With NAC as their proxy, Canadian women were attributed the symbolic wealth and authority associated with masterful knowledge of a dominant discourse because the women’s issues agenda centralized gender as a point of analysis in all policy arenas.

While women had intimate knowledge of the “legitimate language,” the political elite were bereft. The party leaders were forced to not only learn the rhetoric of women’s issues, but become fluent with NAC’s feminist discourse. The alternative was to run the risk of an unsuccessful political encounter, to be bested by a group of women (with all the sexist humiliation that defeat would muster). Bourdieu observes that when dominant and dominated groups meet, a choice must be made: “The first question that arises is, what language will they use? Will the dominant embrace the language of the dominated as a token of his [sic] concern for equality?” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 143). At first glance, it may seem the leaders did embrace the language of women’s issues out of a 71

concern for equality. Closer examination reveals that NAC’s debate strategy meant the

leaders had no option – not for any altruistic cause, but for their own political survival.

“We are the Gender Gap”56

The notion of the gender gap initially gained currency in North America during

the 1980s, drawing attention to both the women’s movement and the gendered differences in various forms of political participation (Conover 1988; Wirls 1986).

Describing the apparent discrepancy between women and men’s voting preferences as

“the newest cleavage in American politics,” Daniel Wirls argues that the 1980 U.S.

election first heralded women’s liberal voting tendencies as a reaction against the rising

tide of neoconservatism (1986, 316). The term, however, came to signify more than just

women and men’s divergent voting practices, and NAC’s strategic engagement with

gender gap discourse evidences these alternative meanings. For instance, Conover (1988) distinguishes between electoral and partisan gender gaps, acknowledging that one’s party preference does not always accord with voting booth decisions. Another gender gap occurs in terms of women’s participation in the election machinery, whether as organizers, party members or candidates. What is critical in NAC’s promulgation of a

Canadian gender gap, ultimately, is that it brought women’s movement discourses to the doorstep of federal politicians by forcing their recognition of women as a consequential voting bloc.

Starting in early 1984, NAC drew on the American political context to foreshadow the potentially deleterious consequences of neoconservative leadership for

56 NAC Federal Election Kit, July 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.6) 72

women and other marginalized (or ‘special interest’) groups in Canada. NAC circulated

American polling results indicative of a partisan gender gap to their member groups via the NAC Memo and the Status of Women News. Framed as a boon to the women’s

movement, outgoing president Doris Anderson notes that, “[…] the best news is that

there is more and more evidence every day that there is a growing gender gap between

male and female voters. This is particularly true in the U.S. where Ronald Reagan’s

repressive measures on social services and his anti-ERA and anti-abortion stances have lost him a lot of female support.”57 By this time, NAC had also received international

correspondence from individuals and grassroots groups who protested the rise of the New

Right in their home countries. The Committee to Defeat Ronald Reagan, for instance,

sent NAC a “Save Our Society” pamphlet that outlined a contest strategy wherein people

were to “find a creative, effective way to tell others about the dangers of the Reagan

Administration.”58 As Sylvia Bashevkin (1998) remarks, “If some British or American

organizations had been naïve about conservative intentions early on, this was not the case

in Canada after 1984” (46).

NAC tracked the development of a discernable gender gap in Canada by

monitoring Gallup polls: the January 1984 NAC Memo contained a Women & Political

Consciousness brief that noted, “A gender gap has appeared in Canadian federal politics over the last year. The 14 point difference, which has opened up between men and women in reference to the Conservative party, is even larger than the 10 point gap which

57 Status of Women News, February 1984 (University of Ottawa, Canadian Women’s Movement Archives [CWMA], NAC fonds, 863.2)

58 Committee to Defeat Ronald Reagan Pamphlet, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818) 73

has President Reagan so worried in the U.S.”59 In light of their avowed non-partisan stance, though, NAC could not develop an election strategy directed against a specific

political party who espoused similarly right-wing worldviews to Reagan or Margaret

Thatcher in Britain. The organization could, however, make clear the anticipated effects

of each parties’ policies on women, demand that the political leadership account for these

effects, and threaten to take the ‘female vote’ to another party. In the words of Doris

Anderson, “Once the political parties realize the women’s vote can make or break them,

we will really make progress.”60

This rhetoric demonstrates the slippery use NAC makes of the term ‘gender gap,’

sliding its meaning from a measure of gendered partisan support evidenced in public

opinion polling to the idea of Canadian women constituting a formidable voting bloc.

This construct elides the heterogeneity of women’s political allegiances by suggesting

that some essential ‘female perspective’ informs women’s political values, priorities and

attitudes; indeed, as a representative parliament of women, this discursive construct

seemingly ran counter to NAC’s feminist politics of plurality. The organization, however,

could profit from this new conceptualization of the gender gap in terms of the political

capital it would generate for the women’s movement. In January 1984, the ‘women’s

vote’ was pitched as the ideal corollary to NAC’s 1984 Annual General Meeting theme,

“Women Mobilizing for Power.” The mission of the election year’s AGM was “to

concentrate on the power of the women’s vote: how that translates into action, what

strategies are needed, what new insights can be developed and where do we go from

59 NAC Memo, January 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 665.10)

60 Status of Women News, February 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 863.2) 74

here? […] But, throughout all our deliberations, we will be coming back to the main theme.”61

More effectively than a consciousness-raising campaign based solely on women’s issues, the concept of the women’s vote tapped into historically-situated discourses of women’s (dis)enfranchisement and the struggle for suffrage. NAC countered the real threat to women’s and other groups’ networks of institutionalized support posed by the encroaching twin specter of social conservatism and neoliberal economic policy by gesturing to a past era when women had minimal citizenship rights. This gesture, however, also pointed toward a story of collective struggle and victory for suffrage; a battle which was overlaid with even greater symbolic meaning, as franchise itself could be understood as a collective action wherein “individual will [becomes] expressed as a part of the more powerful body of group will” (Rothenbuhler 1998, 100). Moreover, all

Canadian women could be subsumed by the notion of the women’s vote, and be brought into conversation with NAC’s feminist discourse. All women became politicized subjects under this reinterpretation of the gender gap, no matter their partisan preferences or personal beliefs. The difference lay between promoting the “women’s vote” as opposed to the “feminist vote.” In retrospect, the discursive shift that redefined the gender gap as the women’s vote was inevitable, even necessary, for NAC’s purposes, given the symbolic power of the slogan for mobilizing a collective identity of politicized Canadian women.

61 NAC Memo, January 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 665.10) 75

Cultivating the ‘Women’s Vote’ Discourse

Several memorable documents in the NAC archive detail carefully orchestrated

performative strategies advanced by the organization’s leadership in order to create a

concrete sense of the women’s vote – to bring it into being, as it were. The Federal

Election Kit, in particular, encouraged women to become politically active by taking part

in ritualized forms of political participation at the local level. Following NAC’s

prescribed measures, women across the nation could create moments of political theatre,

wherein they ‘performed’ the gender gap with vocality, visibility and rational persistence

with letter-writing campaigns, all-candidates meetings and lobbying. Verta Taylor and

Nancy Whittier argue that ritualized forms of collective action evoke an emotional response, or the “glue of solidarity,” that generates movement momentum (in Collins

1995, 176). Although the forms of political ritual encouraged by NAC in these pre- election strategies did not necessarily evoke the affective outpouring of a march or healing circle, their success lay in pinning down politicians’ platforms, eliciting sound bites for news media, and engendering the symbolic capital necessary to eventually stage a leaders’ debate on women’s issues.

The “Kit” is the special federal election edition of Status of Women News produced and released by the NAC Election Strategy committee in July, 1984. The executive had originally planned to print and distribute “15, 000 copies of the kit to a large and varied mailing list of organizations and individuals in Canada,”62 however an

overwhelming demand ultimately saw the publication of more than 30 000 copies in

62 President’s report, June 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 780)

French and English.63 Charging two dollars an issue, NAC hoped the Kit was priced

effectively enough so that most women would have access to it and to use it “to effect”

by organizing all-candidates’ meetings, calling politicians, and planning letter writing

campaigns.64 This was the tool that “your group and individual women can use to make our [i.e., women’s] concerns front and centre during the election.”65 Creating an election- issues package was not a unique strategy to NAC: the National Council of Women of

Canada had produced an “Election ’84 Issues Paper,” the Canadian Health Coalition

[CHC] compiled and distributed a report on the political parties’ responses to a questionnaire, and the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women developed its

Shocking Pink Paper.66 NAC, however, identified its Kit as “more detailed and elaborate

63 NAC press release, July 23, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

64 Penelope Glasser, “Interview with Chaviva Hošek,” August 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.5)

65 NAC Memo, April 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 780)

66 In May 1984, the CACSW, a NAC member group, sent copies of its Shocking Pink Paper to the umbrella organization for broad distribution. A small, foldable document no bigger than a credit card, the Shocking Pink Paper is “[p]rinted in a special small format” that gives the reader at-a-glance information on ten election issues, outlining their relevance to women specifically. Playing with the stereotypical ‘pink’ colour, the design of the pamphlet was carefully crafted to meet the perceived needs of female voters. Small enough to “fit in pocket, wallet or handbag,” the hot pink colour not only mitigates the risk of it becoming lost in a jumble of papers or other everyday objects found in a briefcase or bag, but also symbolically invests the issues addressed in its folds with a sense of urgency and importance. The Pink Paper is most “shocking” in the facts it sets forth on a diverse range of issues, including violence against women (“…as adults and as children we are raped and sexually abused”), poverty (e.g. “Over 2/3 of the single people in Canada who are poor are women”), microtechnologies (…by 1990, nearly a million Canadian women may be unemployed due to technological change”), job ghettoes (“Over 62% or all employed women, compared to 29% of employed men, hold clerical, sales and service jobs”) and parental benefits (“Women in the labour force are penalized for becoming mothers”). A staple of CACSW and NAC pre-election consciousness-raising efforts, the paper was intended “to prepare Canadian women to better influence the political process” (Press release, May 7, 1984, (CWMA, NAC fonds, 803)). Beyond this, in a CACSW press release, Lucie Pépin, President of the CACSW, describes the Shocking Pink Paper as a strategic tool to empower and embolden women to effect concrete political change: “‘As women make up such a small portion of our elected representatives – 15 women out of 282 federal Members of Parliament, or 5.3% – we believe the time has come for women to stand up and ask major questions that will give them a chance to change how Canadian political parties now handle women’s concerns’” (CACSW press release, May 7, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 803)). What this last statement reveals is that the goal of the feminism advocated by NAC and its member group at this time was to ameliorate the way women were treated 77

than anything comparable done by any other women’s organization.”67 The Kit was an

integral component of NAC’s public consciousness-raising campaign: it identified the

women’s issues election agenda and encouraged women to “get out and vote.” The

section Know the Issues; Ask the Questions, for instance, identifies numerous “Facts” and

“Questions for Candidates” on no less than fifteen “NAC Priority Demands,” including affirmative action, child care, constitutional protection for native women, equal pay for work of equal value, property rights, reproductive rights and choice, and violence against women.68 The message implicit to the Kit, of course, was that women would be swayed to vote for candidates whose platforms were most in accordance with NAC’s feminist analysis of electoral issues. Inasmuch as this package was designed to impart information, it also constituted a form of ritual communication.69 Documents of these

types were routinely produced by social groups in advance of major elections, during

times of informal public debate of social issues, and even as promotional material for groups seeking a larger membership and higher profile. More than this, though, these packages were a “representation of shared beliefs” meant to help produce a feminist

social reality (Carey 2009[1989], 15). Like Carey’s analogy of a child working with a

simple map of her neighbourhood to get to school, NAC’s Federal Election Kit “stands as

within the political process, whether as individual voters, as a constituency, or as candidates themselves. Resisting the temptation to endorse and campaign for a particular party (like their American counterpart, the National Organization for Women [NOW]), NAC focused their pre-election efforts on building channels of communication through which information on women’s policy issues could flow. In the case of the Shocking Pink Paper, this meant that NAC and the CACSW quite literally gave women the words with which they could elicit that information from their candidates.

67 President’s Report, June 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 780)

68 NAC Federal Election Kit, July 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.6)

69 James Carey argues that “A ritual view does not exclude the processes of information transmission or attitude change. It merely contends that one cannot understand these processes aright except insofar as they are cast within an essentially ritualistic view of communication and social order” (2009[1989], 17). 78

a representation of an environment capable of clarifying a problematic situation” (21).

The NAC Kit provided a feminist mapping of the political field, a “simple guide for getting involved.”70 Legislative landmarks, like the Indian Act or the federal job creation

program which targeted only male-dominated industries, were used to help identify

women’s priority issues, like the rights of First Nation’s women and job creation

programs aimed at the part-time employment sector. The Kit reconfigured the

“undifferentiated space” of federal politics as a relief map of Canadian women’s

experience under institutionalized discrimination, androcentric structures of dominance

and marginalizing policy.

Also like Carey’s map, the Kit was capable of guiding behavior by detailing

strategies for local and collective action. The Kit invited Canadian women to take part in

ritualized strategies that could be performed in their local settings, instigating a wave of

small-scale collective actions across the nation.71 The publication tells readers to get

involved in the political process at the local level, through a three-step process of Know

the Candidates, Pressure the Candidate, and Support Your Candidate. First, the politicized woman would ‘get to know’ the candidates by asking specific questions of them, organizing an all-candidates’ meeting, and by developing and distributing questionnaires to candidates. The Kit instructs readers about the “quick and easy tools” they can use to articulate the women’s issues agenda, like mailing postcards and letters

outlining women’s movement objectives and priorities. The Kit develops an increasingly

70 NAC Federal Election Kit, July 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.6)

71 Eric Rothenbuhler (1998) draws an ontological distinction between ritual practices within the political and the political as ritual. My analysis of the Kit’s contents conforms to the former characterization, as an example of how ritual can function within political practice. 79

prescriptive tone, advising activists that “Postcard- and letter-writing parties can be

energizing and fun. They usually spark creative ideas. Organize a gathering and write away. And talk about other actions, such as phone-ins and all-candidates’ meetings.”72 To

ensure a successful meeting, it instructs women to: “Participate in or organize a short-

term women’s election coalition or a small election task force,” “Go as a group” that can

“act as a team and apply pressure by taking turns,” “Scatter yourselves throughout the

room […] Sit close to the floor-mikes […] Be the firs tone [sic] ‘up’ [… and] Rely on

group members to press on where you had to leave off.”73

Similarly detailed advice is documented in NAC’s sheet of instructions given to

members before the annual lobby of the federal parties. Delegates were told that, when

meeting with politicians,

Each committee should arrange to have two persons speak to a specific

issue […] The first person initiates the question, the second can act as a

back-up for more information and/or to ask supplementary questions. […]

People should be seated in rows in order of the questions being asked. The

two people asking a question should proceed to the microphone as their

turn comes up. […] Don’t be intimidated by politicians – we have a right

to straight-forward answers. Be firm, knowledgeable and persistent where

necessary.74

72 NAC Federal Election Kit, July 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.6)

73 Ibid.

74 Lobby 84 Instructions, no date (CWMA, NAC fonds, 665.8) 80

The morning of the lobby, members were told “to meet as a group in the foyer of Chateau

Laurier. Please be on time. We will head off to Parliament together as a group.”75

These specific guidelines created rituals of feminist political participation which reshaped typical campaign stops and all-candidates’ meetings into feminist events.

Women co-opted standard political events, like public forums and town hall meetings, by dominating question and answer periods with the women’s issues agenda. They could also jam mainstream channels of political communication by coordinating phone-ins to radio and television shows discussing election issues or featuring a candidate, organizing letter-writing and postcard campaigns to candidates’ offices, and creating and distributing women’s issues questionnaires at forums, in the neighbourhood, and to media. Recast as feminist strategies, these actions contained subversive potential that challenged the system they were supposed to be perpetuating.

These prescribed strategies were also noticed and re-circulated in press reports.

Carol Volkart, for example, commented on the real-world manifestations of NAC’s grassroots campaign, paying particular attention to its ritual aspect:

Sometimes during the election campaign, a woman sitting at the back of a

crowded political meeting will rise to note that women’s earnings average

only about 60 per cent of men’s. ‘What will your party do to eliminate the

wage gap between employed women and men?’ she’ll ask the vote-hungry

politicians. If her question is sidestepped or fudged, another woman seated

else-where in the hall will ask it again. […] If a politician gives an

75 Lobby 84 Instructions, no date (CWMA, NAC fonds, 665.8) 81

unsatisfactory answer to a question, another woman will reframe it or ask

about another aspect of the issue until the candidate has been pinned down

[…] The leaders of the three major political parties are well aware of the

mounting pressure from women.76

It is women’s strategic performance of feminist eventfulness – through a demonstrable

show of numbers and persistent questioning – that endows NAC’s gender gap discourse

of the women’s vote with the symbolic capital required to further their agenda in the

mainstream.

The gender gap discourse was circulated in news media discourse, where the

notion of the women’s vote became contested terrain. NAC’s original intent was to

render women’s issues visible in the political realm by constituting women as an

influential voting constituency. As such, both positively and negatively toned coverage

tended to assess the gender gap in terms of its perceived impact on the election results.

Logically enough, then, it was incorporated into traditional news definitions of politics as

“electoral politics, the debates, personalities […]the competition of the parties” (Hackett

1991, 79).

A spectrum of claims regarding the presence of a Canadian gender gap emerges in

election campaign coverage, which became “touted as the election of the gender gap

when, for once and for all, politicians would have to sit up and listen to women’s deepest

76 Carol Volkart, “Women ready to pink slip candidates on their issues,” The Sun, August 7, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

concerns.”77 Alan Fotheringham was most direct in his denunciation, “There’s no gender

gap.”78 Other columnists did not deny the gender gap, “The gender gap is alive and well

in Canadian politics,”79 but wonder where female voters should turn in the absence of any

viable platforms from the major political parties.80 The Medicine Hat News argued that

the gender gap was already in decline in Canada and would therefore not swing the election in any particular direction; this logic is buttressed by the claim that Canadian

politicians were not predisposed to making “gender a major statement” in the way the

Democratic party did in the United States with their vice-presidential nomination of

Geraldine Ferraro.81 Feminist Jill Vickers attempted to explain such media circulated

refutations of the projected effect of the gender gap on the election, suggesting that “‘The

parties don’t want a gender gap. I think they’re afraid of a variable that they can neither

understand nor control.’”82

In Bourdieuian terms, media discourse that either refutes the existence of a gender

gap or denounces its impact the election, illustrates that androcentric orthodoxy

constructed a barrier to NAC’s heretical discourse of the gender gap and thereby denied

77 Canadian Press, “Women Happy,” Charlottetown Guardian, September 6, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779).

78 Allan Fotheringham, “There’s no gender gap,” Winnipeg Sun, August 20, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

79 Jon Ferry, “Women judges favor Ed Broadbent,” North Bay Nugget, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

80 Leonard Shifrin, “Bridging the gender gap no easy task,” London Free Press, August 20, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

81 Jon Ferry, “Politics blocking female issues,” Medicine Hat News, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

82 “Debate not expected to shed new light on women’s issues,” Montreal Gazette, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779). 83

them the symbolic capital generated by political legitimacy. I posit that the cultural hegemony of the established gender order, undergirded by rising neoconservatism, was

hard at work in these discourses, which suggested that it didn’t actually matter whether or

not a gender gap existed – that, in the end, the women’s vote was irrelevant to the

political life of the nation. NAC proved otherwise.

More supportive coverage of the gender gap strengthened the legitimacy of

NAC’s discourse through efforts to demystify the ‘air of confusion’ that seemed to

surround the term itself. In contrast to dismissive headlines (such as Fotheringham’s),

titles like “Women want answers,” “Politics blocking female issues,” “Forum on

women’s issues attracts 50 on Friday,” and “Women ready to pink slip candidates on the

issues” extended authority to women’s voice in the political realm, by situating them as

viable contenders in the fight (with numbers, a voice, and a vote as weapons in their

arsenal).

What also frames these reports, however, is a tone of earnest confusion. The

gender gap was a phantom menace: an influential factor in the election, but utterly mystifying. After citing a Gallup poll indicating women’s migration to the Liberal party,

Val Sears can only characterize the gender gap as an “undefinable feminine prejudice against Mulroney.”83 Lynda Hurst remarked that

We’ve all been hearing a great deal lately about the ‘gender gap’ and the

likelihood that in this coming election, women are going to vote in a

markedly different way from men […] The ‘women’s vote,’ both here and

83 Val Sears, “Women’s issues debate tonight may tip vote,” Toronto Star, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630 emphasis added).

in the U.S., is starting to be perceived as a major election factor, one that

no candidate can afford to ignore, despite that no one is quite sure what

exactly it is.84

By differentiating between a “generalized ‘women’s vote’” and the “feminist vote,” Hurst

attempted to clearly define the gender gap as a political, rather than gendered position.85

What could be measured in tangible terms, however, were women’s record levels of participation in politics in 1984. News media coverage further developed the electoral- political framing of gender gap discourse in stories that emphasized women’s role(s) in the political field, typically exemplified by the record number of female politicians running in the 1984 election and working behind-the-scenes. That year, an unprecedented

131 women ran for public office in Canada, representing 15% of the total number of candidates fielded from all the parties. In the press coverage, the political parties were generally characterized as staunch advocates of women’s candidacies (albeit in

“winnable” ridings). Numerous local interest stories featured biographies of female candidates, and the national leaders, particularly John Turner and Brian Mulroney, are frequently described as being surrounded by claques of female advisors. For instance, while Turner spent a day “conferring with his special advisers on women’s issues: Lucie

Pepin, former president of [CACSW]; Nancy Morrison, a former British Columbia judge; and Judy Erola, minister responsible for the status of women,” Mulroney was “holed up with advisers, including his wife, Mila, and Jocelyn Côté-O’Hara, Mulroney’s specialist

84 Lynda Hurst, “Women want answers,” Toronto Star, July 29, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779).

85 She continues, explaining that by ‘feminist,’ “I don’t only mean the card-carrying variety, but also that growing number of women whose consciousness has been raised to the point where issues like equal pay, day care and reproductive choice are as important as selecting a candidate as the broader issues of unemployment and inflation. (Not more important, mind you, as important)” (emphasis original). 85

on women’s issues.”86,87 Headlines like “Record number of women running for office”

and “Tea parties a thing of the past” celebrated the arrival of a political climate of equal

opportunity.

The implied question these stories ask is “what gender gap?” Feel-good stories

about women’s record-high participation in electoral politics, with their emphasis on

tangible numbers and biographical profiles of female candidates, countered NAC’s

discourse of the gender gap, which seemed abstract and confusing in comparison. Ottawa

correspondent Nicole Baer challenged such post-feminist portrayals of Canada’s

‘enlightened’ political realm by suggesting that the record number of female candidates was a token gesture on the part of the political parties and not representative of any fundamental change in women’s status.88 When asked for her take on the state of the

system, however, Chaviva Hošek argued simply that compromise was one form of

progress, saying “she doesn’t care if parties wooed women to run purely out of political

motives – with one eye on recent polls of female voting patterns and the trendy notion of

86 Val Sears, “Women’s issues debate tonight may tip vote,” Toronto Star, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

87 When the campaign was criticized for not fostering a female presence within the Conservative party, a party official touted Mila Mulroney as an exemplar of femininity for the nation. In the absence of known women’s issues experts like Liberals Judy Erola and Lucie Pépin, Mila Mulroney was described as “‘a beacon […] She represents both options – a women [sic] studying to be professional engineer who gave it up when she decided to get married and have a family’” (Val Sears, “Women’s issues debate tonight may tip vote,” Toronto Star, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)).

88 Nicole Baer, “131 women will be seeking election,” Peace River Block News, August 8, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

the gender gap. The point is that they are encouraging women to run and the only really

important thing is that women net a fair chance in winnable ridings.”89

NAC and the News

News coverage of feminism and feminist figures has typically relied on specific

strategies, such as trivialization and personalization, to marginalize women’s advocacy

(Rhode 1995; Goddu 1999; Beck 1998). When Hošek took the reins of NAC from Doris

Anderson, media reports amplified her personal attributes and drowned out her

comprehensive knowledge of public issues. Jenn Goddu (1999) argues that Hošek was

“presented as a standard-bearer of femininity” which provided media with a “culturally acceptable” way to frame a woman in power. Aspects of her typically feminine features, including her physical attractiveness and home life (i.e., a straight woman living with her male partner), were emphasized to normalize her feminist politics. Goddu’s study identifies a quintessential piece of Hošek’s coverage, entitled “A Feminist of Steel and

Silk,” to illustrate that news reports “blatantly reassured the reader, reminding them this is a nice, unthreatening woman” (1999). In 1985, feminist historian Penney Kome also noted the impact of Hošek’s demeanor in these terms, stating, “Youthful, animated, and soft-spoken, Hošek’s appearance counters all the stereotypes of feminists as shrill,

mannish women. ‘She’s gold-plated,’ was one senior Tory’s description’” (142).

Deborah Rhode (1995) argues that such personalization strategies focus attention

on feminists’ appearances, putting these women in a double bind. Women who challenge cultural standards of femininity are cast as sour spinsters who cannot attract men,

89 Nicole Baer, “131 women will be seeking election,” Peace River Block News, August 8, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630). 87

whereas those who attend to their looks are deemed complicit with patriarchal oppression

and hypocritical (696). Coverage of Hošek, in mainstream and smaller circulation publications, emphasized her ‘soft’ demeanor and surprisingly feminine appearance, thus minimizing the threat posed by her feminist politics. Even her alma mater conformed to this pattern, in a biographical feature published in the University of Toronto’s The

Graduate:

“The strongest advocate for women’s rights in Canada right now is a slim, soft-spoken, studious English professor at Victoria College who in her spare time serves as the president of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women”

“Hošek is the attractive, late-thirtyish woman you saw calmly telling a national television audience on Aug. 15 that it was watching history being made”

“‘She’s also a very nice person – not shrill, but very effective.’”

“‘Her style is long past fist-shaking […] She manages not to be too abrasive. She doesn’t expect to be able to change attitudes overnight. She doesn’t get angry when she encounters stupidity or anti-feminism. She has a sense of reality about what the women’s movement can do now and what it must do to achieve its goal.’”

“How did a nice, quiet professor of English get into such a powerful position in national politics?”90

Hošek’s description as slim, quiet, calm, nice, attractive and as having appropriately low

expectations for what Canadian feminism can accomplish “not only diminishes [her]

credibility, but it also marginalizes [her] substantial message” (Rhode 1995, 697). Where

Rhode argues that the “media has long delighted in catching activists in such seeming

contradictions,” in Hošek’s case, it proved a political boon, as she used her unexpected

90 Judith Knelman, “Chaviva Hosek,” The Graduate, November/December 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 854.11)

charm to endear politicians and journalists alike (696).91 Nevertheless, the new

president’s accepted, feminine characterization was constructed against an inverse

feminist figure who is stereotypically abrasive, angry, impatient, and unattractive.

Clearly, Hošek was the exception to the rule, as it was the feminist stereotype which was promulgated in trivializing media discourse like this editorial cartoon, published the day following the leadership debate on women’s issues:

Figure 1: Moose Jaw Times-Herald, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)

Here, feminism “appears as the last refuge of homely harpies, whose views about men

stem from a presumed inability to attract them” (Rhode 1995, 696). In addition to making light of the feminist challenge to women’s sexual objectification, it also identified NAC

as politically irrelevant, organizationally ineffectual, and as hopelessly out of date (with

their 1950s costuming marking them as belonging to a bygone era).

91 Vickers et al. (1993) note that Hosek became a “media star” president, much to the chagrin of some members: “many were simply very uncomfortable with a media-star president, despite recognizing the advantages of the situation” (192). 89

Analyzed in terms of cultural hegemony, the movement-media relationship between NAC and the press seems fated to suppress women’s oppositional voices. In his study of the Students for a Democratic Society [SDS], for instance, Todd Gitlin argues that while movement groups can press for change, by exploiting an identifiable point of weakness or ‘self-contradiction’ in hegemonic ideology, their opposition ultimately undergoes “ideological domestication […] in taming and isolating ideological threats to the system” (2003[1980], 13). He posits that news media are ill-equipped to circulate highly critical perspectives because they are embedded in dominant systems of institutional, ideological and economic power relations. While the press will cover oppositional movements, then, news elites are unlikely to publish content that seriously transgresses the hegemonic interests of the ruling politico-economic regime. It follows that numerous studies of media coverage of feminist movements have concluded that there is a tendency to use marginalizing and even demonizing frames on movements, their issues and their leadership, presenting oversimplified, inaccurate and dramatized reporting (particularly in response to the pressures of newsroom conventions).92 In her study of Australian media, feminist researcher Leonie Huddy describes a tense, co- dependent relationship between news media and social movement groups, but ultimately concludes that “Social movements need the media more than media need them” (1997,

184). This scholarship gives primacy to the constitutive power of news media to define feminism.

I argue, however, that these perspectives tend to neglect the effect of changing power relations on media and movement discourses, particularly in terms of the ways

92 For example, see Faludi 1991; Douglas 1994; Rhode 1995; Huddy 1997; Barker-Plummer 2000. 90

they can shift, intersect and acquire dominance (Thornham 2007, 146). This recalls a

Foucauldian concept of power, which informs relationships by degree, not totalities.

Power is always in a state of flux; it is responsive and relational because it enacts

resistance (1990[1978], 95). Power relations, then, are a “strategic field” constituted by a

plurality of resistances that range in type and character (96). Foucault rejected the notion

that power is a purely repressive force. The strategic field of power can also be

productive in that “forms of subjectivity are produced in negotiation with existing power

relations and in the very process of those power relations being instantiated” (Mills 2004,

34). In this view, discourse is the conjunction of power and knowledge, not a site that

simply reflects a structure of domination: “There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it. Discourses are tactical

elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations” (Foucault 1990[1978], 101-

102).

These concepts facilitate the reading of Canadian feminism and media as

mutually-constitutive discourses that operated within a flexible power relation: a form of

strategic interaction. Barker-Plummer’s dialogic model of the movement-media

relationship in the United States approximates this reading, by identifying media and

movement workers as informed, active agents who engage each other’s discourse in an

open-ended process of responsive dialogue (1995). This does not deny that entrenched power relations structure the production of news. Gitlin (2003[1980]) argues that media outlets incorporate challenging voices in political news content so as to maximize profit, audiences and their own perceived legitimacy; the professional ideology of news objectivity demands networks and publishers include oppositional discourse in order to 91

demonstrate their neutrality (258). In this model, movement voices are brought into official news discourse “precisely to tame, to contain, the opposition that it dares not ignore” (259). As we have seen, news strategies – like trivialization, polarization and demonization – do try to harness the subversive political potential of feminist dissent.

I argue, however, that even as Canadian news media incorporated NAC’s feminist campaign, NAC produced news media as a strategic partner in their heretical discourse.

Numerous examples demonstrate how media become productively situated within NAC’s feminist discourse. In April 1984, Chaviva Hošek announced that NAC had “been working actively with the media on the election and women’s issues for quite a while now. Don’t be surprised to see lots more coverage on this topic in the weeks and months to come.”93 In an August 1984 interview, the first item Hošek mentioned about NAC’s election strategy is the central role of media: “We spend a lot of time talking to the media about the gender gap, and about the women’s vote, and the increasing importance to that vote of the way politicians address women’s issues.”94 In a specially produced Election

Strategy Memo, Hošek included photocopies of two news articles positively framing

NAC’s women’s issues election agenda. And the organization often used the CBC’s observation that NAC was “the most powerful lobby in the country” in both internal documents and press releases as evidence of their political pedigree.95

93 NAC Memo, April 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 780)

94 Penelope Glasser, “Interview with Chaviva Hošek,” August 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.5)

95 1984 AGM Lobby Flyer, no date (CWMA, NAC fonds, 665.8)

NAC’s Federal Election Kit was a key tool in building this media-movement

relationship. In the Kit, NAC reminds readers that “Media attention to the factor of the

‘Women’s Vote’ has made the public and the candidates increasingly aware of the

necessity to be well informed on women’s issues.”96 Once the Kit was produced for

public consumption, journalists published its contents as a means of describing the

national women’s movement. Furthermore, the questions provided in the Kit on women’s

issues were used by reporters when interviewing political candidates or constructing

comparative reports on their public policies.97 Moreover, the Toronto Star endorsed the

Kit, referring to it as “a boon for women who want to get involved in the election

process, but frankly don’t know how to go about it.”98 Promotion like this had a ripple

effect, causing news readers to write to NAC to express support or seek out their own

copies of the Kit.99

By 1984, NAC’s familiarity with the practices of news production made them a

formidable partner. The organization had long-established news strategies that

safeguarded NAC from public relation disasters. In this sense, their media practice was

both protectionist and opportunistic. For instance, NAC had developed templates and a

96 NAC Federal Election Kit, July 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 862.6)

97 Roseann Danese, “Getting the answers to women’s issues,” Windsor Star, August 21, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

98 Lynda Hurst, “Women want answers,” Toronto Star, July 29, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779).

99 For example, Olive M. Thiesenhausen wrote to NAC, stating, “It was with interest that I read of Election Kts [sic] in the Star. and happy in the knowledge that women are more aware of the power of their vote” (Thiesenhausen to Hošek, July 25, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)). In her letter, Barbara Strachan noted, “In a column published by the Toronto Star, a journalist wrote that your organization published an election kit to help women in lobbying our electorates. Would you send me a copy before August 15th, if possible? The kit could enable me to increase my awareness of the issues involved and evaluate the impact of policies stated by the different party labels” (Strachan to NAC, July 29, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 818)).

careful vetting process for press releases, so that all correspondence was approved by the executive. The organization also maintained extensive, if chaotic, lists of national and regional television, radio and print media outlets for English and French-speaking

Canada, in which the names and affiliation of sympathetic journalists were noted. The organization kept tabs on their coverage by subscribing to a news clippings service; this created an unofficial archive of press reports relating to NAC, Status of Women Canada, and major women’s issues campaigns. A Media Committee tracked sexist and pornographic representations circulating in mass culture, while maintaining close ties with MediaWatch.100 Member groups and unaffiliated citizens constituted an informal media communications network, as they also sent NAC news clippings that were deemed relevant. And for the previous two years, NAC president Doris Anderson had demonstrated how to use media practice as a productive tool within the organization.101

100 An activist organization founded in 1984 with a mission to “challenge abusive stereotypes and other biased images commonly found in the media.”

