sign in sign up
<<
Home , Bernard Lewis, Voltaire Network

9/11 and : Terrorism, State Violence and Dialogue

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Tapas K. Patra School of Social Science and International Studies Faculty of Arts and Social Science University of New South Wales June 2017 11 PLEASE TYFE

THE UNIVERSITY OF NE'v'V SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname or Family name; Kan

First name; Janice Other name/s: Mary Kai-Yee

Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: AlD

School: Psychology Faculty: Science

Trtle: Ghosts of mother's past: Examining the persistent effects of previous maternal stress on the mother and her subsequent infant rat offspring

Abstract 350 words maxim um: (PLEASE TYPE)

The experiments reported in this thesis exanined the long-term effects of chronk: maternal-separation on the mother and her future offspring. Adult female rats were bred and were then repeatedly separated from their pups (maternal separation; MS) or remained with their pups (standard rearing; SR), After those pups were weaned. females were bred again with all pups from the subsequent litters being standard reared. Hence, these subsequent litter pups had mothers that were either previously separated (MSsue) or not (SRsus} f rom their prior litter. Infant offspring of the subsequent litter and their mothers were the focus of the research reported in this thesis. In the first series of experiments (Chapter 2), those infants were examined for anxiety-like behaviour, as well as w hetherthey use maternal cues to regulate their responses to aversive situations, a process referre:I to as maternal buffering. It was found that MSsus infants did not exhibit more anxiety-like behaviour compared to standard-reared controls. How ever, these infants exhibited impaired rnaternal buffering in response to aversive stfmulation,

The second series of experiments (Chapter 3) examned whether alterations in mother-infant attachment night underlie the atypical learned fear behaviour that has been previously demonstrated in MSsus infants (Kan et al.. 2016) and the impaired maternal buffering observed in Chapter 2. It was found that mothers w itha stress history do not behave differently towards their future offspring when they are undisturbed,1n the nest. How ever, under rrore challenging situations (i.e., when briefly separated from her offspring), mothers that were previously-stressed retrieve their offspring significantly faster, compared to non-stressed mothers.

The third and final series of experiment (Chapter 4) examined behavioural and biological factors in the mother following previous exposure to stress. 1/Vhile previously-stressed mothers did not differ from controls on biological measures. such as serum levels of corticosterone, these mothers exhibited behavioural differences on measures of cognition. Specifically. previously-stressed mothers sho.ved poorer spatial learning, compared to non-stressed mothers. These findings are discussed in terms of broader clinical implications for targeting the mother to prevent the intergenerational transmission of stress effects.

I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available IT¥ thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University librarles in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Aol 1968. 1 retain all property rights. such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in futurew orks (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstra:t of 11'¥ thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).

~. 1 Lb ...... c .... ~Jr::---...... ~.°./.4. /. .l.. 7.... ,. Signature Wrtness Signature Date

The University recognises that there may be exceptional circumstances requiring restridions on copying or conditions on use. Requests for restriction for a period of up to 2 years must be made in w riling. Requests for a longer period of restriction may be considered in exceptional circumstances and require the approval of the Dean of Graduate Research.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY Date of completion of requirements for Awarct COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

'I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (i,uch as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstract International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only). I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/will apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation.'

Signed

Date ...... 0:.Y/.~ ././..7 ...... ··· ··

AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT

'I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of tny thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there are any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format.'

Signed .. .~A...... ~ - ......

Date ... .?.:.f?/ .6./.!. ..7 ...... XI

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

'I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial propo1tions of materia I which have been accepted fo r the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educationa l institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicit ly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectua I content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.'

Signed

Date ..... ~P/tj.1.7...... Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis, titled 9/11 and Islam: Terrorism, State Violence and

Dialogue, is my original work while working as a research scholar in the School of Social

Science and International Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, University of New

South Wales. This has not been submitted for a degree in any other university or academic institution.

Tapas Patra June 2017

i

Acknowledgement

I am thankful to the faculty members and the administrative staff of the School of Social Science and International Studies in the Faculty of Arts and Social Science at the Universityof New South Wales for their support and co-operation.

For this particular project, I would sincerely like to thank my supervisor Dr. Anthony Burke for his encouragement, support and guidance throughout this project. I am indebted. I would also like to thank Dr. Shirley Scott for her generous advice on different styles of writing a political science thesis, and Dr. Andrew Tan for reading the earlier draft of this thesis and supporting my work. My special thank goes to Dr. Andrew M Watts of textedit for his excellent editing of the library copy of this thesis.

I express my sincere gratitude to my extended family and friends for all the support that they have provided me. I am indebted to Bapa and Maa for their love, reassurance,and unfailing faith in me and my work. Ghudu, Bui, Nana and Tilloo sustainedand helped me in various ways that kept me going. I am equally indebted for the support and encouragement I received from Bapu and Maa. I am thankful to Tulu bhai, Bhai and Apa for their unflagging confidence in my ability. Abhaya Nayak shared many discussions and gave invaluble tips on academic research – thank you, Sir. Shane, Alex, Dr. Charu and Priyambada Mishra, Tora, Subrat, Chandrakanta, Jeetu and Bhabani always extended their support in various ways that kept me going. And, furthermore, not to forget Putki, Nishu, Suchi, Adi (Ghudu junior), Adyaa, Saino, Tanish, and Miltu, who would love to see their names mentioned here. I wish one day they would also embark on such a scholarly journey. My very special thanks go to Bhanu for always borrowing and returning books from the library on my behalf and aiding me in various ways. My sincere gratitude goes to my colleagues Paul, Leon Andy from the Spastic Centre and Daryl Weiss from Koomarri for their generous support in many ways that made this journey comfortable. Finally, thanks to Liza for equally sharing the day-to-day frustrations and satisfactions of research with me, along with her own research, for the past fourteen years I have spent completing this project. As this long, arduous journey ends the least I can say to all of you is – thank you.

ii Abstract

This thesis critically explores the dominant discourse on . Taking the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre as the point of departure, it examines a range of neoconservative literature in order to gain a better understanding of the historical and political conditions that gave rise to the present policy impasse concerning Islamic nations. It critically examines how neoconservative theories and policies shaped and influenced the rationalisation behind the present war on terror and American foreign policy. Based on that understanding, this thesis focuses on whether different theories of dialogue can help us to appreciate adequately the politics of justice that Political Islam seeks, and accordingly a range of such theories are examined.

Through critical analysis of a number of neoconservative works, this thesis establishes a formative link between neoconservative theories and the current policy failure. It is also argued that neoconservative theories, perhaps due to their indulgence in the orthodoxies of International Relations ontology, have failed to extend the scope of this debate beyond the narrow discourse effectively captured by the Islamic Other vs. Civilised Us dichotomy. In order to counter adequately conservative explanations and policy discourse, this thesis provides alternative analysis of the development of Islam within the colonial and post-colonial experiences of Muslim communities, particularly in the . This alternative analysis seeks to broaden the debate and bring within hearing alternative voices that define Islam as both non-monolithic and conciliatory in its practice and outlook. In this context it suggests a formative link between these historico-political experiences and the rise of political Islam.

It is further demonstrated that what contributed to the emergence of Islam as a credible and effective political force to challenge political hegemony in the Middle East was indeed the absence of any meaningful political alternative such as nationalism, Western liberalism, or republicanism. Consequently, political Islam nudged the political constituency into greater participation in the public sphere, and initiated a process of political dialogue that the polity of many Muslim states engaged in. Since the justice that political Islam avowedly seeks is dressed in political dialogue, only by thoroughly exploring and mapping out the scope and limits of the politics of dialogue can one expect to understand adequately the nature of this justice and its attendant politics. Accordingly, this thesis examines a range of theories of dialogue, and seeks to redress some of the grave anomalies in the current political framework, in order that readers – politicians, students, community representatives, lawmakers – may look to means of overcoming the current policy impasse.

iii Contents

Introduction ...... 1 CHAPTER ONE ...... 26 Understanding ...... 26 CHAPTER TWO ...... 44 Contesting neoconservative discourses on Suicide Bombing, American Foreign Policy and Political Islam ...... 44 CHAPTER THREE ...... 68 The continuation of the cultralist paradigm: The work of and Bernard Lewis ...... 68 CHAPTER FOUR ...... 90 In Search of an Original Theory: Huntington and Fukuyama Revisited ...... 90 CHAPTER FIVE ...... 111 Framing neoconservative discourse: The Enduring Influence of Older Political Orthodoxies ...... 111 CHAPTER SIX ...... 134 Countering the Neoconservative Framing of (Political) Islam: An alternative historical understanding of the preeminence of Political Islam ...... 134 CHAPTER SEVEN ...... 153 Interpreting the rise of militant Islam ...... 153 CHAPTER EIGHT ...... 186 A hermeneutical interpretation of the preeminence of political Islam: Experience, Choice and Change ...... 186 CHAPTER NINE ...... 203 The Politics of Dialogue and the Future of Political Islam ...... 203 Conclusion ...... 240 REFERENCES ...... 248

iv Introduction

Following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the United States (US) commenced its global war on terror. Approximately one million people in Iraq, 220,000 in , and 80,000 in Pakistan were killed directly or indirectly as a result of this conflict.1The war deeply affected almost all Iraqis. “Stop anyone on any street corner in almost any part of Iraq,” argues Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “and they’ll have a personal story of the violence.”2In place of this violent approach, this thesis critically analyses US policies on the war on terror through the lens of critical and post-colonial, social and international relations theory, and argues that a new dialogic politics can provide a better alternative in dealing with Islamic terrorism. This study argues that the so-called forces of the ‘coalition of the willing’ would have been better served, had they employed a dialogical model of interpretation such as the one proposed by Gadamer, which sees the rise of political Islam as the result of the Muslim experience of colonialism, Cold War- related violence, and domination by Western powers over the past three-hundred years – it is a model that neoconservative analysis of Islam has typically dismissed as unreliable and biased.

There is abroad perception that the post 9/11 attack, the US policy on the war on terror, and American policy in the Middle East were influenced and shaped by a group of thinkers, opinion makers and policy analysts who are generally categorised as neoconservatives. However, there does not appear to be an agreed-upon notion of what neoconservatism is. Hence, there is a need to understand what neoconservatism means and to evaluate the role

1 Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan written bythe Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in collaboration with International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IIPNW) and Physicians for Global Survival (PGS)[ Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa – March 2015) p.15, http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/body-count.pdf accessed 8.7.16. According to this report “The figure is approximately 10 times greater than that of which the public, experts and decision makers are aware of and propagated by the media and major NGOs. And this is only a conservative estimate. The total number of deaths in the three countries named above could also be in excess of 2 million, whereas a figure below 1 million is extremely unlikely,” p.15. 2Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “Though Numbers Unclear, Iraqi Deaths Touch Many,”National Public Radio, February 24, 2009.

1 of neoconservatives in the development of ‘war on terror’ discourse and American foreign policy in the Middle East.

However, in evaluating the neoconservatives’ role in the war on terror, this analysis focuses on one aspect of the debate – the culturalist analysis – which blames Islam and its culture for the rise of Islamic terrorism. Many analysts find it convenient to link the issues concerning Islamic terrorism and Muslim woes with Muslim culture. As the debate on Islam and the war on terror grows increasingly more confused and vicious, demanding the apparent need to adopt a resolute moral and political stance,this thesis provides an alternative analysis of the development of Islam within the colonial and post-colonial experiences of Muslim communities, particularly in the Middle East.3

With this in mind, Chapter One of thesis attempts to situate neoconservative debate within the global perspective of contemporary international relations. The 9/11 attack elicited not only strong condemnation, but also generated intense debate on American foreign policy in the Middle East. In Michael Williams’s observation, these debates “tend to be phrased in a highly politicized and often polemical language that sits uncomfortably with the culture of scholarly discourse and with overtly theoretical debate in particular.”4Balanced examination of the role of neoconservatives in shaping that debate requires a consensual working definition of neoconservatism. This thesis attempts to provide such a definition by examining a range of neoconservative literature, particularly those works adopting a culturalist approach and identifying Islam as the issue – illustrated by figures such as Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Charles Krauthammer, Bernard Lewis, and Daniel Pipes –with the intention of shaping debate on the war on terror and US policy in the Middle East.5This being said, this is not a thesis about neoconservatism as such – rather, it

3 The work of scholars such as Olivier Roy, explains the necessity of taking a stance on the “culturalist approach” on the debate on Islam, particularly after 9/11. According to Roy”since 9/11 the debate on Islam has become more confused than ever and, and if anything, sometimes more nasty” and hence needs this to be critically evaluated. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah.(New York: Press, 2004), p. 9 4 Michael Williams, “What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 308. 5 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. (New York: Penguin Books, 1992); Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon & Schuster,

2 discusses neoconservatism as necessary background in order to address the more urgent question of US policy in the war on terror, achieving this by adoption of the most percipient and inclusive theoretical perspectives in contemporary global political research – critical and post-colonial social and international relations theory.

One of the fundamental issues of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent policy in the war on terror is how to explain and deal with suicide attacks. Chapter Two attempts to place suicide attacks in their proper context, and in doing so it challenges the position of well- known neoconservative figure Daniel Pipes regarding suicide bombing. In framing suicide attacks in the context of occupation and colonialism, this chapter traces the link between the frequency of suicide attacks and the military/political practice of instituting and maintaining occupations, curfews and sanctions. Following Frantz Fanon’s seminal work on the Algerian liberation struggle,6 this study traces the link between the national outburst of anger and consequent occupation. Fanon’s study shows how occupation plays havoc on those occupied. It illustrates how resistance against occupation is typically portrayed as the irrational behaviour of natives, often blamed on racist notions of biological inferiority. Fanon’s study encourages further critical interrogation of anger and suicide attacks. Other studies in this area7(e.g., those by Barbara Victor, Ghassan Hage, Alphonso Lingis) further validate Fanon’s perspective and explain the structural and social conditions that propel people to become suicide bombers. This thesis makes explicit the striking similarity between disparate suicide attacks occurring in militarily and geographically unrelated occupied/colonised spaces. This is in direct conflict with Pipes’ view, which blames Islamic culture and Middle East politics as responsible for suicide attacks.

1996); Charles Krauthammer, Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World, (Washington, D.C:The AIE Press, 2004); Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified,” The Atlantic, 1990, 266(3); Daniel Pipes, The Long Shadow: Culture and Politics in the Middle East. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989). 6Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) 7 See, Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. (: Robinson, 2004); GhassanHage, Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society. (Annandale NSW: Pluto Press, 2003); Alphonso Lingis, Dangerous Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

3 Chapter Three demonstrates how Pipes’ view has been upheld by fellow neoconservatives, who have chosen to ignore the complex – but nonetheless apparent and significant – issues behind such attacks, as typified by the myopic work of Charles Krauthammer and Bernard Lewis. Both Krauthammer’s and Lewis’ works belong to the same culturalist paradigm that finds Islam as the cause of these conflicts and overlooks important and rapidly changing political events in the last one-hundred years that have shaped global politics in its current form. Contrary to their claims of representing bold ideas in understanding current global conflicts, both Krauthammer and Lewis ague the necessity of maintaining the current status quo in global politics by ignoring the inherent contradictions of the current global order that caused these conflicts. In this context Krauthammer’s Democratic Realism and Lewis’s The Roots of Muslim Rage construct the rise of Political Islam as the new threat to global security and society.8 They argue that global security and peace can be best defended by ensuring American military predominance.9 Krauthammer argues that in order to defend the international community and its own interests, America should not hesitate to take pre-emptive action without seeking the approval of the international community – while sanction by the international community should be welcomed, the US should not wait for or abide by that decision. He identifies American power as the international expression of American values, maintaining that because it is a common practice to defend one’s values, it is expected that the US defends its values, which are quintessentially derived from and expressed in its power.10

8See Krauthammer and Lewis, op. cit. 9 Paraphrasing Danny Cooper, one can argue that irrespective of the way in which the neoconservatives perceive and interpret threats, they often reach at the same conclusion: that American military predominance is good both for America and the world. During the Cold War they argued the presence of a revolutionary global superpower – the - endangered the stability of the international system, necessitate the presence of a preeminent American power vital for the future of global security as expressed by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) in 1980s. After the end of the Cold War in the absence of a designated “global power rival”, neconservatives still demanded for significant defence spending. These demands are clearly expressed in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the 1993 Regional Defense Strategy (RDS) and in the Statement of Principles for the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). See, Danny Cooper, “Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis.” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of International Business and Asian Studies, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, July 2009. pp. 16–18. 10 Here power needs to be recognised “as a matter of the instruments, techniques and procedures employed in the attempt to influence the actions of those who have a choice about how they might behave” (Hindess, 1996, 141).

4 Linking power with virtues is nothing new for neoconservatism. Referring to John Kane’s important scholarly tract, Virtue and Power: the Persistent Moral Dilemma of US Foreign Policy,11Danny Cooper explains that Kane’s study underscores “how American statesmen, from its founding fathers to President Bush, had attempted to reconcile their faith in a virtuous America with a national history stained by the exercise, occasionally brutal, of military power.”12In his view, this dilemma became more problematic once the nation confronted Vietnam. Furthermore, “Americans after Vietnam,” in Kane’s view, “could no longer confidently assert their own values or feel comfortable about imposing them on others, and were consequently at a loss as to what to do with their own predominant power.”13However, neoconservatives did not suffer from this dilemma. If the lessons of Vietnam emphasised the limits of power and the hubris embedded within power, the neoconservatives sought to legitimise American power and its actions in Vietnam. According to Tarak Barkawi, their view was that “whatever went wrong in Vietnam, it was right for America to use force to pursue its values, which are synonymous with liberty and freedom around the world.”14In his book Why We Were In Vietnam,15Norman Podhoretz, one of the most prominent neoconservatives, argues that American intentions in Vietnam were beyond reproach. According to this study, in Cooper’s formulation the Vietnam war cannot be categorised as immoral or irrational “given the importance successive US administrations assigned to Indochina.”16Questioning the concerns of anti-war critics regarding the enormous toll of death and suffering inflicted on the Vietnamese, Podhoretz challenges its veracity.17Cooper notes that in Podhoretz’s view there is “no evidence” to support the charge of immoral acts of war.18In challenging the view of anti-war critics, Podhoretz argued that more civilians were killed during the Korean war than in Vietnam. For the present inquiry, according to Cooper, “the accuracy of Podhoretz’s argument is less

11 John Kane, Virtue and Power: the Persistent Moral Dilemma of U.S Foreign Policy (Yale: Yale University Press, 2008), 12Danny Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis,Ph.D, dissertation, (Department of International Business and Asian Studies: Griffith Business School, Griffith University), July 2009, p.166. 13 Cooper, op.cit., p. 166. Also see, Kane, p.337. 14Tarak Barkawi, “On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’”, International Affairs, 2004, 80(1), p. 32. 15 , Why We Were in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982b) 16 Cooper, op.cit., p.167 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

5 important than its purpose.”19 From Podhoretz’s account, instead of atoning morally for its jus ad bellum in Vietnam, Americans can take pride in it. “Perhaps more important,” Tarak Barkawi argues, “are the ways in which the Vietnam war was rewritten in films, television series and novels, for that is where most Americans have learned their ‘history’ of the war.”20In his view the “rewriting of war is a movement” enacted in films such as The Deer Hunter (dir. Michael Cimino, 1978) and We Were Soldiers (dir. Randall Wallace, 2000).21One can agree with Barkawi’s observation that “this kind of imaginative work was crucial to politically enabling the conquest and occupation of Iraq for the purposes of liberating the oppressed Iraqi people.”22In these reinterpretations of war, America displays its exceptionalism as saviour and defender of the oppressed everywhere, willing to use its military power to liberate the downtrodden in order to uphold those values.

The question arises here whether the oppressed elsewhere believe in America as a saviour and defender. Few in the non- seriously credit the claim that America’s values happen to beembedded in its power. They dismiss America’s claim of pursuing power in the service of principles or humanity as self-deluding: in Slavoj Žižek’s terms, one is never sure of America’s mission, for example, one is never sure whether the American warplane flying over Afghanistan will drop bombs or food parcels.23Irrespective of America’s attempt to reinterpret the war in Vietnam and elsewhere, it fails to register as the image of a saviour and defender of the oppressed in the non-Western world. As Fanon famously remarked, “the native laughs in mockery when Western values are mentioned in

19Ibid., p. 168. 20Barkawi, op.cit., p. 32. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real (London: Verso, 2002). Commenting upon the American foreign policy after 9/11 Žižek provides an interesting Schmittian perspective in the mixture of the military and the humanitarian. He notes “we cannot even imagine a neutral humanitarian organization like the Red Cross mediating between the warring parties, organizing the exchange of the prisoners, and so on: one side in the conflict (the US-dominated global force) already assumes the role of the Red Cross – it perceives itself not as one of the warring sides, but as a mediating agent of peace and global order crushing particular rebellions and, simultaneously, providing humanitarian aid to the “local population.” Perhaps, the ultimate image of the treatment of the “local population” as homo sacer is that of the American war plane flying above Afghanistan – one is never sure what it will drop, bombs or food parcels” (pp. 93-94).

6 front of him” – in such instances the “native” is likely to pull out his knife, or at least he “makes sure it is within reach.”24

Krauthammer’s and Pipes’ ways of reading of the world, and in particular the Arab–Islamic world, can be traced back to the influence of Bernard Lewis.25 As the final undertaking in Chapter Three, this thesis examines Lewis’s culturalist paradigm in interpreting the problems concerning the Arab-Islamic world and the role that the US should take to address them. This study finds that Lewis’s interpretation of the contemporary Middle East and Islam through the readings of medieval texts concerning the does not sufficiently take into account modern Arab history. In his attempt to interpret modern political problems in the Middle East by trying to establish a link to medieval and early Islamic history, Lewis ignored the modern political history that has shaped the current political frustration experienced by the . This is best illustrated by the middle- class origins of the 9/11 bombers, many of whom were trained in Western technical institutions and who led individualistic Western lifestyles, speaking Western languages, frequenting clubs, drinking alcohol. They also had minimal familial ties and eschewed traditional values such as arranged marriage and standard religious commitments.26 As Roy observes, they were all far more products of a westernized Islam than of traditional Middle Eastern politics…. Their background [unlike their motivations] has nothing to do with Middle Eastern conflicts…[, rather] their groups are often mixtures of educated middle class leaders and working class dropouts, a pattern common to most West European radicals of the 1970s and 1980s (Germany’s Red Army Faction, Italy’s Red Brigades, France’s Action Directe).27

24 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 33. 25 As one of the foremost postwar Orientalists, Lewis’s influence on the American Right is impeccable. As a postwar historian of Islam and the Middle East, Lewis had a deterministic influence on fellow conservative scholars and policymakers, but this had to change with the appearance of ’s in 1978. Said’s study challenged Lewis’s ideological posturing as an expert on Islam and the Middle East and attributed his stance as a façade for Zionist allegiance. Indeed, Lewis’s authority on Islam and the Middle East was critically questioned and Said’s book established a new benchmark for the study of Islam and the Middle East. There was a resurgence of interest in Lewis’s work after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the Gulf War and finally in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 26 For details about this new breed of militants and their brand of politics see Roy, op. cit., particularly Chapter 7. 27 Ibid. p. 303.

7 It seems Lewis either overlooked or did not take into serious consideration this transformation/radicalisation, and attributes the current radicalisation to medieval Islam, which has no or negligible bearing on current Arab or Islamic radicalisation.28This analysis seeks to explicate these fundamentally different understandings of the world. In this process it examines the impact of colonisation, Cold War policies and the role played by Western powers in general, and the US in particular in sustaining repressive and authoritarian client states (such as Saudi Arab and other Gulf monarchies) in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East – research that has not met with sustained scholarly analysis on the part of Lewis.

The scholarly contributions by Lewis, Krauthammer and Pipes to the debate on the Middle East, justice and culture constitute a unilateral, one-dimensional debate. Whether it is suicide bombing, terrorism, the conflicts in the Middle East, or the lack of progress in Muslim countries, their works insist that the these problems rest with Islam. In this narrative Pipes sees no mystery or complexities behind suicide bombings, whereas the works of Fanon, Victor, Hage, and other scholars offer alternative analyses based upon complex sociopolitical issues – such as colonialism, occupation, and sanction – as the underlying causes. Despite evidence and powerful theoretical interpretations to the contrary, Pipes blames suicide attacks and Middle East conflict on the heritage of Islam. Such a stance suggests either accidental neglect of powerful traditions, or deliberate avoidance of the truth, possibly due to his alleged Islamophobia and Zionist allegiance.29

28 Lewis grudgingly acknowledged that, “all the terrorists who have been identified in on New York and Washington came from Saudi Arabia and Egypt – that is, countries whose rulers are deemed friendly to the United States” and proposed America to distance itself from the Middle Eastern autocrats. However, he did not propose to go against these friendly regimes who harboured those terrorists. Instead, he proposed to take side with those people who were opposing the regimes in Iraq and , regimes that Lewis perceived as strongly anti-American. See, Bernard Lewis, The Crisis in Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, (London: Phoenix, 2004), pp. 102 & 139–140. It seems anti-Americanism is unacceptable than autocratic and theocratic regimes who are friendly to the US or its overall interest in the region. 29 Many authors have set out Daniel Pipes’ strong political stance against Islam and his loyalty to the . Edward Said describes Pipes as a “perfervid anti-Muslim whose main characteristic is that as an Orientalist he ‘knows’ Islam for the appallingly dreadful thing that it is” which he validates by analysing some of (what Said narrates as) Pipes’ “think” pieces. Said shows how Pipes fails to differentiate between radical Islam and non-radical Islam and formulates them as same. Said continues, “Pipes ridicules those experts who say that political Islam has run its course; no, he offers by way of counter argument, its heyday is upon us now. Violent, irrational, unappeasable, totally uncompromising, Pipes’ ‘fundamentalist’ Islam threatens the world, and especially ‘us.’” (Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, London: Vintage, 1997) p. xviii. In The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy

8 Despite this omission, fellow neoconservatives express solidarity with Daniel Pipes. While both Pipes and Lewis take the culturalist route in singling out Arab–Islamic culture for its current apparent radicalism, Krauthammer finds Arab–Islamic radicalism to be the most imminent threat of our time. Although their arguments created excitement in some quarters, their analysis could not offer any new dimension to debate on post-Cold War conflicts and the rise of Islam. The need for an original theory to explain and understand post-Cold War conflict drew a response from fellow neoconservatives Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama, as will be seen in the next chapter.

The impasse that followed the reconceptualisation of world politics after the end of the Cold War seemed to come to an end with the announcement of two apparently competing theories,The End of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel Huntington, and The End of History and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama. In Chapter Four I examine the two theories depicted in these studies and their wider ramifications. Huntington suggests that the future of world politics will be based on cultural competition rather than on power and ideology. He maintains that in the future the world will operate on the basis of cultural differences and affinities rather than on national identities and state loyalties. In such a scenario he doubts whether the West – and in particular the United States, with its individualistic culture and hedonistic lifestyle – can face up to these new challenges.30 The pessimism about the future of American culture strikes a chord in neoconservativethinking. While previously neoconservatives maintained that “the United

(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2008), John Mearsheimer and Stephen M Walt examine the role of the “ Lobby” in shaping the American foreign policy in the Middle East. They describe Daniel Pipes as one of the passionate pro-Israeli neoconservatives who as “the hawkish founder of the pro-Israel Middle East Forum and Campus Watch argues for the advancement of America’s interest in the region that he finds inseparable from Israel’s interest.” Olivier Roy describes Daniel Pipes as a strongly pro-Israeli right-wing academic in his book, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 9. 30 Stephen M. Walt has made this point. For details see Stephen M. Walt, “Building Up New Bogeymen”, Foreign Policy, 1997, No. 106. Similarly, Fukuyama is alarmed by the prospect that the “end of history” may result in producing people pursuing individual ambitions and pleasure seeking activities at the expense of higher goals and community life. He warns instead of being complacent about the “end of history” the West and in particular the United States must strive for something more than domination, if they wish to preserve the benefit of four hundred years’ bourgeois revolution.

9 States was losing the war of values not just with the Soviet Union but also against the ravages of extreme liberalism in the United States and Western Europe.”31 Accordingly, within the country they look with horror at American society, which, in their view, has never recovered from the assault of Woodstock.... When they look at American youth, they do not see a hopeful future. Instead they see an ‘adolescent plugged into a Walkman playing gangsta rap [who] represents a revolutionary and social phenomenon hardwired to the most extreme and corrupting influences.32 In this context Huntington’s analysis reinforces the anxieties that permeate neoconservative thinking about the weakness of Western and especially American culture, which may contradict the claim of American greatness and the claim that its ideals have an intrinsic appeal globally. Huntington’s analysis suggests that in order to defend and protect “Western” ideals and American greatness, the West needs to reorganise itself on civilisational lines, preferably an ideological enemy against whom it can fight and uphold its ideals. During the cold war, that enemy was identified as the Soviet Union and the ideals it represented; with the end of the Cold War, Islam and its ideals were identified as the new enemy.

The gloomy prediction Huntington made about the future of international politics was in stark contrast to Fukuyama’s optimistic prediction of the figurative end of history. Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis celebrated the end of the Cold War, arguing that history has a final purpose in the realisation of “human freedom” – such a freedom can be achieved by integration of a free-market economy and the adoption of liberal democracy. In this context his notion of universal civilisation or international society is imbued with specific characteristics that reflect its Western origin. Fukuyama sees such a possibility as a form of universal human aspiration and inevitable historical destiny. Conventional accounts of universal human aspirations usually claim that because they are universal such aspirations do not require any outside intervention: they unfold themselves through different avenues

31 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 50. 32 Ibid., p. 178. Also see, Charles Krauthammer, “A Social Conservatives’ Credo,” Public Interest, fall 1995, p. 17.

10 such as civil societies, grassroots movements, and dialogue.33 However, Fukuyama’s theory argues for outside intervention – in particular, American power – and the use of force if necessary to realise – or at least protect – such aspirations.

Despite its claims to liberalism, Fukuyama’s “end of history” reveals the enduring influence of certain orthodoxies of realism on his theory, in particular the role of powerful states and the politics of power. Furthermore, Fukuyama’s aspiration for human freedom and universal civilisation is not based on solidarity with global humanity, but (as he suggests) is ineluctably a part of the direction of history. Like many of his neoconservative peers, Fukuyama envisaged that this historical role will be played out by the use of American power to deliver the destiny of history. In so doing, his thesis also vindicates the need to use power in order to maintain the preeminence of American authority and defend Western civilisation, which he considers to be the universal aspiration of the global community.34 I argue that in their attempt to provide an original understanding of post-Cold War global politics, Fukuyama and Huntington unwittingly endorsedcertain aspects of Realism embedded in the Cold War dialectics of rational “us”(West) versus the irrational “Other” (Soviet Union). In this reformulation, Islam replaced the Soviet Union as the irrational “Other” after the end of the Cold War. Although both Fukuyama and Huntington noticed the decisive shift in global politics in an increasingly interdependent global society, they misinterpreted it and its causes. In their analysis they linked “culture” with that

33Martin Luther King’s freedom march and call for race equality in United States had appeal beyond the United States. Similarly, Gandhi’s method of non-violent resistance against and domination received unprecedented support from a wide range of cultures, classes, and creeds within and outside India during India’s independence struggle, and continues to have enduring influence on global civil society. Equally ANC (African National Congress) and Nelson Mandela’s struggle against apartheid had world wide support emphasizing such human emancipation projects entice wider support. Also, irrespective of the certain ideological difference between the feminists in the West and their counterparts in non-Western societies feminist movement as such has universal appeal as it seeks more sensitively to address the issues of gender inequality and concomitant issues of justice to address the complex matrix of human existence. 34 However, from 2002 onwards Fukuyama has distanced himself from the neoconservative agenda under the Bush–Cheney administration, referring its overtly militaristic basis and justification of unilateral armed intervention, particularly in the Middle East. By late 2003, he voiced his growing opposition to the and demanded ’s resignation as Secretary of Defense (Francis Fukuyama, “The Neoconservative Moment”, The National Interest, June 01, 2004; “Fukuyama Withdraws Bush’s Support”, Today’s Zaman, July 14, 2004 (http://www.zaman.com). Irrespective of Fukuyama’s criticisms of neoconservatism, however, his stance on American foreign policy (and the associated notion of expression of high moral values) and his unfailing faith in American power remains unwavering and demands critical scrutiny as such.

11 decisive shift in global politics. There is nothing deficient in cultural explanations of social practices such as political violence or social unrest. However, culture cannot be regarded in isolation, overlooking issues of class, gender, colonialism, and the Cold War. Nonetheless, this sustained oversight is oftenthe case in neoconservative analyses of culture, which typically perceive it as a divisive, rather than a potentially complementary, facet of societal and political relations.

This analysis of the theories of Huntington and Fukuyama uncovers the lasting impact of realism on neoconservatism. Exploration of this theme is the focus of Chapter Five. By examining a diverse range of views of prominent figures of the neoconservative movement – including Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, Charles Krauthammer, and Daniel Pipes –it demonstrates the enduring relevance of realist and statist paradigms at the core of neoconservative debate. This does not mean neoconservatives demand a return to what Jim George describes as the “high politics” of the past. Rather, one can argue that in their demand to maintain the current global order neoconservatives wish to return to what George describes as a time that reflects the strategic rituals of the pre-Cold War era.35 In this new world order, the US-led alliance invokes “the traditional old world images of Hitlerism and appeasement that justify punishment of the designated ‘other’ without fear of major retaliation.”36 The outcome of such an approach is to quarantine and punish some and to protect others. In this context neoconservatives not only invoke the strategic rituals of the old world, but through their arguments they also try to (re)introduce the policies of the 1970s and 1980s that were undertaken to fight Communism and Third World nationalism. In their argument neoconservatives have repackaged those policies by promoting the rhetoric of the international monetary system, theories of just war, civilisational divisions, historic divisions (ahistoric and post-historic worlds), national interest (self-preservation) and security (terrorist) threats to justify the use of force/violence so that international society can be organised according to the Western/American image.

35 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 3. 36 Ibid.

12 Despite their seemingly diverse analyses, neoconservative concerns hardly transcend the national interest of the US. In their view the survival and continuity of a reliable international society depends on keeping the current global order intact, that is, to guarantee the continuing preeminence of the Western model of progress, justice and freedom and its vanguard, American power. Unfortunately, their analyses neglect many alternative views that are suspicious of the Western rhetoric of freedom, equality, justice, and progress. My analysis focuses on these alternative approaches. The memories of colonisation and the perils of the Cold War generate in the non-Western world an entirely different image of the US from the one neoconservatives wish others to believe, namely that American power is an expression of values. The enormous violence many people were subjected to during colonialism and during the Cold War period indelibly registered in the minds of successive generations. It is sobering to remember, as Huntington notes,

the West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas and values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.37

As neoconservatives embark upon reorganising the world along Western lines to maintain the preeminence of the West and the “benefit of four hundred years of bourgeois revolution”38 by naturalising force and organised violence, the uncivilised/ahistoric world responds by resisting that attempt, at times violently. Such resistance challenges critical observers to question power politics, and perhaps even suggests that there are other ways of addressing the structural and ideological differences in global society other than by using brute force. There are other forces, other scholarly legacies and other interpretations of international society outside the neoconservative framework. Drawing from postcolonial, critical, social, Islamic, and International Relations theory, this thesis seeks to articulate a different narrative of global society in the succeeding chapter (Chapter Six). In this effort special attention is paid to examining the growth of Islamic societies, and the growth of

37 Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 51. 38 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 283.

13 political Islam and its influence in diverse Muslim societies, as well as its role in shaping global politics.

The growth of (political) Islam: an alternative historical narrative

In exploring and drawing from diverse scholarly legacies, this chapter attempts todevelop an understanding of global politics in general and Islamic politics in particular that functions as an alternative historical narrative to the neoconservative construction of political Islam. In developing an alternative narrative I seek to broaden debate by introducing the complex political history of the growth of political Islam – its myriad traditions, complex practices, and global scope.

This historical account enables insight into the significance of Islam; it also revitalises the motivation to examine the factors behind the primacy of militant Islam that dominates mainstream discussion of terrorism. Chapter Seven addresses the aspect of militancy in Islam. In order to do so it looks into the impact of early Islamic movements of the 18th and 19th centuries, which sought to challenge and reform the societal decline of Muslim communities. These movements acted as a vehicle of change for larger social forces affecting Muslim societies, simultaneously commenting on their contemporary lifeand indicating approaching changes in the public sphere.

Understanding these changes in the social sphere of Muslim societies demands consideration of the political phenomenon of Islam that is entirely apart from conventional accounts of a static, non-evolving, atavistic society mired in a closed set of beliefs and values. This rethinking also requires a departure from conventional models of international relations, and from the protocols employed by academics and decision makers;39it demands

39 In referring to a conventional account of international relations, I refer to a system where the balance of power and role of nation-states (in particular the role of powerful states) are considered as primary features of global politics. “A distinguished commentator and former policy maker observed that,” argues Tarak Barkawi, “from ‘the beginning of the twentieth century, the international system was based largely on two epochal events in European history: the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Congress of Vienna of 1814 – 15’ – epochal because they established the nation-state and the balance of power as the primary features of international politics.” According to Barkawi, “this is a wholly unremarkable statement, and reflects what students are being taught in many Anglo-American departments of international relations, as well as the basic

14 a reorientation that accedes to the lived experience and myriad social practices of diverse Muslim societies, so as to approach truth in multiple different ways. The experience of colonialism, the Cold War, and the West’s domination in global affairs for the past three- hundred years has shaped, reshaped and mediated the concrete phenomenon known as political Islam. In Chapter Eight this analysis will attempt to understand hermeneutically and historically what is referred to as the preeminence of political Islam (discussed below) by using the notion of horizon proposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer, which often eludes conventional discourse on Islam. With the insight offered by Gadamer I argue that a dialogical model of interpretation has advantages over the rationalist discourse of modern political theory.

The preeminence of (political) Islam: a hermeneutic interpretation

The concept of horizon can be described as a range of visions shaped by an array of experiences. My analysis explores and develops the notion of horizon as a theoretical and analytical device to mediate the relations between experience, everyday life, and historical events. Treating Gadamer’s notion of horizon as the central motif, this study will attempt to establish a clear understanding of the historical/political upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries and the rise of political Islam in terms of greater political participation and the expansion of the public sphere. In his most influential philosophical work, Truth and Method, Gadamer questions the objectivity of Enlightenment reason and suggests that in seeking truth we need to move beyond the modernist legacies of analytical philosophy and the orthodox hermeneutic tradition, which is reliant on the Manichean dualisms of self/other, identity/difference, objective/subjective, and good/evil. In his hermeneutic approach Gadamer argues that the problem of hermeneutics is greater in scope than the domain of scientific method characterised by modern science. He maintains that the imperative of understanding and interpretation of texts/social phenomena is not merely a concern of science or scientific methods, rather it belongs to human experience of the world in general. In other words, one cannot “objectively” explore truth, isolating day-to-day vocabulary employed by academics and decision-makers.” (Tarak Barkawi, “On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’”, International Affairs, 2004, 80(1), p. 20.

15 human experience from the process of determining truth, relegating human experience to the domain of subjective bias or using human experience to illustrate what in an entirely different context Francis Fukuyama refers to as mere happenings, or as that part of history that is not necessarily history (what he identifies as history with a small h). Gadamer stresses that this subjective bias is crucial to our understanding of any social phenomenon, textual representation, or knowledge formulation. In this regard, his work rejects the Enlightenment search for an essential, universal rationality. In the context of the current analysis, such an position challenges the neoconservative stance that dismisses the experiences of Muslim people, like any human experience, as capricious and subjective, and hence unreliable as a means with which to determine truth. Based on Jim George’s observation, this study questions the modernist notion that “beyond mere social ‘appearance’ there is a foundational ‘reality’, a realm of purer understanding that, once discovered, can help us to unlock the essential nature of the relationship between the subjects and objects of the world.”40 Indeed, in his hermeneutic approach Gadamer stresses the importance of experience as crucial to our understanding of each and every social/textual phenomenon.

Gadamer argues that experience imparts formative insight to shape one’s horizon in determining truth or in the process of constructing meaning. In his view, the meaning- making process is intrinsically linked to one’s horizon, which always moves in relation to one’s changing experiences. The concept of horizon has been a fundamental part of the German philosophical tradition “since Nietzsche and Husserl, to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one’s range of vision is gradually expanded.”41 In Gadamer’s view this means a person with no horizon cannot see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest to themselves. On the other hand, he suggests, to have a horizon means to be capable of seeing things beyond the immediate and familiar. While the familiar and immediate shape one’s horizon, the exposure to new or unfamiliar experiences reshapes or expands one’s horizon, whereby the unfamiliar and unknown gradually become familiar and known. The process of knowing the unknown or

40 George, op. cit., p. 31. 41H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method. (Continuum: London, 2006), p. 301.

16 familiarising the unfamiliar becomes “an element of the experience itself, and on the basis of which anything new we come across is available to experience at all.”42

It is in this spirit and with these insights in mind that this chapter seeks to interpret hermeneutically the phenomenon of the preeminence of political Islam. To understand the rise of Islam, one can argue that “we must begin with an interpretive account of the power of Islamic thought rather than with categories outside the Islamists’ worldview that marginalizes Islamists’ own ideas about the movement’s meaning and purpose.”43 In doing so, Islam illustrates how exposure to early Islamic revival movements of the 18th and 19th centuries made sense to participants within their historical horizon and encouraged them to rally around these movements to redress the sociopolitical problems they were confronting. The subsequent exposure to modern political forces – nationalism, Western liberalism, – further expanded the horizon of participants, enabling them to make sense of these new political forces by recognising the familiar traits, covert and overt signs, or implicit allusions with their prior knowledge, which existed as part of their horizon delineated by centuries of tradition and experience. In this context Muslim communities became part of the changing political experience just as changing political practices became part of the Muslim experience. In this symbiotic process both experience and horizon nourished and enriched each other, with the participants becoming an integral part of the changing political process.

The preeminence of political Islam is an outcome of this process, whereby in looking for answers for their concerns many Muslim communities saw the possibilities in Islam in the absence of any comparable contemporary political practices. Their experience of colonialism, Cold-War politics, local authoritarian rulers, and three centuries of domination by the West convinced them a possible way to challenge those forces and break the impasse was through Islam. In taking that step they compelled those forces to engage in public discourse. Once a common grid of Islam was established it allowed many to engage in the

42Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception. trans. Timothy Bahti. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 23. 43 Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: and the Limits of Modern Rationalism. (Princeton: Press, 1999), p.42.

17 public sphere – to raise their concerns based on their political beliefs and values. As a result, often disparate and contending political views found their way into the public sphere. By means of this process Islam ceased to be the exclusive property of a few clerics or ulama,or of the state, and expanded into a wider realm: the larger public sphere. It thus emerged as an effective channel for political mobilisation and communication.

The fundamental principle of being in the public domain requires that a text, theory or political practice is fully accessible to its participants for the very reason that it embodies the word public; on the same ground it also cannot demand prior training, knowledge or hereditary membership as a way to access that text or political practice. Based on this logic one can suggest that everyone had the right to access and interpret Islam according to his or her political beliefs (horizon) and social-historical conditioning (experience). As a result, the emerging political Islam could accommodate figures as diverse as a military dictator like Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan, a brutal warlord like Hekmatyar in Afghanistan, an intellectual like Shariati in Iran, and a moderniser such as Mahathir in Malaysia. It needs to be noted that while there was hardly anything common about their views on Islam, all of them recognised Islam as a common rallying point – a space enabling them to propose new perspectives and pursue their policies with impunity.

This foray into the public sphere facilitated an entire spectrum of political practices, from innovative to conservative, to outright reactionary, all in the name of Islam. In that expansion and interpretation of Islam the 9/11 attack has been regarded as the bloodiest. The attack informs the kind of havoc a rigid interpretation of Islam can create in the absence of any meaningful political practices in many Muslim states. In this context Islam acts as a catalyst to tap the anger emanating from the rigid limits forced on the political life of the masses and articulated against the rulers and their backers. In this process Islam once again made inroads into the polity of many Muslim states and emerged as a significant political force in its own right.

The emergence of Islam had far reaching effect both on the larger Muslim world and on the global community, while the West largely bore the brunt of that reaction. The previously

18 easy path that the Western powers had enjoyed in dealing with Muslim countries (in particular the Middle East) was contested by a politically savvy and socially informed constituency that had weathered many violent and rapacious experiences during colonialism, the Cold War and, more generally, at the hands of the West’s domination of global affairs for the previous five-hundred years. The insight these people gained in dealing with their rulers and the West shaped their horizon and, conversely, that horizon determined which aspects of the political experience to retain and which to discard in order to confront changing realities. In this symbiotic interplay of horizon and experience the public became an integral part of the expanding political process, whereby Islam not only acted as a vehicle of change for larger social/political forces, but also simultaneously commented on contemporary life and the approaching changes to it.

Thus, Islam emerged as a conduit with which to engage both rulers and the ruled in public discourse. As a result, the public could have greater participation and greater say in making decisions concerning its own affairs. Here it is possible to suggest that, irrespective of the systemic contradictions within the Islamic movement, dialogue generates improved understanding among the masses and reaches to the marginalised more than any authoritarian or universalising system that doubts their individual freedom and their capacity to speak for themselves – to take decisions about their own lives. Such a view illustrates that the power of dialogue is integral to the preeminence of political Islam. Thus, it is important to explore the scope and limits of the politics of dialogue in the international realm that often typifies the conditions of radical inequality within it. Chapter Nine of this thesis explores the scope and limits of the politics of dialogue and its philosophical and political ramifications for global politics in the age of terror. It will take into account the contradictions within the Islamic movement and pay special attention to Islamic discourse and its future relevance. The politics of dialogue: possibilities and limits

The deep impact of the Islamic reformist movements of 19th and 20th centuries upon the polity of many Muslim states and on global politics suggests a formative link between these movements and the expansion of the public sphere. In responding to diverse social and

19 political demands these movements used Islam as a tool to reclaim the public sphere and in doing so reinvented its meaning in the modern context. In that reinvention Islam emerged as an effective social force to articulate and debate public concerns. In this reinvention, Islam, by default, forced many rulers to loosen their intransigence and engage in dialogue with the public. In this way, Islam facilitated a dialogic situation and as a result ushered in a dialogic relation.44 This dialogic situation and dialogic relation had a deterministic effect on the polity of many Muslim states and “indicated what dialogue signifies to the politics of our time, including the politics of Islam, and the questions it poses for a possible politics of justice.”45

It is worth remembering that much of this analysis has emphatically illustrated that the politics of Islam over the past three centuries sprang from the “politics of justice” or rather the lack thereof. There is enough evidence to suggest that during both the colonial and post- colonial periods, policies were implemented to legitimise and sustain the interests of a select few in many Muslim countries – which also safeguarded the interests of its Western backers – while the concerns of the majority were overlooked or brutally suppressed.46 Consequently, as a response to these policies in practice, Islam harnessed collective public concern and anger, and engaged them in a dialogic relation, firmly expressing solidarity in articulating and expressing public concerns against collective apathy and inaction. By engaging the public in a dialogic relation, Islam not only restored public faith in the ability of the public sphere to assert the right to justice, but also supported finding a balance between the self and the other, rational and irrational, public and private, the governing and governed, modern and traditional, and between object and subject. The act of dialogue which accorded weight to public experience and everyday life proceeded to open up a

44I have borrowed this term from Ranabir Samaddar’sstudy on the politics of dialogue. For details see The Politics of Dialogue: Living Under the Geopolitical Histories of War and Peace. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004).In Samaddar’s view it is crucial to study dialogical practices as situations and practical experiences. Here, the act of dialog promises a condition to communicate with others and by extension, it suggests a dialogic relation. 45 Ibid., emphasis added. 46For details see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press: 1996); John L. Esposito and AzzamTamimi (eds.), Islam and Secularisation in the Middle East (London: Hurst, 2000); Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Radicalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Ali Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam (Berkeley, California: Mizan Press, 1979).

20 world of experience that was unavailable within the rigid political limits of many Muslim states. Consequently, the new experience fuelled further dialogue, and the insight gained from this dialogue immediately proceeded to challenge the prevailing experience, which in turn promoted new dialogue. This scenario illustrates the dynamic nature of the act of dialogue. It is an ongoing process, entrenched over centuries of history, competing traditions, beliefs, social practices and values, and as a result eliminates that which can only be grasped or explained in quantifiable terms. “Dialogue” and its outcomes can only be defined in a qualitative manner.

The crucial philosophical question one confronts here is: how and what defines dialogue in qualitative terms? What makes dialogue qualitative rather than repetitive or ritualistic? As Ranabir Sammadar phrases this question, "what makes dialogue a dialogue, in other words, what is this with which a dialogue constitutes itself?”47Chapter Nine addresses this question.

In referring to a dialogic model of interpretation, this analysis draws on debates within and about hermeneutics, particularly in the influential work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which has a deterministic influence on a number of scholars, including Habermas’s notion of dialogic ethics.48 Gadamer’s influential work on hermeneutics suggests that experience is integral to all human understanding and insists that the very possibility of political knowledge requires going beyond science and scientific methods – that is, epistemology. In his view “human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself…including the history of religions and religo- political movements”.49 In other words, can a truth be communicated outside modes of experience? Gadamer denies such a possibility and maintains that it “cannot be verified by

47Samaddar, op.cit., p. 347. 48 Emphasis added. To attain a better outcome in a dialogical process Habermas puts great emphasis on reasoned arguments among equals. Fred Dallmayar notes that in a Habermasian model, “dialogue tends to be stylised as 'discourse' and communication as 'rational' communication bent on the assessment of 'validity of claims'. In its basic structure, discourse implies or presupposes the observance of universal rules, procedures, and categories (which are notably of a modern Western vintage). To this extent, sameness of form prevails over concrete diversity, at least on the level of the presumed 'rationality' discourse” (Fred Dallmayar, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 30 -31. 49Gadamer, op.cit., p. xxi.

21 the methodological means proper to science.”50 This analysis examines Gadamer’s stance and his intellectual legacy, illustrated by a range of scholars such as Habermas, Euben, Shapcott, Lebow, and Linklater);51apart from this, however, it also examines what happens when dialogue takes place under conditions of radical inequality, for example, in Euben’s terms between “centre” and “periphery” or, in this thesis’s context, between world’s most advanced society – such as the US – and a pre-modern society such as Afghanistan. Is it possible to hold/exchange meanings without distortion? Is it possible to sustain dialogue without harming or hurting those involved? These questions encourage listening to voices from the periphery, or to scholars who are engaged in the affairs of peripheries. In this regard the work of Mahmood Mamdani, Tarak Barkawi, Naeem Inayatullah, David Blaney and Ranabir Samaddar among others are important for this study.52 Their work not only challenges the continuing hold of the centre of Eurocentric/Western thought, but also powerfully defends the dynamics of the non-European/non-Western world, that is, the postcolonial and the peripheral. In their defence of the non-modern these scholars attempt “to represent, cultivate, and retrieve the voice of the savage/barbarian, [a process which] appears both as something beyond international relations and as something central to its very constitution”53 and in that attempt they kindle, to borrow Samaddar’s terms, an optimism for a new moral community in the international realm.

The dialogical model Gadamer proposed in Truth and Method suggests dialogue as a transforming and transformative discursive practice, a practice that challenges the modernist notion of understanding as discovering the “foundational reality” or the objective

50Ibid. 51 Linklater as such does not directly deal with Gadamer’s notion of experience as a mode to express truth. However, he makes a persuasive case for a different form of political community by extending Habermas’s notion of dialogic ethics (which itself underlines the deterministic influence of Gadamer’s model of understanding and exchanging meanings) into the international realm. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation Of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the post-Westphalian Era, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998) 52 See, MahmoodMamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror,(New York: Pantheon Books, 2004); David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, “International Relations from Below” in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Tarak Barkawi, “On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’”,International Affairs, 2004, 80(1); Ranabir Samaddar, The Politics of Dialogue: Living Under the Geopolitical Histories of War and Peace, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). 53 David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, op. cit., p. 670.

22 truth. Gadamer’s dialogic model rather suggests that meaning making takes place as one moves between horizons of meaning and captures the essence as a result of this “going between” one horizon and another. In this context, any understanding not only involves the participants’ existing knowledge/horizon, but also demands openness to experience, with involvement and immersion in new knowledge/horizons so that participants can challenge existing knowledge and as a result can open up and prepare for a range of meanings. Gadamer’s vision takes concrete shape in Ranabir Samaddar’s rendering of a dialogic model that, despite its differences in subject matter and theoretical/disciplinary concerns, sees social scientific models embedded within rationalist discourse as problematic. This significant perspective has also been reflected in the scholarship of a diverse range of scholars who unequivocally find social scientific models incapable of explaining our contemporary political/social life. In this context the critical response of scholars such as Jim George, Anthony Burke, R. B. J. Walker, Brett Bowden, Edward Said, and Lee Jarvis and Roxanne L. Euben is encouraging, not only because their scholarship is directly relevant to this thesis, but also because their work strives to “identify critical points of entry into an otherwise relatively bounded field of enquiry.”54Importantly, in Roxanne Euben’s observation, such an engagement means “for the sake of understanding what fundamentalism is about, we must strive, in this case against our own moral impulses and intellectual reflexes, to hear voices critical of our own deeply held convictions about the way the world does, or should, work.”55Equally relevant is the work of Barbara Victor and Ghassan Hage, which attempts to broaden radically our understanding of terrorism and unconventional violence. Their passionate study of Palestinian suicide bombers reveals dynamics behind such acts that are different from the conventional narrative of suicide

54Lee Jarvis, “The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Security Dialogue, vol. 40, No. 1, February 2009, p. 16. See, Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); Anthony Burke, “Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence after 9/11,”International Affairs, 2004, 80(2); – “Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War,” Social Identities,2005, 11(4); – “Beyond Security in the Middle East for (Co) Existence”, borderland e-journal, 2007, 6(2); R. B. J. Walker, “War, Terror, Judgment,” in Bülent Gokay and R. B. J. Walker (eds), 11 September 2001:War, Terror, Judgment, (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Brett Bowden, “In the Name of Progress and Peace: The ‘Standard of Civilization’ and the Universalizing Project”,Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 2004, 29(1); Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (London: Vintage, 1997), and Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 55 Roxanne L. Euben, op.cit., p. 16.

23 bombing, as represented by the scholarship of Robert Pape.56Without dismissing and diminishing the horror of these acts, their studies illustrate how far a person can be pushed to embark on such an act when she/he is convinced she/he has nothing to lose. Their analysis highlights the living conditions under occupation that convince many people to opt for violence as a conflict-resolution mechanism in the absence of any other viable political framework to facilitate meaningful dialogue.

It may seem strange to consider violence as a conflict resolution mechanism; however, Frantz Fanon’s influential work on French occupation in Algeria illuminates how and why this occurs. His seminal work on colonial war, occupation, and mental disorder illustrates how violence functions as a conflict-resolution mechanism in the absence of viable political framework. However, Ghassan Hage disagrees with Fanon’s treatment of “violence”. In attempting to understand Palestinian Suicide Bombers, Hage notes that “violence has no other function than to symbolise the survival of a Palestinian will.”57 Accordingly, "there is no room for Fanon’s lyrical ‘Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated by the people’s leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them.’”58 Irrespective of Hage’s rejection of Fanon’s discussion on violence, it is Fanon’s seminal study that deserves much of the credit for explaining the fundamental reasons that push a person to act violently. Contrary to the view of some scholars that Fanon’s theory justifies violence, his theory explains the causes that fuel violence or persuade a person to act violently. His theory explains how in a situation such as occupation the attributes ascribed to the occupied people by the colonial power/force – lazy, irrational, unpredictable, barbaric, undeveloped – as reasons to occupy, humiliate and torture are transformed or channelled into an anti-colonial resistance force by the leaders of the resistance/liberation movement. Fanon’s intellectual position needs to be

56 Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds.) International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York: Pearson, 2005) pp. 232-249. In surveying the global cases of suicide terrorism from 1980-2001 Pape argues that “it pays” because it has forced liberal democracies to compromise. However, Pape does not explain the role of liberal democracies (through their policies of sanctions, occupation and domination) that create the conditions of hot bed for terrorism. Although an important tract for analysing suicide terrorism it does not explain the complexities and dynamics behind such acts. Pape does acknowledge the context of US troop presence in the Persian Gulf in the rise of Al-Qaeda, but does not explore these in long term historical contexts of occupation andimperialism 57Hage, op.cit., p.129. 58 Ibid.

24 understood from this perspective when he speaks of violence. In a situation like occupation or war, Fanon’s theory explains how in the absence of any viable political framework in which negotiation or conflict resolution can occur the injured/violated/humiliated person’s anger could be channelled to resist the occupying power. Fanon’s observation resonates with Alphonso Lingis’ work Dangerous Emotions,59 which has been referred to by Ghassan Hage in his analysis. Lingis’ analysis suggests that the urge to discharge one’s pent-up pain/injury/humiliation as a result of insult incurred in a social gathering functions as a conflict-resolution mechanism. As Hage observes, this is often exploited by terrorist organisations to channel their anger in a concrete manner under colonial conditions into anti-colonial resistance. Despite their different case studies, Lingis and Fanon highlight similar reasons for motivation of the urge to discharge pent-up pain as a conflict-resolution mechanism. Possibly, Hage missed this similarity between Fanon and Lingis’ analyses.

As with the studies of Victor and Hage, Fanon’s research grew out of deep compassion and empathy for a brutalised, violated and demonised people. For Fanon it is for the Algerians under French occupation, while for Victor and Hage it is the plight of the under continuous Israeli assault and occupation. Both studies show that in the absence of any viable channel of communication or political framework the act of violence functions as a possible conflict resolution mechanism for people under occupation. To overcome this situation and to establish a viable channel of communication – a dialogic regime – it is imperative that these fundamental structural imbalances or fault lines are addressed. Regrettably, the current dominant political frameworks/institutions in global politics do not facilitate that possibility. This initiative unfolds a range of contentious questions and some possible answers which, laid bare in the following pages, seek what possibly could have been done to prevent the present impasse instead of what one is facing today. In order to attain these objectives this study finds it is important to understand neoconservative debate on the “war on terror” and American foreign policy, particularly the culturalist analysis that maintains the problem rests with Islam and its culture. However, before exploring these ideas, it is necessary in the following chapter to define neoconservatism.

59Alphonso Lingis, Dangerous Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

25 CHAPTER ONE

Understanding Neoconservatism

It can be argued that the response to the “war on terror” was misguided because the people pursuing or advising this agenda ‒ knowingly or unknowingly – did not understand or reveal the multidimensional nature of their professed "enemy.” These people are widely recognised as neoconservatives, by self-identification, by the nature of their arguments, or by their support for underlying neoconservative ideology. This chapter attempts to understand neoconservatism, paying close attention to those thinkers who have adopted what has been termed a “culturalist” approach. For this purpose this thesis finds the works of Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Charles Krauthammer, Bernard Lewis, and Daniel Pipes are of particular importance for their philosophical justification and their concomitant rationalisation of the use of violence in responding to the war on terror.Apart from reviewing the work of these selected authors, this chapter also analyses relevant literature from a range of scholars who have analysed this school of thought, including Garry Dorrien, Sara Diamond, Justin Vaïsse, Danny Cooper, Stefan Halper, and Jonathan Clarke. Considering the nature and timeframe of this project,it is impossible to analyse every thinker and policymaker identified as neoconservative – such as , , – or for that matter other aspects of neoconservatism.

Before getting to the specifics of the neoconservative “culturalist” position, it is necessary to identify the basic characteristics of neoconservatism. In analysing the dominant literature on neoconservatism, this study finds that, like most movements, neoconservatism does not comprise a single or all-pervasive character. There are differing views, and different understandings of what neoconservatism means. , for example, once described it as a “persuasion”,60 whilst Norman Podhoretz, after the end of the Cold War, described it as a “tendency”, as “it no longer exists as a distinctive phenomenon requiring a

60 Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion,” Weekly Standard, August 25, 2003.

