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Die Reterritorialisierung Des Digitalen Als Reaktionsweise Zeitgenössischer Demokratien Auf Den Plan

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Die Reterritorialisierung Des Digitalen Als Reaktionsweise Zeitgenössischer Demokratien Auf Den Plan In Reaktion auf die Enthüllungen Edward Snowdens und die dadurch aktualisierte Krise der Privatheit tritt die Reterritorialisierung des Digitalen als Reaktionsweise zeitgenössischer Demokratien auf den Plan. Verwerfungen im Zuge zunehmend globalisierter Datenströme sollen nach altbekanntem Muster der territorialen und nationalen Containergesellschaften gekittet werden. Reterritorialisierung adres- siert dabei einen digital induzierten Wandel und versucht, Antworten zu geben auf Fragen der gegenwärtigen Neukonfiguration des Ver- hältnisses von Demokratie und Gesellschaft. Die Kartografie der dynamischen Arena um das umstrittene Konzept Privatheit liefert empirische Erkenntnisse zu einem der meistdiskutierten sozialen Ordnungsmechanismen und zeigt, wie die politische Suche nach Lösungen angesichts der tektonischen Veschiebungen der Digitali- sierung mit bestehenden Institutionen, Routinen und Ressourcen Die Reterritorialisierung des Digitalen Die Reterritorialisierung verbunden bleibt. Die Publikation präsentiert Ergebnisse des BMBF-Projektes “Kartografie und Analyse der Privacy-Arena”, an dem die Disziplinen Soziologie, Rechtswissenschaft und Philosophie/ Ethik beteiligt sind. Die Reterritorialisierung des Digitalen Zur Reaktion nationaler Demokratie auf die Krise der Barbara Büttner, Christian L. Geminn, Thilo Hagendorff, Jörn Lamla, Simon Ledder, Carsten Ochs, Fabian Pittroff Privatheit nach Snowden Barbara Büttner, Christian L. Geminn, Thilo Hagendorff, Jörn Lamla, Simon Ledder, Carsten Ochs, Fabian Pittroff ISBN 978-3-86219-106-2 9 783862 191062 Barbara Büttner, Christian L. Geminn, Thilo Hagendorff, Jörn Lamla, Simon Ledder, Carsten Ochs, Fabian Pittroff Die Reterritorialisierung des Digitalen Zur Reaktion nationaler Demokratie auf die Krise der Privatheit nach Snowden kassel university press Das dieser Publikation zugrundeliegende Vorhaben wurde mit Mitteln des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung unter dem Förderkennzeichen 16KIS0096K gefördert. Die Verantwortung für den Inhalt der Veröffentlichung liegt bei den Autoren. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. ISBN 978-3-86219-106-2 (print) ISBN 978-3-86219-107-9 (e-book) DOI: http://dx.medra.org/10.19211/KUP9783862191079 URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0002-31078 © 2016, kassel university press GmbH, Kassel www.upress.uni-kassel.de Printed in Germany Inhalt 1 Einleitung 4 2 Kartografie als Methode 11 2.1 Strauss‘ Theorie sozialer Welten und Arenen 11 2.2 Das Konzept der Kartografie in der Forschungsliteratur 13 2.3 Mapping sozialer Welten und Arenen nach Clarke als Visualisierungsstrategie 17 2.4 Das Arena-Segment des nationalen Routings 20 3 Routing und die Arena seiner Aushandlung 23 3.1 Schengen- bzw. nationales Routing als umkämpfter Lösungsvorschlag 23 3.2 Die beteiligten sozialen Welten und die Arena ihrer Aushandlungen 27 3.3 Argumente und Bewertungen in der Arena 36 3.4 Recht als Ressource in der Arena 60 3.5 Privatheit in den Diskursen der Arena 76 4 Begriffliche und theoretische Hintergründe 93 4.1 Privatheit – Ideengeschichte und theoretische Zugänge 93 4.2 Der Begriff der Privatsphäre in der Rechtswissenschaft 111 4.3 Vertrauen ins Netz 127 4.4 Vertrauen in der Arena 135 5 Reterritorialisierung und Privatheit 139 5.1 Zugriffsweisen auf den Wert der Privatheit 139 5.2 Die Verlaufskurve des nationalen Routings und die Reproduktion der Container-Gesellschaft 145 6 Schluss: Demokratische Alternativen der Reterritorialisierung 153 7 Literaturverzeichnis 160 1 Einleitung Jörn Lamla Die vorliegende Gemeinschaftsarbeit präsentiert den methodischen und theoretischen Forschungsansatz sowie Hypothesen und Ergeb- nisse aus der Explorationsphase eines BMBF-Verbundprojektes zur „Kartografie und Analyse der Privacy-Arena“.1 An diesem Projekt sind die Disziplinen Soziologie (unter der Leitung von Jörn Lamla und Cars- ten Ochs, Universität Kassel), Rechtswissenschaft (unter der Leitung von Alexander Roßnagel und Silke Jandt, Universität Kassel) und Phi- losophie/Ethik (unter der Leitung von Regina Ammicht Quinn und Jessica Heesen, Universität Tübingen) beteiligt. Die zentrale Idee des Projektes besteht darin, Privatheit als umstrittenes Konzept nicht wissenschaftlich definieren zu wollen, sondern den Streit darum zum Ausgangspunkt der Analyse zu nehmen. Methodisch schließt es an soziologische Ansätze an, die sich dem Nachzeichnen komplexer Kon- fliktlandschaften und ihrer Wandlungsdynamik verschrieben haben. Hierzu zählen Ansätze des „Mapping of Controversies“, die aus den Science & Technology-Studies und