101 Anderson was a powerful force in Canadian media, based on her experiences as a journalist (writing for the Toronto Star for fifteen years) and as editor of Chatelaine (during her tenure Anderson had Chatelaine circulate a survey to its readership that garnered over 11 000 responses, despite taking three hours to complete. The results were then submitted to the Royal Commission on the Status of Women as evidence that Canadian “women were not only aware but supportive of the key liberal feminist goals centered primarily on equality of opportunity and equal participation in society” (Korinek 2000, 98)). Following a principled resignation from her post as president of CACSW, Anderson quickly rose through the ranks of NAC to become president from 1982 to early 1984, becoming “the closest thing to a charismatic leader NAC has ever had” (Vickers et al. 1993, 190). Her influence helped guide NAC to a fresh strategic tack, not only in terms of its organizational structure and aims, but also in the way media practice could be thought of as a productive tool within the organization – even as a tool of diplomacy. As former NAC executive member Laurell Ritchie recalls, there was

[…] one annual meeting that was being torn asunder by a debate that arose when a number of NAC groups wanted to conduct an action which would raise the profile of violence against women. The action involved a particularly offensive Hustler magazine issue in the cigar shop of the Chateau Laurier where we were meeting. Other groups opposed the action. Doris herself had worked on issues of pornography but she also knew the importance of the other economic and social issues to be debated. She quietly invited some key players on both sides to a wine and cheese reception that she ‘just happened’ to be having in her suite. And she asked for a copy of the magazine to be brought to her. 94

With all of this accumulated knowledge, it is little wonder that frustration

emerged when trivializing media coverage of an unsanctioned anti-pornography action

during the 1984 AGM (in the hotel lobby, no less) linked NAC to delegitimizing images

of rowdy protesters. In a follow-up report, NAC member Wendy Lawrence denounced

the unsanctioned action precisely because it was out of the control of NAC’s media practice: it was too sensational and generated preventable and predictably distorted

representations of the organization:

Finally, some comments on the action at the AGM on pornography. I have

heard much adverse comment about this here in Ottawa since the AGM, in

addition to complaints by delegates to the AGM itself. Press reports that I

saw did not distinguish between an action taken at the AGM and a NAC-

sponsored action. Judging by the way colleagues at work responded to

media coverage, I would have to say that this did no credit to NAC, and

was perceived as ineffective in terms of actual results. Furthermore,

overwhelmingly, this was the only aspect of the AGM which received

press coverage […] Considering the fact that news media are event- and

conflict-oriented, it could have been predicted that this type of action

would get attention in a way that workshops dealing with technical details

on pensions and labour legislation do not. The regrettable impression is

left that the women’s movement has a limited range of concerns and ways

Once the invitees were all gathered, she took the magazine, turned it this way and that for a better view and declared it was definitely not to her taste in S&M. But then she asked the delegates exactly how they proposed to make sure this did not become the media story about the annual meeting. It was simple […] but it was just what was needed to start a rational discussion. (Ritchie 2007, 119-120) 95

of taking action. In this case, TV images of women shouting amongst

themselves did not help our cause, and likely contributed to trivializing the

issue. Certainly, the comments made to me during the following week

were derogatory and flippant. Perhaps some of our issues should be seen

as easier to sensationalize, and therefore as requiring more careful

strategies in how we take them before the public.102

To this end, NAC engaged news media as a strategic partner in their “work of

representation” during the 1984 federal election campaign. NAC produced a unified,

collective feminist subject through three primary strategies: gender gap discourse of the

women’s vote, the women’s issues agenda, and ritualized feminist political practices.

Taken together, these combined to foster a vision of widespread, pan-Canadian feminist

identity operating under NAC’s banner. While this heretical discourse generated political

pressure that helped secure the leaders’ debate on women’s issues, it also engendered

opposition from other women’s organizations who resisted NAC’s hegemonic feminism

– even if it was enacted in the name of women’s political empowerment.

For the moment, though, NAC brushed off this challenge and continued to

capitalize on their strengthening identity as the flagship organization of Canadian

feminism. The symbolic capital granted NAC on this basis gave the organization

increased control over the media framing of the women’s issues agenda and their strategic actions. Nowhere was this better exemplified than in the NAC-sponsored leaders’ debate on women’s issues: a type of media event that enjoined broadcast networks to literally partner with the feminist organization in the name of women’s

102 Letter to Chaviva Hošek, April 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 665.14 emphasis original) 96

advocacy and required journalists to suspend, at least temporarily, their critical gaze. The next chapter continues to examine the media-movement relationship, as the eventfulness of Canadian feminism becomes contested terrain in NAC’s staging and news media coverage of the leaders’ debate on women’s issues.

- Chapter Two –

Part I: The Gaffe

“Patting women’s asses is not a laughing matter. It’s one of the oldest paternalistic gestures in our culture. And the women who protest are always accused of lacking a sense of humour. In 1984 we expect more from a Prime Minister who claims to support women’s rights to dignity and equality and who needs women’s votes.”103

The two days prior to the third and final debate between the three leaders of the federal political parties, Prime Minister John Turner held a press conference issuing an apology for publicly patting the backsides of two female Liberal party members. Quebec

Liberal worker Lise St. Martin-Tremblay and Iona Campagnolo, Liberal party president, were the surprised recipients of Turner’s self-described “gestures of friendship.”104

During the first week of the election campaign, Campagnolo was caught off-guard when, during a campaign appearance together in Edmonton, Alberta, Turner patted her on the bottom. The quick-thinking Campagnolo patted him right back, held him at arm’s length and turned to the press corps filming the exchange, remarking, “That’s known as ‘mano a womano.’” Amidst some uncomfortable laughter on both sides, the news clip then shows

Turner holding Campagnolo’s arms, leaning forward and whispering in her ear, before stepping away. Subsequent reporting informed Canadians that Turner “said something to the party president followed by the words ‘a perfect ass’” (“Turner defends…”). In the midst of the televised exchange, viewers could hear Campagnolo retort,

103 MediaWatch to John Turner (and NAC), July 21, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 803)

104 “Prime Minister Apologizes for Bum-Patting Incidents,”Amherst Daily News, August 14, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

Campagnolo: You too! Turner [pointing toward Campagnolo and laughing]: Okay… that’s fair. Campagnolo [pointing back]: That’s fair... That’s equal! Turner: That’s equal. (“A very tactile politician,” CBC Archives)

By shifting the terms of the sexist exchange to gender equality – both verbally and through her reciprocal grab of Turner – Campagnolo publicly scolded the inherent sexism of the Prime Minister’s behavior. The injection of equality discourse into the episode was an early indicator that not only was women’s advocacy a bit of an Achilles’ heel for John

Turner, but also that women’s rights discourse informed the federal election campaign to an unprecedented extent.

Media coverage of the gaffe tapped into women’s movement discourse, drawing attention to established boundaries drawn around overt displays of sexism. A CBC report

on the incident shows reporters insisting Turner address the sexist implications of the

‘pat,’ beyond his infamous declaration that “I’m a very tactile politician.” Surrounded by

a crush of microphones, Turner defends against a barrage of questions about his sexism,

with an aw-shucks half-smile and forced laughter:

Turner: It’s a very human experience… people are reaching out to me. And I’m, I’m hugging the children, talking to them… exchanging greetings in a very, very human way. And uh, I uh, that’s the way I’ve always been. Reporter 1: But do you say hello to the men the same way? That seems to be the point some are… Turner: I say hello to the men the same way [laughing] Reporter 2: You pat ’em on the butt, Mr. Turner? [Turner looks upward as though thinking about it] Reporter 1 [in background]: Women find it offensive Reporter 2: Women find that action offensive and it does date you, John. Turner: I don’t think they find it offensive at all. 99

Reporter [VO]: So Turner says he’s going to keep on doing what he’s been doing: kissing, hugging and patting… right up until election day. Turner [yelling instructions to an aide, as they moves their way through crowded street]: Lots of hugs and lots of pats on the bottom, Bill! (“A very tactile politician,” CBC Archives)

Turner’s disingenuous effort to downplay the ‘friendly gesture’ awkwardly casts him as the ‘everyman’s’ politician who is, literally, in touch with the people.

As the Liberal campaign circled around Turner, ‘locker room’ rationalizations and

‘equal opportunity’ justifications for the gaffe emerged. In a campaign where the idea of a leaders’ debate on women’s issues was gaining increasing momentum, it became critical that Turner be defended and supported by the party’s numerous female candidates. Sandra Douglas-Tubb, Edmonton MP, explained that Turner’s greeting was simply a vestige of his days as a football player: “’I've known John Turner for 18 years and I know that this is just part of being an old football player, that ‘team spirit in the huddle’ thing.’”105 Judy Erola, Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, noted how

Turner’s physical approach spoke to his universally affectionate personality: “He’s a very exuberant, hale fellow, well-met kind of character, and it isn’t that he has this attitude toward women. He is a great hugger, a kisser – a very tactile politician, as he said” (“The

Long Run…”). Nonetheless, Erola “set out some ground rules” for Turner, by sending an edict to the Liberal party issuing the “dos and don’ts” of physical interaction, wherein friendly kissing and hugging were acceptable, but not “patting below the shoulder line”

(“The Long Run…”). In a CBC radio interview, Erola explains that, “it’s a tactile

105 “Bums safe…,” Edmonton Sun, August 14, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630).

100

approach he uses with everybody, males and females, but with females I’ve reminded him that uh… ne touche pas! S’il vous plaît” (“The Long Run…”).

Despite repeated calls for some public act of contrition, Turner refused to apologize for the gaffe, until two days prior to the debate on women’s issues.106 The bum-patting and Turner’s insistent defense of the overtly sexist action had become major distractions not only from other aspects of Turner’s campaign, but also from the federal policy issues women’s movement organizations were trying to publicize during the election season. After a two-hour meeting with a group of female Liberal party members on August 13, the Prime Minister emerged for a press conference during which he issued a tepid mea culpa for the bum-patting.107 Turner was flanked by a veritable ‘harem’ of 25

female Liberals, symbolically ‘standing by their man.’108 He stated that although the media had overplayed two isolated “greetings” between “two friends, political equals,” he acknowledged that it would not happen again – going against his earlier hearty call to continue “slapping people all over the place” until election day (“Turner defends…”).

106 Feminist groups were noticing the Prime Minister’s lack of public contrition for his actions, with one local group, the Kitchener-Waterloo Status of Women, creating a so-called “bum (w)rap.” The device, to be worn about the hips, was decorated with a ‘Turner shield’ and was intended to protect women’s derrieres from unwanted grabs.

107 Meaghan Dean of the Alberta Status of Women Action Committee remarked that the Liberal women with whom Turner met “‘probably pinned his ears to the wall’” in order to elicit the apology (“Prime Minister Apologizes for Bum-Patting Incidents,”Amherst Daily News, August 14, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)).

108 Turner hoped to create an impression of female support coalescing around a respectful, if flawed, leader. Not everyone bought into the message: Ottawa correspondent Douglas Fisher critiqued the press conference as a “claque-like assemblage […] with clapping for the hero and scorn for the questioners […]. Rather than mirroring strong support, the claque underlines that there’s somebody who needs propping up” (Douglas Fisher, “Turner awkwardness,” Thunder Bay Times-News, August 17, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)).

101

In what for Turner must have seemed like an unfortunate twist, his poor performance in two earlier leadership debates made the women’s issues debate his last hope for political redemption.109 In 1990, political scientist Lawrence LeDuc observed that political debates were slowly becoming institutionalized through the “heightened expectations of both press and public that debates are a normal part of a political campaign rather than an extraordinary event” (1990, 124). In the mid-1980s, though, politicians could make a strategic decision about publicly debating their opponents.110 For instance, LeDuc (1990) argues that “Incumbent presidents or prime ministers who enjoy a substantial advantage over their lesser known opponents will generally refuse to enter into a debate. However, ‘incumbents’ who have not held the office very long or who are not ‘real’ incumbents in the sense of having been elected are less hesitant” (122). In

1984, Turner fit into the latter category and so participated in the first two debates quite readily. The Liberal leader, however, did not perform well in those encounters, fumbling a weak ‘I had no option’ defense of recent patronage appointments, which Mulroney capitalized on to great rhetorical effect. His well-publicized hesitancy to participate in

NAC’s debate recalls this compromising moment, as well as the fallout from the bum- patting incident: would it be strategically advantageous to sit this one out or take part, and hope that this debate would be the ‘turning point’ in the Liberal campaign? Turner eventually agreed to participate, taking the opportunity to secure a momentum shift in the

109 For instance, the Edmonton Journal noted, “With Turner’s lackluster performance in last month’s debate still fresh in their minds, aides to the prime minister see Wednesday’s forum as an opportunity for him to re-establish the image of competence that was frittered away by repeated blunders during the early weeks of the campaign. ‘It’s quite important that he show he’s competent,’ one Liberal insider said” (“PM’s hopes tied to women’s issues,” Edmonton Journal, August 13, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)).

110 LeDuc also notes the influence of poor polling numbers on a candidate’s decision, as well as the role played by “personal characteristics and individual attitudes” (124). 102

campaign as well as to silence media reports that he was reticent to face down feminist

‘accusers’ (despite NAC’s assurances that the live encounter was “‘not meant to be a

trap’”).111 His campaign spokespeople denied that he feared the feminist lobby, arguing

instead that the delay resulted from the Prime Minister’s concern over the type of event

that would be staged. In one report, his campaign manager noted that, “Turner’s acceptance of the women’s proposal had nothing to do with the adverse publicity Turner

received over the weekend for greeting some Liberal women with a pat on the derriere.

‘He wanted to make sure it was going to be a true debate on women’s issues and would

be run by the women.’”112

As evidenced by news media interrogation of Turner’s ‘friendly gesture,’ the nation’s socio-political climate welcomed feminist critique of the gaffe and made the

Prime Minister’s ‘grab’ a symbol of the women’s movement’s political relevance. If

women’s advocacy groups needed tangible evidence to prove the need for a continuing,

vocal feminist perspective in (and of) Canadian society, the Prime Minister gave it to

them with the palm of his hand. The gesture publicly affirmed that the battle for women’s

equality had not ended with the entrenchment of the Charter in 1982 and, in fact, still

needed to be waged at the highest levels of federal power. The Prime Minister’s protestive whimper that “people are losing their sense of humour” about good-old-boy behavior, like patting women’s asses, suggested that Canadian public consciousness had internalized certain aspects of the feminist critique and was willing to challenge overtly

111 Robert Sutton, “PM, Opposition may debate women’s issues,” Toronto Star, July 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

112 Canadian Press, “Leaders agree to 3rd debate,” Ottawa Citizen, July 24, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779) 103

sexist displays from its political power-brokers. Evoking stereotypes of ‘humourless

feminists’ was not even enough to deflect the political gravitas of Turner’s sexism, which

put him at odds with (what came to be) a major theme in the election.

While Turner’s subsequent lack of repentance enhanced the political legitimation

of Canadian feminist discourse, it also symbolized wider cultural resistance to feminist critiques of identity, power and institutionalized domination. The following chapter takes up this tension as it was played-out in media discourse of the NAC leaders’ debate on women’s issues, demonstrating the ways in which it connected to broader political- ideological contests. Specifically, I argue that a “collision of worldviews” between

Canadian feminism and neoliberalism simmered on the pages of the nation’s English- language newspapers. These discourses tapped into ideologically informed ideas about citizenship and national unity, and ultimately situated the NAC leaders’ debate on women’s issues at the heart of divisive rhetoric, casting the event as a fractious moment in the nation’s political history. 104

Part II:

‘TV Debate on Women’s Issues Tonite!’: Feminist Eventfulness, Collective Memory and the 1984 NAC Leaders’ Debate on Women’s Issues

Drawing on archival records, existing accounts, and media coverage of the

debate’s conception and planning, this chapter begins by examining the organizational

strategies used by NAC to stage the 1984 federal leaders’ debate on women’s issues,

which represents a key intersection between feminism and neoliberalism in the Canadian

public sphere. The negotiations over venue, audience constitution, media numbers and

NAC’s determination to ‘regulate’ the public-ness of the debate demonstrate the ways

NAC approached a long-standing struggle facing feminist organizing within the mainstream: how to accommodate or ‘manage’ the difference between staging a feminist event as opposed to a media event. Despite the recognition given NAC for accessing greater public authority, I argue that this landmark event came to be remembered as much for de-legitimating the Canadian feminist movement as for either its symbolic importance

(as an unprecedented display of the power of the nation’s women’s lobby to access ‘the mainstream’) or its on-the-ground significance (by literally broadcasting information about routinely marginalized election issues to the electorate). Negatively-toned reviews of the leaders’ debate on women’s issues indicated that NAC’s political worth was measured by their ability to produce an entertaining show. Clearly, this is not the only way to remember the leaders’ debate on women’s issues; the television broadcast, however good or bad it was, should not be exclusively focused on as a representative 105

moment of NAC’s feminism. Instead, this chapter seeks to preserve accounts of the

decisions feminist activists of the 1980s made in order to achieve their objectives.

This chapter gives voice to the feminist organizing logic that shaped NAC’s decision-making during their negotiations with network and political party representatives – a perspective that tends to be submerged in popular recollections of the event. I argue that NAC’s commitment to preserving central tenets of their feminist philosophy during the planning of the leaders’ debate on women’s issues transformed an existing political ritual into a feminist strategy that transgressed public – including other feminists’ – expectations of what a media event should be. In the days following the debate feminist and NAC founding member Laura Sabia issued a scathing critique of the televised event in a special newspaper commentary entitled “The NAC’s worst hour?”

She pointed to the “appalling contrived format,” the “long, convoluted, obfuscated questions,” an ineffective chairman and an “obviously partisan audience [who] hooted and hissed at will” as the details that contributed to the “high school style question and answer period” that was the debate. She declared that the one redeeming quality of the debate was the way it focused public attention on some genuine concerns: “That was ‘the event’ – all else was pap and crap!"113 Sabia’s criticisms reiterated a common theme that

circulated in newspaper coverage of the debate: while it was undeniably historic (as a

‘first ever’ type of occasion), it ultimately failed as a media event - thus becoming a

“non-event.” So characterized, the debate fell from collective memory, where it otherwise

stands as a landmark achievement of Canadian feminism.

113 Laura Sabia, “The NAC’s worst hour?” St. Catharines Standard, August 23, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630 emphasis added) 106

The ‘eventfulness’ of Canadian feminism comes under fire in such critiques,

which suggested a direct correlation between NAC’s ability to produce good television

and feminism’s socio-political relevance. The latter part of this chapter focuses on

specific sites of tension identified in the women’s debate press coverage that spoke to

broader ideological contests between feminism and neoliberalism; these sites of friction

are characterized as ‘seduction/castration’ and ‘women’s issues/what issues.’ I argue that the tenor of these discourses, which emphasized the divisive character of the debate, indicate that the NAC leaders’ debate on women’s issues was ultimately rejected by the press as a ‘worthy’ media event. As a mediated feminist event, it was deemed to have deviated too far from normative expectations of what political contest was expected to do as a media event: to act as a civilizing, conciliatory force. As Dayan and Katz (1992) argue, political contests fulfill a ritual function in the national imagination by carefully managing political competition and uniting the populace as “citizen jurors” of the contest.

Method

This analysis is based on NAC’s archival records of the women’s debate including organizational background documents (including meeting minutes, promotional materials, media statements), which evince an as-yet untold story of the debate’s staging, and an internal archive of commissioned press clippings, which form a comprehensive source of media discourses to which NAC was paying particular attention. NAC’s collection of press clippings concerning the leaders’ debate on women’s issues contains approximately 389 individual articles, which were all published between July and

September 1984. The news articles are drawn from a range of sources, including national 107

publications like the Globe & Mail and Maclean’s, major city newspapers, like the

Toronto Star, the Ottawa Citizen, and the Calgary Herald, as well as local news coverage from smaller towns, like Summerside, PEI and Gull Lake, Saskatchewan. The eclectic collection includes standard political news stories published in major newspapers as well

as an abundance of quirky, less formal pieces that are not expressly marked as Opinion or

Commentary.114 NAC had commissioned press clippings from a media monitoring

service, Bowden’s, at the time of the debate. The clippings collection reveals little about

the ways in which NAC members used them. However it is safe to assume that NAC was

not necessarily interested in tracking their presence in media.

By 1984, the organization had “standing,” which Bill Gamson describes as,

having a voice in the media. […] Standing is not the same as being

covered or mentioned in the news. A movement actor may be in the news

in the sense that its actions are described or criticized without it having

any opportunity to provide interpretation and meaning to the events in

which it is involved. Standing refers to a group being treated as an agent

[…] Gaining standing, then, is both a strategic goal in its own right for a

movement and provides it with a platform for increasing the prominence

of its preferred frames. (2004, 251)

114 While the variety of genres represented in the collection posed some analytical challenges, I initially sorted these clippings as news analysis, opinion/commentary (including a subset of Editorials), and letters to the editor (this last being bracketed from the analysis, unless indicated as such). I then subdivided these categories according to chronology: pre-debate, day-of debate, and post-debate. Then, each of these groups was further sorted according to their overall tone toward the debate: positive, negative, and neutral. Although this system does not account for the different news markets targeted by the individual newspapers (eg. urban/rural, major center/town), it did allow me to determine what the major theme were regarding the debate event in its media coverage over time. I discovered that across news genres, consistent discourses emerged that addressed the event’s perceived impact, for better or worse, on the election and Canadian society generally: namely, its historicity, awareness-raising function, divisiveness and political value. 108

The NAC executive knew that they would already be in the press, since the organization had agency within the news media; they had become the official go-to source on women’s issues in English-Canadian media, especially as they went about securing the leaders’ debate. Their news archive, then, would have revealed more to NAC leadership about the tenor of the coverage, as well as what other political discourses were intersecting with their own.

Political Ritual as Protest: Why A Debate?

If NAC were to fully capitalize on the legitimacy granted by Turner’s gaffe, they were required to distance themselves (and the debate) from that incident. The organization countered media-circulated discourses that suggested NAC might exploit the

“tired subject” of bum-patting at the expense of more substantial public policy issues.

The weeks preceding the debate, for instance, witnessed the publication of news articles and letters to the editor, headlined “More bum patting?” and “We won’t discuss the bum- patting, okay?” The latter article stated, “The prospect of three grown men seriously discussing Turner's much-flouted faux pas on national television for the third time in less than a month, is enough to prompt a channel switch to ‘The Fall Guy.’”115 Another remarked, “Women’s issues indeed merit a separate debate in this election. Dare we hope that commentators will now put aside such froth as the relative tactility of the prime minister?”116 In response, Chaviva Hošek reassured the public that the women’s issues

115 Elaine Bateman, “We won’t discuss the bum-patting, okay?” St. Stephen-St. Croix Courier, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

116 “Real issues,” Ottawa Citizen, July 25, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

109

debate would function solely as a non-partisan event that would “acquaint Canadian

women with the issues and help them question candidates.”117

Hošek’s explanation, however, could not fully capture the complexities or

significance of transforming a familiar political ritual into a social movement

organization’s strategic tool. For instance, as a social movement organization (even a

liberal feminist one), they existed in an oppositional relationship with the state and its

representatives, as the final, much publicized debate question posed to the candidates

suggested, “Why should we trust you now?” Also, their pre-election ‘women’s vote’

discourse sought to mobilize an influential, gender-based voting bloc in light of the encroaching politics of the New Right. Last, NAC advocated an explicitly feminist

perspective on women’s issues, which is not politically neutral; their political project

aligned more organically with certain parties, the Liberals and NDP, than the Progressive

Conservatives. Without expressly contradicting Hošek’s assurances of a nonpartisan

forum, these factors definitely complicated them.

What could NAC hope to achieve, even inadvertently, with the debate strategy?

Typically, televised leadership debates have been situated in effects-oriented research, as opposed to social movement studies of strategic practices engaged by oppositional groups. In effects research, investigators attempt to assess (and in some cases recuperate) the ‘true value’ of debates to electoral campaigns. Early studies tend to argue that televised debates exert a ‘reinforcement effect’ on viewers, further entrenching existing

117 Dorothy Lipvenko, “PC, NDP leaders accept invitation to first debate on women’s issues,” Globe & Mail, July 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779) 110

partisan loyalties.118 LeDuc and Price (1985) argue that the reinforcement effect may occurs as a result of the public’s pre-existing familiarity with the candidates; when politicians are experienced and well-known, the debate serves only to retread the major themes of the election. If, however, the candidates are lesser known, the debate provides more information and can swing prospective votes in a particular direction. Lanoue

(1991) takes up this line of argument in his study of the 1984 election debates. He asserts that those debates “mattered” since John Turner and Brian Mulroney were relatively new faces in electoral politics. Moreover, he posits that the formats of Canadian debates

“allow for direct candidate interaction, and the debates are not encumbered by a panel of media celebrities who often see their job as putting each contender ‘on the spot’ as often

(and as embarrassingly) as possible. As a result, viewers may be less reliant on post- debate media commentary to assess the relative performances of the debaters” (52).

These qualities, he argues, suggest the possibility that Canadian leadership debates are more influential on election outcomes than their American counterparts and, in fact, he concludes this was the case in 1984. He notes that, “while reinforcement is a common – and electorally important – effect of debates, it is not the only effect. Debates do have the capacity to influence voting behavior” (63, emphasis original).

In a study of the 1988 Canadian federal election, Blais and Boyer (1996) also argue that the televised debates impacted the final vote, but underscore the role of

118 For instance, LeDuc and Price (1985) argue that “watching the debates in itself had little effect on individual voting behavior in [the 1979 Canadian federal election], or on the outcome of the 1979 election. While it appears initially that watchers of the debates were somewhat more likely to have voted Conservative or NDP and less likely to have voted Liberal, these patterns are fully accounted for by sociodemographic variables related to exposure to the debates rather than to their content. The effects on behavior, if any, must be described at most as reinforcing. This interpretation appears reasonable when it is considered that a high proportion of debate watchers had already decided on their vote at the time of the debates” (153). 111

intermediaries, such as news media and word-of-mouth, as consequential influences on non-viewers’ decisions. The authors argue that debates can reduce a margin of victory in an election result by influencing even those people who did not watch the debate, as well as those who tuned in, by differentiating between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects of election debates. The former refers to the viewer who watches the debate and “because of what he/she sees or hears, decides to vote in a different way from that which he/she initially had intended” (146). Indirect effects refer to “those produced through intermediaries. […] an individual decides to vote differently because of what the media or friends tell him/her about the debate” (146). In search of a methodological approach that would accurately assess the impact of televised debates on election results, Blais and Boyer posit that an analytical framework discounting people who had not viewed the debate as unaffected would be flawed since “We cannot rule out the possibility that those who did not watch the debate changed their mind because of what they heard or read about the debates. Such an approach […] cannot deal appropriately with the issue of indirect effects” (147). These analyses suggest that, as a political strategy, the NAC-sponsored debate on women’s issues would not necessarily mobilize a voting bloc and/or guarantee a particular electoral result. Otherwise, NAC organizers could trust that the women’s issues agenda would be circulated through the nation’s social fabric through the news media and informal channels of day-to-day conversation.

Although NAC’s professed overriding concern was to create a public discursive arena for women’s issues that was politically ‘safe’ enough to ensure the candidates’ participation, the organization would also be accessing symbolic meanings carried by televised political debate. Baker (1983) argues that televised debates reveal something 112

about a nation’s values by asking, not necessarily what range of political choices are

available to voters, but what the “latent function” of these public ceremonies is (in

Rothenbuhler 1998, 99). Leadership debates are a symbolic form representative of the

political center of the nation; a televisual forum for rational political discourse

characteristic of liberal democratic society (Rothenbuhler 1998, 98). Ideally, such forms

evidence a federal commitment to the transparency of the democratic political process and national leadership, standing as “the most visible public test of aspirant political

candidates” (Norton and Goethals 2004, 227).

As media events, political debates are a celebration of the rules that guide

civilized contest (Dayan and Katz 1992). Such contests represent liminal moments; the

possibility of the emergence of an alternative reality is also accompanied by the threat of

chaos. Dayan and Katz (1992) argue that “In the liminal period of sacred Contests, the

rules reaffirm their civilizing function. Contestants must be equal; viewers are present to

warrant fairness” (137). As contemporary political ritual, leadership debates are

constituted by expected, familiar discourses that indicate an even playing field: objective

moderation (as provided by media representatives), ceremony, and a shared

understanding of what constitute ‘the issues.’ The public is a “citizen jury” which not

only expresses partisan loyalty, but also judges the proceedings as fair play. In this view,

media events are public events.

The NAC leaders’ debate articulated women’s issues to the “sacred center” of

Canadian society by making feminist and (official) political discourses mutually-

constitutive. In 1984, the federal election campaign was defined as “the election of the 113

gender gap.”119 The women’s debate was the pinnacle moment of this discursive

structure: Turner’s campaign depended on it and the sheer spectacle of the historic

occasion generated a great deal of media coverage. As a result, women were rendered visible as citizens, a reminder that although formal terms of gender equality had been

written into the law in 1982, other structures of patriarchy continued to inform Canadian

cultural and national identity and that women’s advocacy, in turn, was far from finished.

Feminist Eventfulness

When publicly announced in early August, the leaders’ debate on women’s issues

was subject to hyperbolic discourses in print media promoting the evening as ‘the great

debate,’ ‘the big show,’ and, notably, as NAC’s ‘media event.’ Televised political

debates were (and are) typically promoted as extraordinary ‘media events’ in the sense

that they deviate from everyday programming. Their difference is also found in their

proclaimed historicity; these events “strive to mark a new record, to change an old way of

doing or thinking, or to mark the passing of an era” (Dayan & Katz 1992, 12). The NAC

leaders’ debate on women’s issues was definitely historic – as the “NAC Page of Firsts” included in the debate’s Media Kit testified, the debate was the:

1) First fully bilingual, live debate, with all three leaders of the major national parties, on women’s issues in Canada 2) first fully bilingual live debate with the leaders of a country’s national political parties in North America (and possibly the world) 3) first debate ever organized, chaired, convened and run by women with the leaders of the national parties of a country 4) first ever all-women’s panel to question the leaders of Canada’s three major national political parties

119 Judy Creighton, “Women worried Mulroney won’t work toward equality,” Hamilton Spectator, September 7, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779) 114

5) first time ever for a country to broadcast live, coast-to-coast, an all- leaders’ debate on women’s issues.120, 121

According to Dayan and Katz (1992), there are several additional features that make a media event: they are broadcast live (and interrupt everyday life and television programming), they are preplanned and scripted, they grab a large audience, there is a

pervasive sense that viewing is obligatory, and a reverent tone is bestowed on the

occasion. The live, multi-channel broadcast of televised national leadership debates

creates a media ‘syntax’ that “put[s] a full stop to everything else on the air […] and

speak[s] to the greatness of the event” (10). The NAC debate was firmly entrenched in

these discourses of media ‘eventfulness,’ as a historic, live broadcast of a political ritual

that the public understood to be significant and worth watching. It was promoted

extensively through news media tracking of its genesis and planning.

Another critical facet of media eventfulness is its conciliatory, not conflictual,

nature. Even in the case of a political debate, where conflict and the prospect of change

are inevitable, the contest is contained within agreed upon rules and, ultimately,

celebrates an established (and establishment) process (8). This emphasis on the

120 NAC Media Kit, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 803)

121 Media descriptions of the debate’s historicity usually served one of two purposes. On one hand, the ‘historic’ debate was significant and politically influential. It was a two-hour “raising of consciousness” and “brought women’s issues to a new level of discussion” (Carol Volkart, “Women give debate good word,” The Sun, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)). Headlines emphasized the profundity and legitimacy of the encounter, proclaiming, “TV debate a definite sign of progress” and “Debate was a benchmark.” Women active in the movement are regularly quoted in these reports, including Hošek and Doris Anderson. The strongest reviews of the debate stress its influence on voting, as well, underscoring the political relevance of the event: “Women’s issues debate tonight may tip vote” (Val Sears, Toronto Star, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)). On the other hand, the only redeeming feature of the debate is its historicity, thus sapping the event of its political potency. Journalist Suzanne Zwarum noticed the depoliticized use of the term, stating, “The women’s debate was pronounced ‘historic,’ but that seems a pallid word to describe what has gone on in this country this week” (“TV debate a definite sign of progress,” Calgary Herald, August 17, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)). To similar effect, the debate is described as “a worthwhile exercise” or an “effective exercise in affirmative action,” implying that it was a momentary, fleeting experiment. The debate is reduced to a token gesture for a special interest group. 115

restoration of order – after a carefully managed set of disagreements – underscores the ritual aspect of media events; they evoke “a liminal sense of togetherness, the quickening of hope, the celebration of a shared sense of purpose or common values” (Curran and

Liebes 1998, 4). Although an oppositional group, NAC had laid the groundwork for this type of experience with heretical discourse of collective, politicized Canadian womanhood. The ‘women’s vote’ and ‘women’s issues’ discourses were as semantically inclusive as possible; could ‘women’s’ shared oppositional positioning toward the state engender grassroots support across the nation?

What prevents media events from exerting a purely propagandistic pressure on society is the role of the audience in determining the ‘success’ of the event. In a liberal democracy, a media event requires public consent in order to be considered successful:

“official events cannot be imposed on the unwilling or unbelieving. […] the audience

[…] has veto power” (Dayan & Katz 1992, 19). In this sense, media events are a hegemonic practice that seek to reaffirm the shared beliefs, practices and structures of power that inform common cultural framework. Although NAC exploited an establishment political ritual and media practice (the ‘event’), they did so in order to further counter-hegemonic ends. The NAC debate defies easy categorization as a

‘typical’ media event, since the organizers sought, if not to change existing social hierarchies, then to at least “signal to the public that the old, heretofore dominant paradigm [was] open for reexamination” (170). Transformative media events, in Curran and Liebes’ words, “are not necessarily supportive of the status quo. On the contrary, they can affirm ‘what ought to be’ in implicit contrast to ‘what is,’ awaken suspended 116

hopes or release submerged social forces in ways that act as catalysts for change” (1998,

4).

The NAC debate was not only a “transformative event” in terms of its end goals

(what the organization hoped it would accomplish), but also in its process of creation and

resultant format. As I discuss forthwith, NAC ensured that a feminist organizing logic

informed decisions made about formative aspects of the debate, signaling its reframing as

a ‘feminist event.’

With only two weeks before the debate was to be staged, major and minor

logistical details were still being hashed out by an organizing committee of a dozen

people representing NAC and Canada’s three major political parties.122 Despite the

abbreviated quality of the handwritten meeting minutes, they reveal the emerging

priorities of the political party representatives and NAC, particularly in terms of the type

of ‘event’ the leaders’ debate on women’s issues would be. Although network reps were

absent from these meetings, their specter haunted the proceedings as the party reps

threatened to pull their leaders from the debate if it were to become a “news event”

instead of a “public event.” At the same time, NAC aimed to preserve the event’s feminist agenda by overseeing the panelist and moderator selection and by managing the seemingly mundane considerations of venue, audience constitution and media

122 In attendance at the debate planning meetings were representatives for the Progressive Conservative party including Brian Armstrong, Tom Gould, media advisor to Mulroney, and Jocelyn Côté-O’Hara, Mulroney’s personal advisor on women’s issues; the Liberal party, including Ratna Ray, director of the Women’s Bureau in the federal Department of Labour from 1979 through 1984, and Gordon Ashworth, labeled the “top campaign operative for Turner”; and the NDP, including Ellen McQuay and Valerie Preston, the federal coordinator of women’s activities for the NDP. NAC representatives were Chaviva Hošek, Lynn Kaye, Nadine Nowlan, Betty Stanley (media liaison for NAC), and MaryLou Murray (meeting secretary).

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presence.123 These details, it turned out, came to resonate with broader issues of

expanding accessibility, minimizing hierarchies of privilege, and maintaining the

publicness of the event.