26 special name of its own.”61 Justin Vaïsse warns of attaching an appellation to neoconservatives:“one should always keep in mind,” she argues, “the versatility and fickleness of labels, and never make a fetish of them.”62Vaïsse points out that, “no two neoconservatives think the same on all issues, and many object to being called neoconservatives in the first place.”63

Despite the epistemological and social problems of defining this term,64the vast majority of neoconservatives nonetheless share and represent a cohesive intellectual outlook.65They may disagree on minor issues, such as whether nation building should or should not be a condition of spreading democracy, but they do agree on fundamental values, such as the necessity of spreading democracy in order to maintain the current global order/American national interest.66Irrespective of their apparent differences, “most contemporary neoconservatives, whether they accept the label or not,” Vaïsse argues, “share a clearly identified set of principles in foreign policy.”67 In Vaïsse’s view, “even though they might

61 Norman Podhoretz, “Neoconservatism : A Eulogy,”Commentary, 1996, 101 (3), pp. 19–20. 62Justin Vaïsse, Why Neoconservatism Still Matters, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper Number 20, May (2010), p. 3. 63 Ibid. 64 Gary Dorrien’s perspective in this context is pertinent. According to him:“Terminology is a slippery problem for a work such as this. Policymakers generally avoid labelling themselves, aside from market-tested vagaries such as “compassionate conservatism,” while are more inclined to define themselves. But in the case of the unipolarist persuasion, the preferred monikers are various and fluid. says that “neo-imperialist,”“neoconservative,”“Pax Americanist,”“unipolarist,” and “neo-Reaganite” apply equally well to him; Charles Krauthammer coined the term “unipolarism” and also goes by “neoimperialist”; prefers “neoconservative” or “Pax Americanist,” and is a chief proponent of democratic globalism; Ben Wattenberg calls himself a “neo-Manifest Destinarian” and “unipolarist”; Max Boot describes himself as a “liberal imperialist” and also claims “neoconservative”; Stanley Kurtz prefers “liberal imperialist”; the Vulcans named themselves after a huge statue in Condoleezza Rice’s hometown of Birmingham, Alabama, which conveyed their sense of themselves as tough, unrelenting, powerful warriors,” (Dorrien, op.cit., pp. 5–6). 65Danny Cooper notes that, “despite their repeated arguments that they do not constitute a conspiring monolith, neoconservatives are much closer in their general views than their qualifications suggest.” In his view, “there are occasional policy differences, to be sure, but they are not fundamental differences, preventing one from thinking about neoconservatism in terms of ideas and beliefs. There is, in fact, a considerable amount of ideational continuity running through neoconservative writing throughout the Cold War and the war on terror,” (see. Cooper, op.cit., p. 21). 66 As Irving Kristol puts it: “'Neoconservatives may disagree with this emphasis or that – we are in no way a coherent, organised movement – but I should be surprised if those disagreements were more than marginal,” Irving Kristol, Reflection of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. xv. 67Vaïsse, op.cit., p. 3. Vaïsse finds in her study – internationalism, primacy, unilateralism, militarism and democracy – as the five main tenets of neoconservatism. One can argue that these tenets may not necessarily

27 quibble among themselves on their particular application, the combination of these principles distinguishes the neoconservatives from other schools of thought” identified by Vaïsse as “isolationists”, “realists”, and “liberals.”68 In Robert Singh’s formulation, “neo- conservatism challenges idealism and realism alike, drawing on each while rejecting elements of both.”69

Based on these observations, one can identify some distinct features in neoconservatives’ understanding of the contemporary world, and of America and its foreign policy. These features are and faith in overwhelming American military power.70Such an understanding is based on certain foundational myths that see the West as civilised, modern, scientific and rational while often seeing and portraying the non-Western world as barbaric, atavistic, traditional, and emotional. In challenging these self-referential positions this study also attempts to examine neoconservative discourse on the war on terror and the US policy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One of the primary features of neoconconservatives’ understanding of the world is the uniqueness of America as a political entity and society, a uniqueness that moreover needs to be safeguarded at all costs. But then, the notion that America is no ordinary country is also acknowledged by others. Danny Cooper places this perspective in context as he reinforces John Kane’s persuasive argument that “neither America nor the world has ever seen America as ordinary”.71

be in the above order or receives equal treatments from their authors. For some democracy takes precedence over unilateralism and vice-versa. For others militarism and (American) primacy takes precedence over others. However, irrespective of their preference of these tenets, they do constitute an essential part of neoconservatives rendering of the global society and American foreign policy. 68 Ibid. 69 Robert Singh, “Neo-Conservatism: Theory and Practice” in Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller and Marl Ledwidge (eds.), New Directions in US Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge, 2009) p. 64. 70 These values have significant influence on most neocon theories. Later on, this study explains how well known neocon ideas such as spread of democracy and free market economy (Fukuyama/The End of History/Universal Civilization), unipolar world (Krauthammer/Democratic Realism), multi-polar world (Huntington/The and the remaking of the World Order) are built significantly based on these two core neoconservative values. 71 Cooper, op.cit.,p. 2.

28 The question then arises, if American exceptionalism is a reality for the world community as it is for Americans, then what bothers neoconservatives? The simple answer is: America’s safekeeping. Preserving America’s uniqueness has been a concern that has bothered generations of American statesmen and intellectuals of varying ideological and intellectual orientations since the birth of the American . In that sense neoconservatives’ concern for America’s safekeeping is not unique. However, what distinguishes the neoconservative position is that the preservation of American exceptionalism is tantamount to preserving the world order. That is: the world can feel safe only if America can feel safe. And neoconservatives perceive that possibility only through the preponderance of overwhelming American military might – which they regard as an expression of values – not only to serve America’s national interest, but also to build the world according to America’s own image and interests.

During the Cold War, neoconservatives argued that the safety of the international order was put at risk by the presence of another global superpower – the Soviet Union – necessitating the overwhelming presence of American power crucial for the future safety of the world. Neoconservatives felt vindicated at the end of the Cold War with the demise of the Soviet Union – they also were at a loss for words.72 It appears that after the end of the Cold War, in the absence of a designated adversary neoconservatives did not know what to fight for. In Gary Dorrien’s observation, for people like Podhoretz, “the moment for politics had passed.”73 Echoing similar sentiment, fellow neoconservative Irving Kristol regretted the absence of an ideological competitor. In a prescient observation he noted:

With the end of the Cold War, what we really need is an obvious ideological and threatening enemy, one worthy our mettle, one that can unite us in opposition. Isn’t that what the most successful movie of the

72Discussing neoconservatism and American foreign policy in an article in 1996, Podhoretz noted: “Once upon a time, I could foresee with reasonable assurance where any neoconservative would stand on almost any serious issue in world affairs. Today, I am hard put to predict where even some of my closest friends will come out when a contentious issue like Bosnia arises” Norman Podhoretz, “Neoconservatism: A Eulogy,”Commentary, 1996, 101 (3), p. 24. 73Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana, (New York: Routledge, 2004).,p. 14.

29 year, Independence Day, is telling us? Where are our aliens when we most need them?74

The self-confidence and the sense of vindication America felt at the end of the Cold War as the only remaining superpower suffered a terrible blow at the turn of the new millennium when a group of terrorists flew hijacked passenger planes into some of America’s iconic buildings: the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon, and a failed attempt to fly into the Whitehouse, on 11 September2001. It appears that the wait for those needed aliens was over. What happened to American foreign policy after the arrival of those aliens is the primary question of this thesis.

The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center is one of the defining moments in American public life. “In the absence of any claim of responsibility for the attacks,” Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke argue, it seems clear that its primary purpose was to strike at the preeminent symbols of U.S. economic and political power (though the latter failed) and to demonstrate that US “hyper-power” was vulnerable to the “asymmetrical” warfare – about which the Pentagon had warned.75 In a number of ways this attack was distinctive. It ensured it would be watched by many, cause maximum havoc at minimum cost, and spark intense debate about the deeper causes of the attack. It has been observed that the estimated cost of the 9/11 attack is as low as $500,000; the 24-hour live news and global media coverage ensured that footage of the event was available to all. It sparked intense debate globally,76 some measured, some enraged. The support the US enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack77emboldened America’s resolve to respond with globally extensive retribution. According to Gary Dorrien, “on 9/11 Bush discovered what his presidency is about.”78

74 Irving Kristol, “A post-Wilsonian foreign policy”, , 2 August 1996, accessible online via http://www.aei.org/publication/a-post-wilsonian-foreign-policy/,accessed 30 May 2016. 75 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.279. 76 Ibid., pp. 31–34, 278- 280 77 Karin von Hippel notes that “in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11, many commentators proclaimed a new and unprecedented era in international cooperation. Not only had consensus been reached that terrorist networks had to be eliminated, but the United States welcomed support from all corners of the globe. In what would soon become the most ephemeral expression of French solidarity in

30

One of President Bush’s earliest remarks on hearing of the attacks was by phone from Air Force One to Vice President Cheney: “We are at war.”79In his address to the nation that night, President Bush observed: “Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.” In the same address he also remarked: “I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”80It appears that the Bush administration’s strategy to expand and entrench the concept of the enemy terrorist as a Cold War surrogate had already been determined. Neoconservatives played an important role in this decision; evidence suggests neoconservatives advocated for war even before clear lines of responsibility were established.81 Irrespective of the national origin of the 9/11 attackers, none of whom were Iraqis or Afghanis, the US and its allies commenced war against Afghanistan and Iraq. recent times, Le Monde's famous headlines read, 'We are all Americans now,' and 800 million people in forty- three European countries observed several minutes of silence. Even Muammar el-Qaddafi and Fidel Castro expressed their outrage and offered limited assistance,” (Karin Von Hippel, “Improving the International Response to the Transnational Terrorist Threat” in Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss [eds.], Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004) .p. 102. 78 Dorrien clearly explains why and how 9/11 defines Bush's presidency. In his words, “it was not until 9/11 that George W. Bush fully joined his own administration. Before 9/11 he adopted Clinton’s defence budget, concentrated on the politics of tax-cutting, and outwardly continued Clinton’s containment policy toward Iraq; like the neocons, he was also more interested in Iraq than al-Qaeda. On 9/11 Bush discovered what his presidency was about. In need of a defined and militant foreign policy, he adopted the determined unipolarist vision of an administration that was already in place and its sense of urgency about overthrowing Iraq. Before 9/11 Bush struck his neocon and hardline conservative supporters as a half-hearted unipolarist. In the aftermath of 9/11 Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld urged Bush to respond to al Qaeda’s fiendish attacks by invading Iraq; Bush pressured counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke to find a link between Saddam and 9/11; and less than two months after the U.S. attacked Afghanistan, Bush secretly ordered a war plan to smash the Iraqi government,” Dorrien,op.cit., pp.2–3. 79 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (London: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 17. 80https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html 81 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke in providing evidence to this observation, explain how just after four days of September 11 attack and even before 'any sure lines of responsibility were established, Deputy Secretary of Defense advocated an attack on Iraq on September 15.' Also “on September 11 itself presidential speechwriter spent an hour on the telephone with , whose first response to the events was to counsel that the United States go after 'not just terrorists, but whoever harbours those terrorists.' Perle was among the first to draw public attention to the significance of the administration's decision to go after states” (Halper and Clarke, op.cit., pp. 32 – 33). Also, see Sam Tanenhaus, “Bush's Brain Trust,” Vanity Fair¸ July 2003, p. 117; Richard Perle, “The US Must Strike at Iraq,” New York Times, December 28, 2001, p. A19.

31

Although neoconservatives came to prominence during George W. Bush’s presidency, it would be a mistake to assume that they were not influential or did not try to shape American foreign policy prior to Bush’s administration, or for that matter prior to the 9/11 attacks. In order to advance their perspectives and agenda –to implement it in government policy – neoconservatives had taken a number of initiatives to influence successive US administrations to shape American foreign policy well before 9/11 terrorist attack. Renowned for their activist stance and as public intellectuals,82 neoconservatives over a number of years created a number of advocacy organisations such as “Coalition for a Democratic Majority”, “Committee on the Present Danger”, and “Project for a New American Century”, along with a number of supportive media outlets – both print and electronics – with the aim of influencing the direction of American policy. Established in the early 1970s, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority was dedicated to “rescue the Democratic Party from its perceived far Left turn and McGovernism”.83 When their own presidential candidate, Scoop Jackson, failed in presidential politics, they established the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), comprising hardliners from both the Republican right and the Democratic Party. As an advocacy group its primary concern was to urge and assist Ronald Reagan to prevent the loss of faith in American Power.84 A few years later leading neoconservative scholars and former policymakers formed the Project for the New

82 Sara Diamond in her analysis of neoconservatism notes that: “Despite differences among them, however, the neoconservatives came to represent a coherent segment of the political class. They were political, as opposed to academic, intellectuals. They worked primarily outside university settings. They were more concerned with influencing public debate and elite policymaking than they were with producing knowledge for other intellectuals,” in Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), p. 179. 83 According to Dorrien most original neocons were appalled at the nomination of George McGovern as Democratic Party's candidate for president in 1972. The neocons found the nomination McGovern symbolises the ideas they despaired. “They despaired over the ascension of antiwar activism, feminism, and moralistic idealism in the Democratic Party, which they called 'McGovernism.' McGovernism stood for appeasement and the politics of liberal guilt, whereas the neocons stood for a self-confident and militantly interventionist Americanism” (p. 7).For a good account of the attempts the Coalition for a Democratic Majority took in order to thwart McGovernism in order to rescue Democratic Party from it, see Chapter 9 in Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995). 84 For a detail overview of the Committee on the Present Danger and its attempts to elevate Regan to the presidency, see Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983).

32 American Century (PNAC).85 The PNAC urged the United States to seize the potential of the “unipolar moment” following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It crafted an assertive role for the US in leading the world into the next century built on the success of the past century to ensure US security and greatness in the next. In a series of open letters signed by its members addressed to sitting presidents, the Project advised them on matters of foreign policy. In 1998, one letter was sent to President Clinton advising him to overthrow the Saddam regime.86After 9/11, the PNAC sent a letter to President Bush advising him on how to conduct the war on terror; part of that recommendation was to remove Saddam Hussein from power.87 Eleven of the eighteen members who signed the letter to President Clinton in 1998 held positions three years later in the administration of President George W. Bush.

Neoconservatives also sought to dominate political discourse in the wider public sphere. Stephen Halper and Jonathan Clarke have extensively recorded this.88 In their attempt neoconservatives not only successfully established themselves organisationally in an array of think tanks and institutes, but also courted a range of cable news networks, such as Fox News, and forged ties with sections of the evangelical right.89Voicing their views through a wide range of means, it sought to shape policy. According to Halper and Clarke,

85 Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles, 3 June 1997 . 86 Project for the New American Century, “An Open Letter to President Clinton:‘Remove Saddam from Power’” (January 26,1998), reprinted in Micah L.Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions,(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003),pp. 199–200. 87Project for the New American Century to President George W.Bush, September 20, 2001, http://www.newamericancentury.org, accessed July 2005; reprinted in Weekly Standard 7 (1 October 2001), 10, and Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 222–224. In this letter, the signatories endorsed the recommendation that “even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.” Dorrien captures the neoconservatives' urge to Bush administration to go after Iraq succinctly: “ To Kristol and Kagan, it was inconceivable that the United States would destroy al-Qaeda’s Taliban base without overthrowing Saddam. They lauded Bush’s September 20th address to Congress for establishing “that taking decisive action against Saddam does not require absolute proof linking Iraq to last week’s attack.” That was absolutely crucial, they contended; 9/11 opened the door to a worldwide American war against terrorism, not merely a police-action response to 9/11.” (Dorrien, op.cit., p. 139) 88 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 89Ibid. For details on neoconservatives' attempt to forge ties with the religious right and section of the American media, see, Ch. 6.

33 The American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), the Center for Security Policy (CSP), the Hudson Institute, and the PNAC had also become important elements in a neo-conservative coalition of intellectuals, ex- government officials, political advisers, media figures, and key conservative personalities, all pressing for the era of American supremacy. They spoke at congressional hearings, took an active role in the mainstream media discourse, sent open letters to the White House, published articles regularly in the major newspapers, and produced a stream of books.90

These circumstances suggest that neoconservatives relentlessly acted to influence and shape American foreign policy after 9/11, as they had been doing for decades prior to the 9/11 attacks. As observed, neoconservatives themselves did not conceal their satisfaction at the extent to which their ideas were incorporated into policy at the earliest moment during the Bush presidency.91Richard Perle claimed that “[t]he President of the United States, on issue after issue,” before his subsequent disavowals,92“has reflected the thinking of neoconservatives.”93It suffices to observe here that neoconservatives’ efforts to influence and shape successive US administrations on American foreign policy has been strong.

Irrespective of the evidence, one often finds comments that question the veracity of this claim, or perceive this claim to be exaggerated. For example, Justin Vaïsse commented that “the neoconservatives never had the kind of overbearing influence on the Bush

90Ibid., p. 103. Halper and Clarke observe that after 9/11 “continuously engaging people's emotions of fear, dread, anger, and revenge, Fox’s newscast became strangely different from the other outlets; more important, Fox’s breathless hyper-developments and the neo-conservative ‘discourse’ went hand in hand,” p. 186. 91 Cooper, op.cit., p. 26. 92Ibid., Cooper has made this observation. As seen, there was hardly any sign of Iraq’s security improving by the end of 2006. Contrary to President Bush's famous speech “Mission Accomplished” on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, on May 2003, the majority of causalities, both military and civilian happened after this famous declaration. Perle even if not distancing from the administration's war on terror policy yet seemed to be less willing to claim that neoconservatives had considerable influence in the Bush administration. He expressed this view in an interview with David Rose of Vanity Fair, see Rose 2006. David Rose “Now They Tell Us: Neo Culpa,” Vanity Fair (2007) http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2006/12/neocons200612 93 Richard Perle, “Empire Builders: In their own words,” Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/neocon/neoconQuotes.html accessed on 31/03/2004

34 administration many opponents credit them with, including on the Iraq War.”94 This observation is loose with the truth. Vaïsse is accurate to the extent that President Bush was not a puppet of neoconservatives, for instance, Cheney and Rumsfeld.95 However, as Gary Dorrien argues, it is also true that Bush’s foreign policy and going to war with Iraq “was rooted historically and ideologically in the neo-imperial ambitions of the neocons.”96

Similarly, one finds objection to Fukuyama, Huntington, or Lewis being called neoconservative.97 In their view it is wrong to attribute to neoconservatism the extensive influence of these analysts’ views in shaping the debate in the war on terror. Such objections do not add any nuance to this debate. Categorising these actors as exclusively representative of aspects of “national interest” or “classical realism” or “expertise in regional history”98 betrays the certitude that they were neoconservatives. Their ideas about

94Justin Vaïsse, Why Neoconservatism Still Matters, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper Number 20, May (2010), p. 1. Also see Cooper, op. cit., p. 38 95 Gary Dorrien has also made similar observation. See Dorrien, op.cit., p. 3. 96 Ibid. Dorrien notes that, “the entire Bush foreign policy team advocates some version of unipolarist ideology, that Cheney and Rumsfeld are committed to PNAC-style unipolarism and are closely associated with movement neocons, and that the Bush administration's determination to overthrow Iraq was rooted historically and ideologically in the neo-imperial ambitions of the neocons,” p. 3. In a similar vein, “Vice- President and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would be better described as American Nationalists than as neo-conservatives,” Halper and Clarke argue, commenting that they “have found that many of their deeply held beliefs about American exceptionalism and unilateralism parallel neo-conservative thought and have been decisive in their support for the underlying neo-conservative ideological thrust.” Both were signatories “to a key neo-conservative document, the 1997 Statements of Principles by the Project for the New American Century. Rumsfeld signed the Project's January 1998 letter to President Bill Clinton calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein. Cheney shares the neo-conservative absolute antipathy to international organisations as source of encroachment on US sovereignty. Without their support, the neo- conservative agenda could never have been implemented.” (Harper and Clarke, op.cit., p. 14). There are a number of similar studies which substantiates this view (such as David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals: New York: Touchstone, 2002; James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of the Bush War Cabinet: New York: Viking, 2004). 97 One comes across such objections, despite Fukuyama having described Huntington, Krauthammer and Pipes, among others, as neoconservatives. See, Fukuyama, Francis, “The Neoconservative Moment,” in Gary Rosen ed., The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 170. 98 Bernard Lewis is often identified as an expert on Arab history/regional history. But after Edward Said’s publication of Orientalism, Lewis’ work had been viewed as work of traditional “Orientalism,” that portrays Arab/Islamic culture as exotic and mysterious reflecting what medieval Europe thought of Islam and Muslim in generally. According to Halper and Clarke: “Embedded in the concept of Orientalism are values and conclusions used to create negative stereotypes of Muslims as the norms of analytic discourse. “” are presented in the imagery of static, almost ideal types, and neither as creatures with a potential in the process of being realised nor as those in the process of making history. Orientalism is thus an intellectual framework, a tool of knowledge about the Arab world that stems from the West’s discursive construction of reality. It is a concept that infuses the media and social exchange and that has slowly become a part of American popular culture. The successive, artfully titled books by Princeton professor emeritus Bernard Lewis, who maintains

35 American exceptionalism, American national interest, and discourse about the Arab world correspond with core neoconservative ideas, and typically complement neoconservative foreign policy objectives. In this context it is arguable that, irrespective of the appellation used, those who either oversaw US policy in the war on terror or whose ideas influenced this policy can be identified as neoconservatives by their actions, or through their support for neoconservative ideology rendering these actions explicable. In that sense, a politician such as Tony Blair, who actively supported the Iraq War and the policy in the war on terror, can also be identified as a neoconservative,99 as "there is no absolute dividing line between who is and who is not a neoconservative.”100

After identifying the basic features of neoconservatism and explaining how this school of thought had been actively involved in shaping US foreign policy prior to and after the 9/11 attacks, it is important to clarify why the neoconservatives’ culturalist stance requires considered investigation. After the end of the Cold War, neoconservatives determined culture as the new bastion from which to wage war against ideological opponents and to influence foreign policy debate; they regarded culture as“key to their identity and political analysis.”101As Gary Dorrien notes, in Podhoretz’s view, the main battleground for neoconservatism was shifting to the cultural realm. Neoconservatives had changed the American right, which prevailed in foreign policy, economics, and politics, but the left still controlled the commanding heights of American culture. The political wars of the 1990s would be over culture.102

close links with neo-conservative decision makers, falls into this category” (Halper and Clarke, op.cit., p. 270). 99 Ben Rawlence in his article in The Guardian, has also identified Tony Blair as a neoconservative. See, Ben Rawlence, “Tony Blair the original neocon,” The Guardian, October 23, 2004), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/oct/23/foreignpolicy.iraq 100 Halper and Clarke, op.cit., p.10. 101 Dorrien, op.cit., p. 2. Dorrien notes that, after the Cold War, the neocons fell out of power, “and in the mid-1990s they attracted attention mostly by waging what they called “culture wars,” but it seemed to me that the foreign policy issue was the key to their identity and political future.” On a similar note, one can suggest that Bernard Lewis’s provocatively titled essay such as, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified,” (1990) and Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993), come under this type of analysis. 102Dorrien, p. 14, emphasis added.

36 This emphasis necessitates a critical stance in this chapter regarding the “culturalist approach” in order to assess its validity. The culturalist approach strikes “a chord among a public that is rather too fond of ready-made analyses”103– who identify the problem with Islamic terrorism as resting solely with Islam and its culture.

The neoconservative authors selected for analysis in this chapter have been leading voices in neoconservative debate, with their views accessible in print and electronic media, and with considerable influence on the conservative segment of the Anglo-American public sphere.

Fukuyama is well-known for his theory of history; according to him history has a definite purpose in the realisation of human freedom. He argued in The End of History and the Last Man (1992) that such freedom can be achieved by adopting liberal democracy and free market economics. Citing the 1989 anti-Communist upheavals and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, he argues that the triumph of liberal democracy and the free market economy over the ideological competitors of fascism, hereditary monarchy, and communism, justify Western democratic capitalism as “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government.”104“Fukuyama’s end of history”, according to Jan Nederveen Pieterse,“is probably the quintessential statement of American cold war victory.”105Relying on the historical model of Marxian dialectic while reversing the conventional Marxist model of historical progress, Fukuyama dismissed post- Cold War violence and retribution as an indication of the pain caused by the emergence of this world order, rather than as an indication of the inherent contradictions within that order. Fukuyama’s claims about the emerging world order and the triumph of the “democratic West” was premature given the unexpected emergence of a chaotic and violent

103Olivier Roy, one of the distinguished scholars on political Islam, notes that,“since 9/11 the debate on Islam has become more confused than ever and, if anything, sometimes more nasty. I do not intend to take a stance over every polemic, but one element of the debate seems as widely known and accepted as it is irrelevant, while striking a chord among a public that is rather too fond of ready- made analyses. I am referring to the culturalist approach, which states: Islam is the issue,” Roy, op.cit., p. 9. 104 Fukuyama, op.cit., p. xi. 105 Jan NederveenPieterse, or Empire? (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 42.

37 world, as witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia, and many other war-destroyed locations. The rigid divisions of the Cold War that managed to conceal the chaos and contradictions in that order were suddenly out in the open –these were contradictions his theory failed to explain by dividing the world into “historical” and “post-historical” spaces. While many were struggling to understand this newly emergent world, fellow neoconservative Samuel Huntington claimed to have devised a prescient and original theory whereby the future of global politics and post-Cold War conflict would be determined not by the disappearance of old ideological divisions or power-political disputes between sovereign states, but rather by divisions along civilisational lines.

Huntington argued in his book The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (1996) that the coexistence of the Islamic civilisation and the civilised West has always been difficult and will remain so. He attributes much of the present conflict in the Middle East and in many parts of the world to Islam, portraying it as inherently violent and militant. He argued that with the end of the Cold War, future conflicts would take place between civilisations based on their culture and beliefs. Since the 9/11 attack Huntington’s thesis has been defended by conservative politicians, and even by Muslim fundamentalists themselves. Olivier Roy argues that “Huntington is regularly accused of having introduced the concept of the “clash of civilizations”, but he is more a symptom than a cause”.106 The culturalist approach is pervasive among traditional Orientalists such as Bernard Lewis, newspaper columnists such as Charles Krauthammer, and “pro-Israel right-wing academics (such as Daniel Pipes), and the person in the street.”107 This view “is also shared by fundamentalists and conservative Muslims, for whom everything pertaining to Islam is or should be related to something in the Koran.”108 This culturalist paradigm “is based on one principle: culture does exist in itself, is transmitted from generation to generation, and is the ultimate explanatory model of any society”.109

106 Roy, op.cit., p. 9. 107Ibid. 108Ibid. 109Ibid., p. 11.

38 It is questionable that the hopes, aspirations and failures of Muslims can be explained by reference to an encompassing Islamic culture, which itself is anything but homogeneous. In Roy’s opinion, "part of the debate is blurred by a constant confusion between religion and culture”.110 It is a truism that “a religion is usually embedded in one or more cultures, but cannot be reduced to a single culture”.111 For example, even though Islamic religion is pervasive in Iran, Malaysia, the Arab states, Africa, and India, it often exists concurrently with other religious faiths, and is divided internally by disparate branches and interpretations – it would be naive to reduce the national, regional, and historical particularities of these societies to a single culture. Nevertheless, many scholars tend to deploy a reductionist approach to explain the issues affecting contemporary Muslim societies. Diverse issues ranging from economic backwardness, to gender inequality, to illiteracy are imputed to a single Islamic culture, ignoring empirical evidence to the contrary.112 Irrespective of this, emphasis on civilisational differences has become the ideological bear-pit for conservative politicians in the West and for Islamists seeking to conserve their respective ways of living. It is this myopic insistence on rendering stereotyped elements of cultural identity contentious that prompts Islamists to defend the hijab and conservatives in the West to press for its removal from the public sphere.113

In this tradition of invoking a civilisational paradigm to justify political actions, Lewis’s position is distinctive.114 In a series of analyses Lewis has emphasised that there is an

110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Such claims fall apart as one looks at the empirical evidence. As Roy comments, “the economic backwardness often linked with Islam vanishes if we compare Muslim countries with a non-Muslim neighbour (for example, Indonesia with Philippines, or Kosovo and Macedonia) and not with the West. Muslim Malaysia has a per capita income slightly higher than that of Buddhist Thailand, while the per capita incomes of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are almost the same. In 2000 Muslim Indonesia had a fertility index of 2.6, while that of the Catholic Philippines was still 3.6. Similarly, literacy rates among Iranian women rose from 28 per cent to 80 per cent between 1976 and 1996” (Roy, 2004, pp. 13-14). In Roy’s view this indicates that Islam’s role in shaping contemporary societies is exaggerated, or one can add that it does not stand as an impediment for their transformation towards modernisation as many claim. In fact, it will be shown in the later part of this undertaking that, Islam like many other religious practices incorporated many aspects of modernity (secular education, opting for nuclear family and monogamy) to make it more relevant to its practitioners. 113The return of the hijab is seen by many modern and Western educated Muslim women as a symbol of liberation and individuality. For detailed discussion of the hijab see Roy, op. cit., pp. 96–97, 131–132, 139– 140, 150–152, 204n, 218–219, 276. 114 Lewis’s academic career spans a period of sixty years. He obtained his doctorate long before the state of Israel was founded, specialising in the . His eloquence in Aramaic, Arabic, Persian and

39 inherent problem with Islamic culture in its apparent inability to live in harmony with other cultures, in particular with Western culture. This view, in Hirsh’s words, "had the remarkable virtue of appealing powerfully to both the hard-power enthusiasts in the administration, principally Bush and Donald Rumsfeld…and to neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Harold Rhode from the Pentagon.”115According to Cooper, "all neoconservatives who attempt to illuminate the roots of al-Qaeda’s brand of Islamic fundamentalism take refuge under his impressive body of scholarship.”116Cooper notes that in an interview with Richard Perle, Perle told Cooper that “the ideas of Bernard Lewis had had a significant impact on the thinking of the Bush administration.”117 According to Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, “although primarily a historian of the Ottoman period, [Lewis] has lent his considerable authority to the broad-front neoconservative assault on Islam, his position as Princeton professor emeritus obscuring the fact that he is an influential, tactical, and partisan player in the contemporary policy debate.”118 If Lewis could be considered as one of the foremost intellectuals in neoconservative debate, Krauthammer and Pipes could be identified as its populist exponents.119

Turkish, among others, and his ability to study in many other languages allows him a level of expertise that is not common among his conservative peers. Until the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism in 1978, Lewis’s work was considered the most authoritative on the subject. After Orientalism, Lewis’s view and expertise were viewed as being representative of a Zionist point of view rather than an objective study of the Orient and Islam. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the wake of the 9/11 attack the demand for Lewis’s work resurfaced significantly among conservative academics and policy makers. In this context it is worth noting the remark made by the US Vice-President Dick Cheney when honoring Lewis at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia “…in this century his (Lewis’s) wisdom is sought daily by policy makers, diplomats, fellow academics and news media” (www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2006/06/20060501- 3.html). In Michael Hirsh’s view Bush administration’s foreign policy was deeply influenced by “Lewis Doctrine” as The Wall Street Journal called it (Hirsh, pp. 13–19). Hirsh notes that Lewis’s reading of Islam (which he often conflates with the Arab world) found an equally empathetic audience within the Bush administration. 115 Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis Revisited,” The Washington Monthly, 2004, 36 (11), pp. 13-19. 116 Cooper, op.cit., p. 123. 117 Ibid. 118 Halper and Clarke, op.cit., p.20. 119 According to Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, the civilisational model that presents the clash between Islam and the West is inevitable because of their cultural differences receive better treatment with less bile in Lewis’ rendition of this model than “some of those, such as Daniel Pipes, who tread in his footprints,” Halper and Clarke, op.cit., p. 334.

40 Krauthammer strongly believes in and advocates American unilateralism as “a new type of realism which would ultimately lead to multilateralism.”120According to Fukuyama, “Krauthammer is a gifted thinker and his ideas are worth taking seriously for their own sake. But, perhaps more importantly, his strategic thinking has become emblematic of a school of thought that has acquired strong influence inside the Bush Administration foreign policy team and beyond.”121 Both Halper and Clarke explain how Krauthammer’s idea of “universal dominion” in a “unipolar” world “set the tone for today’s neoconservative attitude” towards American foreign policy.122

One can agree that after the end of the Cold War, “neoconservatives had lost their compass.”123 They "confronted a question” that the movement “had not faced for a half a century: What should the basis of American foreign policy be?”124 As Halper and Clarke explained, the debate primarily fell into two schools of thought. One group argued for a modest role for American foreign policy, whereas others such as Joshua Muravchik and Charles Krauthammer argued for an aggressive role for American foreign policy, arguing “advancement of democracy” as the primary justification. This group “believed that the advancement of democracy should be the ‘the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy.’”125According to Ben Wattenberg, "in the future, the Number One country will be the one that is most successful in shaping the global democratic culture.”126 Neoconservatives believed in shaping that global democratic culture where necessary with the help of overwhelming American power. For them “the crusade for world democracy and the struggle to preserve America’s unipolar dominance were the same thing.”127In this context it is possible to suggest that with some subjective variation the advancement of

120 Charles Krauthammer, “A New Type of Realism”, The National Interest, Winter 2002/2003. (http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue4/Vol2Issue4Krauthammer.html). 121Francis Fukuyama, “The Neoconservative Movement” in Gary Rosen (ed.) The Right War? The Conservative Debate On Iraq, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 170 122 Halper and Clarke, op.cit., p. 76. They note that “in phraseology that set the tone for today’s neo- conservative attitudes, Krauthammer described America’s foreign policy as one of ‘universal dominion’ in a ‘unipolar ‘ world” (p. 76). Also see, Charles Krauthammer, “Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World,” National Interest, winter 1989/90. 123Ibid. Both Halper and Clarke have made this observation. 124 Halper and Clarke, op.cit., p. 76. 125Ibid. 126Ibid., p. 80. 127Dorrien, op.cit., p. 80.

41 democracy coupled with an unflagging faith in American power constitute the core of neoconservatives’ foreign policy ideology. Krauthammer’s approach “lends considerable credence to George Packer’s observation that neoconservatives see “American power in almost messianic terms.”128

Neoconservatives’ unbending trust in American power is front and centre in the work of Daniel Pipes.129 Like Bernard Lewis, Pipes also studied the history of medieval Islam. His interest in Muslim societies and his oft-stated view that Islam is not a source of strength of such societies but a source of weakness makes him an odd figure to evaluate. Despite challenges from many critics, including from his own conservative peers, Pipes remains a central figure in the conservative movement, and it is not a coincidence that his work has had considerable influence over the actions and policies of the Bush administration.

The , with its policies of armed intervention and the promotion of liberal democracy, was declared in the wake of the 9/11 attack, but as Gary Rosen argues, “the intellectual groundwork behind this policy was laid years before by writers, academics, journalists and policymakers who by self-identification or by the nature of their argument are widely recognized as neo-conservatives.”130Neoconservatives are not only proud to promote their agenda, but they are also “famously eager intellectual combatants, always ready to butt heads with opponents on the left or, for that matter, critics on their own side of the political aisle.”131 After witnessing neoconservatives’ influence on the war on terror and the full impact of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq, one is compelled to question its validity and merit.

128 Cooper, op.cit., p. 190. Also see George Packer, The Assassins’ Gates: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005) p. 74. 129Once a member of the US Institute of Peace, Pipes is probably the most controversial and debated figure among the neoconservatives, apart from being their most recognised public face. Pipes’ frequent media appearances indicate that his ‘expertise’ is much sought after. Also see Edward Said’s evaluation of Daniel Pipes in footnote 25. 130GaryRosen, “Introduction”, inGary Rosen (eds), The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq. (New

York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 1.

131Ibid., p. 2.

42 In this effort, my analysis will begin with scrutinising Pipes’ position on terrorism, in particular in regard to suicide attacks, and American foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks. I will do so by comparing Pipes’ position on these issues with others, on similar issues. One of the fundamental issues of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror is how to explain and deal with suicide attacks. It was not uncommon to portray suicide bombing as nothing other than an act of barbarity that demanded total condemnation – what Ghassan Hage refers to as the “condemnation imperative”. In his view “it is clearly the case that in the Western public sphere the ‘condemnation imperative’ operates as a mode of censoring attempts to provide a sociological explanation for why suicide bombers act the way they do.”132 Furthermore, “if one tries to understand, any accompanying condemnation is deemed suspicious.”133 However, once one resists the “condemnation imperative” as the only way to judge and express one’s view of suicide bombers and instead try to explore the complex political and social issues behind such attacks, perhaps one will be able to articulate them far more effectively.

This study is situated between the dominant view – no further discussion, only total condemnation – and the alternative view that aspires to explore and examine beyond the immediate suffering and loss of precious lives. It aims to explore the relations of curfews, closures, barricades, occupation, and appalling living conditions forced on people by social forces over which they have no control, and on their decision to become suicide bombers. In exploring the impact of these social conditions this research aims to gain a better understanding of suicide attacks and state-sponsored acts of violence. Based on that understanding, one can aspire to the creation of an equitable global discourse in which informed decisions may be made in dealing with terrorism and the war on terror.

132Ghassan Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society. op.cit., p.122. In this context Hage refers to Palestinian suicide bombers. 133 Ibid.

43 CHAPTER TWO

Contesting Neoconservative Discourse on Suicide Bombing, American Foreign Policy, and Political Islam

Following the 9/11 attack the debate over terrorism generated intense interest among scholars, policymakers, newspaper columnists, and the public. The attack drew a remarkably diverse range of responses, varying from the intensely scholarly, through the wildly speculative, to the entirely xenophobic. Remarkably, one of these responses “briefly opened the debate in the US public discourse, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,over the question of why it was that some Muslims and Arabs might hate America as much as they evidently did.”134 Unfortunately, this debate was “shut down in the US itself as al-Qaeda and its followers were vilified and the idea that America had brought the attacks on itself seen as at best tasteless and probably unpatriotic.”135 Amid post-9/11 chaos and before the dust could settle at the World Trade Center site, the US declared war against an already war-ravaged Afghanistan. Before the situation could stabilise in Afghanistan the US went to war with Iraq as an act of retribution, declaring a prolonged “war on terror”. A number of theories of war – just war, small war, ideological war, civilisational war, pre-emptive war – were invoked to justify this policy. Irrespective of well-informed and well-researched opposition to their agenda, the discourse of neoconservatives concerning the war on terror prevailed over all others, including alternative conservative discourse opposed to the war.136

134Tarak Barkawi, “On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’,” International Affairs, 2004, 80(1), p. 35. 135Ibid., p.35. While Barkawi’s observation is true to a considerable extent, it does not mean that others didn’t protest or let the debate to cease. His own writing and scholars such as Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, R. B. J. Walker, Anthony Burke, Roxanne Euben, Ghassan Hage and many others made sure to keep the debate alive. 136 Eminent realists like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt strongly opposed the US decision to goto war in Iraq and dismissed the reasons cited by the US (for example, Iraq might possess weapons of mass destruction that would be a threat to global community, portraying Saddam Hussein as an irrational suicidal adversary and trying to establish a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War”, Foreign Policy, 134, Jan−Feb 2003.

44 The tragic consequences of this policy necessitates evaluating an integral and crucial aspect of the “war on terror” debate – . By examining the neoconservative perspective on suicide attacks and contesting views, this analysis attempts to improve understanding of the complexities behind these attacks. Such an understanding may facilitate informed decision-making in dealing with the war on terror.

In this context, I start with examining well-known neoconservative Daniel Pipes’ theory on Islam and suicide attack. Part of the difficulty in evaluating his work arises from his proclaimed interest in Muslim societies and culture, which sits uneasily with his pronounced views against Islam. Pipes’ claims of expertise in addressing a general audience on modern Middle East politics stand at odds with his training in the history of medieval Islam, but it is precisely because of this training that he believes he is well- equipped to comment upon modern Middle East politics. In his book The Long Shadow: Culture and Politics in the Middle East, he claims superior expertise. In his view, the works of a “political scientist, policy analyst and journalist have their own merits but the work of the historian offers the most profound meaning”. He further extols the virtues of his discipline:

It comes first because it deals with the most general level of analysis. The historian excels at placing current events within their larger context; he is the observer best suited to interpret the long shadow of the past and to show how it affects the present. Many years study of a single subject, supplemented by the knowledge of languages and cultural forms, and often by personal experience, deepen the historian’s perspectives.137

This is one part of his claim that a historian’s analysis is somehow more profound than other analyses. What is more startling is his assertion that these skills have a “particular” usefulness in the Middle East. He does not explain why the same argument cannot be claimed for other parts of the world, but he attaches its particular usefulness to the Middle East by reference to two factors. First, the burden of its ancient culture – that is, Islam – and

137 Daniel Pipes, The Long Shadow: Culture and Politics in the Middle East. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989) p. xi.

45 second, the region’s volatile politics. Citing these two crucial factors, and including his personal experience, Pipes asserts his preeminence in analysis of the Middle East, its culture, and its people. However, an equally personal and more nuanced account occurs a few pages later, when he defines the undertaking of such a project.

The historian specializing in the Renaissance who strayed into questions of current Italian politics would not get much of a hearing, and the same goes for those dealing with other aspects of Europe’s distant past. But a medievalist working on the Middle East (or, for that matter, almost any non-Western region) is sought out. Ironically, this interest results from the faulty assumption that little of significance has changed for a millennium in those parts of the world. This is quite wrong – virtually everything has changed – but the assumption offers the historian opportunities to address a general audience.138

With the assumption that a historian specialising in medieval Islam and politics can comment on the present Middle East ‘to address a general audience’, Pipes seeks to bolster his credentials as an expert on Muslims, Islam and the Middle East. The development of another major event of the time, the and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, together with other events in the Islamic world offered him a great deal of satisfaction in his subject matter and drew him to the contemporary issues of modern Middle East politics and culture. In his own words, "as one thing led to another, I eventually gave up my claim to be a medievalist and metamorphosed into a historian of the modern Middle East.”139 He does not explain how he could manage such a swift career change in such a short time span, trained as a medievalist. However, this decision was immensely beneficial to his career. It led him “into a variety of activities, including service in the U.S. Department of State, the editorship of a world affairs journal and teaching of such subjects as world history, Middle East politics, and strategic studies.”140

Pipes’ decision to become a modern Middle East historian and his subsequent career opportunities aligned conveniently with two major events of the time: the political

138Ibid., p. xx. 139 Ibid. 140Ibid., p. xx.

46 developments in Iran and Afghanistan, and the dominance of cultural theories that were deeply conservative, elitist, and racist, and which typically overlooked issues of class, gender and history associated with projects of human liberation.141Pipes’ decision to divert his early academic career and his subsequent renown engaged with what in an entirely different context Aijaz Ahmad identifies as the rising tide of the global offensive of the Right. The Khomeini victory in Iran and the Afghan war gave further impetus to this development.

The rise of the global offensive of the Right may be one of the major factors behind Pipes’ specialisation, but it does not validate or explain the merits of his text. This takes us back to the necessity of analysing the text. For our present enquiry I will confine my examination to his views on terrorism and American foreign policy in the Middle East, published in his book The Long Shadow: Culture and Politics in the Middle East.

Under the title “Suicide Terrorism: The New Scourge”, Pipes starts with an apolitical sub- heading “Not Unique to the Middle East”. Providing a brief account of French and British soldiers’ actions during World War I and the Irish Republican Army’s activities in 1981, he explains that suicide missions have a long history in Western political tradition and have been legitimised by certain ideologies. He then moves swiftly to comment, “nor are they common among Muslims”. He argues that suicide is strictly forbidden in Islam, as it is in and Christianity. He mentions a Qur’anic verse that according to him could be understood as the Qur’an condemning suicide, but provides no evidence in verification. He cites the Prophet and another current Shiite leader in who firmly

141 I do not suggest that the issues of gender, class and race were absent or not seriously taken into account in cultural theories as such. On the contrary people like Raymond Williams (Problems of Materialism and Culture [1980];The Politics of Modernism and Resources of Hope [1989]; Keywords [1984] ); Christopher Hill (Milton and the English Revolution [1977]; Some intellectual Consequences of the English Revolution [1980] ) and E. P. Thompson (The Making of the English Working Class [1963])very creatively engaged some of these issues that redefined one’s understanding of the relation between history, literature, culture, society and politics. Their engagement illuminated the complex history of capital and labour, coercion and democracy, colony and empire, and indicated their complex relation with society, culture and politics. However, another trend emerged with new styles and new orthodoxies in an alarmist and atavistic way to dominate cultural theories/studies in sections of Europe and the United States. The positions and influence of Daniel Pipes, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington (in his later writings) need to be evaluated focusing on these new fashions and new orthodoxies which these writers so passionately defended and in which culture is treated almost independently outside the influence of other social forces.

47 oppose the practice. He does not provide any supporting evidence for such claims, but instead he describes the suicide attacks in the Middle East as part of state policy. Pipes is emphatic on this point, backing it with tendentious use of selective incidents reported in The Washington Post and The New York Times. According to Pipes, Middle Eastern states sponsor suicide terrorism and “without state support suicide acts would be infrequent and ineffectual.”142 He blames Iran, Syria and Iraq in particular for the policy, but also comments that it has spread all over the Middle East. He argues that states either coerce or blackmail individuals to carry out suicide attacks. These individuals are not necessarily fanatics, political extremists or pathological cases: something as simple as a traffic collision could lead an individual to become a potential suicidal bomber. He denounces analysts who see these individuals as volunteers, which in his view misses the point. In his opinion: Analysts who see the suicide attackers as volunteers miss the point: Anyone unfortunate enough to get into a traffic collision can find himself days later driving a bomb-laden car. Inmates on death row, political dissidents and members of ethnic minorities – under the proper conditions, any of these can be coerced to undertake a suicidal attack143.

Thus any deeper probe is not necessary to investigate suicide bombing. It is as black-and- white as Pipes’ opinion. There is no grey area or mystery to look into it. In his own words: State sponsorship takes the mystery out of suicidal actions. It removes these acts from the realm of aberrant pathology, religious fanaticism, and political extremism, and places them instead within the scope of institutional power and intelligence activities.144

It is well-known that state intelligence agencies abet many subversive acts – including suicide attacks in some cases – for varied reasons, for example, to contain internal security, subvert external threats, or undermine undesired political processes. This kind of operation is not something unique that can only be attributed to the intelligence agencies of the Middle East states. The involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), former KGB and many other Western state intelligence agencies in undertaking such acts is

142 Pipes, op.cit., p. 196. 143 Ibid, p. 200 144Ibid., p. 199.

48 copiously documented by numerous scholars.145 So why does Pipes single out the Middle Eastern states because of such practices? Why does he ignore analysts who offer a totally different and complex view about suicide attacks, rather than regarding them as the policy of the state?

First, Pipes’ view is substantially formed by Zionist-colonial presumptions.146 His avid support for Israel and the Zionist lobby is unquestionable. What is questionable is his hostility towards contemporary Muslims and Islam. He professes respect for Muslims, but at the same time vehemently argues the need for profiling American Muslims.147 Islamophobia exists in many forms. Pipes is the inventor of concepts such as “the New Anti-Semitism”, “the Middle East complot theory”, and “militants of Islam.”148 These concepts are used to undermine the Palestinian cause, to highlight the incapacity of Arabs to resolve their own problems, and to question the loyalty of American Muslims to the United States. All these aspects explain Pipes’ understanding of the world in general and the Middle East in particular. His dismissal of analysts who have a different view about suicide bombing is problematic. Barbara Victor’s Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers, and Ghassan Hage’s essay “Exighophobia/homoiophobia: Comes a time we are all enthusiasm” offer a different and much more complex view of suicide bombers.149Victor and Hage realise that one of the main causes is the result of occupation. Victor closely studied the histories of the first six female suicide bombers and others who failed in their missions, and reveals how crushing poverty, personal tragedy, and occupation can push an individual to make dire decisions.

145There are numerous examples which vindicate the role of state intelligence agencies in carrying out subversive acts for political purposes and it is beyond the scope of this analysis to refer to them all in detail. However, focusing on our current discussion a few notable studies which illuminate and inform about this issue are: Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Crown, 2002); Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House, 2003) and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and ,from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). 146 See fn. 29. 147 See fn. 292. 148“Daniel Pipes, The expert of hate”, Voltaire Network, 2 March 2006, http://www.voltairenet.org/article136260.html 149 Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. (London: Robinson, 2004) and Ghassan Hage, “Exighophobia/homoiophobia: ‘Comes a time we are all enthusiasm’” in Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society. (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 2003).

49

A retrograde feminism that promises equality with men in death fuelled with religious fervour and personal tragedy impelled those women to take these drastic steps. Victor provides the picture behind each of the women suicide bombers. In most cases the woman came from a very vulnerable background with no social system to support her, no future prospects, and no possible escape from her immediate surroundings. Thus, most of these women were persuaded to end their lives. If ending one’s life would give a glimmer of hope to their families in terms of financial rewards or the regaining of lost respectability within their community, then many desperate people would decide to take that step. When living becomes insignificant, many imagine hope in death rather than in living:

Without exception, every woman and young girl who attempted to or succeeded in blowing herself up had been marginalised within Palestinian society. Some were divorced like Wafa Idris; others pregnant out of wedlock, like Zina; while others were being forced into an arranged marriage, like Darine Abu . In some cases, again like Darine, they were the target of ridicule and exclusion because they were educated and intelligent. Then there is the woman who becomes a shahida because she watches a male relative, usually a husband, father, or brother stripped of his dignity and ostracized because he has been accused of collaborating with the enemy. Given the importance ascribed to honour in Palestinian society, it is no surprise that such a woman might consider it an honour to die for the sake of her family.150

Victor’s analysis offers a complex and intimate view behind each Palestinian suicide bomber. Her analysis of the situation behind such acts goes far beyond the burden of occupation, grinding poverty and religious zealotry. Often, conservatives ascribe such acts to the burden of an ancient culture and the militant nature of its people, in an excuse for conservative policy makers to further marginalise Palestinian society and brand them as terrorists. Conversely, fundamentalists use the same logic here, citing their strength and their distinctive makeup to wage and to promote their brand of politics.

150 Victor, op.cit., p. 201.

50 Victor’s analysis questions such logic. The clichéd reference to 72 houris, the promise of a pure husband and all the other rewards in Paradise hardly had a place in the scheme of the suicide bombers that Victor presents. She traces the present woes to the first Intifada when small girls came along with the boys to face and hurl stones at Israeli tanks. It was the first popular uprising against the occupation and surprised the Palestinian leadership and the world alike. The leadership of both Fatah and Hamas did not wish to miss this opportunity to move with the rising tide of protest that they had been unable to motivate earlier with their actions and rhetoric. Before it could slip out of their hands to an alternative national liberation movement they made sure that they clamped down on it and organised it to suit their political agenda. By the time the insurrection was contained and the violence was organised by Fatah and Hamas, the women and the little girls who had grown up to be politically aware women were systematically excluded from the front lines. The excuses were that women have other duties to attain – for the Islamist, it was the home. Clerics and Islamists immediately positioned themselves against women’s participation in violent demonstrations. According to them it was un-Islamic to come to the streets unchaperoned and relinquish the traditional roles of wives, mothers and home makers. The moderate part of the leadership feared “any divisiveness between the various political and religious groups throughout the West Bank and Gaza would hurt the outcome of their struggle.”151 As a result, irrespective of their ideological differences both the liberal and conservative elements of Palestinian politics decided to agree on this issue. “The result was even among women themselves, equality became secondary to the success of the national cause.”152

During the first Intifada women wrote and circulated leaflets, resisted the arrest of male members by the Israeli forces, violated curfews and closures, took charge of educating their children, and did all the productive and progressive activities that men used to do. They took an unprecedented active role not only in running their families and the economy but also in the larger struggle towards independence and equality. In this context, Gaza feminist Zahira Kamal’s comment is of significance: “by breaking the chains of the occupation, the

151 Victor, op. cit., p. 12. 152Ibid., p. 12.

51 women also broke the handcuffs of their own existence.”153The participation and empowerment of women in the first Intifada brought new hope to the Palestinian struggle and to the status of women throughout the Arab world. In Kamal’s view the Intifada "not only challenged the Israelis for the first time in a way that didn’t provoke negative world reaction, but it changed the second class status of women within the Palestinian community.”154 This view is also endorsed by the feminists and peace activists on the Israeli side. Nomi Chazan, a member of the Knesset and a close friend and co-activist of Kamal “through their work in the Palestinian and Israeli Women for peace movement” observes, “perhaps more than a step forward to end occupation back in 1987, the [involvement of women] was a step forward in creating a democratic society, where women are equal and not under the control of religious extremists.”155 The active participation of women in the national struggle ushered a new era in Palestinian politics. It proved that women could not only take charge and run their own affairs successfully but as co-fighters of freedom could attract more empathetic reaction from the rest of the world.

The new-found hope turned out to have a short life. As mentioned earlier, the conservative and liberal establishments of Palestinian politics perceived this movement as a threat to their brand of politics. The first Intifada and concurrent women’s movement was repressed and harnessed to advance their brand of politics. Protesting against the male dominated Fatah and Hamas would have been counterproductive both for the women’s movement and the national struggle. Zahira Kamal puts it thus: “had we protested, Hamas would have taken action against us, and with the Palestinians at variance with each other, Israel would have found it much easier to crush the uprising.”156To avoid any division within the resistance movement, women decided to stay away from the front lines. While the majority stayed away from frontline activities, a few followed their own inner call and acted violently against the Israeli soldiers and occupation. Encouraged by several Communist and Marxist factions within the Liberation Organisation (PLO), these women

153 Ibid., p. 10 154 Ibid., pp. 10–11 155 Ibid, p. 11 156Ibid., p. 12.

52 embarked on self-initiated attacks known as Jihad Fardi, which many analysts contend were a harbinger of the present suicide bombers.

Despite this setback, “out of the devastation of the first Intifada came the first real Middle East peace initiative.”157 The Oslo Accord followed and quickly faded along with the hopes of the Palestinians. Conservatives within Palestinian politics, who were against any peace accord with Israel and were in favor of the creation of an Islamic state, took this opportunity to strengthen their position within Palestinian society and politics. One of their major political weapons was suicide attacks, and the political mileage these groups gained was significant. Not only was it crushing the morale and the spirit of Israeli society, but it was also mobilising public opinion, moving it towards the radical Islamic movement and away from Arafat’s secular Fatah organisation. Arafat realised the time had come to take action to pre-empt all the challenging developments. To contain his influence over Palestinian society and to confront the opposition in Israel, he gave his tacit support to suicide bombings.158

At the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, Fatah’s militant wing the al- Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade began to take credit for suicide and other attacks. “But while Hamas and Islamic Jihad had no problem finding men who were willing to die in the name of Allah, Arafat had great difficulty mobilizing those loyal to his political faction to commit acts of martyrdom.”159 As Victor explains, this led Arafat to shift “his military operations onto a very special kind of suicide bomber.”160

In a speech specifically addressed to them, Arafat called on women to join the national struggle as equal partners. On 27 January 2002, “to thunderous applause and cheers, Arafat stressed the importance of the women’s role in the Intifada.”161 Since the clampdown on the first Intifada and the women’s resistance movement in 1987, no leader had openly addressed and invited women to join the national struggle as equal partners. As he

157 Ibid., p. 15 158Ibid., p. 17. 159Ibid., p. 18. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid., p. 19

53 addressed the audience: “you are my army of roses that will crush Israeli tanks,”162 Arafat publicly endorsed women’s role in political struggle and self-determination. The response was spontaneous and approving. According to Victor, this particular speech would change forever the course of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. As she notes:

Arafat’s usual rhetoric and zeal notwithstanding, what made this particular speech different – and changed forever the nature of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict – was a phrase he used, words that would become his mantra in the weeks and months ahead. ‘Shahida all the way to ’, he said, coining on the spot the feminised version of the Arab word for martyr, shahide, which previously existed only in the masculine form. He repeated it over and over again until the crowd, with raised fists, took the cue and chanted along with him: ‘Shahida, Shahida…until Jerusalem we will give our blood and soul to you…and to Palestine.’163

That very day, “Wafa Idris, a twenty-six year old Palestinian woman, blew herself to pieces in a downtown Jerusalem shopping mall, killing one Israeli man and wounding 131 bystanders.”164 Immediately after her death, claims and counterclaims were made about responsibility for the attack. The world media picked up wrong information from the television station, naming the attacker as a student of Al-Najah University, a hotbed for Hamas sympathisers.165However, the Hamas leader in Gaza refused to comment on the bombing;“That was not surprising, since Hamas and the Islamic Jihad had not issued a fatwa, or religious decree, giving women permission to participate in suicide bombings.”166 The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade initially claimed responsibility then retracted its claim, and on later seeing the positive response in the street, fully accepted responsibility. One truth emerges out of this episode. Irrespective of the reasons behind Wafa Idris’ tragic act, nobody expected the kind of public support her act generated. The leaders of competing ideologies realised the political opportunism arising from Wafa Idris’ act and most of them took steps to bend and amend the rules and interpret the scriptures to

162 Ibid. 163 Ibid, pp. 19–20. The next few paragraphs in this analysis are based on materials from Victor’s book. 164Ibid., p. 20. 165Ibid., p. 22. 166 Ibid.

54 suit political exigency. Sheikh Yassin, the then spiritual leader of Hamas, changed his earlier position about women martyrs or shahidas. Victor claims that once he realised the mood in the streets he not only moved to endorse women martyrs from his previous position of opposing the shahidas but also provided a Koranic interpretation – without supporting evidence – that promised all the rewards a shahida would receive through her act. Similarly, a few weeks after Idris’ act the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, the militant wing of Fatah, officially opened a “woman’s suicide unit” in her honour.

Among all these claims and counterclaims, one factor remains unanswered – the real motives behind Wafa Idris’ tragic act. There are many reasons and many arguments that could validate her death. In this case issues concerning occupation take a prominent place in explaining the suicide attacks. Based on his research on Algeria, terrorism expert Emanuel Savin strongly believes occupation is the main motivating factor behind suicide attacks. According to him the desperate socio-economic situation that occupation creates motivates suicide bombers. Shalfic Masalqu, a psychologist and professor at Hebrew University, conducted research with 300 Palestinian boys and girls aged around 11 years old, and found occupation as the motivating factor for aspiring shahides and shahidas. Experiencing equally the same brutality and fear, these boys and girls think that the highest honour to achieve in life is to die as a martyr. According to Masalqu:

In times of war there is less schizophrenia and less depression. When a nation is at war, the mental health of the population usually gets better. In our society, in this time of war, the general atmosphere is full of hopelessness and I think it is because of the occupation, which is different than a classic war, which brings people to have ideas of death rather than ideas of life. It is the atmosphere that is the main stimuli and not the religious, political, or nationalistic reasons.167

Ariel Merari, another expert on terrorism, believes that the social pressure on individuals places them in a situation where hesitant individuals cannot exculpate themselves from committing the act once they make the promise to carry out the attack. He particularly blames the culture of video recording; where once individuals have aired their intention

167 Ibid, pp. 27–28.

55 publicly they find it difficult either to retract their statements or to step back from committing the act. Here the video recording acts as a document to vilify them as weak if they do not act. Mira Tzoreff, a professor at Ben Gurion University, adds an important angle to this debate. Irrespective of intentions, to her the bomber is chosen from the most vulnerable section of the Palestinian society. Analysing Wafa Idris, Tzoreff argues:

Wafa Idris…the ultimate shahida, who is she after all? She is a talented young woman, married and divorced because she was sterile, desperate because she knew perfectly well there was no future for her in any aspect of the Palestinian society. She knew better than anyone else that the only way for her to come out against this miserable situation was to kill herself.168

While Tzoreff’s analysis throws light on the conditions, constraints and closures that impelled Wafa Idris to take her life, it does not suggest the causes that allowed these conditions to flourish in the first instance. The issue again reminds us of the havoc occupation plays on ordinary Palestinian daily lives. Born in the al-Amani refugee camp in 1975, Wafa Idris grew up witnessing the brutality, poverty and street fighting brought about by the Israeli occupation. Her two brothers, the two wage earners in the family, lost their jobs as taxi drivers as a result of the occupation and its associated problems. As if these hardships were not enough, she had to endure a failed marriage because she could not bear a child, a source of constant taunting and ridicule from neighbors for her apparent inadequacy as a woman. It is tragic that Wafa Idris was blamed for the tragedies she faced through no fault of her own. It is just another classic case of a victim being victimised because she has no avenue left with which to defend herself. Along with her miseries, the burden was on her to redeem herself. In her context, the available resolution was to turn her despair and anger against herself. Palestinian society and the history under Israeli occupation left Idris with no other possible hope. Here Savin’s analysis brings to mind Fanon once again. Commenting upon the miseries of the Algerians under French occupation, Fanon attributes many mental disorders of Algerians to the occupation and the colonial war. In his salutary work, The Wretched of the Earth, concerning the French

168 Ibid, pp. 46–47.

56 occupation in Algeria, Fanon establishes the relationship between colonial war and mental disorders:

For a colonised man, in a contest of oppression like that of Algeria, living does not mean embodying moral values or taking his place in the coherent and fruitful development of the world. To live means to keep on existing. Every date is a victory: not the result of work, but a victory felt as a triumph for life…. Who is going to take the punishment? The French are down in the plain with the police, the army and the tanks. On the mountain there are only Algerians. Up above there is Heaven with the promise of a world beyond the grave; down below there are the French with their very concrete promises of prison, beatings-up and executions. You are forced to come up against yourself. Here we discover the kernel of that hatred of self which is characteristic of racial conflicts in segregated societies.169

Fanon’s analysis differed radically from prevailing analyses at the time. It is illuminating and challenging to confront some of the expert reports on African mental disorders. Fanon provides two notable examples. One is Dr. A. Carothers, an expert from the World Health Organization who blames the cerebral structure of the African’s brain for their mental issues. His observations are collected in his book Normal and Pathological Psychology of the African(1954). In his study “he puts forward the idea that the normal African is a ‘lobotomised European.’”170 According to Dr. Carothers the frontal lobe of the African is detached from his/her nervous system. Once this physiological problem is understood there is little mystery in understanding Africans’ outbursts of anger, hatred, crime. In Dr. Carothers’ analysis this is a biological problem and should be understood as such. The anger and crimes of the natives do not require a sociological and ideological interpretation, but rather a scientific appreciation of the biological limits of the native. If this happened to be the view of an international expert on Algerians, one can only imagine the popular views of ordinary people.

