Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages
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Washington Law Review Volume 9 Number 3 10-1-1934 Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages William F. Starr Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr Part of the Secured Transactions Commons Recommended Citation William F. Starr, Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages, 9 Wash. L. Rev. 143 (1934). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol9/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CONDITIONAL SALES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES WmwAm F STARR* The contract of conditional sale and the chattel mortgage per- form a similar economic function. They are the principal devices by which the obligor may enjoy the use and possession of a chattel in winch a security interest is held by another. Either may serve to secure the payment to the vendor of the purchase money, while m Washington the chattel mortgage only may be employed to secure the repayment of a loan or the performance of other obliga- tions. i They arose out of different legal concepts, developed along dif- ferent lines, gave rise to different rights and remedies, but in the form of the two Uniform Acts have achieved a striking similarity It is the object of this article to relate the history of these se- curity instruments in the State of Washington, to show the legal consequences of a choice between them, to point out a few of the changes which would result from the adoption of either Uniform Act in this State, and finally to offer for discussion suggestions for a Composite Act covering the entire field of security in personal property TnEoRY AND FUNCTION The sole function of a conditional sale contract is to enable the vendor to deliver to the vendee possession of a chattel and retain the legal title for his protection until the purchase price has been paid. Under a conditional sale, as distinguished from a sale upon condition, in case the vendee fails to .perform as agreed, the vendor has a choice between asserting his right to enforce the affirmative obligation of the vendee to pay the purchase price, which converts it into an outright sale and vests legal title in the vendee or his assignee free from any lien for the purchase money, or forfeiting not only the vendee's right to acquire title but also any benefit to which the vendee otherwise would be entitled by virtue of the pay- ments already made. If the instrument gives the vendor this choice, it will be regarded as a conditional sale, although the parties may have termed it a lease. But a lease with a mere option to purchase is not a conditional sale because the vendor cannot elect to hold the lessee for the purchase price.1 However, if the so-called rent *Of the Seattle Bar. 'Bank of Californav. Clear Lake Lnmber Co., 146 Wash. 543, 264 Pac. 705 (1928). Likewise a bill of sale cannot be shown to be a mortgage If there is no enforceable debt obligation. Hays v. Bashar 108 Wash. 491, 185 Pac. 814 (1919) Petrsdge v. Osborne, 120 Wash. 21, 206 Pac. 839 (1922). WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW covers all of the purchase price except a nominal sum, such as $1.00, then it is a true conditional sale for the lessor-vendor has an enforceable claim for substantially all of the purchase price, and it is not essential that the vendor be given the right, immedi- ately upon default, to accelerate the obligation and claim the entire purchase price at once. It is sufficient if he have an enforceable claim under the contract for the entire purchase price at some time, 2 provided he also have the alternative to declare a forfeiture. It IS to be observed that the only purpose to which the conditional vendor may put his retained title, so far as the vendee is concerned, is to repossess the chattel on default and forfeit the contract, the title passes if he sues for the purchase price. The cases abound with illustrations of the unhappy use of the word rescind as though it were synonymous with forfeiture.' Con- tracts are rescinded because of fraud, accident, mistake, or undue delay, ordinarily this is allowed only when the parties can be put substantially in statu quo and the consideration must be returned.4 In one sense this results in a forfeiture, but it is a forfeiture only of the rights to which by the terms of the contract the other party became entitled when the contract was made. But as used in con- nection with conditional sale contracts, the forfeiture includes the