The influence of the networks on the leaders’ debate was, from the start, strongly

felt by the organizers. It wasn’t until Hošek had secured the participation of Broadbent,

Mulroney and (finally) Turner, that media interest skyrocketed. In one interview, she

notes that “‘The networks held back until we had all three leaders committed…[e]ven

though the leaders might have agreed more readily if they knew it would get prime-time coverage. Then, when the networks decided they did want to cover it, we had to make all the arrangements at the last minute’” (Kome 1985, 142). Now that the debate was confirmed, the political party reps did not want to cede any further leadership role to the broadcasters. Tom Gould (media advisor to Mulroney) and Don Foley (advisor for

Turner) wondered whether the television networks would follow the committee’s ground rules, since this was to be a “public event for the people of Canada,” not a news event.124

Any network ‘ownership’ of the debate was understood as a threat to the publicness of

the forum, evoking Dayan and Katz’s assertion that media events originate “not in the

secular routines of the media,” but in the ‘sacred center’ of core symbols, beliefs and

values that shape our collective identity (32). This conversation brings to light a

distinction made between ‘sacred’ public and media events, on the one hand, and

‘secular’ news events, on the other. The former are linked by their ability to evoke

123 In media reports covering the progress of the debate’s planning, news report focused on the anxiety- inducing state of the event’s ‘unsettled details.’

124 Meeting minutes, August 2, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779) 118

people’s participation in the ceremonial aspects of the social and political life of the

nation or the world, whether by gathering in a town hall or around the television. These

forms of participation are less ‘mediated’ in the sense that the “journalists who preside over them suspend their normally critical stance and treat their subject with respect, even awe” (Dayan & Katz 1992, 7). Alternatively, a news event relates to “accidents, of disruption,” it does not celebrate order or its restoration; the tone of the broadcast is different as is its effect on the audience. In the case of the NAC leaders’ debate, the political parties wanted to preserve the order and ceremony characteristic of a media event, in the face of the journalistic value of the first-ever women’s issues debate as a spectacle.

While the party reps were concerned about the leaders’ debate being presented as an undignified novelty act, the meeting minutes document that NAC negotiated the sticking-point details to ensure the production of a feminist event that would not only raise the profile of women’s issues in the election campaign, but stand as a newly-formed discursive arena for women’s issues in the public sphere. The party representatives were concerned over NAC’s explicitly feminist framing of the event. At one point during the planning sessions, the Mulroney camp asked Hošek if NAC’s scheduled introduction of the debate, which would follow Peter Mansbridge’s introduction, could be cut entirely, if it was “negotiable.” It was not. Read by Hošek, the NAC introduction situated the debate within feminist discourse by identifying the debate as “ours,” introducing the past presidents of NAC, and reminding viewers of NAC’s representative status.125 The

125 Hošek’s speech also framed NAC as a historical institution in Canada, by introducing several past NAC presidents. She stressed the organization’s representative status, noting that NAC represents: “Women from 119

introductory moment also created a rare opportunity for a camera shot of the sea of women’s faces watching the proceedings (audience reaction shots were disallowed during the debate). The Conservative party also tried to submit their own list of potential panelists, in light of their dissatisfaction with NAC’s proposed candidates. Liberal

Gordon Ashworth had publicized his displeasure with the field of panelists offered by

NAC in press interviews; he insinuated NAC was holding-up the show by presenting lists of “unacceptable” candidates. In the press, bilingualism was the basis of Ashworth’s complaints; the candidate list did not provide enough selection to ensure fair representation of English and French speaking Canadians.

The debate’s bilingualism was a contentious topic under negotiation, as NAC

underestimated the significance of the language issue both for the networks and the

political parties. The networks required that the debate be bilingual, where Mulroney’s

strategic courting of Quebec voters meant that his camp pushed hard for a precise 50-50

split between English and French. During one planning meeting, his camp stipulated that

Mulroney was “committed to fully bilingual debate […] non-negotiable.”126 In late July,

though, Hošek had predicted that the debate questions “will be primarily in English, but

[…] one or two will be in French as well.”127 Hošek likely saw the women’s debate as

breaking from the tradition established by previous general issue debates, which were

all backgrounds: young women, the elderly women, as well as the wives and mothers who work in the home. Women on the labour force and a great number of women who do both” (“1984 Debate on women’s issues,” August 15, 1984 (Internet and Digital Services, CBC Archives, Available: http://archives.cbc.ca/society/family/clips/15837/) Accessed: July 1, 2009).

126 Meeting minutes, August 2, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

127 Canadian Press, “Networks eye third debate,” Globe and Mail, July 25, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

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entirely unilingual. Nonetheless, her miscalculation surprises in light of her organization’s on-going struggles to maintain relations with the Fédération des femmes du Québec. In the early ’80s, after the FFQ had rescinded its membership, NAC began pursuing measures to make the organization more “francophone friendly,” like instituting simultaneous translation during the AGMs and formally recognizing two official languages (Vickers et al. 1993, 132, 14). In 1984, these efforts paid dividends, as the FFQ renewed its membership and, in doing so, further legitimized NAC’s claims to representative status.128

The meeting minutes suggest the political parties had an additional complaint however; the parties objected to certain panelists based on their perceived alignment with women’s rights advocacy. NDP representative Ratna Ray took issue with nominee Claire

Bonenfant “because she is an advocate of women’s rights.”129 Eleanor Wachtel, according to the Conservative rep, is a better contender because she “does people profiles rather than women’s issues.”130 Kay Sigurjonsson posed a slightly different problem for the parties. Although she was a founding member of NAC, the parties wrote her off as

“not acceptable” due to her affiliation with an Ontario teachers’ union, the Federation of

Women Teachers’ Associations of Ontario. That union had secured approximately 600 of the 2000 tickets available for the event, since they had foot the bill for the rented venue.

128 As the debate preparations wore on, though, the FFQ leveled its own critique of NAC in the press for overlooking their francophone sisters. President Denise Rochon stated “‘It’s a fact that francophone women have been neglected so far […] We were not invited to prepare questions and if we were promised tickets, they were for watching and not participating’” (Canadian Press, “Debate on, women’s group says,” Montreal Gazette, August 4, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)).

129 Meeting minutes, August 6, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

130 Ibid. emphasis added

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The parties worried Sigurjonsson would elicit a partisan response from the live audience;

a dismayed Jocelyn Côté-O’Hara, Mulroney’s women’s issues advisor, winces at the

prospect of “Kay [with] 600 teachers in the room.”131 While NAC was willing to provide

additional candidates for discussion, they refused to let the political parties present their

own contenders, unless as a last resort. They were interested in creating a panel that had familiarity with women’s issues, bilingual representation, and at least some experience with media. A mere six days before the debate was held, the newspapers reported who would be asking the hard questions of the leaders. Hošek took the opportunity to underscore that “they were picked to give a balance between French and English, their knowledge of women’s issues and lack of overt party affiliation.”132 In the end, the

panelists were Eleanor Wachtel, a Vancouver-based writer and broadcaster; Renée

Rowan, a Le Devoir columnist from Montreal; the Toronto-based Kay Sigurjonsson; and

Francine Harel Giasson, a professor with the Université de Montréal business school.

Caroline Andrew, a political science professor at the University of Ottawa, was selected as moderator.

NAC was obviously aware of the importance of media presence at the event; without broadcasters, the debate likely would not have happened since the political

leaders were there for the increased exposure. Nevertheless, NAC conceptualized the

leaders’ debate as a ‘public’ forum, which for them meant privileging women’s live

experience of the event over media presence. NAC’s effort to strike some sort of balance

131 Meeting minutes, August 6, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

132 Wendy Eckersley, “Non-partisan panel picked for debate on women’s issues,” Ottawa Citizen, August 9, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779). 122

between what they perceived to be two integral components of the debate’s success

resonate with the tension Rita Felski (1989) describes as existing “between universality

and particularity defining the logic of the feminist public sphere” (168). Specifically, the

“feminist public sphere […] serves a dual function: internally, it generates a gender-

specific identity grounded in a consciousness of community and solidarity among

women; externally, it seeks to convince society as a whole of the validity of feminist claims, challenging existing structures of authority through political activity and theoretical critique” (168). NAC was reticent to improve media access to the debate if it meant limiting the number of women in attendance; the organizing committee wanted those women who had worked for women’s advocacy through their member organizations to bear witness to this achievement of the women’s movement. Michèle

Barrett (1982) gestures to the effect audiences have on the reception of a text as feminist or not. Commenting on a piece of feminist theatre that included a rape scene, she notes the different meanings the scene held for “the feminists at the front and the men from the rugby club who rushed in from the bar (laughing) when they heard what was going on.

So the image itself, or the play or whatever, might not necessarily be intrinsically sexist or feminist, it may depend on who is reading and receiving it and how they do so” (39).

Barrett underscores the constructed quality of meaning, suggesting that a feminist event depends on both creation and consumption. Following this, feminist women bearing live witness at the NAC debate heightened its reception as a feminist event. This priority impacted decisions made over venue, ticket distribution, and media numbers, much to the chagrin of the party reps who were intent on garnering the widest media exposure and best photo ops possible for their bosses. 123

Early on, NAC dismissed suggestions of holding the debate in a broadcast studio, since that would situate it within the organizing logic of the media and thus compromise the publicness of the event.133 Hošek reminded the other organizers that the “invitation

[sent to the member groups was] to [a] public debate.”134 Two other options were discussed: the Canadian Room, a ballroom in the Royal York Hotel, liked by NAC for its cheaper rental fee, and Roy Thomson Hall, which the political parties favoured, despite its $10 000 price tag. They argued that Roy Thomson Hall would be “infinitely better for media” with its picturesque stage and enough theatre seating to satisfy NAC’s requirements.135 Unconvinced, NAC argued that, aside from the cost, their need to manage media activity during the debate trumped the need for a glamorous-looking stage show, stating,

there is no adequate way of giving the print, radio, and news media access

to this important public event while still maintaining control over the

media’s activities. The fixed theatre style seating arrangement […] does

not provide an opportunity for setting up a segregated, controllable area

for the media and their equipment as does the Royal York Canadian Room

133 Dayan and Katz note that media events are typically “organized outside the media” and that “at least theoretically, the media only provide a channel for their transmission. By ‘outside’ we mean both that the events take place outside the studio in what broadcasters call ‘remote locations’ and that the event is not usually initiated by the broadcasting organizations. This kind of connection, in real time, to a remote place – one having major importance to some central value of society […] is credited with exceptional value, by both broadcasters and their audiences.” (1992: 5-6).

134 Meeting minutes, August 6, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779 emphasis added)

135 Meeting minutes, August 2, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

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balcony facilities. […] We are proceeding with our planning for this event

with the Royal York Hotel.136

This decision was met with consternation over exactly where the media personnel would

be placed, given the Royal York’s more constrained space. NAC’s Lynn Kaye debated

with Conservative Brian Armstrong over how many media reps could fit in the ballroom

(120, with equipment) as opposed to the balcony (100, without equipment) and whether it

was politic or not to situate any additional media reps in an ‘overflow’ room, if they weren’t excluded from the event entirely.137 This last idea was roundly dismissed by the

party reps as simply “not good enough.”138 They argued that limiting media presence

could only negatively impact the “manner in which networks cover the debate […one] cannot exclude media on a selective basis from a public event – media as proxy for voters.”139 At a subsequent meeting, Armstrong reiterates this point, stating that “press

are proxies for the people of Canada.”140 As the ‘eyes of the nation,’ people are brought

into the debate proceedings by media, allowing them to take part in – or at least be

attentive to – the country’s political life. The party reps challenge NAC’s willingness to

limit media numbers in favour of the symbolic power of a live audience’s display of

feminist solidarity, by characterizing their position as undemocratic; NAC was willfully

excluding “the people of Canada” from the political process, by limiting remote access to

136 Untitled document, August 1, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

137 Meeting minutes, August 6, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

138 Ibid.

139 Meeting minutes, August 2, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779 emphasis added)

140 Meeting minutes, August 6, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

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the debate proceedings. One representative questions NAC’s real willingness, even their

ability, to keep out certain ‘fixtures’ of the publishing world if it came to that,

incredulously asking: “You’re going to tell [the Toronto] Sun, [or the Toronto] Star, etc

that they can’t come in?” Hošek refuses to back down in the following exchange with

two party reps:

Hošek: we’ll let in 225 media people and send the rest to monitors in the overflow room Armstrong (PC): tell 600 teachers to go into overflow room Ray (NDP): Globe will have fits Hošek: fairness Armstrong (PC): they will know exclusion based on presence of 600 teachers141

Hošek’s feminist organizing logic attempts to minimize hierarchies of privilege that

elevate the value of mass mediated spectatorship over the direct, perhaps more intimate, experience of feminist live witness. In doing so, NAC reorients the political debate to a

mediated feminist event from its more traditional, familiar framing as a media event.142

An interesting concession made by NAC was their agreement to enforce a

“passive audience” guideline, to appease the political parties’ concerns over the “fair treatment” of their leaders by the crowd. The parties had requested lists of the member groups invited to the debate by NAC, as well as the number of seats issued to each group; they also lobbied hard for more tickets to be allotted to each political party. These requests underscore the parties’ expectations for a potentially confrontational atmosphere

141 Meeting minutes, August 6, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

142 As the planning progressed, NAC updated the media, indicating that there would be approximately 1500 to 2000 audience members, including 300 seats allotted for media, 50 tickets for each party, and that the organization was “overwhelmed” by requests for tickets.

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at the event; an assessment which makes sense given that the debate on women’s issues

was not a typical media event, with a typically integrative or conciliatory tenor. If anything, the debate was a liminal moment, marking what Dayan and Katz would refer to as “the moment of interruption of routinized social time – stop[ping] history in its tracks.

It invites society to consider alternative routes and, in so doing, to reexperience some of

the chaos, anguish, and exhilaration of its genesis” (Dayan & Katz 1992, 161). The

politicians sought to calm some of this potential affective outpouring by insisting on the

passive audience guideline, which translated into “no clapping, cheering, shouting […]

Every one [sic] is asked to remain in their seats, no standing in the aisles etc. No signs, banners, (to be enforced by NAC officials and hotel staff […]) or pamphleteering….”143

Such hand-sitting was counterintuitive at this event, that is, a potent symbol of women’s achieving ‘legitimate’ public voice in the electoral process. In this context, silence became a discursive action imposed on the audience, with the effect of creating (the televised) image of women as compliant political subjects, with all the concomitant significances that gendered compliance to institutional authority carries: acquiescence, self-containment, and (of course) passivity. In the end, Hošek noted that, while NAC

“cannot guarantee anything, […] we will ask audience to be quiet.”144

In the end, NAC distributed ‘audience rules’ to every chair prior to the event and had the moderator instruct women to remain silent throughout the debate, during her introduction (one attendee responded, “‘My goodness […] I’m surprised we were not told

143 Integrated time schedule of NAC leaders’ debate, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

144 Hošek’s next suggestion – of a period for live audience questions posed to the leaders – fails to impress: “Terrible idea,” was one immediate response.

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to wear dress shields’”145). Needless to say, when the time came, the audience did flare

up at certain answers given by the politicians, tending to cheer Broadbent’s platform

while occasionally booing and hissing at the ‘careful’ commitments offered by Turner

and Mulroney.146 In the following days, press reports framed the audience either as

unruly women drunk on their newfound political power or, more positively, as politically

invested citizens, who brought some much-needed vigor to the straight-laced

proceedings.

The feminist organizing logic guiding NAC’s decision making emphasized

women’s immediate experience of the political process, framed the proceedings within a

unifying women’s movement discourse, and selected professional women as panelists

and moderator. The debate planning committee prioritized expanded accessibility to the

debate by reserving space for its members, thus encouraging the reception of the debate

as a feminist event. While this may have cost the event some (direct) media coverage,

NAC refused to privilege mainstream media practices over women’s direct experience of

the historic encounter. Despite a concerted effort, the political parties were unable to

dilute the feminist framing of the event by negotiating away NAC’s televised

introduction, their suggested panelists or moderator, and live audience. While they did

succeed at securing a passive audience guideline, the audience resisted ‘silence’ as a

censuring discursive action by reclaiming their voices, literally. These seemingly trivial

points of discussion were central to the feminist organizing logic utilized by NAC, in

145 Val Sears, “Co-operation triumphs in women’s network,” Toronto Star, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

146 This ‘rebellion’ recalls Foucault’s observation that “where there is power, there is resistance” (1990[1978], 95). 128

their efforts to produce what they referred to as a ‘public event,’ but might be more

accurately called a mediated feminist event.

News media discourses construct a different narrative of the leaders’ debate on

women’s issues, one which ultimately emphasized its divisive character and evoked

neoliberal discourse of un-gendered citizenship and nationhood. At this point, my analysis shifts to consider certain sites of tension in the media coverage of the women’s

debate. One I term seduction/castration, which opposed moderate and militant versions of

politicized Canadian womanhood. The other I characterize as women’s issues/what

issues, which contested the meaning – even existence – of women’s issues as a political

category. These discourses countered NAC’s claims to representative status by insisting

on the heterogeneity of Canadian women’s political investments. While this is an

important critique of some liberal feminist discourse, the difference is most often

expressed in terms of the Canadian everywoman, who is horrified by NAC’s

universalizing claims and women’s issue agenda, and the all too familiar stereotype of the

‘fringe’ feminist.

Seduction/Castration

The historic occasion came off less like a desperate heist and more like a

genteel croquet match back in the Victorian times that were suggested by

the Royal York Hotel’s regal insignia and the modestly draped podia 129

behind which the three men perched like so many earnest suitors bent on

wooing the fair Canadian damsel.147

The gold curtains hanging behind the stage in the Royal York Hotel’s Canadian

Room on the evening of August 15th were not John Turner’s first, or even second, choice of backdrop for the debate on women’s issues, which – for him – represented a final opportunity to redeem a bumbling performance during the first half of the election campaign. His campaign aides fretted over the minutiae of the encounter during the planning sessions with NAC and the other party representatives. Specifically, they argued against re-using the previous event’s cool, blue-toned décor, stating simply that “Turner

was not happy” with it.148 Although politely non-partisan (i.e., not ‘Tory blue’), the

mustard-coloured fabric ultimately did Turner no favours, who turned up at the event

dressed in a summery, light-coloured suit. For a candidate who needed to make a strong

impression, the combination was deadly. As columnist Val Sears observed, “Turner […]

almost faded into the yellow backdrop in his beige suit.”149 Tapping into Turner’s

unfortunate propensity for inappropriate demonstrations of hegemonic masculinity, Terry

Poulton remarked, “Each candidate was respectfully spruced-up, Mulroney and

Broadbent in sober ties and sincere black suits and Turner in a curiously ill-fitting gray

147 Terry Poulton, “Suitors woo Canadian damsels,” Toronto Star, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

148 Meeting minutes, August 2, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

149 Val Sears, “Co-operation triumphs in women’s network,” Toronto Star, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

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number accented by a tie of virile maroon.”150 The close attention paid to the leaders’ fashion may have been a byproduct of the content of the debate, women’s issues. In this

‘exceptional’ circumstance, wherein women put men on the spot, news media similarly turned the intense lens of public scrutiny toward the male leaders’ physical appearance.

As is the case when women’s appearance is constantly evaluated, the fashion discourse objectified the candidates, emphasizing their respective performances of masculinity and furthering the sexualized discourse first evoked by Turner’s butt-grabbing. As Poulton pointed out, the wardrobe malfunction was an unfortunate coincidence for Turner, whose

‘virile’ attire marked him as out of step with the other two leaders, as he was with standard greeting practices for female colleagues. In comparison, Broadbent and

Mulroney arrived looking every inch the respectful gentlemen ready to demonstrate their understanding of, and commitment to women’s issues.

Even before they ascended to the debating podia, a sexualizing discourse of stereotypically romantic imagery and allusions imposed heteronormative logic on the major players involved in the election campaign: the party leaders, the ‘feminists,’ and

‘Canadian women.’ Although one journalist noted that in such an “enlightened campaign” sexist rhetoric should be avoided, many reporters had a field day with the linguistic conventions of election-time reporting. While the metaphorical allusion to politicians ‘wooing’ or ‘courting’ votes is not unusual, the centrality of women’s issues on the political agenda in the 1984 federal election endowed these references with added significance. As a result, journalists’ verbiage sparkled with “nuptial logic” (Deem 2003).

150 Terry Poulton, “Suitors woo Canadian damsels,” Toronto Star, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 131

Headlines proclaimed “Suitors woo Canadian damsels” and that the politicians were working hard, “Wooing the female vote.” NDP leader Ed Broadbent is described as

“obviously relishing the moments during which he could appear as a woman’s dreamboat, promising a variety of goodies…” to the female audience, who responded with “applause and cries of pleasure.”151 Where “[p]oliticians used to speak above the

heads of fair maidens – directly to their husbands and fathers,” Canadian women instead

became situated as the romantic targets of the politicians’ oratory arrows, apparently

plucked straight from Cupid’s quiver.152

On the other hand, the heteronormative romance narrative could be used to only

limited effect when addressing the feminist organizers of the debate. The leadership

debate spoke to a different gender dynamic, having been sponsored by a feminist

organization, with Canadian women contributing to question topics, feminist panelists

posing the questions, and a live, predominantly female (and feminist) audience. With this

inverted power dynamic framing the encounter, romanticized discourse functioned primarily as a burlesque reminder of the way things used to be or, when used by more reactionary columnists, the way things should be.153 The policy statements made by the

leaders during the debate, for instance, evoked flowery, albeit sarcastic, comparison to

violin music and perfume. In the anonymous commentary, “Promises, Promises,” the

151 “Women’s issues debate proved worthwhile,” The Leader Post, August 18, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

152 Susan Semenak, “Where party leaders stand on women’s issues,” The Gazette, August 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

153 One news report emphasizes the ‘unnaturalness’ of this shift, stating, “The sight was odd. Three middle aged men, at times looking uncomfortable, discussing ‘women’s issues’” (“The women’s debate,” Red Deer Advocate, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)).

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leaders’ policy commitments were framed as sentimental schmaltz meant to make women swoon: “A little violin music, if you please, while political leaders launch into another chorus of ‘I Promise You…’ The debate […] on women’s issues last week was again full of promises, as the leaders sought to assure one and all that they were indeed all for things feminine – old ones, young ones, apple pie and babies.”154 The London Free Press

asked readers, “Remember that perfume ad which started out, ‘Promise her anything…’?

The debate on women’s issues Wednesday night sounded a lot like that.”155,156 Such sardonic references castigate male politicians for pandering to women, whose political investments were compared to frivolous – even materialistic – demands. The jokey romanticism of ‘competing suitors’ and love-struck constituents gave way to more punitive discourse, particularly in post-debate reports. Turner, Mulroney and (to a lesser extent) Broadbent were characterized as men weakened, even emasculated, by their involvement in a woman-controlled event. Frequently, the debate was compared to a desperate bidding war, in which “the three [leaders] fell over themselves rushing to assure women that they were fully in support of just about everything that any women’s

154 “Promises, Promises,” Ingersoll Times, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

155 “When every issue is at the top of the list,” London Free Press, August 17, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

156 Perhaps not surprisingly, the ‘kitchen sink’ becomes a popular metaphor invoked to describe the policy platforms described by the party leaders during the debate. A local Hamilton paper proclaims that “Candidates seem to promise everything but kitchen sink” (Anne Bokma, Hamilton City Journal West, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)). The Halifax Mail Star remarks that “In an ‘historic’ nationally-televised debate that sounded at times like a bidding war, Prime Minister John Turner, Tory boss Brian Mulroney, and NDP leader Ed Broadbent appeared to offer women everything and anything but the kitchen sink” (Jim Meek, “Debate was like ‘bidding war’,” Mail Star, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)). And reporter Debra Denomy writes, “NAC wrestled commitments from the three party leaders in almost all areas from abortion to child care facilities, from divorce to the rights of married women, and from retraining to part-time worker benefits. In fact, the kitchen sink would probably have been theirs for the asking” (“Key women’s issue is men’s too – economy,” Waterdown Flamborough News, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)).

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group wants.”157 Commentary pieces tended to critique the candidates in harsher terms.

While Fotheringham remarked, “There wasn’t a nay-sayer in the lot, all three falling down and waving their paws in the air in an effort to please their guests,”158 the Toronto

Star’s Frank Jones contended that the party leaders were “led around by the nose by the

feminists like the three blind mice.”159 The candidates are also described as ‘uneasy,’

‘awkward,’ and ‘fearful.’ The debate was repeatedly referred to as the “great grilling” of

the leaders and an opportunity for Canadian women to “pin down” the male trio. Using

more extreme rhetoric, the Calgary Herald stated, “Three prisoners, dragged before a

hostile jury and a flinty-eyed bench to explain their past actions, tried to outdo each other

in their anxiety to mitigate their crimes.”160

The flip side of this characterization is the stereotypical portrayal of the debate

organizers and panelists as scary, man-hating feminists. In addition to “hostile jury” and

“flinty-eyed bench,” the more vitriolic reports described the organizers and panelists as

“frightful females,” “a squad of stone-faced Amazons staring,”161 “that bloody committee,”162 “an affront to every thinking woman in Canada,”163 ‘self-important,’

157 “TV Debate: Final Encounter a Non-Event,” Cape Breton Post, August 18, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

158 Allan Fotheringham, “Debate proved cure for insomniacs,” Calgary Herald, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

159 Frank Jones, “Debate on women’s issues tonight is complete piffle,” Toronto Star, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

160 “But was justice done?” Calgary Herald, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

161 “Current Comment,” Steinbach Carillon, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

162 “Third debate,” Toronto Sun, July 25, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

163 Ibid.

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‘stupid,’ and, in a special turn of yellow journalism, as ‘rapists’: “The debate on women’s

issues was fun while it lasted. For women who clapped and cheered, the debate was a

form of voyeurism – watching an attempted rape in the political bed with all leaders

hesitant in admitting that they didn’t like what was being done to them.”164 Gitlin

(2003[1980]) argues that such stereotyping results from routine news frames and the

sheer brevity of coverage available to any particular event. This brevity, he posits, “leads

to stereotyping. The media oversimplify reality in order to make it easily digestible […]

What results is the construction of simplistic packages around events” (230). In his

analysis of the SDS, this type of coverage helped deepen existing polarization within the

New Left.

In the case of the women’s debate, the media coverage emphasizes difference

among two loosely defined ‘types’ of politicized Canadian women: those who are ready to be wooed by the great men of politics, and those who seek to emasculate and humble them. This is not a new strategy. Susan Douglas (1994) identifies the revivification, in the

1970s and ’80s, of the ‘catfight’ frame in news media (222). While the catfight usually pits a ball-busting, dark-haired feminist against a socially conservative, light-haired anti- feminist, the coverage of the women’s debate constructed a moderate versus militant feminist dynamic.165 Nonetheless, the divisive rhetoric challenged the collective unity

presented by NAC’s heretical discourse of the ‘women’s vote.’ As Douglas points out,

this fracturing effect is key to the success of catfight narratives:

164 Nellie P. Strowbridge, “People Issues,” Carbonear Compass, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

165 The feminist – antifeminist catfight was also highlighted in media reports, pitting NAC against REAL Women of Canada. See Brodie (2008), Dobrowolsky and Jenson (2004), Goddu (1999), Gill (1988). For additional discussion of the catfight in mass media representations of feminism, refer to Beck (1998). 135

The catfight served two critically important ideological functions: it put

the lie to feminists’ claims about sisterhood and reasserted, in its place,

competitive individualism in which women […] duked it out with each

other. The notion that all women were ‘sisters’ bound together across

ethnic, class, generational, and regional lines by their common experiences

as an oppressed group, was the most powerful, utopian, and, therefore,

threatening concept feminists advanced […] Of all the concepts and

principles that feminists advanced, none was more dangerous to the status

quo than the concept of sisterhood. Hence, the absolute necessity to

demonstrate as simply and vividly as possible that sisterhood was, in fact,

a crock of shit. Through the catfight, the threat that feminist posed could

be contained and turned back on itself. (1994, 223-224)

The organizers and panelists were stereotyped as feminist threats to male political power and, metonymically, the nation. In turn, another category of ‘Canadian woman’ emerges from under the pressure of hegemonic femininity; these women, although politicized, were feminized subjects looking to be enticed by the candidates’ policy bon mots. In return for lusty political promises, Canadian women would grant access to their treasured electoral loyalty. This framing not only countered, but delegitimized NAC’s effort to

“bring women’s issues to a new level of discussion,” by sexualizing political discourse as either the grand seduction of Canadian women or as the feminist castration of the nation.166 By setting forth two versions of politicized Canadian womanhood, these news

166 Carol Volkart, “Women give a debate good word,” The Sun, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 136

reports disguised the complexity and political gravity of the women’s movement, as well as the issues discussed during the debate.

Citizenship discourse wound its way through press coverage of the women’s debate, intersecting with the oppositional framing of moderate and militant feminist women. NAC, representative of militant feminism, was framed as distracting the nation from truly important ‘big picture’ issues and misrepresenting the more moderate concerns of Canadian women. Neoliberal political rationalities assert a new object of social policy, namely the “self-sufficient and genderless individual” as opposed to the “structurally disadvantaged citizen” (Brodie 2004, 154). As a ‘fringe’ group, these discourses suggested that NAC’s interests further cleaved a national foundation already straining under the stress of multiculturalism, regionalism, and economic recession. As ‘bad citizens’ with selfish motives, feminists were chastised for dividing the populace: “[…] some women at least were not falling for attempts to further fragment and divide the electorate into competing pressure groups. Some women […] kept their eyes firmly on the ball and refused to be diverted from the primary problem with Canada today…its failing economy and the size of the national debt.”167 With a ‘now is not the time’ attitude, feminist groups were reminded that “Women should not be striving for special treatment as a unique group with separate needs and concerns (albeit they may very well have them). They should be attempting to make the world judge people as people, on the basis of merit and ability instead of letting the gender gap get even wider.”168

167 Murray Harrison, “News ’N’ Views,” Beauséjour Manitoba Beaver, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

168 M.A.H., “Women and politics,” The Recorder, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 137

These efforts to deflate Canadian feminist momentum relied on media circulated narratives that insisted feminist activity, such as the leaders’ debate, only divided the nation along gender lines (an account that contradicts the equality-seeking character of

1980s liberal feminism in Canada, which sought to narrow existing, gendered gaps in social, economic, and political status). These reports framed feminists as an isolated pocket of rabble-rousers quite distinct from ‘average Canadian women,’ signaling, in

Brodie’s words, a “targeted dismissal and silencing of oppositional voices emanating from the margins” (2004, 155).

Women’s Issues/What Issues

Although the political parties had not publicly questioned ‘women’s issues’ as a conceptual category (in 1984), it was described like a incomprehensible new language the leaders had great difficulty learning. Prior to the debate, news reports noted that party leaders were only able to offer “vague” remarks on women’s issues policy because of their lack of familiarity with the issues. For instance, a Montreal Gazette article quoted

Hošek, “‘The candidates have learned a few catch phrases about women’s issues. But that’s not enough’” and observed, “All three parties have offered lots of talk about ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ and ‘affirmative action.’ But scrambling to pay lip service to these so-called ‘women’s issues,’ the contenders have remained vague.”169 The equal pay for work of equal value provision, in particular, elicited sympathy for the politicians who had difficulty mastering the concept:

169 Susan Semenak, “Where party leaders stand on women’s issues,” Montreal Gazette, August 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 779)

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Equal pay for work of equal value probably wins the prize for being the

least understood issue in this year’s election campaign. Everybody has an

opinion about it, but few understand how it works. Even Prime Minister

John Turner, prior to being briefed for the debate on women’s concerns,

revealed his ignorance of the issue. Early last week, he said equal-value

legislation would only be a ‘persuasive guideline’ in some areas, and

didn’t seem to understand Crown corporations were already covered by

such legislation.170

The Toronto Star commiserated with the politicians, stating, “all three leaders have finally mastered the rhetoric of equality. One can imagine the poor blighters saying their catechism every morning: ‘Equal pay for equal work is different from equal pay for work of equal value, equal pay for equal work is different from … etc. , etc.”171 The reporting

emphasized how difficult it was for the leaders’ to master the ambiguous, complicated

language of women’s issues discourse. Characterized as a particularly elusive subject for

Mulroney and Turner, reports described the two sequestering themselves with female

party members, as though cramming for a difficult exam with expert tutors.172 As much as this coverage pokes fun at the male leaders’ inability to grasp the issues, the reported

‘unknowability’ of women’s issues publicly undermined the legitimacy of the debate.

170 Vicki Barnett, “Equal pay for work of equal value protects women,” Calgary Herald, August 19, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

171 Lynda Hurst, “Turner moves to the head of the class,” Toronto Star, August 26, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630 emphasis original)

172 In comparison, Broadbent had an affinity for women’s issues: “Unlike John Turner and Brian Mulroney, Broadbent didn’t find it necessary to closet himself for many hours with specialists on women’s issues to prepare for the debate” (John Ferguson, “Debate was a benchmark,” Calgary Herald, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)).

139

During the debate itself, as the Edmonton Journal mentioned, the unanimity of the

parties’ positions on many women’s issues policies suggested that they were not political

issues at all, stating, it was a “virtual love-in, only rarely interspersed by verbal blows.

Mulroney underlined the non-partisan nature of many of the women’s issues, when he

remarked, “‘This is neither a Tory, Liberal or NDP issue; it’s a moral issue.’”173 As moral issues, of course, ‘women’s issues’ were out of place in the political field and, therefore, the debate was a superfluous exercise, distracting from real political concerns.