The official theory that Algerians happen to be congenitally aggressive persons who look for the slightest pretext to express themselves was unanimously accepted by the police,

169 Fanon, op. cit., pp. 249–250. 170Ibid., p. 244.

57 judiciary, journalists, and doctors of the period. Another prominent expert whose findings substantiated Dr. Carothers work was Prof. A. Porot, Professor of Psychiatry at the Faculty of Algiers. For over thirty years, under Prof. Porot’s guidance several researchers worked to define different forms of African aggression and to establish a theory that would explain such behavior sociologically and anatomically. Fanon notes:

It was in 1935 at the Congress of Mental Specialists and Neurologists that Prof. Porot defined the scientific bases of his theory. In the discussion that followed the report…he pointed out that ‘the native of North Africa, whose superior and cortical activities are only slightly developed, is a primitive creature whose life, essentially vegetative and instinctive, is above all regulated by his diencephalon.’171

Once the aggressiveness of the native was attributed to the diencephalon and the frontal lobe of his/her brain, no mystery remained to be explained of the native’s aggressive act. It was attributed to the biological limitation of the native. This theory was taught, developed, widely accepted and upheld in universities for years. Many graduates who received this education came to accommodate themselves to the idea that Algerians were congenitally aggressive and impulsive. Thus, the homicidal and violent acts of the Algerian could be scientifically analysed and understood. Sociological and political explanations were not seriously considered because it was a scientific issue. This theory did not hold good once the national liberation struggle took momentum. Once the idea that Algerians were congenitally aggressive and impulsive was internalised, and with the progress of the liberation movement, this trait of the Algerian became an asset. It meant the Algerians would not surrender without fighting. It was realised by the people and the leaders that their inborn deficiencies constituted their strengths in their resistance against the occupation. The judges and the officials had already noticed that the Algerian anger had transformed into a collective anger against the occupier. Personal quarrels, violence and disputes were diminishing. As Fanon notes:

171Ibid., p. 243.

58 There are no longer explosive outbursts of rage because my wife’s forehead or her left shoulder were seen by my neighbor. The national conflict seems to have canalized all anger, and nationalized all affective or emotional movements.172

In effect the political conflict in Algeria had accommodated the personal conflict and allowed an outlet for their personal despair, hopelessness and fear, which were in the first place the direct product of occupation. In this context Wafa Idris’ suicidal act can be understood. Her experience of hopelessness, helplessness and despair was also a product of the occupation. She herself experienced the same brutality and fear, along with other boys and girls. The dire economic conditions she experienced were not of her making. The curfews and closures that the Israeli armed forces imposed on the Palestinian territories left little chance for Palestinian society to flourish, and in turn left a dim chance that Wafa Idris, a member of the most vulnerable section of Palestinian society, could overcome her adversities in any possible constructive way except by taking her own life. If, in that act, she could redeem a position for herself or her family in society one can imagine that she would be less hesitant to take such a step.

It is understandable to condemn Wafa Idris’ act and other suicide attacks, but it would be a grave mistake to ignore the living conditions from which suicidal attacks emanate. When one confronts the history of occupation, as in Fanon’s study of Algeria under the French occupation and Victor’s bleak pictures of lives in Palestine refugee camps under Israeli occupation, one finds it less difficult to realise the havoc occupation unleashes on occupied people’s daily lives. It is detrimental to ignore the living conditions and to place blame squarely on suicide bombers and their handlers if one seriously wishes to understand the logics and complexities of suicide attacks, even when one strongly disapproves such practices. Such an act would deny the benefit of accessing other knowledge about suicide bombers. This view is also strongly reflected in Ghassan Hage’s analysis of suicide bombings.

172Ibid.,p. 247.

59 Hage believes that any discussion of suicide bombers, or rather, discussion in the Western public sphere of Palestinian suicide bombers, is highly problematic unless these practices are treated with unqualified condemnation. He observes it is difficult to harbour or express any kind of understanding whatsoever, even if one disapproves such acts. According to him:

It is clearly the case that in the Western public sphere the ‘condemnation imperative’ operates as a mode of censoring attempts to provide a sociological explanation for why Palestinian suicide bombers (PSBs) act the way they do. It is difficult to express any form of understanding whatsoever, even when one is indeed also condemning the practices of PSBs. Only unqualified condemnation will do. And if one tries to understand, any accompanying condemnation is deemed suspicious.173

In this climate of suspicion Hage, like many other analysts, encounters increasing hostility in trying to explain suicide bombings other than with unqualified condemnation. In this context Hage raises a very pertinent question: why is terrorism as a form of political violence so problematic? Whereas other forms of political violence, many proportionately much greater, have been normalised. He further questions what constitutes legitimate violence and what deprives legitimacy to other forms of political violence.

Citing the Israel–Palestine conflict, Hage notes that the Israelis had inflicted disproportionate violence on the Palestinian population before the second Intifada, let alone after. The “collateral damage”– the popularly used phrase – is far higher than the damage the Palestinian suicide bombers caused, but such colonial violence does not qualify for uncritical condemnation. According to Hage:

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation – as opposed to the way we approach the violence of colonial domination, for example – is an indication of the symbolic violence

173Ghassan Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society. (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 2003), p.122.

60 that continues to shape our understanding of what constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence.174

The depth and meaning of this symbolic violence is derived from our understanding of what terrorism means. This is a complex issue, particularly considering that actors of politically motivated terrorism often regard themselves as freedom fighters, martyrs, and liberators.175In this context they perceive their organisations as legitimate political groups to the extent that they maintain leverage in negotiation by withholding an undertaking to cease terrorist action. The history of colonialism and different resistance movements validate this claim to a large extent. Once we are prepared to accept such a validation, we find it less problematic to examine this violence. From this point of view, many Palestinians and Arabs do not find it as perplexing as others do.

To many Palestinians and their sympathisers it is a question of distribution of violence. As such, many Palestinians consider terrorist attacks as a last resort. For many Palestinians “suicide bombings are seen as a marriage between the necessity for resistance and a state of quantitative and qualitative military hardware deprivation.”176

According to Hage such a condition is possible because of the failure of the political apparatus. Under such a condition “violence emerges as a genuine and apparently reasonable possibility.”177Hage explains this condition as social unavailability, a condition that indicates unavailability of any opportunity to make something of one’s life. Hage further investigates the concept of social unavailability based on Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of illusio: “the deep belief in the importance of our life pursuits.”178 Bourdieu sees society as

174Ibid., p. 127. 175 For example, members and sympathisers of IRA (Irish Republican Army), LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) and the Jewish underground movement Irgun Zvai Leumi in Palestine in the 1940s considered themselves as legitimate fighters for freedom. They had clear political demands. For IRA and LTTE it was independence and for PLO it is the end to the occupation of their lands. According to Pieterse, “the same organizations that the United States promoted in the eighties were declared the new enemies in the nineties, renamed fundamentalists, with clash of civilizations serving as the new enemy doctrine. Yesterday’s freedom fighter literally became today’s terrorist,” Pieterse, op.cit., p. 116. 176Hage, op. cit., p. 128. 177 Ibid., p. 130 178 Ibid., p. 133

61 “primarily a mechanism for the generation of meanings for life.”179 Accordingly, people invest in life to make it meaningful,

[b]ut for Bourdieu, meaningfulness is not always offered by society. Indeed, society is characterized by a deep inequality in the distribution of meaningfulness…One of the most unequal of all distributions, and probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the distribution of…social importance and reasons for living. When people face a shrinking of their opportunities to realise their selves they suffer from ‘social ageing.’180

In this sense, Hage argues that in the absence of the possibility of a meaningful life, “colonized Palestinian society produces a generalized form of premature social ageing, even of social death: a situation where there is felt to be an almost complete absence of the possibility of a worthy life.”181Hage cites a study by the Institute of Community and Public Health at Birzeit University on its undergraduates during the first period of the second Intifada (2000–2001). This study reveals the inability of students to visualise a better life other “than their hopelessly miserable current life offers.”182 For Hage “nothing symbolizes social death as clearly or as forcefully as this inability to dream a meaningful life.”183 In Hage’s view “this generalized state of social death does not in itself directly cause suicide bombers.”184 It could lead to resignation and indifference as in some post-colonial cultures, but instead it allows the development of a martyr culture. Hage sees here “the suicide bombing as a meaningful activity – as an illusio – emerges.”185

In analysing the development of martyr culture Hage finds that after the first act of suicide bombing occurred a culture of glorification followed, which as a result produced more suicide bombers followed by further glorification “until this culture of glorification became

179Ibid., p. 132. 180Ibid, op. cit., 133. 181 Ibid. 182Ibid., p. 134. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid.

62 an entrenched part of Palestinian colonised society.”186Hage finds “martyrdom” as a result bestows immense social capital on the martyrs themselves:

The culture of martyrdom, with the high social esteem (symbolic capital) it bestows on the ‘martyrs’ themselves (the funeral processions, the speeches, the photos filling the streets and so forth, plus the relative wealth and social support their families receive), stands against the background of social death described above. It reveals itself for many Palestinian young people as a path of social meaningfulness and self-fulfillment in an otherwise meaningless life. The culture of martyrdom is an astonishing manifestation of the capacity of the human imagination – individuals commit themselves to a path that leads to an imagined enjoyable symbolic life following the cessation of their physical life. It is a swapping of physical existence for symbolic existence.187

Hage’s analysis once again proves that in the absence of any meaningful life and with shrinking opportunities, many young Palestinians see meaning in death rather than in living. Following Bourdieu’s idea of “the chase” as a way society invites us to live, Hage argues “in the case of the Palestinian colonised society, it is also how it can invite us to die.”188 In Bourdieu’s view,

The social world provides something more and other than the apparent stakes: the chase, Pascal reminds us, counts as much as, if not more than, the quarry, and there is a happiness in activity which exceeds the visible profits – wage, prize or reward – and which consists in the fact of emerging from indifference (or depression), being occupied, projected towards goals, and feeling oneself objectively, and therefore subjectively, endowed with a social mission.189

Hage finds Bourdieu’s idea of “the chase” as a way of making life worth of living, but in the case of Palestinian society that worthiness comes in dying. Hage regards this as a

186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid., p. 135 189 Bourdieu, quoted in Hage, op. cit., p. 134.

63 paradoxical social category –“suicidal capital”, that is, exchanged for the symbolic capital (“the chase”).

Hage, like Barbara Victor, reminds us that children’s stone throwing lays the preparatory groundwork for the formation of future suicide bombers. Stone-throwing symbolises the collective frustration with the bleak conditions of the Palestinians, particularly in the refugee camps. The Palestinian history under Israeli occupation validates the reasons that made these conditions possible at the first place. The closures, curfews and crushing poverty are the direct result of the Israeli occupation. As discussed by Fanon, Savin and others, it is important to realise that “occupation” plays one of the most crucial motivating factors for the suicide attacks. Concerning suicide bombers, Hage refers to Rita Giacaman who observes:

Their stressful and desperate life events do not only relate to what is taking place in their lives now, but more importantly, to the fact that they have chronically been violated, have been cumulatively disadvantaged, beginning in early life, and have undergone series of subsequent experiences that accumulated over time to produce in youth the disadvantages, inclinations, and behavior that we see today.190

Hage sees Israeli colonialism as driven by its search for “zero vulnerability”. In Hage’s view this popular psyche of the Israelis is shaped “by the sense of insecurity that many Israeli have acquired through their deep internalization of centuries of anti-Semitism and 50-odd years of Arab anti-colonial enmity.”191The horrors of the Holocaust played a significant role in shaping this psyche.

In Hage’s view this search for zero vulnerability produces a gaze that sees threat everywhere and in everything, and as a result perceives everybody as a potential security risk. In this context every Palestinian is considered a security risk, as is any independent political Palestinian voice, or for that matter any independent political will that differs from

190Giacaman, quoted in Hage, op. cit., p. 135. 191Hage, op. cit., p. 135.

64 the dominant Israeli political discourse. To pre-empt these threats all sorts of coercive methods are implemented on a daily basis that the Palestinians experience in their everyday life. These experiences create a sense of impotence, helplessness and despair, along with violation and humiliation at a national and personal level, and results in the experience of collective shame: “having another nation enter your territory at will, arrest your leaders and talk about them as if they are disposable entities is clearly and significantly humiliating.”192 The regular experience of “being shouted at, abused, searched, stopped, ordered around, checked, asked to wait, ‘allowed to pass’, and so on”193 at a personal level has affected almost every Palestinian in the occupied territories. Over a period of time these pains are internalised and the feelings of impotence become stronger. To overcome the humiliation and impotence individuals adopt and exercise different social skills depending on their age, education, and social status. Here, Shalfic Masalqa, a psychologist and Professsor at Hebrew University provides an excellent description of how one reacts to such a situation: “‘First of all, I’m an adult’, says Dr Masalqa”.

Humiliation for adolescents takes on far greater proportions and has far more serious repercussions than for an adult. If I get stopped at a check point, the soldiers can’t humiliate me because I am secure in who I am. But if a fourteen or fifteen-year-old boy is humiliated, at that moment, at that very instant, being kicked or being forced to lean on a wall, is the moment a suicide bomber is created. That is what makes the pathology. Add to that the other realities, such as where this youngster is returning to, where he lives, what his day- today life is about – without education, his father out of a job and unable to feed everyone, or watching a male relative beaten by soldiers. All that youngster can do is explain his experiences at that moment by the fact that it is the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] soldiers who have done this to him and to his family. It is much easier to make a projection and say the only reason why I am so badly off is because of the occupation.194

192Ibid., p. 137. 193Ibid., p. 137. 194 Victor, op. cit., p. 178.

65 Masalqa’s description shows how humiliation leads an individual to take extreme steps because the individual has no better avenues to redress the humiliation. The pent-up emotion that builds over a period of time prolongs the pain and creates the desire to discharge the pain of this accumulated violence at any available opportunity. It is not hard to realise that the Palestinian society in its abysmal state can hardly provide any comfort to redress this pain in any possibly comforting way. On the other hand, one cannot ever imagine having the strength to confront an aggressor as powerful as the Israeli forces. In this unequal balance of power other – retrograde – forces step in to take advantage of the situation. In this context it is possible to imagine how organisations like Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade could envisage a role to play to assuage the pain that many Palestinians experienced on a routine basis, by providing the victims of humiliation with a possible way and meaning to release their pain. The primacy and the secret of their success primarily and fundamentally depend on providing a mechanism that would transform their humiliation into honour.

When analysing the complex and contested history of suicide bombings in the Middle East, there is no mention of the burden of its ancient culture – Islam – or the militant nature of its people as motivating factors behind such attacks as Pipes claims. There is also no mention of how involvement in a traffic collision could later transform someone into a suicide bomber. Daniel Pipes’ claim of “inmates on death row, political dissidents, members of ethnic minorities and drivers in traffic collisions” as potential suicide bombers does not emerge easily from this analysis, which indicates that suicide bombing is a state-sponsored and state-promoted activity. Pipes’ readymade analysis may appeal to a section of the society that is always eager for simple policy solutions, but his kind of engagement conceals many important issues such as occupation, use of state violence, irresolvable poverty, and accompanying problems that in the first place push the most vulnerable section of an equally dismal and powerless society – such as Palestinian society – to take such dire steps. Instead of seeking to address these pressing issues, Pipes, without supporting evidence, argues that the problem with Islamic terrorism is rooted in Islam and its culture. Irrespective of Pipes’ theory on Islam and suicide attack, many of his neoconservative peers endorse his view– that “Islam” is the issue. The following chapter

66 discusses the endorsement by his peers –evident in the work of Charles Krauthammer and Bernard Lewis – to explain suicide attack and Islamic terrorism.

67 CHAPTER THREE

The continuation of the culturalist paradigm: The work of Charles Krauthammer and Bernard Lewis

Pipes was nominated to the US Institute of Peace by President Bush, irrespective of his views on Islam and the Middle East, to the dismay of many better-informed scholars and observers. However, many of his neoconservative peers rallied behind him, justifying his nomination on the grounds that his view was a “bitter truth” that many found hard to swallow. Among others such solidarity is found in Charles Krauthammer’s work. According to him, “the attack on Pipes was nothing but another symptom of the absurd political correctness surrounding Islamic radicalism”. In his alarmist view he maintains:

We are all supposed to pretend that we have equal suspicion of terrorist intent thus must give equal scrutiny to a 70-year-old Irish nun, a 50-year-old Jewish seminarian, and a 30-year-old man from Saudi Arabia. Your daughter is on that plane: to whom do you want the security guards to give their attention?…. For Bush, this would be an act of characteristic principle and courage. The problem however, is that such an act makes the appointment furtive. Worse, it lets the McCarthyites off too easy.195

Krauthammer singles out Arab–Islamic radicalism and its concurrent anti-Americanism as the imminent problem of our time. Like many of his conservative peers, he finds Arab– Islamic radicalism to be the existential threat to the civilised West in general and to the US in particular. According to him, unless this threat is thwarted or crushed it will unbalance America’s unique position in the international system. For many conservatives and opinion makers, such a situation would be tantamount to the breakdown of the present international system. Anyone familiar with the works of these intellectuals will acknowledge that for many conservatives and their supporters “America is the World”. Accordingly, challenges

195 Charles Krauthammer, “The Truth about Daniel Pipes”, Washington Post, August 15, 2003 cited in http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1316

68 or opposition to American strategic interest is equally a challenge to the international system. Arguing that America is a disinterested superpower, Krauthammer explains that history inadvertently placed America in this position. As a reluctant power America was dragged into three great wars of the 20th century – World War I, World War II and the Cold War – by three influential presidents: Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman. With the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union it was the only surviving superpower, a position Krauthammer calls the unipolar world. In his view nobody could envisage or prepare for such a situation. As a result of this historical accident America has become the designated custodian of the new international system, but in reality Americans are not interested in other places. Left alone they would much rather stick to each other than meddle in “other” people’s affairs:

We like it here. We like our McDonald’s. We like our football. We like our rock-and-roll. We’ve got the Grand Canyon and Gracelands. We’ve got Silicon Valley and South Beach. We’ve got everything. And if that’s not enough, we’ve got Vegas – which is a facsimile of everything. What could we possibly need anywhere else? We don’t like exotic languages – lots of declensions and moods. We don’t know even what a mood is. We like Iowa corn and New York hot dogs, and if we want Chinese or Indian or Italian, we go to the food court. We don’t send the Marines for takeout.196

With this declaration one would gain the impression that America is a benign power. In Krauthammer’s opinion even if America occupies this unique position of being the lone superpower, it is not an imperial power because America does not believe in empire- building. The seeming empire it has acquired is the result of history:

The use of the word ‘empire’ in the American context is ridiculous. It is absurd to apply the word to a people whose first instinct upon arriving on anyone’s soil is to demand an exit strategy. I can assure you that when the Romans went into Gaul and the British into India,

196 Charles Krauthammer, Democratic Realism:An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World, (Washington, D.C:The AIE Press, 2004). pp. 2–3.

69 they were not looking for exit strategies. They were looking for entry strategies.197

To clarify the American position in the present condition he compares it with the Athenian republic, albeit more democratic and republican than Athens. But he further clarifies the nature of this republic as a commercial republic:

We are a commercial republic…a commercial republic with overwhelming global power. A commercial republic that, by pure accident of history, has been designated custodian of the international system. The eyes of every supplicant from East Timor to Afghanistan, from Iraq to Liberia; Arab and Israeli, Irish and British, North and South Korea are upon us. That is who we are. That is where we are.198

With this point of view Krauthammer notes that “Americans have a healthy aversion to foreign policy”. As theirs is a self-contained world, they do not like to venture into exotic places or feel the urge to explore exotic languages. Probably this would have remained the case had they not been dragged into the three major wars of the 20th century, World War I, World War II and the Cold War. Krauthammer does not discuss the circumstances under which World War II helped in dragging America out of the Depression, its booming economy ensuring its postwar domination over global resources, including oil. For the present analysis we will set aside these difficult issues and concentrate on the issues he raised, notably American foreign policy and its obligation to international society.

From the outset it appears America would have preferred an isolationist policy, neither being bothered by others nor bothering others. According to Krauthammer isolationism sprang from a view of America as spiritually superior to the Old World. It is based on the idea of America as the emerging New World, devoid of the intrigues and trappings of the Old World. According to the isolationists such a condition allows them to sustain and pursue their world without meddling with the rest of the world, but the events of the 20th century were the undoing of its isolationist aspirations. An increasingly interdependent

197Ibid., p. 2. 198Ibid., p. 3.

70 world with the combination of modern technology and mass movements of people does not afford such blissful isolation. The Old World has been stirred, changed and reshaped beyond recognition. The events of 20th century made sure that the different worlds were coalesced and reconfigured, while many other societies collapsed apparently through no fault of their own but because of upheavals beyond their own making. As a result the quiet Americans and their emerging New World became entangled with other worlds and their exotica and evils. Accordingly, in Krauthammer’s view an isolationist policy is untenable at present, no matter how well it complements the American mentality. This raises the next question: if not isolationism, then what other policy should America pursue? Krauthammer explains two other schools of thought before delineating his own policy. Let us briefly examine these other schools of thought before embarking upon Krauthammer’s own.

The two schools of thought are and realism. These are major schools of thought in studies of the history of International Relations, more specifically in the history of Western studies of international relations. Krauthammer traces the pedigree of liberal internationalism to “Woodrow Wilson’s utopianism, Harry Truman’s anticommunism and John Kennedy’s militant universalism,”199 but according to him it lost its validity after the Vietnam War. The debacle in Vietnam challenged the moral superiority that America had claimed since the Second World War. As a retreat, liberal internationalism turned out to be an ideology of passivity and reflexive anti- interventionism. According to Krauthammer such a policy weakens America’s position in world affairs and bolsters the position of its adversaries. He cites the nuclear freeze movement, opposition to the war in Central America and the movements to ban land mines as products of such a policy. Krauthammer finds these outcomes problematic. In his view such outcomes challenge the notion of national interest classically defined as the will to power, by its great theorist, Hans Morgenthau as a basis of pursuing realpolitik.200He

199 Krauthammer, Democratic Realism, p. 4. 200 Krauthammer opines “Morgenthau postulated that what drives nations, what motivates their foreign policy, is the will to power – to keep it and expand it,”Democratic Realism, p.13.Here power is understood as a capacity and a right to act as an instrument of domination. According to Hobbes such a notion of power is problematic. In his view sovereignty often understood to be based on consent, appears in its contemporary manifestations to be problematic between the idea of power as a capacity and as a right. In his view it is a confusion that is endemic to modern political theory. For details see Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power:

71 argues that to disregard the proven path of realpolitik – of integrating power, morality and self-interest – is detrimental to American interest and is also untenable. He believes liberal internationalism’s policy of passivity and non or selective intervention curtails American power and allows weak countries to exert power beyond their true power. He objects to this parity. In his view the altruistic nature of liberal internationalism does not help American national interest and does not change the international system from a Hobbesian universe into a Lockean universe. He finds liberal internationalism as a policy lofty and self- delusionary. In his view had this policy been pursued it would have allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power and Qaddafi to maintain a nuclear armament policy. In contrast, a policy of brute force and armed intervention facilitated the exit of Hussein and contained Qaddafi, who finally gave up the nuclear armament program. In Krauthammer’s view treaties, negotiations, United Nations’ (UN) recommendations and dialogues, while having moral value and legitimacy, are of limited value for a great power like America in a realpolitik sense. In his analysis the international community does not reflect the image of domestic civil society, so to apply the norms of domestic civil society in the international arena is counterproductive. Such an action puts no moral pressure on the errant members of the international community such as Libya and Iran; instead it restrains American power when pursuing its national interest. In short, the international community does not transform into a norms-based community in the image of domestic civil society through treaties and contracts, hence it defeats the very purpose of changing international society in the image of domestic civil society. In this context Krauthammer turns to examine the much-practiced and time-tested other school of thought, “realism”.

In Krauthammer’s view realists do not suffer from the illusion of the liberal internationalists or isolationists. Realists acknowledge the impossibility of changing the Hobbesian world into a Lockean world. Such recognition comes from their fundamental observation that the international system does not reflect the image of domestic civil society. As different worlds with different aspirations live together it is highly unlikely that they would adhere to the same norms that govern domestic civil society aspires. In this

From Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). Also see Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 1964).

72 context Krauthammer finds, for example, a fisheries treaty with Canada is workable but “an agreed framework on plutonium processing with the likes of North Korea is not worth the paper it is written on.”201 Drawing upon the realist axiom he finds the international community a fiction. According to him “it is not a community, it is a cacophony – of straining ambitions, disparate values and contending power.”202 In such a condition only the overwhelming power and deterrent threat of the US holds the international community together. He emphasises that nations big or small, norm-abiding or norm-breaking, recognise and respect “power” in a classical “realist” sense.203 In Krauthammer’s view treaties are parchments that do not protect civilisation from barbarism, but power does, and thus in a unipolar world it is American power which has the capacity, and thereby the right, to act in order to do so.

In this context he opposes the land mines treaty that the Clinton administration pursued but failed to ratify. In his view this failure to ratify suggests the triumph of realism over woolly liberal internationalism. Only the US can enforce and guard that dividing-line. In his view “America is the land mine between barbarism and civilization.”204 To enforce this sanity American power can use the privilege bestowed upon it either unilaterally or pre-emptively. Krauthammer regards a world of terror pre-emption an improvement on classical deterrence. In the bipolar Cold War, world deterrence could function with a non-suicidal adversary. It does not work in a unipolar world where the adversary is not afraid of a suicidal stand and where it is increasingly difficult to detect an adversary or a potential adversary. In Krauthammer’s view in an atmosphere of undetectables and undeterrables, pre-emption remains the only possible strategy. In the absence of pre-emption, the only other option remaining is unilateral action.

201 Krauthammer, Democratic Realism, p. 10. 202Ibid, p. 10. 203 While realists cannot agree on a single definition of power, they can still be distinguished “by the intensity and exclusivity of their commitment to core realist premises” as Donnelly observes. According to him, with the exception of “Radical” realists who “exclude almost everything except power and self-interest from (international) politics”, one can “think of a continuum of positions”. In this continuum “‘Strong’ realists stress the predominance of power, self-interest and conflict but allow modest space for politically salient ‘non-realist’ forces and concerns. Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz the leading realists of their generations, all lie in this range of continuum” (Jack Donnelly, “Realism” in Scott Burchill ... [et al.], – 3rd ed. Theories of International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) pp. 31-32. 204Ibid., p. 10.

73

Commenting upon unilateralism, Krauthammer argues ends justifying means – that it is the road to multilateralism. In his view it is a question of leadership about who takes the first step or fires the first shot. Citing the example of the first Gulf War, he comments that, without the American initiative of declaring the war on Iraq and the intention to wage war independently if found short of partners, there would not have been such an impressive coalition. That is, altruistic unilateralism ultimately produces multilateralism. In his words,“no one seeks to be unilateral. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be held hostage to the will of others.”205

Here one finds a disturbing parallel between the views of Krauthammer and the late Ibn Saud, founding ruler of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud was fond of saying “the English are my friends; but I will walk with them only so far as my religion and honor will allow.”206 In Krauthammer’s lexicon multilateralism is fine as long as others toe the American line. In this context America should have the freedom to act upon its power and retain it, but he then casts doubt on this power. In his view power alone has its limitations. He condescendingly remarks that “for most Americans, will to power might be a correct description of the world – of what motivates other countries – but it cannot be a prescription for America…America cannot and will not live by realpolitik alone.”207 In his view conservative foreign policy must strive for something beyond power to outwit the liberal ideal of a domestic international community, otherwise it will lose the debate. From this perspective he outlines his own political theory, which he calls Democratic Realism.

Krauthammer defines democratic realism as an alternative to realism that considers America’s national interest as an expression of values rather than power. In expressing these values, it seeks to use its military supremacy to support US security interests and democracy simultaneously. Drawing upon “democratic globalism”, the foreign policy of neoconservatives that has dominated US foreign relations throughout this decade, Krauthammer espouses its values and spirit with little reservation. To him “the spread of

205 Krauthammer, Democratic Realism, p. 12. 206 C. C. Lewis, “Ibn Sa’ud and the Future of Arabia”, International Affairs, 1933, 12(4), pp. 518–534. 207 Krauthammer, Democratic Realism, p. 13.

74 liberal democracy and the success of liberty” are essential American values that neoconservatives must rally its people to support and pursue. It was to uphold these values that the US waged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. To him these steps are acceptable as long as they are targeted and focused.

Krauthammer views “democratic globalism” as utopian to a certain extent, but he vehemently opposes this being interpreted as Wilsonian. According to him, "democratic globalism” is very much embedded within realism’s central tenet concerning power. As a result, it challenges Wilsonian liberal internationalism. Seeking to challenge Wilsonian optimism, he mocks Wilson’s lofty vision:

Wilson envisioned the spread of democratic values through as-yet- to-be invented international institutions. He could be forgiven for that. In 1918, there was no way to know how utterly corrupt and useless those international institutions would turn out to be. Eight decades of bitter experience later – with Libya chairing the UN Commission on Human Rights – there is no way not to know.208

Krauthammer drives home this point to prove that international institutions are useless in a unipolar world. Accordingly, American foreign policy establishment should not seek multilateralism per se but should welcome it if it comes as a result of unilateral or pre- emptive action. Portraying the US as a benign super power he argues that it should have the freedom to act for the sake of freedom with or without the international community’s approval. Krauthammer’s view was reflected in President Bush’s announcement of a “forward strategy of freedom” in the Middle East. In a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy Bush commented:

The advancement of freedom is the calling of our time, it is the calling of our country…America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history…. Working for the spread of freedom can be hard. Yet, America has accomplished hard tasks before…. And as we meet the terror and violence of the world, we

208Ibid., p. 15.

75 can be certain the author of freedom is not indifferent to the fate of freedom.209

With this mutually complementary view Krauthammer and Bush both have an unshakable faith in America’s love for freedom and its power to pursue and extend it. In this context the spread of freedom becomes an American enterprise and responsibility. Here America becomes the distributor, arbitrator and retriever of freedom. The universal aspiration of freedom is condensed to an American aspiration because America knows what is best for the world and for itself. Anyone who challenges such a view is perceived as an apologist of anti-freedom. This commitment appears to be noble and clear as long as the critics remain silent. Cracks appear in such a claim the moment critics question America’s dubious alliances with Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. The US alliance with Saudi Arabia began in the 1930s, long before the Cold War, but after seventy years or so of alliance it is hard to find any trace of freedom or liberty in Saudi Arabia, or any effort to build institutions that would be accountable to such principles. The US–Pakistan alliance and Pakistan’s checquered political history suggest America’s love for democracy and liberty is not without exception. The Anglo-American establishment’s consistent support for Pakistan’s military rulers and dictators and the continuous cold reception of democratic India’s overtures for co-operation during the Cold War suggest American intransigence entrenched, as Aijaz Ahmad phrases it, "in the grip of McCarthyism and then generally of the Dulles–Nixon variety of the extreme Right” that forced India to seek co-operation elsewhere.210 This dichotomy between preaching and practice raised problems for Krauthammer’s theory. To overcome this dichotomy, he provides the following resolution:

Where to intervene? Where to bring democracy? Where to nation- build? I propose a single criterion: where it counts. Call it democratic realism. And this is its axiom: We will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity – meaning, places central to the

209George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. (Washington DC: United States Chamber of Commerce, 6 November 2003). 210Aijaz Ahmad,In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 302.However, since the 9/11 tragedy the conservative view of India is becoming more supportive as a hedge against China and in Pakistan.

76 larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom.211

In the current context he finds this threat emanates from Arab–Islamic radicalism. He blames this radicalism on the hopeless conditions the Arab–Islamic world is subject to: political oppression, uneven income distribution, absence of nation-building institutions, and as a result the absence of a meaningful civil society. In addition, many people in that part of the world blame America for their plight, which turns that frustration into virulent anti-Americanism. In Krauthammer’s view to contain and assuage such anger America needs to approach the problem with surgical precision instead of following the conventional path of co-operation, multilateral confidence building among the international community and diplomacy. Instead he proposes America should take territory and leave its mark. In his view America, with its overwhelming power and with “the eyes of every supplicant from East Timor to Afghanistan, from Iraq to Liberia” upon it, could and indeed did capture territory, as we have witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq. As for the enduring scars of such action, that is another story.

Krauthammer and Pipes’ particular way of reading of the world and the Arab world in particular can be traced back to the scholarly influence of Bernard Lewis, the foremost scholar among neoconservatives and the most influential postwar Orientalist. Lewis’s influence over the American Right is unquestionable. The extent of the influence of Lewis’s expertise over the American Right can be seen in Vice-President Cheney’s remarks when honouring Lewis at the World Affairs Council. Cheney commented “… in this new century, his wisdom is sought daily by policymakers, diplomats, fellow academics, and the news media.”212 Fellow neoconservative scholars look upon him as an intellectual elder statesman of the movement for inspiration and wisdom. According to Cooper, “he has walked in neoconservative circles for a number of years and has had access to senior policy-makers, including Scoop Jackson, and senior foreign policy advisers, including

211 Krauthammer, Democratic Realism, p. 16. 212 Remarks by Vice-President Cheney at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia luncheon honoring Bernard Lewis (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060501-3.html)

77 many of those who served in the Bush White House.”213 Addressed as the doyen and sage of , Lewis’s influence as a postwar historian of Islam and the Middle East grew and influenced policymakers and academics alike until Edward Said’s Orientalism appeared in 1978, challenging Lewis’s ideological enterprise. Said argued that “Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient.”214 Both Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke observe that “embedded in the concept of Orientalism are values and conclusions used to create negative stereotypes of Muslims as the norms of analytic discourse.”215 In this kind of analysis:

‘Arabs’ are presented in the imagery of static, almost ideal types, and neither as creatures with a potential in the process of being realized nor as those in the process of making history. Orientalism is thus an intellectual framework, a tool of knowledge about the Arab world that stems from the West’s discursive construction of reality. It is a concept that infuses the media and social exchange and that has slowly become a part of American popular culture.216

According to Halper and Clarke, “the successive, artfully titled books by Princeton professor emeritus, Bernard Lewis, who maintains close links with neo-conservative decision makers, fall into this category.”217 However, the intervention of Said’s Orientalism altered the study of the Arab and Islamic world beyond the scope of traditional Orientalists and established a new benchmark for discussion of the Middle East and Islam.

Said’s work challenged, dissected and exposed Orientalism and created anxiety among traditional Orientalists, enabling new possibilities for others; as a result it questioned, damaged, and diminished Lewis’s influence over Middle Eastern studies and Islam. After the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism, Lewis’s scholarly authority on Islam and the Middle East was diminished and viewed with far greater skepticism. His work was seen as camouflage for Zionist historiography rather than objective research of Islam and the

213 Cooper, op.cit., p. 123. 214 Edward Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 3. 215 Halper and Clarke, op.cit., p. 270 216 Ibid. 217Ibid.

78 Middle East. Nonetheless, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the first Gulf War a year later, and again in the wake of the 9/11 attack, interest in Lewis’s work became popular once again.

Contemporaneous with the first Gulf War, Lewis’s provocative 1990 essay “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified”, drew renewed and enthusiastic interest in his work.218 One of the primary reasons for this interest can be attributed to the perceived triumph of Western liberal bourgeois ideologies over forces of the Left, identified with the former Soviet Union as its vanguard, and Third Worldism as its ideological compatriot. As Ahmad in an entirely different context notes, the political balance within metropolitan countries had decisively moved further to the Right by the late 1970s. In his view the rise of Reaganism and Thatcherism and the defeat of social democracy in Western Europe and Scandinavia are a few of the salient features of that shift.219 As a result of that shift Ahmad argues that the adversarial critical space was taken over by cultural theory, particularly by its conservative segment, in the absence of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist critiques of the earlier tradition that was influenced by or descended from classical Marxism. The demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s further complemented the critical space dominated by the Right with rise of Reagan, Thatcher and Khomeini in the eighties. The resurgence in Lewis’s work needs to be viewed in this context.

In The Roots of Muslim Rage Lewis polemically articulates the tensions and conflicts of the1990s by attributing them to the shortcomings of Islamic civilisation. His basic premise is that the West – what used to be known as – is now at its final phase of centuries-old struggle for ideological superiority over Islamic civilisation, a term popularly attributed to the present Middle East. In his view, for the first thousand years since the advent of Islam in the 7th century Islam was on the rise and Christendom was in retreat but since the failure of second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has been in retreat for

218 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage” The Atlantic, 1990, 266(3) 219 Ahmad, op.cit., p.191.

79 the past three-hundred years. In the absence of a well-defined adversary after the Cold War, Lewis’s premise gained currency in an emerging “New World Order”. A potent enemy could be identified and its irrational rage could be traced back to its historical origin. It is a historical rage, a millennial rage and we the civilised world “should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival.”220 He elaborates this point with the following:

For a long time now there has been a rising tide of rebellion against this Western paramountcy, and a desire to reassert Muslim values and Muslim greatness. The Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers, and the enfranchisement of native non- Muslim elements. The third – the last straw – was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children. It was too much to endure, and the outbreak of rage against these alien, infidel, and incomprehensible forces that had subverted his dominance, disrupted his society, and finally violated the sanctuary of his home was inevitable. It was also natural that this rage should be directed primarily against the millennial enemy and should draw its strength from ancient beliefs and loyalties.221

Here Lewis type-casts Muslims as a single adult male who enjoyed his power, prestige and primeval bliss for centuries until it was challenged by forces outside his sphere of influence. Here the outside forces coalesced along with his immediate kith and kin to upstage him from enjoying his harmony with himself and others. As a result, his wounded pride took solace in his faith to regain his lost pride, prestige and position within his immediate world and in the larger world.

220 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic, 1990, 266(3), p. 60. 221 Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 49.

80 Lewis’s analysis informs us that for centuries there was no exchange of ideas between the Muslim world and the greater world, women had no social power222 and the Muslim world remained quintessentially a static, non-evolving and non-interacting male world enjoying its eternal bliss and peace. Anyone with any sense of history would find it hard to agree with this view. Muslim societies are rich, diverse and pluralistic like any other social groups. As members of many ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups they represent a diverse range of cultures and social practices. Even in Lewis’s region of interest – the Middle East – the diversity of its inhabitants is more prominent than its claimed collective singular image. For instance, what is common between an Egyptian, a Saudi and an Iranian? The Iranians who identify with their Persian heritage and Persian nationalism have nothing to do with a Saudi’s Wahhabi identity or for that matter with the Egyptian’s Arab identity. Similarly, there is nothing common between a Middle Eastern Muslim, an African Muslim, a Bangladeshi Muslim and an Indian Muslim other than being born to a common faith. In fact, a Bangladeshi proudly identifies with his or her Bengali identity, language and culture. Poet Rabindranath Tagore probably is the only literary figure who has the distinction of writing the national anthems of two nations: Bangladesh and India. RabindraSangeet is a popular form of musical culture is still practiced by a number of Bengalis regardless of

222 Lewis’s claim about inferior status of women in Muslim societies lacks historicity. According to M. Shahid Alam “in the early centuries of Islam, there were at least three groups – the Kharijis, the Qarmatians, and the Sufis – that did not accept the legal interpretations of the four traditional schools of Islamic law as sacrosanct. Instead, they looked for inspiration to the Qur’anic precepts on the moral and spiritual equality of men and women, claiming that the early applications of these precepts were time bound. The Kharijis and the Qarmatians rejected concubinage and child marriage, and the Qarmatians went further in rejecting polygamy and the veil. In a similar spirit, the Sufis welcomed women travellers on the spiritual path, permitting women ‘to give central place in their lives to their spiritual vocation.’” Similarly, “a comparative study of the property rights enjoyed by women in Europe and Islam, a reliable index of the social power of women both inside and outside the household, also indicates the relative advantage that Muslim women had compared to their European counterpart until quite recently. Unlike her European counterpart, a married Muslim woman could own property as well as the wages she earned. In Britain, the most advanced country in Europe, married women did not acquire the right to own property until 1882. The ownership of property gave Muslim women a measure of social power not available to women in Europe. A Muslim woman of independent means had a stronger hand in marriage: she could initiate a divorce or craft a marriage contract that prevented her husband taking another wife. Muslim women often engaged in trading activities, buying and selling property, lending money, or renting out stores. They created waqfs, charitable foundations financed by earnings from property, which they also administered. A small number of women distinguished themselves as scholars of the religious sciences. According to one report from the early nineteenth century, women attended al-Azhar, the leading university in the Islamic world. According to Alamon the basis of such evidence, it prompts Leila Ahmed to conclude, that Muslim “women were not, after all, the passive creatures, wholly without material resources or legal rights that the Western world once imagined them to be” (M. Shahid Alam, “Scholarship or Sophistry? A Review of Bernard Lewis’s What Went Wrong?” Studies in Contemporary Islam 4 (2002) 1, pp. 75–77 and Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) cited in Alam, 2002).

81 their national identities and diverse faith practices. In this context Lewis’s argument of Muslim as a collective single entity at best appears to be tenuous. This tension is reflected in the passage just discussed and throughout the essay. For example, if the Muslim society had continued to be such a static society blessed with eternal peace then how could the women become emancipated and the children rebellious? Lewis provides an answer a few passages later:

At first the Muslim response to Western civilization was one of admiration and emulations – an immense respect for the achievements of the West, and a desire to imitate and adopt them ... Muslim writers observed and described the wealth and power of the West, its science and technology, its manufactures, and its forms of government. For a time the secret of Western success was seen to lie in two achievements: economic advancement and especially industry; political institutions and especially freedom. Several generations of reformers and modernizers tried to adapt these and introduce them to their own countries, in the hope that they would thereby be able to achieve equality with the West….223

Lewis’s irrepressible tendency for saying entirely contrary things in the same essay, with the effect that each claim cancels out the other, is evident throughout this essay, as in his other work. The claim that Muslim response to Western civilisation was one of admiration, emulation and respect sits uneasily with the following passage:

The introduction of Western commercial, financial, and industrial methods did indeed bring great wealth, but it accrued to transplanted Westerners and members of Westernized minorities, and to only a few among the mainstream Muslim population…. For vast numbers of Middle Easterners, Western-style political institutions brought tyranny, even Western-style warfare brought defeat. It is hardly surprising that so many were willing to listen to voices telling them that the old Islamic ways were best and their only salvation was to throw aside the pagan innovations of the reformers and return to the True Path that God had prescribed for his people.224

223 Bernard Lewis, op. cit., pp. 57–58. 224Ibid., pp. 58–59.

82 Thus the claim that Arab society is open, progressive and adaptive is immediately countered with a declaration that it is a closed, static and non-adaptive society. An original claim is negated by a wild counterclaim. Such an irrational investigation of his subject matter creates the impression that he is equally transfixed by and frightened about his subject matter. His transfixion started when he lost himself in the immense Imperial Ottoman archives and it continued as he witnessed the transformation of Imperial Ottoman to modern Turkey under Kemal Ataturk. Immersed, soaked and ecstatic in the medieval texts as he was, Lewis began to interpret modern political developments in the Middle East through the Ottoman prism by establishing a pattern back to medieval and early Islamic history. Among postwar historians of the Middle East, it can be argued that this kind of analysis is Lewis’s originality.

In many of his works the interpretation of modern political developments through the prism of medieval texts was consistently maintained and advocated, ignoring recent developments that restructured and reshaped the modern Middle East since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and all other imperial powers of Europe. What he failed to realise and recognise was that Ottoman Turks were not Arabs and Arabs do not identify themselves as Turks. Arab identity has for a long time been maintained by upholding their exclusivity. According to Muralidharan, “the divisions are numerous – between the Bedouin of the Arabian Peninsula, the Palestinians, the Berbers of North Africa, the Kurds, and the Arabs of the fertile crescent from Syria to Iraq. Cutting across these, there are the divisions imposed by religious sect.”225

Many Middle Eastern rulers sustain their regimes on the basis of exploiting their exclusivity, and once nationalism reared its head in the 19th century such exclusivity became even more prominent.226 The Ottomans were challenged from within and finally the Ottoman Empire crashed in ruins following the First World War. The Turks went their

225Sukumar Muralidharan, “Saddam Hussein, Western Imperialism and Arab Identity”, Economic and Political Weekly, 1990, XXV(38), p. 2135. 226 The al-Sauds’ role in establishing the kingdom of Saudi Arab and the al-Sabahs’ role in establishing the Emirate of Kuwait are just few examples of Arab exclusivity that has for long shunned the larger cause of unity. Of course the role of the British foreign policy in the region to a large extent helped to maintain that exclusivity. Later on, the Cold War policies further helped to maintain those divisions.

83 own way to confront the new realities in a rapidly changing world, and the Arabs took a different path, with new allies and friends and their new-found wealth. The war booty was shared and protected on the basis of exclusivity rather than from any longing to retain a lost golden age or a lost empire. In this sharing, even religious icons and treasures did not escape the rules of hard bargaining. For instance, the custody of Mecca changed hands until it came under the control of obstreperous al-Sauds of the fanatical Wahhabi sect, a strategic move that the al-Sauds would use for their own ends. Lewis’s scholarly investigation somehow missed all of these upheavals and political changes.

It is easy to notice that the underlying theme in the three passages is identical: Islam has a genuine grievance against the West after its repeated defeats on all fronts over the last three hundred years. The manifestation of the present anger needs to be understood from a historical point of view, and not from its modern political upheavals. Lewis’s conclusion here is explicable in a general sense, but what is perplexing is to observe how the humiliation of the Muslim, characteristically a single entity in The Roots of Muslim Rage transforms into a collective humiliation of the Ottomans in Islam and the West and in What Went Wrong. The woes of the Muslim turn out to be the woes of the Ottomans and vice versa, – irrespective of the demise of the Ottomans, the Islamic world still carries their pain. The pain of the Ottomans interchangeably becomes the wrath of Muslim rage, and The Roots of Muslim Rage traces its source to the pain of the Ottomans. It is evident in many of Lewis’s works that much of the same material is used to underscore his basic premise, namely Muslim anger is a historical anger consequent on three-hundred years of atavistic memory inherent in Islamic culture– memory that continues to haunt the Muslim world, unable to escape its medieval past.

This is a very comforting way to analyse contemporary Middle East problems because it ignores or overlooks current issues – the endemic poverty, the massively corrupt political practices in the region, and occupation – which have rendered most of the region underdeveloped for much of the 20th century irrespective of its oil wealth and human potential. It is important to remember that to a large extent the colonial policies in the early part of the 20th century and the Cold War policies in the latter part shaped and contributed

84 to the current miseries in many Middle East/Muslim states, as in many post-colonial societies. Instead of addressing these modern issues, Lewis attributes the current plight of Arabs/Muslims to a millennial anger and historical blunders. He struggles to justify this view through medieval texts, especially through the Ottoman experience with the post- Ottoman legendary figure, Kemal Ataturk, who ironically was the chief architect of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and abolition of the Istanbul . Lewis’s analysis fails to register one important observation, namely that Ataturk’s “approach to modernity was deeply influenced by the fascism of the period (Mussolini was a still a much-admired model in the 1920s)”,227 and was not inspired by the glory of the Ottoman or medieval Islamic texts. Lewis fails to distinguish this and he “confusingly conflates old Ottoman with modern Arab history.”228 He also chooses to ignore the historical and political circumstances that stood in the way of this conflation – after the Ottoman Empire was dismantled “a link was severed with the rest of the Arab/Muslim world.”229 Turkey under Ataturk concentrated on rebuilding its Turkish nationalism by discarding many icons of Islamic culture, including purging the of its Arab vocabulary. Turkey took one direction while the Arabs, who were colonised, went in another. In other words, Istanbul and the Caliphate were irrelevant for Arabs, Turks and Muslims in general. In this context Lewis not only fails to acknowledge the Arab/Muslim world’s break with the past, but by treating culture as almost independent of the influence other social forces he also “totally ignores the impact of the British and French colonialists, and the repressive rule of many post-colonial leaders on them.”230

It is important to note that long before the Ottoman Empire collapsed its control over the Arab world was at best tenuous. Many of its feudal representatives already enjoyed a degree of autonomy and the presence of European powers in the region was becoming significant. The Ottoman Empire was becoming the stage from which the German challenge to British imperial hegemony was being mounted and which would lay the

227 Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis Revisited”, The Washington Monthly, 2004, 36(11), p. 18. 228Ibid., p. 15. 229Ibid., p. 15. 230Ibid., p. 15.

85 groundwork for the great imperial war of 1914–18 that would end ultimately with the Ottoman Empire in ruins. During the war years, British policy in the Middle East was dominated by efforts to undermine the Ottomans from within. British colonial policy of the time in many ways complemented the political opportunism of these rulers. Unperturbed by the surrounding upheavals the British Empire foisted treaty after treaty onto favourably disposed residual feudal chieftains of the crumbling Ottomans. Following the crash of the Ottomans an explosion of nationalism was gripping the whole Arab world. Witnessing all these exciting political developments, the British Empire joined with France both before and during World War I and jointly they decided to carve up the Middle East and retain it within their political orbit. The Sykes–Picot agreement in 1916 is one (in)famous example of that policy.231 Equally, the other important goal of this plan was to ease Anglo–French rivalry. Sykes anticipated an Arab uprising and emphasised the political necessity of this agreement, as reflected in his note: “it was [inescapable]…that an Arab rising was sooner or later to take place, and that the French and ourselves ought to be on better terms if the rising was not be a curse instead of a blessing.”232

Anglo–French hostility remained and the deal France made with Britain did not work out as envisioned following the Bolshevik revolution. Nationalism had already made inroads and the appeal of Marxism was gaining currency in varied ways. Echoing the spirit of the Zimmerwald conference, the Inter-Allied Labor conference in 1918 declared the “Right of each people to determine its own destiny.”233 Woodrow Wilson’s declaration to build a new world based on self-determination was an acceptance of that idea albeit safeguarding his own “realist” policy that would significantly influence American foreign policy successively.234 Wilson thwarting the Anglo–French partition plans declared that “all well-

231 Many Islamists from Bin Laden to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/Syria) do not recognise legitimacy of these sovereign borders. 232 Jukka Nevakivi, cited in Edward Said, Orientalism. (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 221. 233 Gilbert Murray, “Self-Determination of Nationalities”, Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, 1922, 1(1), p. 6. 234 Henry Kissinger observes the successive domination of Wilsonianism on American foreign policy. According to him “Though Wilson could not convince his own country of its merit, the idea lived on. It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency and continues to march to this day that also reflects the inherent tension between

86 defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism”.235 but these “new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism” were exploited by the rival fiefdoms with the complicity of Western powers. As a result, the whole Arabian Peninsula was transformed, resulting in a number of kingdoms, emirates and sultanates. On the other hand, Arab nationalists made inroads on the eastern Mediterranean seaboard and claimed sovereignty comprising Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine together with its capital at Damascus. This aspiration did not work out either, because they became distracted by and entangled with the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. By 1939 British power in the Middle East was under siege: “The Palestinian intifada against Jewish colonisation had compelled a retreat from the Balfour declaration, in turn spurring a wave of reprisal attacks from Jewish terrorists.”236 In addition, American involvement in the Middle East and in World War II was strengthening and expanding. By the end of World War II the whole political map of the Middle East had changed, Europe was divided into two ideological political camps and America’s political hegemony was well established in the world political order, marginalising the old powers of Europe to peripheries.

The tumultuous political reshaping of the world in the 20th century exacted a great human price. Millions of lives were lost, calling into question the so-called civilising mission of the Western world, derived from Enlightenment rationalism. None of these developments or their impacts on the lives of the people in the so-called non-Western world drew attention in Lewis’s analysis and political consciousness. Either he was oblivious to such upheavals and political developments or he did not consider them important enough for objective scrutiny. These rapid political developments demand a sense of political responsibility that is ethically viable, as can be found in the existence and influence of such forces in all emancipatory projects for human liberation, that seriously take, often complex

American liberal ideas with the harsh realities of the wider world”, (Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 30, emphasis added). 235Ibid, p. 6. 236Muralidharan, op. cit., p. 2134.

87 and diverse experiences of Muslim societies into account, “over their putative mass-based unity and anti-Westernism.”237

Irrespective of his representation of Islam, Lewis’s culturalist approach still draws serious attention from decision makers and policymakers. However, this kind of culturalist approach fails to explain the modern problems (such as poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, etc.) that many Muslim societies are facing, irrespective of its erudition and insights. Such an approach is equally incapable of reducing the tension concerning the debates on terrorism, violence and associated anxieties that often blame Islam and its people without veracity. Instead the debate is locked within this kind of conservative culturalist paradigm ignoring what is happening on Arab/Karachi/Kabul streets or outside of this self-defeating paradigm.

It is self-defeating because it fails to address, or rather it is incapable of addressing, the complex issues of class, race, colonialism, occupation, sanction, domination and exploitation; the issues that need to be addressed in any human emancipation project. In their analysis, Lewis, Krauthammer and Pipes unwittingly missed to address these complex issues that have a deterministic effect on the current turmoil concerning this debate,238 by primarily treating culture as an impeding rather than integrating force. As a consequence, although their analyses stirred enough controversies and reaffirmed conventional prejudices against Islam and Muslims, such research could hardly provide any new insight to explain or address the contemporary anxieties and conflicts in post-Cold War global politics.

237 Said, Orientalism, op.cit., p. xxvii. 238 Many scholars including Edward Said attribute Lewis’s style of analysis of Islam and Muslim societies as a camouflage for Zionist allegiance. In M. Shahid Alam’s view, once the Zionist project gathered momentum Lewis repositioned himself to “Orientalism’s original mission of subordinating knowledge to Western power, now filtered through the prism of Zionist interest. “This Zionist Orientalism has assiduously sought to paint Islam and Islamic societies as innately hostile to the West, modernism, democracy, tolerance, scientific advance, and women’s rights”. Furthermore, according to him this “Zionist camp has been led for more than fifty years by Lewis and has been strongly supported by a contingent of able lieutenants, whose ranks have included the likes of Elie Kedourie, David Pryce-Jones, Raphael Patai, Daniel Pipes, and . There are many foot soldiers, too, who have provided distinguished service to this new Orientalism. No rooster of these foot soldiers would be complete without the names of Thomas Friedman, Martin Peretz, Norman Podhoretz, Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol, and Judith Miller” (M. Shahid Alam, op. cit., pp. 78-80).

88 The need for an original theory to explain the anxieties of post-Cold War world was responded by two fellow neoconservatives. Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama each responded that they had something original to offer to assist understanding of the conflicts and politics of the post-Cold War world, which many scholars were struggling to fathom or could manage to grasp only some aspects of it. To end this policy impasse Huntington and Fukuyama announced two apparently original and competing theories, The End of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order and The End of History and the Last Man respectively. In analysing the merits of their claims in the following Chapter this study will examine the validity of their claims. In so doing in Chapter Four this study will see whether Huntington and Fukuyama provided some radically new ideas or their theories are a continuum of the core neoconservative principles.

89

CHAPTER FOUR

In Search of an Original Theory: Huntington and Fukuyama Revisited

One realises that overemphasis of the role of Islam as the source of the current conflicts and woes in Muslim societies does not help in understanding or addressing the underlying issues causing these conflicts. The quest for an original theory concerning this debate was further enlivened with the appearance of two famous books.239 Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man and Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World raised surprising amounts of excitement in some quarters and disbelief in others as they each promised to offer an original theory to explain contemporary world politics – and associated anxieties – after the end of the Cold War. Widely believed to be two competing views of the future state of international politics, each claimed to offer a comprehensive theory to enable understanding of what was likely to determine the direction of global politics in the future.

Huntington put forward an ambitious hypothesis in an essay “The Clash of Civilizations?” in the summer issue of Foreign Affairs in 1993 which was later expanded to a full length book published in 1996. Huntington observes and suggests that the future of world politics will be based on cultural competition rather than on power and ideology as witnessed during the Cold War. Huntington’s central thesis is straightforward and seemingly new. According to this thesis, “in the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural.”240 Consequently the future world will operate on the basis of cultural differences and affinities rather than on national identities and state loyalties. Huntington maintains that:

239See, Fukuyama (1992) and Huntington (1996) op.cit. 240 Huntington (1996), op. cit., p. 21.

90 State borders, in short, have become increasingly permeable. All these developments have led many to see the gradual end of the hard, ‘billiard ball’ state, which purportedly has been the norm since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and the emergence of a varied, complex, multilayered international order more closely resembling that of medieval times.241

In his view the emergence of this new international order has dramatically altered world politics. “For the first time in history” he writes, “global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational”.242 In his view “in this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.”243 With this new scenario the future of global politics will be dominated and determined by seven to eight major civilisations of the world, of which the conflict between Islam and the West gets the major share of his concern with numerous graphs, tables and eclectic arguments. The book aspired to provide Americans with an original thesis as a reliable guide to the emerging world order and a potential blueprint for policy makers to face the emerging unstable phase of world politics.244

Huntington reconceptualises the post-Cold War world through the prism of civilisation. He divides the world into seven or eight civilisational groups of which five civilisations have core states while the remainder do not. He argues that the future of world politics will be determined along these civilisational lines. He maintains that to understand conflicts in our time and in the future, cultural differences must be understood and instead of the state, culture and ethnicity must be accepted as the flashpoints of conflict or war. In this context he warns that Western civilisation will lose its preeminence in world affairs unless it recognises these developments. However, he argues that to retain its position the West and in particular the United States must strengthen itself internally and must abandon the

241Ibid., p. 35. 242Ibid., p. 21. 243Ibid., p. 28. 244 This observation is based on the excellent comments of Edward Said (“The Clash of Ignorance”, The Nation, October 22, 2001); Seizaburo Sato (“The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan”, Asia Pacific Review, 1997, 4[2]); Stephen M. Walt (“Building Up New Bogeymen”, Foreign Policy, No 106, Spring 1997) and David Skidmore (“Huntington’s Clash Revisited”, Journal of World Systems Research, 1998, 4[2]) on their critique of Huntington’s thesis.

91 civilising mission of spreading liberal democracy and intervening in others’ affairs except where they pose a direct threat to its own interest. In this context he regards the Chinese and Islamic civilisations as presenting the greatest threats to Western civilisation.

Huntington argues the Chinese threat comes from its ordered society and he attributes the Chinese economic success to that order and discipline. In his view the community overrides individual interest in China, which rejects the individualistic culture of the West. Economic success reinforces the primacy of the community over the individual and in turn encourages them to strive for greater global influence that will inevitably end in a clash of interests that may lead to a clash of civilisations.

The strengths that Huntington finds in Chinese society are absent, in his view, in the Islamic world. If the Chinese challenge comes from its well-ordered and disciplined society, the Islamic threat comes from the lack of this. In his view the Islamic threat comes from the lack of a well-ordered and cohesive society. The demographic explosion, along with millions of unruly, unruled, and badly ruled Muslims with a strong resurgence of political Islam poses that threat. At the same time he finds deep divisions within the Islamic civilisation and recognises its marginal economic position compared with the West. Irrespective of this inequality and its lack of unity, Huntington perceives Islam as the primary threat to the West. He finds Islam and the West are already at war and observes:

If the Muslims allege that the West wars on Islam and if the Westerners allege that Islamic groups war on the West, it seems reasonable to conclude that something very much like a war is underway. In this quasi war, each side has capitalized on its own strengths and the other side’s weakness…. Dedicated Islamic militants exploit the open societies of the West and plant car bombs at selected targets. Western military professionals exploit the open skies of Islam and drop smart bombs on selected targets.245

In his view “the Islamic Resurgence has given Muslims renewed confidence in the distinctive character and worth of their civilization and values compared to those of the

245 Huntington, op. cit., p. 217.

92 West.”246 He further reiterates that any attempt by the West to spread its values and institutions and intervene in the conflicts in the Muslim world would further escalate resentment among the Muslims. In his view

[S]o long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries.247

To avoid these bleak scenarios Huntington argues for greater economic, military and political cooperation among Western nations. In his view,

if North America and Europe renew their moral life, build on their cultural community, and develop close forms of economic and political integration to supplement their security collaboration in NATO, they could generate a third Euroamerican phase of Western economic affluence and political influence.248

In this respect he advocates bringing Latin America (which according to him does not have a core state) into the Western fold while preventing Japan from coming under the Chinese sphere of influence. It is interesting to note that a few years earlier Huntington warned about Japan’s economic rise and saw Japan’s economic power as the worst threat to the American interest in post-Cold War era. In his essay “The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan”,249Seizaburo Sato illuminates this shift in Huntington’s theory and warns about its pitfalls. Commenting upon Huntington’s suggestion for strong ties between the West and Japan irrespective of their civilisational differences, Sato reminds us “such a willful shift in the designation of principal enemies within such a short time span is concrete evidence of the extent of Huntington’s confusion in defining what he means by ‘the clash of civilizations’.”250 Sato maintains “by regarding institutional differences as the cause of

246Ibid., p. 211. 247Ibid., p. 212. 248Ibid, p. 308. 249 Seizaburo Sato “The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan”, Asia Pacific Review, 1997, 4[2], pp.7- 23. 250Sato, op. cit., p.17.

93 unavoidable conflict, Huntington’s theory, if taken as guide to policy-making, has the potential to become dangerously self-fulfilling.”251 In Sato’s view Huntington misreads the institutional differences and the degree of difference in industrialisation between the West and non-Western countries as the clash of civilisations.