der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie her- vorgegangen sind, sowie die Mapping-Verfahren der Situationsanaly- se von Adele Clarke (2012). Letztere greift auf die Theorie der Sozialen Welten und Arenen zurück, die Anselm Strauss (1978, 1993; vgl. Strü- bing 2007) entwickelt hat, um dem dynamischen Strukturwandel und der „Wissensorganisation in modernen Komplexgesellschaften“ (Schütze 2002) Rechnung zu tragen. Im Sinne dieses Ansatzes wird hier angenommen, dass sich auch um die Streitsache Privatheit eine komplexe Arena gebildet hat und dynamisch entwickelt, die durch eine Pluralität sozialer Welten konstituiert und vorangetrieben wird. Gegenwärtig kommt diese Arena insbesondere durch die Herausfor- 1 Aus Gründen der sprachlichen Vereinheitlichung und Vereinfachung wurde auf ein Gendern verzichtet und nur die männliche Form verwendet. In der Regel sind alle Geschlechter angesprochen. 4 derungen der Digitalisierung stark in Bewegung und evoziert einen Strudel von Argumenten und Positionierungen seitens der Beteiligten und Betroffenen. Angesichts der Offenheit dieser Situation ist es für die interdisziplinäre Forschung zentral, die Figuration der Arena de- tailliert in den Blick zu nehmen, um tragfähige Hypothesen zu den sozialen, technischen, rechtlichen, politischen und ethischen Ver- schiebungen zu generieren, die mit dem gegenwärtigen Wandel der Privatheit im Zuge der Digitalisierung verknüpft sind. Im Sinne der Grounded Theory hat sich der Projektverbund für einen spiralförmigen Forschungsprozess entschieden, um nach und nach zu generalisierenden Aussagen über die Privacy-Arena zu gelangen. Im Sinne dieses Vorgehens musste ein geeigneter und überschauba- rer Zugang zum Issue Privatheit identifiziert werden. Daher stand am Anfang der nachfolgenden Exploration die forschungspragmatische Entscheidung, mit der Analyse einer spezifischen und überschauba- ren Debatte in die Situationsanalyse einzusteigen. Ausgewählt wurde dafür die Kontroverse um nationales Routing, das in Reaktion auf die Enthüllungen Edward Snowdens und die dadurch aktualisierte Krise der Privatheit als Lösungsvorschlag ins Spiel gebracht wurde. Die Auswertung dieses empirischen Falles führte zu der Hypothese, dass sich im Vorschlag des nationalen Routings Bestrebungen zu einer Reterritorialisierung des Digitalen manifestieren, die mit Berufung auf den Wert der Privatheit und das (keineswegs deckungsgleiche) Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung gerechtfertigt werden. Unklar und empirisch zu ermitteln ist dabei, wie diese Ausrichtung der Pri- vacy-Politik motiviert ist: Resultiert sie aus vertieften Auseinanderset- zungen mit den Problemen des Privatheitsschutzes im digitalen Zeit- alter oder wiederholt sie nur die Routinen und Präferenzen etablier- ter sozialer Welten und politischer Traditionen? Der Verlauf der Aus- einandersetzungen zeigt zwar, dass sich der Vorschlag eines nationa- len oder europäischen Routings in der Arena nicht durchsetzen konn- te und vorerst gescheitert ist, aber auch hierfür sind die Gründe nicht offensichtlich. Dieses Scheitern bedeutet jedenfalls nicht, dass auch die mit dem Vorschlag verbundene Logik der Reterritorialisierung 5 digitaler Netze und Kommunikationsströme vom Tisch ist. Die Analy- se des Aushandlungsprozesses zum Vorschlag des nationalen Rou- tings hat vielmehr zu allgemeineren Fragen und Hypothesen darüber geführt. Wie ist die Suche nach Antworten auf die Krise der Privatheit angesichts der Digitalisierung verbunden mit den bestehenden Insti- tutionen, Routinen und Ressourcen des Rechts, der Staatlichkeit und der Demokratie? Welche Folgen werden die Reaktionen auf diese Krise für die Privatheit und das Verständnis von Freiheit und Selbst- bestimmung zeitigen? An dieser Stelle verschmilzt der wörtliche geopolitische Gehalt des Reterritorialisierungsbegriffs mit seiner abstrakteren metaphorischen Verwendungsweise in Philosophie und Sozialtheorie. Er bahnt einen Weg von den Niederungen der Router-Technologie und der nationa- len Rechtsauslegungen des Telekommunikationsgeheimnisses hin zu Fragen der digitalen Neukonfiguration des Verhältnisses von Demo- kratie und Gesellschaft oder der Zukunft des Grundrechts auf infor- mationelle Selbstbestimmung. Ausgehend vom Vorschlag des natio- nalen Routings meint Reterritorialisierung zunächst nicht viel mehr als den Versuch, problematischen Folgen der Digitalisierung mit einer Begrenzung digitaler Datenströme auf territorial bestimmte Rechts- räume zu begegnen. Während solche Rechtsräume derzeit laufend unkontrolliert überschritten und missachtet würden, sollen die Da- tenflüsse stattdessen an staatliche Grenzen zurückgebunden werden; entweder durch gesetzliche Vorschriften (etwa im Rahmen von Be- hördenkommunikation) oder durch die Bereitstellung infrastrukturel- ler Möglichkeiten und deren freiwillige Nutzung
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