Clearly, women’s issues were contested terrain in media discourses that challenged the seemingly homogenous (mis)representation of Canadian women’s interests. Approximately thirty news items assert an oppositional reading wherein

‘women’s issues’ are actually ‘just issues,’ in that the debated issues were not especially relevant to women, as exemplified by the statement: “[…] there are really no isolated women’s issues, only people issues.”174 These reports doubt the specificity of women’s issues thereby undermining the foundation of the leaders’ debate, NAC (as the public

face of the women’s issues agenda), and Canadian women’s advocacy in general. The

term was denaturalized in news coverage with the frequent use of scare quotes and the

qualifier ‘so called’: “‘Women’s issues’ debate infringed on free speech”175 and “The

extent to which so-called ‘women's issues’ determine how many women voters is

173 Nino Wischnewski, “Women’s issues,” Edmonton Journal, August 31, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

174 “Fuller in Ottawa,” Dunnville Chronicle, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

175 Nora McLaughlin, “ ‘Women’s issues’ debate infringed on free speech,” Collingwood Times, August 21, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

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questionable.”176 These immediately drew attention to the ‘troubled’ nature of the term,

which some argued served to ghettoize women within Canadian society. A report on a post-debate television appearance made by Liberal Judy Erola supported her suggestion

that women’s issues be considered ‘main’ issues, not secondary ones.177 Catherine Ford

argued in the Calgary Herald that the election was “characterized by the sudden interest

in ‘women’s issues.’ The fact that most of these issues only serve to further ghettoize

women appear to have been forgotten in the sudden rush to woo the female voters.”178 In

stronger terms,

It seems that instead of fighting for equality at work, [women] are

feverishly building new barriers between men and women. Shooting

themselves in the foot. Crawling into ghettos.[…] Of course, there are no

women’s issues. Day care, maternity leave, pensions, fair pay and access

to jobs are economic issues. Pretending problems like these can be solved

in some sort of world sucked free of men is crazy.179

This frame, however, did not always derogate the value and authority of the

debate. ‘Women’s issues’ are just ‘issues’ also advanced the notion that women’s

experience of Canadian life was indeed marked by gender, but that it should also be

understood as inextricably connected to the experiences of other citizens, as systemic. In

176 Richard Gwyn, “Score one for Turner,” The Daily Times, August 21, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

177 The Valley Leader, “A valid point,” MacGregor Herald, August 18, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

178 Catherine Ford, “First, women have to learn the rules,” Calgary Herald, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

179 Garth Turner, “Are women serious – or just patsies?” Kindersley Clarion, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

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turn, all Canadians, not only women, should be invested in a public conversation that

addresses these perspectives:

One heartening facet in Wednesday's political debate on women's issues was that it delved into a truly national concern, rather than one affecting a particular region or group. The questions thrown at the three national political leaders were supposedly ones that women are interested in, but as such they proved to be ones that matter a great deal to most Canadian men as well.180

[NDP candidate] Tim Tynan said the women’s issue label is a misnomer and he prefers instead to use the phrase ‘human issues’ because so many of them apply to men and women alike. Granted, violent pornography, rape and equal pay for work of equal value lend themselves more to women, but the concerns they expressed during the recent National Action Committee on the Status of Women debate on network television over nuclear disarmament, poverty, employment and hate literature apply to all Canadians, regardless of gender.181

[a Globe & Mail editorial said] it was ‘a shame’ that the last time the leaders face off together publicly in the campaign, they would be restricted ‘exclusively’ to so-called women’s issues.’ A shame? Not at all. The economy, work, jobs, technological change, and for that matter women’s role in the family and abortion are not exclusive concerns to women.182

Although few in number, such reports situate the NAC debate as an integrative, unifying

event for the nation, accomplishing what the organization had initially intended: to create

a more inclusive venue for political participation. By orienting women’s issues as being

of concern to the general public, the ‘women’s issues’ as ‘just issues’ theme lost its

neoliberal thrust and assumed a decidedly feminist significance.

180 “Women's issues debate proved worthwhile,” Regina Leader Post, August 18, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

181 Stewart Sutherland, “The issue is human, not women’s,” Orillia Packet & Times, August 25, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

182 Elaine Bateman, “We won’t discuss the bum-patting, okay?” St. Stephen St. Croix Courier, August 15, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 142

As the public face of the women’s issues agenda, NAC was also targeted in media

discourse as non-representative of mainstream Canadian values. The debate, in turn, was

characterized as subverting the political process by distracting politicians from the truly

meaningful issues facing the nation. ‘Women’s issues’ was declared a misnomer precisely because those issues had been identified as such by NAC, a non-representative group:

The reality is that the National Action Committee on the Status of Women

does not speak for all Canadian women. Therefore, many of the issues

raised, the stands sought, are not the issues or stands that predominate in

the thinking of many Canadian women. The big issues of this campaign

are unemployment, jobs, inflation, the national deficit, patronage

appointments, past government performance, interest rates, the value of

the Canadian dollar and the ways the economy can be revitalized […] it is

unfortunate that there was no effort to include at least some of them in this

debate.183

These discourses evoke the moderate versus militant catfight frame described earlier, but situate it within delegitimizing critiques of the women’s issue agenda. NAC’s heretical discourse of a politicized, collective Canadian womanhood was thoroughly torn down in press reports that emphasized a distinction between non-feminist (i.e., moderate, acceptable) Canadian women and feminist (radical, rejected) women. In the debate

183 “An unimpressive TV debate,” The Sault Daily Star, August 17 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 143

coverage, NAC was also characterized as unintelligent and embarrassing to Canadian

women:

If these so-called feminists had any concern for the women they

supposedly represent they surely would have come up with questions

worthy of thought […] The majority of the women I’ve talked to since the

‘debate?’ […] were more embarrassed about that debate than anything. In

the words of one lady, ‘We’ve been placed in the ghetto of feminism.’184

The distancing of real Canadian women from NAC (and the women’s movement) was furthered through the frequent citation of ‘everyday’ women’s reactions to the debate, such as, “[…] the majority of women throughout Canada, myself included, have values and beliefs which differ widely from those purported by the small group of radical feminists known as the Status of Women [sic]. This group has been remarkable successful in intimidating our political leaders and furthering the erroneous assumption that they speak for all women”185 and “Langevin said she missed watching the leaders’

debate on women’s issues Wednesday night because was washing dishes and putting the

kids to bed.”186 This last remark in particular challenged NAC’s representative status in

terms of class privilege: whereas feminist women could afford the time and expense to

make a television show, real Canadian women did not have the luxury of even watching

the debate, as they were too busy taking care of domestic responsibilities.

184 “Trying Harder,” Sunday News, August 19, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

185 Judith John, “Not for all women,” Trail Daily Times, August 23, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

186 Canadian Press, “Repatriating rhino a major campaign issue,” Kingston Whig-Standard, August 17, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 144

The stereotyping of feminists as militant, trivial and polarizing in mass media discourse was a popular mechanism of delegitimization. Media-circulated challenges to

NAC’s legitimacy did not contest the organization’s impressive membership numbers, but instead relied on the formation of discursive structures that characterized NAC as an elitist, unintelligent and yet threatening organization. As a result, NAC’s heretical discourse of a collective, feminist constituency of like-minded Canadian women was deconstructed in press reports that pitted women against each other in a ‘catfight’ paradigm.

“‘Great debate’ a ‘non-event’”187

In addition to neoliberal discourse of the un-gendered citizen, news coverage emphasized how its ‘poor’ technical execution contributed to the debate’s perceived failure as a media event. As demonstrated above, a feminist organizing logic informed

NAC’s decision making processes while negotiating the debate’s technical details with the political parties. But did NAC’s commitment to ensuring the production of a feminist, public event mean that the resulting leaders’ debate on women’s issues was fundamentally different from the other, general issue leadership debates? A vast majority of the news articles set apart the women’ s debate as quite different from the norm, in terms of its subject matter (which had been oppugned) and its presentation. As the sponsors of the debate, the feminist organizers bore the burden of responsibility in media discourse, despite the collaboration with the political parties that took place during its planning. As a result, the ‘eventfulness’ of Canadian feminism is called into question,

187 Bette Murphy, “‘Great debate’ a ‘non-event,’” The Evening Telegram, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 145

suggesting a direct correlation between NAC’s ability to stage a good show, and the

socio-political relevance of the women’s movement.

The post-debate coverage was a public vetting, wherein the “citizen jury” constructed the debate’s meaning in order to determine the worth of NAC’s attempted remapping of social reality.188 Critiqued as rigid, badly translated and poorly run, the

debate’s performative failure was attributed to a feminine inability to organize a national

event. Fotheringham’s caustic review stated, “Can the sex that can’t divide up a luncheon

cheque run a national debate? The answer, alas, is no. […] It was a real snoozer this one,

run on so many rules that you’d have thought a convention of school marms had laid

down the guidelines.”189 Catherine Ford argued that the organizers made a mistake

choosing “low profile” panelists, suggesting that NAC should have selected women with

higher public recognition factor and experience with media. This oversight, she claimed,

was “indicative of the blindness of women in our attempts to gain a share of the power in

this country – an unwillingness to play hardball. […] you don’t send second string to the

World Series.”190 The structure of the questions/answers – i.e., head-to-head match-ups

between two of the three candidates – was also described as a feminist failing, as it was

framed in ‘equality’ rhetoric: “All three leaders have strong views on [women’s] issues.

188 Dayan and Katz (1992) refer to this vetting as public debate that acts as a formal evaluative dimension of transformative events. The process involves “political leaders, parties, and the media. These debates are meant to assess the event’s impact but […] their role is not simply one of assessing, but also one of constructing the event’s significance. They modulate the consequences of the event [..]” (184).

189 Allan Fotheringham, “Zzzz – that sums up great women’s debate,” The Province, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) To be fair, Fotheringham’s article also made the point that the women were as inept as men when it came to staging an election debate (thus proving that equality between the sexes did exist).

190 Catherine Ford, “First, women have to learn rules,” Calgary Herald, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

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But because the debate was divided into one-on-one sessions, the leaders did not have equal opportunities to discuss them”191 and “It was ironic that, on a night when the real issues was equal opportunity for women, the very nature of the debate, with its head-to- head clash between two leaders at a time, militated against equal opportunity for discussion of a topic by all three leaders.”192

Leadership debates in Canada became bilingual in 1984 for the first time, having not only strategic significance, but also symbolic (or latent) function. The bilingualism of the 1984 debates was, significantly, a strategic maneuver insisted upon by the Mulroney campaign so as to strengthen his bond with Quebec voters. However, it was also public testament of a federal commitment to (bi-)cultural diversity and representativeness in national politics. Boxed into a corner by the Conservative’s non-negotiable ‘50/50’ language strategy, the women’s debate was the first to include simultaneous translation of

French and English language. When a translation problem emerged in the first few minutes of the debate, some condemned NAC for single-handedly defeating the nation’s unity project: “To the ladies who set up that program may we give a big raspberry. For all your good intentions, your technical errors have set Canadian unity back to square one,

191 Untitled, The Province, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) The one-on-one format did not preclude the third candidate from advancing a stance on a particular issue, since all leaders had one ‘free pass’ which allowed them to interject on any issue. Nonetheless, NAC was critiqued for the set-up, particularly since Mulroney was not compelled to articulate his party’s policy on reproductive rights, specifically, abortion policy.

192 “Bilingual flop,” Nanaimo Daily Free Press, August 17, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

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along with any hope for women’s issues.”193 The women’s debate was characterized as a

“Bilingual flop” and as ‘force-feeding franglais to the entire country.’194

These criticisms of the performative aspects of the women’s debate take NAC to

task for not only failing to meet (ambiguously-defined) standards of televised debate

production, but also for violating the symbolic function invested in this particular

political ritual. NAC did not use the debate strategy to reaffirm the political center of the

nation, but to challenge its androcentric policies and practices. The panelists’ questions

were intended to pin down political leadership on issues about which they were reticent

to become ‘transparent.’ Although the debate was “the most visible public test of aspirant political candidates,” they were not in contest with each other. As a movement organization, NAC’s oppositional stance informed the entire proceeding. As such, the encounter allied the politicians against the panelists, the moderator, the sponsor – that is, against ‘the women.’ Ultimately, NAC broke with normative expectations of political debate as ritual: the moderation was invested, not politically ‘objective,’ the rowdy audience violated passivity rules meant to preserve ‘ceremony,’ and the issues under discussion were hotly contested. Like the neoliberal media discourses that distinguished a

Canadian “everywomen” from the fringe feminists and women’s issues from general

issues, talk of the performative failings of the women’s debate emphasized the divisive

193 Rose Mary Webber, “Kootenay Diversions,” Kootenay Advertiser, August 28, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) The problem arose when a clash of French and English voices volubly overlapped during the first twenty minutes of the broadcast. At another point, the politicians’ voices were silenced entirely.

194 “Bilingual flop,” Nanaimo Daily Free Press, August 17, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630); Jim Slotek, “Thank God C’est Finis,” Calgary Sun, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630). Framed more positively, W.A. Wilson reported that, “It may even be an important way of praising the essence of the occasion to say that it surmounted the television production which was awful and a format that at times was infuriating to viewers” (“Debate on women’s issues had highest standards,” Truro Daily News, August 18, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)). 148

character of NAC’s debate and, by extension, of Canadian feminism generally. In turn,

the debate could not hope to perform the important unifying, conciliatory function of a

media event, described by Dayan and Katz.

The media rejection of the women’s debate as a media event and subsequent

characterization as a ‘non-event’ in press reports meant that the NAC debate was denied

its ‘monumental status’ and thus fell from the nation’s collective memory.

Transformative events, such as the leaders’ debate on women’s issues, hold the possibility of marking the advent of a new point in collective history (of a nation, world, etc.); they “convey the perception that ‘if this much is possible, then we are already in a new era’” (Dayan & Katz 1992, 165). In these terms, such events organize time and memory by acting as reference points within, for example, a nation’s history. They are

“electronic monuments” that are intended to “live in collective memory” through their evocation of trauma, gratification, or exceptionalism (211).

The NAC leaders’ debate on women’s issues was a turning point in Canadian feminist history that occurred at precisely the moment when the women’s movement was being written off as ‘in recession.’ The debate demonstrated that a nationalized feminist presence could bring popular pressure to bear on the political leadership. It created a

liminal moment framed within the organizing logic of NAC’s feminist political project.

However, a concatenation of delegitimizing discourses undermined this moment.

In addition to the neoliberal discourses of the debate as profoundly divisive, press reports

concluded that the debate was exceedingly dull and unwatchable – even unable to elicit a

response from viewers. Articles emphasized journalists’ and viewers’ lack of interest in 149

the debate, characterizing it as a chore that had to be completed. The rhetoric of neutrality

informing these reports helped sap any enthusiasm for women’s advocacy that might

have been provoked by the debate. Indeed, some reports suggested that the debate was

being forgotten before the broadcast had even ended.195 Several reports described it as

“an unimpressive TV debate,” “ho-hum,” “boring” and “dull.” Some journalists

“confessed” to either not watching the debate or to falling asleep during the broadcast. A

Newfoundland columnist, for instance, informed her readers that she was commissioned

by CBC radio to watch the show, so she could participate in a post-debate forum the

morning after: “It was this obligation and only this obligation that kept me in front of the tube for the two hours. As it was, I dozed now and then.”196 Another reported, “I must

confess, I did not watch the great television debate on women’s issues last week for more

than about six minutes. I don’t see how anyone with an I.Q. of over 90 […] could have

stuck it out much longer.”197 Articles seeking local women’s reactions to the show made

statements like, “Many women contacted didn’t bother to watch the debate”198 and (as

mentioned earlier) “Langevin said she missed watching the leaders’ debate on women’s

195 Dayan and Katz (1992) note the importance of enthusiasm to transformative events. Public sympathy and enthusiasm signal that the “contradiction [of the proposed future] is welcome. The announced changes are desirable. They correspond to powerful – if hitherto silenced – aspirations. They presuppose a public that is already more than willing to embark on the adventure” (183).

196 Bette Murphy, “‘Great debate a ‘non-event,’” St. John’s Evening Telegram, August 22, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

197 George Jonas, “Is saying believing?” Toronto Sun, August 23, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

198 “Yawns in Nanaimo,” Nanaimo Daily Free Press, August 16, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

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issues Wednesday night because she was washing dishes and putting the kids to bed.”199

The following illustration was most succinct:

Figure 2: Editorial cartoon, London Free Press, August 21, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630)

This editorial cartoon featured a snoozing woman lit by the glow of her television, with a

newspaper slipping from her fingers with the headline, “TV Debate on Women’s Issues

Tonite!” The show was so dull, apparently, that she could not stay awake long enough to even start nibbling on her bowl of popcorn, which sits untouched on the floor beside her chair. Could there be a more punitive discourse than such dispassion?

The non-eventfulness signaled by this characterization of the debate enacted cultural amnesia around the event, erasing it from collective memory. I argue, however, that by attending to the feminist organizing logic informing NAC’s decision-making

199 Canadian Press, “Repatriating rhino a major campaign issue,” Kingston Whig-Standard, August 17, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 630) 151

during the planning sessions and how their choices influenced the production of the debate as a public event, an alternative, recuperative history of a landmark moment in

Anglo-Canadian feminism emerges. This history counters not only the delegitimizing effect of neoliberal discourses of un-gendered citizenship and national divisiveness as well as belittling rhetoric of its dullness, but also renders visible the NAC leaders’ debate as a monument of Canadian feminist organizing in the 1980s.

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- Chapter Three -

NAC, the Networks and the Neoliberal State: Excommunication and the 1988 General Issues Leadership Debate

In 1988, four years after NAC had “partnered” with the nation’s media outlets to broadcast the first ever leaders’ debate on women’s issues, a more adversarial tone informed the dynamic. This change derived in part from the pressure being imposed by

neoliberal social and economic policies being advanced by the new Prime Minister;

federally-funded news media and social advocacy groups were vulnerable to the cost-

cutting measures advanced under the new regime. Combined with the Mulroney

government’s neoconservatism, “special interest” groups like NAC had to counter a level

of federal dispassion they had never experienced before. These circumstances heightened

the importance of media in promoting the women’s rights agenda espoused by NAC. Not

surprisingly, the media-movement dynamic became increasingly tense as these

organizations navigated their respective paths of self-preservation. In this chapter, I argue

that these tensions coalesced at the time of the 1988 federal election between NAC and

the national news network, the CBC.

In light of the upcoming federal election, NAC had budgeted approximately $30

000 for television and radio public service announcements [PSAs] that were to comprise

one facet of the organization’s “Women Vote!/Femmes On Votez!” [sic] awareness

raising campaign. The PSAs had two purposes: to identify NAC’s four point women’s

issues agenda and to urge women to vote in the upcoming federal election. As the

Toronto Star described, NAC’s PSA for the CBC featured a “dialogue between two

women talking about the election. One woman says she won’t vote because she doesn’t 153

think her vote will make a difference, but the second urges her to vote, saying issues

important to women will be afected by the outcome. The four issues mentioned include

free trade, child care, reproductive rights, and violence against women.”200 NAC had developed the English and French-language public service announcements for both public and private broadcasters, producing them in strict adherence to the networks’ stated guidelines. NAC’s advertisements were quickly approved for distribution by the

Telecasters Committee of Canada for private broadcasters.

In a surprising turn, however, the CBC refused to air the television spot, arguing that “‘messages from groups or organizations which directly or indirectly advocate a point of view on an election issue are unacceptable. During the current Federal General election campaign only messages from registered political parties are accepted for broadcast on CBC facilities.’”201 Immediately, NAC contemplated taking legal action

against the network, given that the CBC’s PSA guidelines made no mention of increased

restrictions on PSA content during federal elections campaigns. The women’s

organization publicly protested the ban by issuing a press release defending the non-

partisan message of the PSA and questioning the anti-democratic nature of CBC’s

decision. NAC President Lynn Kaye argued that the public service announcement’s

‘only message is that women should get out and vote on election day.

Does the CBC truly believe that encouraging citizens to vote is

200 “CBC rejects message urging women to vote,” Toronto Star, October 19, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

201 “TV ad urging women to vote called unacceptable by CBC,” Globe and Mail, October 19, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

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‘unacceptable’? […] It is surely a responsibility of broadcasters to air

announcements which have as their objective the exercise by Canadians of

their most basic civic duty – the right to vote. How can the CBC say it is

strengthening the political fabric of Canada if it declines to run

announcements of this kind?’202

The network’s PSA ban occurred less than one week after NAC had publicly accused the

CBC of “discriminating against women and attempting to manage the news” and of

subjugating its moral responsibility to the country in the name of corporate greed because

of its refusal to air a separate leaders’ debate on women’s issues.203

Whether or not the CBC’s block was a retaliatory gesture, the network’s refusal to accommodate NAC’s political strategies during the 1988 election campaign constituted a tactic of power that brought together multiple points of resistance to NAC’s publicly recognized position in the political process. Recalling Foucault, tactics of power, “which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems” (1990[1978], 95). Accordingly, I argue that a consolidation of network and neoliberal state power occurred during the 1988 federal election campaign that culminated in NAC’s “excommunication” from its position amongst the nation’s political elite – an identity that had come about as a result of the organization’s ability to secure the 1984 leaders’ debate on women’s issues.

202 NAC press release, October 18, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

203 Specifically, the press release stated: “‘We believe the networks have a moral responsibility to the country and should carry out what all the party leaders and NAC agreed to do – a separate debate on women’s issues’” (NAC press release, October 8, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)). 155

Archival documentation demonstrates that NAC embraced strategic innovation (a

“flexible repertoire”) to counter the challenges presented under the new regime, which included a state-sanctioned anti-feminist countermovement built on neoliberal discourses of false equivalency and “successful” citizenship. Specifically, I examine the ways in which NAC responded to a changing political opportunity structure by revising their media practice; the organization pursued measures to professionalize their media strategies, with journalism workshops, revised communications policy and a ‘renovated’ debate strategy in order to combat their increasing marginalization as a “special interest” group – a characterization that disconnected NAC from the collective, movement-based identity advocated by their heretical discourse of 1984.

NAC’s increasingly expert media savvy also fostered the organization’s identity as a consecrated member of the political elite. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in

NAC’s proposed second leaders’ debate on women’s issues, which responded to media- circulated criticism of the previous debate as a boring non-event. In the end, I argue that

NAC transitioned its debate strategy in relation to the Conservative government’s efforts to transform the leader’s debate into a mechanism of demobilization for the feminist movement, by refusing NAC’s sponsorship and only agreeing to incorporate women’s issues questions into a general issue debate. NAC, in the meantime, would be resituated back on the margins of official political discourse through its exclusion from the televised proceedings.

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Rites of Institution

In 1984, two rites of institution occurred during the federal election campaign,

which had the effect of instituting two subjects representing competing worldviews: NAC

as a member of the political elite and neoliberalism’s “successful citizen.” Situated in

tense relation to one another, this dynamic shaped the terrain of political debate over the

next four years, coming to a point of “resolution” during the 1988 federal election, when

NAC tried to secure its second leadership debate on women’s issues. The first rite of institution was NAC’s sponsorship of the inaugural leaders’ debate on women’s issues, which secured Canadian women’s political capital in a notoriously male-dominated arena. In turn, the organization came to be “regarded as the formal women’s movement in

Canada, the official women’s opposition, and the public voice and symbol of feminism in

Canada” (Greaves 1991, 103-104). Second, the Progressive Conservative party won a decisive majority government for the first time since 1958, signaling the arrival of a new political-economic order. The Tories’ drubbed the Liberal party, who had their worst electoral showing ever winning only 40 seats. Not only did the PCs lead the count in every province, but they also secured more than half of the popular vote. The shift to a the new order was further consecrated by the media, when the Canadian Press named party leader Brian Mulroney “Newsmaker of the Year” in 1984.

Bourdieu (1991[1982]) argues that “rites of passage” carry greater social

significance than the term suggests. He is less interested in the distinction separating

those who either have or have not made the symbolic crossing-over of some arbitrary

boundary, that is, “a before and an after” demarcation (1991[1982], 118). Instead, 157

Bourdieu notes that there is a less noticeable, yet lasting difference embedded between groups for whom a rite is applicable and groups for whom it is not. He observes that

“There is a hidden set of individuals in relation to which the instituted group is defined”

(1991[1982], 118). Rites of passage, according to Bourdieu, are more accurately described as “rites of consecration or rites of legitimation, or, quite simply, rites of institution” (117-118).204

As we saw in Chapter Two, the 1984 NAC debate was a rite of institution for

Canadian women’s groups, establishing NAC as the flagship organization of national feminism. As political-media ritual, leadership debates legitimize an otherwise arbitrary boundary between the prestigious few who are regularly invited to participate and those who are not (Darras 2005). Hošek’s introduction to the ’84 encounter made it clear that the organization would remain a fixture in national political discourse, stating, “This historic occasion marks the beginning of a new tradition, a tradition that now takes its natural place in the political process of Canada” (“Debate on Women’s…, CBC

Archives). The debate signified NAC’s taking hold of the “symbolic skeptron” of mainstream political power, ushering Canadian women into the ritual space of political debate. Although their consecration as the legitimate voice of feminism was contended by certain other women’s groups, the move paid off in terms of how it broke the androcentric order of the official political field.

204 To illustrate this process, Bourdieu argues that sexually differentiated rites, like circumcision, fortify gender difference because “by treating men and women differently, the rite consecrates the difference, institutes it, while at the same time instituting man as man, i.e., circumcised, and woman as woman, i.e., not subject to this ritual operation” (118).

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In the second instance, the election of the Progressive Conservatives symbolically marked the advent of the neoliberal federal framework in Canada; a new political- economic order that ultimately sounded the death knell of Trudeau-era social liberalism.

Once Mulroney came to power, the “responsibility mix” of the Canadian welfare state, that is, the balance of responsibilities shared by government, the market, the community and the family unit, began to shift dramatically away from the state and toward the market and the self-sufficient citizen (Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2004, 156). Under the new regime, lines of demarcation – raced, gendered, classed – separated “successful citizens” who could flourish in a system that refused to recognize (and resisted redressing) structural forms of discrimination and disadvantage, from those who floundered and failed.

Whereas NAC fought for legislative and judicial intervention on the behalf of structurally disadvantaged women in Canada, the neoliberal model of the ideal citizen is unencumbered by systemic forms of discrimination based on gender, race, class, ability and so on. Neoliberal logic also posits that “powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions […] for their own benefit” (Harvey 2005, 2).

Therefore, NAC’s legitimation in the official political field at the same moment of

Conservative victory proved to be a thorn in the Mulroney government’s side, particularly when the organization launched a massive campaign against the Prime

Minister’s most explicit statement of neoliberal policy: the Free Trade Agreement.

NAC’s challenge to the Free Trade Agreement emphasized the ways in which the deal would further entrench barriers to women’s full equality in Canadian society. NAC 159

initiated its anti-Free Trade campaign as early as 1985 and was a founding member of the

Pro-Canada Network (later called Action Canada Network); a coalition of labour,

feminist, anti-poverty and aboriginal groups that opposed the deal on the grounds it

would compromise the cultural, economic, and political life of the nation. While creating

an extensive network of opposition, these efforts publicized the deleterious consequences

of the deal which critics felt Mulroney was trying to elide in public discourse. As the

defining issue of the 1988 election, a significant theme in NAC’s campaign strategy was

“Free Trade is a Women’s Issue.”205 In a briefing book of NAC’s priority election issues,

the organization stressed the urgent need to communicate an explicitly feminist analysis

of the FTA: “While free trade is obviously an important general issue in the election, it is also an issue that affects women very particularly. As such, NAC has identified free trade as it affects women as an important matter for debate.”206 NAC notes the cost of the FTA on women in the service sector, “where 84% of working women are concentrated.” The organization points out the risk of privatizing social service providers, such as health care and child care. NAC personalizes to women consumers concerns about the FTA, informing them that the imposition of a new sales tax to compensate for lost revenue on import taxes “may mean that every time we ride the bus, take our kids to day care, make

a bank transaction, and have a hair-cut, we will have to pay a tax.” Finally, whereas

opposition leader John Turner rhetorically linked concerns over threats to our national

independence to the loss of the “dream of Canada,” NAC related these worries to

feminist “initiatives to promote global development, including non-exploitative relations

205 “Free Trade Is A Women’s Issue” flyer, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

206 NAC Memo, October 19, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693 emphasis original)

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[sic] with Third World Countries, and our commitment to world peace.” Where the

politicians’ Free Trade discourse focused on an idealized nation, NAC’s feminist analysis

argued that extant barriers to full equality for Canadian women would be strengthened. In

electronic bulletins, information sheets, and brochures, the organization explained that the Agreement “will affect every issue women in this country have been fighting for.

Women will be amongst those hardest hit, and can least afford to bear the cost of free

trade adjustments.”207

Since the Liberal and NDP parties also opposed the FTA, NAC was labeled a partisan lobby group by the Tories, a punitive discourse that sought to undercut their status as the ‘official women’s opposition.’208 Marjorie Cohen, the economist who led

NAC’s anti-Free Trade charge, recalls that the government and business sector “tried to

reassure people and accused NAC of scaremongering” (1995, 280). Bashevkin’s study of

women’s activism during the rise of the New Right concludes that, in Canada, NAC’s

dedicated challenge to the FTA (combined with their vociferous opposition to

Mulroney’s constitutional initiatives), “incurred the personal wrath of the prime minister

[…] Canadian Conservatives, like their British and American counterparts, used a

mixture of angry rhetoric and budget cuts essentially to punish feminists for stepping out of line” (1998, 123). For Mulroney, it became abundantly clear that the women’s

207 “Free Trade Is A Women’s Issue,” undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

208 News reports focused on an “inflammatory” statement in NAC’s Federal Election Kit, which was used as evidence of NAC’s partisan politics: The present federal government of Canada has not lived up to its 1984 election promises to promote women’s full and equitable participation in all spheres of Canadian life. While the Progressive Conservatives have paid lip-service, their legislation and policies have continually and consistently undermined the hard-fought gains made by women […] We challenge Mr. Mulroney to put his mandate to the test. (Draft NAC Federal Election Kit, 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 804.1))

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movement’s political endorsement was not forthcoming. And since his electoral base was

constituted of social conservatives, Quebec nationalists, and neoliberals in Ontario and the Maritime provinces, the Prime Minister had little incentive to actively woo the women’s vote. Comments to the press affirmed Mulroney’s dismissive attitude towards

NAC: “[‘prominent women’s groups’] really do not represent most Canadian women […]

Further, they are allied with our partisan rivals, so why court who’ll never give you any credit?’”209 In fact, his government’s retaliatory funding cuts and marginalizing rhetoric

indicated that the Tories pursued policies that would effectively demobilize the women’s

movement entirely.

REAL Women, False Equivalency

This chafing dynamic shaped the intervening years between elections, as the

Tories reconsidered (and eventually restructured) government funding of women’s

groups according to a “doctrine of false equivalency.” The roots of this perspective are

found in the discourse of liberal individualism, which posits that “categorizing people in

groups by race, gender, religion, and sexuality, and acting as though these ascriptions say

something significant […] is invidious and oppressive. The only liberatory approach is to

think of people and treat them as individuals, variable and unique. This individualist

ideology … obscures oppression” (Young in Dobrowolsky 1998, 712). Active during the

Mulroney years, employment activist Pamela Kahn experienced the neoliberal spin on

this discourse, stating, “The formal discourse on equality was there, but other criteria

regarding economic rationality were brought into the picture. We saw the erosion of an

209 Robert Lee, “Women’s issues offer parties more pain than political gain,” Ottawa Citizen, August 16, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693) 162

egalitarian or humanitarian discourse […] The only discourse that seems legitimate now is the bottom-line fiscal discourse” (in Bashevkin 1998, 159). Since established advocacy groups had better-developed support networks and deeper financial reserves, the

Mulroney government drew on discourses of “equality” and “fairness” to justify the economic promotion of disproportionately small, sometimes politically reactionary interest groups who also happened to support Conservative policy initiatives, like REAL

(Real, Equal, Active for Life) Women of Canada.

The neoliberal spin on women’s equality discourse also circulated in media discourses that contested NAC’s representative status, by situating them in “natural” opposition to conservative “pro-family” women’s groups, primarily REAL Women. A brief review of REAL Women of Canada’s 1987 appeal for government funding demonstrates that the Mulroney government’s doctrine of false equivalency, supported by news discourse of neoliberal “equality,” contributed to the construction of REAL Women as an anti-feminist countermovement.

After three years of unsuccessful funding applications submitted to the Women’s

Program (administered by the Secretary of State), REAL Women launched a highly- publicized appeal in 1987, on the basis that the federal government had been infiltrated by NAC’s radical feminist agenda, thus stifling the activities, values and beliefs of the

“silent majority” of traditionally-minded Canadians (Goddu 1999).210 Their ultimate goal was to break the “cozy conspiracy” between the women’s movement and the feminists

210 The Globe & Mail quoted REAL Women member and attorney Gwen Landolt, who said, “‘the public servants in the Secretary of State women’s program are using their positions to support and recognize only radical feminist groups to the detriment of other women’s groups which do not share their philosophy. So we know that they are running the show.’” (Canadian Press, “‘Radical feminists’ blocking bids for financing, lobby group says,” Globe & Mail, December 12, 1986 (CWMA, NAC fonds 693)). 163

working in government, whose (supposed) combined efforts created a bias against funding conservative women’s groups.

The source of NAC’s government funding, the Women’s Program had been

“‘organized by feminists who had decided that the resources of the state could be used to support the development of the women’s movement and [was] located in a department that had a history of creating programs for the “disadvantaged”’” (Findlay in Pal 1993,

141-142). The Women’s Program rejected REAL Women’s repeated applications on the basis that the burgeoning organization’s mandate contradicted the funding agency’s principles, which did not support the “‘promotion of a particular family model’” to

Canadian women (Blanchard in Pal 1993, 145).211

Constructed as a natural foil to NAC in media discourse, REAL Women’s

“plight” had generated a great deal of publicity and support from Tory backbenchers as well as the socially conservative Reform party. Despite the media’s liberal foundation, the press welcomed the arrival of REAL Women onto the scene of women’s politics since it enabled a reconstruction of public definitions of feminism: “portraying it once again as an extremist social perspective rather than a set of beliefs which had already been widely diffused throughout the social fabric” (Gill 1988, 2). Pirsch-Steigerwald

(2002) concludes that the majority of news articles in her study of the media coverage of

211 Leslie Pal (1993) notes that the Women’s Programs core principles stemmed from the government’s commitment to the 1979 World Plan of Action adopted by the United Nations: The principles were: that all persons should enjoy equal human rights, opportunities and responsibilities; that both women and men should be free to make lifestyle choices, and that therefore neither law nor society should impose sex-stereotyped roles on women or men; and that with the exception of maternity and short-term remedial measures to reduce or eliminate past disadvantages, there would be no special treatment on the basis of sex. (144) 164

REAL Women’s challenge “tended to support the equal and fair funding of all groups

[frame], a liberal-pluralist argument whose coverage depicts all groups as equally

‘special,’ reducing the women’s movement’s broader significance” (212 emphasis

original). The neoliberal spin on equality discourse was exemplified in Barbara Amiel’s

Toronto Sun column, “Vulgar Feminism,” where she remarked,

I wonder if REAL Women have got their funding from the government

yet. Minister McDougall said she would fund any group that was

committed to the equality of women, which ought to mean that she will

stop funding NAC – which is committed to special privileges for women

and therefore inequality – and immediately turn the monies over to women

of more moderate views. We shall see.212

As a result of the mounting pressure of REAL Women’s campaign and

Conservative party support, the Secretary of State convened hearings to explore REAL

Women’s complaints regarding the government’s unfair funding practices for women’s

groups (Brodie 2008; Pirsch-Steigerwald 2002). While the final report, “Fairness in

Funding,” recommended that women’s groups become more self-supporting, it ultimately advocated that the government continue to fund women’s organizations, including NAC

(Greaves 1991, 103).213

212 Barbara Amiel, “Vulgar feminism,” Toronto Sun, December 14, 1986 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

213 The report’s results were met with some relief, since the parliamentary committee “included only one woman and was dogged throughout by several unofficial ‘members’ from the PC caucus (‘Tory Neanderthals,’ as some PC feminists called them) who ‘sat in’ on the committees’ deliberations” (Vickers et al. 1993, 147). 165

By the late 1980s, however, Mulroney enacted the “doctrine of false equivalency”

to justify revising the eligibility guidelines of the Women’s Program, thereby making

available government funds to REAL Women as NAC’s apportionment was cut. Not only

did this give REAL Women more resources with which to build their organization, but it

also endowed them with increased political credibility. Social activist Evelyn Cronin

remarks that, “It suited [the Tories] to have REAL Women around. They could do bad

and slighting things toward the women’s movement. It suited them to have the pro and

con sides, even if NAC had millions of members and REAL Women was only a handful.

This whole politics of false equivalency, of using women to turn against women, is

ongoing” (in Bashevkin 1998, 154). Media discourses challenging NAC’s representative

status legitimated this strategy and generated further momentum for the construction of

an anti-feminist countermovement, headed by REAL Women.