On close examination Huntington’s theory contradicts the evidence he provides to support his claim. His claim that other civilisations outside the Western and Sinic civilisations seem to be less conducive to modernisation and industrialisation does not hold true when one looks at the modernisation of many non-Western and non-Sinic civilisations. Commenting upon the modernisation of predominantly Muslim Indonesia and Malaysia Sato argues that it is hard to believe that these successes rely solely on the small proportion of resident Chinese in the population, as Huntington claims. Similarly India’s industrialisation (with the second largest Muslim population in the world) further proves neither Islam nor Hindu civilisationsas such stand in the way of industrialisation. Sato argues that “the leaders of China, Malaysia, and Singapore have been emphasizing ‘Asian values’ and ‘Asia’s own way of modernization’, partly in protest against the West’s criticism of these countries’ human rights practices and Western demands for increased market access.”252He continues, "in doing so, they are not expressing a position against modernization per se, nor are they confidently exalting the superiority of their ‘Asian values’ or ‘Asia’s own way of modernization’.”253 Sato suggests “rather, their real motives lie in these leaders’ awareness of the weakness of their own countries’ competitive position vis-à-vis the developed countries and of the need to provide protection for their home industries, and their fear that chaos may ensue if the traditional social order is swept away by the tide of modernization.”254

The tide of modernisation often conceals the ground realities many non-modern or less- modern societies face. For example, commenting on the popularity of the Islamic madāris (madrasa) schools in Pakistan and elsewhere, Tarak Barkawi remarks that such recognition

251 Ibid. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid.

94 “stems in part from IMF structural adjustment programs that forced retrenchments in public education.”255 Here one observes that the institutional difference are not of one’s own choice but as a result of conditions imposed by global financial regimes who conform to the norms of Western rhetoric on “good governance”. Huntington’s investigation attributes very little weight to these facts, or – more frequently – omits to consider them at all.

Similarly, Huntington’s concerns about the growth of Muslim immigration to Europe are based on fear rather than fact. He notes in 1990 Turkish foreign residents in Germany numbered over one and half a million but he fails to mention that Turkish immigration to Germany began as part of the Marshall plan. It was mostly who ventured to clean up the rubble of Dresden, Hamburg and other parts of war ravaged Germany in order to rebuild the country from the ashes during the severe labour shortages of the post-war period. Migrants were considered an asset for as long as the economy was booming but with the collapse of the Berlin wall and subsequent fiscal adjustment migrants were seen first as economic liabilities and then as social liabilities.256Given the institutional differences derived from the structural adjustment of the global economy it was easy to imagine the emerging social discord as clash of civilisations.

255Barkawi, op. cit., p. 26. 256 For details see, Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt and Daniel Steinvorth, “Turkish Immigration to Germany:A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities,”Spiegel Online, 7 September, 2010.http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/turkish-immigration-to-germany-a-sorry-history-of-self- deception-and-wasted-opportunities-a-716067.html; The authors explain how Turkish migration program started as a labour recruitment agreement between then West Germany and Turkey to fulfil the labour shortage affecting German industries. They note, “The government and the economy were ecstatic over the Turkish guest workers, who were “between 18 and 45, at the prime of their labor capacity,” boosted tax revenues and social security contributions and made a “substantial contribution to increasing production levels”. German companies were mainly interested in semi-skilled or unskilled labourers for poorly paid, unpopular jobs on assembly lines and in shift work. Poor, remote regions of Turkey were the preferred recruitment areas. At the time, no one in Germany cared much that many of the new arrivals could hardly read or write, making it difficult for them to participate in German society.The guest workers were expected to live together in newly built dormitories near the factories where they worked, and return to their native countries after working for a few years...Besides, the Turkish immigrants had proven to be reliable workers who made fewer demands than their German counterparts but were no less productive, according to a 1966 report by the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA)... On the contrary, when the oil crisis threatened to stall the economy in 1973, the guest workers were suddenly seen as an economic burden, “and whenever an economic crisis arises migrants are seen as burdens. Also see, Yaşar Aydın,The Germany- Turkey Migration Corridor: Refitting Policies for a Transnational Age, (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016).

95 “The global divide as represented by Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and others suggests, "in Pieterse’s view, “that the new threats are a matter of failed modernity or resistance to modernity.”257 In Pieterse’s formulation modernity need not to be perceived as the final point in “the old panorama of evolutionism, progress, developmentalism, modernization, Westernization.”258He argues that instead of regarding the notion of modernity as representing a singular entity, it should rather be termed “modernities” and, similarly, one should acknowledge existence of different types of capitalism rather than capitalism, different types of industrialisation rather than industrialisation.259 It is difficult to imagine how the reality of the “idea of different modernities” eluded Huntington’s analysis, given that he was “once the great teller of stories about the necessities of modernizing the state”260for the very reason of closing that gap among different modernities – if necessary by external intervention or by a bit of push from above.261

In the early part of his book he remarks that “the West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas and values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.”262 It is a pity that Huntington did not further explore this profound observation and investigated his observations along that line. But as Seizaburo Sato observed, although some Asian countries have acquired a degree of confidence based on their achievements, “at the same time they are especially sensitive to Western demands on human rights issues and economic liberalization because their memories of living under the colonial rule are still fresh.”263 As an atavistic memory it recurs again and again and stirs up many unpleasant memories. The conflicts in Algeria, Afghanistan and the open wound in Palestine are just some of the salient features of the legacy that the non-Western world can rarely escape or forget. The ongoing strife and suffering in Iraq and the

257Pieterse, op.cit., p. 116. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid. 260 R. B. J. walker, op.cit., p. 79. 261 For details see Vijay Prashad. The Darker Nation. (New York: The New Press, 2007), pp. 140–146. 262 Huntington, op. cit., p. 51. 263 Sato, op. cit., p. 18.

96 neighboring areas only heightens and painfully recalls that memory. As mentioned earlier, this sort of observation and accompanying tension occur throughout Huntington’s thesis.

There are a number of instances where his hypothesis is countered by his own claims. For example, his hypothesis that conflict between civilisations will be more frequent and intense than conflict within them is countered by his claim that conflict within civilisations are roughly fifty percent more frequent than conflict between them. To prove this point he claims that “the conflicts within Islam also are more numerous than those in any other civilization, including tribal conflict in Africa.”264 He provides two tables on current ethno- political conflicts in order to prove the inherently conflicting nature of contemporary Islam. In an equally provocative remark he notes “Islam’s borders are bloody, and so are its innards.”265 These observations and the statistics he provides directly counter his own hypothesis. If it is accepted that civilisational differences are the prime cause of conflict, then it is a glaring omission that they do not feature in Huntington’s calculations, which demonstrate a substantially different outcome. Stephen Walt points out this inconsistency:

there are roughly twenty ‘Western’ states with which the United States could find itself at odds, but there are more than 175 non- Western states that the United States could quarrel with as well. Even if conflict occurred on a purely random basis, we would expect more clashes to be between groups from different ‘civilizations.’266

Walt continues: “This gap should be even more pronounced if ‘civilizational’ differences are a powerful cause of conflict, as Huntington posits, but the evidence he presents shows that exactly the opposite is occurring.”267The evidence further reiterates Huntington’s scholarly confusion and emphasises that in a world of nation states “civilizational” affinities play second fiddle to national interest. The post-Cold War conflicts are no exception to that rule. Huntington’s penchant to claim one thing and provide evidence entirely counter to that claim has the effect that each claim is canceled out by a counterclaim is evident throughout the book.

264 Huntington, op. cit., p. 257. 265Ibid., p. 258. 266 Stephen M. Walt, “Building Up New Bogeymen”, Foreign Policy, (No 106, Spring 1997) p.186. 267 Ibid.

97

Irrespective of its simplistic treatment of culture and Islam, Huntington’s thesis has been championed by conservative politicians and Muslim fundamentalists alike. Emphasis on civilisational difference continues to function as an ideological precept for Islamists in defending their cause and values, just as it has been adopted by conservative politicians in the West to defend their interests and their way of life, and to seek to legitimate Middle Eastern wars. With the almost complete absence of any progressive forces or civil society, many Muslim-majority countries acknowledge the power of Islam, however retrograde it may be, as a point of commonality for their aspirations – as applicable to liberation from the fetters of local despotism as it is to freedom from global authoritarianism. On the other hand, in the absence of any designated ideological enemies, conservative politicians and academics have found it convenient to rally against Islam in defense of the West and its values. Huntington’s concerns converge on this point – that of defending Western interests above all other concerns. As Walt notes:

Huntington has always been a staunch defender of Western civilization in general and the United States in particular, and he is clearly worried that the hedonistic, individualistic culture of the West is no longer up to the challenges it faces. By portraying the contemporary world as one of relentless cultural competition, therefore, he may be trying to provide us with the bogeyman we need to keep our own house in order.268

As has been observed, Huntington’s culturalist approach has been enthusiastically endorsed by “Muslim fundamentalists themselves, who also try to explain every conflict in terms of Crusade versus jihad.”269Bin Laden’s oft-repeated declaration that Islam and its civilisation is different from the West and its values found strong currency in Huntington’s theory. The military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are portrayed by the Islamists as a war against Islam and promoted as a war on terror by the conservatives. United States officials regularly complement the Islamist view, associating Islam with terror, and resistance against local despotism as a global security issue. Vice-President Cheney remarked:

268 Walt, op. cit., p. 189. 269 Roy, op.cit., p. 72.

98

The terrorist waging war against this country does not fight according to the rules of warfare, or international law, or moral standards, or basic humanity. And we have to be clear-eyed about the character and objective of these adversaries. They have a strategic goal to recreate the old seventh-century Caliphate – an empire stretching from Europe through the Middle East, all the way around to Southeast Asia.270

In a fitting remark a few months earlier President Bush echoed similar concerns to Cheney’s. Speaking at the same venue, Bush declared

The terrorists have stated their objectives. They intend to build a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing all current and former Muslim lands stretching from Europe to North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.271

Both Cheney and Bush urged the American public to support a global campaign against the Islamists and their apparent intention to build an Islamic empire, calling upon the rest of the world to follow suit. A global war between Western and Islamic nations is precisely what Al-Qaeda and the Islamists seek to achieve. By exploiting America’s fear for its security, Islamists and their sympathisers aspire to make their own vision of Islamic civilisation a reality. In this effort a theory such as Huntington’s helps to portray that vision as achievable, rather than as concomitant with Islamists aspirations. “The clash of civilizations” Jan Nederveen Pieterse notes, “was originally a funding proposal that Samuel Huntington wrote as director of the Center of Strategic Studies at Harvard University.”272 Ironically, “it turned out to perfectly serve the purpose of a new postwar enemy doctrine.”273:

It echoes the American sense of geographical and historical distance from other continents. In other cultures that have been intimately

270 Dick Cheney, Remarks by the Vice-President to the Heritage Foundation. 24 January 2008, p. 2 (http://www.pr-inside.com/print401743.htm) 271 George W. Bush, President Bush’s Remarks on the Global War on Terror. November 1, 2007, 1 (http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bush110107.cfm?renderforprint=1) 272 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization or Empire, op.cit., p.118. 273 Ibid.

99 interacting cross-culturally for ages, the exaggerated perceptions of difference with other cultures to the point of a worldwide clash of civilizations, are often viewed as a bizarre premise. This contributed to the rapid dissolution of worldwide solidarity with America in the wake of 9/11.274

As Walt observes, the more we believe in it, the more self-fulfilling it may prove, with disastrous consequences. I may add to his observation that many among us are already pushed into the conflict zone through no fault of their own. After more than a decade of military campaigning in Iraq, after the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians and with thousands of Iraqi and American soldiers dead and wounded, the US administration (in particular the Bush Presidency) regardless of its often repeated denials that the war is not a clash between civilisations has uncannily vindicated Huntington’s theory and the Islamists’ logic. However wrong their logic may be, it is hard to deny that the US provided both a moral justification and a real space to the Islamists to justify their equally violent reaction. Drawing on Huntington’s civilisational theory the Islamists reach an inescapable conclusion, “it is war that makes and remakes civilization,”275 not the other way around. Half a century ago the Futurist poet Marinetti in his manifesto on the Ethiopian colonial war declared:

For twenty-seven years we Futurists have rebelled against the branding of war as anti-aesthetic….Accordingly we state: … War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the ceasefire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning villages, and many others.276

The flowery sounding carpet bombing, daisy cutters and other fire power that the Bush– Cheney administration unleashed in Iraq for a better Iraq reminds us of the kind of beauty Marinetti advocated and saw in war. But many Iraqis who endure the day to day life in Iraq

274Ibid., pp. 118–119. 275This observation is based on TarakBarkawi’s observation. Barkawi, op. cit., p. 25. 276 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, in Hannah Arendt (ed.), Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn. (Glasgow: Collins, 1973), pp. 241–242.

100 would certainly like to live a life devoid of that beauty and sense of aesthetics. Instead of “exploring the open skies of Islam to drop smart bombs on selected targets” Western leaders and policy makers should explore “the myriad currents and counter currents that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for that history not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of exchange, cross fertilization and sharing.”277 In this context, Huntington’s theory does not facilitate much in acknowledging and exploring those forces that animate, enrich and empower the shared human history, of sufferings and of joys and the common challenges humanity faces.

Huntington’s reconceptualisation of the post-Cold War world and his understanding of Western civilisation stands in stark contrast with another bold theory of the time, “the end of history” thesis by Francis Fukuyama. It has been rightfully observed by many that Huntington’s bold vision happened to be a policy response to his rivals in the policy making ranks, notably Fukuyama. The negative prediction that Huntington made about the future of the international community was in direct contrast to Fukuyama’s optimistic prediction of a figurative end of history.

Fukuyama put forward an ambitious theory in an article “The End of History?” in the summer issue of The National Interest. The essay attracted heated commentary across the world, with some endorsing his view enthusiastically and others receiving it with disbelief and contempt. The book The End of History and the Last Man appeared in 1992. According to his theory history has a finite purpose which is the realisation of “human freedom”. He argues that such a freedom can be achieved by adopting liberal democracy and the free market economy as an unrivaled political framework. Citing the 1989 uprisings against the Communist dictators in Eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union he argues that the triumph of liberal democracy and free market economy over their ideological competitors (fascism, hereditary monarchy and communism) justify “the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government.”278 Ironically this was a time when history was unfolding in an unprecedented way everywhere and

277 Said, op.cit., “The Clash of Ignorance”, p. 2. 278 Fukuyama (1992), op.cit., p. xi.

101 events were rapidly disseminated by satellite television and video clips in a way that could be compared with what the Gutenberg revolution did for the religious upheavals of 16th century Europe. In great upheavals conventional wisdom warns not to reach any conclusion in analysis or the forecasting of future events on the basis of such upheavals, but Fukuyama was bold enough to pass judgment on such events and even used them to predict the future course of history.

Commenting upon the upheavals of 1989 in Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama argued that liberal democracy and free market economy have vindicated their primacy over their ideological competitors and “liberal democracy as a system of government has emerged as the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and ‘as such constituted ‘the end of history.’”279 In the same paragraph he further declares “the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on.”

The idea that history was suddenly brought to an end along with humankind’s ideological evolution with the emergence of liberal democracy as a system of government rang alarm bells. Skeptics who were happy that democracy was in no further danger from its rivals did not believe this happened because history had suddenly stopped making any sense. In fact, it was a time when major historic events were happening and in historic proportion. Many world shaking events occurred, and occurred very rapidly, between the time Fukuyama’s article appeared in 1989 and its book version in 1992. The Tiananmen Square massacre, the first Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union are just some of the salient events during that period. These events were happening particularly quickly and on such an unprecedented scale that many scholars, including historians, found it hard to categorise or understand these events. While many found it was too soon to characterise these events and had their doubts about them, Fukuyama did not suffer from such intellectual doubts.

In his declaration Fukuyama raises a number of issues and treats them in a compelling manner. He tries to connect and make sense of such issues with two major themes. First, history has a finite process, preceded and followed by a condition which is not strictly part

279Ibid, p. xi.

102 of history at all. Second, history has a purpose which is the “realization of human freedom”. Observing the events of 1989 and 1990 Fukuyama reached the conclusion that the time had come for the finite process of history. The only historical task left for humanity is to realise human freedom. He suggested that freedom could be achieved by promoting liberal democracy and free market economy. In accomplishing the purpose of history, American help could be counted upon if necessary. As the richest democracy and the sole superpower on the planet, America’s benign interest in the world affairs should neither be doubted nor questioned. Thus he maintains

While this book is informed by recent world events, its subject returns to a very old question: Whether, at the end of the twentieth century, it makes sense for us once again to speak of a coherent and directional History of mankind that will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy? The answer … is yes.280

He provides two separate reasons for his answer. One is economics and the other is the struggle for recognition. The liberal principles of economics together with science encourage us to mature in order to be competitive with the rest of the world and bring material prosperity, but according to Fukuyama this is not enough. In his eyes authoritarian political states from Meiji Japan and Bismarckian Germany to present day Singapore and Thailand can achieve this aim and in many instances can achieve far greater economic prosperity than democratic states but they do not necessarily deliver democracy. In his view “while modern natural science guides us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy, it does not necessarily deliver to the Promised Land itself.”281 One needs more than the liberal economic policies to achieve the Promised Land. To do so, Fukuyama asks us to go back to Hegel’s non materialist account of history, based on the “struggle for recognition”.

To dispel negative response from his critics Fukuyama pointed out that in proclaiming “the end of history” he in no way meant the end of political and social unrest, or the daily occurrence of great and grave events. Instead he was referring to “History: that is, history

280Ibid, pp. xii–xiii. 281Ibid, p. xv.

103 understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times.”282 He made the distinction between history with a small “h” (occurrences of daily events), and History with a capital “H” (the meaning of these events “understood as a single evolutionary process”). He assigns the events of the first half of the 20th century to “history” with a small “h” while the second half of 20th century belongs to Historical experience that unfolds the direction of History as envisaged by Hegel, the original author of “the end of history” and Fukuyama’s main inspiration. It is an evolutionary process that demands freedom’s self-articulation which can only be experienced in an organised political society. Outside of organised political society human beings cannot take an interest in freedom, and therefore cannot experience a really historical existence. In this context once History has started only certain people and nations are lucky enough to experience and contribute to it while others remain outside it. Hegel found Europe in the realm of Historical experience whereas History was just beginning for Asia and he declared Africa to be “unhistorical.”283 The collective experiences of self- expression of people in Asia and Africa were not counted as History; they were merely events. As a result, they had no role in the advancement of freedom. Accordingly, once History had started, only a selected few could experience and contribute to it. By the same token, when it becomes an imperative need for others to experience and contribute to History, they need solicited or unsolicited assistance from those who were already in History and making History. Like many of his fellow neoconservatives Fukuyama envisages the US in that historical role.

In this context the “war on terror”, the military campaign in Afghanistan and the Iraq War justify the Historical role of the US, however flawed it may be. As freedom is intrinsically linked with History’s purpose in the Hegelian system, it becomes imperative for those who are part of History in that system to play their part to realise history’s purpose. Since the Hegelian system was put forward two hundred years ago, many fundamental changes have taken place in human affairs. One of the significant changes is that the Historical role Hegel envisaged for Europe has been taken over by the US. Since the Second World War

282Ibid., p. xii. 283 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Prometheus Books, 1990), pp. 91-99, 104, 443.

104 America has replaced Europe in the Historical role of articulating and advancing History’s self-realisation, that is, the realisation of human freedom.

Imbued with History’s historical role to advance its purpose, half a century ago America embarked upon a Historical journey to bring freedom to the “semi-historical” or “ahistorical” places and the hallmarks of this journey were witnessed in Hiroshima, Vietnam, Chile and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Freedom, backed by an American policy of unhindered freedom, leaves all the hallmarks of a Mephistophelian theatre during that freedom journey. Freedom at any price happened to be the central motif in American foreign policy establishment. Events that drew their inspiration from that motif included the dedication of the space shuttle Colombia to the Afghani jihadis by President Reagan in the 1980s, through to the efforts for rapid implementation of democracy in Iraq in 2003. As a mirror image this motif reverberates throughout the American establishment. However chilling it may sound, it is certainly not a coincidence that much of the intellectual justification that influences Bush Administration’s policy (of regime change, massive increase in military spending and the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) happened to be sourced from, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a broad front organisations of leading neoconservative scholars and former policymakers,284 who wanted the United States to seize the potential of the “unipolar moment” following the collapse of the Soviet Union for the US to develop a “Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity” that “is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure (its) security and (its) greatness in the next. The Project’s 1997 Statement of Principles set out four demands which were seen crucial to its success for the New American Century. These four critical goals were “to increase defense spending and modernize the US armed forces in order to carry out its global responsibilities”; to “strengthen ties to democratic allies” and to “challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values”; to “promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad”; and to “accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our

284 Tom Barry and Jim Lobe, “The men who stole the show”, Special Report No 18 (Albuquerque: Foreign Policy in Focus, 2002)

105 principles.”285 This vision statement was signed by individuals from a wide range of American society, including former Reagan administration figures Dan Quayle, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz (all of whom except Quayle subsequently took important positions in the Bush administration), Jeb Bush (George W. Bush’s brother and former Florida Governor), Religious Right leader Gary Bauer,I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby (a longtime associate of Wolfowitz and Cheney who also served as the Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney), (a longtime associate of key hardliners and neoconservatives within the Republican Party who worked closely with key figures during George H.W. Bush and George Bush’s Presidencies including serving as ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, and also closely worked with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the architect of the policy supporting the mujahideen resistance to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan during the Carter administration)286 and Francis Fukuyama.

One of the core demands of these signatories was to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad that Fukuyama so passionately advocates. Here “freedom is something America brings to the world, for itself and from within itself. It is not a space in the world to which it submits, which binds it or presents any limits, moral, political or ethical.”287 Here freedom no longer belongs to the affairs of collective human aspiration, but to the direction of history that can be realised through the enactment of American force. In this frame, American power would not hesitate to bomb, beat, wound and subjugate

285 Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles, 3 June 1997 . 286 It should also be noted during George H.W. Bush’s administration the then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney assigned Wolfowitz with producing a military strategy for the post-Cold War world. The subsequent 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) articulated for the first time a proposed strategy of US global supremacy based on overwhelming US military power. Khailzad was given the job of doing the actual drafting of the DPG, working in tandem with Wolfowitz and Libby. The draft guidance outlined a national security strategy that, in hindsight, seems to have served as blueprint for neoconservative efforts during the 1990s to craft a new rationale for US military activity throughout the globe. According to James Mann, the author of The Rise of the Vulcans: the history of Bush’s War Cabinet, “many of the ideas contained in the draft DPG would also be revived repeatedly over the next decade and serve as a broad framework for building a new neoconservative consensus, whose preeminent expression would ultimately arrive in the form of President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy in 2002”. For detail see James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: the history of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004). Also see 1992 Draft Defense Planning guidance, last update March 12, 2008 287 Anthony Burke, “Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War”, Social Identities, 2005, 11(4), p. 328.

106 millions from Hiroshima to Vietnam to Iraq if it was necessary to bring them into History. The perfection Fukuyama envisaged at the end of history, with the advocacy of American power bringing it about, would materialise in its most tragic authenticity. Caught as they are in the sufferings and the daily bloodbaths created by the US military campaign – involving the Iraqi security force, the Mehdi army, various militia factions, and now ISIS – the plight of the Iraqis is a sobering reminder of the dangers of such thinking.288 The spiritual freedom Fukuyama envisages as the purpose of History demands blood to become reality. By forcing the Iraqis to be part of History by means of the Hegelian system, the American military campaign has displaced them from their own land with catastrophic outcomes. Thousands of refugee camps in neighboring Syria,289 and the exodus of professionally qualified Iraqis to Europe and North America as a result of this campaign is a reminder of the inhumane and impersonal Hegelian system in action. A chasm already existed between the West and the Islamic countries because of strong conservative attitudes to one another – this widened with the arrival of new refugees. For refugees of war it takes many years to rebuild a life. The scars of war barely disappear and serve as a constant reminder of vulnerability in one’s own land and one’s marginality in the lands to which you’re delivered. In a cycle of war and dispossession a stable, prosperous life remains a mirage. According to Fukuyama’s theory, the colossal totality of these innumerable instances of suffering can be relegated to history with a small “h”: these misfortunes are happenings, but not History. Once loss of human lives becomes a statistical narrative of collateral damage it is easy to justify human lives as a resource, and hence as a means to an end. As Fukuyama argues, History has a higher purpose – the realisation of human freedom – these happenings should not be considered part of History. By the same token, his theory normalises the American military campaign in Iraq and the subsequent plight of Iraqis through their ahistorical existence.

288 It is an irony that Fukuyama’s much more nuanced view of“freedom”took such a bizarre and tragic turn through the policies of George W. Bush. It is important to note that Fukuyama questioned his own judgment over his initial support for a military campaign in Iraq and also questioned the neoconservative position on American foreign policy and the war on terror. Consequently, he very publicly broke with the neoconservatives. For details see Francis Fukuyama, “History and September 11”, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), World in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. (London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 27– 35 & Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism”, The New York Times, February 19, 2006. 289 One can pretty well imagine the plight of these refugees with the ongoing unrest in Syria. Although some of them managed to return to Iraq, undertaking significant risk, others did not even have that choice. The current situation makes it even harder with escalating violence engulfing the entire region.

107

This means that instead of building grand theories, what one needs is less theory. In other words, one can’t build theories without taking into account – what Gadamer emphasises as our everyday experience of life. In Gadamer’s view, "the understanding and the interpretation of texts or knowledge is not merely a concern of the science, but obviously belongs to human experience of the world in general” that includes “the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself.”290Gadamer explains that one cannot reduce one’s experience – including history – to what Roxanne L. Euben in an entirely different context describes as something “irretrievably locked away into hermetically sealed boxes of meaning”. That means, one cannot categorise history in terms of history with a small “h” and a capital “H”. In other words, the experience of people who are caught up with history – such as in Afghanistan and Iraq – is as important as people who make history – such as those in the US: they are intrinsically linked with each other. In this sense it would be liberating to understand history as an inclusive phenomenon that values human experiences as much as human aspirations in their totality. This is exactly what the Iraqis and the many people who live outside History as stratified by Hegel – and defended by Fukuyama – wish: to acknowledge the lived experience of people in its full diversity so as to approach truth in many different ways. To permit any reduction in the valuing of diverse lived experience means one ignores individual freedom and alternative views. In other words, one does not become free by first becoming systematic; “On the contrary,” as Emmanuel Levin as states, “we become systematic and orderly in our thinking by first freely making a choice for generosity and communication, i.e., for the social.”291

It is a tragedy that the Iraqi people have been continually denied the opportunity to make a free social choice for communication, first by the Baathists, followed by the civil war, succeeded by the US-led war aspiring to establish a new world order, and now the havoc wreaked by ISIL/ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant/also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/al-Sham). Strangled as they are between these systematic orders, the blood of Iraqis speaks louder than any voice they can utter. Instead of a matter of choice,

290 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 2006), pp. xx–xxi, emphasis added. 291Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), p. 15.

108 contemplation or belief for an entire people, freedom fails to move beyond sanctioning its naked will to power and its concomitant violence. Caught up in an endless cycle of violence and tragedy since 1990, and with no possible reprieve in the near future, it is implausible for Iraqis or Islamists or anyone to believe in Fukuyama’s theory or, for that matter, in America’s love of freedom. In an extraordinarily prescient analysis published in 1989, Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends, William Pfaff commented:

The American insistence that human freedom implies history’s malleability has engendered an activist foreign policy which presumes that nations and international society can be changed into something more acceptable to Americans. This is the sense of the American Century: that in it history has been achieving its democratic fulfillment. It is the American temper to force matters to a conclusion, to settle, win, put it all behind, move on to something else. It is crucially hard to accept that history does not have a stop: that there are problems at the heart of American national security that might have no solution.292

Pfaff’s work has a curious echo of Fukuyama’s The End of History theory, which first appeared as an article in the same year. It takes extraordinary confidence to put an end to history with the defeat of bureaucratic socialism, the triumph of liberal democracy and a free market economy. It is another matter that one needs imagination and admiration to read history in order to realise that there are no full stops in history, only occasional commas and semicolons. Ironically, many neoconservatives deny reading history in the usual sense, and fall short of realising that history does not cease. With their refusal to read history in the usual sense the neoconservatives attempt to depict and mould the rest of the world in America’s own image. It is evident that in this attempt they not only rob people of their own familiar world, however flawed that world may be, but in the process also remove those people to conditions far worse than those previously endured.

Despite the surprising attention Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis – and its associated notion of a single global civilisation – and Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis

292 William Pfaff, Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends. (New York: Hill and Wang, The Noonday Press, 1989), p. 5.

109 received, neither provided new insight or added any interesting dimension to the contemporary debate on global politics other than to re-endorse the particular orthodoxies of realpolitik/realism as a means of justifying the West/America’s hegemonic role in global politics. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse explains, “if the end of history is the definition of self, its supplement is Huntington’s clash of civilizations.”293

Far from proposing divergent and innovative theories, on close scrutiny the works of Fukuyama and Huntington – like those of their neoconservative peers Lewis, Krauthammer, and Pipes – represent aspects of Realism that “framed International Relations in terms of the dichotomy between a unified, positive Western identity and the dangers of an anarchical world ‘out there’ – earlier it was the realm of the Soviet Other,”294 now it is the contentious sphere of the Muslim Other. Gridlocked within the discourse of power politics, the neoconservatives could hardly add any new or significant dimension to the debate concerning terrorism, Islam and global politics “beyond the restricted boundaries of their discourse of Otherness.”295 In this context, in reformulating global politics the neoconservatives appear to offer alternative perspectives while they “appeal to characteristically realist forces and explanations that ‘hedge’ their own perspectives”.296In framing neoconservative debate in proper perspective, Chapter Five examines the enduring relevance of the Realist and statist paradigm at the core of neoconservative discourse.

293 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization or Empire, op.cit., p.42. 294George, op. cit., p. 86. 295Ibid, p. 224. 296 Donnelly, op. cit., p. 32

110 CHAPTER FIVE

Framing neoconservative discourse: The Enduring Influence of Older Political Orthodoxies

It is evident that in trying to mould international society neoconservatives have failed to provide a new vision or political idea; rather they have revealed neoconservative discourse’s inextricable relationship with older political ontologies. In this respect Fukuyama’s end of history theory and its attendant freedom ride for the ahistorical people of the world, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations theory, postwar Orientalist Lewis’s cultural paradigm, Krauthammer’s Democratic Realism, and Pipes’ historical analysis clearly reveal the enduring relevance of the Realist and statist paradigms at the core of neoconservative discourse. Their unfailing faith in American power as a central motif, as defined in traditional realist terms as the role of great powers, reaffirms the principles of realpolitik as defined by Hans Morgenthau and others. Irrespective of their seemingly diverse analysis, none of their concerns transcend the narrow national interest or move beyond the interests of the West. Here the notion of the West is not geographically constrained. As Trinh T. Minh-ha in an entirely different context once said, "there are many Third Worlds who live/exist within the First World and paradoxically there are many First Worlds that exist within the Third World”. In other words, while the deeply conservative Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arab, Bahrain, Qatar, etc.) complement the interests of Western powers, conservative Afghanistan does not. Here interests of the West include and serve the purpose of the ruling elites of Gulf States.

In this regard the global moral order – in which the United States wishes to prevail over international society – is crucially imbued with America’s self-interest and its material power. In this respect the conservative policy makers in the United States not only wish to see international society acting in its own image, but also does not hesitate to defend the use of American force to obtain a desired result. Thus a limit or boundary is placed on the self-expression of international society, which cannot and should not act and behave

111 independently outside the Euro-American idea of global reality. In such an analysis, borrowing George’s terminology, one can argue that global reality is “reduced to a singular, self-affirming narrative of Western (primarily Western European) eternal wisdom, derived (crudely) from the scattered textual uttering of the Greeks, Christian theology and post- Renaissance Europe.”297 Furthermore, articulated in logocentric terms, this narrative remains, in the 1990s and in this new millennium, rigidly state-centric and centered on the opposition between a realm of (domestic) sovereign identity, rationality, and social coherence and a realm of (international) anarchy, fragmentation and threat ‘out there,’ which must be disciplined, ordered, and controlled for the common, systematic good.298

Neoconservative discourse arguing for this common, systemic good primarily and fundamentally revolves around the view that what benefits America and the West is good for the rest of the world. In this view, what is good for America is good for the international community but not necessarily vice versa. It is evident in neoconservative analysis that a well-ordered domestic society (the US) risks its way of life and preeminence within the international community unless it keeps the “anarchy out there” at bay. In this context, Fukuyama’s concern for “freedom” for other people does not emanate from solidarity with those people, nor does it arise because “freedom” is a collective aspiration of humanity. Instead, it is ineluctably part of the direction of history, offering the possibility for the United States to retain, maintain, and continue its preeminence within the prevailing international order. In Anthony Burke’s terms, it is where the American myth and its military power coincide, where the ‘unfolding American promise that everyone belongs’ collides with the cold, instrumental ‘strategic vision of America’s role in the world’ advanced by the PNAC. It is where freedom and action, freedom and power, coalesce – where freedom obtains its ‘objectivity’ and the nation becomes the ‘object of History.’299

297 George, op. cit., p. 223. 298 Ibid., p. 223. My emphasis. 299 Anthony Burke, “Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War”, Social Identities,2005, 11(4),p. 326.

112 Furthermore, Burke argues that “it is important to understand that here we are not primarily concerned with standard liberal-humanist accounts of freedom as a series of freedoms (speech, labor, property ownership, suffrage) possessed by individuals that a democracy naturally embodies and seeks to preserve.”300 He notes that while such freedoms are certainly valuable and as such the US constitution is notable in guarding them, however they are not available to everyone even within the American society. For example, Daniel Pipes insistence on profiling American Muslims301 or Charles Krauthammer’s advice to inform the security official to keep an eye on a thirty year young Saudi man if he happens to fly on the same plane as your daughter, stems from the same ontological narrative where the notion of freedom is selective and embedded with notion of fear: of the unknown, unfamiliar. It is an exclusivist notion of freedom that primarily rests on the notion “of sameness (of culture/political subjectivity) “that annihilates difference; one constituted through threat, set off against both (‘backward’) Oriental and indigenous cultures, and against secessionist and subversive threats from within and without”,302 and often such freedom is secured at the price of others’ security.

In this respect, as freedom is ineluctably part of the direction of history, if necessary, Fukuyama argues that American power should not dither, nor should it hesitate to bomb, beat, wound and subjugate millions of ahistorical people (from Vietnam to Afghanistan to Iraq) to bring them into history.303He argues that this destiny of history could be best

300 Ibid. 301In a New York Sun article (“Why the Japanese Internment Still Matters,”28 December 2004) Daniel Pipes wrote his position on profiling American Muslims. The article commented that “For years, it has been my position that the threat of radical Islam implies an imperative to focus security measures on Muslims. If searching for rapists, one looks only at the male population. Similarly, if searching for Islamists (adherents of radical Islam), one looks at the Muslim population.” (http://www.meforum.org/4274/why-the-japanese- internment-still-matters). Also, reinforcing his position on this issue in another article in New York Post (“The Enemy within and the Need for Profiling,” 24 January 2003) he commented that “There is no escaping the unfortunate fact that Muslim government employees in law enforcement, the military, and the diplomatic corps need to be watched for connections to terrorism, as do Muslim chaplains in prisons and the armed forces. Muslim visitors and immigrants must undergo additional background checks. require a scrutiny beyond that applied to churches, synagogues, and temples. Muslim schools require increased oversight to ascertain what is being taught to children.” (http://www.danielpipes.org/1009/the-enemy-within- and-the-need-for-profiling). Also see, Stephen Sheehi, Islamophobia: The ideological campaign against Muslims (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, Inc.) p. 1978. 302 Buke,”Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War,” op.cit., p. 327. 303 As mentioned earlier, Fukuyama maintained that the end of the Cold War had marked not just “the passing of a particular period of history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government

113 achieved by American help, and if necessary with the application of particular force and pressure. The US is the sole superpower and the richest country on the planet, so its benign concern for the international community should neither be doubted nor questioned. Drawing upon Hegel, Fukuyama divides the international community primarily into two different historical spheres. One is the politically well organised “post-historical” world and the other is the world still “stuck in history”. In his view these two worlds will try to maintain their status quo but will come to loggerheads over the prickly issues of immigration, security and importantly oil, which he argues will have devastating economic consequences for the post-historical world. To avoid such a scenario, and contrary to his often repeated argument against “realist methods”, in his prescriptive doctrine he approves realist methods “when dealing with the part still in history” as “the relationship between democracies and non-democracies will still be characterized by distrust and fear…force will continue to be the ultima ratio in their mutual relations.”304 Thus, “in essence, then it is argued that a variation of the “might equal to right”, or realist, brand of logic prevails” and it can be seen that this logic has been in unhindered operation since the end of the Cold War. His prescriptive doctrine ruthlessly counters his claim that “old rules of power politics would have decreasing relevance”305 for the post-historical world.

Fukuyama rightly observes the members of the post-historical world “are the heirs of the bourgeois revolution started over four hundred years ago.”306 In his view “the desire for comfortable self-preservation” in the post-historical world would discourage its members from risking their lives in a battle for pure prestige. However, when the post-historical world confronts or apprehends risks to the continuation of the “comfortable self- preservation”, Fukuyama, in a characteristically realist tradition, advocates for a NATO- style “league of truly free states brought together…capable of forceful action to protect its

whose ideal can’t be improved upon.” In his view, the time has come to fulfill for history’s self-realisation, i.e., the realisation of human freedom, which he envisages can be achieved by promoting liberal democracy and free market economy to ensure the opening up of new markets and the promotion of growth through complete integration into international trade and investment regimes. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, 1989, 16(Summer), p. 4. Italic within brackets my emphasis. 304 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p. 279. 305Ibid., p. 276. 306Ibid., p. 283.

114 collective security from threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world.”307 His distrust of the UN and his unbending faith in “the traditional moralism of American foreign policy” prompts him to declare that “international law is merely domestic law writ large.”308 In other words, it can be argued that the international community ideally should be an extension or image of the domestic community. Likewise, the post-historical world should not hesitate to bomb, beat and subjugate the ahistorical world to bring it into History. The US led freedom ride in Iraq sadly reminds us of William Pfaff’s prescient analysis once again. Pfaff maintains that “the American insistence that human freedom implies history’s malleability has engendered an activist foreign policy which presumes that nations and international society can be changed into something more acceptable to Americans.”309

Fukuyama tries to convince readers that the wellbeing of the international community is very much intertwined with America’s national interest. Without the latter’s safeguard the international community will be at risk and to avoid that risk there should not be any moral dilemma for the Western world and its vanguard, the US, to use force and violence to achieve peace. Under the guise of a caricature of a cosmopolitan theory, Fukuyama essentially promotes and defends a realist logic to defend and safeguard American and Western interests at any cost. Like many realists he imagines and believes that pursuing and preserving the American national interest is tantamount to maintaining the international system. The “realist utopia” Fukuyama promotes and upholds is based on what the non- Western or ahistorical world lacks. Based on this “lack” he justifies and normalises the use of violence in dealing with numerous people of the ahistorical world to counter that lack. Drawing from Hegel,310 the kind of society Fukuyama envisages and believes in, one that

307Ibid., p. 283. 308Ibid., pp. 280–281. 309William Pfaff,op.cit., p. 5. 310 Though Fukuyama gives an impression that his End of History thesis is a reflection of the Hegelian idea of history, as Brett Bowden points out, “it far more closely reflects or resembles the Kantian ‘idea of world history’, something which can be constructed and directed”. Bowden, op. cit., p. 50. Similarly, Jan Nederveen Pieterse also establishes the connection between Kant’s idea of perpetual peace that with Fukuyama’s theory. According to him: “The code word for this project is ‘Freedom.’ Freedom is short for ‘American values,’ short for ‘free enterprise,’ and the cue to the empire of liberty. The Bush II administration took up empire in the name of liberal internationalism, echoing Wilson’s pledge to use American power to create a ‘universal dominion of the right’ and practicing ‘Wilsonianism with a vengeance.’ As Immanuel Kant observed, ‘It is

115 truly reflects the aspirations of the whole international community, belies its very specific (cultural/political) origin. The world has gone through a sea change since Hegel and Kant put forward their philosophies. After two World Wars, the Cold War and millions of deaths through mechanised killings it requires extraordinary defiance for anyone to believe that humanity has a single destiny, a telos for the entire humanity to fulfill History’s purpose.

However, history proves otherwise and the asymmetrical political practices and events of recent centuries provide an entirely different (and difficult) picture of our understanding of history. The violence committed against ahistorical people over the last five hundred years through conquest, colonisation, two World Wars and the divisiveness of the Cold War in the effort to bring them into History is evidence enough to question History’s purpose or destiny. The (im)balance of power continues to be the dominant feature of international politics, complemented by a Clausewitzian justification to safeguard and continue that policy which many in the Euro–American academic and political sphere believe to be the balance of power or the realist logic. The “freedom ride” that Fukuyama offers at the end of his thesis has an uncertain final destination, but despite asking the companions on the journey to take this uncharted path, Fukuyama in effect argues that eventually “history will vindicate its own rationality.”311

Only a person who believes that history can be read or narrated in a singular way would maintain such a view. Because history forewarns us, it hardly vindicates its own rationality. The very event – the demise of the Soviet Union – that triggered Fukuyama to come forward with his triumphalist theory hardly vindicates any rationality. As Jim George observes,

The inability of mainstream analysis to predict the demise of the Soviet superpower intrinsically connected to the interpretive silences and inadequacies at the core of the Realist discourse of International Relations in the 1950s. Realists actually knew very little about the

the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible’” (see Pieterse, op.cit., p. 42). 311 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p. 339.

116 primary Cold War Other beyond the restricted boundaries of their discourse of Otherness.312

It would not be exaggeration to claim that an entire generation of “realists” spent their whole life studying the irrational world of the Soviet Union and the Cold War stand-off without having the slightest clue about its future demise. Based on this observation it is possible to suggest that neoconservatives studying the irrational world of Islam may not have a clue what is really happening in that world other than blaming their culture (Islam).

It is troubling, although not entirely surprising, that many commentators still have not learned a lesson from the failure to foresee the sudden demise of the Soviet Union. Instead of realising that inadequacy and acting upon it, unfortunately the realist discourse predominantly continues to focus on the debate about the objectified “Other” and the rational “us”. Many commentators maintain the characteristically realist tradition of dividing the world into separate ideological/political blocs – primarily one free, cosmopolitan and rational, and the other oppressed, traditional and emotional (irrational) – and pursue this division and logic as the basis of their theories and demands to maintain the balance of power (in which human relations are governed by power and force rather than communicative actions and consent). They urge that the “balance of power” is maintained in favor of the “free world” for the greater good of the international community. Drawing on this tradition, Fukuyama develops the theory of “freedom” based on the “post-historical” existence of the affluent Western world as opposed to the lack of “freedom” of the ahistorical non-Western world.

Following the same tradition fellow neorealist Samuel Huntington puts forward a similar theory with a subjective twist. Instead of dividing the world on the basis of freedom or lack of it Huntington neatly divides the world into different civilisational/cultural spheres while disagreeing with Fukuyama’s optimism that humanity is moving towards a “universal civilization” based on and inspired by the American way of life. Instead he argues that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the world has not evolved from a bipolar to a

312 George, op. cit., p. 224.

117 unipolar world but instead has turned into multipolar world “resembling that of medieval times”. In this new scenario, he argues, the future of global politics will be determined by the politics of competing civilisations. What is striking in this analysis is that in this civilisational competition the major tension will emanate from the conflict between the West and the Islamic civilisation. In saying this, he reminds that civilisations as such will not fight with each other because they are not concrete political agencies but abstract cultural entities. However, civilisational tensions will be settled through their political agencies which he calls “core states”. In his view each civilisation represents and rallies around a core state. For example, the Western civilisation rallies around the United States, the Sinic civilisation around China and so on. Some unlucky civilisations will not find a core state and the Islamic civilisation is one of them.

In essence, he argues that, ultimately, civilisational tensions will be settled on the basis of state powers. By assigning states as the mechanism to settle civilisational disputes he reverts to what he has been claiming all through his scholarly career, the central role of powerful “nation-states” or great powers as defined in traditional “realist” terms in defining and directing international politics.313 Once international issues are delegated to great powers the realist logic of balance of power prevails and it is this logic that determines the future of international politics, not some abstract concept such as civilisation.

In his insightful analysis realist Stephen Walt clearly shows how Huntington unambiguously acknowledges the “enduring relevance of the realist, statist paradigm” at the end of his thesis when he lays out the possible scenario for the future conflict.314 Huntington argues that a possible future conflict will happen between the West and China, not between the West and Islam as a significant part of his analysis leads us to believe. This conflict will be triggered by an intra-civilisational fight between China and Vietnam over a dispute on oil, not cultural differences, as both countries belong to the same civilisation

313Walt, op. cit., p. 188. 314 Ibid. Critiquing Huntington’s thesis, Walt argues that it offers a dangerous and self-fulfilling prophecy if we take it seriously. According to Walt, “as a staunch defender of the Western civilization in general and the United States in particular Huntington is worried about the challenges the West faces in the current global set up and accordingly to offset those challenges he provides a bogeyman to maintain and defend its pre- eminence in the world,” p. 189.

118 according to Huntington’s theory. Eventually the conflict will involve a number of states because of concerns about the balance of power and the supply of oil. The fears about oil supplies will lead many states to form a strategic alliance based on national interests rather than civilisational values. In essence “when he turns away from expounding his paradigm and describes what a 21stcentury conflict might actually look like, Huntington largely ignores his own creation and relies on the traditional principles of realpolitik.”315

It is evident that ultimately it is “realism” that essentially matters, defines and directs the post-Cold War world, not the civilisational differences. Throughout his thesis Huntington’s paramount concern revolves around a common theme, to preserve the preeminence and influence of Western civilisation in general and its vanguard, the United States, in particular. To safeguard the preeminence of Western civilisation and the interests of the United States and Europe, in his theory Huntington provides a “civilizational mask” to pursue and implement the “realist” logic under another name.

Huntington’s invention of this “civilizational mask” is not an original idea. As mentioned earlier he borrowed this term from Bernard Lewis’s provocatively titled essay The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so many Muslims resent the West. In the wake of the tumultuous years of the demise of the Soviet Union and in the absence of a designated adversary, Lewis’s work provided much scholarly justification for those who were looking for a designated adversary. The sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union caught many mainstream analysts off guard, people who had spent almost their entire scholarly careers engaged in the Realist discourse of International Relations during the Cold War years studying the “evil empire” and its “evil designs”. When none of the predicted “evil designs” worked out and the empire itself gave away to internal discontent, mainstream analysts had few justifications for their avowed engagement. Many analysts working within realism’s restricted discourse of “Otherness” studied, analysed and commented upon the Soviet Union and its totalitarian designs and argued for the balance of power to safeguard the international community. Using the oppositional binaries between good and evil, freedom and no freedom, rationality and irrationality (emotion) these analysts built, nurtured and maintained the West’s self-

315Ibid., p. 188.

119 identity by attributing “Otherness” to the Soviet Union. The unexpected demise of the Soviet Union not only created a crisis in the West’s self-identity but also created crises within the mainstream International Relations community that had been so intrinsically connected with “realism” and the logic associated with it as the primary features of international politics. In this context Lewis’s provocative essay that was contemporaneous with the first Gulf War provided a much needed reprieve to “realists” who were in dire need of a designated adversary.

Lewis (reformulating the Cold War binary opposition) suggested the future conflict in global politics will be mainly between Islam and the West. He argues that Muslim Rage is a response to the past failures of the Islamic world, rather than a reaction to the current policies of the US or for that matter to the past actions of the West.316 To understand the manifestation of the present violence he relies heavily on medieval texts, particularly of the Ottoman Empire, ignoring the impact of colonisation, modernisation, two World Wars and the Cold War. Essentially he argues many of their woes are self-created and places the blame for this on the intransigence of Islamic culture. He further maintains such intransigence leads to irrational reactions and anger which cannot be interpreted rationally. It is similar to the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War; something that is outside the known and familiar, hidden behind their burqas/veils. In other words, the Islamic veil has replaced the Iron Curtain but it remains essentially the same; unknown, unreliable and radically different from our open, liberal and familiar West. In essence, then, it is argued that instead of Communism it is now Islam that poses the emerging threat or surfaces to be the new political blind spot.

Lewis’s reconceptualisation of Islam as the emerging threat gained strong currency in the prevailing political uncertainties of the post-Soviet era. The Gulf War, the ongoing mess in Afghanistan and the surging discontent in the Balkans escalated those uncertainties and with no clear policy approach from the US and its allies, Lewis’s position was

316 Fellow neoconservative, also maintains a similar view. He argues that the current anti- Americanism stems from the “‘road rage’ of a thwarted Arab world – the congenital condition of a culture yet to take full responsibility for its self-inflicted wounds” (“Iraq and the Arab Future”, Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1, January/February 2003, pp. 2–4).

120 strengthened. Both the neoconservatives, who were rapidly occupying the position of mainstream analysts, and the Islamists upheld his view. For the Islamists it was the way to save Islam and Muslims from the Crusaders or the infidels. For neoconservatives the recognition and acknowledgment of this innate cultural difference provided a reason to defend their view of the “ideal” ways of life and its cherished values and that later gave intellectual justification for the war in Iraq (as part of the larger war on terror policy). The opposition of “Islam versus the West,” appeals both to the fundamentalists and the neoconservatives, for whom as a mirror image “Islam” is the issue. Effectively, under this discursive regime an ‘us’ is easily identified and opposed to a ‘them’; a homogeneous ‘self’ confronts a threatening Other; a free, open, pluralistic social system can be distinguished from its closed, totalitarian counterparts; and a particular (Western, rational– scientific) way of knowing the world can be intellectually and institutionally legitimated in its struggle against the forces of ideology, irrationality, distortion, and untruth.317

Lewis’s ominous analysis fits well with this dichotomised logic. According to him:

It should be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present and worldwide expansion of both.318

In Lewis’s terms the world’s secular present is intrinsically linked with the Judeo-Christian heritage and he does not see any contradiction in the expansion of both. In other words, the expansion of the both is part of the same narrative – they (Judeo-Christianity and ) are two faces of the same coin. It implies that any other understanding of “our secular present“ unlinked with the Judeo-Christian heritage seems problematic, which he tries to conceptualise by providing an alarmist vision of “clash of civilizations”. That vision forewarns one that it is futile to maintain any other form of understanding of the current

317 George, op. cit., p. 223. 318 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, p. 60.

121 conflicts as one is facing a state of anarchy which can’t be addressed by policy measures and the actions of the governments. In essence, he argues that one must pay serious attention to the inherent anarchy within the international system, which happens to be the traditional rallying point for some “Realists” and many neoconservatives. According to this perspective anarchy exists and it is outside the rational purview. Because of this, any rational engagement (e.g., empathy, dialogue and empowerment) becomes irrelevant and those who demand such alternatives are branded as apologists for anarchy or find themselves harassed into silence. The anarchy theme has become a cause célèbre for neo- Realism in the 1990s and in this decade.319

Anarchy, thus (made by Man but beyond his transcendental powers), is now the foundation of real meaning in relations between states, and Realists’ knowledge is now centered on a pessimistic, fatalistic determinism that, in its (structuralist) certitude, requires no further critical questioning.320

Instead, neo-Realists demand limited structural adjustment within the anarchical structure on their (rational–scientific) terms. If those terms demand use of brute force as the best way of adjusting to such a structure, then it must be used. As George maintains “it was the logic of anarchical struggle that gave coherence to the most costly arms race in human history.”321 The post-Cold War conflicts in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the disproportionate violence and retribution to which fellow human beings have been subjected to in those places since the end of the Cold War, and the escalated version of this since 9/11 draw much of their philosophical justification from this “anarchical logic” which has become a fundamental feature of International Relations per se. Lewis’s analysis in the Root of Muslim Rage is deeply rooted in the Realist tradition of International Relations “which must retain an anarchical specter “out there” in order to represent the Traditional self in privileged terms”322 and to maintain that “Traditional self in privileged terms” it should not

319Jim George has eloquently explained its special significance in the 1990s in Chapter 6 in his book Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994). 320Ibid., p. 203. 321Ibid., p. 203. 322Ibid., p. 202.

122 hesitate to use force and violence. Lewis’s support for the military campaign in Iraq further strengthens this Realist logic.

As Michael Hirsh notes, “Lewis was among the earliest prominent voices after September 11 to press for a confrontation with Saddam, doing so in a series of op-ed pieces in The Wall Street Journal with titles like ‘A War of Resolve’ and ‘Time for Toppling.’”323 In this respect a link was manufactured for selling the war to the public despite there being nooperational link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime. For the administration and the neoconservatives, “’s supposedly broad Muslim base, and Saddam’s recalcitrance to the West, were part of the same pathology.”324 The best way to treat such pathology is to beat it into submission. As the case for invading Iraq all but collapsed, it vindicated Bin Laden’s often repeated rhetoric, “describing the Americans as the latter-day Crusaders and Mongols, thus luring more adherents and inviting more rage and terror acts.”325 In a continuous circle of violence, with one inflaming the other, the neoconservatives’ response to anarchy through violence invites further violence from the fundamentalists/anarchists allowing no reprieve or any possible exit from that suicidal loop.

It is important to note that shortly after the 9/11 attacks, on September 20, 2001, PNAC issued an open letter to President Bush that commended for his admirable commitment to “lead the world to victory” in his newly declared war against terrorism. The letter emphasised that “the US policy must aim, not only at finding the people responsible for this incident, but also target those “other groups out there that mean us no good”. It urged him not only to target but also other supposed “perpetrators” including Saddam Hussein and Hezbollah. Considered to be the most brazen of PNAC’s many publications, this letter made one of the first arguments for regime change in Iraq as part of the “war on terror”, arguing that this is necessary even if the Iraqi regime was unconnected to the attacks. It argued that “even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to attack, any

323 Hirsh, op. cit., p. 14. 324Ibid., p. 14. 325Ibid., p. 16. According to Hirsh “the administration admitted as much last summer, when it acknowledged that its ‘Pattern of Global Terrorism’ report had been 180 degrees wrong. The report, which came out last June, at first said terrorist attacks around the world were down in 2003, indicating the war on terror being won. Following complaints from experts, the State Department later revised the report to show that attacks were at their highest level since 1982” (“Bernard Lewis Revisited” pp. 16-17).

123 strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to take such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.”326 The letter also emphasised that “in order to carry out this first war of the 21st century successfully”, and “in order to do the future generation a favor by coming together and whipping terrorism” it would be necessary to commit “a large increase in defense spending” and “may well require the United States to engage a well-armed foe, and will also require that we remain capable of defending our interests elsewhere in the world”. Finally the letter urged that “there be no hesitation in requesting whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to win this war”. It is certainly no coincidence that those who signed this letter included Charles Krauthammer and Francis Fukuyama (one of the original signatories of PNAC). It is crucial to remember here that in a Faustian twist nearly a dozen of the original signatories had already joined the Bush administration (in particular the Pentagon and the Office of the Vice President), who, needless to add had already not only identifying with the “strategic vision of America’s role in the world” advanced by the PNAC, but also had the means to implement that vision and had already set themselves on that path. The 9/11 attacks only fast forwarded their resolve to implement that agenda in the national interest. According to George Packer among its various concerns PNAC’s first order of business was Iraq, where the military campaign would serve “as the test case for (neoconservative) ideas about American power and world leadership.”327 Disagreeing over George H. W. Bush’s reservation to oust Saddam Hussein a decade earlier, neoconservatives had long been agitating for more aggressive US action to advance their cause.328 In Iraq, PNAC and its sympathisers saw an opportunity to accomplish two separate but related goals: to show the world that the US is the dominant global power by undertaking, as Krauthammer maintains, an “unapologetic demonstration of will”,329 and to undertake radical reconstruction of the Middle East political landscape along lines

326 Project for the New American Century, Letter to President Bush on the War on Terrorism, September 20, 2001. 327 George Packer, The Assassins’ Gates: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005) p. 36. 328 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 329 Charles Krauthammer, “The Bush Doctrine”, Time, February 26, 2001.

124 consistent with the neoconservatives’ vision for Israeli security,330 which remains one of be fundamental concerns of US foreign policy in the region.

In this context, one can claim that bereft of its nuances, Democratic Realism continues to carry orthodoxies of “classical realism”.331In the name of “expressing values”, Democratic Realism justifies the use of absolute power without any fear of possible retaliation. During the Cold War the Iron Curtain imposed a degree of mutual restraint on unilateral action against the adversary or the perceived adversary. By replacing the Iron Curtain with the Islamic veil or burqa, the neoconservatives have robbed humanity of that limited sense of security. The US-led military campaign in Iraq has turned it from a brutal, highly secular and functional society into an equally brutal and ethnically divided dysfunctional society. In this transformation the Islamic veil or burqa has returned with a vengeance, making it hard for the campaigners and the US policymakers to see, hidden behind that veil, the enduring pain and suffering the Iraqi people face in their everyday life. Bearing questionable ethical responsibility Democratic Realism, although imbued with classical realism’s central tenet of power, lacks the self-restraint, self-consciousness or guarded respect for the designated “Other” that “realism” enforced or accepted among its practitioners as minimum the basic rule of International Relations during the Cold War period. Instead of promoting the preventive and sensitive global strategies that many expected after the Cold War, Democratic Realism has invoked what Jim George has described in another context:

The traditional old-world images (e.g., of Hitlerism and appeasement) and acted in accordance with old-world strategic rituals in accomplishing what Cold War alliances had been unable to

330 See, for instance, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” Strategic Research Publications, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, (June 1996) which outlined that “removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq [is] an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right”. 331 It is bereft of nuances of ‘classical realism’ because many Realists such as Morgenthau, Kennan and Brodie all criticised the Vietnam war; similarly, neorealists like Mearsheimer, Walt and Waltz opposed Iraq War. One of such nuances is the value of self restrain that many Realists advocated in dealing with an adversary or perceived adversary. Also see fn. 203. As Jack Donnelly notes irrespective of their stress on the core realist premises of power, self-interest and conflict the leading realists such as Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz of their generation “allowed modest space for politically salient ‘non-realist’ forces and concerns.” He cites Carr, who stated “we cannot ultimately find a resting place in pure realism” (Donnelly, op. cit., p. 32).

125 accomplish for forty years – that is, to actually punish the designated “Other” without fear or major retaliation.332

In this sense, rather than preparing us for a sensitive, innovative and non-coercive approach to the post-Cold War era Democratic Realism drags us (primarily without our consent) back to the Old World strategic rituals of the pre Cold War era. In essence, Democratic Realism offers a dangerous, atavistic and highly contentious theory which is neither “democratic” nor “realistic”. It would have been better justified, in its true spirit, had it been called unipolaror neo-imperial realism, as those labels (“unipolarism” and “neo- imperialist”) also apply equally well to Krauthammer.333

Krauthammer by his own admission belongs to this latter day school of “realism” popularly known as neoconservatism. This school strongly believes in the integration of power, morality and self-interest (national interest) as the basis of pursuing realpolitik.334 The neoconservatives have unfailing faith in American power together with a belief that the pursuit America’s national interest is equal to expressing its values. The use of American force to impose those values on the international community in order to “change them into something more acceptable to Americans”, remains, to borrow George’s terminology, “at the ontological heart of modernist social theory and the dominant (Realist) Tradition and discipline of International Relations.”335 However, in practice this theory lacks the preventive deterrence that the Cold War ensured to a certain extent. Without the fear of significant retribution, many neoconservatives supported and normalised this coercive policy to punish the designated “Other” in order to safeguard and express American values, that it imagines are the universal aspiration of the international community. Among the neoconservatives, one can claim that Daniel Pipes would be the most strident voice who supports, justifies (without supporting evidence) and strongly endorses this policy as practice as the following discussion will reveal.

332 George, op. cit., p. 3. 333 See, Dorrien, op.cit., p. 5. Also, see fn. 64. 334 Yet neocons and neorealists interpret these things very differently. While neorealists (such as Walt) allow space for dissent or for non-realist concerns, neocons don’t allow space for such concerns. Their view is akin to what once President Bush expressed to the world in one of his speeches after the 9/11 attack: “Either you are with us or against us” 335 George, op.cit., p. 223.

126 Unlike his fellow neoconservatives Daniel Pipes does not suffer much from intellectual doubts, ideological posturing or moral rectitude in his quest to find and punish the designated “Other” in order to maintain the present international order and keep the American national interest intact. His theory is very straightforward: the Red menace has gone, now here comes the Green (Islam). In other words, “we“ (in the West) have dealt with the Soviet Union and removed the Iron Curtain, now it is time to deal with Muslims and remove the veil. For Pipes the present threat to the West and the United States in particular comes from the Islamic world. His argument is that Islam is irrational, atavistic and vengeful because he knows it to be so. In his view the foreign policy of the US in the Middle East has nothing to do with the rise of terrorism in the region, rather such terrorist acts are state-sponsored. Pipes finds no pathological, fanatical or political links behind the suicide attacks. In his view these attacks happen with the logistical support of state intelligence agencies and as state-sponsored policy. It is a characteristic view that many neoconservatives of late are obsessed with; based on the view they advocate punishment of any regime that they think abets such acts. It had become imperative for the Bush administration strategists to establish operational links between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda to justify and unleash the military campaign in Iraq. In Paul Wolfowitz’s famous words “these were good bureaucratic reasons for selling the war to the public.”336 It is altogether a different matter that these links were unfounded or imagined but that did not stop the administration from going to war to punish its designated “Other”. In this context, notwithstanding Pipes’ confrontational analysis and sweeping generalisation,337 the US led military campaign in Iraq vindicated his stand. Drawing from classical realism’s binary division of “self” and “other” Pipes cloaks his Islamophobia with the guise of historical analysis or moral principles and advocates punishment of the designated “Other” in the name of ensuring American national interest and its security.