payments which have been made. The misconception which may arise from the lack of precision in the use of these words is illus- trated in a recent case. A conditional sale of realty provided for a forfeiture but omitted the usual provision that in that event the vendor should retain as liquidated damages the payments already made. The real contention of the vendee, although neither he nor the court so expressed it, would appear to have been that this con- tract gave the vendor merely the option to rescind on default by the vendee, but not to retain the payments. The court very prop- erly held that the word forfeiture implied the retention of the payments already made and that it was not necessary specifically to provide for it. 5 In Washington judicial decision restricts the conditional sale contract to the use of the actual vendor in the economic sense. It Quinn v. Parke & Lacey Machinery Co., 5 Wash. 276, 31 Paa. 866 (1892) Kidder v. Wittier Corbmn Mach. Co., 38 Wash. 179, 80 Pac. 301 (1905). For a case distinguishing a consignment from a conditional sale, see 125 Wash. 301, 216 Pac. 14 (1923). Grennelle v. Boulass, 48 Wash. 310, 93 Pac. 421 (1908) Bouvier's Dictionary. Grays Harbor Nat'l Bank of Aberdeen v. Jacobs & Hart et al., 169 Wash. 674, 14 Pac. (2d) 963 (1932) See also Lundberg v. Kitsap Bank, 79 Wash. 75, 139 Pac. 769 (1914). CONDITIONAL SALES is not adapted to the use of the financier or lender of money He cannot use the device to avoid the usury laws, nor to obtain the extraordinary remedies of the conditional vendor. And it is im- material whether he takes title from the borrower and executes a contract of conditional sale back to hun,6 or whether he intercepts the passing of title to the vendee, takes title from the economic vendor, and himself executes the contract of conditional sale.7 The conditional vendor must be one who actually made the sale and assumed the risks incident to the business of selling goods. Where the court finds that it is merely a "security transaction," 8 or a method of securing a money loan, 9 it is not enforceable as a conditional sale contract, and whether it may be enforced as a chattel mortgage depends upon questions of form, or filing, and of the parties who are contesting its validity However, the court drew a sound distinction in a case in which the receiver of the economic vendor sought to contest the contracts as being in fraud of the creditors of the economic vendor when the latter had in fact been paid in full, and held that if the contracts were invalid only the purchasers or their creditors could legally complain.lo It is not intended to suggest that the conditional sale is restricted to the use of the regular merchant, nor that one may not 'buy an article merely for the purpose of selling it on conditional sale, nor even that one may not sell under such a contract an article he does not own and thereafter purchase it to fulfill his contract, but mere- ly that the lender of money cannot step into the picture when the seller has found a purchaser, take title from the seller and execute the contract as nominal vendor. He may, however, as assignee of the vendor exercise all the rights reserved under the contract,"1 aSeaboardDairy Credit Corp. v. Paulson, 174 Wash. 594, 25 Pac. (2d) 974 (1933) Olson v. Legal Adj. Bureau, 142 Wash. 446, 253 Pac. 643 (1927). But see Dennis v. Montesano Bank, 38 Wash. 435, 80 Pae. 764 (1905). 7Ijon v. Nourse, 104 Wash. 309, 176 Pac. 359 (1918) Mahon -v. Nel- son, 148 Wash. 110, 268 Pac. 144 (1928). 'Kelley v. Price, 148 Wash. 542, 269 Pac. 842 (1928). OLahn & Simmons v. Matzen Woolen Mills, 147 Wash. 560, 266 Pac. 697 (1928), where the court also found it met its test of a chattel mortgage. " Lloyd, Receiver, v. MacCallnum-Donahoe Co., 127 Wash. 180, 21 Pac. 849 (1923). Commiercial Credit Co. v. Nat'l Cr Co., 143 Wash. 253, 255 Pac. 104 (1927). But the assignee can exercise only the rights of the assignor and where F advanced money to the vendee to meet payments, under an indefinite promise of some security, and subsequently paid the vendor the balance due and took an assignment of the contract, a tender of the amount of such balance, by the receiver of the vendee, vested title in the vendee free of the assignee's claim for the money advanced to the vendee to meet prior payments. Duarte v. Munniok, 85 Wash. 539, 148 Pac. 600 (1915). WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW but since the contract is not negotiable his position is not so ad- vantageous as it would be were he allowed to enter it as vendor.