The foundation of REAL Women’s critique was that they were the victims of an

unholy alliance: they lumped NAC with the state, while they stood apart – “simple

housewives” who could stand on their own two feet.214 When Mulroney changed the

Women’s Program’s eligibility guidelines in 1989 and made $20 000 available to fund a

REAL Women conference, the conservative group felt the perceived alliance between

NAC and the state had been broken. In keeping with the rhetoric of self-sufficiency, however, REAL Women ultimately declined to apply for any additional federal assistance in subsequent years (Brodie 2008, 155-156). REAL Women’s version of

214 Vickers et al. (1993) observe that ‘simple housewives’ was the “journalistic peg on which everyone from 100 Huntley Street to Saturday Night hung their stories. In fact, its spokewomen usually had professional training” (146).

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women’s advocacy – as independent from state funding – further legitimized the conservative women’s group as a model of neoliberal successful citizenship, particularly when situated against NAC’s “victim feminism.”215

Repertoire Innovation: ‘Becoming what they are’

Against this backdrop of rising antagonism, NAC poured resources into the organization’s professionalization, particularly in terms of further refining its media strategies. This was a function of their institution as a member of the political elite in the

1984 election; Bourdieu argues that acts of institution exert a “performative magic” governed by the principle of ‘becoming what you are’ (1991[1982], 122). He states that

“The act of institution is an act of communication […]: it signifies to someone what his

[sic] identity is” (121). No longer a grassroots outsider to the political mainstream, NAC pursued the means to better manage the public representation of the national feminist agenda by educating their member groups through media workshops hosted by professional journalists, updating the organization’s media communications guidelines, and adapting the debate strategy so as to create a better ‘media product’ than their previous effort yielded. These measures were the tangible effects of NAC’s ritual institution as the public face of national feminism in Canada.

During a 1987 Elections and the Press workshop, NAC members asked three professional journalists how they might combat the “catfight” framing imposed on news coverage of the women’s movement, since “IT IS PATRIARCHY AND THE STATE.

215 As Brodie (2008) remarks, however, conformity to the new, neoliberal citizenship regime meant that “REAL Women, with its support base firmly lodged within the white middle-class, refused to recognize the differing capacities of Canadian women to stand on their own two feet in the competitive and often expensive game of political lobbying” (156). 167

THAT IS WHAT WE’RE FIGHTING AGAINST.”216 Since REAL Women’s founding

in 1983, NAC had been situated in opposition with the conservative group as a means to

divert attention from the organization’s calls for government action on redressing institutionalized discrimination against women. As Douglas (1994) argues of the

American case, the media promulgated the catfight opposition to the effect that “Both women were sullied; no one won. Meanwhile, then men, dry, clean and tidy, were off in some wood-paneled den relaxing, having a drink and a smoke, and being reasonable”

(223). After four years of this entrenched media frame, NAC members asked the professionals how to redirect the site of feminist contention from the “loud scream” of

REAL Women back to the neoliberal state, where the main struggle was occurring.217

The women journalists on the panel were sympathetic to NAC’s concerns, but could offer little more than advice on how to best tailor their message to the “limitations of the institution.”218 Susan Pratt, an Alberta reporter, reminded NAC members of the

parameters of political news coverage within which journalists worked: “the story is ‘how

is the speech going over?’ The story is ‘how is the pitch varying?’ The story is ‘how is

this context for your speech?’ […] the reporters are looking for a story in the context [of

the event,] or the audience reception of the speech.”219 She reiterated that political

reporters focus on policy announcements and look for sources who know when to

216 Elections and the Press Workshop Minutes, November 22, 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 704 emphasis original)

217 In relation to REAL Women, NAC members specifically wondered, “how do we penetrate the veneer of Grandma? To see the anti-democratic, anti-everything they represent?” (Elections and the Press workshop minutes, November 22, 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 704))

218 Elections and the Press workshop minutes, November 22, 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 704)

219 Ibid. emphasis original

168

engage, advising the importance of “being on your feet and knowing when to respond;

sparring.”220 Another panelist stressed how the organization’s credibility as a source would benefit from cultivating different communicative styles, depending on the media format: “know thyself as a communicator. […] Come across as genuine and natural […]

on radio or TV, it is like you are talking to someone; talk to the typewriter or to the

computer screen. This will give you a speaking not a writing style.” As an example, she

noted that “John Turner does not use the media very well. You cannot speak to a

camera.”221

Linda Goyette, an Edmonton journalist, reinforced the view that there were

female reporters committed to giving women’s issues a positive spin and incorporating

gender balance in their political news coverage, despite these institutional barriers. She

reasoned that “there weren’t women covering politics 10 years ago [but they] study

political analysis now, tag after political candidates, women are at every level of

reporting [and are] very interested in achieving balance in newspaper copy so that women

get an even shake.”222 Writing for the Edmonton Journal in 1987, Goyette’s own desire

to produce an affirmative piece on women’s role in the political process was stymied by

the reality of women’s gains in politics – a reality that ultimately killed the article. She recounted that it

220 Elections and the Press workshop minutes, November 22, 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 704)

221 Ibid.

222 Ibid.

169

was to be an upbeat, dynamic and uplifting account of achievement of

women in democracy. WOMEN WIN BIG. But, the research was very

discouraging and ‘we kid ourselves if we think we are making great

progress. All the women in elected political positions across Canada up

until 1984 could fit on one 60 passenger bus.’ By 1987 there were still

only 90 women.223

Moreover, the panelists had a difficult time pinning down credible government sources on women’s issues, noting that female politicians “do not champion women’s issues because they will become ghettoized: don’t want lines divided by sex.”224 So while

(certain) journalists’ had the will to promote women’s issues in media discourse, they lacked the credible sources and facts and figures needed to create a story that met the demands of newsroom standards of political news reporting. According to the panelists, this accounted for the noticeable paucity of supportive coverage of the women’s movement. To overcome these barriers, the panelists’ recommended that NAC play to its strengths when seeking change in the tenor of its news coverage: pressure editorial boards and lobby for greater fairness in media framing of the women’s movement. If

NAC made its news media coverage an identifiable women’s issue, much in the way they had for violent and pornographic representations of women in mass media, then the organization was more likely to realize a change in women’s movement reporting.

223 Elections and the Press workshop minutes, November 22, 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 704)

224 Ibid.

170

Although NAC did not take-up this last suggestion, the organization’s media

policy was revamped in 1987 with detailed guidelines suggestive of the familiar combat

adage, “the best offense is a good defense” – a posture reflective of the tense socio-

political context. The Communications Policy suggested that a more adversarial tenor

informed the relationship between NAC and news media, warning that “journalists often

put pressure on executive members to give immediate answers on subjects on which there

may be no policy (or no policy you are aware of).”225 The policy provided members with

a five point plan to cope with the situation, so as to avoid creating public relations

blunders that would substantiate Conservative claims that NAC was not a major political

player. It recommended that members ask for a delay, offer only a personal (not organizational) opinion on the subject, refer the reporter to an executive member, redirect the question, or “if you don’t trust the reporter, or feel the question is loaded, say you have NO COMMENT on the issue.”226

The hierarchical vetting process for all “public communications” outlined in the

Communications Policy suggested NAC was closing ranks to maintain control over the

organization’s public image. All written and verbal communication had to be approved

by NAC executive members before being distributed. For example, any briefs that “have

not received the approval of the executive will not be sent our media list, nor be

distributed to the media at a press conference, nor be announced in a press release, nor be included in our publications list, nor be publicized in NAC’s publications.”227 The policy

225 NAC Communications Policy, June 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 702)

226 Ibid. emphasis original

227 Ibid. 171

also indicated that NAC leadership was concerned about inadvertently issuing conflicting

or inconsistent policy positions, which made sense given the size and regional

distribution of the organization’s membership. In terms of new policy positions that were

“non-controversial,” members were to “always check with the appropriate NAC

committee chair to make sure the positions taken are non-controversial and consistent

with NAC’s latest views on the issue.”228, 229 To further help manage the information

flow out of NAC, media spokespeople were assigned for specific issue areas like

Organizational Review, Budget, Childcare, Meech Lake, Housing, Lesbians and Foreign

Policy.230 Any inconsistencies in NAC’s policy statements would have provided fodder

for the conservatives’ canon. Although consecrated into the political elite, the

organization’s membership was tenuous under the new regime. As a result, NAC had to

monitor its own public statements as carefully as it did the government’s.

NAC’s effort to professionalize their media practice was exemplified in the

planning of the proposed 1988 leaders’ debate on women’s issues, as the debate planning

committee entertained ways to adapt the debate strategy in order to create a more media-

friendly event than last time. Responding to media-circulated criticism of the past debate

as a boring non-event, President Lynn Kaye led the charge to generate a seamless

production that would stand as a public record of both the politicians’ electoral promises

on women’s issues, as well as a testament to the continuing relevancy and strength of the

228 NAC Communications Policy, June 1987 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 702 emphasis original)

229 “Controversial” subjects, on the other hand, referred to “a subject where one or more executive members or member groups have expressed differing views.” In that case, the letter or brief would be delayed until the matter was resolved by the executive.

230 “Media Spokespersons,” undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696) 172

women’s movement. Innovating (or, more accurately, ‘renovating’) their election strategy

was necessary, since the political opportunity structure extant under the Liberal regime

had shifted with the election of the Progressive Conservatives. As Tilly and Tarrow

(2007) argue, during periods of rapid political change, as was happening in Canada at this

time, innovation of the strategic repertoire becomes key for a movement’s continued

survival (21). For NAC, this meant reconsidering the value of features integral to their

1984 effort, such as feminist live witness and its publicness, to better accommodate the

televisual medium.

In early June 1988, Kaye and a coalition of NAC’s member groups met to

“review some of the critiques of the last Debate as a television event.”231, 232 The

committee members noted that “media said it wasn’t good tv” and “media women said

get a TV producer.”233 Already these comments suggest NAC’s different orientation to

the debate strategy; in 1984, the prioritized vision was of it as a mediated feminist event,

not as an entertaining television show. To make the 1988 debate a livelier and more

watchable event, NAC hired a television producer, tweaked the proposed question- answer format, and limited the agenda to four priority issues so as to allow “all three leaders to speak on them with time for rebuttal.”234, 235 A more contentious change,

231 Meeting minutes (typed), June 8, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

232 In 1988, Lynn Kaye knew that securing the debate would prove more difficult than the 1984 debate, citing not only the changed political climate, but also the absence of an advantageous gaffe: “we got it [because] of Turner bum incident” (Meeting minutes (handwritten), June 7, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)).

233 Meeting minutes (handwritten), June 7, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

234 The television producer, Joan Shaffer, was hired in late September for an initial payment of $2500, which represented one half of her fee. This covered her involvement in “Phase I” of the debate project, which included the “planning, budgeting, and negotiations with networks and political parties.” The Letter 173

however, concerned what had been an integral component of the original debate: the delegation of NAC members in attendance. The presence of their membership reflected

NAC’s commitment to producing an explicitly feminist event. So when Kaye suggested in 1988 that it be a “studio event and not a public meeting,” some internal negotiations took place over what type of event was being constructed.236

The discussion over the value of feminist live witness took over the initial planning session, as members debated its performative effect, its impact on accessibility, and organizational finances.237 Committee members were not convinced that feminist live witness was the most effective form of feminist participation in the debate. Supporters argued that the live audience “put more pressure on the leaders and gave the event a sense of immediacy.”238 But detractors questioned the quality of the women’s experience as an audience, since in 1984 they had been subjected to the passive audience guideline: “it only gave the appearance of having women involved, because they were not able to put

of Agreement indicated that Shaffer would receive the remainder of the contract “prior to entering Phase II of the project.” Phase II, however, did not happen. (NAC to Joan Shaffer, September 30, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696))

NAC also seemed to have hired a lawyer to handle debate negotiations with the networks and political parties. Although the archive did not yield a contract for services, attorney Peter S. Grant appeared to have acted as NAC’s liaison, mailing correspondence to the networks, relaying the networks’ responses back to NAC, and providing copies of their correspondence for NAC’s records. These two hires were an important aspect of NAC’s process of professionalization compared to 1984, when NAC met and spoke with network representatives personally.

235 The issues were free trade, child care, abortion and violence against women. With a limited agenda, the three leaders would be required to answer on all topics, unlike 1984, when Mulroney was not compelled to state his party’s position on abortion (a much criticized aspect of that encounter). (Lynn Kaye to Brian Mulroney, August 29, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693))

236 Meeting minutes (typed), June 8, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

237 Lynn Kaye to NAC Executive Members, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693 emphasis original)

238 Meeting minutes (typed), June 8, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

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questions to the leaders and could only express themselves by cheering or booing.”239

These positions contrasted different views of the function of feminist live witness. On the one hand, the politicians were central to the experience: the audience was a pressure tactic, meant to elicit serious commitments from the candidates. On the other hand, the feminist audience’s experience of the event was prioritized, as they were given the opportunity to participate in an updated version of sit-in protest, tailor made for a political debate forum. Kaye’s bottom line, however, was securing the politician’s participation; without all-party agreement, the discussion was moot. She suggested that the political party leaders would be more responsive to a proposal for a closed studio debate, than a public forum. The same three leaders were in the leadership race: would

Turner or Mulroney be interested in a repeat performance of 1984, when the underdog

Broadbent was cheered on by a crowd of feminists as they were booed?240 She concluded

that “a public meeting [should] NOT be held in conjunction with the debate.”241

As we saw in 1984, the issue of accessibility was inherent to the concept of feminist live witness. At that time, NAC prioritized women’s live experience of the event over media presence in order to protect the feminist “publicness” of the debate. An unintended side effect of that commitment was regional bias; the majority of women who

239 Meeting minutes (typed), June 8, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

240 These early discussions also touched on issues of question/answer formats, sponsorship and network involvement. While it was concluded that most of these issues depended on the parties’ and networks’ responses to the proposal, Kaye informed the NAC Executive that the election committee was recommending that “a leaders’ debate take place during the election campaign HOSTED by NAC, in co- operation with other sponsoring groups” (Lynn Kaye to NAC Executive Members, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693 emphasis original)). As a primary sponsor (or “host”), NAC could ensure some measure of control over the debate’s production and their public image.

241 Lynn Kaye to NAC Executive Members, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693 emphasis original)

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could afford to attend were local, coming from Toronto or Ottawa-based women’s groups. The point was made that “A public meeting held in any one centre naturally favours the women in that locale.”242 In 1988, NAC argued that eliminating the live

audience would prevent inadvertent exclusion of their geographically distant member

groups. Instead, as Conservative Brian Armstrong had argued in 1984, the press would

function as proxy for the Canadian people. In this vein, Kaye argued to the NAC

executive that “in a country the size of Canada the media is the best vehicle to give as

many Canadian women as possible access to NAC’s message and the leaders’

responses.”243

Theoretically, this shift changes the type of event being produced. Dayan and

Katz (1992) argue that media events are typically ‘organized outside the media,’ with

networks functioning only as a means of transmitting the content of the occasion (5-6).

Although the 1984 debate was organized outside of the media, the inclusion of a feminist

audience contributed to its framing as explicitly feminist, helping to construct the debate

as a mediated feminist event as opposed to a typical media event. In 1988, though, NAC

leaned toward situating the proposed debate within a network studio and without feminist live witness. Would this make the event any less feminist? Would the increasingly “made

for television” character of protest, on the rise since the 1960s as Tilly and Tarrow (2007)

argue, undermine the debate’s integrity as a feminist strategy?

In this case, yes – but it was a price NAC could afford to pay. The optics of the

broadcast would lose some of their rhetorical power. Although no reaction shots were

242 Lynn Kaye to NAC Executive Members, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

243 Ibid. 176

permitted during actual debating, the introductory moments (during Hošek’s speech, for

instance) included numerous panning shots of a sea of feminist faces. This was a

powerful visual reminder of the strength of the collective women’s movement, which

would be lost in a studio presentation without a live audience. And, as some committee

members argued, the affective quality of having a crowd of women attending to the candidates’ every word – eliciting reactions that would be broadcast to the nation – would be compromised. However, these were losses NAC could afford to take. The audience’s vocal responses were the basis of media-circulated discourse about the “unruliness” and unreasonableness of the women’s movement; a decision to eliminate feminist live witness meant withdrawing one basis for delegitimization. Second, the panning shots of the packed auditorium were brief and restricted to the opening few minutes. If they lost these opening shots in the 1988 debate, NAC could compensate with an opening montage of images from the 1984 encounter.244 The opening sequence would remind audiences of

the strength of the movement, as well as cultivate a sense of tradition around the

women’s debates.

Moreover, by 1988, NAC had entered more tenuous financial times. The

projected budget for NAC’s 1988 election campaign was $105 500, including $60 000 for

mass media strategies ($30 000 for the debate, $30 000 for TV and radio PSAs), which left a $57 500 difference for NAC to cover.245 Since NAC was spearheading the anti-Free

244 NAC had a draft outline of the proposed 1988 debate on women’s issues prepared by September, 1988. The first element of the event was to be a “montage opening (montage from the ’84 debate title/vo/theme music)” lasting 20 seconds. (National Leaders’ Debate on Women’s Issues draft timetable, September 21, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696))

245 NAC Election Budget, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

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Trade movement, which formed the heart of Mulroney’s election platform, the

organization was not likely to receive supplementary or emergency government

funding.246 For the first time, the organization’s election strategy included a fundraising

drive directed at member groups. NAC started soliciting member groups for donations as

early as July 1988. In one instance, NAC mailed a letter to their member groups, in which

four of five election strategies involved making financial contributions to the umbrella organization.247 These circumstances made cutting the public meeting aspect of the

debate strategy a tempting option. As Kaye remarked in a report to the executive: “As

you know, our resources are extremely tight.”248

NAC’s final proposal, however, reflected the organization’s commitment to the feminist organizing logic that guided the 1984 effort. In letters sent to the networks, NAC

described a vision of the debate that included a live audience comprised of

representatives from its member groups, arguing that “This does not exclude the use of a

television studio as the venue […] if the debate is held in a studio as opposed to a public

auditorium, it should be structured so that a studio audience can attend.”249 In the letter,

Kaye also reasoned that feminist live witness will “add immediacy and interest to the

246 This had been the case in 1985, after NAC came up short in its budget after staging the 1984 leaders’ debate on women’s issues. That year, the strategy cost NAC approximately $30 000 ($34 000 is cited in a different document), with donated goods and services amounting to an additional $17 000. Chaviva Hošek made a plea to then Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, Walter McLean, for supplementary funding for the 1984-1985 fiscal year. She emphasized in her request that NAC had received the smallest percentage increase in funding for that year, of all the major national women’s groups. The government approved NAC’s request, sending a cheque for approximately $55 000 (Chaviva Hošek to Walter McLean, January 11, 1985 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)).

247 Lynn Kaye to member groups, July 11, 1988, (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

248 Lynn Kaye to NAC Executive Members, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

249 Lynn Kaye to Bill Morgan, September 21, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

178

occasion, [and] will provide the leaders with a sense of responsiveness.”250 The organization attempted to mitigate regional bias by contacting its almost 600 member groups to send representatives from across the nation.251 To address concerns the candidates may have had about partisan cheering, Kaye advised that “the audience be somewhat differently organized than was the case in 1984. Now that it is possible to plan in advance, we propose that the audience be a non-partisan audience of women representing all regions of country as well as all age groups and walks of life.”252 For

NAC, the proposed 1988 debate event would not only maintain its feminist framing through the inclusion of a live audience, but it would also better reflect the organization’s commitment to equitable access for all its feminist members.

The efforts NAC took to professionalize, exemplified in their media workshop, the updated communications policy, and the renovated debate strategy, represented a few of the “real” effects of their institution as a member of the political elite on their organizational media strategy. Competing for legitimacy at the level of political elites,

NAC needed to manage the organization’s public image in terms of journalists’ framing of its agenda, the consistency of its policy stances, and the production of a seamless television debate. These undertakings are what Bourdieu refers to as a ‘self-respecting heir behaving like an heir’ (1991[1982], 122).

250 Lynn Kaye to Bill Morgan, September 21, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

251 NAC also offered to help fund those groups who lacked the financial resources to send representatives (Lynn Kaye to Bill Morgan, September 21, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)).

252 Lynn Kaye to Bill Morgan, September 21, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696) 179

Whereas Bourdieu argues that “all social destinies […] are equally fatal,” though,

NAC’s consecration amongst political elites was not necessarily a permanent condition.

One of the functions of the act of institution, Bourdieu notes, is “to discourage permanently any attempt to cross the line, to transgress, desert, or quit” (122 emphasis original). While their political legitimization in 1984 might be read as a hegemonic gesture meant to permanently co-opt the women’s movement’s rising opposition, I posit that NAC was always “on the bubble,” that is, at risk of being bounced out of the official political realm. As a social movement organization, NAC was not untouchable: oppositional movement voices gain and diminish in public popularity, fall in and out of favour under different political regimes, and pose varying degrees of threat and/or opportunity for a ruling government.

In the end, NAC’s decision to adjust only minor aspects of the debate strategy and to keep those elements that framed it as an explicitly feminist event signaled a refusal to conform to the standards of media eventfulness that usually framed televised political debate. Although the organization was willing to limit and identify a four-point women’s issues agenda, the proposal included feminist live witness and NAC selected moderator and panelists. As they did in 1984, these facets of the proposal violated the ceremony and objective moderation characteristic of this political ritual. Whether or not NAC could have maintained its consecrated status amidst the political elite cannot be determined, since their proposed debate never happened. Instead, in a definitive act of de-institution, the Prime Minister redirected the women’s issues agenda out of NAC’s hands and into the broadcast networks’. 180

Acts of De-Institution

Whereas the leaders of the other two political parties agreed to participate in

NAC’s proposed debate, Mulroney’s slighting response attempted to shift control over the event’s production from the organization to television networks, a tactic of power that consolidated state and media resources. Signed by the co-chairmen of the Progressive

Conservative party, the letter initially “applauds” NAC’s precedent setting 1984 debate on women’s issues, remarking that “it is the Prime Minister’s intention to honour and sustain that tradition.”253 The chairmen then stated, however, that Mulroney’s

participation in the women’s debate would be unfair to “other legitimate groups with

sincere interests in some of the vital issues that must be addressed in this campaign. […]

It seems to us that our accepting NAC’s invitation puts us in a slightly unbalanced position with these other groups. Despite the precedent, can we really accept one group’s invitation, and turn down all the others? We think not.”254 Mulroney’s camp

characterized NAC’s request as a plea for special treatment.

This leitmotif of neoliberal discourse redefines advocacy groups as “special

interest,” which was an effective way to discredit equality-seeking organizations in the

public eye. Social movement groups, including NAC, were “not viewed as filling representational lacunae by providing an alternative to parties; rather, they are described as having a singular or ‘special’ focus and this, in turn, calls into question their democratic credentials” (Dobrowolsky 1998, 708). NAC had already been subjected to delegitimizing “bad citizen” discourses in 1984, as certain news reports claimed that the

253 Norman Atkins and Michel Cogger to Lynn Kaye, August 25, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds 693)

254 Ibid. 181

women’s debate was a divisive moment in the nation because its sponsoring organization

represented the interests of only a radical few. As the public face of national feminism in

Canada, the women’s movement as a whole also was characterized as pursuing goals that

were not in the general interest, as working against a fully-democratic Canada. As

Dobrowolsky (1998) notes, “The irony is that the aim of feminist mobilization is not to

limit, but to broaden and deepen democracy” (719).

Moreover, claims that feminist organizations lobbied on behalf of “special

interests” which competed with national priorities sought to contain forms of contention

that were undergirded by collective support. In NAC’s case, the organization combined

lobbying (or “interest” based) efforts with “a provocative, mobilizing, social movement presence” (Dobrowolsky 1998, 715-716). Their collective presence was strategically emphasized in the organization’s heretical discourse of national representativeness during the 1984 election campaign. Over the next four years, NAC continued to participate in coalition building politics, such as co-founding the Pro-Canada Network, demonstrating the organization’s commitment to a movement-based politics of collective action and identity, in combination with lobbying strategies. NAC’s 1988 election campaign slogan,

Women Vote!, persisted these efforts in the face of politicians’ marginalizing discourse of “special interest.” Confronted with the will, resources and extensive network of the neoliberal regime, however, NAC encountered numerous obstacles sustaining its popular profile as a social movement organization and not a “special interest” group.

Another such impediment came in the form of the Conservative party’s counter-

proposal, which promised the Prime Minister’s participation in a women’s issues debate 182

if it was sponsored by the television networks. The Conservatives redirected the site of contention from the field of feminist “special interest” politics to the broadcast media, in an attempt to institutionalize the women’s issues agenda while marginalizing NAC. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) identify this type of institutionalization – where oppositional voices are subsumed within state practices – as a mechanism of demobilization (97-109). The authors argue that as movement participants become discouraged by repression, boredom or movement fatigue, one of two paths may be taken in a process of demobilization: institutionalization and escalation (which will be addressed in the subsequent chapter).

Institutionalization refers to the “substitution of the routines of organized politics for the disorder of life in the streets, buttressed by mass organization and purposive incentives”

(della Porta and Tarrow in Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 101). Inherent to this concept is compromise; movement actors adjust their political strategies in order to make some gains. Although the women’s debate strategy is clearly not comparable to violent street protest, the use of repression to coerce compromise is parallel. In this case, the

Conservatives offered NAC a compromise presentation that ensured the public airing of the women’s issues agenda, but delimited the feminist organization’s involvement.

In the Tories’ proposal, the women’s issues agenda would not be framed by a feminist organizational presence; neither NAC nor any other women’s group would

influence the questions asked of the leaders, the selection of panelists and moderator, the

presence and/or constitution of a live audience, or the introductory contextualization of

the event as an emergent, feminist tradition. Within the organizing logic of media,

women’s issues would be televisually presented as unaffiliated from NAC’s political

power and disconnected from the collective strength of the women’s movement. The 183

letter posited that only the networks – not NAC – could endow women’s issues with enough political credibility to be taken seriously on the national stage, stating, the Prime

Minister “believes nationally televised debates sponsored by the broadcast networks will signal recognition by all involved of the truly national importance of the issues and the audience to be addressed.”255

Mulroney used print and broadcast media as a strategic field on which to enact

(and enliven) the power struggle between his office and NAC over the proposed debate,

as the Tories attempted to produce a disempowered feminist subject. Since the

Conservatives’ had forwarded their letter of response to the media, newspaper reports

quickly reinforced the Prime Minister’s usurpation of NAC’s leadership role in planning the women’s debate. Alongside a photograph of a grinning, bespectacled Mulroney, the

Globe & Mail announced, “PM sets the terms on TV debate.” His quoted remark that,

“‘the practical reality is we have to draw the line on most of these invitations,’” diminished NAC’s consecrated status, by situating the organization’s request as no different than any other made by less established advocacy groups.256 President Lynn

Kaye responded to the disparaging characterization with a statement to the press. She

emphasized that NAC had obtained “all party agreement” for the proposed second

women’s debate, which, in principle, it had. Not only did this strategy reassert NAC’s political capital (having secured all three leaders’ participation), but it also increased

public pressure on the Tory leader to follow through. To this end, the Globe & Mail

255 Norman Atkins and Michel Cogger to Lynn Kaye, August 25, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds 693)

256 Christopher Waddell, “PM sets terms on TV debate,” Globe & Mail, August 27, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

184

reported that “[Kaye] did not interpret the Tory proposal as a negative answer to NAC’s

involvement.”257 Taking a different tack than Kaye, Doris Anderson reported that the

Conservatives’ response “looks like a complete rejection, and a cop-out.”258 She revealed

Mulroney’s counter-proposal for what it was – a necessary gesture to mitigate any negative fallout that an outright rejection would have generated. Mulroney had no

personal interest or political motivation to participate in a women’s issues debate, even

one organized by the networks. As Dobrowolsky (1998) points out, “In comparison to the

early 1980s, the climate for ‘interest groups’ had turned substantially colder by the end of

the decade. Given the Conservative government’s priorities, there was little time or use

for […] advocacy groups” (724).

To Mulroney’s advantage, his government’s neoliberal policy had forged the way

for a fortuitous “‘confluence of interests’” between the Conservative government and the

networks by the late 1980s.259 Both market and ideological rationales compelled the

networks to align with the interests of the neoliberal state. As Gitlin (2003[1980]) argues, media elites have only “bounded” autonomy from the state, since they are ruled by corporate interests. He identifies an incessant tension embedded within the news media practice:

257 “NAC undaunted as Tories refuse sponsored debate,” Globe & Mail, August 30, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

258 Doris Anderson, “Real men debate women’s issues,” Toronto Star, October 2, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

259 William Walker, “Parties battle networks, each other over prime-time campaign,” Toronto Star, October 11, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

185

The media elite want to honor the political-economic system as a whole;

their very power and prestige deeply presuppose that system. At the same

time, they are committed, like members of any other corporate elite, to

their own particular economic and political advantage. The networks

above all play for high profit stakes. The resulting conflicts – between

particular corporate interests and what the networks take to be the interests

of the corporate system as a whole – constitute one irreducible source of

strain within the system […]. Even a news organization’s methods for

legitimizing the system as a whole, its code of objectivity and balance,

pull it in conflicting directions: at one moment toward the institutions of

political and economic power, and at another toward alternative and even,

at times, oppositional movements, depending on political circumstance.

(2003[1980], 258)

Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue simply that “regimes shape institutions” (60). The CBC

had certainly felt the impact of Mulroney’s economism: the public broadcaster’s budget

had been cut by $85 million in 1985, with another $20 million reduction slated for 1989

(Collins 1990, 88). As such, it was not particularly motivated to broadcast the proposed

women’s debate, something the feminists knew. In her Toronto Star column, Anderson

reported that the network was already “strapped for extra cash to do anything, let alone

stage another debate […The CBC had] it’s budget run through the wringer several times

by this government and hung out to dry some millions of dollars.”260 In addition, the

260 Doris Anderson, “Real men debate women’s issues,” Toronto Star, October 2, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693) 186

Conservatives’ had called an autumn election that coincided with the networks’ lucrative

fall television schedule. How likely was it that the networks would choose to broadcast a second set of leadership debates, deemed to be of “special interest,” in place of the World

Series or the start of the NHL season? As the CBC Director, TV News and Current

Affairs, John Owen remarked, “‘it would be elitist to assume that people wouldn’t want

to see the World Series.’”261, 262

The rapid consolidation of network and neoliberal state power moved NAC

toward a flexible strategic repertoire. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that quick shifts in

the political opportunity structure motivates “challengers [to] seek new means to outwit

authorities and competitors” (58). NAC’s negotiations with the networks demonstrated

their willingness to fulfill any number of roles in order to secure a separate debate on women’s issues; the organization did not want to engage in a tug-of-war for control over

the event. In her letter to the CBC, Lynn Kaye sets forth the options as NAC understood

them to be:

1. Would the CBC and/or the other networks be interested in sponsoring a

National Leaders’ Debate on Women’s Issues […]?

261 William Walker, “Parties battle networks, each other over prime-time campaign debate,” Toronto Star, October 11, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

262 Sports broadcasts became an unofficial standard by which to measure the women’s debate’s importance to Canadian society at large. In addition to Owen’s remarks, Lynn Kaye had initially justified pursuing a second debate because the 1984 event had garnered 54% of the viewing audience (or 14% of the total population) or, as she put it in a letter to the member groups, “more viewers than watch the Stanley Cup playoffs” (Lynn Kaye to Member Groups, July 11, 1984 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)). 187

2. If a full sponsorship by the networks of such a debate is not of interest

to you or them, would a co-sponsorship with NAC on a non-partisan basis

be of interest?

3. If the networks are not prepared to be involved in the sponsorship of

such a debate, NAC will be proposing to sponsor a non-partisan debate

[…] would the networks be prepared to broadcast it on a national basis?

[…]

If the networks are prepared to sponsor such a debate, NAC would be

prepared to fully support it. In addition, we would be pleased to assist in

any advisory capacity that might be considered useful or appropriate.263

Despite NAC’s maneuvering, the networks refused NAC’s request to sponsor a separate women’s debate because doing so would set an untenable standard for other advocacy groups. In attorney Peter Grant’s report to NAC, he stated that, for the CBC and CTV, sponsoring a women’s debate “sets a precedent for covering specific topics at the insistence of pressure groups. The networks have already been asked to sponsor special issue debates by the Assembly of First Nations, REAL Women, etc., and do not want to get into this.”264 The networks were unprepared to handle competing claims for political legitimacy from different advocacy groups, and so all were denied; this essentially sanctioned the neoliberal state’s belief that extra-parliamentary groups should

263 Lynn Kaye to Bill Morgan, September 21, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

264 Peter Grant to Lynn Kaye, October 3, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696) 188

not intervene in the workings of government. The networks’ refusal, therefore, made the

Conservatives’ counter-proposal strategy politically potent.

‘Covering the Waterfront’

A variety of tactics came together to form a “comprehensive system” of power that undermined NAC’s consecrated position in the political process: the Mulroney government cultivated an anti-feminist countermovement with their funding of REAL

Women of Canada; neoliberal discourses of false equivalency and “successful” citizenship, which gained currency in media reporting, shaped the perception of NAC as a threat to full democracy; the Prime Minister redirected “ownership” of the proposed debate on women’s issues from NAC to the television networks, further reinforcing the delegitimizing perception that NAC was not a representative organization; and the networks refused to sponsor or broadcast a separate women’s debate, thus sanctioning the

Mulroney government’s marginalizing characterization of NAC as a special interest group. Along with the CBC’s inexplicable banning of the “Women Vote!” PSA, these acts of de-institution drove NAC (and the women’s movement) from the consecrated space of official political discourse. Confronted with this consolidation of network and neoliberal state power, NAC’s best, most organized efforts could not prevent the women’s issues debate from being “‘submerged in a marathon [general issues] debate.’”265

265 Mark Kennedy, “Women’s group still willing to stage election debate,” Ottawa Citizen, October 8, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

189

In their refusal to sponsor a separate women’s debate, the networks asserted that the four priority women’s issues identified by NAC – free trade, abortion, child care, and violence against women – would be addressed in the general issue debates because those issues “are not peripheral women’s issues but are general issues of interest to men as well as women.”266 While this logic highlighted an inconsistency within neoliberal discourse

(women’s issues are simultaneously of “special” and “general” interest), it also enabled the networks’ claims to have provided fair and balanced coverage of alternative voices in the election (Gitlin 2003[1980]).

Although Curran and Liebes (1998) state that a hallmark of liberal democratic society is the ability of the television networks to say ‘no’ to a media event, newspaper reports criticized the broadcasters’ decision not to hold a separate women’s debate, alleging that the “united front” of the three networks (CBC, CTV, and Global) had prioritized financial and commercial interests ahead of Canadian women’s well-being.