336 Hirsh, op. cit., p. 14. 337 According to Harper and Clarke, “the ‘confrontational’…model has many characteristics of the ‘clash of civilizations.’ It is a model that is based on the notion that, a clash is inevitable between Islam and the West because their worldviews are fundamentally different. In their view, “this is the model presented in effect by Princeton professor Bernard Lewis, the neo-conservatives’ favourite Arabist, albeit more elegantly and with less bile than some of those, such as Daniel Pipes, who tread in his footprints” (Harper and Clarke, op.cit., p. 334).

127 It is evident from this analysis that Pipes’ writing and the theories of fellow neoconservatives Krauthammer, Lewis, Huntington and Fukuyama are fundamentally and philosophically very much imbued with the tenets of old “realism” and intrinsically linked with power politics and its systemic intricacies, while lacking the nuances and sensitivity of classical “realism”. Although they often invoke certain tenets of realism they contradict classical realism at many points and have been strongly attacked by realists such as Walt, Mearsheimer, Ikenberry and others.338In essence, these views are a crude adaptation of elements of realism but at odds with contemporary realist views. According to Ikenberry “unilateralism, of course, is not a new feature of American foreign policy. In every historical era, the United States has shown a willingness to reject treaties, violate rules, ignore allies, and use military force on its own. But many observers saw the unilateralism of the Bush administration as something much more sweeping – not an occasional ad hoc policy decision but a new strategic orientation or what one pundit touts as the ‘new unilateralism.’”339 He maintains that:

For the first time since the dawn of the Cold War, a new grand strategy is taking shape in Washington. It is advanced most directly as a response to terrorism, but it also constitutes a broader view about how the United States should wield power and organize world order. According to this new paradigm, America is to be less bound to its partners and to global rules and institutions while it steps forward to play a more unilateral and anticipatory role in attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue states seeking WMD. The United States will use its unrivaled military power to manage the global order.340

338 For details see Mearsheimer and Walt, op. cit., and G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds), International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005); Ikenberry…[et al.], The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 339 G. John Ikenberry, “Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism,” cited in G. John Ikenberry…[et al.], The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p.7. 340Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds), International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005), pp. 456-457.

128 He further notes that the proponents of such a strategy argue that America’s security need is best served by taking unilateral stance as Krauthammer argued that “it is the very road to multilateralism”. In Ikenberry’s view such a principle of acting unilaterally and preemptively “plays havoc with the old international rules of self-defense and United Nations norms about the proper use of force” and “renders international norms of self- defense – enshrined by Article 51 of the UN Charter – almost meaningless.”341 Critiquing the Bush administration’s security doctrine, as succinctly illustrated in President Bush’s West Point address,342 he argues that such a stance “takes this country down the same slippery slope” where preemptive use of force will be seen by the world as an act of aggression rather than as an act of self-defense. In his view “this policy of no regrets errs on the side of action – but it can also easily become national security by hunch or inference, leaving the world without clear-cut norms for justifying force.”343 Furthermore “in this brave new world, neoimperial thinkers contend that the older realist and liberal grand strategies are not very helpful. American security will not be ensured, as realist grand strategies assumes, by the preservation of deterrence and stable relations among the major powers.”344 However, “pitfalls accompany this neoimperial grand strategy. Unchecked US power, shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from the postwar norms and institutions of the international order, will usher in a more hostile international system, making it far harder to achieve American interests.”345 According to Ikenberry such a strategy “poses a wider problem for the maintenance of American unipolar power. It steps into the oldest trap of powerful imperial states: self-encirclement.”346 Furthermore, “when the most powerful state in the world throws its weight around, unconstrained by rules or norms of legitimacy, it risks a backlash. Other countries will bridle at an international order in which the United States plays only by its own rules”347 In his view Bush’s security strategy fails to provide a

341 Ibid. 342 President Bush stated, “the military must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price”, Gerry J. Gilmore “Bush: West Point Grads Answer History’s Call to Duty”, (1st June 2002) 343Ikenberry op.cit “America’s Imperial Ambition,” pp. 456-457. 344Ibid., p.458. 345 Ibid. 346 Ibid., p.459. 347Ibid.

129 “positive agenda for a strengthened and more decent postwar world order” other than articulating “the struggle as one between freedom and evil”. “This failure” he adds,

explains why the sympathy and goodwill generated around the world for the United States after September 11 quickly disappeared. Newspapers that once proclaimed, “We are all Americans,” now express distrust toward America. . . The United States appear to be degrading the rules and institutions of international community, not enhancing them. To the rest of the world, neoimperial thinking has more to do with exercising power than exercising leadership.348

As Stephen Walt puts it “America may be a genuinely benevolent force in today’s world, but the rest of the world does not always see it that way.”349 He notes that “the war in Iraq reinforced global concerns about the unchecked nature of US power”. As observed,

The United States also showed scant regard for global opinion when it decided to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the United States unsuccessfully sought UN Security Council authorization for the Iraq invasion, it made clear from the outset that it did not regard such authorization as necessary. Indeed, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice later acknowledged that the decision for war was made even before the UN was consulted, and the failure to obtain UN authorization did not slow the march to war.350

In Walt’s view the US need not have to question about its own primacy but it certainly should question about the legitimacy of that primacy. According to him, the “US primacy will be seen as more legitimate when the United States acts in accordance with established international procedures.”351 Citing the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, Walt suggests “it was widely regarded as a legitimate use of US power” because it had the United Nations Security Council approval. In contrast “the decision to attack Iraq in 2003 undercut the legitimacy of US primacy because it failed to secure the Security Council authorization and

348Ibid., p.460. 349 Stephen M. Walt, TAMING AMERICAN POWER: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), p. 61. 350Ibid., p. 98. 351Ibid., p. 162.

130 decided to go ahead anyway.”352 In his view “focusing solely on US interests and ignoring to the interests of others is not without costs”. “In fact”, he adds “the United States may pay a large – and unnecessary – price for treating the rest of the world as if it is merely an obstacle in its path.”353 Unfortunately, as evidence suggests, many of its top officials and policy advisors unhesitatingly promote and defend such a policy.

Neoconservative discourse conveys and rallies around those aspects of “realism” that give primacy to power politics and particularly the US’ role in maintaining the current status quo in managing the global politics at the expense of other practices of politics. In this kind of stubbornness they are least open to and reluctant to accept other ideas that place International Relations discourse outside the narrow boundary of power politics or the politics of “Otherness”. In this sense, the new/old “realists” prefer to be tormented within the close confines of power politics rather than open up to try and see other important currents that flow to define, defend and enrich the international community in its full and spirited diversity. In order to test these currents it is important to resolve to give up some of the pleasures, rewards and comforts that an Imperial Ottoman guarantees and to deny the kind of luxury and accompanying complacency that “four hundred years of bourgeois revolution” ensured to a small but a privileged section of the post-historical world. It is necessary also to join with those emotional, ahistorical people to confront the pain and the joy they endure in order to realise “realities” that are so different, so diverse from the familiar world the neoconservatives so ardently believe to be “universal”. It is equally helpful for neoconservatives to remember one of the enduring symbols of Western philosophical heritage, Icarus, who constantly and sensibly reminds us of the hubris in believing too much in material power. He reminds us also of the limits of a linear “technocratic, utilitarian approach” to life.

It is possible to suggest that the neoconservatives in their striving for power and prestige slide into a conundrum where it becomes imperative to seek power for power’s sake. In an entirely different context reflecting upon the role of art, Futurist poet Marinetti once had the

352 Ibid. 353Ibid., p.98.

131 maxim “l’art pour l’art’ or “fiat ars – pereat mundus”, art for art sake or let there be art and the world can perish.354 Similarly, the neoconservatives in their persuasion of power argue “may many other worlds perish but let the preeminence of the West (and its vanguard the US) remain the same”. Essentially, while trying to organise international politics the West insists on retaining the existing property structure intact, whereas the non-Western world wants fundamental changes in that structure. The US strongly approves of and insists on the use of its power to resolve the conflicts that ensue in efforts to organise international society, primarily in favor of maintaining the present international order. Yet power politics is not the only way to address the structural and ideological differences in international society nor does global history attest its wide practice. As Jim George illustrates, “power politics behavior is not endemic in global history, nor is the cause of “peace” greatly assisted by the Traditional solutions (balancing strategies and alliance formations) when it does occur.”355Similarly “realism “should not be the only tool to be used to analyse international relations. As Donnelly argues,

Realism must be a part of the analytical toolkit of every serious student of international relations. But if it is our only tool – or even our primary tool – we will be woefully underequipped for our analytical tasks, our vision of international relations will be sadly impoverished, and, to the extent that theory has an impact on practice, the projects we undertake in the world are liable to be mangled and misshapen.356

There are other forces, other scholarly legacies and other interpretations of International Relations from diverse standpoints that challenge this dominant narrative of International Relations. In their diverse efforts these scholars expose its cracks, limitations and accompanying dangers. In this respect the enduring values in Fanon’s post-colonial discourse and in particular the havoc occupation unleashes on occupied people’s daily life provides rich insights to this debate. Furthermore, the critical social theory perspectives of scholars such as Jim George, Anthony Burke, Brett Bowden, Roxanne L. Euben, Lee Jarvis and R. B. J. Walker, among others, are of particular importance for this undertaking. They

354 See Benjamin, op. cit., for the most explicit evidence of this. 355 George, op. cit., p. 226. 356 Donnelly, op. cit., p.54.

132 are among some of the leading scholars who examine the contemporary theories as practice in International Relations from a broad historical–philosophical context, that opens up and add new terrains to this debate. Finally, a different rich historical interpretation of the growth of political Islam is necessary not only for its theoretical value but also to realise the accompanying sense of justice and belonging associated with it. In the following chapter, in analysing the growth of Islam as a formidable political force this study will examine aspects (of Islam) that are hardly discussed or represented in the works of Pipes, Krauthammer, Lewis, and such figures from the conservative establishment. In this regard it draws upon a range of alternative literature from various disciplines and the wider history of philosophy; this will broaden the debate, enabling a thorough, critical understanding of Islam, its practitioners, and its significance in global politics.

133 CHAPTER SIX

Countering the Neoconservative Framing of (Political) Islam: An alternative historical understanding of the preeminence of Political Islam

In the previous chapter I have discussed the link between neoconservative discourse and the older ontology of International Relations. In discussing the inadequacies and limitations of this connection, I argued why it is important to confront and challenge this dominant form of disciplinary protocol within International Relations. As part of that critical engagement, this chapter challenges the often menacing, threatening and monolithic account of Islam prevalent in neoconservative scholarship, instead depicting Islam as complex, heterogeneous, and conciliatory in its practice and outlook. The analysis draws upon a breadth of literature on Islam inspired by numerous specialists. It examines Middle East literature, postcolonial theory, critical theory, and critical IR as considered alternatives to neoconservative discourse in order to develop an extensive, factually based historical understanding of Islam’s preeminence.

This extensive historical understanding of the preeminence of Islam accounts for how, as a dynamic social and political phenomenon, Islam has outgrown the practices of clergies and state apparatus. Over the centuries Islam has been reinvented by political thinkers, activists, and ordinary people to challenge the authorities, thereby seeking to attain greater social and political goals. This reinvention of Islam as a political means of challenging rulers is not unique. There are numerous accounts in which religion or religious symbols have been used to advance political objectives. The latter part of this chapter demonstrates how an avowedly secular and deeply humane figure – Gandhi – used traditional/religious symbols, including Islam and Islamic symbols, to explain complex social/political issues in a manner that masses could comprehend, relate to, and apply in forms of resistance in order to achieve specific political aims –such symbols transcend their immediate religious significance and act as catalysts of change for political and social concerns.

134

In tracing these factors one confronts Islam in its long tradition of revival (tajdid) and reform (islah) in response to community calls in times of decline and self-doubt. From the 18th to the 20th centuries several Islamic movements sprang up across the Islamic world, responding to diverse social and political demands. In turn, these diverse social and political movements had a deterministic influence over Islam. This kind of political osmosis allowed Islam to expand its political constituency beyond its traditional bases, becoming a global agent of change.

The rise of political Islam is intrinsically linked with social and political upheavals of the 20th century. The reshaping of Europe in the late 19th and 20th centuries directly affected the entire globe, and the Muslim world was no exception to this. The accompanying struggles for power among the imperial European powers were staged in central and eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Ottoman Empire, which suffered its swift and unanticipated demise in the wake of the inconclusive Great Imperial War of 1914–18.357 Situated in this context, the experience of the non-Western world echoed the clash of Europe’s great powers. Caught between the power struggles in the Western world, the non-Western world – the ahistorical world, as Fukuyama prefers to describe it –was transformed beyond recognition. The impact of this transformation was deep and wide, and nowhere was this difference more obvious than in the Muslim world. Contrary to neoconservative claims of a static, non- evolving and atavistic Islamic culture, the Muslim world evolved, transformed and directed aspirations for a better world beyond its immediate experience while enduring the turmoil, upheavals and violence that were not of its making.

Rise and impact of Nationalism

The political upheavals and the restructuring of power in Europe had visible and concrete impacts on the rest of the world. These upheavals saw the emergence of a number of

357It is inconclusive in the sense that few could have imagined the outbreak of another war in two decades and the scale of barbarity and mechanised killing of fellow human beings the world would witness. As TarakBarkawi argues “the Cold War that followed these two wars was by no means cold in the Third World, where millions died in Cold War-related and other violence in the years after 1945”. Barkawi, op. cit., p. 19.

135 independent states in the Middle East hastily carved out by contending European powers (and steadfastly joined by the Americans) with the connivance of selected Sheikhs, ethnic groups and self-serving military leaders, and importantly, fueled by the desire for control over oil. The world witnessed the emergence of a number of kingdoms, emirates and sultanates in the Arabian Peninsula. The present Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and many other Gulf states owe their origin to this narrative. In most cases this outcome did not reflect the aspirations of the people, nor did it have their popular mandate. In many cases the public was relegated to an acquiescent role in nation building, and in the process many communities who had lived in these places for generations suddenly found themselves marginalised, or were coerced or bought into silence. As a result, these people ceased to be a part of any political process, and instead of being governed through dialogue and consent, they were managed by power and force.

The situation was different to a large extent on the eastern Mediterranean seaboard, where Arab nationalists had made inroads and “declared a sovereign state embracing Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine, with its capital at Damascus.”358 Quite early on, nationalism had also made inroads into old established countries including Iran and Egypt, that had maintained a certain degree of independence by appeasing the encroaching imperial powers. As Esposito notes, Iran had long maintained its independence through a fine balance of appeasing two imperial powers: the British in the south and the Russians in the north. He further illustrates the two events that shaped the Iranian nationalism, the Tobacco Protest (1891–92) and the Constitutional Revolution (1905–11) that led to the creation of the National Assembly in 1906.359However, this experiment was short-lived. The nationalists’ agenda was no longer considered important following a change of ruler shortly after and once Britain and Russia had ensured their imperial gains. However, as Esposito

358Muralidharan, op. cit., p. 2134 359The former was a protest against foreign economic dependency and the latter opposed the excessive power of the state. When a British company was granted monopoly over the sale and export of tobacco by the there was a backlash from the wider public led by the affected merchants and supported by the Muslim religious leaders. Realising the popular support for the protest and fearing that the Russians would take advantage of the situation, the Shah surrendered to the protesters’ demand. Emboldened by their success, religious leaders joined with other sections of society – landlords, merchants and army officers – to demand constitutional reforms. Although the Shah initially resisted these demands he eventually conceded to widespread pressure from the public together with Britain and Russia, and this led to the creation of a national assembly in 1906.

136 notes, these early experiences of nationalism encouraged its people to resist foreign domination and interference with a strong reaction that included an Islamic component.

In contrast to Persian nationalism, in its early stage Arab and Egyptian nationalism developed with no Islamic component. In most cases Arab nationalism emerged as a reaction to the irksome control of the Ottoman, and it had limited ambitions in its nationalist agenda. These included a degree of autonomy in internal affairs and the primacy of certain families and their ambitions, for example, the ambitions of the al-Sabahs in Kuwait, the Sauds and the Hashemites in the Arabian Peninsula prevailed over other popular ambitions. Mandates and treaties to a great extent accommodated these limited ambitions. These limited nationalist agendas (of few elites) were further strengthened when hostilities broke out in Europe and the final power struggle in the Western world was arbitrated through the Second World War. At the end of the war the world was divided into two ideological blocs. The traditional elites found it mutually beneficial to stay close to the West. The only countries to embrace the other contending power, the Soviet Union, were those few where the people had removed their traditional elites or opposed the imposition of them (as in Syria). In this process the popular nationalist ambitions of many people did not materialize or were thwarted by the ruling elites, either feudal or military or both.

Compared with the Arabian Peninsula, in Egypt, nationalism and striving for national identity took a different shape. This was mainly because the British occupation had effectively cut off Egypt from the Ottoman Empire and brought it under the direct control of a Western power. Egyptian nationalism developed and took shape against a Western power360. The partition of Palestine after the Second World War and the creation of the state of Israel dramatically altered the quiescent nationalism into a vibrant and dynamic force. At the same time, the anti-colonial movement emerged in many parts of the world, in countries that were impatient to get rid of their colonial masters and their local

360In the early stage a liberal nationalism emerged under the leadership of the Wafd party. Encouraged by the call for self-determination from Woodrow Wilson, early nationalists like SaadZaghlul hoped to gain representation at the 1919 Paris peace conference but this was absolutely denied by the British High Commission. During the war years’nationalism was largely quiescent and the Anglo–Egyptian treaty of 1936 gave Egyptians a degree of autonomy in internal affairs while at the same time guaranteeing British protection from external threats.

137 collaborators, and this added further impetus to Egyptian nationalism. Frustrated by a series of false promises the political constituency was becoming restive and liberal nationalism seemed inadequate to vent that frustration. The appeal of other secular political forces, in particular Arab socialism, was rapidly gaining strong currency. Finally, Egyptian military elites (Free Officers) under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the corrupt regime of King Farouk that had been supported by the West, meaning the end of proxy British rule and liberal nationalism, and the rise of Arab nationalism. In this effort the contributions and support of the Communist Party, labour groups and various religious organisations including the Muslim Brotherhood were of significance. They shared common concerns with the Arab nationalists such as anti-imperialism, Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine, but the religious organisations differed in their world view about Muslim societies and their perceived decline.

In its early phase Arab nationalism with a sense of common identity appealed to nationalist sentiment based on a common language and a heritage rooted in literature and history rather than in religion.361 Similarly, as Esposito observes, the Young Turks emphasised Turkish ethnic and language identity rather than common Ottoman links, and they fostered nascent nationalist sentiment among various ethnic and linguistic groups within the Ottoman Empire over issues of language, identity and political autonomy. The Ottoman Empire experienced the first stirrings of modern forms of nationalism based on these aspects with the tacit support of rival European powers. However, as Esposito notes “Arab and Egyptian nationalism did not really take shape and function as an effective tool in the struggle for independence from European hegemony until after World War I.”362

New Nations – Exclusive Citizenship

The Ottoman Empire fell apart following the First World War. The post-Ottoman period saw the growth of a number of nation states, quickly carved out to suit the mutual interests

361 John Esposito has drawn this point. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 63. 362 Esposito, op. cit., p. 63.

138 of a few feudal chieftains and the West.363 The popular aspirations of the people did not play a significant role in the birth of these states, and in numerous cases resistance to such efforts was dealt with ruthlessly. As a result, many people who considered they belonged to the same community based on shared language, literature and history, found themselves either marginalised or outside the polity of nation building. It is observed that, “at the time of transformation into modern nation-states, most Middle Eastern countries considered all Ottoman subjects as citizens.”364 This status changed dramatically as states deliberately deprived hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of any kind of citizenship, based on a policy of exclusion. Putting this policy in perspective, Olivier Roy explains how the policy of bestowing citizenship based on patrilineal descent in states like Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has contributed

to an increase in the number of stateless and uprooted people among refugees displaced by war (for example, Palestinians who fled in 1948 and 1967, or Afghans), unrecognized minorities (in Syria and Kuwait, hundreds of thousands of permanent inhabitants are deliberately deprived of identity cards by the state: the Makhtumi, or ‘unregistered’, who are Kurds in Syria, and the Bidun, or ‘without [papers]’, who are Arabs in Kuwait).365

In such a condition “children born to a female citizen and a male foreigner cannot request citizenship of the country in which they have been born and brought up.”366 For example, “the marriage of an Iranian woman to an Afghan man, even if both are Persian speaking Shias, is considered illegal unless it has been sanctioned by a special decision of the Cabinet.”367 Similarly, “a child born in Kuwait to a Palestinian father and a Kuwaiti mother has no citizenship”. Unfortunately there is absolutely no legal recourse against this

363 Bin Ladenregarded division of the Islamic world into several countries as un-Islamic, describing it as a tool of western policy – to undermine and weaken the Islamic world. On various occasions he questioned these divisions and the legitimacy of their rulers, inciting the overthrow of these regimes and establishment of a Global Islamic State.(See FBIS Report: Compilation of Usama ’s Statements 1994–Jan 2004, pp. 146–147;

247–252). 364 Roy, op. cit., p. 105. 365Ibid., p. 105. 366Ibid., p. 105. 367 Roy, op. cit., p. 105.

139 systemic deprivation because these inhabitants have no legal status.368 As a result of these policies many inhabitants who had lived on these lands for generations found themselves excluded from any meaningful nation building activities when self-preservation became the immediate challenge. As such the mandate period had already politically isolated these disfranchised people. The growing influence of European power with the connivance of self-serving local chiefs during the mandate period further enhanced the fear of becoming politically and socially irrelevant. To counter this fear, these people already stirred by European colonisation, resorted to national and religious movements to vent their discontent and aspire to attain their legitimate rights. Wilson’s declaration for national self- determination added further impetus to that valid aspiration.

In such a political context many inhabitants realised that to go against the local chieftains would be suicidal. However, they also realised that by responding to the religious and nationalist calls they could not only avoid the wrath of the local rulers but could also justify their actions in terms of a common goal (national liberation from foreign powers) and higher obligation (striving to restore the former glory of Islam). To further this strategy many religious forces (including Islam, the dominant one) joined with local and Arab nationalists to avoid divisions within the resistance movement and to achieve their political rights and restore their community identity.

Islamic Modernisation and its discontent

In this struggle diverse religious movements played a subordinate role to Arab and local nationalism. The reciprocal borrowings from generations of civilisational interaction had already altered a section of the population who acknowledged the importance of Western education, modern institutions and expanding technology. As Esposito observed “Muslim rulers in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Iran looked to the West to develop military, economic, and political modernization programs based upon European learning and

368 The growing frustration and sense of isolation of these floating people should be understood in this context. As Olivier Roy rightly points out “many Al-Qaeda members fit this pattern, such as Ramzi Ahmad Yousef, one of those implicated in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, who was born to a Pakistani Baluchi father and a Palestinian mother,” Roy, op. cit., p. 106.

140 technology.”369 Out of this cross-fertilization, the intellectual elite were born, equipped with modern education and Western outlook. However, this transformation took place, as Esposito illustrates, in a top-down rather than a bottom-up manner. In his view such steps were taken “in reaction to the external threat of European expansionism and not as a response to internal societal pressures.”370 The primary beneficiary of this change was the minority elite while the majority remained outside the change process, still having limited or no access to the benefits of modernization. To win the majority’s support, “Islamic rationales were employed by some to legitimate the transformation; implicit in this process was the gradual acceptance of a secular outlook that restricted religion to personal life while turning to the West for development models in public life.”371 In this effort a series of Western inspired reforms were implemented in social, educational and administrative spheres to “modernize” Muslim societies. As a result “the traditional Islamic basis and legitimacy of Muslim societies were slowly altered as the ideology, law, and institutions of the state, indebted to imported models from the West, were increasingly secularized.”372Although such a top-down modernization process altered the traditional Islamic base and legitimacy of Muslim societies it did not really involve the populace through greater participation in the modernization process nor did it wish to involve people in the decision making processes that are conventionally associated with modernity. This ruler sponsored modernization was essentially self-serving and self-preserving. As Esposito points out it “was primarily motivated by a desire to strengthen and centralize their power, not to share it.”373 In his view “the rulers’ primary interest was in military, bureaucratic, and technological reform, not in substantive political change.”374 A limited concession was allowed when popular uprisings demanded greater public participation in the affairs of the state but demand for serious political reform to limit the power of rulers was either thwarted or crushed, as in the cases of Iran in 1906 in response to the demand for Constitutional Revolution (1905–06) and Egypt where representation was denied at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

369 Esposito, op. cit., p. 54. 370Ibid. 371Ibid. 372Ibid. 373Ibid. 374Ibid.

141

The modernization process sponsored and managed by rulers saw the emergence of a Westernized modern minority and a more traditional, Islamic oriented majority. This chasm was evident in legal, educational and economic systems. As Esposito illustrates, each had its own adherents, agendas and constituencies and as a result the process “also eroded the traditional bases of power and authority of religious leaders, as new classes of modern trained elites assumed positions of importance in government, education, and law, positions which had always been the province of the ulama.”375 The power vacuum created by rendering the role of ulama redundant was not replaced by any of the alternative progressive forces that are usually affiliated with modernity, national liberation and anti- colonial movements. The primary reason for the absence of such forces, as discussed earlier, was that rulers either thwarted or crushed such efforts and a particular type of modernization was in operation to strengthen and centralize their power. In some cases it was also due to the absence of a meaningful or organised bourgeois class. In the absence of other alternatives, it was expected that the Islamic oriented majority would revert back to Islam and its associated heritage, and traditions to express their concerns.

Islam’s homecoming: Role and impact of Religious movements on local nationalism and Arab nationalism

The moderates and the conservatives within Islam who were already worried about the erosion of traditional beliefs and customs with the fast incursion of “modernity” enthusiastically welcome back this (Islam’s) homecoming. A powerful wave of Muslim religious revivalism had gripped the community in the 18th century, addressing its internal sociocultural decline. In addition to this internal challenge the external threat from European colonisation added further impetus to the revival movement. The internal decline along with the external threat to their identity and autonomy, summoned Muslim societies for greater introspection and efforts to resolve this impasse. Esposito, referring to John O. Voll, notes “Islam possessed a rich, long tradition of Islamic revival (tajdid) and reform (islah).”376 In his view “down through the ages, individuals (theologians, legal scholars,

375 Esposito, op. cit., pp. 54–55. 376 Esposito, op. cit., p. 49.

142 Sufi masters, and charismatic preachers) and organisations undertook the renewal of the community in times of weakness and decline, responding to the apparent gap between the Islamic ideal and the realities of Muslim life.”377 The return to Islam also required people to revisit its fundamentals and re-educate themselves about them. Esposito identifies these fundamentals – the , the life of the Prophet, and the early Islamic community – as the model for reform. Based on these, a number of Islamic revival movements sprang up across the Islamic world during the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Notable among them were the Mahdi (1848–85) in , the Sanusi (1787–1859) in Libya, the Wahhabi (1703–92) in Saudi Arabia, the Fulani in Nigeria (1754–1817), the Faraidiyyah of Hajji Shariat Allah (1764–1840) in Bengal, the militant movements of Ahmed Brelwi (1786–1831) in India, and the Padri in Indonesia (1803–37).378

In responding to the internal decline most of these movements found its root cause lay within the Islamic world. The revivalists identified “the political divisions within the imperial sultanates (Ottoman, Safavid, and Mogul) and beyond”, “Muslim departure from true Islamic values, the assimilation and infusion of local, indigenous, un-Islamic beliefs and practices”379 and the emulation and appreciation of other cultures and values as the root causes of the decline of Muslim societies. Once it was realised that the cause of the decline lay within the Islamic communities and their un-Islamic ways of life, it seemed logical for many to return to a “true Islam” and redeem that lost glory. As a result, different revival movements responding to local concerns brought together committed sympathizers or believers around a local leader or an Islamic group with a pledge to purify Muslim communities through a combination of religious commitments and political activism. According to Esposito, over a period of time this process of Islamic reform and renewal based upon a return to fundamentals of Islam led to the creation of several Islamic oriented states. He notes that the Mahdi in Sudan, the Sanusi in Libya, the Fulani in Nigeria and the Wahhabi in Saudi Arabia played significant roles in the creations of these states. The role of colonial policies

377Ibid., p. 49. 378Ibid., p. 50. 379Ibid., p. 50.

143 Although the revival movements played a significant role in the creation of these states they were not the only forces at work. The colonial policies of the time assisted and encouraged local leaders and religious groups to create these states in order to undermine the Ottomans and weaken the Moguls and Safavid from within. British colonial policy encouraged the Hashemite Sherif Hussein of Mecca to rebel and declare himself the sovereign ruler of the Hejaz area and similarly Ibn Saud of the Wahhabi sect to be promoted as the King of Nejd. It is another matter that the British government maintained guarded neutrality concerning the religious disputes between the Hashemites and Saudsthat ultimately created the conditions for the takeover of Hejaz by the Sauds. The Hashemites, the traditional custodians of Mecca and Medina, were exiled, leaving the Hejaz area to the Sauds. The British-guarded neutrality was decisive in enabling the Wahhabis to seize and claim the Hejaz area as part of their territory or kingdom, which later was transformed into the present Saudi Arabia. Sukumar Muralidharan cites the eminent Arab scholar who put this neutrality in perspective. Analyzing the diplomatic phraseology of the then British foreign secretary, Rodinson finds this neutrality a charade. Muralidharan summed up Rodinson’s perspective thus:

Hussein of Mecca proved less than pliable to the British diktat, and entertained ambitions of bringing the entire Arabian Peninsula under his control. Ibn Saud was more favorably disposed to the British, and had some dealings with the Viceroy of British India during the war. British ‘neutrality’ was more or less a charade. Ibn Saud triumphed in his battle against the Hashemites without great bloodshed on either side, because the British tilt in his favor proved decisive.380

It is evident then that British colonial policy played a decisive role in the success of a particular religious movement that happened to serve the interests of an equally favorable ruler (Ibn Saud). A number of authors demonstrate that, although the Muslim revivalist movements started in response to internal decline, over a period of time many were co- opted by rulers (religious or secular) for their own political interests. Irrespective of the rulers’ appropriation, these movements independently “transformed their societies through

380Muralidharan, op. cit., p. 2134.

144 a religiously legitimated and inspired socio-political movement.”381 The impact of these movements was far from homogenous, but irrespective of their regional differences they all agreed-upon and promoted certain ideological world views. Esposito sums up the key features of their ideological stand as:

(i) Islam was the solution; (ii) a return to the Quran and Sunnah (model, example) of the Prophet was the method; (iii) a community governed by God’s revealed law, the was the goal; and (iv) all who resisted, Muslim or non-Muslim, were enemies of God.382

Based on these ideologies the revivalist movements went on spreading and promoting God’s rule to restore Muslim societies. In this process they not only ignited their lost pride and self-esteem but also altered the consciousness of the people as the Khilafat (the restoration of Istanbul Caliphate) movement demonstrated.

Khilafat movement (for the restoration of Istanbul Caliphate): use of religion in transforming and empowering a society

The Islamic revivalist movements of the 18th and 19th centuries, which had addressed internal social and moral decline in Muslim communities and bridged the political divisions across the Islamic world, faced a new political challenge in the early part of the 20th century. A disturbing picture emerged at the end of the First World War that revealed the extent of Western domination over the Muslim world. From Africa to Levant to the Middle East, and from India to South East Asia, the presence of one or other Western powers revealed the politically weak and fragmented nature of the Muslim world. It was also observed that “where Muslims retained power, in Turkey and Iran, they were constantly on the defensive against the political and economic ambitions of the British and the French, and Russians, whose inroads and machinations threatened their independence and stability.”383 Already struggling with its own internal decline, the outside incursion further heightened Muslim apprehension about its independent political and sociocultural identity. In addition to that apprehension, the imminent abolition of the Istanbul Caliphate further

381 Esposito, op. cit., p. 50. 382Ibid., p. 50. 383Ibid., p. 51.

145 convinced many Muslims that their world was ready to be seized by an expansionist Christian West.384 This conviction was self-explanatory. In 1920 Muhammad Ali, a member of the Khilafat committee – whose primary demand was the restoration and continuation of the Istanbul Caliphate – led an Indian delegation to London to warn the colonial government that

Muslims were bound to obey their Holy Prophet, who with his dying breath had commanded them never to surrender control of the Arab lands containing their holy places to any non-Muslim. They could therefore never accept the proposed British and French mandates over Iraq, Syria and Palestine.385

As such “their arguments failed to move Lloyd George: when Muhammad Ali demanded justice for Turkey, the Prime Minister replied that Turkey would indeed get full justice: ‘Austria has had justice, Germany has had justice – pretty terrible justice, why should Turkey escape?’”386

Indian Muslims felt cheated after the First World War when they expected that Britain would honour its war promise to respect the Sultan’s position as Caliph, as the spiritual leader of Islam and as the custodian of the holy places.387 For Britain it was just another war promise designed to secure the loyalty of Indian Muslims during the war period. As Read and Fisher note, “to the British, it was purely a matter between the allies and Turkey and nothing to do with religion, or with India.”388 The allies were interested in dismantling the Ottoman Empire and dividing the territories among themselves, but the Indian Muslims had not accepted this idea and viewed it as a deliberate attempt by the West to undermine

384Evidence suggests a surge in pan-Islamic feeling stirred by the distant figure of the Ottoman Sultan– Caliph/Khalifa, was not uncommon in the Muslim world as it was seen during the Balkan war of 1876–78 and the Graeco–Turkish war of 1896–97. One can imagine the scale of feeling when the very symbol of Muslim power was under mortal threat. 385 Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Proudest Day: India’s long road to independence. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 183. 386Ibid., p. 183. 387 During the war, the British government made this promise to secure the loyalty of Indian Muslims so that the Muslims would not extend their support to the Ottoman (Turkey)–Germany alliance. The Indian Muslims respected the promise and pledged their support to the British and the Allies during the war. (See Esposito, op. cit., pp. 63–65 and Read and Fisher, op. cit., p.111 and pp. 182–190). 388Read and Fisher, op. cit., p. 182

146 the authority of Islam.389 The outcome of the Khilafat meeting with the British Prime Minister further vindicated that view. A bitter and aggrieved Khilafat delegation returned to India to explore other avenues for their grievance.

In its early stage the Khilafat campaigners consisted of “a small minority of Indian Muslims, mostly younger, educated men from the north and a few wealthy merchants in Bombay”390 whereas for the majority of Indian Muslims and non-Muslims it didn’t stir much enthusiasm. The Muslim League was not interested in their campaign and prominent nationalists like Mohammad Ali Jinnah, true to his secular credentials, stayed away from them. The campaign did appeal to Gandhi, who saw it as a weapon to launch a new assault against British rule. Gandhi’s national liberation campaign based on ahmisa (non-violence) had not gathered momentum because of other political developments in India in 1920. In that year, under the leadership of another stalwart Lala Lajpat Rai, the All-India Trade Union Congress was formed to organise the highly politicised labour unions. The Indian Communist Party was also formed in 1920, and peasant associations were being formed all over the country as the first genuine grassroots political movements. These political developments impacted upon Gandhi’s national liberation campaign and in seeking to recharge and launch a new campaign against the British he found a cause in the Khilafat campaign. He thought the Khilafat cause would strengthen Hindu–Muslim unity against British rule and, importantly, he wished to avoid any division within the national resistance movement, which British colonial policy had persistently been trying to create.391 The insignificant support base for the Khilafat campaign dramatically changed once Gandhi extended his whole-hearted support to the cause.

A year earlier Gandhi had received a lukewarm response when he called upon followers to observe the “Khilafat Day” protest in October 1919. This did not dissuade Gandhi and again in November he urged the first national Khilafat conference to adopt the tactic of noncooperation with the British government. As Read and Fisher observe:

389Ibid., p. 182. 390Ibid., p. 182. 391 For detail see Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885–1947 (Delhi: Macmillan India, 1984), especially Chapter V (Mass Nationalism: Emergence and Problems 1917–1927).

147

It was the first time he had used the term, and, as with so many of Gandhi’s pronouncements, even he was not clear what he meant by it. But the delegates resolved to make a start by taking no part in the victory celebrations, and by boycotting British goods.392

The movement was energised with the active participation of the Khilafat delegates recently returned from their failed meeting with Lloyd George. The Khilafat cause with the support of Gandhi and other prominent national liberation leaders turned into a popular mass movement.

The three prominent Khilafat leaders, Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali and Abul Kalam Azad were maulanas, learned men, “and thus automatically commanded the respect of believers, and all three were capable of arousing the masses with rhetoric, appealing directly to their religious fervour.”393 Read and Fisher describe an incident that reflected the capability of their appeal. When Azad called

the Muslims in Sind and North-West Frontier to abandon their homes and join a hijrat, a religious emigration, to Afghanistan, by declaring that India had become dar-ul-harb, an accursed land in which it was a sin for a Muslim to live, because of the disregard for the law of Islam shown by the British government394 many Muslims took his call seriously and around 18,000 of them made the trek across Khyber Pass and reached Afghanistan. In that appeal “they had been told that the Afghans would welcome them with open arms and fertile lands.”395 It is another story that the unprepared Afghans were horrified by the influx and turned them back without food or funds. Despite this blunder, the circumstances under which thousands of people were motivated to leave their homes and land without evidence that the Promised Land would welcome them with prosperity was itself a gigantic step to achieve.

392 Read and Fisher, op. cit., p. 183. 393Ibid., p. 183. 394 Ibid., p. 183 395Ibid., p. 183.

148 By joining the Khilafat campaign to the struggle for national liberation, Gandhi was able to spread the campaign for non-cooperation. In a typical Derridan interpretation whereby readers become co-authors of a text – a position in which the reader draws a particular meaning of a text from within the horizon of her own worldview, beliefs, norms, and practices396– different campaigners of the Khilafat movement drew and interpreted different meanings from the movement based on their own worldviews and acted upon those diverse interpretations, the majority of which had nothing to do with restoration of the Caliphate. Myriad local issues and grievances were aired as part of the movement, including such tangential matters as personal property disputes. Peasants, mill-hands, laborers, textile workers, and untouchable Hindus were encouraged to complain at meetings of Khilafat and the Congress Party – the leading political party in undivided India’s freedom struggle. Participants were radicalised and encouraged to protest against their exploitation by landlords, moneylenders, government, and the innumerable collaborators of the British-India colonial government. For instance, the Moplahs, a landless Muslim peasantry on the Malabar coast, tilled leasehold lands and had a genuine grievance against the Hindu jenmis (landlords).The tension between them continued for some time, with protests and clashes between the Moplahs and the jenmis occurring regularly. The Khilafat transformed these prolonged grievances into a massive popular rebellion. After the Manjeri conference of April 1920, the Khilafat movement adopted the cause of tenant rights that had begun in Malabar in 1916.397 The arrest of established Congress Party and Khilafat

396Derrida’s observation/critique is well illustrated in his work The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987). Derrida’s account deals with the question of modes of transmission of meaning between the author’s intention and the reader’s perception that often challenge the very notion of “meaning”. See also Derrida’s essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Science”, in Writing and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), pp. 278–282. Roxanne L. Euben further illustrates the influence of the concept of horizon on other scholars as put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method. Euben reflecting on Fred Dallmayr’s work (Beyond Orientalism and Alternative Visions) notes that according to Dallmayr – “Jacques Derrida, particularly in his The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, is an important accomplice in developing a (deconstructive) ‘hermeneutics of difference’. Hermeneutics’ central proposition is that all interpreters are ‘situated’, that is, located within particular traditions and defined by what Gadamer calls ‘prejudices’, and that consequently the ‘understanding of the text is conditioned by the self-understanding of the interpretation’” (David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle, p. viii). Interpretation is thus not a matter of a disinterested and unbiased observer finding objective knowledge about a particular subject: interpretation is defined by the hermeneutic circle, the dependence of any interpretation upon prior common understandings embedded (in Gadamer’s case) in language and expression. Escaping the circle requires an illusory perspective outside of tradition (Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, p. 182, n. 81). 397 For details see chapter III and pp. 206–26 in Sarkar, op. cit.

149 leaders further convinced these radical leaders to preach about and promote an egalitarian millennium. In some cases local leaders were said to have promised that in the coming Muslim state “they would not have any expensive litigation, the revamping of the existing police system and providing each according to his needs.”398 As a result of the arrests, the agitation gained considerable popular support and the British lost control over the south Malabar Coast for several months. A number of Khilafat were established under newly declared presidents to flout British colonial rule and existing property structures. Along with the Khilafat agitation, a nationwide peasants’ uprising, organised labour movements, and various trade union strikes paralysed the nation and brought the British government to its knees. The situation was such that in September 1920, a British General Officer Commanding asked for extra artillery reinforcements as he assessed that the situation in Malabar Coast with the Moplahs was a real war.399 It is true, that during the Moplahs’ unrest about 600 Hindus were killed and some 2500 were forcibly converted,400but in comparison a highly disproportionate number of people were killed, wounded and imprisoned during the bloody suppression by the British government. Sarkar observes that in that suppression 2,337 rebels were killed, 1,652 were wounded, and no less than 45,404 were imprisoned.401 The central fact remains that a massive, popular, grassroots anti-imperialist movement was bloodily crushed, exposing the thin veil of British liberalism when its imperial devices and interests were challenged.

In addition to this popular uprising, Gandhi’s unique way of communicating with the masses by raising the issues of untouchability, the evils of liquor, and emphasising Hindu– Muslim unity struck a sympathetic chord among the masses. The emphasis was always on unifying issues and on trying to cut across or reconcile class divisions. As a result, it was quite normal to notice many Khilafat campaigners organising volunteer groups and trade unions. For example, activists such as Muhammad Osman had been active in organising Muslim workers in Calcutta’s industrial suburbs as early as 1921. Another interesting

398 Sarkar, op. cit., p. 216. As one would observe, these promises or declarations were more akin to Marxist practices than to Islam, or perhaps it is possible to suggest Islam as a religion happened to be closer to Marxist practices where the central figure is the Holy Prophet rather than Marx. 399 Sarkar, op. cit., p. 216. 400Ibid., p. 217. 401Ibid., p. 217.

150 aspect of the Khilafat movement was that many, without realising what it meant or confusing it with the Urdu word khilaf, which means “against”, assumed it was a symbol of general revolt against authority and government and were happy that it meant they should oppose the government. An interesting observation has been made by Read and Fisher on Gandhi’s noncooperation and the Khilafat campaign; when Gandhi promised swaraj, freedom, people had an idea what he meant but few people of either faith had much idea what Khilafat meant. They note:

Hindus and Muslims everywhere took up the call, fired by the two key words, ‘swaraj’ and ‘Khilafat’. Swaraj which was clear enough, but out in the boondocks, few people of either faith had much idea what Khilafat meant. However, as it sounded like ‘khilaf’, which is Urdu for ‘against’, they were happy to assume it meant they should oppose the government.402

The movement progressed during the year. By the end of 1921, the nationwide unrest, picketing and protest was showing some results but was also putting strain on many established leaders. The closing down of educational institutions and businesses and the boycott of courts was affecting many prominent leaders who made a living out of those activities. As a result, they demanded that many of the boycott programs were watered down. Added to this there was no sign whatsoever of the swaraj (freedom) that Gandhi had promised would be achieved within a year, and as a result many campaigners turned to look for alternatives.

The combination of nationalism, peasants’ movements and trade union activities transformed many activists like Muzaffar Ahmad and Singaravely Chettiar to work towards establishing the first Communist groups in India, and many would increasingly develop interest in Marxism, for example, S. A. Dange, R. S. Nimbkar and R. V. Nadkarni. Alongwith this development, many who had used the movement to settle long standing grievances over property and labour disputes, which had nothing to do with the Khilafat campaign or the national liberation struggle, returned to their usual business once they achieved their limited goals. Many of the campaigners were increasingly exhausted and

402 Read and Fisher, op. cit., p. 188.

151 disillusioned because there was no sign of swaraj (freedom)that Gandhi had promised, nor was there any sign of the restoration of the Caliphate. The Khilafat movement finally lost all its steam and direction when the Turks under Mustafa Kemal deposed the Sultan and abolished the Caliphate. Contrary to the Khilafat movement’s demand for the Turkish Sultan to assume control of Muslim holy places, the only territories the modern Turks were “interested in retaining was the oil-rich Mosul region and those parts of Thrace and Anatolia which had been ceded to Greece.”403 Mustafa Kemal’s act might have delivered the final blow to the Khilafat movement and the greater Muslim world by abolishing the Caliphate but in the process it transformed a largely impoverished, illiterate and passive Muslim population into socially informed and politically active co-participants against local exploitation, imperialism and foreign rule.

This historical account of Islam while provides rich and powerful insights of its preeminence, however, it is not clear how the current version of militant Islam took currency particularly in the context of war on terror. In order to gain that knowledge, in the following chapter this analysis looks into the impact of the Islamic movements of the 18th and 19th centuries, that originally meant to challenge and reform the internal decline of Muslim societies. This study attempts to interpret the rise of militant Islam in the context of that impact in Chapter Seven.

403Ibid., p. 183.

152 CHAPTER SEVEN

Interpreting the rise of militant Islam

The analysis of this chapter supports the argument that the Islamic movements of the 18th and 19th centuries originally intended to challenge and reform the internal decline of Muslim societies had an asymmetrical impact in shaping Muslim societies. Irrespective of its significance to these revival movements, Islam’s role in shaping Muslim societies was neither homogeneous, nor it was intransigent in regard to the development and influence of other political forces such as nationalism, Western liberalism, and Marxism. In addition to these forces, the Cold War policies and American Foreign Policy in the Middle East had significant influence in further reshaping Muslim societies in general, and the Middle East in particular. In this context, it is possible to suggest a formative link between these historical/political events of the nineteenth and twentieth century and the rise of political Islam particularly its militant version in the later part of the twentieth century and it global outreach at the end of the twentieth century.

It is evident from the previous discussion that the Islamic revival movements of 18th and 19th centuries that originally meant to challenge and reform the internal decline of Muslim societies, later joined and incorporated the agendas of other secular political forces (nationalist, socialist, communist etc.) of the 20th century to get rid of the imperial power that they considered to be the major enemy in their struggle for self-determination and a just Islamic society. Similarly, secular political forces extended their support to religious forces in order to achieve larger common political goals as evident in Gandhi’s support for the Khilafat movement. In doing so these secular forces aspired for a modern, secular and progressive society where religion and religious symbols played a complementary role in achieving those goals. As the years progressed, the intensity of the desire for independence and freedom increased. Realising that it would be impossible to rule and control an increasingly politically enlightened and hostile Muslim world directly, the Western world

153 fragmented the Muslim world (in particular the oil-rich Arab world) in active collaboration with self-serving native rulers and compradors and bequeathed sovereignty to a number of newly created and politically fragile states, in a bid to control them strategically and most importantly, safeguard the supply of oil. At the end of the Second World War and by the early 1950s many sovereign states emerged out of previous colonies or mandate areas, including India and Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria and a number of Gulf principalities.

Two Superpowers, two ideological camps

The world witnessed another equally significant political development after the Second World War with the emergence of two superpowers leading two ideological blocs, the so called Free World and the Socialist bloc. In this political development many old European and colonial powers were relegated to a subordinate role under the two superpowers. Europe was carved into two ideological camps; one (Western Europe) pledging its allegiance to the “Free World” led by the United States and the other (Eastern Europe) pledging its allegiance to the Socialist bloc led by the former USSR. As happened during both World Wars and the colonial period, the rest of the non-Western world was either coerced or coaxed to follow suit.

In this new alignment the conservative Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Bahrain), former Shah-ruled authoritarian state like Iran, and states like Pakistan and Indonesia ruled by military dictators404 embraced and pledged their allegiance to the United States, the leader of the Free World. The United States was happy to endorse their allegiance although the structure of these states defied the core values of freedom, liberty, equality, fraternity, etc. that the Free World and its vanguard the United States proclaimed were so integral to its way of life or its worldview. All the shortcomings such an uncritical alliance entailed were covered under the guise of the “realist” logic or realpolitik.

404It needs to be noted that Indonesia pledged its allegiance to the US later, after Suharto took power. Initially it was hostile to the US.

154 On the other hand, secular and authoritarian states like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan (and Libya joined this camp later) embraced Arab nationalism and pledged their allegiance to the Soviet Union, the leader of the Socialist bloc. Despite their many shortcomings in many social and political aspects these states still promoted secular education to a great extent and continued to emphasise the primacy of the state over religion. It is true that many Pan Arab nationalists and socialists emphasised this point, following what early modernists like Taha Husayn had stressed, that “modern needs of society would be best be served by the separation of religion and politics.”405Husayn further maintained that the future of Muslim societies would be best achieved not by returning to an Islamic past or the path of Islamic modernism but rather by aggressively pursuing Western-oriented liberal, secular reform.406 A number of governments advocating such views came to power in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan and Libya. Many leaders of these countries were influenced by the rise of Nasser and his call for Pan-Arab identity and unity.

Nasser and Pan-Arabism

From the 1950s onwards the rise of Nasser and Pan-Arabism influenced and inspired many Arab leaders to follow Nasser. A brief account recorded by John Esposito reveals the scale of that influence.407 According to this account, Sudan’s Nimeiri and Libya’s Qaddafi seized power based on Nasser’s 1952 army uprising and espousing the value of Arab nationalism/socialism and Arab unity. The Tripoli Pact of 1970 was specifically designed for the complete merger of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. It was never implemented but nevertheless it highlighted the influence of Arab nationalism in its heyday. The rapid ascent of Nasser after the Suez crisis significantly influenced and determined the secular segment of Arab politics. Nasser was credited with standing up to the West and defeating European colonialism not only in the Arab and Muslim world but in the broader non-Western world. He became a symbol of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism in much of the non-Western world. Much to the discomfort of the West, Nasser went on to build the Aswan Dam and

405 Esposito, op. cit., p. 60. 406Ibid., pp. 60–61. 407Ibid., pp. 67–92 and John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds.), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (London: Hurst, 2000).

155 the Halwan steel plant with the Soviet assistance when the United States withdrew its promised loan to build the dam.408 Nasser’s cult-like personality had a spellbinding effect not only on Egyptian and Arab masses but over the larger world that was still fighting against colonialism and imperialism. To broaden and secure his leadership throughout the Arab and Muslim world Nasser, like the early Islamic reformists, emphasized common heritage, language and history rather than religion. Epitomising the historical–political experience of the anti-colonial, anti-imperial and national liberation struggles in much of the non-Western world at the time, Nasser’s message appealed to the mood of the moment. He highlighted and exposed the political divisions, disparities and miseries of the Arab and Muslim world and attributed the causes as much to imperialism and colonialism as to self- serving Sultans, Kings, Emirs and their compradors. Like many he questioned the legitimacy of these rulers and their states created during the mandate period and the interwar period. Like the early reformers Nasser and fellow Pan-Arabists attributed the Arab and Muslim world’s predicament as much to its internal failures as to outside intervention or interference.

It has been noted that “the emergence of the Arab nationalism/socialism of Nasser and the Baath party signaled a period in which local or state nationalism was transformed into or equated with a transnational, Pan-Arab nationalist sentiment that stressed Arab political unification and independence from foreign domination.”409 Both Nasserites and Baathists blamed Arab ills on colonialism, imperialism and rivalry for power among its Sheikhs, Kings and Emirs who were created by Western power and who supported and served Western interests. They questioned the artificial divisions imposed upon the Arab populace by Western powers with the connivance of these self-serving rulers. Furthermore, they questioned the elitism and exclusivity that grew with the exploration for oil after the Second World War and hammered home the point that “Arab oil belongs to the whole Arab world” not to a few selected families. This resonated not only with the large impoverished local population but also among the larger non-Western world deprived of many basic

408 Ahmad, op. cit., p. 304. See also Saïd K Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of The House of Saud. (London: Bloomsbury, 2005), pp. 159–160. 409 Esposito, op. cit., p. 72.

156 necessities that the majority in the Western world took for granted.410 The Nasserites and the Baathists also highlighted that the structural divisions has rendered the Arab world incapable of thwarting Western domination and interference.411 According to them the strongest example of that incapability was the creation of Israel and the dispossession of the Palestinian people from their own land.412

Suez crises, Nasser, and American foreign policy in the Middle East

Nasser’s stand on the Suez crises challenged that view. It drove home the message that a true Arab leader can successfully confront the West and maintain independence. After the Suez standoff Nasser’s popularity soared, but the goodwill the United States had earned in handling the crises quickly dissipated; for the United States, post-Suez success in the Arab world was short-lived. Advised by pro-Nasser CIA operators who were distrustful of traditional rulers, the ruling combination of Eisenhower and Dulles believed that if a non- traditional, modern popular leader like Nasser could be won over to the Western orbit, it would not only enhance America’s image in the Arab and larger Muslim world, but would also ease the way for the promotion and application of US policy in the Middle East.413 The two other factors that dominated the US foreign policy establishment after the end of the Second World War were the need to contain the Communist movement and Soviet incursions into world affairs, and to safeguard the state of Israel and support its Zionist credentials.

The United States had secured its position in the Arab world by the early 1950s.Pro- Western monarchs reigned in the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE), while there was a Hashemite ruling Jordan, a pro-Western Prime Minister (Nuri al-Said) ruling in the name of another Hashemite king in Iraq, and a President (Camille Chamoun) in Lebanon. To complicate the situation, the Shah had been restored to his throne in Iran in 1952, derailing Mossadegh’s republican nationalist experiment. Although not an Arabic

410Aburish, op. cit., pp. 124–133. 411 Esposito, op. cit., p. 70. 412Ibid., p. 70. 413Aburish, op. cit., pp. 158–161.

157 country, as a Muslim country Iran’s support for Israel was vital. With such a hegemonic position the question could be asked, why was the US bothered with winning Nasser over into the Western orbit? There were two reasons. First, as an active sponsor of such regimes the United States would have realised that with their questionable legitimacy none of them had popular support among their constituencies and none had the moral right to make peace with Israel in a way that would have remotely convinced its own people, let alone the world. Second, claiming itself as the leader of the Free World and without the legacy of a coloniser it was usual for the US to warm to a popular leader (like Nasser) who had broken away from the past to legitimate and buttress its claim in the Arab and larger Muslim world. By the rules of transitive logic, the support of Nasser was taken as support from the Arab world, and an extrapolation of that logic would imply support from the greater Muslim world.

However, Nasser was not a political novice. As with many of his generation, memory of living under colonial rule was fresh and tormenting. To surrender to the Western orbit would have been political suicide for him: he had stood up to the West and such a move would have neutralised the legitimacy and popularity he had gained during his ascent to power. In the early years opposition from within his own rank-and-file and from outside impelled him to seek a global profile and international support, which he secured at the Bandung summit. Aijaz Ahmad has argued in an entirely different context that “Nasser’s own coup and subsequent anti-British moves had been designed largely to pre-empt the possibility of a Communist revolution from the Left, as well as to neutralise the Muslim Brotherhood [Ikhwan-ul-Muslimun] on the right.”414 Ahmad illustrates that the stature Nasser gained at Bandung prepared him “for a showdown with the British over Suez the next year, which was to lead to nationalisation of the canal, the tripartite invasion of Egypt…and Nasser’s rise to unassailable hegemony in Arab nationalist politics for the next fifteen years.”415 In this context it would have been unwise for him to accede unhesitatingly to American pressure. The derailment of Mossadegh’s nationalist government in Iran and the installation of the Shah to the throne had raised deep-seated suspicion about Anglo-

414 Ahmad, op. cit., p. 304. 415Ibid., p. 304.

158 American motives among progressives in the Middle East, and this may have led Nasser to be cautious about taking steps to join the US-led Western bloc. He had already created his own niche and support bloc at Bandung that had propelled him onto the World stage alongside figures like Nehru and Sukarno who were actively involved in the national liberation struggle of their own countries. It is easy to see why Nasser was cautious about losing that stature and why he did not rush to embrace a lesser position that would have put him on a par with the Shah of Iran and other Arab monarchs whose legitimacy had been questioned from their very inception.

On the other hand, the patience of the Eisenhower–Dulles administration was growing thin. Using the logic of the McCarthyist terror in society at large, in the Cold War idiom Nasser’s unyielding stance was interpreted as one of “not being for us meant being against us.”416As a result the same far Right intransigence in the grip of McCarthyism not only saw Nasser as a threat to American interests and the Free World but also as a subversive political force that could upset the carefully contrived situation in the Middle East that the Euro-American powers had so skillfully put together in the first place. The Eisenhower administration was irritated by the Syrian Baathists’ consistently neutralist stance, and also interpreted that in the Cold War idiom of not being with us meant being against us. The US “sought alliance from its client states to teach Syria a lesson and perhaps topple the regime.”417 In a countermove “Syria sought security in association with the other Pan- Arabist (albeit very different) of Nasser’s Egypt.”418 This voluntary union gave birth to the United Arab Republic, federating Egypt and Syria in 1958.

This voluntary union was short-lived, but in its immediate wake alarm bells rang in the pro- Western capitals of the Arab world. The Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri al-Said and President

416It is sobering to remember that the same terror compelled Charlie Chaplin to leave the US and live in exile for the rest of his life. Two decades later another deeply conservative and highly intolerant administration denied a visa to Gabriel Garcia Marquez on the pretext of the subversive nature of his writing, which was perceived to have the potential to disrupt/harm the American way of life. If something as innocuous a vocation as acting or writing is perceived to be a potential threat to American society, it is easy to imagine the perceived magnitude of a threat that challenges American policy and the establishment from a popular leader who also happens to be an Arab and a Muslim. 417Muralidharan, op. cit., p. 2133. 418Ibid., p. 2133.

159 Camille Chamoun were especially perturbed. Said had earlier played an active role on behalf of the British during the Suez crisis and took the lead in “seeking and obtaining, a federation with Jordan as a counter weight.”419 Rather than leaving the matter there, he further “lobbied hard for a military campaign against Syria, conducted jointly with the Anglo–American forces, to detach it from the Egyptian orbit.”420 This move proved to be his undoing: “instead of marching to the Syrian frontier, the troops marched to the Royal Palace, and decimated the remnants of the Hashemite dynasty in whose name al-Said ruled. Said himself escaped, but was discovered the next day and lynched.”421 The Pan-Arab tide not only took over another pro-Western capital but “the message of Suez was further underlined – that the Arab quest for identity depended crucially on the maintenance of an adversarial posture towards the imperialist powers.”422

Ignoring this blunder and instead of learning its lesson, the United States emphasised the Eisenhower Doctrine (possibly an ideological precursor of “Reagan Doctrine”, a term coined by Charles Krauthammer, a luminary of the neoconservative establishment) and looked for another trusted client from the region to check the wave of Pan-Arabism. There were not many choices for the US or the Free World in their quest to contain the wave of Pan-Arabism. Iran was firmly within the Western orbit but it was not an Arab state and as such was facilitating the British in maintaining the security of the littoral states of the Gulf (Bahrain, Oman and the UAE).After the British left their last Gulf outpost the security of those states fell to Iran. Of the two remaining Gulf states, the tiny principality of Kuwait was not considered for obvious reasons, so the logical choice was Saudi Arabia, which had steadfastly maintained its loyalty and pliability towards its colonial/Western masters/sponsors with a history of matching brutality. It was not a large state like Egypt or Iraq but it was not as insignificant as Bahrain or Kuwait which, even with adequate assistance, lacked the potential to be a counter force to Pan-Arabism. At least Saudi Arabiahad some potential that could be developed as a potent counter-force against Pan- Arabism or Nasserism, and, with a friendly Iran in the region, it was a valid belief that

419Ibid., p. 2133. 420 Ibid. 421 Ibid. 422 Ibid.

160 Saudi Arabia could be developed as a counter force in alliance with other Western client states.

US-Saudi Arab partnership: a brief account

From the very foundation of the kingdom Saudi Arabia needed the support of the Western powers (first the British and later the Americans) more than they needed its support, but with the changing political landscape, the Americans needed Saudi support in equal measure. The rapid political changes demanded an equally bold partnership that would not only keep the wave of Pan-Arabism at bay but would also ensure the continuity of a mutually beneficial partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It is also true that Saudi Arabia had few alternatives, and as William Quandt observes, although it always wanted to stay clear of Arab politics it was drawn into them because Pan-Arabism threatened Saudi interests and safety.423 Here, now was a situation that the could not ignore; if they accepted Pan-Arabism or Nasser they were doomed and to confront Nasser simply to contain Pan-Arabism would have been equally counterproductive. They had to find an alternative course of action.

Saudi foreign policy and the rise of Pan-Islamism

With American support the Saudis arrived at a policy that would not only contain Pan- Arabism and undermine Nasser but would also unleash internecine hostilities among fellow Arabs and Muslims in the following years whose consequence would be felt right up until the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the present war on terror. As observed, “to counter Nasser’s ideological offensive, Saudi Arabia offered Pan-Islamism as an ideological alternative to Arab nationalism.”424 The establishment of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the World Muslim League were specifically designed to serve this purpose. The Organization of the Islamic Conference served to coordinate the foreign policies of Muslim countries while the World Muslim League was initiated to promote Saudi influence in the

423Aburish, op. cit., p. 126. 424Anwar-ul-HaqAhady, “Saudi Arabia, Iran and the conflict in Afghanistan”, in William Maley(eds.), Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban. (London: Hurst and Company, 2001), p. 118.

161 Muslim cultural and religious spheres.425 As a result many anti-Nasser activists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Yemeni royalists who had escaped the pro-Nasser republican regime and other anti-Nasser forces in the Arab world found a sponsor and safe haven in Saudi Arabia. Droves of anti-Nasser activists of various ideological colors moved to Saudi Arabia where they were indoctrinated with Wahhabi teachings, encouraged and materially supported to campaign against governments who were perceived to be threats to Saudi interests or gravitating to a Pan-Arab camp under Nasser.426 The Yemeni civil wars, the unrest in Sudan, the lawlessness in Somalia, and of course the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan substantially owe their origins to this narrative.

The Saudi policy of promoting a rigid Islamic identity at the expense of an Arab one to confront Nasser was not limited to the Arab world but expanded to the non-Arab world and to regimes that were perceived detrimental to Saudi interests. In this effort a rigid Islamic identity challenged the religious neutrality (Communist, secularist and nationalist) of other non-Arab Muslim countries, tried to undermine their credentials on that basis and often branded them as godless. According to the rules of transitive logic this was tantamount to their being enemies of Islam. Of course this policy was comfortably overlooked for friendly countries such as Pakistan that since its foundation had been ruled mainly by military dictators. The Saudi policy of promoting Islam over Arabism finally prevailed with Nasser’s defeat in the 1967 Arab–Israel war and this also signaled the end of the golden years of Pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism and the consolidation of Saudi Arabia’s position as the leader of the Islamic world.427

Sadat and Egypt’s return to pro-Western camp

The preeminence of Saudi Arabia was further enhanced with Nasser’s death in 1972.His successor distanced himself from the former USSR and proactively developed a partnership with the Saudis, veering towards the Western camp. Trying to establish

425 Ibid., p. 118 426 Revolutionary Iran also played a similar role later in Lebanon and Palestine. 427 See Esposito, op. cit., pp. 10–11 & 72–73, and Aburish, op. cit., pp. 132–136. For a discussion of Saudi Arabia’s effort to establish its leadership in the Islamic world, see AdeedDawisha, Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security. (London: Adelphi Paper no. 158, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), pp. 8–13.

162 himself as a leader in his own right and to “enhance his political legitimacy, he turned to and relied heavily upon Islam.”428 This served him on two fronts. First, it portrayed him as a “believer President“, while more importantly it contained the growing opposition from the Nasserites and Left forces who opposed his pro-Western economic and political policies. Under the pretext of Islam, Sadat pushed to legitimise “key government actions and policies such as the 1973 Egyptian–Israeli war, the Camp David Accords, and Muslim family law reforms, and importantly the open door economic policy.”429

Rise of political Islam and the consolidation of American power in the Middle East

All of these changes in the period 1975–79 served to secure the US position in the Arab world and the greater Muslim world. Along with the traditional client states, Egypt was brought back into its sphere of influence. The Shah of Iran was already projecting himself as the gendarme of the Gulf and, Iraq and Syria, which remained outside its sphere of influence, were contained by its most trusted ally Israel. Similarly, in the larger Muslim world, the world’s most populous Muslim country – Indonesia – was in the iron fist of Suharto, another trusted ally of the West at the time, who had decimated half a million of his own people in the name of avoiding a Communist takeover.430 The global outreach of American power over the Middle East and the larger Muslim world was more or less complete and “within the Arab world, that view of the Soviet Union as an imperialist power had surely by then become quite widespread, endorsed not by the PLO but by the partnership between Anwar Sadat and the Saudi monarch.”431 The US-approved, Saudi- sponsored policy of promoting Islam over Arab nationalism, Nasserism and Communism ultimately prevailed. The Saudi policy of driving a wedge between Islam and Arabism ultimately paid dividends, and Islam again returned as a significant force in the policies of many Muslim nations, with the active support and policy of many state actors.

428 Esposito, op. cit., p. 94. 429Ibid., pp. 94–95. 430 Ahmad, op. cit., p. 304. 431Ibid., p. 292.

163 Iranian revolution, invasion of Afghanistan and US-Saudi policy paralysis

This situation abruptly came to an end with the Iranian revolution and the dramatic political changes in Afghanistan. The Iranian revolution not only challenged the Saudis’ Islamist position but vehemently argued that monarchy was incompatible with Islam. It also claimed that Saudi Arabia’s close relations with the United States were against the interests of the Muslims. The Saudi establishment became particularly alarmed when a group of Saudi zealots asserting the illegitimacy of the royal family occupied the grand in Mecca in 1979. This seizure continued for two weeks until French paratroopers killed most of them by flooding the building and applying electricity to it.432 The self-proclaimed custodian of the holy places did not find it odd to use infidels to storm the mosque and quash the rebellion. The result of this suppression was costly: 227 people were killed and 400 were wounded, and in a bizarre display of their authority, 63 rebels “were distributed all over the country and beheaded publicly without trial and watched by the viewers on live television.”433 True to their credentials the threat to the regime was once again doused with unspeakable brutality but the challenge from within and outside to their Islamic credentials continued to trouble the regime.

Once described by President Nixon as the twin pillars of Gulf stability, Saudi Arabia and Iran were portrayed as the showcases of American policy success in the Middle East. Now, post-Shah Iran was not only vehemently anti-American and anti-Israel but also opposed the Gulf monarchs. As part of its revolutionary agenda Iran took leading role in exporting its Islamic credentials and as part of that role its media constantly portrayed its views against Israel and America, reminded the region’s people about the excesses of Gulf elitism and exposed the grand scale of corruption in Saudi Arabia. Iran’s Islamic stance eroded the Islamic credentials of Saudi Arabia that it had built at the expense of Arab nationalism/socialism and other secular forces and highlighted the Saudi–American partnership as fundamentally wrong and detrimental to the interests of Muslims and Islam. With their policy in deadlock in the Middle East, both the Saudis and the United States

432Aburish, op. cit., p. 108. 433Ibid., p. 108. For a discussion of the Mecca seizure also see Esposito, op. cit., p. 19 and Roy, op. cit., pp. 285 & 287.

164 looked for alternatives to salvage the policy impasse and leadership credibility. They found the answer in the Afghan conflict.

Afghan crisis: a brief account

Afghanistan faced a unique political dilemma. In its checkered political history political stability had been secured by maintaining a delicate balance between the interests of the numerically dominant Pashtuns and the interests of other ethnic groups and distributing the resources accordingly. As William Maley suggests, “a top-heavy centrally invested power structure rarely functioned in Afghanistan and when it did rarely worked as during the rule of Abdul Rahman Khan, who ruled from 1880 to 1901 it exacted a terrible human price.”434 As a predominantly pastoral and agricultural society with diverse ethnic and linguistic groups Afghanistan drew its legitimacy from the prudential support of diverse local elites by catering to their prerogatives and competing interests.435 As Maley illustrates, its complex social structure hardly allows “any simple stratification along lines of class – a concept with limited value in the analysis of Afghanistan’s micro societies – but tends rather to reflect the importance of bonds of kinship and reciprocity.”436 As a result of this dynamic, “groups have suffered systematic disadvantage tending to reflect Weberian-style social closure, in which certain groups like the Hazaras, by virtue of their distinctively oriental appearances have particularly been victim.”437 It is important to understand this web-like character of Afghan society before embarking on any analysis.

Afghan polity built on this web-like character by maintaining and respecting a fine balance among its ethnic and linguistic constituents (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and other groups). In this delicate balancing act organised religious groups never played a determining role in Afghanistan’s polity, however, “insensitivity to key interests of the religious establishment attracted severe backlash as Amanullah discovered to his cost in 1928–29.”438Maley

434 William Maley, “Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban”, in William Maley (eds.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. (London: Hurst and Company, 2001), pp. 5–6. 435Ibid., p. 4–7. 436Ibid., p. 5. 437Ibid., p. 5. 438Maley, op. cit., p. 8.

165 provides a succinct account that highlights the ineffectiveness of religious mobilization prior to the coup in 1978. According to this account:

Those who sought to oppose the unveiling of women from 1959 were swiftly repressed, and while a significant Muslim youth movement…took shape, those of its members who attempted an uprising against the Daoud regime, in the Panjsheer Valley in 1975, were crushed with ease by the Afghan army.439

The coup brought an end to this situation, rupturing “once and for all the delicate equilibrium by which the state had survived one in which strategic distribution of resources and respect for the prerogatives of local elites had secured the prudential support of those whom the central authorities were unable to intimidate.”440 The rebellion started as a result of an economic crisis triggered by the decline in foreign aid that resulted in a reduction in government job opportunities. Many Afghans with Western-style education confidently expected to secure government jobs in a country where the majority of the population was engaged in agricultural and pastoral activities.441This disgruntled group joined with a section of Soviet-trained army personnel to create the conditions for a radical shift in Afghanistan’s politics that ultimately resulted in the coup and the killing of the moderately Left and Soviet-leaning President Mohammad Daoud. What ensued was a power struggle between the hardline Khalq faction and the moderate Parcham faction within the communist People’s Democratic Party. From a narrow support base the Khalq tried to impose a radical agenda that many found detrimental to their interests and which had the potential to disrupt the finely balanced social order.442 As a result, the hardliners increasingly faced ferocious popular resistance. According to Maley, “the combination of popular resistance and intra-elite antagonism set the scene for the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 by the regime’s Soviet backer.”443

439Ibid., p. 8. 440Ibid., p. 7. 441 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 77. 442Maley, op. cit., p. 7. 443Ibid., p. 7.

166 The coup drastically changed the finely balanced social order that was based on a strategic distribution of resources and respected the prerogatives of local/ethnic elites. Most rulers who facilitated and led Afghanistan’s modernisation process understood the importance and complexity of kinship bonds, familial ties, ethnic dynamics and the ways a predominantly pastoral society made sense of this web-like structure. It is unlikely that the post-coup leaders were unaware of the complexity of this web-like structure of Afghan society but rather they were under the misconception that by either ignoring or silencing these concerns they could successfully impose their policies.444 In this effort the coup leadership tried to deploy symbolic measures to highlight its secular credentials and ideological attachment to the Soviet Union. As Maley points out “it is therefore hardly surprising that opposition to the regime was rhetorically articulated in religious terms”445

The Saudi-Pakistan policy response to Afghan crisis

The Saudi and Pakistan establishments realised that they could use the situation in Afghanistan to their advantage and exploit it as a diversionary tactic, so as to contain at least temporarily some of the violent antagonism that was threatening both nations from within and outside. For the Saudis this was a situation that could allow them to strengthen their Islamic credentials at home and reassert their leadership position in the larger Muslim world which was threatened and undermined by post-Shah Iran. In the case of Pakistan and its Islamic military dictator (Zia al-Haq) it was a question of his own survival.446 He was

444 A similar parallel can be seen in the post-Saddam Iraq where the US appointed administration led by Paul Bremmer ignored these traditional dynamics and faced ferocious hostilities. 445Maley, op. cit., p. 8. 446 Steve Coll provides an excellent analysis on Zia al-Haq and his position concerning the Afghan conflict. Coll, citing an ISI Brigadier, notes that “yes, Zia was a devout Muslim, [but he] was too much of a politician to have the fundamentalist fervour. Without Zia there could have been no successful jihad, but behind all the public image there was always the calculating politician who put his own position foremost….He also sought to safeguard Pakistan, and at times he showed himself willing to compromise with the Soviets over Afghanistan, through negotiations.... He feared that Kabul's communists would stir up Pashtun independence activists along the disputed Afghanistan–Pakistan border, Pashtuns comprised Afghanistan's dominant ethnic group, but there more Pashtuns living inside Pakistan than inside Afghanistan. A successful independence campaign might well shatter Pakistan once and for all. Within a year of the Soviet invasion, about one million Afghan refugees had poured into Pakistan threatening social unrest. Soviet and Afghan secret services had begun to run terrorist operations on Pakistani soil, as far inland as Sind. A strong hold of the Bhutto family, Sind was hotbed of opposition to Zia…. To avoid this Zia felt he needed to carry the Afghan jihad well across the Khyber Pass, to keep the Soviets back on their heels. A war fought on Islamic principles could also help Zia shore up a political base at home and deflect appeals to Pashtun nationalism.” For details see Steve Coll,

167 facing mounting opposition after dislodging a populist social democracy and was desperate to drag Pakistan out of a gloomy economic downturn (as a result of three wars, bad rulers and the absence of a meaningful civil society). The turmoil in Afghanistan provided both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with the opportunity to divert the internal and external antagonism they were facing against communism and radical Shiism (the Iranian brand of radical Islam), a stance that United States approved.

Saudi response to Iranian revolution and the Iraqi woes

The direct threat from Iran was dealt with by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United States giving encouragement in varying degrees to Iraq to attack Iran. As “the second most populous among the littoral states of the Gulf, and largest among the Middle East Arab states, Iraq has always felt entitled to a longer stretch of coastline than the few kilometers that the British partition bestowed them.”447 After the British withdrawal from their last Persian Gulf outpost in 1971, the Iraqis were emboldened to take action. Their plan did not materialise because Iran was put in the charge of the security of the Gulf States and the Shah of Iran projected himself as the new gendarme of the Gulf.448 The Shah’s steadily growing military might over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway was unacceptable to Iraq. It was not possible at the time to directly confront the Western backed Iran but Kuwait seemed an easier target for Iraq, as the 1973 showdown with Kuwait demonstrated.

The factors behind making Kuwait the target are illustrated by Sukumar Muralidharan, who provides a succinct account of the reasoning behind the choice. As he notes:

A prospective site for an Iraqi oil-loading port at Umm Qasr on the Gulf was found to suffer from a serious drawback – the maritime approach to the site ran through Kuwaiti territorial waters. In particular, the tiny Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan obtruded most inconveniently into waters that Iraq could otherwise have asserted their claim over. In March 1973, Iraqi government of General Hasan

Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and , from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 61–62. 447Muralidharan, op.cit., p. 2135. 448Ibid., p. 2135.

168 al-Bakr – quite unilaterally – presented the Kuwaiti Emir with a ‘draft treaty’. Among other things, the draft guaranteed Iraq the absolute right to transport, process, and load crude oil at particular sites in Kuwait, for no monetary consideration. The draft was rejected on sight by Kuwait. The next day, Iraqi troops occupied two Kuwaiti border outposts. Saudi forces were moved to the Kuwaiti border as a gesture of solidarity … Negotiation followed, and Iraqi troops withdrew in … April. It was rumored then, that Kuwait had bought the truce through the payment of an unspecified fortune in dinar.449

Furthermore, “a 1975 agreement with Iran, brokered by friendly Arab states, marked out clear jurisdictions over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. But the entire Iraqi seaboard remained ill-equipped to handle ships of large draughts.”450 Over the years the denial of access to the sea further escalated Iraqi frustration. The overthrow of the Shah in 1979 did not deliver any result to the Iraqis. The Iraqi frustration was tapped by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (by rhetorically using the Arab card against the Persian threat) and approved by the United States. They encouraged Saddam Hussein to start a military campaign against Iran to rectify the most glaring anomaly of the political geography of the Persian Gulf region. The campaign lasted eight years with no tangible results and served to compound Iraqi frustration. Iraq was burdened with a huge debt incurred during its conflict with Iran. Economic austerity was clearly on the agenda and the wealthy “Arab brothers” were less inclined to rescue Iraq from the debt trap. A convoluted sense of possessing enormous power and its role (in bankrolling) in the war effort against Iran emboldened Kuwait to believe that the world around it owed it a great debt for its service. In an act of defiance, instead of assuaging the Iraqi frustration “Kuwait increased its output of oil, which of course lowered the price of Iraqi oil, and started demanding repayment of loans from war- torn Iraq, setting the stage for Saddam’s invasion.”451

It is sobering to remember that “as vice-president of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council in 1973, Saddam Hussein had been one of the prime instigators of the showdown

449 Ibid, op. cit., p. 2135. 450Ibid., p. 2135. 451Barkawi, op. cit., p. 36.See also Aburish, op. cit., pp. 173–180.

169 on the Kuwaiti border.”452 In the changing circumstances, he seemed less inclined to compromise on what he thought as his legitimate reward for all his efforts to safeguard his Arab brothers. The debt and the losses (both human and material) Iraq incurred during this protracted war meant that the country was showing all the signs of a sluggish economy and a post-war depression. These circumstances possibly necessitated an external adventure that might “serve a diversionary purpose in this respect that could contain some of the violent antagonism that threatened the Iraqi nation from within.”453

Iraq marched towards Kuwait believing it had Washington’s approval, but Washington, Britain and their allies had other designs, namely to eliminate the only Middle East power capable of challenging the US hegemony over the Arab world. Iraq was heavily armed during the Iraq–Iran war, receiving both material and logistic support from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States. It received direct American support against Iran that included sharing intelligence data gathered by AWACS, early warning aircraft supplied to Saudi Arabia, and the United States also offered to supply the ultra-sophisticated Harpoon missile to maintain Iraq’s technological edge over Iran.454

At the end of the Iraq–Iran war Iraq emerged militarily strong and economically shattered, whereas an angry Iran was forced to revisit its radical Islamic policies. With the death of Khomeini, Iran abandoned its policy of exporting revolutionary ideas and concentrated on its own Persian nationalism. Iraq was unlucky on that front because Arab nationalism had run out of steam for all concerned (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States) who to varying degrees encouraged Hussein to carry proudly the Arab flag in confronting Iran. The Cold War was over and the United States had emerged victorious, remaining as the world’s sole superpower. The United States, its allies and its client states were in no mood to redress Iraqi frustration or change their Middle East policies that Iraq blamed for much of its woes. In addition to this intransigence Saddam Hussein’s demand for the withdrawal of the American fleet from the Gulf further isolated Iraq. Hussein was portrayed as a dangerous man unworthy to rule and Iraq was rendered as a pariah state.

452Muralidharan, op. cit., p. 2135. 453Ibid., p. 2135. 454Aburish, op. cit., pp. 171–172.

170 The response from the United States and its allies was swift and severe. The havoc unleashed upon the Iraqi population and the collateral damage caused in the region were overshadowed by theincredible display of US military might. In addition to this damage a decade of sanctions followed the Gulf War and had a catastrophic effect on the Iraqi people. It placed further pressure on a fragile economy that had never quite recovered from its eight-year war against Iran. The human disaster in Iraq was deeply felt in the Arab world.455

The war also made the entire region poorer. Jordan and Yemen suffer economic downturns while the income per capita in Saudi Arabia plunged from $28,600 in 1981 (equivalent to the United States in the same year) to $6,800 in 2001.456 Despite the war expenditure, the West, in particular the United States did extremely well during that period. It secured the positioning of equipment in the oil states, established a tripwire in Kuwait, and it was also able to negotiate acceptance of the presence of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula. During the 1990s “while the American economy boomed, the Arab economies grew only 0.7% annually, and the Islamic states in onetime Soviet Central Asia actually contracted without big subsidies from Moscow.”457

The US policy, Afghan crisis and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism

In the post-Cold War jubilation, the West and the United States ignored these disturbing developments and did not give them adequate attention. The West and the United States were awestruck as the Soviet Union totally unraveled, and a few months later the Gulf campaign commenced. The shock and surprise at the dismantling of the Soviet Union (preceded by the fall of the Berlin Wall) was so great that a section of the intelligentsia

455Barkawi, op. cit., p. 36. 456 For a detailed discussion, see Eric Rouleau, “Trouble in the Kingdom”, Foreign Affairs, 2002, 81, July– August. See also Fouad Ajami, “The Sentry’s Solitude”, Foreign Affairs, 2001, 80, November–December. The sanctions prohibited countries like Jordan and Yemen conducting business with Iraq. Their economy was significantly influenced by the Iraqi economy and Iraqi oil. For example, Jordan’s oil need was complemented by the supply of free Iraqi oil. 457Business Week (1 October 2001, p. 47), cited in Timothy W.Luke, “Postmodern Geopolitics”, in A Companion to Political Geography, John A. Agnew, et al.(eds), 2003, p. 224.

171 even went ahead and cheerfully declared these events effectively augured “the end of history” that argued liberal democracy in its particularly American embodiment was the “final form of human government” and the final point of mankind’s ideological evolution. Although such jubilation is understandable it often hides the historical events that warrant such an outcome. On that jubilant note the United States simply walked away from Afghanistan leaving the country to its warring factions. The factional antagonism that in the first place ensured the unrest and later turned into full-scale war was not resolved. With Soviet aid cut off completely following the failure of the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow (which destroyed the political positions of those committed to the Communist regime in Afghanistan), the regime collapsed completely.458Government, such as it was, was left to the devices of various factional groups and warlords whose ideological affinity with the groups they nominally represented was potentially quite tenuous and their ideological affinity with each other was almost negligible. These differences were so obvious that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar would not agree to anything that included Ahmed Shah Masoud.459 The dire economic conditions alongside warring factions with no genuine ideological commitments set up a catastrophic political situation whose outcome was hardly surprising. The subsequent rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, its slide into complete anarchy and a heavily armed al-Qaeda free from any effective control by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the Saudi establishment or importantly the CIA were the outcomes of this dire political situation, created because the US and its allies did not care about nor had any concrete post-withdrawal strategy for Afghanistan.

The US strategy to turn potentially anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism against the communist camp (involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the non-state actors) lost its value after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Gulf War exposed the insularity of Iran and the deep divisions among the Islamists and the Arab hierarchy. The continuing expansion of the US military presence in the Gulf in the1990s only exacerbated the deep suspicion the Islamists and the militants had held all along of the United States, namely that it was a hegemonic power and not a benevolent power at the service of the Muslim world and the

458Maley, op. cit., p. 8. 459Ibid., p. 9.

172 world at large, as the United States preferred to identify itself. As such Afghanistan was not a showcase of success and neither the militants nor the Islamists were proud of it. After the Soviet withdrawal they inherited a brutalised country whose spirit and body was crushed. As observed “out of a population of roughly 20 million, one million died, another million and a half were maimed, another 5 million became refugees, and just about everyone was internally displaced.”460 It has also been noted by UN agencies “that nearly a million and a half went clinically insane as a consequence of decades of continuous war.”461 If this was the success of jihad and victory for the Free World one needs to rethink and redefine victory and success as understood by most people.

The consequence of these political developments had an impact on Islamist movements in general and the militants in particular. The Islamists turned more inward and took different stands based on their respective national interests.462The militants became increasingly disconnected from their sponsoring states and turned more outward, expanding their passion outside an Afghanistan that had little to inspire other than ruins and mayhem on all fronts. The significant number of uprooted or international militants who had no specific ties to Middle Eastern politics or earlier Islamic movements and little or no interest in the politics of their country of origin developed a camaraderie that complemented their passion. In turn their passion led to a trail of terror as the world witnessed bombings in Riyadh and near Dhahran in 1995 and 1996 respectively, bombing of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the attack on USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 and finally the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The global outreach of American power was contested at home and overseas by a militant outfit – al-Qaeda – that was once armed materially and politically under the aegis of the United States during the Cold War and had fought on its side. It was during such an unstable period as this that a distorted and

460 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), p. 252. 461Ibid., p. 252. 462Olivier Roy, commenting upon the future of Islamism in Afghanistan, observes, “Most of the mainstream Islamist movements in the Middle East had turned into ‘Islamo-nationalist’ movements .Caught between increasingly repressive authoritarian regimes and radical splinter groups, they adopted a lower profile or played mainly on ‘Islamo-nationalism’, with less emphasis on international Muslim solidarity and more on domestic politics, presenting themselves as the most fitted to fulfill the national interest; Refah, FIS, and Hamas are prominent examples.” Olivier Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” in William Maley (eds.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, (London: Hurst and Company, 2001), p. 204.

173 unbalanced group like al-Qaeda could seize the opportunity to transform itself into a formidable military force, and aspire to expand globally at the expense of all the moderate forces in Islam. Without the patronage of the United States and its allied partners Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, bin Laden could never have attained such notoriety nor could al- Qaeda have built up its capacity to the current level to strike such terror whenever and wherever it wished.463

Self-righteousness and values

The global outreach of al-Qaeda is not just an isolated phenomenon grown out of Islamic fundamentalism nor is it the final outcome of political Islam. Rather, its growth is the outcome of complicity between an ideologically intolerant ruthless political project and conservative American foreign policy, a legacy from the Dulles–Eisenhower–McCarthyist combination that had immense influence over successive US administrations and their way of seeing and dealing with the rest of the world. It is a view based on America’s confidence in its invincibility and self-righteousness to such an extent that is loath to

grant any considerable space to fundamental dissent of any kind, so that demands even for simple decency – that non-Western texts be integrated into the basic syllabi, that women have the right to abortion … or the writing of their own history, that normative pressures concede ground to individual sexual choice – are construed as mad attacks on Western civilization and ‘family values’, and

463 The kind of logistic support al-Qaeda received from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was phenomenal during this period (1980–89). It would be unimaginable to assemble such a global army of Islamic warriors in Afghanistan without such logistical support. The kind of financial and military/intelligence support al-Qaeda received from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan respectively has been well documented. It is estimated that between 1979 and 1989 the US and Saudis provided up to ten billion dollars of secret assistance to rebel groups in Afghanistan. For a discussion of al-Qaeda’s rise and its decision to go global; see, Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. (London: Hurst, 2002); Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003); Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) and Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy. (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2006). For the US and CIA’s involvement in the Afghanistan resistance movement and al-Qaeda’s evolution to its current status see Steve Coll, op. cit. In his book Coll provides the inside account of the CIA’s covert funding of an Islamic jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, explores how this implanted the seeds of Bin Laden’s rise to such notoriety and traces how Bin Laden built his global network as result of the alliance with these state actors (the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan).

174 outright degenerations against which ‘the American mind’, … needs to defend itself.464

Only such a mindset can perceive something as common as Marquez’s writings subversive and detect their potential to disrupt the American way of life, or could perceive threat in Chaplin’s work. As result anything that does not fit its idea of ideal, for example, those countries who opted in favor of a non-capitalist form of development, those societies who find traditional ways of living more conducive to their immediate surroundings than scientifically and materially advanced urban societies, or those societies where primacy is given to bonds of kinship and reciprocity over a materially affluent but emotionally aloof and impersonal modern urban life are either looked down upon or presumed to be anti- Western or anti-American hence anti-modern. Such a conclusion is not inevitable, nor is it the only possible explanation. After all, societies and people make choices from what is available around them. It is pointless to question why the Vietnamese, the Somalis or the Afghans do not conform to the American or the British standard or ways of life and vice versa. Social organisation and property structure in the former are markedly different from those in the latter. To demand that non-Western societies organise along the Western standard (fully integrating into international trade and investment regime) without affecting the property structure is tantamount to maintaining the fundamental status quo or the North–South divide intact. As Barkawi observes “the popularity of the Islamic madrassi schools in Pakistan and elsewhere, for example, stems in part from IMF structural adjustment programs that forced retrenchments in public education.”465 It is ludicrous to demand that non-Western societies maintain a secular public education system while meeting the guidelines for forced retrenchments in public education at the same time, enforced and monitored from a structure often referred to as the “Washington consensus”. Faced with such a Hobson’s choice non-Western people often see the West’s emphasis on values, justice and universality with deep suspicion.466

464 Ahmad, op. cit., p. 65. 465Barkawi, op. cit., p. 26. 466 Many scholars have expressed and endorsed such a view of the non-Western world to the West. However, in this context I refer to Frantz Fanon who brilliantly and convincingly made this observation in the colonial encounters in Algeria and Africa in The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977).

175 The experience of non-Western people during colonialism and the Cold War period gives them a very different picture of West’s preferred own self-image. It is an image that is commensurate with narcissism, violence, domination and exploitation. In their view it is nothing other than West’s chimera to see itself as the champion of liberty, equality, fraternity and rationality.467To enforce that “champion” role it appears that the West would go to any extent to subjugate, amend, trivialise, tarnish and tamper with the non-Western world so that it can qualify to meet their standard of acceptability. To achieve this objective, the West demands from the non-Western world unqualified obedience subject tothe threat of collective punishment. On this basis, the West believed it was appropriate to impose draconian sanctions on Iraqi civilians until Saddam Hussein was removed from power. When the then US ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright was confronted by Leslie Stahl on national television, asking how she felt about the fact that sanctions had killed half a million Iraqi children, she replied, “it is a very hard choice” adding, "we think the price is worth it.”468 Earlier, in May 1991, the US Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates made the US position clear by declaring that “Saddam’s leadership will never be accepted by the world community and, therefore, Iraqis will pay the price while he remains in power.”469 The United Kingdom’s permanent representative to the UN, David Hannay, stated, "my government believes that it will in fact prove impossible for Iraq to rejoin the community of civilised nations while Saddam Hussein remains in power”470and this only reaffirms the Euro–American solidarity on such core policy issues. This policy was also reaffirmed by both sides of US politics; by Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger during the Clinton administration (March and November 1997) and Secretary of State Colin Powell during the Bush administration (February 2002).471 The price Iraqis were forced to pay and continue to pay to be part of the world community as deemed “right” by the West stands at odds with West’s much cherished values of liberty, justice and humanity. The pre-condition of Iraq’s acceptance by the world community is based on what, in an entirely different context, Walter Benjamin once described as “the

467Fanon, op. cit., p.22. 46860 Minutes, May 12, 1996. 469 Stanley Meisler, “US Sanctions Threat Takes UN by Surprise”, Los Angeles Times, 9 May 1991, p. 10. 470 Anthony Burke, “Iraq: Strategy’s Burnt Offering”, Global Change, Peace and Security, 2005, 17(2), p. 207; UN Security Council Resolution No. 687 (1991). 471 Glen Rangwala, “The Myth that All Iraq Needs to Do to Lift Sanctions Is Comply with Weapon Inspectors”, http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/mythoflifting.html.

176 violation of the masses that forces the masses ‘to their knees’”,472 so that the masses can be either be brought into the world community or restructured according to the Western standard. Time and again the position that the non-Western world can be changed, restructured and rearranged according to the Western standard with required violence, norms of Bretton Woods conventions, and UN/US sanctions so that they could be more acceptable to the West has been reaffirmed.

There are several examples of this reaffirmation. The US rejection of World Trade Organisation (WTO) jurisdiction over its sanctions against Cuba “in response to a complaint brought to the WTO by the European Union”, “its refusal to place its forces under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is the only body able to prosecute violations of the laws of war”, “the West’s preferential commitment to patent right over human rights, to the point where it values the profits of its pharmaceutical corporations above the lives of millions suffering from diseases in the global South” and the repeated refusal of the US to ratify the UN resolutions calling on all states to observe international law are just a few examples of this flawed and prejudicial policy.473 The then US ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright placed the narrative in perspective. Chomsky quotes and paraphrases Albright’s clarification regarding the US stance on the Middle East, informing the Security Council that in that region

the United States will act ‘multilaterally when we can and unilaterally as we must’ because ‘[w]e recognize this area as vital to US national interests’ and therefore recognize no limits or constraints, surely not international law or the United Nations.”474

That is, the world community cannot or should not question America's claim of the right to ignore or to reject outright other views if thought necessary.

472 Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 241–242. Commenting upon the pre-eminence of Fascism and its relations with Art, Benjamin commented: Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves… The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. The violation of the masses, whom Fascism, with its Führer cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values. 473 Noam Chomsky, Middle East Illusions: Peace, Security and Terror. (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 161; Burke, “Iraq: Strategy’s Burnt Offering”, pp. 191–213; Barkawi, op. cit., pp. 27–28. 474 Chomsky, op.cit., p. 162.

177

This view was never lost on the non-Western world. It became obvious for many in the non-Western world particularly for the Islamists that to preserve their identity it was necessary to maintain an equally adversarial posture towards the West. In particular, this view was upheld and followed by the fundamentalists. Bin Laden’s famous interview with John Miller illuminates and sums up that spirit. On being asked whether his fatwa calling on all Muslims to kill Americans extended to all Americans, Bin Laden replied:

We are surprised this question is coming from Americans. Each action will solicit a similar reaction. We must use such punishment to keep your evil away from Muslims…America does not have a religion that prevents it from destroying all people.

…The Prophet said: ‘A woman entered hell because of a cat’. She did not feed it and blocked it from finding food on its own. She is going to hell for blocking the cat to death, but [what do you] say to those who agreed and gave reason for the hundreds of thousands of troops to blockade millions of Muslims in Iraq?475

Bin Laden’s message underscores a disturbing belief in the moral and practical necessity of collective punishment – what Albright, Berger, Powell, Gates and Hannay have all along advocated. Bin Laden and his followers derive the moral approval for collective punishment both from the Book and in the US principle. Both the US and the fundamentalist recognise no limits or constraints in punishing children or unarmed civilians, nor do they find it morally unacceptable. Driven by a messianic zeal to mould the world according to their norms both the fundamentalist and the US stand rigid to oppose the granting of any meaningful space to fundamental dissent of any kind other than their own way of articulating the world and they demand an unqualified consent on that articulation. This articulation is based on self-righteousness and power.476 It is an account of power in the service of the “self” where “the righteousness of self goes alongside the

475 John Miller, “To Terror’s Source”, ABC news.com, May 1998. 476Mahmood Mamdani also reaches such a conclusion: “Both see the world through the lenses of power. Both are informed by highly ideological world views, which each articulates in a highly religious political language, one that is self-righteous.” Mamdani, op. cit., p. 257.

178 demonisation of the other as evil.”477It is a narrative of the “self” that “fails to grasp its own possibility as a philosophy of difference”478as Levinas once put it. Precisely because it fails to grasp that difference “it covertly sanctions the self’s naked will for power and its concomitant usurpation of the other.”479 In that naked will for power, each vies for none but the other. As witnessed “there is an eerie similarity between the American bombing of Iraq and Afghanistan and the al-Qaeda bombing of embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and of the Twin Towers on 9/11: both testify that, when it comes to the contest for power, the rest of the world exists only as collateral.”480 However, it is crucial to realise that “this…is where the comparison must end, for the moral equivalence between the two does not translate into a political equivalence. There is no denying the global character of American power, before which the network known as al-Qaeda can only be described in the diminutive.”481 This diminutive stature of al-Qaeda or other Islamic fundamental outfits, however, should not provide any comfort to the West or US. As Barkawi notes, “whatever is made of al-Qaeda’s political project, it should be remembered that although the Goths lacked a program of reform, they nonetheless managed to sack Rome.”482

It is equally important to remember that the West’s military superiority, technological prowess nor its self-righteous belief in civilisational superiority guarantees any immunity from the less civilised, technologically and militarily inferior non-West. In the history of conflict between the West and the non-West, one comes across numerous examples that demonstrate the West’s vulnerability at the hands of the wretched of this earth. In recent memory Vietnam is possibly the most glaring example, where ill equipped bare footed peasants who often doubled as soldiers forced the US to retreat. No doubt in that confrontation the Vietnamese suffered heavy casualties but it drove home a strong message that neither military superiority nor scientific sophistication could guarantee victory against a scientifically unsophisticated and militarily ill equipped but nevertheless determined (and largely) agrarian society, which after the outcome of the Second World War the US more

477Ibid., p. 257. 478 Committee of Public Safety, “My Place in the Sun: Reflection on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas”, Diacritics, 1996, 26(1), p. 6. 479Ibid., p. 6. 480Mamdani, op. cit., pp. 257–258. 481Ibid., pp. 257–258. 482Barkawi, op. cit., p. 28.

179 or less thought of as an easy walkover. Similarly, to a lesser extent the Iran crisis saw the end of Carter’s presidency and even tiny Nicaragua created a constitutional crisis for Reagan.483

Beyond power and civilisational standards

Here one faces a fundamental question: if unassailable technological power and civilisational superiority cannot guarantee any comfort to the West in dealing with the non- Western world, what else will assure such comfort to the West? As history forewarned, the Western policymakers believe that they could control the direction of history so that nations and international society could be changed into something more acceptable to the West severely backfired. Vietnam, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq all illustrate the unintended consequences of that policy. As Barkawi notes:

It is not surprising that with all those aircraft carrier battle groups, fighter and bomber wings, heavy divisions, and nearly bottomless financial resources, President Bush thought he could shape Iraq’s future according to his wishes. Unintended consequences are, however, the regular outcome of such efforts. In the early part of the Cold War, the US resorted to cheap and apparently effective covert operations to ‘switch regimes’ when those perceived as leftists or communists came to power through the ballot box. This had the effect of shutting down legitimate avenues for the expression of dissent and created conditions for the rise of insurgencies and guerrilla warfare, which proved far more costly to fight, quite aside from the price in lives and broken futures.484

These unintended political developments boldly warn that to attain any basic security or comfort the West must look outside old strategies of power (at least in its current form) and civilisational conformity. It is evident that pursuing power for the sake of power further removes one from one’s cherished goal. Like a modern day Icarus, it leads its adherents on a self-defeating journey. This policy has deluded Western policy makers into believing that

483Ibid., p. 31. 484Barkawi, op. cit., pp. 34–35.

180 they run the course of human history and can modify, direct and decide how it should be played out. However, such beliefs are based on human hubris rather than on a hard analysis of history as many events discussed earlier vindicate. As such, history confirms that many of these conflicts between the West and the non-West stemmed from fundamental inequalities in power and wealth between the two rather than from civilisational difference. It is important to realise that Bin Laden and his many followers are the product of those inequalities, in the long history of invoking tradition and Islam they do not necessarily signal a retreat into some imagined golden age of Islam but challenge the anomalies of a modernity that has served some extremely well and others with unprecedented calamity.

Taking anti-Modern stand to Examine Modernity

The inherent anomalies of modernity have been expressed in many ways. Struggles against local despotism that were often expressed in religious idioms as legitimate avenues for expressing dissent were either suppressed or simply did not exist within the polity of those states. The Iranian revolution and the rise of Khomeini owe as much of their success to the repression of secular political movements and the closing down of civil society as to the Shah’s megalomaniac ways and profligate lifestyle. While the anti-Shah public unrest could be turned into a revolution and was instrumental in overthrowing his Western backed regime in Iran, the unrest in neighboring states resulted in violent outbursts as the watchful authorities reasserted their positions with violent retribution. The rebellion of the Shi’a minority from the eastern province in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s, the Mosque rebellion in Mecca in1979 and the gunning down of Sadat in 1981 all stem from a history of lament and frustration where legitimate concerns were seen as threats to authoritarian rules or to their overall interests. This narrative is equally applicable, with important variations, to other Middle Eastern states. In the absence of any public accountability these states often reassert their intransigent rule over a fragmented and disillusioned public, away from the reach of the media or institutions that supposedly facilitate human wellbeing and adjudicate on their sufferings. As a result of the harsh, disillusioning limits to political life the anger and frustration often turn on their Western backers and take a global character where (in the absence of anything else) Islam increasingly emerges as the ideological rallying point for

181 many Muslims against local despotism and global authoritarianism. As R. B. J. Walker observes in the current global order

[I]t is a mistake to assume that the events of 11 September were aimed simply, or even primarily, at the USA; rather than say, against the House of Saud and all it stands for as an expression of modernist authoritarianism and as an agent of global/American political and economic hegemony.485

Following the same analysis it could be argued, “what might be said of Saudi Arabia might also be said, with important variations, in relation to Egypt, Iran, Syria, Iraq, the Gulf States, and so on.”486 Following the same cursory political sketch one ends up with the specific dilemma of Afghanistan; the combination of the world’s most reactionary forces fueled and supported by the world’s most modern forces profoundly antithetical to its overall values and interests that had brutally wrecked a predominantly pastoral and rural society. Evidence suggests that

[W]hatever one might say about the specific peculiarities of , Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, or the Taliban, it is crucial to understand that they express social contradictions and forces that arise from intense social struggles against globally articulated forms of economic, military and political power.487

Many of these social contradictions have been sustained through a systemic social exclusion and one’s unwillingness to grasp the contradictions. It is evident that “some of the greatest crimes against humanity have been generated by huge social forces that destroy the lives of vast numbers of people every day; forces on which some of us thrive at other people’s expense, and against which we have absolutely no legal recourse.”488 Numerous cases (including Afghanistan and Iraq) illustrate that “we cannot take the whole economic, social, cultural or religious systems to court, and we cannot bomb them out of existence.”489

485R. B. J. Walker, “War, Terror, Judgment”, in Bülent Gokay and R. B. J. Walker, (eds), 11 September 2001: War, Terror, Judgment. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 77. 486Ibid., p. 77. 487Ibid., p. 77. 488Ibid., p. 80. 489Ibid., p. 80.

182 Unless one acknowledges and value the fundamental differences as an act of knowing, not in the sense of gathering, but rather as an act of seeking and seeing as prior to judging and justifying one may as well be caught up in the perpetuation of the narrative of good and evil, of rational and irrational, of the civilised and barbaric, of the West versus the non- West. Any attempt to ignore and undermine these fundamental differences by using force or violence so that international society can be changed into something more acceptable to the West or to the Americans runs the risk of backfiring severely.

If the US/West is to avoid the risk of backfire and the wrath of the non-West, it is imperative that they discard the gendarme role of policing the international community on civilisational divisions, and on the Manichean dualisms of good and evil, modern and traditional, rational and irrational. Instead they should step outside of these policing lines and take a break from the old elitism of the international order, and should try to engross in myriad cultures, civilisations and ways of lives that nonetheless thrive and make sense to billions of people away from the privileges and perks of the Western way of life. As Brett Bowden argues, being traditional or not conforming to the Western standard does not mean something is to be looked down upon, it means simply to be different.490 Any attempt to

...organize and control the world by drawing a line, both physically and metaphorically, between here and there, this state and that state, America and the Middle East, between the included and the excluded…the nice people here, the weird and dangerous foreigners there becomes increasingly difficult and costly491 as the history of the last few centuries warrants. This history also forewarns that any attempt to shape international societies along Western lines, ignoring people’s immediate concerns and repressing their genuine political aspirations through legitimate avenues, often results in unintended outcomes. There is enough evidence to indicate that nowhere more so than in the Middle East did the policy to repress genuine political aspirations and deny any space to express fundamental dissent of any kind (the rights to independent thought, association, and alternative development models) through legitimate avenues

490 Bowden, op. cit., p. 61. 491Walker, op. cit., p. 81.

183 backfired spectacularly. In doing so it gave rise to militant forces, often Islamic ones, which outstripped the moderate forces or voices. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy needs to be seen through this political prism.

It is evident that the Islamic movements that responded to the internal decline of Muslim societies in the 19th and 20th centuries acted as vehicles of change for larger social forces, simultaneously commenting on contemporary life and indicating approaching changes in the larger social sphere. In order to understand those approaching changes, conventional discourse on political Islam demanded a rethinking of the basic protocols deployed in understanding this significant political phenomenon. This required a kind of rethinking separate from conventional accounts of international relations and the existing procedures employed by academics and decision-makers. Such a rethinking demands learning from lived experience and myriad social practices, in order to approach truth in multiple different ways. In analysing the colonial and post-colonial experience of Muslim communities by means of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of horizon, the following chapter will attempt to understand hermeneutically and historically the phenomenon of the preeminence of political Islam.

In his most influential philosophical treaty, Truth and Method, Gadamer attacks the objectivity of Enlightenment reason and explains the need to acknowledge prejudice as present in all human understanding. He argues that a subject interprets meaning from within the horizon of his or her worldview, his or her own beliefs, norms and practices. In his view, "the understanding and interpretation of texts or meaning is not merely a concern of science, but obviously belongs to human experience of the world in general.”492 Thus, one’s horizon is linked to one’s experience of the world, and changing experiences of that world redefine and rearticulate one’s horizon and hence one’s worldview. Taking this premise as its departure point, Chapter Eight will explore how the experience of Muslim communities with Western powers and their policies over the last two hundred years shaped their positions and influenced their decisions in dealing with the West. Based on such understanding, this analysis anticipates that its broader application might inform and

492Gadamer, op. cit., p. xxi, emphasis added.

184 improve decisions made when dealing with Islam, terrorism, and state-sanctioned acts of violence.

185 CHAPTER EIGHT

A hermeneutical interpretation of the preeminence of Political Islam: Experience, Choice and Change

Contemporary debate concerning the war on terror, the Western response, and the changing international order primarily and substantially concerns Islam and its impact on both the Muslim and the non-Muslim world. As part of that engagement, this thesis seeks to articulate these concerns, and in that effort takes steps to understand hermeneutically and historically the merit of such a phenomenon. At the same time, it is not focused on questions of the relative power of Islam as a theology, mystical or spiritual, or of its diverse sects and practices – discussion of these matters is readily available elsewhere. Pertinent to this thesis is political Islam – the way it has been framed by contemporary debate, in particularly its portrayal by neoconservatives.

However, this version is not the only choice available to Muslim communities nor is its influence as pervasive as the dominant discourse claims. Contrary to the claims as one witnessed earlier, the influence and the role of Islam in shaping Muslim societies was neither homogeneous nor was intransigent to the influence of other political and social forces. It is also evident that its reaction to the process of modernisation had been diverse and irregular, with some (such as early reformists like Taha Husayn) embracing it wholeheartedly while others (like Mohamed Iqbal) received it cautiously. In fact, the Islamic component was insignificant in the early period of the national liberation struggles of many Muslim countries. Irrespective of the uneven influences over Muslim societies and haphazard development, as a political ideology Islam played a moderate role in the polity of many nations with significant Muslim communities. Its multifaceted theories, norms and diverse cultural practices had deterministic political and social effects on diverse Muslim communities and were acknowledged as such.

186 This all changed with the emergence of the Cold War; gradually Islam was seen and portrayed in a one-dimensional idiom, particularly after the dispossession of Palestinians from their lands and the creation of the state of Israel. The Saudi-US partnership in promoting a hardline Islam to counter the influence of Pan-Arab nationalism, the Iranian revolution in 1979, the subsequent conflict in Afghanistan, the Gulf War in 1991, and finally the 9/11 attack in the US further consolidated that view. As a result, the debate on Islam has become more confused and, if anything, more vitriolic. In this fluid state of affairs, the emergence of apparent quick-fix analyses further adds to the confusion, spreads misinformed apprehension without basis, and uncritically isolates and targets the Muslim community.

The ensuing confusion is often reflected in the policies and actions of those who influence and guide global affairs. In order to prevent or minimise such misperception, this analysis aims to fill in the gaps between historical fact and the philosophical understanding of political Islam, with the intention of offering the means with which stakeholders of global affairs can pursue policies with clarity and confidence. By using the notion of horizon as propounded by Hans-Georg Gadamer, this analysis will attempt to establish a clear understanding of the links between the historical and political upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries and the rise of political Islam, in terms of greater political participation and the expansion of political constituencies in Muslim countries.

In Gadamer’s view, “the horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.”493 The concept of horizon has been in operation in German philosophical tradition “since Nietzsche and Husserl to characterize the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one’s range of vision is gradually expanded.”494In other words, “a person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest to him. On the other hand, “to have a horizon” means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.”495 A horizon indicates “the relative significance of everything within this horizon that defines its

493Gadamer, op. cit., p. 301. 494Ibid. 495Ibid.

187 value to those who have that horizon.”496 In this context it made sense to the adherents of the 18th century Islamic revival movements within their historical horizon to rally around these movements. For many Muslim societies in the 18th century these religiously legitimated and inspired sociopolitical movements made perfect sense within their horizon delineated by tradition and experience. The subsequent exposure to nationalism, Western liberalism and Marxism, while appearing to be something completely new, could not prevent Muslim communities from making sense out of these modern political forces by recognising familiar traits, overt and covert signs, or implicit allusions with their prior knowledge which was already there as part of their horizon. It became part of their gradually expanding vision. It was an ongoing process not frozen in time and space. According to Gadamer:

The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound by any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us…. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion. The surrounding horizon is not set in motion by historical consciousness. But in it this motion becomes aware of itself.497

In the process of exposure to new political/social forces the Muslim communities also moved into a new horizon, just as the new horizons moved into their historical/political consciousness. The exposure to the Islamic revival and reform movements itself becomes required knowledge for many participants of diverse Muslim communities to confront the sociopolitical issues they were facing with the rapid political changes in the world. This knowledge facilitated the expansion of their horizon in order to prepare them for unexposed or unfamiliar forces that “itself becomes an element of the experience itself, and on the basis of which anything new that they come across is available to experience at all, i.e., as it were comprehensible in a context of experience.”498 In this context the Muslim communities (like any other communities) become part of the changing social/political

496Ibid. 497Ibid., p. 303. 498 G. Buck, Lernen und Erfahrung. (Stuttgart, 1967), p.56.

188 experience, just as changing political practices become part of the Muslim experience. Here experience has to be understood in its broader philosophical sense, as Gadamer notes, “it refers not only to experience in the sense of the information about this or that. It refers to experience in general. This experience is always to be acquired, and from it no one can be exempt. Experience in this sense belongs to the historical nature of man.”499 This means that one cannot prevent or control or direct experience for others to experience according to one’s wishes or whims however well-meant the effort may be. In his brilliant exposition of the theory of hermeneutic experience Gadamer notes “in bringing up children, for example, parents may try to spare them certain experiences, experience as a whole is not something anyone can be spared.”500 It happens irrespective of external intervention, social or historical conditions and prior forewarnings, “rather, experience in this sense inevitably involves many disappointments of one’s expectations and only thus is experience acquired.”501

The many disappointments that Muslim communities, especially those in the Middle East (like many in the non-West), experienced during the Cold War, colonialism and the last three hundred plus years of Western domination of world affairs thwarted many of their expectations. Their experience with the Islamic revival movements of 18th and 19th centuries not only restored their lost pride and self-esteem but in the process enriched and alerted their horizon for the coming changes. The subsequent exposure to modern political forces (nationalism, Western liberalism and Marxism) “itself became an element of the experience itself” which facilitated the gaining of new experiences and knowledge about these political forces. This new experience informed the Muslim communities of the potentials and limits of those (modern political) forces within its polity, simultaneously also indicating the limits of Islam in the changing political configuration in the Middle East and in the larger world. As a result of these experiences, along with Islam, nationalism, republicanism and socialism also gained popular political currency. The early signs of popular support for these modern political forces were evident in the demand for constitutional revolution in Iran in 1906 and the Egyptian demand to be part of the 1919

499Gadamer, op. cit., p. 350. 500 Ibid. 501 Ibid.

189 Paris peace conference. In varying degrees these events shaped Iranian (Persian) and Egyptian (Arab) nationalism whose full force would be experienced later. The unprecedented rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and its hegemonic influence for the next twenty or so years not only justified the popular support for these modern forces but also validated the Muslim communities’ openness to experience anything new (the political forces) that they came across. In this process they became part of the new political experience while new political experiences became part of them. These new experiences also compelled participants to raise questions about the conventional accounts of Islam and its limits in modern life while opening up new horizons and new possibilities through their experience of nationalism and other progressive forces. However, the possibilities and promises that modern forces (nationalism and republicanism) offered could not be fully experienced by many in the Middle East and other Muslim countries, because such engagements were derailed by external intervention with the connivance of local despots, associates and reactionary forces that were opposed to these new forces that challenged their positions. In many cases also internal agencies (the army and the bureaucracy) played a significant role which was antithetical to the overall flourishing of modern forces and a genuine civil society.

As demonstrated earlier, the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in a CIA supported coup in the early 1950s derailed a republican and nationalist experiment in Iran and in turn denied its people a legitimate opportunity to experience republicanism and nationalism in its full potential. The US, rather than respecting the genuine aspirations of Iranians to experiment with these modern political forces doubted the reliability of their freedom to experiment with republicanism. Based on that unreliability the US treated the Iranian aspirations and experience as amateurish and immature and spared them from experiencing such an experience in the way that “parents in bringing up children try to spare them certain experiences”, a condition often seen in the relationship between the West and non-West. This parental role is a historical role that has philosophical sanction in Western modernity, particularly in Hegel’s tripartite classification of history. Hegel in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, assigns Europe to the apex of civilisation and development, ahead of Asia (which was at the ‘childhood of History’) and Africa (which is merely) at the

190 ‘threshold of the World’s History…still involved in the conditions of mere nature.”502 Hegel basically allocated the role of the parent to Europe, the role of child to Asia and the role of infant to Africa. Accordingly, the US (which had taken the role of Europe since Hegel presented his theory in 1822)503 played the role of the parent relegating the role of child to Iran in this historical classification. In this unequal relationship the US (with the support of other Western powers) although sparing Iran its legitimate right to experience republicanism and nationalism could not spare the experience of denial which itself became another experience, albeit a negative one. True to Gadamer’s hermeneutical observation “experience in this sense inevitably involved many disappointments of one’s expectations and only thus was experience acquired.”504 It is essential to remember that the disappointments that the Iranians had endured, who in their effort to engage and experience a republican experiment increasingly took other avenues, specifically a religious one, to express their disenchantments. What has been said of Iran might also be said, with important variations, in relation to Pakistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, the Gulf States, and so on. The repeated denials of mass participation in the public sphere, even if they were cast in the form of Islamic rationales in some cases, that many experienced in the Muslim world simultaneously informed them about their current impasse and the larger political forces that caused such an impasse. In addition to this experience, the suffering that many experienced with the dispossession of Palestinians from their land because of the creation of the state of Israel and the humiliation they suffered in the Arab–Israel war in 1967 further ingrained in their horizon that the West’s engagement with the Muslim world had less to do with their own betterment than with the consolidation of Western interests and the safeguarding of their clients’ interests.

The experiences the Muslim world endured during the imperial and colonial periods along with the current (policy) impasse helped to inform its people to determine which aspect of the (political) experience to retain and which to alter in a situation like this. This experience, in turn, had allowed people an insight to discern their future course. Here

502Hegel, op. cit., pp. 91–99, 104, 443. 503 As such Hegel assigned Europe the most privileged and exalted space in History in his treaty in 1822 but certainly the US consolidated that position by the end of Second World War 504Gadamer, op. cit., p. 350.

191 “insight is more than the knowledge of this or that situation. It always involves an escape from something that had deceived us and held us captive.”505 As a result “insight always involves an element of self-knowledge and constitutes a necessary side of what we called experience in the proper sense…It too is ultimately part of the vocation of man – i.e., to be discerning and insightful.”506 The insight the people gained from their experience with local authoritarian regimes and global political forces informed them of the available choices and allowed them to draw meaning from those choices. The choices they had were either to maintain the status quo, co-opt the establishment or to counter-protest using the same rationales that the rulers were deploying to secure their legitimacy. This was often some version of Islam that the rulers deemed proper to serve their interests. In this context the third choice seemed most meaningful and feasible to many, i.e. by using the same rationales (Islam) as the rulers used, at least they could claim they were engaged in an Islamic discourse and following the path of the God and the holy Book. With such a claim it would be hard for regimes either to discredit them or to exercise wrath on people who claimed all they were doing was following The Book.

Once this common grid (Islam) was established it provided many a way to engage in public life in order to raise their concerns and discontent, and it simultaneously impelled the regimes to engage in an ideological dialogue, essentially on Islamic terms. Of course this was something that many regimes could not dismiss as easily as they could dismiss the demands of republicanism, communism or Western liberalism. Demands based on these notions could be ignored on the basis of their un-Islamic character or roots, on the excuse of their manifest association with a godless system (Marxism/Communism) or a morally and ethically bankrupt system (Western liberalism/individualism) as illustrated in the philosophy of Sayyid Qutb.507 Once the terms of reference (Islamic justification) were

505Gadamer, op. cit., p. 350. 506Ibid. 507SayyidQutb, in his influential 1963 Islamic ideological tract, Maalim fil Tariq (Signposts or Milestones) emphasised the need for the advancement of a vanguard, a group (jamaa) of true Muslims, a righteous minority committed to Islam to save it from being lost in a sea of ignorance and unbelief (jahilliya). Qutb was unequivocally critical ofboth Western liberalism and Marxism. In his view “democracy in the West has become sterile to such an extent that its intellectuals borrow from the systems of the Eastern bloc, especially in the economic sphere, under the name of socialism…Marxism stands intellectually defeated and it is not an exaggeration to say that in practice not a single nation in the world is truly Marxist…The era dominated by the resurgence of science has come to an end…All the nationalistic and chauvinistic ideologies that have

192 acknowledged the regimes were drawn to engage with their constituents to acquiesce, reject or reach a compromise with their demands. There is enough evidence to suggest that diverse Muslim nations with disparate political establishments and political agendas had to engage in these debates if only to contain the growing public discontent and, importantly, to reassert and revalidate their own legitimacy. Islamic rationales had once been harnessed by the regimes to consolidate power, safeguard their interests and undermine the demands for alternative credible political practices. Now these regimes hardly could foresee that by using the same grid (as a form of reverse engineering) to carry the discontent and concerns of many ordinary people, a vibrant Islam would one day come back to haunt them.

Many reformist leaders used this grid(Islam) to push forward reformist agendas and try to bridge the gap between modern secular and traditional religious forces. Some notables in this effort are Jalal-e-Ahmad, Mehdi Bazargan and Dr. Ali Shariati in Iran, Hassan al- Turabi, Sadiq al-Mahdi and Mahmud Muhammad Taha in Sudan, Shaykh Ali Abbasi Madani in Algeria, among many other such notables in several other locations. Ahmad, Bazargan and Shariati had different political orientations and training but they had one thing in common. They were critical of the blind persuasion of Westernisation/modernisation (to suit one’s own purposes) used both by the regime and its constituents which in their view did not address the specific concerns and problems the community was facing. Here modernisation did not mean the gradual process of democratisation, emancipation or the prospect for a civil society but instead was a means to subjugate people for utilitarian reasons for the benefit of the few. Ahmad, Bazargan and Shariati simultaneously did not recommend a retreat to the pristine past, because with their secular modern training and outlook they were concerned with the contemporary problems of modern life (the anxiety, seclusion and the barriers that it creates for many in its practice). In their view these problems become increasingly problematic in the absence of a true modern structure and its associated institutions that are supposed to take care of these shortcomings of modernity. appeared in modern times, and all the movements and theories derived from them, have also lost their vitality. In short, all man-made theories, both individualistic and collectivist, have proved to be failures” (SayyidQutb, Maalim fil-Tariq [Signposts along the Road]. (Dar al-Shuruq: Beirut, 1991). See also Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Esposito, op. cit.

193 It is important to remember that Jalal-e-Ahmad (a secular socialist), Bazargan(a French trained engineer who was active in Prime Minister Mossadegh’s republican movement) and Shariati (a Sorbonne-educated academic) while critical of the conservative establishment of modernity did not dismiss modernity as such.508 Their opposition was to a conservative (authoritarian) modern system with its oppressive state apparatus (secret police, prisons, courts, etc.) that foreclosed opportunities for many while a few thrived at others’ expense. Their contention was about the structural problems of the society; thus their demand was for structural change. In the absence of other secular modern alternatives, it was not surprising that these reformers would appeal to a common idiom that the people could relate to or easily identify with through their prior knowledge or experience. In this case the common idiom turned out to be their Persian–Islamic heritage. Using this common heritage as a framework, and based on their modern as well as their traditional experiences, these reformers effectively articulated the underlying concerns (inequality, liberty, justice, national identity, limited social mobility and limits of political participation) of many people cutting across social and ideological divisions. Their appeal to people for structural change was thus against both traditional Islam under the ulama, (burdened with its anachronistic interpretations and obscure manuals that spoke more of past glory than present despairs) and uncritical acceptance of the modernisation and Westernisation that destroyed many people’s lives. This appeal found a sympathetic chord among many who were denied a share of the profits of modernisation or who perpetually remained outside its realm because of historical and political reasons. By default, the appeal (to Islam) tapped into the deep familiarity of traditional Islamic practices, norms and beliefs, shaped by history and tradition. Thus the reformists’ appeal harnessed both a spontaneous identification and a reality that was well beyond the immediate and rational and operated at a subconscious level; something that already existed in their horizon through their experience of colonialism and the politics of the Cold War. As a result, out of sheer common sense, if not ideological conviction, this idiom developed into a veritable catalyst for the masses, amalgamating the contemporary social theories and practices of Marx,

508For a detailed discussion on their political views see John L. Esposito, op. cit., p. 105–112; Jalal Al-e- Ahmad, Gharbzadegi[Westernstruck]. (Lexington, KY:Mazda, 1982) and Ali Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam. (Berkeley, California: Mizan Press 1979). Here “conservative establishment of modernity” means a practice of modernity used/adapted only for a utilitarian use by a minority elite categorically for their own benefit where the voices of the majority are not addressed or addressed in limited manner only.

194 Weber and Emile Durkheim, the highly influential post-colonial exposition of Fanon and the revolutionary socialist rhetoric of Che Guevara and other influential political activists of the time,509 making Islam tangible and meaningful to its adherents. In this process Islam was no longer the purview of a few clerics or ulama or the state. Instead it moved to the public sphere where it belongs and thus emerged as the most effective channel for political mobilization and mass communication.

Once Islam returned to the public sphere it was subject to the rules of the public sphere. For the very reason that it is public sphere–by definition it means that a text, theory or social practice is fully accessible to its participants and does not demand exclusive prerequisites (prior training or hereditary membership) from its participants. Based on this principle it was open to everyone to access and interpret Islam according to his or her political orientation and social historical conditioning. As a result, as we witnessed earlier, many (like Shariati) who were often denounced as “Islamic Marxist” by the regime would embark on an innovative interpretation of Islam whereas others (like the Khomeiniites) would deliver a retrograde account of Islam.510 The spread of Islam and its increasing importance (with notable local variations) in public life needs to be understood from this perspective.511However this perspective fails to explain fully in a case like Afghanistan.