The Toronto Star quoted NDP campaigner Robin Sears as saying, “‘[it] feels the networks have greedily put advertising revenues during the lucrative fall season ahead of a public duty to provide Canadians with information on which they may decide how to cast a vote Nov. 21.’”267 Others questioned the ability of a general issue debate to “cover the waterfront” and still give women’s issues their due diligence.268 NAC took advantage of the sympathetic tenor of this coverage and issued a press release accusing the networks

266 Peter Grant to Lynn Kaye, October 3, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 696)

267 William Walker, “Parties battle networks, each other over prime-time campaign,” Toronto Star, October 11, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

268 Mark Kennedy, “Women’s group still willing to stage election debate,” Ottawa Citizen, October 8, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

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of “discriminating against women and attempting to manage the news.”269 By dismissing the “moral responsibility” bestowed on them by the Prime Minister’s “special request” and the clear mandate of all-party agreement, the networks were now the ones subverting the democratic process.270

Nevertheless, in a culminating act of de-institution, NAC was ‘excommunicated’ from the consecrated space of official political discourse – despite the inclusion of one hour of women’s issue questioning and Lynn Kaye’s public proclamations that “‘It’s there […] because we pushed for it.’”271 Without doubt, the organization’s persistent efforts continued until the last minute, when NAC sent a confidential briefing book consisting of twenty-three issue related documents to the debate’s moderator (Rosalie

Abella) and three panelists (Pamela Wallin, CTV; David Halton, CBC; and Doug Small,

Global) to assist in their preparation of the women’s issues questions.272 NAC’s inability to secure a separate debate on women’s issues was not due to any strategic flaw or major organizational failing; they had little hope of overcoming the consolidation of network and neoliberal state power.

While the women’s issues agenda maintained a degree of political capital through its inclusion in the general issue debates, it was also neatly excised from its affiliation with NAC and the collective power of the women’s movement. Subjected to the

269 NAC press release, October 18, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

270 Ibid.

271 Christie Blatchford, “‘Women’s issues’ offend,” Toronto Star, October 12, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693)

272 My research in the NAC archive turned-up no documents detailing the fate of this submission to the panel. 191

televisual hegemony of traditional political debate, the women’s issues debate segment

lost much of the symbolic power it had held as a feminist event, without its overt framing within the feminist tradition, feminist live witness, or women’s movement representatives on hand to ask questions. Lacking NAC’s sponsorship, the 1988 women’s issues debate segment also lost its grounding in a specific political perspective; this culminated in a strange moment when a question’s appropriateness came under scrutiny during the actual

debate. The panelists’ and moderator’s judgment were called into question, as Broadbent

started debating Canadian women’s interest in national defense spending. Broadbent’s

criticism simultaneously disciplined women’s issues as external to “hard” policy issues

like national defense and consigned to oblivion decades of anti-nuclear activism led by

the Canadian feminist peace movement. Perhaps more surprising than Broadbent’s challenge was the moderator’s acquiescence to it. Abella conceded that “that oblique reference to social issues [in the question] turns out not to be a reference to women’s issues” and blamed the panelists for the “unexpected intervention” (“1988 Leaders’

Debate, CBC Archives”). Despite Pamela Wallin’s defensive riposte that “we [the

panelists] felt women were in fact very interested in these issues and in the spending of

defense funds,” this episode ultimately undermined the place of women’s issues in the

official political realm by reminding the viewing audience of just how “tricky” women’s

issues could be: not even the “objective” media experts could properly identify them.

After the Conservatives’ re-election, NAC endured both economic and symbolic

retaliatory measures for their vociferous, coalition-based challenge to cornerstones of the

PC platform, such as the Free Trade Agreement and, later, the party’s proposed budget.

Mulroney tightened the federal purse-strings around the organization’s budget by cutting 192

more than 50% of NAC’s funding by 1992. In yet another stinging act of de-institution,

the Prime Minister refused to send representatives to meet with NAC at their 1989 annual

lobby for the first time since its inception in 1977; a highly symbolic gesture that cast

NAC as an anachronism of the women’s movement, particularly in light of Barb

McDougall’s comment that Canadian women were “finding other voices”273 to speak on

their behalf (she may have been referring to REAL Women, who finally received

government funding for their activities in 1989). In press reports, McDougall, the

Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, posited that NAC’s strategies had

outlived their usefulness, stating that the NAC lobby was “‘not seen to be an effective

mechanism’”274 and that “‘there are better forums’”275 in which to discuss women’s

issues. By this, McDougall apparently meant private, closed door meetings – an option

extended to NAC in advance of the lobby weekend.276 NAC leadership turned down

McDougall’s offer to meet privately, however, as the organization recognized the Tory refusal as a denial of the women’s movement as an influential political constituency. In comments to the press, Kaye remarked, “If one of the parties decides that we are not a

273 Joan Bryden, “McDougall slams women’s group,” Edmonton Journal, May 16, 1989 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

274 Paul Koring, “Tories break tradition by boycotting meetings with women’s lobby,” Globe & Mail, May 13, 1989 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

275 Joan Bryden, “McDougall slams women’s group,” Edmonton Journal, May 16, 1989 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

276 The Tories also argued that NAC’s decorum during lobbying sessions was objectionable. One news report noted that the approximately 200 NAC women in attendance would either boo and hiss or give standing ovations to parties, depending on their responses. This tactic recalled the “hissing suffragist” figure of the early 1900s who would express their displeasure with those politicians who opposed women’s franchise.

193

constituency that they want to address, then they can live with the consequences of that decision.”277

The web of events identified in this chapter signaled not only the growing estrangement between NAC and the federal government, but also the emergence of a broader shift in the organization’s strategic perspective. The de-instituting acts carried out by the Conservative government were also mechanisms of demobilization exerted on the women’s movement. The accumulation of neoliberal state and network power had the effect, on one hand, of producing movement fatigue and disillusionment amongst women’s groups. Feminist activists described a “growing sense of despair and powerlessness, of not being listened to, and of being made to feel invisible” during this era (Bashevkin 1996, 233). As Tilly and Tarrow (2007) note, another, inverse reaction also emerges from the repression of contentious politics: escalation. Confronted with the legacy of the Mulroney years – economic starvation, the severing of institutionalized channels of communication, and the retraction of ‘gender’ as basis for claims-making on the state – NAC pursued less conciliatory forms of feminist advocacy, breaking with their established liberal politics and embracing what was considered an increasingly “radical” agenda, particularly as they entered the early 1990s. As Laura Sabia remarked, “Will

NAC change? It must or it will perish!”278

277 Joan Bryden, “McDougall slams women’s group,” Edmonton Journal, May 16, 1989 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

278 Sabia, however, was suggesting that NAC pursue more conciliatory politics with the government, not less, in order to maintain its relevancy. (Laura Sabia, untitled, Toronto Sun, May 23, 1989 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)) 194

- Chapter Four -

Solidarity Amongst Diversity: Radical Democratic Feminist Citizenship and NAC’s Future Vision

We are […] witnessing the emergence of a new hegemonic project, that of liberal-conservative discourse, which seeks to articulate the neo-liberal defence of the free market economy with the profoundly anti-egalitarian cultural and social traditionalism of conservatism.279 The fact that the women’s movement is responding to this environment by engaging in the fight for social, economic, and political equity for women of colour, lesbians, Aboriginal women, disAbled [sic] women, and by pro- actively strengthening the voices of these constituencies of women within the ranks of our own organizations, is yet further testament to the capacity of feminism to be a pivotal force for fundamental social change our foremothers dreamed of.280

Writing in 1985 in response to the ‘crisis of the left’ in Thatcherite Britain, Stuart

Hall presciently argued that rebuilding the left was a project that would require a self-

reflexive process of deep democratization; this project would involve, he noted, “the

construction of new kinds of political linkages between representatives and their

constituencies, between old and new class forces, between the skilled and the unemployed, between the older dispossessed and the new social movements: in short, between the grand old cause and the brand new times…” (243). Eight years later (and across an ocean), NAC was engaging in its own project of renewal as the organization withstood the hostile political climate of right-wing Canada to survive its twentieth anniversary and start developing a strategic framework for the organization’s future

279 Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 175.

280 Punam Khosla, “Review of the Situation of Women in Canada, 1993,” July 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 708) 195

based on strengthening coalitions, implementing affirmative action measures and

fostering dialogue between older and younger feminists.

Central to NAC’s political agenda at this time was the resolution to halt the

conservative agenda that had taken hold of the nation alongside the Tory’s neoliberal

economic regime. To accomplish this, NAC had to communicate a different model of

social division than that advanced under the conservative regime, which held that

“difference = inequality = liberty” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 174). NAC could not hope

to contest neoconservative politics without, to paraphrase Hall, attending to cultural

questions, without conducting a ‘politics’ of the subjective moment, of identity, and without a conception of the subjects of its project, those who it was making feminism for

and with (1988, 8). In the mid-1980s, NAC advocated on behalf of a symbolic “Canadian

woman.” The organization’s heretical discourse of national representativeness relied on

generalized claims about NAC’s diversity and number of members, while their election

campaigns hearkened on broadly-based women’s vote and gender gap discourses that

spoke to all “Canadian women.” As Mulroney’s neoliberal restructuring eroded state-

based mechanisms of women’s advocacy, however, NAC’s heretical discourse lost some

degree of its rhetorical power alongside its political capital.

In the meantime, NAC leadership had been spurred by internal dialogues over the

role of its marginalized members (including women of colour, francophone feminists,

disabled and immigrant women) to redress the inequities present in the organization by

turning to a politics of diversity. NAC’s attempt to become more representative of its

constituency through an organizational reorientation toward anti-racist feminism, 196

however, also provided the women’s group with slightly different grounds for claims- making on the state. NAC’s feminism of the 1990s, based on discourses of diversity, equality, and solidarity, advocated for a “feminist citizen” figure constituted by any number of subject positions (such as race, gender, orientation, age, and ability). While women’s shared oppression still offered a basis for collective action, it was no longer identified by NAC as the defining source of organizational identity and political activism.

Instead, NAC’s intersectional feminist approach “expanded the chains of equivalents between the different struggles against oppression” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 176).281

NAC brought pluralism into the public sphere with a version of what Laclau and Mouffe

(2007) identify as “radical democratic citizenship” – that is, a feminist citizen that was not “abstracted from all its other determinations” (Laclau and Mouffe 2007).

In the early 1990s, NAC’s radical democratic approach to feminist advocacy sought to build stronger coalitions among different women’s groups in order to produce a more formidable power bloc to fight neoconservatism, the organization’s identified nemesis. This was not an easy transition to make, as NAC’s newfound effort to prioritize a politics of diversity guided the organizational leadership to stake out unpopular positions both internal and external to the organization. This chapter traces the emergence of the radical democratic feminist citizen in organizational discourses of solidarity, diversity and democracy, as these discourses informed NAC’s administrative and organizing processes, its twentieth anniversary celebrations at the 1992 AGM, notably

281 Intersectional feminist analysis deconstructs the generic category of “woman” by addressing the “intersectionality of various social divisions, most often – but not exclusively – focusing on gender, race, and class” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 193). Brah and Phoenix (2004) provide a detailed historical examination of intersectional analysis. 197

the commemorative history of NAC, as well as the speeches given at NAC’s 1993 AGM,

which was intended to set the tone for Canada’s feminist future with its theme, “Taking

Our Places: Feminism in the Nineties.” To begin, this chapter demonstrates how, at the

turn of the decade, NAC responded to the Conservative government’s repressive tactics with a politics of escalation that laid the groundwork for the organization’s future vision of a radical democratic feminist citizenship.

Opposition - Escalation

From 1988 through 1992, the cooperative foundation of state-movement relations underpinning Canadian women’s advocacy was pulled from under the feet of the women’s movement by the Tory government, who sought to marginalize its flagship organization as a “special interest group” through a series of de-instituting measures.

NAC, however, did not view itself as any less politically potent. As Vickers et al. (1993)

point out, “They had achieved a significant framework of rights, and they were now

exploring them. They were increasingly coming to see themselves as equal partners in the

process of making choices about Canada’s future” (272). Feminist accounts of this era

document how NAC, despite its increasingly limited resources, launched oppositional

campaigns against a series of federal policy initiatives, such as free trade, the Meech

Lake Accord, and the implementation of the GST, that movement outsiders thought

overreached the organization’s status-of-women mandate. The Conservative government,

however, was ever intent on delimiting NAC’s influence in the public sphere.

The 1990 federal budget marked a turning point in the already adversarial

dynamic shaping the state-movement relationship. As the latest in a series of 198

demobilization maneuvers, the government approved budget cuts to the Women’s

Program that targeted specific feminist resources and organizations. This stands in

marked contrast to the year prior, when Women’s Program administrators had final say

over where to impose funding cuts. Interpreted as an effort to literally silence the

women’s movement, NAC and other like-minded organizations responded to the

repressive strategy with escalating politics and increased momentum. Whereas certain mechanisms of demobilization produce an institutionalizing effect, Tilly and Tarrow

(2007) note that social movement actors may also respond to repressive strategies by

pursuing “more extreme goals and more robust tactics” in their advocacy work (101).

Such was the case here.

Although budget cuts affected nearly all federal departments in 1990, feminists argued that the government was making a concerted effort to silence the women’s movement given its specific targeting of feminist organizations, publications and resource centres. In the name of deficit reduction, the 1990 federal budget called for $1.6 million to be cut from the Women’s Program budget. This budget compounded the $1.2 million funding cut to the Women’s Program in 1989. As news of the devastating impact of these cuts traveled, journalists looked more closely at what was being funded instead:

$161 million to Boeing, $17 million in “loans” to strip clubs, $14 million to advertise the

GST, and $1.6 million (the same sum cut from the Women’s Program) to “lease a luxury

office in Halifax for occasional visiting cabinet ministers.”282 For the women’s

movement, however, this amount supported a vast network of support services and

282 Eleanor Wachtel, “When budget cuts seem more like censorship,” Toronto Star, March 21, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785) 199

educational resources on women’s issues. The withdrawal of the funding had devastating consequences: the money provided the core funding for 80 women’s resource centres

across Canada (providing women psychological counseling, education and training, legal

advice, and health assistance), four major feminist publications, and numerous

organizations conducting research on women’s issues.

A sense of moral outrage circulated in media coverage of the 1990 budget, as the

government came across as callous and indifferent to women’s concerns in a society that

was still recovering from the recent mass murder of fourteen female engineering students

in Montreal, Quebec. In one letter to the editor, a York University political science

professor drew quick comparison between the events: “Less than three months after the

Prime Minister shed political tears over the Montreal massacre it appears that Marc

Lepine is alive and well and living in Ottawa.”283 The Mulroney government was viewed as “silencing the women’s movement” by severing nation-wide channels of communication, education, and outreach. The Toronto Star proclaimed that Ottawa was

“Toying with women” and “stepping up war on women”284 and a Globe and Mail

headline characterized the budget cuts as a “betrayal.”285 The press gave extensive

coverage of women protesting nation-wide, as they conducted sit-ins at government

offices from Vancouver to Newfoundland, with one reporter saying it was “no wonder”

283 Michael Kaufman, “Cynical Policy,” Globe & Mail, March 12, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785)

284 “Toying with women,” Toronto Star, May 9, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785); Val Sears, “Ottawa accused of stepping up war on women,” Toronto Star, April 3, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785)

285 Ross Howard, “Budget a betrayal, opposition says,” Globe & Mail, September 28, 1989 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785)

200

women were mobilizing in such ways.286 And in a co-authored press release, NAC and

the editors of three women’s journals bankrupted by the cuts stated,

At a time when the country is still in shock following the massacre of

fourteen women students […] the government is eliminating the tools of

women’s communication and education. […] ‘How are we going to be

able to fight the violence that women face daily if we can no longer

communicate with each other across the country – if our voices have been

silenced?’”287

When Liberal MP Mary Clancy “lamented that these cuts were grossly ill-timed in the

wake of the Montreal massacre, Finance Minister Michael Wilson rose in furious,

righteous wrath to call her remarks ‘outrageous.’”288 Outrageous or not, these

comparisons made an indelible impression in the public imagination.

NAC first protested the funding cuts using diplomatic channels, sending letters to

the Secretary of State, sympathetic MPs and the prime minister. They argued that “These

cuts are not effective deficit reduction. $1.6 million represents virtually nothing in

relation to total government spending on the deficit, and it has enabled a world of

possibility and effort on the part of women of this country.”289 The government’s

286 Kim Bolan, “Women occupy office,” The Sun, March 31, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785); Gerald Caplan, “No wonder women are protesting,” Toronto Star, no date (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785); “Police bust up Metro women’s sit-in,” Toronto Star, February 27, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785)

287 Press Release, February 23, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785)

288 Michele Landsberg, “Tory cuts are silencing our sisters,” Toronto Star, February 27, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785)

289 NAC Executive to the Prime Minister, March 8, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785) 201

response was predictably unsympathetic: then-MP Kim Campbell retorted, “‘Our

government does not view Canadians as victims and does not see it as the role of

government to perpetuate weakness and dependency’” (Bashevkin 2002, 31).

Since diplomatic letters did not compel the government to reconsider the cuts to

the Women’s Program, NAC pursued direct action strategies to fight the Tory budget.

The organization formed an internal committee to investigate alternate forms of protest

and joined forces with two national coalitions of advocacy groups. These coalitions used

occupations, demonstrations, and rallies to generate mass support for the funding of women’s groups. NAC developed The Banner Project: Speaking the Truth About

Women’s Lives, which involved the creation of a multitude of three foot deep banners

describing ‘the reality of women’s lives.’ NAC hoped to generate enough banners to

literally wrap the Parliament buildings, in a highly public, symbolic act. Although the

banners were not ultimately used in this way, the coalitions were successful: the

government succumbed to public pressure and returned $1.5 million of the funding.

This moment was a rallying point for the Canadian women’s movement, which

had become fatigued by the demobilizing strategies of repression enacted by the

Conservative government over the past several years. The 1990 federal budget mobilized

women’s groups, including NAC, against the targeted dismissal of the women’s

movement. Eleanor Wachtel, panelist during the 1984 women’s debate, characterized the

government as homing in on the feminist press since it posed a threat, being a “defiant” 202

and “tangible” presence in the neoconservative state.290 Carol Green, co-editor of

Canadian Woman Studies, emphasized that “‘The [feminist] magazines are a rallying point for an analysis of government policies that negatively affect women. We’re a strong voice in the country […] This is a censorship issue.’”291 Mulroney and the Conservative party were identified in media-circulated discourses as not only censors of the feminist press, but symbolic killers: their policies put women at risk by closing off avenues of communication, support, and education. While the funding reversal most certainly resulted from the negative publicity generated by the latter comparison (and not so much from concern over the stifled voice of Canadian feminism), this event made a crack in the federal government’s public credibility on women’s issues. This was a fracture the nation’s women’s groups hoped to exploit in the coming years.

Diversity - Solidarity

In the two years since the federal government’s attempted funding cuts and the murders at École Polytechnique, the women’s movement regained some of its past momentum: NAC’s membership had grown, they increased their operating budget, and they recaptured a degree of their former political capital. In Rebick’s words, “the success of our work over the last two years has forced the federal government to deal more seriously with NAC. Attempts to marginalize NAC that were rampant over the previous several years have slowed down […] The closed doors that we protested at last year’s

290 Eleanor Wachtel, “When budget cuts seem more like censorship,” Toronto Star, March 21, 1990 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 785)

291 Ibid. 203

AGM have been opened, at least a crack.”292 NAC’s role in the Canadian political scene

was redefined by 1992. The downturn in public support for the Conservatives in combination with NAC’s consistently anti-conservative campaigns meant that the organization had come to be viewed as an “extra-parliamentary opposition” – a political movement that linked society and the state, instead of the “official women’s opposition” of the mid-1980s (Gottlieb 1993, 381).293 At the time, Judy Rebick remarked that,

“‘People see us as one of the only progressive voices that has any power. And they want

us to do everything, not just focus on women’s issues. They want us to act like a political party’” (Gottlieb 1993, 381).294

While NAC’s feminist politics of women’s equality had always implicitly tapped

into ideas of Canadian citizenship and democracy, organizational documents demonstrate

that these discourses became more explicit by the early 1990s. The organization was

reassessing its own democratic processes as subordinated member groups voiced

criticism over their ongoing exclusion from leadership positions. NAC’s political system

of representative democracy was not working effectively for member groups who

claimed the interests of women of colour and immigrant women were not being reflected

in the organization’s operation, policy or campaigns. This spurred NAC leadership to

reorient the organization’s praxis toward anti-racist feminism. As an umbrella

292 Executive Report to the Membership, June 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 654)

293 As mentioned earlier, NAC had staked out oppositional stances on a series of Tory initiatives: free trade, the GST, the Meech Lake Accord, and the federal budget. At the time, the organization refuted accusations that they had become a partisan group, saying they were simply against neoconservative policies no matter which party implemented them, Lisa Young (2007), however, argues that NAC was not, as they claimed, non-partisan. Instead, the organization would be more accurately described as apartisan, since “its focus remained very much in the political arena, yet rejected political parties’ monopoly of the arena” (74).

294 Also see Young (2000), 74. 204

organization comprised of several hundred coalition groups, NAC could readily be

described as having been always already diverse. What the turn toward anti-racism feminism accomplished, however, was the institutionalization of equality measures like affirmative action and a salaried presidency.295 Equally important was that NAC

leadership promoted the politics of diversity to its member groups and the public as the

key to the women’s movement’s longevity and power.

In light of member groups’ critique of the efficacy of representative democracy

within NAC, the Executive reconsidered the ways in which its administrative policies and

advocacy practices fostered hierarchical relations. NAC needed to re-build increasingly

tenuous relations with its members to strengthen the organization’s foundation and live

up to its claims of representativeness. Principles of power sharing and true

representativeness guided the organization’s internal restructuring, which intended to

center anti-racist feminist analysis throughout NAC’s processes. The change in

perspective went beyond recognizing the movement as simply diverse or “multicultural”;

it interrogated the reified connections between power, race and gender within the

mainstream Canadian feminist movement.

In addition to a paid presidency and mandatory affirmative action on the NAC

Executive, Rebick pursued strategies of solidarity amongst diversity at the level of

committee work and in consultation processes in order to make NAC’s campaigns truly

representative of its constituents’ interests. The organization began to break down the

295 The affirmative action measures adopted by NAC in 1991 included “designating places on the executive for underrepresented groups, including women of colour, immigrant women, women with disabilities and Aboriginal women. If no one from a designated group filled the spot, it would remain empty” (Rebick 2005, 236). A salaried presidency enabled low income women’s participation in leadership roles within the organization, whereas previously they could not afford to take part in that capacity. 205

homogenization of the movement by engaging in self-reflexive practice, by noticing

which voices had been silenced and which groups had been absented over the course of

NAC’s past twenty years. In the 1992 Executive Report to the Membership, for instance,

Rebick noted that “One mechanism to achieve this has been national meetings to develop campaigns where both NAC member groups and others [from] under-represented constituencies have been able to participate. While there are still problems, we feel that we are breaking new ground in creating a truly inclusive women’s movement at the national level.”296 This seemingly simple act – of inviting under-represented groups to planning sessions, to roundtable discussions, into campaigns – was an act of equalization;

as Laclau and Mouffe (2007) argue, “equalization starts from increasing diversity,

recognition of plurality, difference.” The common refrain throughout Rebick’s annual report was that these strategies would build a more powerful organization and a more unified women’s movement – no matter what difficulties were encountered: “Breaking new ground is never easy but there is no question that our political positions and organizational process is changing daily as a result of our changing composition. The result is a much stronger and more united organization.”297

This re-orientation was met with resistance from some white feminists who

argued that NAC’s advocacy on behalf of “doubly oppressed” women, notably

Aboriginal women and the Innu, demonstrated the organization’s non-racist

296 Executive Report to the Membership, June 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 654)

297 Executive Report to the Membership, June 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 654)

206

orientation.298 Pierson (1993) accounts for this misconception, arguing that anti-racist feminism entreated white feminist women to leave their comfort zones and move toward a painful set of realizations:

some [advocacy campaign] issues have been less disruptive than others to

white feminists’ sense of self and understanding of our place in the world.

[…] And it is more comfortable for women in the dominant group to see

inequality between the men and women in a subordinate group than it is to

acknowledge the inequality between, say, white women and Native

women. […] It is the systemic racism in society and within our own ranks

that women who experience racist oppression have wanted to put on the

feminist agenda. (202)

As a result, tension existed within NAC between two discrepant versions of the organization’s feminism: one advocated by some white feminists who remained firm in their support that NAC was representative of a pan-Canadian women’s movement, and one advocated by women of colour, Rebick, and member groups who recognized the exclusions perpetuated by NAC, as it represented a white women’s movement in Canada.

This tension was evident during the writing of NAC’s commemorative history, created for the twentieth anniversary of the 1972 Strategies for Change conference which was to be celebrated at NAC’s 1992 AGM. Commissioned from feminist researcher

Anne Molgat, the NAC history was to be based on the organization’s archival records as

298 Pierson (1993) argues that “Feminists of colour, who have dared to challenge white feminists on their racism, have not infrequently been met with hurt, anger, denial and countercharges. This defensive reaction is fed, in part, by the two problematic components of white feminism […]: the victim mentality and the construction of white society of goodness and benevolence” (207). 207

well as interviews with past presidents. Molgat wrote the NAC history using a dialogic method, both soliciting and incorporating feedback on the final text from former and current NAC executive members including Judy Rebick, Alice de Wolff, Martha

McGloin, Laurell Ritchie and Kay MacPherson. Based on comments Molgat made when submitting her first draft, the NAC leadership was interested in producing a history that was highly “representative.” This proved difficult, however, as Molgat noted that

“tracking the participation of what we now – patronizingly, I think – call constituency groups is not easy. […] Yes, I will mention the absence of various folks, but I cannot put them where the evidence I have doesn’t show them to be, nor can I spend a great deal of time talking about who wasn’t there.”299

Molgat’s handling of NAC’s past representativeness was closely scrutinized by

NAC leadership given the organization’s recent turn toward the politics of diversity.

Their feedback on Molgat’s initial draft made many suggestions about how to frame the presence/absence of typically marginalized groups – women of colour, lesbian women, francophone feminists, disabled women – throughout the organization’s lifetime. The

NAC executive had to be concerned about the impact of a “celebratory history” that failed to acknowledge past exclusions, particularly during a time when the organization was seeking to rebuild connections with alienated member groups. At the same time, an important consideration for both Molgat and NAC executives was how to avoid writing a revisionist history, wherein the organization’s past practices would be judged according to contemporary definitions of diversity.

299 Anne to Martha email, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694) Molgat’s task was made more difficult by what she describes as the “spotty” archival evidence of NAC’s diversity in its early years. 208

In such a short (twenty page) history, Molgat admitted to “having trouble striking

the balance.”300 For instance, her initial draft stated that “The NAC of the mid-1970s was

a Toronto-based organization of middle-class, able-bodied, English-speaking white

women, very few of whom were ‘out’ lesbians.”301 This description was deemed “unfair”

by Ritchie and MacPherson.302 Molgat decided that, “Rather than write in a piece about

how they were trying to involve other women (poor women, immigrant women, union

women, rural women) and how diversity meant something different at that time […] I

changed the beginning.”303 In another instance, where Molgat had written that disabled

women were not represented at the 1972 Strategy for Change conference, it was brought

to light that at least one such woman had been in attendance. In turn, Molgat responded,

“I have taken out the reference to the absence of women with disabilities at Strategy for

Change rather than trying to write Elsie Gregory McGill in (saves me accidentally missing another women [sic] with a disability who was there).”304 Given the space

restrictions of the history text she was commissioned to write, Molgat was forced to

sacrifice the specificity of past events, even though it meant eliding the experiences of

already marginalized NAC members.

Another point of contention concerned the way in which NAC’s internal tensions were described in the history. Judy Rebick, for instance, was specifically concerned about

300 Anne to Martha email, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

301 Draft NAC History, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

302 Anne to Alice email, May 25, 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

303 Ibid.

304 Ibid.

209

the impact on current organizational relationships of Molgat concluding the history on a cautionary note. In its summary, the draft history touched on NAC’s increasing representativeness of marginalized women and highlighted the organization’s

intersectional analysis of women’s issues.305 Next, however, Molgat focused on the history of antagonism within NAC. She identified a need for current NAC women “to learn to be kind to one another and more respectful of others’ points of view. Some of us experience NAC as a nasty place and speak with bitterness of the thrashings one woman says began at the first meeting. […] we need to begin to think seriously about the violence we do to each other in the feminist community.”306 Rebick contested this rendering of NAC, arguing that “this paragraph suggests we are still trashing each other in NAC and I don’t believe that this is true. The line about the violence we do each other in the feminist community is particularly harsh and unnecessary. Perhaps it could be changed to read we are learning to be kinder and more respectful.”307 While Molgat

refused to “whitewash” comments made by former NAC members, Rebick was

305 The concluding paragraphs stated: Lesbians have always been among us; we are making NAC a safer place in which to be open. We have long supported native women’s issues, increasingly there are native women at the executive table. We have full regional representation, and there are growing numbers of members from outside central Canada. Fully a third of the 91-92 executive are women of colour, immigrant women, aboriginal women and women with disabilities. As we become more diverse, we are learning new ways in which to work. We are learning to share the leadership and to recognize barriers to participation. Many others of us are still underrepresented, we are weaker without the voices of older women, of young women, of rural women and of poor women. We are learning that racism is a women’s issue, as is ableism. We are coming to realize that […] homophobia is every woman’s problem. We are seeing that as long as we live in a country […] where most women over 65 are destined to die in poverty, economic issues require our attention […] We are grappling with the interconnections of issues and seeing in coalitions the way of the future. (Draft NAC History, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694))

306 Draft NAC History, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

307 Judy to Anne, May 19, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)

210

concerned about the effect of the admonitory conclusion on the morale of a diversifying

membership. Not only would the comments have compromised her personal mission for

the organization, which was to manage and minimize any factionalism with discourse of

‘solidarity amongst diversity,’308 they would have also lent a less conciliatory tenor on the celebratory AGM, which was intended to foster an energized, dynamic vision of a diversified women’s movement working in solidarity for the next twenty years of feminist advocacy in Canada.

NAC’s Alternative Vision: Radical Democratic Feminist Citizenship

Both Rebick and her successor, Sunera Thobani, understood that NAC’s future was inextricably bound with the rise of neoconservatism. Immediately following her acclamation at the 1993 AGM, Thobani evinced the connection in a public speech, stating that “‘The only way the neoconservative agenda can be pushed forward is to destroy the women’s movement.’”309 NAC’s turn toward the politics of diversity laid the foundation for building and strengthening coalitions with certain demographics of

feminist women that had been marginalized in NAC’s liberal feminist praxis. Reaching out to women of colour, immigrant women, lesbians, the disabled, and young feminists

(to name a few), NAC not only started to better fulfill its mandate as the most representative women’s organization in Canada, but it also began to forge an extensive

308 In 1990, Rebick’s presidential platform suggested her early interest in strengthening NAC’s coalition politics. She sought to reduce the “Quebec-bashing” taking place in constitutional debates, to recruit more visible minority women into NAC, and to forge more solid connections between NAC and the labour movement (to bring more labour women into the organization) (Draft NAC History, May 1992 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 694)).

309 Leanne Woodhouse, “NAC attacks neo-conservatives,” Star Phoenix, June 7, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707)

211

alliance, or power bloc, of the feminist Left; NAC was positioning itself to become a

formidable opponent against the neoconservative social order advanced by the Tory

agenda.

With its theme of “Taking Our Places: Feminism in the Nineties,” the 1993

annual general meeting was identified as an opportunity for NAC to identify its long-term

goals and strategies; in other words, to solidify its future vision. There, it was determined

that the face of the feminist future belonged to Tanzanian-born Sunera Thobani, who was

acclaimed NAC’s first woman of colour president.310 With an extensive background in

anti-racist feminist advocacy, Thobani not only had the practical experience to advance

this agenda, but she was also a powerful symbol of the new radical democratic feminist

citizen for and with whom NAC advocated. In her speeches and press releases, Thobani would give voice to NAC’s new strategy to combat the neoconservative agenda: the

promotion of an alternative vision of the nation.

The 1993 AGM had produced an overarching strategy that combined NAC’s turn

toward anti-racist feminism with its battle against what Rebick called “the biggest threat

to equality in decades” – the neoconservative agenda.311 There, NAC resolved to

“promote our alternative vision of Canada and the world, and to contrast it to the vision

310 Given the symbolic significance of her presidency, Thobani’s qualifications can easily be minimized or overlooked in accounts of her leadership. Thobani had devoted years of service to feminism in England and then Vancouver, BC, where she was a co-founder of the South Asian Women’s Action Network (SAWAN). Subsequently, she moved to Toronto and became a NAC Executive board member in 1991, a position she held until her presidency. As Cenen Bagen, a NAC committee member at the time, stated, “‘It wasn’t as if the white women handed it to her’” (in Pierson 1993, 210).

311 NAC Press Release, June 4, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707)

212

of Canada and the world offered by the conservative agenda.”312 NAC’s alternative

vision would reflect the organization’s “commitment to eliminating racism, homophobia,

discrimination on the basis of disability, poverty and any other grounds that create

oppression for women.”313 In her first official speech as NAC President, Thobani

compelled women to challenge the neoconservative social order with a different, better,

feminist version of Canada, which would be comparatively more democratic: “‘We have

to decide what kind of society we are and what kind of world we want. Feminism plays a

large role in the kind of world we want, a world where there’s equality, democracy and

social justice.’”314 As outgoing president, Rebick reinforced Thobani’s message,

underscoring “the need to ‘re-invent’ democracy to serve the interests of a wider group in society […] ‘This is really what feminism is all about.’”315 Discourses of social justice, citizenship and democracy were the terms used to advance NAC’s competing vision of

Canadian society since the conservative agenda itself transcended a status-of-woman mandate.

This shift was an organic, cumulative response to the types of priority campaigns

NAC had undertaken since Mulroney’s election in 1984, namely those that involved

“defending the welfare state from neoliberal assaults” (Brodie 1994).316 In campaigns

against the Free Trade Agreement, the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown

312 Resolutions Passed at the 1993 AGM, June 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707)

313 Ibid.

314 Leanne Woodhouse, “NAC attacks neo-conservatives,” Star Phoenix, June 7, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707)

315 NAC Press Release, June 4, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707)

316 Significantly, Brodie (1994) also notes that this put NAC in the awkward position of defending state structures that they had previously critiqued as “inadequate, patriarchal, classist and racist.” 213

Accord, NAC and other leading organizations oriented their discursive battles in terms of

“Canadianness,” nationhood and citizenship in part because those were precisely the terms being used by the government to sell its proposals to the public. NAC’s analysis, rooted in anti-racist feminist discourse, clarified the exclusions perpetuated by such policies and discourses by advocating in solidarity with less “visible” groups struggling against oppression. In doing so, NAC articulated a public challenge to common sense ideas about the celebrated status afforded certain forms of national citizenship and not others under neoconservatism.

In its more virulent forms, NAC argued, neoconservatism fostered an oppressive and dangerous atmosphere that was most keenly felt by Canada’s most marginalized citizens, including women of colour, immigrants, and the disabled. Neoconservatism, as a form of coercion meant to compel order from citizens otherwise encouraged to pursue rugged individualism, will “highlight threats, real or imagined, both at home and abroad, to the integrity and stability of the nation” (Harvey 2005, 82). The state fosters bonds of social solidarity, but in the name of cultural nationalism that can border on xenophobia.

The neoconservative state promotes a “climate of consent” around a set of moral values that focused on “righteousness, Christianity […] family values, and right-to-life issues, and on antagonism to the new social movements such as feminism, gay rights, affirmative action, and environmentalism” (Harvey 2005, 84). This set of values suggested a naturalized constituency of the New Right that represented “real

Canadianness” that was distanced from the so-called political correctness of radicalized minorities (Mackey 2002, 108). 214

NAC argued that the “hidden truth” of the Conservatives’ agenda was its

“inherent assumption that already disadvantaged women will quietly absorb the social costs of creating more profits for an increasingly powerful international corporate elite.”317 This was the impetus behind NAC’s solidarity with the Native Women’s

Association Canada [NWCA] in their opposition to the Charlottetown Accord. NAC contested the vulnerable position created for Aboriginal women in the provision for First

Nations self-government, which was not subject to Charter equality provisions. As

Mulroney saw his legacy as a “nation builder”318 slipping away in the face of NAC’s vociferous opposition, he publicly censured the organization as one of the “enemies of

Canada.”319 Mulroney’s governance produced what Thobani (2005) would call certain

317 Punam Khosla, “Review of the Situation of Women in Canada, 1993,” July 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 708)

318 Mulroney’s nation building rhetoric was exemplified during the 1988 English-language leadership debate when John Turner argued that the Free Trade Agreement was not in the best interest of the nation. Mulroney angrily retorted,

Mr. Turner, Mr. Turner. Let me tell you something, sir. This country is only about 120 years old, but my own father 55 years ago went himself as a laborer with hundreds of other Canadians, and with their own hands in northeastern Quebec they built a little town, schools and churches, and they in their own way were nation building. In the same way that the waves of immigrants from the Ukraine and Eastern Europe rolled back the Prairies and in their own way, in their own time, they were nation building because they loved Canada. I today, sir, as a Canadian, believe genuinely in what I am doing. I believe it is right for Canada. I believe that in my own modest way I am nation building because I believe this benefits Canada and I love Canada. (Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1989, 62- 63)

Mulroney’s impassioned defense of free trade betrayed the neoconservative values informing his neoliberal economic platform. With a bit of “discursive magic,” Mulroney defined the nation as the product of white European colonialists’ pure, patriotic intentions, while simultaneously absenting racial minorities’ experience of that history or presence as national subjects. Canada, according to Mulroney’s heartfelt plea, was a “homogenous cultural/political entity, resting on legitimately possessed territory, with an exclusive right to legislate over a diverse group of people” (Bannerji 2000, 105). While this conformed to the hegemonic view of Canadian society, it also staked out the terms of Mulroney’s nation building project as myopic and even racist.

319 Mulroney viewed constitutional reform as the crowning achievement of his tenure as Prime Minister. A legislative symbol of national unity, the Charlottetown Accord included the “Canada clause,” which sought 215

“exalted subjects,” that is, the ideologically aligned and/or compliant citizen, as well as

certain castigated Others – the ungovernable. Speaking on behalf of the latter, NAC

called the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, “a victory for democracy.”320

Laclau and Mouffe (2007) argue that, in their notion of radical democratic

politics, “radical” refers to the extension of “democratic struggle to all those areas in

which the relation of domination exist[s].” In the early 1990s, NAC followed a similar

path by recognizing organizational structures of exclusion that privileged white feminist

practice over that of numerous others’. Despite their claims to national

representativeness, women of colour within the organization made it clear that structures

of domination were preventing their interests from being properly represented, thus

manifesting a less than democratic feminist practice.

A nexus of factors converged by 1992 to produce a shift in NAC’s feminist

praxis: an alienated membership, leadership willing to foster change, and an encroaching neoconservative social order. Viewing its fate as inextricably bound to that of the

neoconservative agenda, NAC launched, in Rebick’s words, “a fundamental struggle, led

by those most marginalized.”321 Under Rebick and Thobani, NAC embraced anti-racist

to capture the values that defined the Canadian culture, such as provisions that recognized Quebec as a distinct society and allowed for Aboriginal self-government. By the 1990s, however, Mulroney’s legacy looked grim as the country wallowed in an economic recession and encountered multiple reminders of the social divisions that, he argued, threatened Canadian unity, such as Meech Lake and Oka. Also injurious to Mulroney’s political legacy was the Spicer Commission report, which had been released in 1990. The Spicer Commission was a grassroots-styled “independent” inquiry created to take the pulse of the nation, particularly in terms of “what kind of country [the people] wanted for themselves and their children” (Spicer 1991). The results were scathing toward the Prime Minister, indicating great distrust and disillusionment with the federal leadership (Mackey 2002, 113).

320 Executive Report to the Membership 1993, undated (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707)

321 NAC Press Release, June 4, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707) 216

feminism, redefining the feminist constituent on whose behalf they advocated: the more

representative radical democratic feminist citizen usurped the celebrated, but

homogenous “Canadian woman” promoted in NAC’s heretical discourse of the mid-

1980s. To redress the disparities between member groups that privileged white feminists’

practice, NAC implemented affirmative action and attempted to equalize

underrepresented groups’ participation in organizational activities.

Alongside these efforts, NAC leadership used discourses of solidarity amongst

diversity to mobilize the membership behind the common goal of combating the

neoconservative agenda. To accomplish this, as Thobani emphasized in her inaugural

speech, women needed “‘to learn to stop the changing of our differences into hierarchies,

and instead learn how to turn these differences into strengths.’”322 In contrast to the

model of social division set forth by the right wing (difference = inequality = liberty),

NAC’s anti-racist feminist praxis of the early 1990s advanced an alternative vision of the

nation based on the assertion that difference = equivalences = democratic pluralism. This chain of equivalences suggested a radical extension of the democratic struggle to multiple arenas of Canadian social life. As NAC’s “overreaching” of its status-of-women mandate during these years demonstrated, the organization brought its alternative vision of a radical democratic feminist citizenship to bear on a panoply of social, economic and political questions facing the nation. What began as an internal review of the organization’s own structures of domination, quickly turned outward as NAC’s feminist praxis began operating according to a new principle, perhaps best expressed by Thobani,

322 NAC Press Release, June 6, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707) 217

who remarked that “‘None of us will be free and equal until everyone is free and equal.’”323

In the early 1990s, NAC countered the right wing mobilization of discourses of

“feminist failure” with a shift to anti-racist feminism; a political praxis that empowered traditionally marginalized constituencies in the Canadian women’s movement. This political re-orientation provided NAC a framework for the formation of a broader, stronger coalition of the feminist Left that could more effectively oppose the Canadian political right. However this key transition in NAC’s activism is typically not remembered as a purposeful attempt to become democratically representative of its

membership or as a strategic intervention in the ascendance of neoconservatism. Instead, the Canadian women’s movement of the 1990s is primarily characterized as ideologically fractured, unfocused, and increasingly socio-politically irrelevant. This uninformed

historicization becomes legitimized through its repetition in dominant narratives of the women’s movement, even within feminist historiography.

Our feminist histories of this era need to attend to the concerted effort of the

neoconservative movement to sideline the Canadian feminist opposition, which had

spearheaded highly effective, coalition-based campaigns against federal initiatives like

the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. In 1983, Lynne Segal noted that a weak link

in Thatcherism was its failure to ‘successfully crush a feminist consciousness’ that

recognized the ways in which the combined force of neoliberalism and neoconservatism

exacerbated the oppression of women’s lives – as vulnerable and exploited workers, as

323 Leanne Woodhouse, “NAC attacks neo-conservatives,” Star Phoenix, June 7, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707) 218

overburdened housewives, mothers and daughters (214). NAC too refused to be crushed by the combined weight of neoliberal economic policy and neoconservative attempts to reshape common sense ideas about women’s advocacy – as the “new folk devil” of special interest groups (Hall 1983, 29). They accomplished this by explicitly framing the stakes of Canadian women’s equality in the same discursive structures articulated by the by the state: nationhood, democracy and citizenship. 219

Not Flatlining: Feminist Rhythm and Continuity

In 1993, NAC proposed a third, though ultimately unrealized federal leadership

debate. This time, however, the organization invited the politicians to a debate on

“equity” – not women’s – issues. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Canadian welfare state had fostered a sense of national community (or gemeinschaft) that enabled intermediary organizations such as NAC to call upon social institutions, including media outlets, to equalize marginalized social groups’ access to the state in the name of Canadian universal citizenship rights. NAC’s efforts to secure the 1984 and 1988 federal leaders’ debates on women’s issues invoked these mores, as they persuaded the political candidates and broadcast networks to get on board with the projects. As we heard in

1988, NAC openly criticized the CBC as undemocratic when the broadcaster refused to air the “Women Vote!” PSA, and, later, for not sponsoring a separate women’s issues debate: Kaye argued that the network was forsaking its “‘moral responsibility to the country.’”324

However, the increasing “marketization” of equality discourse meant that, by

1993, there was little political leverage left in that line of discourse. Under neoliberalism,

the principles of universal social and economic rights were watered-down and replaced

with equity policies based on the promise of equality of opportunity – which is, as Jenson

(2001) notes, “perhaps the most limited definition of social justice” (124). In light of

these developments, NAC’s re-naming of its 1993 debate strategy may be readily

interpreted as a response to the neoliberal re-signification of equality discourse.

324 Canadian Press, “Networks knocked by women’s group,” Vancouver Sun, October 11, 1988 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 693) 220

At the same time, though, issues of equity spoke to NAC’s re-orientation toward a politics of radical democratic feminist citizenship, which decentered gender as the primary marker of women’s oppression in favour of an intersectional analysis. A debate on equity issues would have more accurately reflected NAC’s broadening analysis of women’s multiple oppressions, based on their constitution within a plurality of subject positions (like race, class, ability and sexual orientation) and social, political and economic issues that extended beyond a status-of-women mandate.

NAC’s turn toward anti-racist feminism and the figure of the radical democratic feminist citizen paved the way for young feminists’ leadership in the organization and the

Canadian women’s movement. As NAC strengthened existing bonds with alienated member groups, particularly those representing women of colour, it also sought to forge new connections with underrepresented constituencies like young women. For the first time since 1988, meeting minutes and communiqués detailed active efforts by NAC leadership to bring young women into high profile roles in the organization.325 For

instance, at the 1992 AGM, a “youth exec” was to be created and then trained to take-

over the organization in 2012.326 The closing plenary was described as a “panel of young

women (the future experience) and elder women (the past wisdom).”327 And, according to

news reports, the 1993 AGM witnessed a dramatic increase in young women’s

attendance, suggesting a promising future for the organization.

325 The only other documents I found referencing young women’s role in NAC are two reports pertaining to the “Young Women & Feminism Committee” founded in 1987-1988, one of which noted that a young woman was elected to the NAC Executive at the 1987 AGM in order to represent young feminists’ interests.

326 “Thoughts on NAC 20th Anniversary,” December 3, 1991 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 655)

327 AGM Report of the Committee Meeting, January 15, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 652) 221

NAC’s redress of the exclusions perpetuated by its organizational practices was a

means to forge a powerful coalition of the feminist Left, in the face of the threat posed by

the neoconservative agenda. While Rebick and Thobani’s efforts to make NAC

increasingly accessible to women of colour and younger women signaled their vision of

feminism’s future leaders, NAC’s outreach efforts also demonstrated that the perceived

disconnect between second and third wave feminist activism in Canada was not as deeply

entrenched as we so often tell ourselves today. In fact, these developments show that

decisive action was taken by both established players in mainstream feminism and

relative newcomers to the movement in order to prevent the occurrence of a radical break

in national level feminist advocacy, at precisely the time when the women’s movement

came under serious fire from the political right in Canada.

The connections fostered by NAC’s turn toward radical democratic feminist

citizenship went beyond power sharing with young women and women of colour; the

organization’s politics of diversity provided a framework within which “third wave” politics could, and would, develop and flourish. A logical, organic extension of NAC’s politics of radical democratic feminist citizenship, the Canadian third wave has been

shaped by a praxis of plurality, as a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-sexual movement.

Third wavers also make strategic use of different media forms to advance specific

agendas; a strategy that was critical for NAC as it drew on the institutional authority and

emancipatory potential of news media to create space for women’s issues in national

political discourse. 222

The continuities briefly described here demonstrate that the Canadian women’s

movement did not decline or die, as has been frequently reported in the nation’s news

media. Instead, NAC countered delegitimizing discourses that were circulated in news

media and the constant threat – and delivery – of federal de-funding by shifting

organizational strategies. To assume that NAC’s evolving advocacy strategies,

exemplified in the preceding analysis by the leadership debates, represented a failure of

the organization’s feminism would be folly. A more productive narrative of mainstream

Anglo-Canadian feminist history takes into account the impact of the external pressures exerted on a national organization that was always already vulnerable to the vagaries of

state funding priorities and ideological sea-changes. As Eunadie Johnson, a representative

of the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women, reminded NAC

delegates at the 1993 AGM: “‘a movement is not a flat line, it has different rhythms. We

need to fight in different places, at different times, and in different ways.’”328 With that in

mind, the steady ebb and flow trajectory traced by feminist oceanography is better left behind.

In its place, we ought to instead consider the forces that have allied against

feminists, and the strategies feminist movements developed in turn to create a place in the

national political dialogue for feminists and feminist concerns. Canadian feminist

historiography is better served by an analogy of sound waves, wherein different streams

of feminist activity overlap, growing louder and quieter – and not always in causal

relation to one another. Garrison’s re-imagining of feminism(s) as radio waves resituates

the Canadian women’s movement primary political struggle between feminists and state-

328 NAC Press Release, June 4, 1993 (CWMA, NAC fonds, 707) 223

sanctioned structures of oppression, instead of between competing feminisms, by

accounting for the presence of institutionalized sources of power and competing

ideologies; in other words, the “interference” that disrupts or blocks an otherwise clear

signal.

As feminist historiographers, we must be cognizant of the tactics of memory to

which we adhere, since prevailing wave narratives of feminism’s inevitable decline too

readily coincide with right wing mobilizations of “feminist failure” discourse. As

opposed to diagnosing feminism as terminally ill, my dissertation re-characterizes the

issue as a matter of who killed Canadian feminism. Not only does this reorientation

produce a narrative of feminism that better accounts for the external pressures exerted on

NAC during the federal shift to a neoliberal framework, it also makes visible a history in

which feminism does not actually die. Instead, as my analysis of NAC demonstrates, the

Canadian women’s movement responded to the neoliberal regime’s coordinated attack on women’s advocacy by modulating its frequency. As certain feminist wavelengths diminished, others amplified, ensuring that a national voice for women’s equality would not be drowned out by the deafening rush of an oncoming tidal wave.

224

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Kielbowicz, Richard B. and Scherer, Clifford. (1986). “The Role of the Press in the Dynamics of Social Movements.” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 9: 71-96.

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Mackey, Eva. (2002). The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Misztal, Barbara A. (2003). Theories of Social Remembering. Philadelphia: Open University Press. 231

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APPENDIX A: Files Consulted in NAC Fonds (by Series and Box No.)

Series 1: Annual General Meetings Box 640 Mid-Year 1984, Montreal 1984 AGM: lobby 1984 AGM

Box 646 1988 NAC Annual General Meeting: resolutions 1988 Annual General Meeting: sponsorship 1986-1987 Annual General Meeting: statistics 1988 Annual General Meeting: resolutions (reference, originals) 1988 NAC: proceedings of meeting with the Federal Party caucuses 1988 Lobby Transcript 1988 NAC: proposed resolutions 1988 Annual Report: 1987-1988 1988 Feminism and Political Power

Box 647 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: resolutions 1989 Annual General Meeting: analysis 1989 Annual General Meeting: annual report, English 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: emergency resolutions 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: budget 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: evaluations

Box 648 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: [committee] correspondence 1989 Annual General Meeting: constitution 1989 Annual General Meeting: 1988 May, revised constitution, master 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: fundraising, City of Ottawa 1989 Annual General Meeting: invitations 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: issue workshops 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: keynote speaker 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: lobby Lobby: mp’s responses 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: lobby transcript 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: 1988 AGM, minutes 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: parliamentarians 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: registration package, master, photocopying 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: policy committee meetings, minutes 1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: press file 236

1989 NAC Annual General Meeting: program

Box 649 Press Clippings Debate: chronological order List of Names: registration

Box 652 1993 Annual General Meeting 1993 Taking Our Places: feminism in the 90s, conference kit

Box 654 1992 Media 1992 Annual General Meeting: priority campaign Workshops: priority campaigns

Box 655 1992 Annual General Meeting: agenda

Box 656 1992 NAC: Strategies for Change, part II

Box 659 Executive Report to the Membership – 1993 Resolutions: Taking Our Place: feminism in the 90s

Box 660 Report on the ’93 NAC Conference and AGM to AGM Committee and Executive Committee; Resolutions: Taking Our Place: feminism in the 90s (conference and Annual General Meeting)

Box 665 1984 Annual General Meeting: equipment, suppliers 1984 Annual General Meeting: candidates biographies (includes photos) 1984 Annual General Meeting: constitutional amendments 1984 Annual General Meeting: display space requests 1984 Annual General Meeting: evaluation forms 1984 Annual General Meeting: hotel arrangements 1984 Annual General Meeting: report, master 1984 Kit Masters 1984 Annual General Meeting: masters of regn. forms 1984 Annual General Meeting: memo announcements 1984 Annual General Meeting: nominations for executive 1984 Lobby: transcript 1984 Annual General Meeting: parliamentary lobby 1984 Annual General Meeting: parliamentarians, secretary hired help 237

1984 Annual General Meeting: planning committee 1984 Annual General Meeting: resolutions proposed

Box 667 1988-1989 Annual General Meeting: annual report 1987-1988 Annual General Meeting: annual report

Series 2: Campaigns Box 630 Clippings

Box 687 Secretary of State: women’s program, women’s funding data 1987-1988 Press clippings [REAL Women 1987] Funding women’s groups

Box 693 Election 1988: press clipping Election 1988: press releases Public Service Announcement: distribution list Election 1988: publications [Loose material] Election 1988: t-shirts Election 1988: Women Vote Day Election Campaign Committee Campaigns: 1992-1993

Box 694 NAC History Election 1988: equality accord responses Election 1988: equality accord [responses] Election 1988: correspondence and members Ottawa Press Release from Ottawa Press Clippings

Box 695 Activity Report, 1990-1991

Box 696 Media: press list, Ontario Radio and TV columnists Media: NAC spokespersons, 1989-1990 Media: press lists, feminist press Election 1988: Free Trade, pamphlet 238

Election 1988: Free Trade, translations Election 1988: Action Bulletins Election 1988: budget Election 1988: campaign strategy Election 1988: campaign, other organizations Election 1988: leaders’ debate Election 1988: issue flyers Activity Reports Activity Report: issue committee Activity Reports: 1991-1992

Box 698 NAC Press Releases, 1980 Media Relations Committee F/R Publicity Action, 1993

Series 3: Executive/Committees Box 699 NAC Publicity Projects Media: Canadian News Wire Media: Lists Information Articles Press: Letters to the editors

Box 701 Feminist Action vol. 33, May-June 1988`

Box 702 NAC Communications Policy NAC Activity Reports NAC Committee: activity, 1987-1988 NAC Executive: correspondence, 1987-1988 Election Kit (1987) R.E.A.L. Women NAC Organizational Review NAC Financial Statements

Box 704 Mid-Year 1987-1988: election kit II, workshop 1987

Box 707 Annual General Meeting Press, 1993 Resolutions, 1993 Annual General Meeting, 1993 [1] 239

Annual General Meeting, 1993 [2] Annual General Meeting Media, 1992 Media Press Release: December 1990-1991 (by NAC) Press Releases, 1989 Press Release, 1990-1991 Constitution

Box 708 Anti: Racism Renewal, 1993 Review, 1993

Box 710 Lesbian Issues Committee

Box 711 NAC Press Releases, 1975-1978 National Action Committee: fortress

Box 713 Francophone Women: bilingualism Multiculturalism Feminist Media

Box 729 4 file [sic] of Activity Report Activity Reports 1988 Secretary of State: activity reports, 1989-1990 Secretary of State: activity reports, 1988-1989

Series 4: Financial Records Box 751 Bowdens Clippings Service Debates (costs) Globe and Mail Newspaper Advertising Toronto Star

Box 757 Hosek, Chaviva

Box 779 Debate, 1984 Leaders’ (on women’s issues) 240

Box 780 Media Coverage Quarterly Reports, 1984

Box 784 Funding cuts: media Funding cuts: government correspondence Funding cuts: 1992-1993 Secretary of State: women’s program, 1993

Box 785 Women’s Program Submission, 1992-1993

Box 803 Government Federal: Misc, 1984 election, general Government Federal: Misc, 1984 election, TV debate, audio cassettes

Box 804 Government Federal: Misc, 1983? election

Series 5: Journals Box 818 Journal: July 1984 Journal: August 1984

Box 838 Executive correspondence: received 1988 Speaking engagements: 1988 President’s Correspondence: 1988 NAC: press releases Finance Committee: minutes, 1987-1988 NAC Executive: requests for support, 1986 Secretary of State: activity, 1987-1988 Secretary of State: committees and lobbying submission, 1987-1988

Series 6: Office/Administration/Personnel Box 839 Secretary of State: women’s program, correspondence sent, 1987-1988, grant application Secretary of State: 1987-1988, operations submission Secretary of State: 1987-1988, letter of agreement

241

Box 841 Leaders’ Debate

Box 842 Invitation re: Sunera

Box 852 Member group mailings: 1988-1989 Press releases: 1988-1989 NAC: member group mailings, 1987-1988

Box 854 NAC Collector Items President Activity Report, 1984 NAC Promotion Anti-NAC Media NAC in the Media: March, 1984-1985 NAC Letters to Editors: March 1984-1985 NAC press releases: March 1984-1985 NAC participation in shows and conference: general, March 1984-1985 NAC telegrams, March 1984-1985 NAC speaking engagements, March 1984-1985 NAC: media, public relations, press lists NAC executive meetings: agendas, minutes, regional reports NAC participation: woman’s show NAC executive: current correspondence between executive NAC listings in publications

Box 855 NO Funding cuts Funding cuts: 1985-1987 NO fundraising Constitution Bookmark Production Distributed Oka: 1990 1990, December 6 events Court challenges program: 1991-1992 Montreal killings: 1989 (Polytechnique, University of Montreal) Review of the situation of Canadian Women: 1991

Box 856 Action Now FAF (Feminist Action Féministe): vol. 6, #2, racism Annual report: 1993 242

Box 857 Sunera Thobani: speaks requests and thank yous 1994 Sunera Thobani

Series 7: Publication Box 862 Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol.10, no 3, December 1984 Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol.10, no 2, November 1984 Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol.10, no 1, September 1984 Status copy (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol.9, no. 3, August 1984 Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol. 9, no. 2, July 1984, Federal Election Issue

Box 863 Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol. 9, no. 2, July 1984, French edition, Federal Election Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol. 9, no. 1, February 1984

Box 872 Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol. 9, no. 1, Winter 1984 (cont’d); vol. 9, no. 2, Summer 1983

Box 873 Status (Status of Women News = La Revue Statut de la Femme): vol. 9, no. 3, August 1984; vol. 10, no. 1, November 1984

Box 869 Status: editorial committee, minutes, reports, 1983-1984 Status: correspondence, 1984

Box 882 Status in the Media

Box 887 NAC Memo Masters: 1984

243

Series 8: Penney Kome Box 899 Donations to NAC Mail, newspapers, clippings, publicity, letters, etc. Newspapers clippings, letters, etc.

244

APPENDIX B: Bibliography of Primary News Sources (by Series and Box No.)

Series 2: Campaigns

Box 630 “A familiar tune.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. “A look at future.” Toronto Canadian Jewish News 9 August 1984. A.B. “Sitting on the Fence.” Eastern Ontario Farmer [Ottawa, ON] 21 August 1984. ---. “Sitting on the Fence.” Western Ontario Farmer [London, ON] 22 August 1984. Against Abortion. “Letter to the Editor.” Shaunavon Standard [SK] 22 August 1984. “An unimpressive TV debate.” The Sault Daily Star [Sault Ste. Marie, ON] 17 August 1984. “Area delegates attend annual teachers’ meeting.” Brantford Expositor [ON] 22 August 1984. “Area women to attend debate.” Almonte Gazette [ON] 15 August 1984. Baer, Nicole. “Women gain in 1st debate.” Moose Jaw Times-Herald [SK] 16 August 1984. ---. “131 women will be seeking election.” Peace River Block News [AB] 8 August 1984. ---. “Debate last major forum for leaders.” Daily Herald [Prince Albert, SK] 15 August 1984. Barnett, Vicki. “Equal pay for work of equal value protects women.” Calgary Herald 19 August 1984. Bateman, Elaine. “We won't discuss the bum-patting, okay?” St. Stephen St. Croix Courier [St. Stephen, NB] 15 August 1984. Bauslaugh, Cheryl. “Why separate issues into ‘men’s’ and ‘women’s’: ‘Milestone’ debate told us little.” Simcoe Reformer [ON] 23 August 1984. “Bilingual flop.” Nanaimo Daily Free Press [BC] 17 August 1984. Boisseau, Peter R. “Women feel main issues ignored by party leaders.” Moncton Times [NB] 21 August 1984. Bokma, Anne. “Candidates seem to promise everything but kitchen sink.” Hamilton City Journal West 15 August 1984. Bragg, Bob. “Broadbent winner of ho-hum debate.” Calgary Herald 19 August 1984. Branswell, Helen. “Women the Real Winners.” The Gleaner [Fredericton, NB] 16 August 1984. “Brian a ‘survivor.’” Calgary Sun 17 August 1984. “Broadbent Wins, Mulroney Loses debate, Beveridge Says.” The Gull Lake Advance [SK] 21 August 1984. Brown, Stewart. “Fighting words: Party leaders square off again tomorrow in debate.” Hamilton Spectator 14 August 1984. Buchanan, Lembi. “Equal rights a hot issue.” Elliott Lake Standard [ON] 19 August 1984. “Bums safe from [...]: Turner promises to keep his tactile style [...].” Edmonton Sun 14 August 1984. “But can she cook?” Edmonton Journal 13 August 1984. 245

“But was justice done?” Calgary Herald 16 August 1984. Camp, Dalton. “Morale Low in Liberal Ranks, Says Keith Davey.” Observer [Pembroke, ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Watching the debate on ‘women's issues’ was like watching Christians fighting lions.” Kingston Whig-Standard 22 August 1984. Canadian Press. “Arts community skeptical.” The Truro Daily News [Truro, NS] 21 August 1984. ---. “Broadbent and Women's Issues: ‘The Time for Equality Is Now.’” The Gleaner [Fredericton, NB] 14 August 1984. ---. “Broadbent clear favorite in this week's debate.” Observer [Pembroke, ON] 17 August 1984. ---. “Broadbent comes out clear cut winner in national debate.” The Daily Times [Lloydminster, SK] 16 August 1984: 7. ---. “Broadbent looks best in debate.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 16 August 1984. ---. “Broadbent says: ‘Social programs in jeopardy.’” [Yellowknife, NWT] 20 August 1984. ---. “Broadview-Greenwood: Toe-to-toe fight for Worthington.” Chronicle-Journal [Thunder Bay, ON] 21 August 1984. ---. “Campaigns pick up as leaders draw nearer to election date.” The Daily Times [Lloydminster, SK] 17 August 1984. ---. “Candidates face all-female panel in womens-issues debate tonight.” Record [Sherbrooke, QC] 15 August 1984. ---. “Chance to Speak Directly to Voters: Debate to Concentrate on Issues Affecting Women.” Penticton Herald 15 August 1984. ---. “City passes sex resolution.” Timmins Daily News [ON] 14 August 1984. ---. “Davey says polls are out of date.” 22 August 1984. ---. “Debate better than nothing: women.” Thunder Bay Times-News 17 August 1984. ---. “Debate broke little new ground.” The Evening Guide [Port Hope, ON] 16 August 1984. ---. “Debate reaction supports NDP.” The Daily Times [Brampton, ON] 16 August 1984. ---. “Debate set on women's issues.” Peace River Block News [Dawson Creek, BC] 8 August 1984. ---. “Election group pushing abortion issue.” The Daily News [Prince Rupert, BC] 31 August 1984. ---. “Fight for equality has a price tag.” St. Catharines Standard 22 August 1984. ---. “John Turner leaves bum patting behind.” The Red Deer 14 August 1984. ---. “Keep Fighting Women Are Told.” Observer [Pembroke, ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Ladies' Choice: Leaders dance to NAC tune in last debate.” The Oshawa Times 15 August 1984. ---. “Last punch at Mulroney.” Chronicle-Journal [Thunder Bay, ON] 16 August 1984. ---. “Leaders back on campaign trail.” Northern Daily News [Kirkland Lake, ON] 17 August 1984. ---. “Leaders Break Little New Ground in Election Debate.” The Journal Pioneer [Summerside, PEI] 16 August 1984. 246

---. “Leaders head to head in first debate tonight.” The Evening Telegram [St. John’s, NL] 24 July 1984. ---. “Leaders Prepare for TV Debate on Women's Issues.” The Journal Pioneer [Summerside, PEI] 13 August 1984. ---. “Liberals represent rich conducted poll suggests.” Moose Jaw Times-Herald [SK] 21 August 1984. ---. “Little ground broken.” Simcoe Reformer [ON] 16 August 1984. ---. “More women urged by group to pursue seat in Parliament.” Chatham Daily News [ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Mulroney blasts Turner for opening old wounds.” Northern Daily News [Kirkland Lake, ON] 15 August 1984. ---. “Mulroney now target of Grit, NDP bosses.” The Star Phoenix [Saskatoon, SK] 22 August 1984. ---. “Mulroney’s record on women's issues hit.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 16 August 1984. ---. “NDP leader is concerned about women.” Daily Herald [Prince Albert, SK] 17 August 1984. ---. “No more patting behinds.” New Glasgow Evening News [NS] 14 August 1984. ---. “Only Liberals can be trusted Turner claims.” The Intelligencer [Belleville, ON] 16 August 1984. ---. “Party leaders to return to trail.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 17 August 1984. ---. “Persistence has paid off.” Nelson Daily News 20 [BC] August 1984. ---. “Persistence was key to getting Turner to debate women's issues.” Moncton Times 22 August 1984. ---. “PM apologizes for backside patting.” The Evening Patriot [Charlottetown, PEI] 14 August 1984. ---. “PM apologizes for ‘bum’ pats.” Calgary Herald 14 August 1984: A1, A2. ---. “PM Attacks Mulroney's House Record.” St. John Times Globe [NB] 16 August 1984. ---. “PM blasts his rivals in debate.” Daily Herald [Prince Albert, SK] 16 August 1984. ---. “PM, Broadbent roast Mulroney.” The Times Journal [St. Thomas, ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Polls destroying Liberal morale: Davey.” The Intelligencer [Belleville, ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Polls destroying morale of Grits claims Davey.” Standard-Freeholder [Cornwall, ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Polls Destroying Our Morale, Says Davey.” Telegraph Journal [St. John, NB] 22 August 1984. ---. “Pornography could cost hotel $55 000.” Toronto Star 25 August 1984. ---. “Real debate winner may not have been leaders.” Guelph Daily Mercury 16 August 1984. ---. “Repatriating rhino a major campaign issue.” The Kingston Whig-Standard [ON] 17 August 1984. ---. “Technical Problems Plague TV Debate.” The Gleaner [Fredericton, NB] 16 August 1984. 247

---. “Telegram blasts Erola.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 14 August 1984. ---. “Television networks make pitch for debate.” The Evening Telegram [St. John’s, NL] 27 July 1984. ---. “There's genuine concern.” Moose Jaw Times-Herald [SK] 17 August 1984. ---. “These were the key events in countdown to 33rd federal election.” Toronto Star 5 September 1984. ---. “They say it isn't porn.” Moose Jaw Times-Herald [SK] 20 August 1984. ---. “Turner Challenges Mulroney For Price Tag on Promises.” Cape Breton Post 17 August 1984. ---. “Turner accuses Tories of means-testing plans.” The Kingston Whig-Standard 17 August 1984. ---. “Turner Apologizes for ‘Pats.’” The Citizen [Prince George, BC] 14 August 1984. ---. “Turner apologizes for patting.” Kenora Miner & News [ON] 14 August 1984. ---. “Turner ducks forum.” Kitchener-Waterloo Record [ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Turner ends with blast at Mulroney.” Simcoe Reformer [ON] 16 August 1984. ---. “Turner makes apology.” The Gleaner [Fredericton, NB] 14 August 1984. ---. “Turner places emphasis on debate.” Timmins Daily News [ON] 15 August 1984. ---. “Turner promises no more patting.” Timmins Daily News [ON] 14 August 1984. ---. “Turner says unrealistic to support freeze.” The Journal Pioneer [Summerside, PEI] 15 August 1984. ---. “Turner throws last punch in women's debate.” The Daily Times [Lloydminster, AB] 16 August 1984. ---. “Turner, Broadbent slam Mulroney.” The Owen Sound Sun-Times [ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Turner’s sorry for patting bums, but women say it’s non-issue.” Daily Herald-Tribune [Grande Prairie, AB] 14 August 1984. ---. “TV debate inaccessible.” The Evening Patriot [Charlottetown, PEI] 16 August 1984. ---. “TV debate likely.” The Citizen [Prince George, BC] 8 August 1984. ---. “TV viewers complain.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 16 August 1984. ---. “Women's groups unanimous: Male leaders’ debate ‘big step’ forward.” Record [Sherbrooke, QC] 17 August 1984. ---. “Women's issues debated.” Trail Daily Times [BC] 9 August 1984. ---. “Women's issues spotlighted: Back on the attack.” Welland-Port Colborne Tribune [ON] 17 August 1984. ---. “Women's Leaders Rate Debaters: NDP Wins Women's Debate.” The Evening Patriot [Charlottetown, PEI] 16 August 1984. “Candidates forum on women's issues.” Hamilton Mountain News 15 August 1984. Chant, E.P. “The Not So Great Debates.” Amherstburg Echo [ON] 22 August 1984. Chapman, Arthur. “Leaders debates make dull television.” Winnipeg Free Press 16 August 1984. Chevrier, D. “The potential is there now go for it, women!” Toronto Star 27 August 1984. Chouinard, Peggy. “Women's views varied too!” The London Free Press 21 August 1984. 248