509 For detailed discussion see Esposito, op. cit., pp. 105–127; Roy, op. cit., pp. 29–33, 40–50, 303, 324, 332– 340; Shariati, op. cit. 510 Esposito, op. cit., p. 110. Importantly, Olivier Roy also argues“individualization of faith does not necessarily lead to a more secular and liberal way of life. Modernity does not automatically lead to liberalism and democracy, and secularization could accompany a reconstruction of closed religious identities, a process we call communitarization. In short, individualization may lead either to liberal forms of Islam or to neofundamentalism”, Roy, Globalized Islam, p. 149. 511 For example, rulers like Muammar Qaddafi of Libya and Muhammad Mahathir of Malaysia have used Islam in very different ways. Qaddafi cemented his position as the leader of the socialist revolution after deposing the conservative regime of King Idris “whose right to rule had been Islamically legitimated by his descent from the nineteenth-century Islamic revivalist leader Muhammad ibn al-Sanusi (1787–1859), who had established an Islamic state in Libya” (Esposito, op. cit., p. 77) and virtually ending the Sanusi’s hold in modern Libya. As Esposito notes, Qaddafi and his young officers found it useful, if not necessary, to justify their actions Islamically. By employing Islam, Qaddafi introduced a series of reforms more akin with the visions of many Left/socialist leaders of the sixties and seventies than with the vision of the conservative religious establishment. Libya’s transformation from the Libyan Arab Republic to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (masses) is one of the indications of his utopian vision. Here one has to note that in this use of Islam Qaddafi relegated the responsibility for the state from God to the masses. It was up to him and the masses to define Islam, not the ulama. While Qaddafi employed Islam to cement Libya’s national ideology and Arab nationalism/socialism, in Malaysia Mahathir used it to reinforce the indigenous Malay Muslim support base and its Asian profile (common heritage, values [Confucian and indigenous Malay

195 Here one confronts the full scope of that difference. In the absence of a Shariati or a Khomeini in Afghanistan it was left up to the likes of war lords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rashid Dostum (although neither Dostum nor Hekmatyar were Islamic ideologues or activists in the way that Khomeini or Shariati were) to promote a form of Islam that suited their political purpose, which also involved considerable financial interests.512 It has to be noted that with limited or negligible popular support these individuals and their outfits still could flourish on the strength of external support.513 The solidarity expressed with the wider resistance movement often concealed their ideological and personal differences (based on clan interests and local agendas or needs) but surfaced in a fractious and violent way after the Soviet withdrawal. This is a significant insight in relation to the Afghan resistance movement because it demonstrates the tenuous nature of the affiliation of these groups, not only with each other but also with the wider resistance movement. Despite this tenuous affiliation “yet the vocabulary of Islamic resistance embraced a remarkably diverse range of politico-religious forces, varying from the intensely ideological to the avowedly rustic.”514 Characteristically

[T]he Afghan resistance, collectively known by the title Mujahideen (meaning ‘Warriors in the Way of God’), ranged from ‘parties’ (tanzimat) with headquarters outside Afghanistan, to forces organised on a regional basis, to scattered groups of fighters with local interests and agendas whose attachment to the wider resistance was dictated by a need for access to weaponry but … whose

Muslim culture and work ethics]) to boost its scope in regional and (Esposito and Voll, op. cit., pp. 124–149). 512 See Mary Kaldor’s significant analysis, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA. Stanford University Press, 1999) that tracksthe financial stakes involves in terrorism and areas of conflicts. See also John P. Sullivan, “Terrorism, Crime and Private Armies,” Low Intensity Conflict &Law Enforcement, 2002, 11(2–3). 513Despite his openly strong anti-Western position, Hekmatyar was the main beneficiary of the US and Saudi assistance (Roy,Globalized Islam, p. 293n and “Squeezing Islam’s Moderates,” TheMiddle East, June 1993: 22). His exclusive relationship with Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and the long-term patronage he received from ISI only strengthened his position without popular support. But Hekmatyar is not the only warlord or resistance fighter who flourished in strength despite having no popular support, others also flourished as a result of external patronage. As Maley points out “Hekmatyar’s Pushtun Hezb-e Islami flourished on the strength of long-term patronage from Pakistan’s ISI, while the Ittehad-e Islami of Abdul- Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf received generous financial support through charitable trusts established in Saudi Arabia” (Maley, op. cit., p. 9.) 514Maley, op. cit., p. 8.

196 ideological affinity with the parties they nominally represented was potentially quite tenuous.515 The semi-educated, unemployed and uprooted footsoldiers (with diverse ethnic, linguistic and cultural backgrounds) rounded up around the globe by both the non-state and state actors to assist in this operation as expected only added further impetus to the differences. Increasingly these footsoldiers took the onus for defining Islam and delivering its promises according to their experience and insight (framed under conditions of radical inequality evidently seen in current global political, military and economic structures). In turn, if their (re)definition (of Islam) demands the undertaking of missions to blow an oil pipeline here or fly planes into buildings there, then there are enough graduates from such schools of thought to oblige. It is sufficient to reiterate that Bin Laden happens to be their most celebrated and easily recognised graduate.

The preeminence of political Islam, in particular its militant version, is very much the outcome of the policies of the West and its client states in the Muslim world towards its people. The moderate position Islam had secured in the polity of many Muslim majority states was eroded gradually to accommodate the interests of a number of authoritarian and undemocratic forms of government among them, and the myopic interests of the West. In the erosion of that political space, instead of promoting other secular modern forces and encouraging the growth of civil societies the dominant policy in action had been to repress such forces. If any excuse was needed to repress these secular modern forces then it was provided by the name of Islam, albeit a rigid version, promoted as discussed earlier by the highly authoritarian Saudi regime in tandem with the Gulf States and other pro-Western Muslim states such as Pakistan and Egypt and endorsed by the Western powers, the avowed supporter of liberty, equality, justice and so on. In the absence of legitimate avenues to express dissent and aspirations, the resistance to the rigid and disillusioning limits of political life took an equally rigid counter-political stance in the name of Islam and again made inroads into the polity of Muslim states. However, the return of Islam into the polity of Muslim states was a guarded one because severe reprisals from the authorities always reminded people of the risk of unbridled activism, even if it was Islamic. All this had to

515Ibid., pp. 8–9.

197 change with the Iranian revolution. The Khomeiniite takeover of Iran upset the status quo by deposing the Shah and increasing the pressure on the Gulf oligarchy and other authoritarian regimes. The Khomeiniites not only argued that monarchy was incompatible with Islam but also emphasised that close relations between US and its client states in the region was against the interests of Muslims.516Political Islam found a philosophical justification in the new revolutionary Islam that gave further impetus to Islamic activism throughout the world and fired the imagination of many in the Muslim world.517 It emerged as an increasingly important discourse in the polity of Muslim nations in the systemic absence and practice of other secular modern forces and thus opened up the political constituency for greater participation in public sphere.

The experience that many people were subjected to during the past half century in the name of “modernisation” by arbitrary and undemocratic forms of government in a number of Muslim countries had informed them about a very different image of their rulers and also of the West. The violence and suffering people had endured during the past half century within the context of modernisation led them to address these issues outside of the existing structures of modernity (adapted by the establishment for its own purpose rather than for modernising the society, as the conventional account of modernity defines). This, in turn, encouraged many to tap into the deep familiarity of their common heritage, namely Islam, to vent their discontent and possibly redress the existing structural problems in the hope of achieving a more satisfying life. Based on their collective experience the response to this call was overwhelming and eclectic. It was overwhelming because many could easily engage with a familiar idiom (Islam) to articulate and express their current discontent and concerns, without inviting the risk of being discredited by the regimes for not following the

516Ahady, op. cit., p. 118. Iran’s anti-American foreign rhetoric is common to media and scholarly analysis. Scholars such as Esposito, Voll, and Gerges, in their analysis of Iran’s foreign policy have also supported this view: see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 14–20, 44, 118–120; Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy. (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2006) pp. 14–15, 164–166, 170–173; John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, The Makers of Contemporary Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The late Khomeini described America as the “great Satan” – in matching rhetoric President Reagan described Iran as the “evil Empire”. 517 Esposito, op. cit., pp. 15–17. For a detailed discussion on the impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran, see Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Yvonne Y. Haddad, The Islamic Impact. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984); John L. Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact. (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990).

198 Islamic path or promoting ideas that challenge God's authority. All they were asking was to follow the path of Islam. At the same time, it was eclectic because it was open to interpretation based on the experience and horizon of the activist-interpreters which was shaped by tradition and history, but over the years they redefined tradition and reinterpreted Islam in the modern context and effectively endorsed new meanings of it. In turn the activist-interpreters influenced and shaped the experience of the public as they became part of the changing social/political experience; just as the changing social/political practices became part of the public experience. This in turn informed the public about which aspects of the changing social/political practices to retain and which to discard in order to make meaningful social/political engagement among themselves and with the regimes. Through these efforts Islam was once again retrieved from declining under the deadweight of anachronistic traditions, the clutches of ulama and the rulers, and reclaimed its pride of place both in the public sphere and polity of Muslim nations, and ultimately provided philosophical justification to people’s political action.

The opening up of the public sphere had far reaching effects beyond its immediate milieu. It had significant effect on the West and on global politics outside its own location. The cozy relationship the West had in dealing with Muslim countries (in particular the Middle East states) during the colonial period and the Cold War was contested by a politically savvy and socially informed constituency, if not by the rulers. The Islamic revolution in Iran drastically upset the political balance in the Middle East that the West had so guardedly developed in the first place. The Iranian revolution proved that there is no guarantee of safety against public discontent and rage, no matter how authoritarian a ruler or how powerful a ruler’s friends might be. While having the best equipped military in the region the Shah’s regime collapsed in face of the concerted protests by the masses. This in turn fired the imagination of many who were facing similar situations of oppression, injustice and insignificant social mobility throughout the world. The spontaneous support Khomeini received in the immediate aftermath of the revolution from activists, individuals, and organisations with diverse social/political orientations – Islamists, Marxists and

199 liberals518– indicates that these people were showing their confidence not just in a familiar idiom, but also in an idiom that brought change in a very tangible way to what many perceived to be a symbol of oppression, decadence and servility to the West. Ideological divisions within the movement later surfaced as the clerics and the anti-cleric reformists struggled for power. Notwithstanding this, Islam acted as a vehicle of transformation, at once commenting on contemporary life and indicating approaching changes in the larger social sphere.

Through these changes political Islam repositioned itself from the periphery to the center in the polity of many Muslim nations. The interlocking alliances among various groups allowed it a distinct cosmopolitan edge and shared vision with which the masses could identify and that was unavailable either within the religious establishment or in the polity of many Muslim nations. The secularists could identify the modern currents within the movement (demand for representation, transparency, justice and so on), the traditionalists could identify with the cultural norms, history, social mores and so on that the movement was espousing and with its anchor to their traditional roots dislocated by modernisation. As a result, out of sheer convenience if not ideological commitment, many rulers and activists found it convenient to rally around Islam to legitimate their authority and justify their actions and so muster public support. It seemed convenient for a moderniser like Mahathir, a socialist like Qaddafi or an army dictator like General Zia to turn to Islam to promote and endorse their policies. Similarly, the opposition to such regimes was also articulated using Islamic rationales. It is no surprise to find arguments and counter-arguments for any political/social action in the name of Islam, be it suicide bombings or women’s place in the society or participatory democracy or any other issues.

The specter and vitality of political Islam permeated diverse Muslim societies irrespective of their linguistic, cultural and political divisions. This in turn intertwined and engaged both rulers and the public in an Islamic discourse in the long absence of practice and commitment to other modern discourses. In this respect a resurgent Islam opened up the

518 Esposito, The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality? pp. 15–18. See also Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: , and Modernity. (London: Verso, 2002).

200 public realm that had been organised and monitored by the rulers’ collective intransigence and corruption, in the grip first of Western political and economic hegemony and then generally of the Saudi-Wahhabi variety of extreme conservatism.519 In this opening up it showed that it is possible to retrieve Islam from its historical alienation and reinvent it as an effective social force and thus to modernize its meaning. In this respect, it also underscored an important point that to contain, contend, engage and exercise one’s authority over the masses it needs to involve the public in a discourse that is meaningful and liberating to its practitioners. The same logic is also true for Western powers in dealing with Muslim states; they can possibly win their confidence by initiating and engaging them in a dialogue in its broad sense and in earnest. To do so the US and the Western powers first need to step down from their current policy approach on the Middle East of acting “multilaterally when it can and unilaterally as it must” because the US recognises this area as vital to its national interests and therefore recognise no limits or constraints, surely not international law or the United Nations520and rather should acknowledge the limits or constrains as part of any engagement process not only to upheld the international law (which conventionally acknowledges the universal consent in enacting this law at the first place) but also to demonstrate the world community that as its valued and most powerful member the US practices what it preaches. In other words the US can’t promote a policy of exclusion based on cultural and material difference and at the same time emphasis on freedom, fraternity and equality. In order to create a different form of moral community from the existing one,

519 In this context an obvious question may arise for the reader, that under such a condition why did the Saudi establishment/intelligence often support Qutb’s followers, Al-Qaeda and Taliban? The answer is that it did this to sustain and secure its own position in the Islamic world, where its legitimacy is often questioned. As discussed on many occasions in this analysis, initially the threat came from Nasser’s Arab nationalism and to counter this threat Saudi Arabia endorsed and offered pan-Islamism as an ideological alternative to Arab nationalism. As part of this policy it supported anti-Nasser forces (including the Muslim Brotherhood) both materially and ideologically. In this way the Saudis contained the antagonism from within and outside that threatened its legitimacy. For sometime, such a policy allowed security and stability to the Saudis. Later, with the rise of the Khomeiniites in Iran the threat loomed large once again, not from the nationalists or secularists but from a revolutionary Islam. In addition to the threat from Islamic Iran the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan only heightened Saudi insecurity. In such a changing scenario Saudi Arabia had to come up with a new policy. It found the situation in Afghanistan as a great opportunity to its own advantage for diversionary purposes both to counter the antagonism from within and the Islamic threat from Iran. The subsequent support for Al-Qaeda and Taliban needs to be understood from this perspective. For a detailed discussion of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy objectives and involvement in Muslim affairs, see AdeedDawisha, Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security. (London: Adelphi Paper no. 158, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982); William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981). 520 See Footnote 474.

201 it should stop demanding that the Muslim/Arab world organise their societies along Western lines. Rather the Western elites and their political allies in the Muslim world should aim at providing the grossly underprivileged and marginalised populace who are considered undeveloped, barbaric and irrational with the same privileges and access to modern life as they themselves have, thus allowing the general public to develop a suitable level of sophistication to realise the benefits of modernity. Without this access to the benefits of modernity the majority of people in many Muslim states have never had, oryet have the means or scope to organise and behave themselves along Western lines as the conservative establishment of modernity demands. In this respect the conservative establishment in the West needs to discard the elitist approach of dialogue between elites and enter the realm of the public sphere and broaden its scope by taking the (so referred) irrational, undeveloped and barbaric masses and their experiences and concerns into account. Perhaps only then could a robust and developed theory of “the politics of dialogue” evolve, away from the current practice of dialogue being imposed and exercised by the global powers in sustaining the current global order.

In embarking on such a journey one may even be so optimistic as to imagine that such a journey may result in better understanding of the nature of humanity’s self-articulation. In turn this may facilitate the ability to take more informed decisions while dealing both with terrorism and state sanctioned acts of violence. As discussed earlier and in several contexts in this thesis, the Islamic movement underscores the validity of this argument. To reiterate, irrespective of the contradictions within the Islamic movement dialogue (even if an Islamic one) generates a better understanding among the masses and reaches out to those on its margins. The following chapter, while taking into account the contradictions in the Islamic movement, will explore the limits and scope of the politics of dialogue paying special attention to Islamic discourse and its future.

202 CHAPTER NINE

The Politics of Dialogue and the Future of Political Islam

The future of political Islam will be determined among other political practices, importantly by the politics of dialogue. Readers may have noticed throughout this thesis that the politics of Islam during the past three centuries sprang from the politics of justice or rather, the lack of it. From the early reformists to the current activists one recurring theme that has consistently attracted their attention is a sense of justice that many felt was denied to their people in various aspects of life. The Tobacco Protest (1891–92) in Iran, the demand for participation in the Paris peace conference by the Egyptian nationalists in 1920, the Khilafat movement in India in the 1920s, and the Palestinian resistance against Israel’s occupation as the assault on the Palestinian population continues are just a few examples that highlight the outcome of the sense of injustice deeply felt by many. While rulers could not redress such issues or engage the public in any meaningful ways, Islamic movements engaged them in a dialogic relation and stood firmly with them in articulating their concerns in the absence of other legitimate avenues of protest. In this regard the Islamic movement at least has restored a political space for the public to have some say or control over their own affairs.

As discussed in the previous chapter the evolution and the rise of political Islam has been linked with the long absence of practice of and commitment to other modern political discourses in key states. In the absence of practice of other modern secular discourses – such as genuinely participatory democracy – the Islamic discourse turned out to be the most effective social force to open up the public sphere and engage the masses and the rulers in debates concerning their aspirations and concerns. This opening up allowed reinterpretation of Islamic beliefs through the modern sociological and political languages of Durkheim, Weber and Marx, and often with Frantz Fanon’s moving revolutionary outlook for post- colonial societies that many in Muslim societies could relate to and identify with as a

203 common ground from which to engage in a dialogue. In this reinterpretation Islam was transformed from an ineffective social force into a dynamic social force that commented on the realities of society and indicated approaching changes. In this context Islam tapped the vast “nonrational sources of knowledge such as habit, tradition, faith, unexamined thought and religious authority.”521This was a substratum of social/political consciousness shaped by tradition and history, not by conscious training as characterised by the logic of modernisation, a gradual process of mass participation in public life and the expansion of civil society. Taking their cue from their earlier brush with constitutionalism, Marxism and liberalism many activists/reformists successfully projected these values onto the discontented masses through an Islamic idiom. This not only encouraged the masses to reclaim their position in the public sphere but also provided a means or a model for participation and articulation of their concerns so as to reassert their legitimate role in public life. As a result, many rulers were forced to break or at least relax their intransigence and engage in a dialogue with the public and in doing so they modernised Islam’s meaning.The practice of dialogue in an Islamic idiom522may not have reduced the significant chasm between the rulers and the masses but it definitely “indicated what dialogue signifies to the politics of our time, including the politics of Islam (my emphasis) and the questions it poses for a possible politics of justice.”523

The current political Islam owes much of it eminence to the act of dialogue that took the public experience and social practices of everyday life seriously and articulated them creatively. The act of dialogue not only restored the self-confidence of its participants to assert their right for justice in the public sphere but also helped its participants in their self- articulation; a self-articulation that seeks to find a balance between the self and the outside; a self-articulation that attempts to acquire a transnational character that is evinced in intense protest against globally articulated forms of economic, military and political power and their local agents as seen in Iraq and many other such places. This protest speaks against a

521Euben, op. cit., p. 35. 522 Readers would have noticed throughout this thesis that in the absence of practice of dialogue in any meaningful way diverse Islamic movements facilitated situations that encouraged engaging and developing relations among its participants to assert their legitimate demand to open up the public sphere. As a result of that demand it also allowed its participants to compel the rulers to engage in dialogue. 523Ranabir Samaddar, The Politics of Dialogue: Living Under the Geopolitical Histories of War and Peace (Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), p. 347.

204 “runaway world” that in the first place brought so many miseries to their world through colonisation and then “through such a grotesque form of de-colonisation that the de- colonised nations still reel under its impact.”524 It is crucial to understand that the (Islamic) protest is as much against the apathy and hypocrisy of the most powerful as against the hopelessness of the most vulnerable. While it speaks for the most vulnerable, it also speaks to them and simultaneously compels the most powerful to listen to them. It is important to realise that the protest pushes for a new dialogue away from the conventional account of dialogue framed by treaties, alliances, strategies, elite diplomacies and policies. It is difficult to extract the desired outcome through the act of dialogue alone while the current status quo of states and elites remain the same. The exchange has been two-way: while the politics of dialogue fuels unrest and protest, in turn the protest and unrest determines the course of the dialogue. This means the current dialogic regime fails to address current political concerns and as a result it drives people to re-examine the importance of studying what Ranabir Samaddar refers as the “relational accounts of the discursive and institutional forms of the dialogic acts, the dialogic situation, and the scope of the dialogic universe.”525 As Samaddar notes, the push for a new dialogue to seek justice is not going to be easy and “this politics will not be less confrontationist than the politics of the Cold War.”526 Therefore, it is important to join Samaddar and others who in their diverse scholarly practice indicated a dialogic model of interpretation that in Roxanne Euben’s terms“may be usefully employed to generate a “better” understanding of fundamentalism.”527 Embarking on such a practice it is important to question in Samaddar’s terminology “what is this act,

524Ranabir Samaddar has made this point. Samaddar, The Politics of Dialogue, pp. 320–321, 334–335. 525Ibid., p.347. In referring to a dialogic model of interpretation and its scope, I invoke a tradition that traverses a vast amount of literature and many traditions (from Plato’s cornerstone The Republic in Western philosophy to Bishnusharma’s The Jatak Tales in Indian philosophy illustrates the diversity and depth of this tradition) that are beyond the scope of this analysis. However, for the current focus I express my solidarity with Ranabir Sammaddar and with his dialogic model of interpretation, drawing on debates specifically from a post-colonial position that I share with him. Equally important for this endeavor is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s groundbreaking philosophy of hermeneutics that influenced many scholars across disciplines. Notable among them is Jurgen Habermas whose notion of dialogic ethics has been further extended by Andrew Linklater into the international realm. Both Linklater and Habermas argue for a new political community governed by dialogue and consent rather than power and force. 526Samaddar, The Politics of Dialogue, p. 335. 527Euben, op.cit., p. 36.

205 which makes dialogue a dialogue, in other words, what is this with which a dialogue constitutes itself?”528

Taking the ongoing conflicts in post-colonial South Asia (Kashmir, Jaffna and Pakistan, the present epicentre of the war against terror) Samaddar offers a comprehensive analysis of war and peace in the region and the pervasive tension that continues between the state and its constituents. On the basis of his analysis of a number of dialogic situations and dialogic relations, Samaddar illustrates how these dialogic acts and practices take place. Based on that analysis he argues:

The word, act, as we know is a carrier of double meaning – in the sense of activity it is production, and in the sense of form, an institution. In order to produce, we must stand apart from the means with which we produce in order to act on them. We give ourselves to what we are producing and what we want to produce, by not giving into it – that is to say, a total conversion of our alienation or distancing into our identity as an actor, that is our political subject- hood and individuality. It means that in practicing and forming dialogue, as political subjects we are away from it, and then into it. We are not inherently dialogists just in the way we are not naturally unilateral beings. We are dialogic because relations compel dialogues – we have differences, quarrels, reasons to accommodate, appreciate, and these are…relational acts.529

It is true that relations/relational acts compel dialogue but the question here is as Samaddar notes, what is the validity of “these relational acts is as we find them in situations of war, peace, diplomacies, and the strivings for rights and justice, and what do these relational acts mean in terms of the truth of dialogue?”530 Reflecting upon the conventional forms and institutions of dialogue Samaddar points out one of the most established forms of dialogue or conversation today, “namely constitution and the constitutional forms of accommodation and conversation", is the prevailing expression of political rationality that defines the acts of dialogue. Samaddar argues that irrespective of its wide acceptance in contemporary

528Samaddar, op.cit., p. 347. 529Ibid., p. 347. 530Ibid., p. 347.

206 global politics this particular form of dialogue has limits in ensuring minimal justice, which reflects the limits of legal and juridical conversations and dialogue that are the essential features of this form of dialogue. Here one confronts a political problem, not just a legal or an ethical one, as R. B. J. Walker in a similar context argues that “we absolutely do not have any legal recourse against huge social forces that destroy the lives of millions of people whereas many of us thrive on those forces”. As such, “we cannot take whole economic, social, cultural or religious systems to court, and we cannot bomb them out of existence.”531 It is hard to disagree with Samaddar as he observes that many of the current conflicts in and around many regions of the globe are outside the realm of constitution and constitutional forms of accommodation.

To clarify the limits “that constitution and law-bound dialogues have on the political issues of our time and emphasising the need to study dialogic situation in the broadest possible political context”, Samaddar raises the question concerning self-determination. He asks whether “the right of self-determination is the source of conflict or a contribution to conflict prevention?”532In his view “the dilemma evident in the search for a constitutional answer to a fundamentally political question is nothing but agony of what law does to our questions of political subject-hood.”533 Citing the case of all ex-colonial countries of South Asia, Samaddar points out that in these post-colonial countries,

constitution-making and legal rationality was not a matter of philosophy but direct acts of conflict-moderation, resolution, and prevention, dialogue is at once an object (a demand, an issue, a theme of quarrel) and a subject (an act, a procedure, a process that constitutes into a self). Law makes us citizens and subjects, so that we can dialogue in our polity, yet law places limits on our capacity and power to dialogue in order to re-make our political society. Our role as political subjects founds the basic law through among things animated conversations that is, the constitution; yet, it is constitution that defines our political subjectivity and the power to dialogue. In

531 Walker, op. cit., p. 80. 532Samaddar, op. cit., p. 348. 533Ibid.

207 this logical circle we have the self-foundation of law – the aporia in terms of dialogic politics.534

Here constitution acts as double-edged sword – while it has the capacity to facilitate and expand dialogue, it can also limit its scope by citing law (which often validates the political rationality of the state and global actors). “Constitution”, Samaddar argues, “lays the guidelines of negotiating conflicting relations and building up unities. But constitution, precisely because these are fundamental rules, makes negotiation difficult, at times impossible.”535 This template becomes increasingly problematic when one faces anti- democratic and arbitrary modern states like Saudi Arabia, many authoritarian states in the Middle East and other Muslim majority states (Algeria, Libya, etc.) who have adapted modernity to their own purposes(to sustain and maintain many anti-modern policies). For many of these countries writing a constitution was not a matter of philosophy but one of political exigency specifically tailored to suit the interests of few families, clans, classes and their powerful Western protectors. Here constitutions rarely grant the political subjecthood that many would imagine as a pre-requisite of what most have come to call the logic of modernisation. One confronts here a peculiar problem where anti-modern forces operate in tandem with modern authoritarian states (often drawing support from the world’s highly modernised societies) for their selfish ends thus defying the very logic and values of modernisation as a gradual process of democratisation. These structural differences contribute to a significant degree to the scope of constitutional forms of dialogue (in terms of quality and viability). The scope of constitution in this context is even more limited and makes the power to dialogue or to negotiate fundamentally unsustainable and for most of the time impossible.

This dead end in constitutional forms of dialogue leads Samaddar to raise the key question: “How can we have a fundamental negotiation?” In other words, is it possible to have a fundamental negotiation while fundamental rules remain intact? Samaddar denies that possibility. According to him:

534Ibid. 535Ibid.

208 If it is fundamental, it means we cannot negotiate, we can negate. Constitution by creating a political body, in that footstep we can include international law also, by appealing to the body of internationally recognized (that is legal) actors recognizes its subjects who are then objects to be constitutionally governed. In this logical closure, law derives its greatest strength, and dialogic politics faces its greatest challenge. It is this juridical finality of the conflict resolution procedure, which dialogic acts at times tear apart, for while often being subject to constitution and law, dialogue presents truths beyond constitution, and suggests new ways of constituting that unity of the subject and object.536

Furthermore, “politics while vexed, and at times paralyzed with the duality of the juridical truth and dialogic truth, becomes under pressure of the dialogic acts what it is, namely an act that gives birth to law and constitutions, and immediately proceeds thereafter to subvert it with new ideas and conversations”,537 a scenario that marks the limits of constitutional forms of dialogue and indicates dialogue’s own independent self and philosophical underpinnings. It is an ongoing process, entrenched over centuries of history, cross-cultural interactions, competing traditions, beliefs, social practices and values, and cannot be grasped or explained in any quantifiable way –certainly not by a constitution. Instead,

this dialogue, in doubt and objection, is a constant going beyond oneself and a return to oneself, one’s own opinions and one’s own points of view…it is this infinite dialogue with ourselves which never leads anywhere definitely and which differentiates us from that ideal of an infinite spirit for which all that exists and all truth lies open in a single moment’s vision.538

As observed,

it is…in the midst of this interior conversation with ourselves, which is always simultaneously the anticipation of conversation with others and the introduction of others into the conversation with ourselves –

536Ibid. p. 348. 537Ibid. 538Gadamer, op. cit., p. 547.

209 that the world begins to open up and achieve order in all the domains of experience.539

Here, “the dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definite knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself.”540 Thus a qualitative dialogue is possible in which participants/actors are not only prepared to acknowledge and appropriate their own existing knowledge (through prior experience and learning), but should also be prepared for often-changing, unfamiliar, unequal and unpleasant experiences in order to learn from them. Here,

[being experienced], does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them.541

Such participants/actors, enriched by experience, hold the capacity to “enframe” the views of participants/actors in the conversation in a mutually meaningful way by authenticating some of these experiences and views and refuting others.

It needs to be realised that such “enframing” of views in a mutually meaningful way often ushers in the birth of constitutions and charters that subsequently determine the course of the dialogue, which at times may be at odds with the political issues of the time and with the resulting chasm in one’s political subjecthood and political society. In this context, as Euben argues, “we cannot escape the hermeneutical circle, the dialogic model recommends itself not because it is invulnerable to distortion of power but less susceptible to them than the social scientific models parasitic on rationalist discourse.”542 In this logical circle one not only confronts what Samaddar maintains is “the self-foundation of law – the aporia in terms dialogic politics”, but one also faces a condition that demands a journey of self- discovery with new ideas, experiences and fresh dialogues to deal with the changing

539Ibid., p. 547. 540Ibid., p. 350. 541Ibid., p. 350. 542Euben, op. cit., p. 42.

210 political issues of our time. This self-discovery marks the trajectory of the dialogic model, which is evolving and dynamic in spirit, not confined to constitutions and law, and which through dialogic politics ushers in the establishment of constitutions and law as a result of dialogic acts.

Thus in such a dialogic model, dialogue

does not mean the enactment of a ready-made consensus (the subsumption of particulars under a universalist umbrella) nor the conduct of random chatter…. [D]ialogical exchange has an ‘agonal’ or tensional quality which cannot be fully stabilized; as a corollary to self-exposure, it requires a willingness to ‘risk oneself’ that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative process in which the status of self and other are continually renegotiated.543

Such a quality negates claims to a universalist umbrella – a tenet sustained by the value accorded its apparent timelessness, promising justice and peace as achievable in a quantifiable way. One thus faces a condition that is at odds with conforming to a universalist idiom like that exemplified in Kant’s iuscosmopoliticum – in which he envisaged humanity’s ultimate goal as achieving universal justice and “perpetual peace”. Fukuyama claims this view had a strong influence on his “End of History” thesis, and the associated notion of universal civilisation based on some Euro–American values.544 Kant believed it is possible to attain such a goal by submitting oneself to a civil constitution based on a cosmopolitan law. For Kant, the “highest purpose of Nature” is the attainment of a “perfectly just civic constitution.”545 According to him it is possible to attain such a constitution through republicanism. In his view, the “only constitution which derives from the original compact, and on which all juridical legislation of a people must be based, is the

543 Fred Dallmayar, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. xviii. 544 Anthony Burke in his analysis argues that Hegel (via Kojève’s interpretation) significantly influenced Fukuyama’s End of History thesis. In Burke’s view Hegel’s use of Kant is distorting and even Kant’s teleology was an afterthought. For details, see Anthony Burke, “Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War,” Social Identities, 2005, 11(4), pp. 315–343. 545 Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”, in Lewis White Beck (eds.), Kant on History. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 16.

211 republican.”546 Kant’s vision that human progress is linked with constitutionalism fuels much of contemporary political debate through its quest for a universal idiom. The linking of peace and justice with the spread of democracy draws much of its strength from this Kantian logic. In this context it is hardly surprising that “following Kant and taking into account the rate of the spread of democracy it tempted Michael Doyle to predict that “global peace should be anticipated, at the earliest, in 2113.”547 Unfortunately, the rate of spread of disproportionate violence accompanied by the enforcement of conditions of liberal or neo-liberal democracy and international monetary agencies happens to be a distinctly Western project inaugurated by Kant, inextricably linked with his idea of “world history” and a iuscosmopoliticum. Kant’s universality not only suffers from the shortcomings of being limited by a specifically Western view of universality, but also from his unbending faith in the capacity of a constitution.

Considering the limits of constitutional forms of dialogue, Samaddar argues that “Kant was only deluding himself” when he wrote that,

[T]he idea of a cosmopolitan right…a complement of the unwritten code of law – constitutional as well as international code of law [is] necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realization of perpetual peace. For only by endeavoring to fulfill the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching the ideal.548

In Samaddar’s view this exposes the weakness in Kant’s theory, but at the same time, Samaddar argues, Kant hints “at a significant truth in that same third definitive article, that perpetual peace is perpetual effort, and that ‘mutual interest’ and ‘means of mediation’ lead to ‘a concord in a state of peace’, in other words, there are practices of peace, the perpetual practices.”549 This means the institutionalised application of the values of democratic republicanism, international agencies and the co-operative efforts of individual sovereign states is not enough.

546Ibid., pp. 93–94. 547Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. Part 2,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12(4), p. 352, cited by Bowden, op. cit., p. 49. 548Samaddar, op. cit., p. 348. 549Ibid., p. 348.

212

Built upon democratic structural principles, the UN and the International Court of Justice were empowered as the ultimate bodies in which the principles of “cosmopolitan rights” and “sovereignty” are often tested. It is self-evident that despite the claim to extend minimum justice to all people possible, this is a fallacy. For instance, “Article 2 (paragraph 4) of the charter of the United Nations has declared, ‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’”550 Despite this declaration, “the United Nations had, however, visualised collective compulsory measures, individual and collective self-defense permitted and promoted by the collective body of the nations, the UN.”551However, as Samaddar notes, “this has taken a bizarre turn – a group of nations or conceivably one nation alone can also take coercive measures against a state if it thinks that the latter has violated international and national norms as envisaged in the charter and other subsequent declaration on human rights.”552 It is worth recollecting the macabre outcome of such an interpretation. The history of the last half century, littered with dead bodies, dead treaties and the stench of blood, reveals the elastic interpretation of “constitution” and law as an end in itself, a constitutional exercise for the sake of political ritual rather than any meaningful political engagement. The Iraq War and the present “war on terror” are just two significant manifestations of the bizarre interpretation of “constitution”, where self-reference becomes the foundation and destination of constitutional exercise. As mentioned earlier it has been eloquently reflected in PNAC’s (Project for New American Century) statement of principles which among other things emphasises the need to “strengthen ties to democratic allies” and to “challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values”; to “promote the cause of economic and political freedom abroad”; and to “accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles”553 which had a deterministic influence on Bush administration’s policy of regime change and its military campaign in Iraq. On a similar

550Ibid., p. 147. 551Ibid. 552 Ibid. 553 Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles, 3 June1997. Also see note 193.

213 note, in informing the Security Council of US stance on the Middle East, Madeleine Albright essentially argued in the Middle East United States will act “multilaterally” when it can and unilaterally as it must, because the US recognises the Middle East as important to US national interests and therefore does not recognise limits or constraints of international law or the United Nations.554 In this context the role of UN, which is underpinned by strong rules about the use of force and human rights is perfunctory. No longer a matter of contemplation, belief or choice, for many people and many nations constitution remained an illusionary promise of political power becoming instead a raison d’être for subjugation, torture and usurpation. The ongoing strife in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are the unspeakable reminders of the limits of constitution and constitutional forms of dialogue. As observed “we are now in a situation where sovereignty has been internationalized, and ‘order’ is no longer taken as the natural adjunct of peace, unlike in the Westphalian scenario where the capacity of a state to maintain order at home and remain disciplined abroad was recognized and acknowledged as being peaceful.”555 Instead one faces a scenario in global politics where the role and legitimacy of the UN is expendable and flexible. Depending upon the significance of their sovereignty some states are considered more equal than others.556 In this international social Darwinism a clear pecking order defines who the elites are and who lack the qualities (based on values, civilisational standard and material power) to be part of that exclusive association.

As a result the states that adopt and follow the technologically and scientifically advanced Western model are deemed part of the association of elites whereas the states that do not choose or are unable to afford this model are relegated either on the basis of civilisation or sovereignty or both. Such a classification allows some states and associations to prevail over all other states and associations. In this context the US could ignore Hans Blix, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)

554 See Footnote 474 (Chomsky, p. 162). 555Samaddar, op.cit., p. 38. 556 Powerful sovereign states often take unilateral action against relatively less powerful states if they think/perceive the sovereignty of the less powerful state functions against their interest. For example, when a powerful state like China takes a decision on Tibet the international community is unable to do anything other than customary protest, or when Russia decides to raid Georgia (apparently for its defiance) the international community was unable to do anything. Samaddar’s observation (Footnote 550) explains why the sovereignty of some states is more significant than others.

214 inspectors and the UN Security Council and form a “coalition of the willing” to declare war against Iraq in the name of delivering justice to the Iraqi people and securing America’s security in the wake of the 9/11 attack. In the same way Russia could ignore international opinion and raid Ingushetia or Georgia, justifying such action by claiming it was needed to secure the safety of “its” people even though they are members of other sovereign states.557 On the other hand, when a group of Afghan women requested the UN through its representative to Peshawar and Islamabad, Angela King that “they would like to mobilize educated Afghan women in the peace-making process, Ms. King reportedly asked them to apply for UN jobs instead.”558 It was observed that “after the meeting the women felt confused, insulted, hurt, angry and substantially ignored.”559 However, “they noted bitterly this is not an unusual situation – neither within our societies, nor within the UN agencies.”560 The strict policing of gender inequality is not only practiced in non-modern Afghan society but also in the global agencies that are patently the forums for the collective advancement of humanity irrespective of gender difference.

Women here are doubly dislocated, first as a result of war and conflict they are rendered as political non-entities and subsequently, for that reason, they remain outside dialogic politics. It is a sad truth that in all conflict zones the existing institutional structures (UN, ICC, European Union and NATO) lack mechanisms to enable the expression of the concerns of all those affected people in general, and, women and children in particular. Once again, as mentioned earlier one is reminded of the statement by the then US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, when she was confronted by Leslie Stahl on national television and asked how she felt about the fact that sanctions had killed half a million Iraqi children. She replied, “it is a very hard choice”, adding “we think the price is worth it.”561 If this is the view of a prominent stateswoman, herself a mother, representing the most powerful and apparently most civilised country on earth, one should not be surprised that women’s voices and children’s suffering are never heard beyond their

557 This also relates to the structural power they hold as veto-holding permanent members of the UNSC. 558Samaddar, op. cit., p. 299. Samaddar notes this, referring to Paula Banerjee’s detailed study of the patterns of institutional response to the situation of refugee women in South Asia. For more information, see Paula Banerjee, “Dislocating Women and Making the Nation”, Refugee Watch, 2004, 17(December). 559Ibid., pp. 299–300. 560 Ibid. 56160 Minutes, May 12, 1996.

215 immediate confines in Mosul, Gaza, the Swat Valley, , Waziristan and UN refugee camps, where they are often caught in the crossfire of resistance forces within and intervening forces outside, both operating in the name of justice and peace. The institutional apathy expressed in institutional proportions forecloses any meaningful dialogue with these women. Their voices are silenced even before they are raised; the institutional norms take precedence over their experiences, their views rendering their political subjecthood irrelevant and unworthy of dialogue.

This form of dialogue becomes more problematic as one tries to exercise it in places like Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan. This policy simply defies its logic (accommodation and conversation). One simply cannot bomb, maim, displace and silence a large number of people in the name of liberty and then offer them a constitution and/or an election, expecting that it would heal all the wounds, erase the memory of the loved and lost ones and propel them to conversations about what many among us think is the way to go about in the world.562As such, many established democracies and functional societies find it hard to deal with the growing discontent and contemporary political issues based only on the constitutional and legal interpretation of the state and global institutions.563In addition to

562 As Richard Ned Lebow in a similar context notes, “Of course dialogue does not operate in a vacuum … It may also explain why the initial Iraqi euphoria at the overthrow of Saddam Hussein quickly turned into opposition to the USA as an occupier. This transition was facilitated by American occupation policy, which aimed – but never really succeeded – in addressing Iraqi appetites (by providing security, food, electricity, etc.) to the exclusion, and often the detriment, of satisfying Iraqi needs for self-esteem” (Richard Ned Lebow “The power of persuasion”, in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, (eds), Power in World Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 136-137. 563 For example, one finds many discontent voices within the union of India often demanding to address issues (such as empowerment, autonomy and preferential access to resources) which are often intrinsically linked with their ethnic and/or territorial identity. Some of these issues surfaced during colonial period (such as the request of Naga people to the British Government initially to exclude Naga Hills from the Reformed Scheme so that they could be free from “new and heavy” taxes and later on their demand increased which included but not restricted to self-determination and “hoping that the grey area of shared sovereignty with the future state of India would find appropriate institutional forms”. The reluctance of the retreating colonial power to do anything substantive for the Nagas left both the post-colonial Indian state and the Naga people unprepared in finding out a suitable political settlement. The following decades witnessed the rise of Naga insurgency, heavy military response from the Indian state, peace process and the signing of peace accords and so on to stabilise the discontent. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore how far these accords met either the demands of the Nagas or the state (which over time kept changing for both the parties) or for that matter it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the issues concerning identity/autonomy/independence that re-surfaced after independence carrying both strong territorial and ethnic implications where demand persisted for re-negotiation of the relationship between the state and communities often in the absence of national consensus or the sympathy of the nation (as one faces the difficulties in finding a solution of the problems in Kashmir, parts of Northeast and other parts of India). In

216 this limitation, the number of people who are forced to join the growing numbers of refugees and deterritorialised, ‘non-legal or unregistered or without papers people’564 (within the state) as a result of huge social forces characterised by global and inflexible local forces only escalates the problem, against which there is no legal recourse. For instance, the massacre at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps during the war in Lebanon in 1982 illustrates the lack of capacity of these institutions either to resist or address such unspeakable atrocities. In order to create a firmer ring of security, Israel drove around 400,000 Palestinians out of Lebanon, mass murdered refugees in camps and expropriated the lands, none of which the international community could prevent.565 As Samaddar notes,

the Arab resistance collapsed in face of concerted western military and political might, under the deadweight of corruption and oligarchy, and then let down by an inappropriate leadership of a stateless people, who could float, organize raids, mount heroic resistance, but was inadequate for reclaiming political history for themselves on their own.566

Instead of granting any political space “the archetypal victim would be thus considered fit for few dollars to stay in the squalid camps and the expelling state would get an annual help of 5 billion dollars to keep the refugees from returning.”567 Israel (with the decisive support of US) continued this draconian policy despite the large number of (Palestinian) people dispossessed of their homes and driven from camps and with so many deaths (18,000), and regardless of the customary protest of the Security Council568 and the international this context it would be suffice to say that even within the democratic framework it is often hard to address the political issues of our time based only on the constitutional and legal interpretation of the state and global institutions. For details see Samaddar (Chapter 6) “Governing through Peace Accords” in The Politics of Dialogue, pp. 159-196. 564 As mentioned earlier Olivier Roy in his analysis sheds light on this issue. Roy, Globalized Islam, pp. 105– 106. Also see footnote 362, 363, 364 and 365 for detail information. 565Samaddar, op. cit., p. 297. 566Ibid., pp. 297–298. 567Ibid., p. 298. 568 The problem explains the lack of a law against aggression. In the current structure the five permanent members with their veto power often diktats their own terms on the Security Council or renders its resolutions useless. Invoking Thomas Schelling – Janice Bially Mattern explains how coercive force works. She notes that in Schelling’s view “coercive force works by giving the victim the appearance of a choice about compliance. The choice, however, is actually a ‘non-choice’ since it is offered to the victim in the context of a credible threat – indeed, a promise – of some physical loss so horrifying (often death) that the victim must succumb to the force-wielder’s wishes. Coercion thus works like a trap; either submit or risk death” (Janice Bially Mattern “Why ‘soft power’ isn’t so soft: representational force and attraction in world politics”, in

217 community. The most recent manifestation of this policy of separation is the erection of a formidable security wall thus creating a further chasm between Palestinians and Israel both politically and physically, leaving the international community and Palestinians outside the wall for dialogue that could never cross the wall to reach either the Israeli establishment or its people.569

Based only on the constitutional and legal interpretation of the global institutions and the state, the issues discussed above indicate the limitation of these institutional forms in addressing the contemporary political issues. Such a limitation encourages one for a radical rethinking of the basic protocols employed in understanding the current political and intellectual practices. This requires a kind of rethinking away from the domain of institutional and disciplinary forms back to where it belongs, to people’s everyday lives experience. As Emmanuel Levinas puts it: “this means less interest in conceptual constructions and greater readiness to listen and learn from experience.”570 In his view instead of building great systems, one should recognise people’s collective lives experience and use it to approach truth in many different ways. This kind of understanding opens up new spaces to interpret dialogic politics and to make them relevant under the aegis of one’s everyday social life/practices, but this does not mean that one’s social practices or “empirical practices of conversation will survive by translating themselves into juridical knowledge.”571 It means

if law exists as…on a self-foundation, that is to say, it does not need apparently a politics and history, dialogic practices as relational acts in politics makes this self foundation weak, unstable, with what stands on this foundation, that is law, always appealing to an agency outside, that is politics, to help it out, to restore social faith in it.572

Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, (eds), Power in World Politics: London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 110. 569 To evaluate the wall’s multiple purposes and meaning see Anthony Burke’s analysis “Beyond Security in the Middle East for (Co)Existence”, borderland e-journal, 2007, 6(2). 570Levinas, op. cit., p. 16. 571Samaddar, op. cit., p. 349. 572 Ibid.

218 Rather “in this structure of ‘in’ and ‘out’, we can rediscover the fundamentals of the politics of dialogue. Neither war, nor the supposed opposite, constitution, can suppress it for long.”573 In other words, those conversations that cannot be translated into juridical knowledge or interpreted through institutional frameworks (conversations states, diplomacy, the UN, ICC and others) warrant more attention in the politics of dialogue.574It is possible that the answer to the current debate on the politics of war/terror remains in those dialogues, which cannot be translated in a strictly policed existing political structures with their civilisational and material classifications.

In this context, to avoid misinterpretation or wrong interpretation of the practices of conversation and to avoid injustice one needs to give greater emphasis to what Jean Francis Lyotard calls the différend. Lyotard distinguishes an injury (un dommage) from an injustice (un tort), where the position of the accused and that of the accuser/judge cannot be

573 Ibid. 574It is equally important to facilitate that quest, it also involves reform and transformation of these institutions and protocols to incorporate and honour the lived experiences of the many, rather than state protocols of diplomacy and realpolitik. This means the emphasis need to focus on the political practices that promises prospects for change through the process of empowerment and the creation of new participatory spaces. Such a process obviously invites to broadly define power than traditionally has been the case. Erik Ringmar provides an important dimension to broaden this debate. He notes that “if the study of international politics is the study of how actors define and achieve their aims, what matters is potentia rather than potestas. While potestas is the power through which the world is governed, potentia is the power through which the world is made. We need to study the ways in which actors are empowered and disempowered and, thus, which institutions enable or disable reflection, action and compromise” (Erik Ringmar “Empowerment Among Nations: A Sociological Perspective” in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, (eds), Power in World Politics: London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 202. Citing the example of US foreign policy in recent years, Ringmar argues that it has taken a stance “where it matters far more to the US what it can do to others rather than what it can get done together with others”. As a result, he argues that the USA generally considered being the most powerful country in the world, yet it seems strangely powerless when dealing with a number of contemporary challenges including the Iraqi insurgency, fugitive terrorists and North Korean bombs…. [The reason is that the USA,] in its foreign policy in recent years has prioritized the pursuit of potestas at the expense of potentia; what the USA can do to others has mattered far more that what it can get done together with others. Above all, it has neglected to sustain systematically the kinds of international institutions which empower its friends and disempower its enemies. Ironically, this has made the USA far less powerful than it could have been…the concept of ‘the political’ itself is far too narrowly defined…. The image here is that of politics as an antagonistic struggle between actors who meet each other head-on as though on a metaphorical battlefield […]. And while there is no denying that such clashes do take place – indeed actual battlefields have not yet disappeared – a sociological understanding of power reminds us that this is a very partial view of what politics is all about. Before overt clashes can be staged, power has been exercised in forming the actors, their identities, outlooks on life, and the definition of their interests (p. 202).

219 articulated in the same idiom. It is a situation where “in an injustice, the injury is not judged according to the litigant’s own criteria of validity, so that the litigant (who then becomes a victim) is in effect silenced. This juridical paradigm is not limited to the courts.”575 As plenty of evidence suggests, this paradigm is well entrenched in everyday life situations through existing ethical and political practices. Whether it is Angela King’s directive to apply for UN jobs in response to the Afghan women’s request to include educated Afghan women in the peace process, or Madeleine Albright’s justification of sanctions in the face of half a million Iraqi children dying as a result of that political practice, it is crucial to remember that one is facing unequal political positions where the existing political idiom is incapable of articulating and acknowledging the litigant/victim’s voice/ordeal.576 Here the

575 Simon During, “Postmodernism or Post-colonialism”, in Thomas Docherty (eds.), Postmodernism: A Reader. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 456. 576 Bin Laden (in his numerous statements) often raised and questioned this unequal political position between the Muslim world and the US. In his view the existing political idiom is incapable of articulating the ordeals of thousands of victims of US policies in the Muslim world. He emphatically underscored this unequal political position that in his view often unjustly favored the US position. His call for jihad (war) against the US and its allies was precisely based to address that anomaly within the global political system and had nothing to do with America’s often announced rhetoric about freedom, liberty and democracy. Bin Laden rejected the charges of terrorism or being part of a terrorist organisation in many of his interviews, maintaining that the policies and actions of the US and its allies in the Islamic world invites violent reaction. In one of his many interviews rejecting the accusation of financing terrorism and being part of an international terrorist organisation Bin Laden said that “as for their accusation [that we] terrorize the innocent, the children, and the women, these fall into the category of “accusing others of their own affliction in order to fool the masses.” The evidence overwhelmingly shows America and Israel killing the weaker men, women and children in the Muslim world and elsewhere. A few examples of this are the recent Qana massacre in Lebanon, and the death of more than 600,000 Iraqi children because of the shortage of food and medicine which resulted from the boycotts and sanctions, also, their withholding of arms from the Muslims of Bosnia- Herzegovina, leaving them prey to the Christian Serbians who massacred and raped in a manner not seen in contemporary history. Nor should one forget the deliberate, premeditated dropping of the H bombs on cities with their entire populations of children, elderly and women, as was the case with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then, killing hundreds of thousands of children in Iraq, whose numbers [of dead] continue to increase as a result of the sanctions. Despite the ongoing American occupation of Saudi Arabia, America continues to claim that it is upholding the banner of freedom and humanity, yet it perpetrated deeds which you would not find the most ravenous of animals debasing themselves to do. As for what America accuses of, the killing of innocent people, it has not been able to offer any evidence, despite the magnitude of its expenditure on intelligence services. Witness our history in the Afghan phase of the jihad. This was unstained with any blood of innocent people, despite the inhuman Russian campaign against our women, our children, and our brothers in Afghanistan … Our encouragement and call to Muslims to enter jihad against the American and Israeli occupiers are actions which we undertake as religious obligations” (Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages To The World:The Statements Of Osama , trans. James Howarth. New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 40 – 41. However, Bin Laden’s stance on the US and its allies’ policies is clearly at odds with this, given that Al Qaeda’s violence that has taken so many lives, including many non-westerners and non-whites. His stance in no way absolves his or Al Qaeda’s culpability for the loss of so many innocents lives. Here, as one would notice, other than both the US and Al Qaeda claiming to be self- righteous, both speak distinctly in two different languages where it becomes problematic not only to mediate between the two parties (the aggressor and the aggrieved) but also makes it equally complex to define notion of justice or for that matter the notion of ‘terrorism’ in the conventional sense it is understood.

220 dominant or the powerful voice emanates through institutionalised politics with the effect that fear/force reinforces the exercise of power to prevail over all other competing voices. As observed, “the privileging of descriptive statements over prescriptive ones is a différend which occurs within end-means rationality; the West places colonised peoples in a différend; capitalism, with its tie to universality, creates a différend; for the specific, the unexchangeable, and so on.”577 As a result, under this framework the plight/grievance of the litigant/victim will never be understood or will remain vulnerable to misinterpretation and as a consequence of that (mis)interpretation the litigant/victim may end up with mistreatment or arbitrary treatment. Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, among other such facilities, loudly resonate with the fundamental irony of such a framework. As Samaddar remarked, “the fundamental irony of such a situation where the victim has to prove his victimization is not lost or compensated by objective tests”. Rather, in such a scenario “the role of judge…changes gradually from a recipient of requests to an interrogator of grounds, who arrogates to him the sovereign authority to interpret, assess, and declare the past pain of the refuge/victim and his fear of future torture, and makes his evaluation shareable with the shelter-seeker”,578or with other victims in a similar situation.

In this context it is impossible to ignore the existence and practice of differends in collective social and political sphere, which also signal that in the contemporary patterns of political, legal and social exclusion that bestows a few countries or a few materially advanced societies privileged positions over all other competing social and political practices under conditions of radical inequality to direct the course of global politics, one needs to reconceptualise the politics of dialogue outside the official and disciplinary domain to ensure minimum justice to all people/victims. To do so first one needs to acknowledge that differends play a significant role in our social and political life and take better care to minimise this unexchangeablity of conversation/engagement. In this effort, instead of building any universalising system or meta-narrative (such as American exceptionalism)that claims to cover all other systems or all other narratives, the focus of

577During, op. cit., p. 456. 578Samaddar, op. cit., p. 278. Samaddar has made this point based on a number of refugees fleeing a warring/persecuting state and seeking asylum in another country. His remark evaluates the plight of the refugees/victims caught in the lengthy legal process of UNHCR, the judiciary, the persecuting state, and the politics of (just) war all under the aegis of international relations.

221 critical attention should be “turning toward those effectively excluded from Traditional analysis but integral nevertheless to a volatile, changing world that defies grand-theorized representation of it.”579As a step forward,

in this enlarged and enriched agenda of global politics must be the voices and aspirations of the non-elite, the non-white, the non- Western,…and those who in their repossession of culture, history, and language, in their challenges to rigid developmental models, in their insistence on political participation, in their questioning of the ‘expert’, in their dissent against gendered and class givens, and in their confrontations with systemic ‘big brother’ have illustrated their desire to think and speak for themselves, to face their worlds as creative, imaginative human beings capable of both understanding the processes that ‘objectively’ define them and changing those processes.580

In this critical turnaround greater emphasis should be placed on listening to and learning from the experience of those rarely heard and carelessly heard people (as seen in Angela King’s directive to apply for UN jobs in response to the Afghan women’s request to include educated Afghan women in the peace process) who have systematically remained outside the great systems but who nevertheless as human beings deserve respect, dignity and a space to be heard, rather than being less respected or excluded on the basis of civilisational and material classifications. To restore the social and moral faith, these marginalised individuals must have the right and ability to speak the truth without fear or favor, which at the minimum will help to restore pride and dignity in the victims. But truth telling does not necessarily guarantee that justice or truth will prevail, because “truth telling can also become banal, as it is fast becoming a staple in the diet of transitional peacekeeping, truth itself becomes a victim of the daily truths of maneuver and manufacture of silence under new conditions.”581 In a systemic justice framework (constitutional bodies, states, and truth commissions) the possibility of attaining justice by telling the truth is not complementary to each other. Rather it “is often de-linked from the process of justice.”582 As one observes, in

579 George, op. cit., p. 229. 580Ibid., pp. 229–230. 581Samaddar, op. cit., p. 251. 582 Ibid.

222 that (de-linking of truth from justice) process the facts provided by Hans Blix and the UNMOVIC inspectors were ignored because the facts did not support the reason (the end- means rationality) that the US and United Kingdom envisaged. Similarly, contrary to the claim of its autonomous growth, the “rise of the Islamic madrassi schools in Pakistan and elsewhere is directly linked in part with the IMF’s structural adjustment programs that forced retrenchments in public education.”583 Likewise, the West’s often repeated claims of solidarity with democracy falters when one observes democratically elected governments (Mossadegh in Iran, Lumumba in Congo, and Allende in Chile) are overthrown because they did not satisfy or fit into the West’s idea of global political structure. For similar reasons humanitarian aid flooded Kosovo, but the plight of Afghans and Iraqis because of prolonged war did not evoke corresponding scrutiny from the framework of humanitarian assistance. The elastic interpretation of law makes truth expendable and instead of other factors such as theories of (just)war, sovereignty, rhetoric of the international monetary system and “balance of power "takes precedence over truth. As a result, the uncovering of truth is not necessarily an impartial act, but rather a partisan or tendentious act to quarantine and punish some, and to protect and provide impunity to others. It follows a template that judges Saddam Hussein, Ho Chi Minh, Mossadegh, and similar figures as criminals while excusing Pinochet, Sharon, Musharraf and such other figures as members of the morally just. According to Samaddar, “old dictators are being let off, because they had fought communism; new dictators are hauled [away], because they represent rogue states.”584 It is no surprise that, following the same template, US drones strike wherever and whenever they are directed, and amid global protest Israel continues to exercise disproportionate force against Palestinian resistance with impunity. It is sobering to remember that “in the decades of the seventies and eighties of the last century thousands and thousands of men and women were subjected to torture, kidnapping, extortion, forced disappearance, and on many occasions, executions”585 and the existing legal and constitutional system did not provide reprieve to these people. Rather, legal and constitutional means were often used to justify and carry out the policies of state violence. In this context women and children remain at greater risk than men of a range of dangers,

583Barkawi, op. cit., p. 26. 584Samaddar, op. cit., p. 46. 585 Ibid.

223 including starvation, rape, torture and mutilation, as seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, caught between the global “power balance” and local despotism.586Too often

the language of human rights and human emancipation has been used by the great powers to re-establish control over vast territories, in particular the post-colonial areas, whereas challenging that control, issues of rights are being deployed in another contest also of different nature – this is the contest against global power structures, in which the demand for dialogue occupies a place of critical importance.587

In this new political conjuncture, where the issues of rights are set out against current global power structures, this emerging political practice also demands a simultaneous restructuring of the dialogic structures currently determined by the state, big powers and global institutions. As seen

under the influence of great institution-setting in Europe through the European Union, Council of Europe, Organisation of Cooperation and Security in Europe, European Court, various treaties, conventions, and not the least NATO, the institutional argument has gained strength, and seems to suggest almost universal efficacy of the formula that institutional process despite lack of consensus on critical issues of political life can lead to sustained cooperation and dialogue among nation-states under conditions that would be defined.588

In other words, institutional process can define the conditions under which institutional dialogue will work. If those conditions emphasise attaining or achieving a certain level of economic and political development to reap the benefit of institutional argument, then often

586 The intensity of such dangers varies from time to time depending on improvements in the security situation. However, a high number of vulnerable people (particularly women and children) still remain at high risk from such dangers. With the civilian governments taking charge in these places measures are taken to address the challenges. Evidently in some areas (for example, the Kurdish region in Iraq or parts of Kabul in Afghanistan) the situation has improved but the risk is still there, as we often see. One also needs to remember that the prolonged war and sanctions had its toll both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 1979–80 both countries have been fighting some kind of war or other. It is not just the factional groups/warlords who maim each other or the general populace but also the landmines dumped in these places over years still mutilate many on a regular basis. 587Samaddar, op. cit., p. 46. 588Ibid., p. 5.

224 parties who lack those conditions are compelled to adopt those conditions – this enables them to attain the objective economic and political goals that permit institutional dialogue.It is a vision frequently promoted by the advocates of institutional dialogue, justifying accompanying actions in order for institutional dialogue to function. Often seen in the World Bank and IMF’s rhetoric on “good governance” – “emphasis on reconstruction, reforms, institution setting … and linking regional cooperation with reconstruction has revived what Samaddar calls institutional wisdom.”589

Evidently, "there was a near unanimous opinion after the Balkan tragedy, that new institutions should be set up, institutional process and supervision would have to be strengthened, and erring nations would be gradually trained and disciplined in institutional behaviour, and cooperation and dialogue.”590 It is worth observing that “the difference between the current phase of institutionalism and the earlier ones is that, the reformers today prefer to infuse notions of dialogue and peace in their prescriptions.”591 It has been observed that “reconstruction, the concern that led to the setting up of premier international financial institutions after the Second World War, is again the watchword with few more words adopted as companion terms such as poverty, race, social safety net, social capital, new democracy, dialogue, and good governance.”592 In effect, "the institutional insight and wisdom is at its worst an ancillary of the Fund-bank regime, at its best a reflection of new workings in international relations theory.”593 In these new workings “if one has to see dialogue in the context of the incipient forms of justice and democracy, one must also see it in the context of power, whose one form is the institutional management of conflict.”594 However, the institutional management of conflict becomes problematic, particularly when one confronts, for example, the current reality in Iraq and Afghanistan. The conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan not only question the universal efficacy of institutional dialogue, but also indicate the asymmetrical power positions these institutions embody within the current global power structure. In this context the institutional argument fails to grasp current

589Ibid., p. 6. 590 Ibid. 591Ibid., p. 6. 592 Ibid. 593 Ibid. 594 Ibid.