Clarke, Jack. “Who's going to decide work value?” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 23 August 1984. Cockshutt, Susan. “Votes for Women....” St. Albert & Sturgeon Gazette [AB] 1 August 1984. Cowan, Peter. “CBC poll bad news for Turner.” Kamloops News 21 August 1984. ---. “Latest poll gives Tories major lead.” [Southam News] 21 August 1984. ---. “PCs heading for majority poll predicts.” Hamilton Spectator 21 August 1984: A1, A2. Craig, Terry. “Candidates committed to women's issues.” The Star Phoenix [Saskatoon, SK] 24 August 1984. “Current Comment.” Steinbach Carillon [MB] 22 August 1984. Danese, Roseann. “Getting the answers to women's issues.” Windsor Star 21 August 1984. “Davey Claims Polls Now Out of Date.” St. John Times Globe [NB] 22 August 1984. “Debate on Women’s Issues: Some hard, persistent questioning.” Kelowna Daily Courier [BC] 20 August 1984. “Debate women's issues.” The Beacon Herald [Stratford, ON] 20 August 1984. “Delayed Grit response annoys women’s groups.” Winnipeg Free Press 18 August 1984. Denomy, Debra. “Key women's issue is men’s too - economy.” Waterdown Flamborough News [Waterdown, ON] 22 August 1984. DiManno, Rosie, and Paula Todd. “Women fear for their future with Tories at helm in Ottawa.” Toronto Star 5 September 1984. “Ed backs fair pay, fair play.” Calgary Sun 14 August 1984. Einsiedler, Owen. “Broadbent tagged women’s debate winner but most local women didn't bother watching.” Swift Current Sun [BC] 21 August 1984: 5. “Feminist calls for communal changes.” Toronto Canadian Jewish News 16 August 1984. Ferguson, John. “Debate was a benchmark.” Calgary Herald 16 August 1984. Ferris, Alan. “Geills Turner charms crowd during ‘teary-eyed’ tour.” Guelph Daily Mercury [ON] 21 August 1984. Ferry, Jon. “Politics blocking female issues.” Medicine Hat News [AB] 15 August 1984: 1, 16. ---. “Tonight’s leaders’ debate ‘major coup’ for women.” The Sault Daily Star [Sault Ste. Marie, ON] 15 August 1984. ---. “Women judges favor Ed Broadbent.” North Bay Nugget [ON] 16 August 1984. Fisher, Douglas. “Broadbent cruising to 25 seats or less.” The Gleaner [Fredericton, NB] 21 August 1984. ---. “NDP campaign is strong.” Cambridge Daily Reporter [ON] 20 August 1984. ---. “NDP enjoys best ever reception.” Guelph Daily Mercury [ON] 20 August 1984. ---. “New Democrats have never had such a good campaign.” The Lethbridge Herald [AB] 22 August 1984. ---. “Of PQ, Books, PM, Mulroney, and Women.” The Gleaner [Fredericton, NB] 25 August 1984. ---. “Track team did not do too well.” Chatham Daily News [ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Turner awkwardness.” Thunder Bay Times-News 17 August 1984. 249

Ford, Catherine. “First, women have to learn rules.” Calgary Herald 16 August 1984. “Forum on women’s issues attracts 50 on Friday.” Brantford Expositor [ON] 18 August 1984. Fotheringham, Allan. “Debate proved cure for insomniacs,” Calgary Herald 16 August 1984. ---. “Iona must be after Liberal top job.” The Brandon Sun [MB] 15 August 1984. ---. “Tactile Turner in Trouble: Crafty Campagnolo laying pathway to the top.” The Citizen [Prince George, BC] 14 August 1984. ---. “There’s no gender gap.” Winnipeg Sun 20 August 1984. ---. “Zzzzz - that sums up great women’s debate.” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. ---. “Turner warily watching the woman in waiting.” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 14 August 1984. Fournier, Lew. “It’s time for women to seize power.” Kitchener-Waterloo Record [ON] 17 August 1984. Fraser, Bill. “Tea parties thing of the past.” Barrie Banner [ON] 15 August 1984: 9, 10. “Fuller in Ottawa.” Dunnville Chronicle [ON] 15 August 1984. Garratty, Mike. “Women winners in big TV debate.” Barrie Examiner [ON] 16 August 1984. “Geills Turner here on voting mission.” Moose Jaw Times-Herald [SK] 17 August 1984. Gill, Ian. “Leaders generous with confetti promises in past week.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 18 August 1984. Goar, Carol. “Women and the election.” 20 August 1984: 18-22. Goodman, Patricia. “Letter of the Day.” Toronto Sun 21 August 1984. Griffiths, Ruth. “Debate pleases P.A. women.” Daily Herald [Prince Albert, SK] 16 August 1984. Gunn, Anne. “Debate missed some issues.” Port Hawksbury Scotia Sun [NS] 29 August 1984. Gwyn, Richard. “Debate illustrates women's new-found power in political process.” The London Free Press 17 August 1984. ---. “Score one for Turner.” The Daily Times [Lloydminster, AB] 21 August 1984. ---. “Turner proves he has the right stuff.” The Red Deer Advocate [AB] 16 August 1984. ---. “Turner seized opportunity during this week's TV debate.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 18 August 1984. Hare, Alison. “Record number of women running for federal office.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 19 August 1984. Harrison, Murray. “News N’ Views.” Beauséjour Manitoba Beaver 22 August 1984. Hellyer, Paul. “Where is men’s debate?.” Kindersley Clarion [SK] 15 August 1984. Hepburn, Bob. “Turner says Tories basically opposed to improving programs affecting women.” Toronto Star 16 August 1984: A1, A11. Hicks, Jack. “Women in the Arctic.” The Globe & Mail 28 August 1984. Hodgson, Derik. “Bowling for Dollars has more thrills.” Toronto Sun 16 August 1984. Hoffman, Lothar. “RE Women’s Debate.” Toronto Sun 22 August 1984. “‘Honest John’ strategy may have come too late.” The London Free Press 18 August 1984. 250

Hood, Marilyn F. “Women's debate fair, firm and thought-provoking.” The Kingston Whig-Standard 23 August 1984. “How leaders stand on women's issues.” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 15 August 1984. Hoy, Claire. “If fetuses had the vote.” Toronto Star 15 August 1984. Hoyt, Don. “Sense of Humor Needed.” Telegraph Journal 24 August 1984. Hurst, Lynda. “Turner moves to head of the class.” Toronto Star 26 August 1984. “Jim Durocher Outlines Women's Issues Policy.” Meadow Lake Progress [SK] 15 August 1984. John, Judith. “Not for all women.” Trail Daily Times [BC] 23 August 1984. “John vows end to pats.” Calgary Sun 14 August 1984. Jonas, George. “Is saying believing?” Toronto Sun 23 August 1984. Jones, Frank. “Debate on women's issues tonight is complete piffle.” Toronto Star 15 August 1984. “Jumped gun.” Calgary Sun 16 August 1984. Kelly, Caitlin. “Women unsure pledges will mean real change.” The Globe & Mail 27 August 1984. Kelly, Dean. “Can’t buy wealth.” The Oshawa Times [ON] 21 August 1984. “Kent candidates answer questions.” Wallaceburg Courier Press [ON] 22 August 1984: 1, 7. Lamb, Jamie. “An exercise in chicanery and futility.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. “Leaders debate useful but dull.” The Journal Pioneer [Summerside, PEI] 16 August 1984. “Leaders face tough grilling in NAC debate.” The Sunday Express [Montreal, QC] 12 August 1984. “Leaders offer empty rhetoric to women.” The Sunday Express [Montreal, QC] 12 August 1984. Lessard, Shirley. “Great Women’s Debate: all old news.” The Daily Times [Lloydminster, AB] 16 August 1984. “Letters to the Editor - Toronto Star.” Toronto Star 25 August 1984. Loughran, Patricia. “An open letter on the women's debate.” Burford Advance [ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “Debate was NDP platform.” The Recorder & Times [Brockville, ON] 21 August 1984. Loughran, Patricia L. “Says NAC ignores mothers at home.” Bracebridge Examiner [ON] 22 August 1984. Lukenda, V.C. “The NAC clearly does not speak for all women.” The Sault Daily Star [Sault Ste. Marie, ON] 8 August 1984. Lunch, Charles. “A Return to Issues.” Telegraph Journal [St. John, NB] 20 August 1984. Lynch, Charles. “Image politics fades away.” Calgary Herald 16 August 1984. ---. “The Nation.” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 17 August 1984. MacDonald, Anna. “Broadbent Says ‘Time For Equality of Sexes Is Now.’” The Journal Pioneer [Summerside, PEI] 14 August 1984. “MacDonald backs Mulroney on equal pay for equal work.” The London Free Press 22 August 1984. 251

MacDonald, Don. “Tories lead; Grits split; NDP hustles.” The Mail Star [Halifax, NS] 13 August 1984: 1, 2, 9. MacPherson, Robert. “Liberals rolling out the big names for final campaign push in Quebec.” The Recorder & Times [Brockville, ON] 16 August 1984. MAH. “Women and politics.” The Recorder [Boissevain, MB] 22 August 1984. Majta, C. “‘Women’s issues’ a misnomer.” Hamilton Spectator 22 August 1984. Mandel, Michele, and Bob Pomerantz. “Viewers in Metro not impressed by debate.” Toronto Star 16 August 1984. “Many Believe Liberals ‘Party of the Rich.’” Observer [Pembroke, ON] 22 August 1984. Marriot, Pamela. “Election campaigns should see women are natural matyrs.” The Kingston Whig-Standard 23 August 1984. Marsh, Donald H. “Worst TV show of 1984?” The London Free Press 21 August 1984. Martin, Paula. “PCs, Grits reject quotas for women in federal jobs.” Winnipeg Free Press 16 August 1984. Martin, Paula, and Bob Cox. “Debate fails to stir viewers.” Winnipeg Free Press 16 August 1984. Martin, Trevor. “Women's issues: Libertarian view.” Whitehorse Star [YT] 10 August 1984. Martindale, Barbara A. “Expecting too much.” Caledonia Grand River Sachem [ON] 22 August 1984. Maser, Peter. “New Gallup poll gives Tories commanding lead.” North Bay Nugget [ON] 18 August 1984. ---. “Polls track Tory surge.” Calgary Herald 19 August 1984. Mayenknecht, Tom. “As Turner falls Broadbent surprises.” Oakville Beaver [ON] 22 August 1984. ---. “It was Turner’s best three minutes.” Oakville Beaver [ON] 17 August 1984. McCullough, Melodie. “Promises made in T.V. debate must be kept.” Gananoque Reporter [ON] 22 August 1984. McGillivray, Don. “Tokenism is bad for business.” Financial Times [Toronto, ON] 20 August 1984. McKeown, M. “Disappointing.” Hamilton Spectator 23 August 1984. McLaughlin, Nora. “Grass-roots men, women fear feminists getting too powerful.” Toronto Star 21 August 1984. ---. “‘Women’s issues’ debate infringed on free speech.” Collingwood Times [ON] 21 August 1984. McQuiggan, Keith. “Stop those spats.” Trail Daily Times [BC] 15 August 1984. Meek, Jim. “Debate was like a ‘bidding war.’” The Mail Star [Halifax, NS] 16 August 1984: 1, 2. Moreira, Peter. “Dancing ‘the Bay Street shuffle’: Broadbent critical of both leaders.” The Mail Star [Halifax, NS] 23 August 1984. Morton, Peter. “Major issues not debated, says Klein.” Calgary Herald 17 August 1984. Mossman, Bob. “‘The Other Woman.’” Bridgewater Bulletin [NS] 15 August 1984. “Mulroney gets nod from hotline callers.” Toronto Sun 16 August 1984. Murphy, Bette. “‘Great debate’ a ‘non-event.’” The Evening Telegram [St. John’s, NL] 22 August 1984. 252

Nagle, Patrick. “Women get promises, promises.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. Naiman, Sandy. “‘Giant step’ ... or ‘pap and crap’?” Toronto Sun 16 August 1984. “Debate a farce: reader.” Stoney Creek News [ON] 29 August 1984. Naumetz, Tim. “Turner scores on Mulroney women’s record.” Daily Townsman [Cranbrook, BC] 16 August 1984. ---. “PM blasts Mulroney on Commons record.” The Red Deer Advocate [AB] 16 August 1984. ---. “Technical difficulties: Issues debate held.” Peace River Block News [Dawson Creek, BC] 16 August 1984. ---. “Tories don't really support women’s programs: Turner.” The Recorder & Times [Brockville, ON] 16 August 1984. “NDP leader most tuned in, TV viewers say.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. “NDP Report on Women’s Issues.” Wawa Algoma News Review [ON] 15 August 1984. Nelson, Norman. “Deans celebrates birthday, hopes for present.” Hamilton Mountain News 22 August 1984. O'Donnell, Joe. “Leaders vow pension for housewives.” Toronto Star 16 August 1984. Olinger, David. “Women reps have particular expectations for TV debate.” Daily Herald-Tribune [Grande Prairie, AB] 10 August 1984. Osborne, Ron. “A disaster.” Hamilton Spectator 23 August 1984. Oshell, Elaine. “Almaguin Spotlight.” North Bay Nugget [ON] 23 August 1984. Pack, Nancy. “Women and men are people too.” Topic Newsmagazine [Bradford, ON] 28 August 1984: 10. Palmer, John. “TV debate - sad moment in Canadian politics.” Packet & Times [Orillia, ON] 18 August 1984. Paton, John, and Terry Collins. “Mulroney ‘uncommitted’ on women's issues: Turner lists Tory sins.” Toronto Sun 16 August 1984. Pennington, Ruth M. “RE The Tower of Babel.” Toronto Sun 28 August 1984. “Pensioned to millionaires.” The Oshawa Times [ON] 20 August 1984. Petrasek, Grace. “Debate riles ‘Real Women.’” Powell River News-Town Crier [BC] 6 August 1984. Pierce, Gretchen. “Study issues, women told.” Edmonton Journal 31 August 1984. “PM’s hopes tied to women’s issues.” Edmonton Journal 13 August 1984. Poland, Tony. “‘Innocuous’ debate leaves women fuming.” Brampton Guardian [ON] 22 August 1984. “Porn issue ‘media sport.’” Kitchener-Waterloo Record [ON] 21 August 1984. Poulton, Terry. “Suitors woo Canadian damsels.” Toronto Star 16 August 1984. “Prime Minister Apologizes for Bum-Patting Incidents.” Amherst Daily News [NS] 14 August 1984. “Prime Minister visits riding.” Stouffville Sun [ON] 15 August 1984. “Promises, promises.” Tillsonburg News [ON] 20 August 1984. “Promises, promises.” Ingersoll Times [ON] 22 August 1984. Realwomen. “‘Other’ group's policies not really the same.” Yorkton Enterprise [SK] 13 August 1984. 253

“REAL Women object to women's issues debate.” Pictou Advocate [NS] 8 August 1984. “REAL Women Objecting to Women's Issues Debate.” Rosetown Eagle [SK] 15 August 1984. “Real Women oppose NAC claims and tactics.” Bridgewater Bulletin [NS] 15 August 1984. S.F. “The shape of things to come.” Kemptville Weekly Advance [ON] 22 August 1984. Sabia, Laura. “The NAC's worst hour?” St. Catharines Standard 23 August 1984. Schachter, Harvey. “Saying No to the Chambre of Commerce.” The Kingston Whig- Standard 21 August 1984. Sears, Val. “Co-operation triumphs in women’s network.” Toronto Star 16 August 1984. ---. “Women’s issues debate tonight may tip vote.” Toronto Star 15 August 1984. Sheppard, Jim. “Voter the winner in Wednesday debate.” Nelson Daily News [BC] 17 August 1984. Shifrin, Leonard. “Bridging the gender gap no easy task.” The London Free Press 20 August 1984. ---. “Canada’s gender gap has no where [sic] to go: Even NDP didn't keep its pledges.” 24 August 1984. “Single issues politics.” West Lorne Sun [Rodney, ON] 23 August 1984. Slotek, Jim. “Thank God c’est finis.” Calgary Sun 16 August 1984. Smith, Jackie. “Broadbent a clear winner, Anderson says.” Toronto Star 15 August 1984. Smith, Patricia A. “They don’t speak for all women.” Brantford Expositor [ON] 22 August 1984. “Star survey finds Township reaction mixed: Women insulted by TV debate.” Port Perry Star [ON] 21 August 1984: 1, 3. Steden, Anneliese. “Feminists speak for a minority.” Kitchener-Waterloo Record [ON] 30 August 1984. Steden, Annette . “Fed up with the feminists.” Cambridge Times [ON] 29 August 1984. Strowbridge, Nellie . “People Issues.” Carbonear Compass [NL] 22 August 1984. Sudol, Carol. “Women are declared historic debate winners.” Burlington Weekend Post [ON] 22 August 1984. Sutherland, Stewart. “The issue is human, not women’s.” Packet & Times [Orillia, ON] 25 August 1984. “Talk deficit!” Toronto Sun 15 August 1984. “Television debate ‘historic.’” Daily Herald [Prince Albert, SK] 18 August 1984. “The great debate for women.” The Evening Telegram [St. John’s, NL] 25 August 1984. The Valley Leader. “A valid point.” MacGregor Herald [Portage La Prairie, MB] 8 August 1984. “The viewers were losers during first women’s debate.” Alexandria/Glengarry News [ON] 22 August 1984. “The women’s debate.” The Red Deer Advocate [AB] 16 August 1984. Tinker, Susan. “Women's issues debate short on policies.” North Battleford News- Optimist [SK] 17 August 1984: 9, 16. “Trying Harder.” Sunday News [Williams Lake, BC] 19 August 1984. “Turner boning up on women’s issues.” The Citizen [Prince George, BC] 13 August 1984. 254

“Turner sorry for bum-patting.” The Daily News [Prince Rupert, BC] 14 August 1984. Turner, Garth. “Are women serious - or just patsies?” Kindersley Clarion [SK] 15 August 1984. ---. “Canadian Business.” Eston Press [SK] 15 August 1984. “TV debate fails on key issues.” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. “TV Debate: Final Encounter a Non-Event.” Cape Breton Post 18 August 1984. “Two titles.” Calgary Herald 16 August 1984. Untitled. The Province [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. VanderBoom, Femmie. “Women's debate was a farce.” Hamilton Spectator 23 August 1984. Villemaire, Robert. “Turner questioned.” Standard-Freeholder [Cornwall, ON] 25 August 1984. Volkart, Carol. “Eight Women Talk Back.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 18 August 1984. ---. “Livelier TV debate touted.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 15 August 1984. ---. “Women give debate a good word.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984: 1-2. ---. “Women ready to pink slip candidates on their issues.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 7 August 1984. “Voters to see PC ‘bill.’” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 16 August 1984. W.R. “Editorials: The role of women.” Winchester Free Press [ON] 22 August 1984. “‘Wake up,’ Brunet: Women are sure to suffer without NDP.” Kapuskasing Northern Times [ON] 29 August 1984. Webber, Rose Mary. “kootenay diversions.” The Kootenay Advertiser [BC] 28 August 1984. “When every issue is at the top of the list.” The London Free Press 17 August 1984. White, Stephen. “Hidden agendas keep Grits, Tories away from promises: Brunet.” Timmins Daily News [ON] 21 August 1984. “Why That Debate?” Port Perry Star [ON] 21 August 1984. Wilson, W.A. “Debate on women's issues had highest standards.” The Truro Daily News [Truro, NS] 18 August 1984. ---. “Hard questioning in women’s debate.” Simcoe Reformer [ON] 20 August 1984. ---. “Leaders’ debate well organized.” Chatham Daily News [ON] 21 August 1984. ---. “Leaders’ Debate: Women's Issues Tough.” Thomson News Service [Ottawa, ON] 20 August 1984. ---. “The women's debate.” Chronicle-Journal [Thunder Bay, ON] 18 August 1984. ---. “Women’s tv debate better grip on issues.” The Oshawa Times [ON] 20 August 1984. Wilson-Smith, Anthony. “The Tories assault a Liberal bastion.” Maclean's 20 August 1984: 16-17. Winsor, Hugh. “Trust question cuts through words.” The Globe & Mail 16 August 1984. Wischnewski, Nino. “Women’s issues” Edmonton Journal 31 August 1984. “Women found last question crucial.” Timmins Daily News [ON] 16 August 1984. “Women’s concerns come to the fore.” The Intelligencer [Belleville, ON] 17 August 1984. “Women’s debate just the start.” The Times [Nanaimo, BC] 18 August 1984. “Women’s debate serves purpose.” Cambridge Daily Reporter [ON] 18 August 1984. 255

“Women’s issue debate has dangers for leaders.” The Journal Pioneer [Summerside, PEI] 13 August 1984. “Women's issues debate proved worthwhile.” The Leader Post [Regina, SK] 18 August 1984. “Women’s Issues Debated.” The Citizen [Prince George, BC] 15 August 1984. “Women’s issues in campaign lost: Pro life.” Hanover Post [ON] 15 August 1984. “Women’s issues not big concern.” The Owen Sound Sun-Times [ON] 27 August 1984. Wong, Sherwin. “Chretien speaks in Barrie.” Alliston Herald [ON] 15 August 1984. Wood, Dianne, and Jonathan Fear. “Leaders debate described as victory for women.” Kitchener-Waterloo Record [ON] 16 August 1984. “Wooing the female vote.” Kamloops Daily Sentinel [BC] 19 August 1984. “Yawns in Nanaimo.” Nanaimo Daily Free Press [BC] 16 August 1984. Yeo, Debra Ann. “No longer a ‘minority’? Rise of women’s issues applauded, but politicians’ sincerity in doubt.” Kitchener-Waterloo Record [ON] 17 August 1984: B1, B2. “Z.” Editorial Cartoon. London Free Press 21 August 1984. Zwarun, Suzanne. “Feminists cynical about TV debate.” Calgary Herald 13 August 1984. ---. “TV debate a definite sign of progress.” Calgary Herald 17 August 1984.

Box 693 Amiel, Barbara. “Vulgar feminism.” Toronto Sun 14 December 1986. Anderson, Doris. “Action committee in crisis – again.” Toronto Star 30 July 1988: F1. ---. “What’s so hot about free trade, Brian?” Toronto Star 22 October 1988: H3. Bird, Heather. “Broadbent to get first and last word in televised debate.” Toronto Star 19 October 1988: A3. Blatchford, Christie. “‘Women’s issues’ offend.” Toronto Star 12 October 1988: 5. Canadian Press. “Networks knocked by women’s group.” Vancouver Sun 11 October 1988: A12. ---. “‘Radical feminists’ blocking bids for financing, lobby group says.” Globe & Mail 12 December 1986. ---. “Tories want 4 TV debates by party leaders.” Toronto Star 27 August 1988. ---. “Turner wants debate on trade in election.” Toronto Star 22 September 1988: A18. “CBC rejects message urging women to vote.” Toronto Star 19 October 1988. Cruickshank, John. “Special-interest groups target election heroes, foes.” Globe and Mail 12 August 1988: A1, A5. Dunphy, Cathy. “On REAL’s western front.” Toronto Star 13 July 1987. Frum, David. “The feminist connection.” Toronto Sun 31 May 1988. Kennedy, Mark. “Women’s group still willing to stage election debate.” Ottawa Citizen 8 October 1988. Lee, Robert. “Women’s issues offer parties more pain than political gain.” Ottawa Citizen 16 August 1988. Macaluso, Grace. “REAL Women target feminist movement as conservatism spreads.” The Star [Windsor, ON] 6 May 1989: F7. 256

“NAC undaunted as Tories refuse sponsored debate.” Globe and Mail 30 August 1988: 3. Page, Shelley. “Authors issue plea for TV debate on environment.” Toronto Star 13 October 1988: A1, A2. Paterson, Jody. “CBC action infuriates women’s group.” Kamloops News [BC] 3 November 1988. Rauhala, Ann. “Women’s group plans drive to bring out voters.” Globe and Mail 9 October 1988. Sabia, Laura. untitled. Toronto Sun 24 May 1988. “TV ad urging women to vote called unacceptable by CBC.” Globe and Mail 19 October 1988. Waddell, Christopher. “PM sets terms on TV debate.” Globe and Mail 27 August 1988: A6. Walker, William. “Parties battle networks, each other over prime-time campaign.” Toronto Star 11 October 1988. ---. “TV showdown set for leaders.” Toronto Star 12 October 1988: A1, A2. “When leaders debate.” Globe and Mail 8 October 1988. Winsor, Hugh. “2 debates of 3 hours agreed to by leaders.” Globe and Mail 12 October 1988: A1, A2.

Box 694 Bryden, Joan. “McDougall slams women’s group.” Edmonton Journal 16 May 1989. Drache, Arthur. “REAL Women’s grant gives message to NAC.” Financial Post [Don Mills, ON] 16 May 1989: 13. Koring, Paul. “Tories break tradition by boycotting meetings with women’s lobby.” Globe & Mail 13 May 1989: A3. Lee, Robert. “McDougall refuses to meet with women’s group lobby.” Ottawa Citizen 12 May 1989. ---. “Minister ‘snubbed’ group month ago, letter shows.” Ottawa Citizen 13 May 1989: A4. Sabia, Laura. untitled. Toronto Sun 23 May 1989.

Box 696 Anderson, Doris. “Real men debate women’s issues,” Toronto Star 2 October 1988. “NAC undaunted as Tories refuse sponsored debate,” Globe & Mail 30 August 1988. Waddell, Christopher. “PM sets terms on TV debate,” Globe & Mail 27 August 1988.

Series 3: Executive/Committees

Box 707 Canadian Press. “Violence panel dealt another blow.” Globe and Mail 22 June 1992. Kavanaugh, Jean. “Racism charge ‘the worst thing ever in my life.’” Toronto Star 15 June 1992: A1. 257

Thobani, Sunera. “NAC calls for halt to racism: Three Sisters revisited.” Canadian Dimension [Winnipeg, MB] January-February 1994: 45. “Women taking aim at politics group says.” Toronto Star 6 June 1992. Woodhouse, Leanne. “NAC attacks neo-conservatives.” StarPhoenix [Saskatoon, SK] 7 June 1993. ---. “NAC called upon to denounce oppression in Guatemala.” StarPhoenix [Saskatoon, SK] 7 June 1993. ---. “New NAC head puts conflict behind her.” StarPhoenix [Saskatoon, SK] 7 June 1993. ---. “New reproductive technologies threaten women: NAC official.” StarPhoenix [Saskatoon, SK] 7 June 1993. Wattie, Chris. “NAC to fight federal anti-stalking legislation.” StarPhoenix [Saskatoon, SK] 7 June 1993.

Series 4: Financial Records

Box 779 Anderson, Doris. “Guide to view debate on women.” Toronto Star 11 August 1984: L1. Baer, Nicole. “Cabinet possibilities include women.” Winnipeg Free Press 6 September 1984. ---. “Elxn-Hosek.” Wirestories – Status of Women Canada [Toronto, ON] 19 August 1984. ---. “Mulroney expected to deliver on women's issues, group says.” Winnipeg Free Press 5 September 1984. ---. “'No alternative on women's concerns'.” Kelowna Daily Courier [BC] 5 September 1984. Bell, Pat. “Ottawa women to mark scorecards during debate.” Ottawa Citizen 4 August 1984: 5. “Bottoms out, issues in.” Montreal Gazette 15 August 1984: B2. “Broadbent Wins Debate, Beveridge Says.” Shaunavon Standard [SK] 29 August 1984. Canadian Press. “19 Women to Sit on Government Side.” St. John Times Globe [NB] 5 September 1984. ---. “Court kills man’s bid to expand TV debate.” Toronto Star 15 August 1984: A10. ---. “Debate on, women’s group says.” Montreal Gazette 4 August 1984: A7. ---. “Election aftermath ax razor sharp.” Daily Sentinel Review [Woodstock, ON] 7 September 1984. ---. “Elxn-Debate-Women.” Wirestories – Status of Women Canada [Toronto, ON] 7 August 1984. ---. “Elxn-Turner-Evans.” Wirestories – Status of Women Canada [Toronto, ON] 14 August 1984. ---. “Elexn-Women-Debate.” Wirestories – Status of Women Canada [Toronto, ON] 30 July 1984. ---. “Leaders agree to 3rd debate.” Ottawa Citizen 24 July 1984. ---. “NAC ‘pushing narrow views.’” The Mail Star [Halifax, NS] 31 July 1984. 258

---. “Networks eye third debate.” Globe and Mail 25 July 1984. ---. “Real Women want input into debate.” The Citizen [Prince George, BC] 31 July 1984. ---. “Tory majority ahead, says poll.” The Evening Telegram [St. John’s, NL] 21 August 1984. ---. “Turner urged to halt CNR appeal.” Winnipeg Free Press 31 August 1984. ---. “Women Happy.” The Guardian [Charlottetown, PEI] 6 September 1984. ---. “Women Waiting for Action.” The Gleaner [Fredericton, NB] 5 September 1984. “CBC Survey Released Shows Conservatives with Commanding Lead.” Clarenville Packet [Grand Falls, NL] 29 August 1984. Creighton, Judy. “Women worried Mulroney won't work toward equality.” Hamilton Spectator 7 September 1984. “Debate not expected to shed new light on women’s issues.” Montreal Gazette August 15, 1984. “Debate on women’s issues to be televised.” Toronto Star 10 August 1984: A14. “Debate will further goals of all women.” Toronto Star no date. Eckersley, Wendy. “Non-partisan panel picked for debate on women’s issues.” Ottawa Citizen 9 August 1984. Edwart, David. “Paternalistic Condescension in Article.” Contrast [Toronto, ON] 7 September 1984. Finlayson, Judith. “Whose interests are being served?” Globe and Mail 13 August 1984: S10. Goldenberg, Suzanne. “Details vague as debate on women’s issues draws near.” Globe and Mail 3 August 1984: 4. ---. “No celebrities, feminist hardliners: Panelists chosen for women’s debate.” Globe and Mail 9 August 1984: 8. Griffiths, Ruth. “Women's groups cautious.” Daily Herald [Prince Albert, SK] 5 September 1984. Hošek, Chaviva. “Goodwill toward women, but not much else.” Financial Post [Don Mills, ON] 25 August 1984. Howard, Ross. “Credibility on line as politicians face women’s debate.” Globe and Mail 13 August 1984: 1. Hurst, Lynda. “Debate shed light on the fine print of inequality.” Toronto Star 21 August 1984: B1. ---. “Women want answers.” Toronto Star 29 July 1984. Istona, Mildred. “The ‘women’s issues’ issue.” Chatelaine October 1984: 2. Lipvenko, Dorothy. “PC, NDP leaders accept invitation to first debate on women’s issues.” Globe & Mail 11 July 1984. “Local women have chance to grade debaters.” Ottawa Citizen 14 August 1984: 3. Nichols, Mark. “‘Why should we trust you now?’” Maclean’s 27 August 1984: 14-15. “Older women a priority.” Springhill Record [NS] 29 August 1984. Procher, Donna. “Leaders must oppose.” Barrie Examiner [ON] 1 September 1984. “Real issues.” Ottawa Citizen 25 July 1984. Rosenfeld, Erika. “Women’s committee unqualified to set debate agenda, rival says.” Globe and Mail 30 July 1984: 5. 259

Rushton, Roy C. “Maggie's Drawers.” Pictou Advocate [NS] 29 August 1984. Seel, Lois. “This attack on the NDP forces letter.” Chatham Miramichi Weekend [SK] 31 August 1984. Semenak, Susan. “Where party leaders stand on women’s issues.” Montreal Gazette 11 August 1984: E8, E9. Smith, Ken. “It’s Your Business.” Wirestories – Status of Women Canada 7 September 1984. Sutton, Robert. “PM, Opposition may debate women’s issues.” Toronto Star 11 July 1984. “Third debate,” Toronto Sun 25 July 1984: 10. “Women get tough on CN.” The Province [Vancouver, BC] 31 August 1984. “Women iron out debate details.” Toronto Sun 31 July 1984: 30.

Box 785 Anderson, Doris. “For women, PM’s glass slipper no longer fits.” Toronto Star 2 March 1990: A25. Bolan, Kim. “Women occupy office.” The Sun [Vancouver, BC] 31 March 1990: A6. Byrne, Kathleen. “Financing of centres is finished, Ottawa tells protesting women.” Globe and Mail 7 April 1990. ---. “Women’s centres shut down across country as budget cuts bite.” Globe and Mail 5 March 1990: A10. Cameron, Stevie. “Women’s centres across Canada begin to close as funding dries up.” Globe and Mail 7 April 1990: A9. Campbell, Donald. “City women protest cuts to centres.” Winnipeg Free Press 20 April 1990. Caplan, Gerald. “No wonder women are protesting.” Opinion. Toronto Star no date. Dunphy, Catherine. “Feminists to confront Tory minister.” Toronto Star 12 March 1990. Flavelle, Dana. “Casualties of the cuts.” Toronto Star 9 March 1990: C1, C4. Grossi, Fiorella. “Grants fail to appease women’s groups.” Globe and Mail 7 May 1990. Howard, Ross. “Budget a betrayal, opposition says.” Globe and Mail 28 September 1989. Kaufman, Michael. “Cynical Policy.” Letter to the Editor. Globe and Mail 12 March 1990. Kenna, Kathleen. “Budget cuts needed, women told.” Toronto Star 2 March 1990. Michelin, Lana. “Minorities changing the face of women’s movement.” Globe and Mail 5 March 1990: A11. Landsberg, Michele. “Tory cuts are silencing our sisters.” Toronto Star 27 February 1990. “Police bust up Metro women’s sit-in.” Toronto Star 3 April 1990: A1. Pollak, Nancy. “Women’s Program slashed: No centres, no staff, no service.” Kinesis March 1990: 3. Rusk, James. “Wilson challenges budget critics to say how they would cut deficit.” Globe and Mail 9 May 1990. Sears, Val. “Ottawa accused of stepping up ‘war on women.’” Toronto Star 3 April 1990: A9. 260

“Steep savings: Closure of women’s centres will cost.” Editorial. The Province [Vancouver, BC] 5 March 1990: 24. Stephenson, Wendy. “Funding cuts hit hard: Women’s shelters, groups hurting.” Winnipeg Sun 20 April 1990: 6. “Toying with women.” Toronto Star 9 May 1990. Vienneau, David. “Cuts to women’s programs will remain, minister says.” Toronto Star 9 May 1990: A17. ---. “Women’s groups complain they’re being silenced.” Toronto Star 27 February 1990. ---. “Women’s groups may lose money.” Toronto Star 23 February 1990: D1. Wachtel, Eleanor. “When budget cuts seem more like censorship.” Toronto Star 21 March 1990. Winsor, Hugh and Kirk Makin. “Funds reduced or ended for outspoken women’s, native groups.” Globe and Mail 23 February 1990: A13. Winsor, Hugh. “Government advertising to sell budget shows only one side of coin.” Globe and Mail 8 May 1989: A2. “Women and minister to discuss budget cuts.” Western Star [Cornerbrook, NL] 11 April 1990: 3.

Box 818 “TV Debate on Women’s Issues Tonite!” Editorial Cartoon. Moose Jaw Times-Herald [SK] 16 August 1984.

Series 6: Office/Administration/Personnel

Box 854 Amiel, Barbara. “How the feminists hurt women.” Maclean’s 1 October 1984: 13. Inglis, Dorothy. “The response was predictable.” Evening Telegram [St. John’s, NL] 28 July 1984. Smith, Jackie. “NAC presses MPs to fight for women.” Toronto Star 23 March 1984. ---. “REAL Women set to fight feminists.” Toronto Star 2 February 1984: A14. ---. “Where are women in leadership race?” Toronto Star 1 May 1984: H3. Schwartz, Susan. “Networks hold first joint meeting.” Montreal Gazette 7 December 1984: C2.

Box 855 Fine, Sean. “Advocacy groups battle to survive.” Globe and Mail 17 July 1990: A8. McTeer, Maureen. “Federal funds for women’s groups: Where does the money go?” Chatelaine August 1986: 40.

Box 857 Gwyn, Richard. “Canada: On the cutting edge or edge of disaster?” Toronto Star 14 July 1993: A19.