225 global politics because, like international relations theory, "it fails to understand the impact of war and development on patterns of dialogue, because it is too immersed itself in the neo-classical theory of utility and gain.”595 As a creation of major powers, these global institutions often find it impossible to maintain the status quo of the current global power structure while simultaneously demanding its restructure.596

This dilemma reflects the inherent “tension” associated with the concept of power. Analysing Ranke’s historical worldview, Gadamer links the concept of power with that of freedom.597Power and freedom are intertwined with each other, making it difficult to understand one without the existence of the other. This intertwinedness reflects the sense of coherence and continuity of all human activity. That does not mean to make a sense of continuity and coherence of all human activity – past, present and future – a certain status quo needs to be maintained with regards to the twin concept of “power and freedom”. On the contrary, this continuity and coherence exists in a particular way because of certain past events or actions. In other words, alternative specific events or actions could result in human activity with a different sense of coherence and continuity. For example, certain historical events might have caused American exceptionalism and the current global order, establishing the current continuity and coherence – albeit unjust and dysfunctional– of

595Ibid., p. 11. 596 For example, Samaddar argues that “neither our realists and neo-realists nor our moralists have looked into the one of the fundamental phenomena in international politics – the role of women in the reorganization of the world power structure today. It should not surprise us therefore, that the demands of justice and desire to transcend the language of rights with a language of justice, propelled by the women’s desire everywhere for dignity and recognition (for example, in … Palestine … Iraq and Afghanistan), has not been theorized. Almost everywhere massive numbers of women are confronting dominant power structures with demands for dialogue on all contested issues” (p. 9, emphasis added). Also, as Felix Berenskoetter notes “feminist IR long remained reluctant to positively engage the conceptual grammar of a male-dominated discipline which feminist and postcolonial studies find hard to comprehend or conceptualize “ (in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, (eds), Power in World Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 12, emphasis added). 597 Citing Ranke, Gadamer notes “... freedom involves power, germinal power. Without the latter the former disappears, both in world events and in the sphere of ideas. At every moment something new can begin, something whose sole origin is the primary and common source of all human activity. Nothing exists entirely for the sake of something else, nothing is entirely identical with the reality of something else. But still a deep inner coherence penetrates everywhere, and no one is entirely independent of it. Beside freedom stands necessity. It consists in what has already been formed and cannot be destroyed, which is the basis of all new activity. What has already come into being coheres with what is coming into being. But even this continuity itself is not something arbitrary to be merely accepted, but it has come into existence in one particular way, and not another. It is, likewise, an object of knowledge. A long series of events – succeeding and simultaneous to one another – linked together in this way constitute a century, and epoch. ...” Gadamer, op. cit., p. 202.

226 global life. But that does not mean this order is inevitable. Islamic radicalism and its associated incoherence are so much ingrained within that order that it is difficult to imagine one without the other. In many junctures in this thesis one finds that Islamic radicalism is directly linked with American exceptionalism. It is difficult to imagine the American narrative of freedom without American exceptionalism. They are related not by happenstance, but as fundamental possibilities of each other. As with American exceptionalism, this narrative of freedom is exclusive and self-referential. Many, including the supporters of radical Islam, do not accept this narrative as universal; they see it as only serving a narrow vision of American power, and resist it with the equally exclusive narrative of “radical Islam”. Here, both the narratives, while trying to resist each other, still attempt simultaneously to transcend, preserve and transform the concept of “freedom”, which also implies attempts to transcend, preserve and transform their concomitant notions of power as well. In Gadamer’s formulation, “power is obviously the central category of the historical worldview… [with] such a central place because in it interiority and exteriority are held in a peculiar tense unity.”598 In this context, one can argue that the discussed “peculiar tense unity” is crucial to an effective dialogue in which interiority(centre) and exteriority(periphery) are in a constant struggle to hold that unity, and that it also signals the potential for change in the existing dialogic structure. It is precisely asking for a dialogic act that is not partisan in striving for truth and justice, a framework that would not encourage global institutions, the state, and powerful individual actors to “quarantine the dirty wars of the past through…accords to stabilize the polities…in such hierarchic order that, virtually, some of the aspects of modern warfare will not be discussed” – for example, the proxy war in Afghanistan during the Cold War or Iraq–Iran war at the same period, which had the blessing of the West, the US, the Arab states, and other allies –“while some others will be brought under collective scrutiny, and quarantined”,599 and punished. Rather, in this effort the dialogic act seeks truth and justice in its full diversity, an act that seeks higher quality of life rather than power and control; an act that seeks freedom and the creative advance of life rather than order and system. As Ranabir Samaddar proposes:

598 Ibid. 599Ibid., pp. 46–47.

227

All this can be re-told in another way, namely that, dialogue already inscribed in a juridical order, rediscovers itself by discovering limits of dialogue in its juridical existence. Thus constitution does not resolve issues but provokes issues by provoking dialogue to step out of bounds. That is the act of dialogue – its amenability to organization, governing, government, and yet reaching beyond to the irreducible conversation on the street, of the masses. This is the closest that we can possibly come to its truth as an act, the truth of its possibility and deficit. This is what the post-colonial experience of war, partition, self-determination, accommodation, forced migration, care, protection, and peace efforts, signifies – the unending possibility of dialogic acts and the dialogic deficit.600

Such experiences strongly advocate that “studying dialogic practices as situations and practical experiences is therefore crucial”601 to our understanding of truth and justice. This study “will lead us to the acts of the street, the politics of the corporeal action as different from communicative action, the collective desire and acts of the masses to dialogue, ally, unite, befriend, understand, accommodate, and co-exist – less a matter of ideology, more a matter of urge, practicality, compulsion, hence existence.”602

In this critical realisation, “dialogue is thus less a matter of ideal than of contention. This is what makes it the wild spring, beyond training, familiarization courses on meetings, conventions, assemblies, and drafting of treaties and laws, capsules of conversational techniques, and etiquettes of diplomats and conflict resolution specialists”,603 and what Jim George describes as the narrative of existing (International Relations) disciplinary folklores.604 This means “a more profound willingness to critically confront the way we think and act, to strip bare the very basis of thinking and acting, to re-interrogate its meaning and the ways we legitimate the social and intellectual givens that for so long have been reality – the way the world is, out there.”605 However, such a profound resolution has

600Ibid., p. 349. 601Ibid., p. 349. 602Ibid., p. 349. 603Ibid., p. 349. 604 George, op. cit., p. 228. 605 Ibid.

228 wider implications both for our political subjecthood and practice at all levels of experience – from the personal to the global. As demonstrated earlier, the notion of universal civilisation (the “end of history” thesis) and its matching counter notion606“the clash of civilizations” are not of much help in furthering the contentious issues of politics of dialogue. Fortunately, these are not the only theories or options available nor are the constitutional forms the only way to dialogue. The politics of dialogue essentially depends how we perceive the world and our fellow human beings. Compartmentalising human society on the basis of civilisation or on different phases of history is not of much help either in seeking justice or a higher quality of life. Rather it stifles human progress by maintaining a classificatory system “which is itself both an explanation and justification for those at the margins remaining there for generations.”607 It is the same explanation and justification that perceives American/Western lives to be valuable, whereas the lives of Iraqis and Afghanis are expendable. In this justification, the truth that “some of the world’s most dangerous people hide out in the mountains, and others have legitimate access to the most devastating weapons of mass destruction the world has ever known”608 is overlooked. Despite this concealment of truth,

[W]e shall do well to remember that behind our back, almost escaping our gaze, a new global politics is shaping up. The hazy contours of that politics show the signs of a new moral community that tries to find a balance between the self and the outside, attempts to acquire a global character that is evinced in the huge public protests against the policies of the WTO, the World Bank-IMF…and the formation of an all-American Free Trade Zone…speaks out against a ‘runaway world’, criticizes…risky technologies, violations of human rights…and emphasises a new ethics marked by a respect for plurality, accommodation, sense of responsibility, and a notion of just reconciliation.609

606 Contrary to this widely held belief that “the end of history” thesis and “the clash of civilization” thesis offer competing views, Brett Bowden has argued that they are two sides of the same coin. In his view “the pursue of the former through the West’s strict enforcement of a standard of civilization almost inevitably risks leading to the latter.” Bowden, op. cit. p. 68. 607 Benedict Kingsbury, “Sovereignty and Inequality”, in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds), Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 91. 608Walker, op. cit., p. 81. 609Samaddar, op. cit., pp. 334–335.

229 In a long line of terror protests, 11 September turned out to be one of the bloodiest – unforgivable and bizarre. As an atavistic image it tends to haunt and reproduce some of the horrors of the atomic bombing of civilians in the Second World War, the spraying of Agent Orange in Vietnam, the1982 massacre at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps during the war in Lebanon. On one side, the atrocities are justified in the name of progress and peace by deploying the existing framework of justice and upholding the protocols of international society, which continue to fly the colours of their Western orthodoxy. On the other side, “atrocities are sustained by resisting that orthodoxy fueled by years of negligence, exclusion, religious dogmas and subjection to extreme violence.”610 Both sides represent blatant forms of intransigent orthodoxy that leaves hardly any space for introspection, evaluation, dissent and engagement. Both sides need to be opposed, as neither helps the advancement of our collective humanity. It as if after more than a decade the war on terror policy, like many past US foreign policies in the Middle East, has not only backfired, but in addition has created the stage for the rise of ISIL/ISIS. The scenario clearly shows that the post 9/11 policies of the US, NATO, and other international bodies are not attaining the outcomes the Bush Presidency and its supporters promised.

The rise of ISIL reiterates the failure of that policy. The rise of ISIL with better access to sophisticated weapons, trained combat personnel (such as ex-Baathists soldiers, former Saddam Hussein loyalists) and steady flow of funds has escalated violence with more brutality.611 Such a situation poised to escalate further military action from the US and its allies “to counter the real and exaggerated threat from ISIS.”612The situation in the Middle East illustrates a grim picture far from the optimism that President Obama’s Cairo speech raised.

610Walker, op. cit., p. 80. Without such a policy brutal figures like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could never have flourished so well nor Bin Laden would have achieved such notoriety. 611 “What is ‘Islamic State’?,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144 612 For details see the PSR (Physician for Social Responsibility) report on Body Count in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan written by the Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in collaboration with International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IIPNW) and Physicians for Global Survival (PGS),[ Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa – March 2015) p.9, http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/body-count.pdf accessed 8.7.16.

230 The kind of optimism about a potential change in US regional policy that accompanied Obama’s Cairo speech on 5th of June 2009 has since been dissipated in the Arab world.613His controversial policies like widespread drone strikes and the use of “imminent threat” to justify killing without oversight do not reflect the optimism of Cairo speech rather reflect the spirit of his speech to WestPoint 2010 Cadets.614 In other words instead of continuing with the optimism of Cairo speech or embarking on a more emancipating approach to dialogue the current administration revert backs into a perfunctory approach to dialogue, ignoring the fundamental issues and deluding themselves as “the monarchs of today want to civilise dialogue, teach the masses how to co-exist (in constitutional form, within constitutional bounds) because dialogue on the street is an object of fear, the fear of the unanticipated and the unknown alliances, understandings, negotiating capacities, and realities.”615 From the outset it looks like the new administration wants to move away from the traditional approach to dialogue but recent developments concerning the new settlements in the Palestinian territories by Israel challenge that engagement and the peace process. The US role reversal on Israel, from calling for a freeze on all settlement activity

613Rashed Al Dhaheri, “Obama’s Cairo Speech: A step in the Arab journey of hope and despair”, 6 December 2010, Public Diplomacy Council, accessed 01-06-17, Following the speech, Essam Derbala, a leader of the Egyptian Islamist group al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, called for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to halt attacks on U.S. civilians and to consider the “opening” offered by Obama. He added that the organisations should also open up to talks with the United States (see “Islamist urges al Qaeda to open up to Obama’s offer”. Reuters. 6 June 2009). However, there were many who were sceptical of Obama’s Cairo address. For example, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood dismissed it as public relation exercise; Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, without directly referring to Obama’s speech commented that “[t]he new US government seeks to transform this image. I say firmly, that this will not be achieved by talking, speech and slogans” (see “A New Beginning: Follow-up speeches: political effects”) and other commentators such as Rami Khouri, the editor of The Daily Star and director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut referred Obama’s address as positive but considered it “only as rhetoric” and argued that the Muslim world is still waiting for Obama’s words to “translate” into real policy Rami G. Khouri, “A bold speech, but hollow in some areas”, The Daily Star, 6 June 2009, ). 614 Obama’s WestPoint speech provides a great example of the structural continuities (of realist policy) in American foreign policy that defies his earlier stance of rhetorically distancing himself from American exceptionalism. His WestPoint speech reaffirms the continuity of the status quo of (realist) American foreign policy. As part of the continuation of that policy President Obama among other things emphasised that “a fundamental part of our strategy is America’s support for those universal rights that formed the creed of our founding… Time and again, Americans have risen to meet and to shape moments of change…We have to see that horizon, and to get there we must pursue a strategy of national renewal and global leadership. We have to build the sources of America’s strength and influence, and shape a world that’s more peaceful and more prosperous…Yes, we are clear-eyed about the shortfalls of our international system. But America has not succeeded by stepping out of the currents of cooperation – we have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice, so nations thrive by meeting their responsibilities and face consequences when they don’t” (http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-6509577.html). In other words, he indicated that American power will maintain its primacy and will continue to influence to shape the international order. 615Samaddar, op. cit., p. 349.

231 in the West Bank to conceding for a temporary freeze as Israel refuses to abide by the provisions stipulated in the road map to peace jeopardises the Middle East process and raises concerns about the push for a new dialogue for justice and peace.616 On a brighter note, one should realise that this new politics is not going to be any less challenging as the administration tries to break with old practices. The old orthodoxy, the old elites and traditional practitioners of International Relations will not easily give up their pride of place in history and within the disciplines, and will try their best to guard their citadel. To do so they will look for every opportunity and every setback to discredit and emphasise the apparent danger in swimming in this wild spring. Because one already knows their concerns, one will not only be able to deal with them far more effectively and creatively but also benefit from those concerns. As such, this new politics underscores a fundamental feature in human affairs that as fellow humanbeings as George argues “we are intrinsic to the problem as well crucial to any solution.”617 If this realisation can be graciously accepted one will find that instead of building great systems and massive walls that exclude, silence and destroy the lives of vast numbers of people every day, one should rather remove those walls and use one’s capacities (as fellow human being) to help the silenced, dispossessed and excluded to speak for themselves and to flood the world with new ideas and new hopes for our collective benefit. Only then can a robust dialogic regime emerge without fear or favor;”... as Marx suggested in so many of his writings, the deepest privacy of power is contested by innovative acts of the masses of which political conversation is one of the most profound form.”618 The emergence of a politics of robust dialogue will eventually lead to restoration of the public sphere and by virtue of that public faith will return to public life.

Once public faith returns to public sphere the public can then dictate, debate and decide about its own affairs. Instead of their fate being decided by powerful people in Washington, London and other metropolitan capitals people should retain the confidence to speak and decide for themselves. As Walter Benjamin, in an entirely different context, once mused, in Homer’s time it was up to the Olympian gods to contemplate human affairs.619In other

616John Lyons, “Middle East talks ‘doomed to fail’,” The Australian (November 4, 2009), p. 13. 617 George, op. cit., p. 231. 618Samaddar, op. cit., p. 349. 619 Benjamin, op. cit., p. 242.

232 words, during Homer’s time mankind was devoid of the pleasure and primacy of contemplating its own affairs or taking charge of its destiny and left it to the Olympian gods. In our modern times as some powerful figures have envisaged taking on the role of the Olympian gods, we as modern people should neither allow them to snatch from us the pleasure of making decisions on our lives nor should we give up that primacy and allow someone else to decide on our behalf. In order to avoid such a possibility Jim George argues “one has to take seriously Foucault’s injunction against ‘universal intellectuals’ who have traditionally detached themselves from the larger struggle for freedom, openness, and enhanced human dignity while ostensibly and loudly propounding their commitment to these principles.”620One notes that “Foucault’s point, of course, was that traditionally those who have spoken for the ‘people’, the ‘state’, the ‘national interest’, the ‘state system’, the ‘free world’, the ‘marginalised’, and the ‘oppressed’ have done so in universalized, essentialized, and ultimately exploitative terms.”621 On the other hand, “Foucault argued, is to disavow one’s (modernist) Godlike status and seek not to speak for others but to utilize one’s capacities to help others speak for themselves.”622 By creating such an ambience one can truly aspire to hear multitudes of voices in their full (gender, race, ethnic and class) diversity being able to express themselves robustly, creatively and imaginatively as people do at all levels, from the personal to the global, in their everyday lives without the help of any godlike figure or figure of authority. As such “no more acts performed at the level of everyday life will wear the robe of a monarch distant, special, omnipotent, and capricious – sort of a magical authority that the oracles of truth telling have bestowed upon it.”623 Rather “the economy of the world of dialogue will shed at least much of its mystery, in other words its discovered and (thus) prescribed rules and orders will be wrestling in open with promise of transparency, that is to say, banality.”624

Once one realises this fundamental truth, one can also easily “shed the mystery” from the world of dialogue and enter the everyday lives of people where dialogue takes place in ways that are much less ritualistic, less hierarchical and where the dialogic act does not

620 George, op. cit., p. 230. 621Ibid., pp. 230–231. 622Ibid., p. 231. 623Samaddar, op. cit., p. 19. 624Ibid., p. 19.

233 demand special knowledge of communication, exclusive affiliation, established political positions, preferred geographical heritage and above all erudition from the participants. By virtue of that entry one must take the opportunity to be reconnected with the everyday lives of people with their diverse moral beliefs, cultural and political practices that hold promise not only on the quality of dialogue but, importantly, on the quality of life. This is a philosophy that seeks for freedom and creative advance of life rather than order and system.

Integral to this model is the attempt to keep the conversation as an ongoing process and a quest through which to approach truth in many different ways, taking into account humanity's diverse lived experiences. In other words, as Samaddar notes, this model informs us that the story is far from finished. Rather, such a model demands that stories need to be re-mapped, re-listened to and retold, because the thousands of untold stories of subjugation, violence, torture and struggle for national liberation or self-determination rarely saw the light of the day or were told in a tendentious way that invariably conformed to a rational and civilisational model of story-telling. This model challenges and reveals the pitfalls of the dominant narrative of storytelling, the narrative that insists on depicting the West as civilised, modern and rational while in contrast reflecting the rest of the world as barbaric and emotional. Taking into account the diverse experiences of the post-colonial realities of Muslim societies625 this model challenges the dominant narrative (the rational account) and its supposedly “universal” application. In this regard it maintains that in attempting to enforce a particular type of dialogic model the authors of prevailing global politics inescapably indicate the collapse of dialogue; not the emergence of a universal dialogic regime, or a universal template for conversation but, as often seen, the emergence of the most vicious kinds of orthodoxies in the public sphere.

In order to avoid the vicious orthodoxies the “politics of dialogue” has sought to express solidarity with and add to this developing field in global politics. It has done so, not only

625 It is widely claimed by many Muslim rulers/nations (Saudi Arab, the Gulf States and Iran) that they were never colonised in a literal sense. On the contrary, in effect they were subject to the imperial policies of the time as numerous treaties and events illustrate. In suggesting post-colonial realities, I am referring to the realities experienced by many societies after the Second World War and during the Cold War – as Samaddar remarks a period where decolonisation took place in such frenzied and grotesque way that the decolonised nations still reel under its impact. In our current context the goriest example would be Pakistan, presumably the epicenter of terrorism.

234 for its textual and theoretical analysis, but because it may result in better understanding of the nature of humanity’s self articulation. As Ranabir Samaddar eloquently puts “the model speaks of contending rights, their limits, the trans-valuation of several aspects of a dialogic situation and the process of focalization inbuilt in a dialogic act, the absence of any inherent virtue in a dialogic act, and the existence of dialogue as a field of governing relations.”626 It is these governing relations that give primacy to listen, learn and reciprocate from experience(not only of self, but also from the experience of others), instead of fortifying oneself with order and system, as the elites who are more interested in domination than dialogue often do. It is a model that puts greater emphasis on transparency and the transformative quality of dialogue rather than seeking for “objective” truth and a universal dialogic regime (such as UN). The model draws its strength from individual freedom and expression of diverse views rather than from any grand system, no matter how emancipatory or benign it claims to be. A fundamental feature of this model is that one does not become dialogical by becoming systemic. On the contrary, one becomes systemic and orderly in one’s outlook by first freely making a choice and ability for communication. The prevailing system in many societies (including in many Middle Eastern states) often does not offer the opportunity to make a free choice to speak out, converse and express. Essentially the subjects are integral to dialogic politics and as such cannot be excluded from the dialogic process. Attempts to remove the subjects from dialogic politics or to manipulate the outcome of a dialogic process to suit powerful global and local actors only undermine the power of dialogic politics and create conditions for strife, unrest and unforeseen problems, as one encounters in many cases in the Middle East in this study. A number of studies, including the current analysis show the penchant of insecure regimes in the Middle East to shut down the public sphere and secular channels of representation has severely backfired and consequently the expression of dissent has taken a more militant form, especially an Islamic fundamentalist one.

This is particularly evident in the case of suicide bombers. Wafa Idris, Darine Abu Aisha and other Palestinian women suicide bombers who either attempted or succeeded in blowing themselves up did so as an act of desperation when there was no avenue available

626Samaddar, op. cit., p. 350.

235 for them to articulate/communicate their anguish, vulnerability and bleak lives. The curfews and closures that the Israeli armed forces imposed on the Palestinian territories left little chance for the Palestinian society to flourish, and as a result there was little chance for people like Idris to pursue life in any meaningful way other than to end life with the hope that death would bring some justice to their families. Given the quantitative and qualitative deprivation of military hardware627 it was expected that the political conflict in Palestine would accommodate their personal conflict (as it happened in Algeria during its liberation struggle) as matter of exigency and various agencies (al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and similar outfits) would not hesitate to provide logistic support to such an attempt. As discussed earlier, in the absence of any political choice “violence emerges as a genuine and apparently reasonable possibility.”628 In order to avoid this possibility the dialogic model comes into relief. Dialogic politics seriously believes that by allowing individuals like Wafa Idris the freedom to make a choice and the ability for communication, one can prevent such tragic incidents from happening, or at least minimise their occurrence.

It needs to be remembered that Wafa Idris’ experience of injustice, misery and vulnerability was also a product of occupation. What Wafa Idris felt at an individual level, thousands and thousands Palestinians, Iraqis and Afghans felt at a collective level. Frantz Fanon’s seminal work on Algeria under the French occupation describes how it not only breaks the limbs and spirit of its occupants and brutalises them to a non-human level, but, in the process, like Newton’s third law, it also elicits equally violent reactions from the victims of occupation. In this logical cycle, state/institutional violence creates the conditions for escalation of counter-violence, which in turn are used as an excuse by the perpetrator or the occupying state to intensify further violence. The danger of this policy constantly reminds us that “the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East is a history of tragedy and folly, where each

627Ghassan Hage made this remark. He pointed out that for many Palestinians ‘suicide bombings are seen as a marriage between the necessity for resistance and a state of quantitative and qualitative military hardware deprivation’. Quoting a Palestinian Australian Hage argues that had the Palestinian the luxury of accessing the same kind of weapons and military support the Israelis happen to receive from the Americans they would not wish to become suicide bombers. They could have killed more Israelis and the world would have thought them more civilised (see Hage. op.cit., p.128). 628Hage, op. cit., p. 140.

236 stage lays the groundwork for the next crisis.”629 Such a condition demands that one must break this vicious cycle if one seriously seeks justice and peace. It seems that many proponents of the “war on terror” prefer to maintain this cycle than to try out other promising political currents that flow outside this violent model. Immediately after the 9/11 tragedy, “there was a brief debate in US public sphere over the question of why it was that some Muslims and Arabs might hate America as much as they evidently did.”630 In the context of occupation and the way the US-led coalition conducts the war on terror it is not difficult to understand why US Middle Eastern policies elicit so much violent resistance. Instead of allowing the debate to continue while seeking alternatives the US as usual in a cavalier manner shut down the debate,631because to challenge the US position (the neoconservative narrative) on the debate was seen unpatriotic and not sensible. This effectively closed down all other powerful avenues that may have emerged, a profoundly tragic decision not only for the US but also for those in Afghanistan, Iraq and neighboring areas. The unremitting bloodbath engulfs the Iraqis, Afghans and others as harshly as it engulfs American foreign policy. Notwithstanding such tragic outcomes General Stanley McChrystal the then ISAF commander632 hoped that with a “troop surge” he could stabilise Afghanistan, but the history of occupation in Afghanistan paints a different picture altogether, as shown by Zamir Kabulov the then Russian ambassador to Afghanistan and a former KGB agent in Kabul during the Soviet occupation. Based on his experience Kabulov noted that “the US has already repeated all the mistakes that the Soviets had done and moved on to making mistakes of its own, ones for which Moscow owns no copyright”.

629Barkawi, op. cit., p. 35. 630Ibid., p. 35. As Stephen Walt puts it “one month after the September 11 attacks (and more than a year before the invasion of Iraq), President George W. Bush told a prime-time news conference that he was surprised to learn that there was “vitriolic hatred” of Americans in other parts of the world. Bush said he was ‘amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us . . . like most Americans, I just can’t believe it” (Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: Global Response To US Primacy [New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005] p.62. 631 See footnote 135. People who carry out the debate such as Chomsky and others were seen as minority or apologists. 632 General David Petraeus who oversaw the troop surge in Iraq has replaced McChrystal in Afghanistan in (June 2010) following McChrystal’s disparaging remarks about senior civil officials engaged with the Afghan issue and his open acknowledgment of the war as an unwinnable conflict in an interview to a magazine (Rolling Stone). Now it is widely acknowledged that both the civilian and military leadership in Europe and the US think that there is no military solution to the Afghan conflict and the military engagement is now more one of seeking a satisfactory closure to the operation. For a detailed discussion on a face saving strategy in Afghanistan, see Brendan O’Neill, “Dying for a P. R. Win from Afghan War”, The Australian (June 30, 2010), p. 10.

237 One of the biggest mistakes the Soviets made, Kabulov maintained, was to let troop numbers grow, which proved its undoing. According to him, “the more foreign troops you have roaming the country, the more the irritative allergy toward them is going to be provoked.”633

This insight from an experienced diplomat and security agent reminds us of a fundamental truth: that with the mightiest forces and with limitless resources one cannot shape the destiny of any people against their wishes nor can such policies win their hearts and minds. To win people’s confidence one needs to take them into one’s confidence. This is essentially what dialogic politics reiterates. People are an integral part of this politics and “thus it is a politics of engagement in an alienated world.”634 It is no surprise why many early Islamic reformist leaders like Jalal-e-Ahmad, Ali Shariati, Shaykh Ali Abbasi Madani and others happened to be so successful in the Islamic world. They all maintained a position where they always took people into their confidence; they not only spoke to the people about the uncertainties and the complexities of modern social life but also encouraged them to speak out loudly about their fears and hopes. In the process of telling their truths the people regained their pride and dignity that many insecure Middle Eastern regimes systematically denied to them, often branding diverse (both secular and traditional) channels of communication as un-Islamic and thus not suitable for conversation. In the absence of either secular or traditional channels of representation the reformist leaders deployed Islam as a veritable grid to re-engage and co-opt a disillusioned and alienated community in public discourse. These reformists through their encounters with other modern secular traditions (such as Marxism and Western liberalism) retained many aspects of these secular political practices and creatively injected them into Islamic tradition. In doing so they transformed Islam from a less effective social force into a vibrant and dynamic social force that commented on the changing realities of society while

633 Mackey, Robert. “How Many Troops to Secure Afghanistan?”, The Lede, 21 September 2009. 634Samaddar, op. cit., p. 350. Taking people into confidence does not necessarily mean one can pursue dialogue. For example, the Taliban leadership and other allies like Haqqani won’t pursue dialogue with the Afghan leaders or the US as Taliban values won’t accept the Afghan constitution. At the same time, one can at least consider taking Pakistani leadership (including the Army) into confidence who wants a major role in settling the Afghan conflict as the US administration itself has recognised that the Taliban can’t be defeated. It also has to be noted that Pakistan’s link both with the Haqqani network and the Taliban goes back a long way.

238 simultaneously indicating approaching changes. Islam in this context tapped the vast social repository shaped by tradition and history, not by conscious training. Thus these reformists harnessed among the masses both a spontaneous identification and a reality that is well beyond the immediate and rational. It is no surprise that out of sheer common sense, if not on an ideological basis, this idiom was developed into a veritable catalyst of the masses, making the political life of Muslim states/societies tangible and comprehensible to their participants.

239 Conclusion

This thesis begins by analysing the US military response to the 9/11 terrorist attack, and its philosophical justification. In examining the validity and merit of that response this thesis unravels the systemic flaws in, and the futility of that justification. The findings that emerged from this analysis provide a complex history behind the attack. As such, and rightly so, the attack is blamed on Islamic radicalism. However, once the blame game is over, one needs to understand how and why Islamic radicalism took its current form, in particular its militant version. Upon analysis it is shown that the preeminence of political Islam, in particular its radical version, is very much a product of the policies of the US/West and its modern authoritarian client states in the Muslim world who lack legitimacy or popular support. There is an element of unfortunate truth in an observation made by Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood that it was during the anti- Nasser campaign period that “America made Islam.”635

Despite the lessons learnt from its past blunder of the regime change policy, the US and its alliance repeated the same mistake in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Tarak Barkawi has observed, “far more civilians were killed in these operations than died on 9/11 itself, and many have argued that the UN and international law are among the casualties.”636 In this context it is hard to accept America’s benign intentions and its narrative of “power at the service of principle”. Rather it has confirmed a widely held belief that the lives of Americans and westerners are more valuable than others. This observation was never lost on many Islamic fundamentalists (including Bin Laden) and many of their supporters who with equally missionary zeal articulated and justified their response with commensurate violence.

In order to stop this cycle of violence and to guard against the temptation for “regime change” the US needs to learn from the rather tragic history of its foreign policy in the

635Aburish, op. cit., p. 130. 636Barkawi, op. cit., p.37.

240 Middle East. The history of US foreign policy in Muslim countries and the Middle East in particular throws light on the current policy impasse. It shows that in the few instances where the US earned the goodwill of the public, it did so by engaging and listening to the voices of the masses on the streets. For instance, the handling of Suez episode illustrates how it can earn goodwill without resorting to war, violence and unnecessary waste of resources. It is altogether another matter that such goodwill dissipated quickly. The Suez episode also underlines a second, perhaps more important message, namely that “the Arab quest for identity depended crucially on the maintenance of an adversarial posture towards the imperialist powers.”637Ironically, this second message was never lost on the Arab masses while the first message barely registered in the psyche the US establishment.

For a brief period during the Kennedy Presidency the US followed a sensible and broadly engaging policy that genuinely tried to accommodate the popular movements in the region and stressed the need for internal reforms. Kennedy could foresee the danger of the Saudis adopting Islam as an ideological weapon against the secular Arab nationalism.638 Despite the privileged status that Saudi Arabia had with the US establishment, and going against the advice from many of his counselors,639 Kennedy refused to accept the continued hands-off policy towards Saudi Arabia. His letter of October 20, 1962 to Saudi Arabia reveals that he envisaged a new chapter in American–Saudi relations “based on people’s right to self- determination, progress and freedom.”640 Saudi Arabia did indeed positively respond taking some steps towards internal reform, but these brief efforts came to an end with Kennedy’s death and the increasing involvement of America and its allies with the Vietnam crisis. Furthermore, Nasser’s defeat in 1967 Arab–Israeli war together with the increasing oil wealth of the Saudi only enhanced the grip over all other contending political and religious forces in the affairs of many Muslim nations.

The future of political Islam depends on whether the contending political forces are allowed to flourish and be accommodated without external interference. Paraphrasing Saïd K.

637Muralidharan, op. cit., p. 2133. 638Aburish, op. cit., pp. 162–163. 639Ibid., pp. 162–163. 640 For a detailed study see Aburish, Ibid., especially pp. 46–47, 162–163, 312.

241 Aburish, one may claim that contrary to superficial analysis, the Arab masses that supported Nasser and other progressive movements have not disappeared altogether, but continue to oppose the authoritarian repressive regimes in the region through the adoption of radical Islam to achieve their old aims.641 In other words, Islamic politics will remain relevant as long as the repressive regimes retain their orthodoxies.642 In this context, if the US and its allies are not in a position to encourage the progressive social forces, the least they could do is not hinder such efforts to mould the Middle East according to their own preferred image. The US and its allies may even consider re-energising these forces by listening to the voices/conversations of the masses on the streets. Instead of seeing itself in the role of the midwife of democracy and peace, the US may instead apply its vast experience and capacities to helping those who have been systematically silenced, ignored and deprived of the ability to speak and protest in gaining the peace, justice and voice they seek.

Samaddar has emphatically highlighted the connection between the post-colonial experience and the dialogic deficit: “this is what the post-colonial experience of war, partition, self-determination, accommodation, forced migration, care, protection, and peace efforts, signifies – the unending possibility of dialogic acts and the dialogic deficit”.643 This unending possibility of dialogic acts and dialogic deficit refers to a dialogic model of interpretation, a model whose influence “is central to the thought and writings of figures as diverse as Mikhail Bakhtin, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas,”644 and has been elaborated in a variety of disciplines. In this context Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutics is particularly relevant since it encourages extrapolating the concept of dialogue and its deeper ramification. As Richard Ned Lebow aptly puts “for Gadamer dialogue ‘is the art of

641Ibid., p. 145. The role of Islamists recently in the Tunisia, Libya and Egypt further validates this claim and its relevance in the current uprising. 642 Equally the Islamic politics will face strong resistance if it pursues as other repressive regimes, their own orthodoxies and authoritarian policies as recently witnessed in Egypt. 643Samaddar, op.cit., p. 349. 644 Richard Ned Lebow “The power of persuasion,” in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, (eds), Power in World Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 136.

242 having conversation, and that includes having the art of having a conversation with oneself and fervently seeking an understanding of oneself.’”645 He further observes,

it is not so much a method, as a philosophical enterprise that puts people in touch with themselves and others and reveals to them the prior determinations, anticipations and imprints that reside in their concepts. Experiencing the other through dialogue can lead to exstasis, or the experience of being outside of oneself.646

In this way, “dialogue helps people who start with different understandings to reach or at least strive for a binding philosophical or political consensus.”647 Thus, for Lebow “critical hermeneutics in its broadest sense is an attempt to transgress culture and power structures through a radical break with subjective self-understanding.”648

How an actor can transgress cultural boundaries and power structures is, however, far from obvious. Although dialogues would appear to be the means of cross-cultural communication, but “we are not inherently dialogists just in the way we are not naturally unilateral beings.”649Indeed, as Samaddar continues, we “are dialogic because relations compel dialogues – we have differences, quarrels, reasons to accommodate, appreciate.”650However, as witnessed in everyday life, these relations are often asymmetrical. Dialogue between two unequal parties such as between a doctor and a patient, between a teacher and a student, between a judge and a plaintiff, or between a police officer and a victim are inherently asymmetrical. In presence of such asymmetry, the institutional role sanctioned to one party allows them the sovereign authority to interpret, assess and determine the outcome of the conversation (which is often incapable of articulating the voice/ordeals of the plaintiff/victim/patient),making meaningful dialogue hard to evolve.

645 Ibid. 646 Ibid. 647Ibid., emphasis added. 648 Ibid. 649Samaddar, op. cit., p. 347. 650 Ibid

243 Many proposals have been put forward to facilitate meaningful dialogue in such asymmetric situations. Jean Francis Lyotard recommends greater emphasis on what he calls the différend, since, for instance, the position of the accused and that of the judge do not lend themselves to meaningful articulation in the same idiom. If so, then the Islamists reaction to American foreign policy and military action, and the resultant US policy response generates different meanings for each other, severely limiting dialogic acts without subjugation and distortion of meaning. On the other hand, Habermas, who finds Gadamer’s dialogic model inadequate because “it is a process inattentive to the ways in which language can distort and conceal as well as express the social, political and economic conditions of life,”651 envisages an “ideal speech situation” and puts “great emphasis on reasoned argument among equals to pursue a coercion free discourse in which participants are willing to be convinced by the best arguments.”652

The preconditions advocated by Habermas for better dialogue raise additional problems. For example, if “language is the medium not only of cultural meaning but also of power and labor, we are driven to a perspective distant from, but not outside of, the realm of language” as Habermas contends, then we are not outside the realm of language but inside it, hence are susceptible to the associated conditions such as labour and power that language carries. Hence, in order to create the conditions for an “ideal speech situation” one must first address the questions of power and labor. This leaves open the distinct possibility that the participants may at times need not only to reassess their own stance in a dialogic relation, but also to revisit the conditions that allowed them to take such a stance in the first place. In other words, a necessary prerequisite for the ideal speech situation advocated by Habermas is that the participants need to embark on a dialogue with themselves while simultaneously seeking to reach out others as Gadamer so eloquently emphasised in his philosophy. Gadamer’s model of interpretations, while critical of the objectivity of Enlightenment reason, does not devalues reason but only attributes a different purpose behind it. His model values reason

651Euben, op.cit., p.38. 652Lebow, op.cit., p.136.

244 less for its ability to convince than for its ability to communicate openness and honesty. These values help to build the trust and friendship on which the underlying propensity to cooperate and be persuaded ultimately depend.653

It is very pertinent to note that the Islamists creatively deployed reason in a very Gadamerian sense to engage its participants precisely to build trust and friendship.

In this engagement, instead of rejecting their traditional source of knowledge, such as norms and beliefs, unexamined thought and Islamic practices the Islamists appropriated these non-rational or traditional sources of knowledge to engage its participants in a dialogue while simultaneously expanding their knowledge through exposure to other intellectual sources of not necessarily religious nature, such as nationalism, Western liberalism and Marxism. Interestingly, the Islamists’ refusal to uncritical acceptance of modernity and unquestioning rejection of native cultural practices did not mean a total rejection of modernity as such: they were equally critical of both the traditional authority of ulama and the authoritarian regimes that used modernity for their own end. They wanted to address the structural problems of the society, and their demand for structural change accompanied aspects of non-modern cultural codes/practices that often elude modern rationalist discourse.654

These seemingly non-modern norms and practices indeed define their cultural identity – something that modern rational theory fails to comprehend. In defending the non-modern, the non-rational and the non-Western, the critics of modern rationalism often questions the very methods Westerners employ to understand norms and ideas that presuppose non- rational, transcend truths. In their defense these critics never reject the concerns and aspirations of those voices as childish or primitive of those trying to survive the process of victimisation let loose by modern institutions or who have been systematically excluded from the benefits of modernisation and globalisation. Their anti-modern interpretation of

653 Ibid. 654 A family idol or prayer mat may be considered as an artifact or materials of interest for research in art history or anthropology for Westerners or practitioners of modern rationalism, but for many non-Westerners often these very symbols or cultural codes are intrinsically linked with their identities.

245 non-modern norms and beliefs are crucial to the understanding of concrete political phenomena that are often considered beyond the rationalist discourse of modern political theory.655These differing worldviews on the concept of society and community define the limits and scope of Western rationalist perspectives regarding fundamental debate about coexistence. It is hardly surprising that war, curfews, and barricades cannot bridge the gap between these fundamentally differing viewpoints.

Indeed, as inhabitants of the modern world, defenders of modernity are typically very far removed from non-modern norms and beliefs, from the non-modern everyday struggle to survive. The apologists of modernity can barely imagine that in following their norms and beliefs, multitudes carry on their daily business outside the precepts and prosperity of the Western world. This is not surprising, considering the late Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s famous remark that "there is nothing called a society”.656 Highly regarded for her political actions and views among the neoconservative rank and file, Thatcher’s perspective signifies profound ignorance of, and disregard for, the societal existence of the majority of individuals on this planet. It is little wonder then that the structure and modus operandi of non-modern Afghan society, founded upon bonds of kinship and reciprocity, is not well-understood.

The current policy impasse on the war on terror stems from fundamentally incommensurate views about coexistence. This deadend leads one to ask: “Is it possible to reach out to each other while fundamental views remain intact?” Politics appears to deny such a possibility, but hermeneutics does not. This thesis has presented the case for the advantages of the philosophical hermeneutic model of interpretation over the rationalist discourse of modern political theory. It does so, in Shapcott’s formulation, “by making the case for justice as

655 For example, Roxanne Euben observes: “rationalism emerges as a technique of means and mastery rather than arbiter of values and ends; and the association of history and rationality is abstracted from its Western cultural context such that rationalization is no longer merely an account of Western history, but a scientific standard by which to measure and evaluate the past, present, and future of developing countries” (Enemy in the Mirror, pp. 35-36). Her insight illustrates the limits of rationalist discourse for understanding concrete political phenomenon beyond quantitative analysis. 656http://thinkworth.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/there-is-nothing-called-society-margaret-thatcher.

246 recognition through dialogue”.657 Using Gadamer’s notion of horizon, this study takes into account the colonial and post-colonial experience of Islamic communities in order to better understand the concrete political phenomenon of Islamic radicalism, the deeper understanding of which often eludes rationalist discourse. This hermeneutical understanding provides guidance as to how dialogue can occur across cultures under conditions of drastic inequality. This does not mean it can lead to agreement. On the contrary, the recognition of disagreement allows one to better understand another’s position, and enables each to validate their experience of truth. For example, one may not agree with the rise of madrasa schools in Pakistan, but one can certainly develop an understanding of why this happens. Such understanding carries the possibility of acknowledging the other as equal in dialogue. To borrow Lee Jarvis’ words, this very step has the potential to “identify critical points of entry into an otherwise relatively bounded field of enquiry". With that promise, readers might seek to identify as many critical points of entry into dialogue as are possible, with the hope of locating points of exit from the recurrent pattern of urbane atrocity that Western policy and practice has entrenched in its war on terror.

657 Richard Shapcott, “Cosmopolitan Conversations: Justice Dialogue and the Cosmopolitan Project”, Global Society, 2002, 16:3, p.243.

247 REFERENCES

Aburish,Saïd K. The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud. London: Bloomsbury, 2005. Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. “Saudi Arabia, Iran and the conflict in Afghanistan.” in William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban. London: Hurst and Company, 2001, pp. 117–134. Ahmad, Aijaz. In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Ajami, Fouad. The Dream Palace of the Arabs. New York: Vintage Books, 1999. Ajami, Fouad. “The Sentry’s Solitude.” Foreign Affairs, 2001, 80 (November–December). Ajami, Fouad. “Iraq and the Arab Future.” Foreign Affairs, 2003, 82, no. 1 (January– February), pp. 2–4. Alam, M. Shahid. “Scholarship or Sophistry? A Review of Bernard Lewis’s What Went Wrong?”Studies in Contemporary Islam 4 (2002) 1, pp. 53–80. Al-e-Ahmad, Jalal. Gharbzadegi[Westernstruck]. Lexington, KY:Mazda, 1982, pp. 75–77. Ali, Tariq. The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity. London: Verso, 2002. Arjomand, Said Amir. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Aydın, Yaşar. The Germany–Turkey Migration Corridor: Refitting Policies for a Transnational Age. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016. Baer, Robert. See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism. New York: Crown, 2002. Banerjee, Paula. “Dislocating Women and Making the Nation.” Refugee Watch, 2004, 17 (December). Barkawi, Tarak. “On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’.” International Affairs, 2004, 80 (1), pp. 19–37. Bearden, Milt and James Risen. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB. New York: Random House, 2003. Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” in Hannah Arendt, ed., Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, Glasgow: Collins, 1973, pp. 217–251. Berenskotter, Felix. “Thinking about power.” in Felix Berenskotter and M. J. Williams, ed., Power in World Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1–22. Berenskoetter, Felix and M. J. Williams.ed. Power in World Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.

248 Blaney, David L. and N. Inayatullah. “International Relations from Below.” in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ed., The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 663–674. Bourdieu, Pierre. Pascalian Meditations. Oxford: Polity Press, 2000. Bowden, Brett. “In the Name of Progress and Peace: The ‘Standard of Civilization’ and the Universalising Project.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 2004, 29(1), pp. 43– 68. Buck, G. Lernen und Erfahrung.Stuttgart, 1967. Burchill, Scott ... [et al.] – 3rd ed. Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Burke, Anthony. “Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence after 9/11.”International Affairs, 2004, 80(2), pp. 329–353. Burke, Anthony. “Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War.” Social Identities, 2005, 11(4), pp. 315–343. Burke, Anthony. “Iraq: Strategy’s Burnt Offering”, Global Change, Peace and Security.2005, 17(2), pp. 191–213. Burke, Anthony. “Beyond Security in the Middle East for (Co)Existence.” borderland e- journal, 2007, 6(2). Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003. Buzan, Barry. “Whom may we bomb?” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, ed., Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 85–94. Chomsky, Noam. Middle East Illusions: Peace, Security and Terror. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.New York: Penguin Books, 2005. Committee of Public Safety. “My Place in the Sun: Reflection on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas.”Diacritics, 1996, 26(1), pp. 3–10. Cooper, Danny. Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis. Ph.D dissertation, Department of International Business and Asian Studies, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, July 2009. Dallmayar, Fred. Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Dawisha, Adeed. Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 158 (1982), pp. 8–13. Derrida, J. “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Science.” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978, pp. 278–282.

249 Derrida, J. The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987. Diamond, Sara. Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States. New York: The Guildford University Press, 1995. Donnelly, Jack. “Realism.” in Scott Burchill ... [et al.] – 3rd ed. Theories of International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 29–54, 2005. Dorrien, Gary. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. New York: Routledge, 2004. Doyle, Michael W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. Part 2.”Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12 (4), pp. 323–353. During, Simon. “Postmodernism or Post-colonialism.” in Thomas Docherty, ed., Postmodernism: A Reader, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993,pp. 448–462. Esposito, John L. ed. The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990. Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Esposito, John L. and Azzam Tamimi.ed. Islam and Secularism in the Middle East. London: Hurst, 2000. Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. Islam and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. The Makers of Contemporary Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Euben, Roxanne L. Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967. Foucault, Michel. “The order of discourse.” in Robert Young, ed., Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader, London: Routledge, 1981, pp. 48–77. Foucault, Michael. Power/ Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. Foucault, Michael. “What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader, New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, pp. 32–50. Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, 1989, 16 (Summer), pp. 3–18. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Penguin Books, 1992.

250 Fukuyama, Francis. “History and September 11.” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, ed., World in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, London: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 27–35. Fukuyama, Francis. “The Neoconservative Moment.” The National Interest, 1 June 2004. Fukuyama, Francis. “The Neoconservative Movement.” in Gary Rosen, ed., The Right War? The Conservative Debate On Iraq, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 170. Fukuyama, Francis. “After Neoconservatism”, The New York Times, 19 February 2006. Gadamer, H. G. Truth and Method. Continuum: London, 2006. Gerges, Fawaz A. Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2006. George, Jim. Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. Giacaman, Rita. “Youth Suicide in Palestine.” unpublished report, Birzeit University, 2001. Gray, John. Al Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2004. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. London: Hurst, 2002. Haddad, Yvonne Y. The Islamic Impact. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984. Hage, Ghassan. Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society. Annandale NSW: Pluto Press, 2003. Hage, Ghassan. “Exighophobia/homoiophobia: ‘Comes a time we are all enthusiasm’.” in Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society, Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 2003. Halberstam, David. War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals. New York: Touchstone, 2002. Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Hegel, G. W. F. The Philosophy of History. New York: Prometheus Books, 1990. Hindess, Barry. Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Hippel, Karin Von. “Improving the International Response to the Transnational Terrorist Threat.” in Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004. Hirsh, Michael. “Bernard Lewis Revisited.” The Washington Monthly, 2004, 36(11), pp. 13–19. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilization?” Foreign Affairs, 1993, 72, no. 3, p 41. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

251 Ikenberry, G. J. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Ikenbury, G. J. “America’s Imperial Ambition.” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, ed., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005, pp. 454–460. Ikenberry, G. J. …[et al.]. The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Ikenberry, G. J. “Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism.” in G. John Ikenberry…[et al.], The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp.1–24. Jarvis, Lee. “The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies.” Security Dialogue, vol. 40, No. 1, February 2009, pp. 5–27. Jarvis, Lee. Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Jauss, Hans Robert. Towards an Aesthetic of Reception. trans. Timothy Bahti, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. Kane, John. Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of US Foreign Policy, Yale: Yale University Press, 2008. Kant, Immanuel. “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View.” in Lewis White Beck, ed., Kant on History, Indianapolis: Bobbs–Merrill, 1963, pp. 16 –24. Kingsbury, Benedict. “Sovereignty and Inequality.” in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, ed., Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 66–94. Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Krauthammer, Charles. “Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World.”National Interest, winter 1989/90. Krauthammer, Charles. “A Social Conservatives’ Credo.”Public Interest, fall 1995, p. 17. Krauthammer, Charles. “The Bush Doctrine.” Time, 26 February 2001. Krauthammer, Charles. “A New Type of Realism.” The National Interest, Winter 2002/2003, http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue4/Vol2Issue4Krauthammer .html. Krauthammer, Charles. “The Truth about Daniel Pipes.” Washington Post, 15 August 2003. Krauthammer, Charles. Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World. Washington, D. C:The AIE Press, 2004.

252 Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment Revisited.” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, ed., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005, pp. 461–471. Kristol, Irving. “The Neoconservative Persuasion.” Weekly Standard, 25 August 2003. Kristol, Irving, “A post-Wilsonian foreign policy.” The Wall Street Journal, 2 August 1996, available online at http://www.aei.org/publication/a-post-wilsonian-foreign- policy/, accessed 30-05-2016. Kristol, Irving. Reflection of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead. New York: Basic Books, 1983. Lawrence, Bruce. ed. Messages to The World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden. trans. James Howarth, New York: Verso, 2005. Lebow, Richard Ned. “The power of persuasion.” In Felix Berneskotter and M. J. Williams, ed., Power in World Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 120 – 140. Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity.trans. Alphonso Lingis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not easily be mollified.” The Atlantic, 1990, 266(3), pp. 47–60. Lewis, Bernard. Islam and the West. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis in Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. London: Phoenix, 2004. Lewis, C.C. “Ibn Sa’ud and the Future of Arabia.” International Affairs, 1933, 12(4), pp. 518–534. Lingis, Alphonso. Dangerous Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Linklater, Andrew. The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998. Lyons, John. “Middle East talks ‘doomed to fail’.”, The Australian, 4 November 2009, p. 13. Lyotard, J. -F. Le Differend. Minuit, Paris, trans. G. van den Abbeele as The Differend, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. Maley, William. “Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban.” in William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, London: Hurst and Company, 2001, pp. 1–28. Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004. Mann, James. The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of the Bush War Cabinet. New York: Viking, 2004.

253 Mattern, Janice Bially. “Why ‘soft power’ isn’t so soft: representational force and attraction in world politics.” in Felix Berneskotter and M. J. Williams, ed., Power in World Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 98–119. Mearsheimer, John. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War.” International Security, 1990, No 15, pp. 5–56. Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. “An Unnecessary War.” Foreign Policy, 2003, No. 134, (Jan–Feb). Mearsheimer, John and Stephen M. Walt. The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2008. Meisler, Stanley. “US Sanctions Threat Takes UN by Surprise.” Los Angeles Times, 9 May 1991. Miller, John. “To Terror’s Source.”ABCnews.com, May 1998. Morgenthau, Hans. J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 1964. Muralidharan, Sukumar. “Saddam Hussein, Western Imperialism and Arab Identity.” Economic and Political Weekly, 1990, XXV(38), pp. 2133–2135. Murray, Douglas. Neoconservatism: Why We Need It. New York: Encounter Books, 2006. Murray, Gilbert. “Self-Determination of Nationalities.” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, 1922, 1(1), pp. 6–13. Nevakivi, Jukka. Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920.London: Athlone Press, 1969. O’Neill, Brendan. “Dying for a P. R. Win from Afghan War.” The Australian, 30 June 2010, p. 10. Packer, George. The Assassins’ Gates: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005. Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, ed., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, New York: Pearson, 2005, pp. 232–249. Perle, Richard. “The US Must Strike at Iraq.” New York Times, December 28, 2001, p. A19. Perle, Richard. “Empire Builders: In their own words.” Christian Science Monitor, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/neocon/neoconQuotes.html accessed 31-03-2004. Pfaff, William. Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends. New York: Hill and Wang, The Noonday Press, 1989. Pipes, Daniel. Militant Islam Reaches America. New York: Norton, 2003. Pipes, Daniel. The Long Shadow: Culture and Politics in the MiddleEast. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989.

254 Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. Globalization or Empire? New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 42. Podhoretz, Norman. “Neoconservatism: A Eulogy.” Commentary, 1996, 101 (3), pp. 19– 28. Podhoretz, Norman. Why we Were in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982b. Prashad, Vijay. The Darker Nation. New York: The New Press, 2007. Quandt, William B. Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981. Qutb, Sayyid. Maalim fil-Tariq [Signposts along the Road], Dar al-Shuruq: Beirut, 1991. Rangwala, Glen. “The Myth that All Iraq Needs to Do to Lift Sanctions Is Comply with Weapon Inspectors.” Available at http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/mythoflifting.html Rawlence, Ben. “Tony Blair the original neocon.”The Guardian, 23 October 2004. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/oct/23/foreignpolicy.iraq Read, Anthony and Fisher, David. The Proudest Day: India’s long road to independence. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999. Reus-Smit, Christian and Duncan Snidal. ed. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Ringmar, Erik. “Empowerment Among Nations: A Sociological Perspective.” in Felix Berneskotter and M. J. Williams, ed., Power in World Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 189–203. Rose, David. “Neo Culpa: Now They Tell Us.” Vanity Fair, November 3, 2006. Available at http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2006/12/neocons200612 Rosen, Gary. ed. The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Rouleau, Eric. “Trouble in the Kingdom.”Foreign Affairs, 2002, 81, (July–August). Roy, Olivier. “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan.” in William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, London: Hurst and Company, 2001, pp. 199–210. Roy, Olivier. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Said, Edward W. Orientalism. London: Penguin Books, 1995. Said, Edward W. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. London: Vintage, 1997.

255 Said, Edward W. “The Clash of Ignorance.” The Nation, 22 October 2001. Available at http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20011022&s=said Accessed on 17-10- 2007 Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India: 1885–1947. Delhi: Macmillan India, 1984. Samaddar, Ranabir. The Politics of Dialogue: Living Under the Geopolitical Histories of War and Peace. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004. Sanders, Jerry. Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment. Boston: South End Press, 1983. Sato, Seizaburo. “The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan.” Asia Pacific Review, 1997, 4(2), pp. 7–23. Shapcott, Richard. “Cosmopolitan Conversations: Justice Dialogue and the Cosmopolitan Project.”Global Society, 2002, 16:3, pp.221–243. Shariati, Ali. On the Sociology of Islam. Berkeley, Carlifonia: Mizan Press, 1979. Sheehi, Stephen. Islamphobia:The ideological campaign against Muslims. Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, Inc., 2011. Singh, Robert. “Neo-Conservatism: Theory and Practice.” in Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller and Marl Ledwidge, ed., New Directions in US Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 2009. Sirfy, Micah L. and Christopher Cerf. ed. The Iraq War Reader. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003. Skidmore, David. “Huntington’s Clash Revisited.” Journal of World Systems Research, 1998, 4(2), pp. 180–188. Sullivan, John P. “Terrorism, Crime and Private Armies.” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 2002, 11(2–3). Tanenhaus, Sam. “Bush’s Brain Trust.” Vanity Fair¸ July 2003. Victor, Barbara. Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. London: Robinson, 2004. Vaïsse, Justin. Why Neoconservatism Still Matters. Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper Number 20, May (2010), pp. 1–11. Von Hippel, Karin. “Improving the International Response to the Transnational Terrorist Threat.” in Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 102–119. Walker, R. B. J. “War, Terror, Judgment.”in Bülent Gokay and R. B. J. Walker, ed., 11September 2001: War, Terror, Judgment, London: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 62–83. Walt, Stephen M. “Building Up New Bogeymen.” Foreign Policy, 1997, No. 106, pp. 176– 189. Walt, Stephen M. Taming American Power: Global Response to US Primacy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005.

256 Waltz, Kenneth N. “The Continuity of International Politics.” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, ed., Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, London: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 348–354. Williams, Michael. “What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in I.R. Theory.” European Journal of International Relations, 2005, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 307–337. Woodward, Bob. Bush at War. London: Simon and Schuster, 2002. Žižek, Slavoj. Welcome to the Desert of the Real. London: Verso, 2002.

257 Reports, Documents, Presidential Speeches, and other Media Sources

60 Minutes, 12 May 1996. Barry, Tom, and Lobe, Jim. “The men who stole the show”, Special Report No 18 (Albuquerque: Foreign Policy in Focus, 2002) http://www.fpip.org. Bush, George W. “President Bush’s Remarks on the Global War on Terror”,1 November 2007 http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bush110107.cfm?renderforpri nt=1). Bush, George W. “Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy”, Washington DC: United States Chamber of Commerce, 6 November 2003. Bush, George W. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”, The Whitehouse: President George W. Bush, Office of the Press Secretary, 11 September 2001, https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html. Business Week (1 October 2001, p. 47), cited in Luke, Timothy W., “Postmodern Geopolitics”, in A Companion to Political Geography(Ch. 15), John A. Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, Gerard Toal (eds), Blackwell Publishing, Carlton, Victoria, 2003, p. 224. CBC News, “Text of Obama’s Speech to West Point 2010 Cadets”, 22 May 2010,http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-6509577.html. Cheney, Dick. US Vice-President, “Remarks by the Vice-President to the Heritage Foundation”, 24 January 2008. http://www.pr-inside.com/print401743.htm Accessed on 07-02-2008. Cheney, Dick. US Vice-President, “Vice President’s Remarks at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia Luncheon Honoring Professor Bernard Lewis (Park Hyatt Philadelphia at the Bellevue, Philadelphia)”, The Whitehouse: President George W. Bush, Office of the Vice President, 1 May 2006, https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060501-3.html. “Daniel Pipes, the expert of hate”, Voltaire Network, 2 March 2006,http://www.voltairenet.org/article136260.html. al Dhaheri, Rashed. “Obama’s Cairo Speech: A step in the Arab journey of hope and despair”, 6 December 2010, Public Diplomacy Council, accessed 01-06-17, http://www.publicdiplomacycouncil.org/sites/default/files/users/Lisa%20Heyn/Rash ed%20AlDhaheri_Obamas%20Cairo%20speech.pdf. Draft Defense Planning guidance, 1992, last update 12 March 2008, http://www.rightweb.irc-nline.org/profile/1992_Draft_Defense_Planning_Guidance. FBIS Report: Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin’s Statements 1994-–Jan 2004, pp. 146– 147; 247–252.

258 “Fukuyama Withdraws Bush’s Support”, Today’s Zaman, 14 July 2004, http://www.zaman.com. Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes (Lulu). “Though Numbers Unclear, Iraqi Deaths Touch Many,” National Public Radio, 24 February 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100145401. Gilmore, Gerry J. “Bush: West Point Grads Answer History’s Call to Duty”, 1 June 2002,http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43798. “Islamist urges al Qaeda to open up to Obama’s offer”. Reuters, 6 June 2009. Khouri, Rami G. “A bold speech, but hollow in some areas”, The Daily Star (Lebanon), 6 June 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Jun/06/A-bold- speech-but-hollow-in-some-areas.ashx#axzz2RRS0yPsM. Mackey, Robert. “How Many Troops to Secure Afghanistan?”, The Lede, 21 September 2009, accessed on 23-09-09, https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/how- many-troops-to-secure-afghanistan/. Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt and Daniel Steinvorth, “Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities,” Spiegel Online, 7 September 2010,http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/turkish- immigration-to-germany-a-sorry-history-of-self-deception-and-wasted- opportunities-a-716067.html “A New Beginning: Follow-up speeches: political effects”, National Public Library, Accessed 01-06-17, http://nationalpubliclibrary.com/articles/eng/A_New_Beginning. New York Post, “The Enemy within and the Need for Profiling,” 24 January2003,http://www.danielpipes.org/1009/the-enemy-within-and-the-need-for- profiling. New York Sun, “Why the Japanese Internment Still Matters,” 28 December 2004. Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IIPNW) and Physicians for Global Survival (PGS), Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan, Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa, March 2015,p.15, http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/body-count.pdf accessed 8-7-16. Pipes, Daniel. “The Enemy within and the Need for Profiling.” New York Post, 24 January2003; http://www.danielpipes.org/1009/the-enemy-within-and-the-need-for- profiling. Pipes, Daniel. “Why the Japanese Internment Still Matters.” New York Sun, 28 December 2004; http://www.meforum.org/4274/why-the-japanese-internment-still-matters. Project for the New American Century to President George W. Bush, 20 September 2001, http://www.newamericancentury.org, accessed 12 July 2005; reprinted in Weekly Standard 7 (1 October 2001), 10, and Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 222–224.

259 Project for the New American Century, “An Open Letter to President Clinton: ‘Remove Saddam from Power’”, 26 January1998, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds), The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003, pp. 199–200. Project for the New American Century, Letter to President Bush on the War on Terrorism, 20 September 2001. Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles, 3 June 1997 hhtp://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm. “Squeezing Islam’s Moderates”, The Middle East, June 1993. “‘There is nothing called society’ – Margaret Thatcher”, Thinkworth, http://thinkworth.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/there-is-nothing-called-society- margaret-thatcher. UN Security Council Resolution No. 687 (1991). “What is ‘Islamic State’?” BBC News, 2 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-29052144.

260