IOP/TFI:H/79 I 35 Technical Reports No. 35 (restricted) REVITALIZATION OF THE MAURITIAN BANK FISHERY AN APPRAISAL A REPORT PREPARED BY: U.N. Wijkstrom and T. Kroepelien FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS INDIAN OCEAN PROGRAMME Rome, November 1979 The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delim~tation of its frontiers or boundaries. Bibliographic Entry: Wijkstr8m, U.N. and T. Kroepelien (1979) Tech.Rep.Indian Ocean Programme, (25):56 p. Revitalization of the Mauritian Bank Fishery. An Appraisal Vessel economics; Fishery development. Fishery economics. Fishery management. Fishery enterprises. Mother ships. Mauritius. The copyright in this book is vested in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, by any method or process, without written permission from the copyright holder. Applications for such permission, with a statement of the purpose and extent of the reproduction desired, should be addressed to the Director, Pub~ications Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Via delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Rome, Italy. (Q FAO 1980 - iii - ABSTRACT In response to a request from the Govermnent of Mauritius, the FAO/UNDP Indian Ocean Fishery Survey and Development Progranune sent two consultants to advise on ways and means of revitalizing the Mauritian off-shore bank fishery. The report concludes that the decline in the bank fishery is due more to human problems than to changes in fishing conditions, and recommends that business managers; fishermen and government officials cooperate in implementing an action plan to prepare for off-shore fisheries. The nature of such an action plan is outlined in the report. - iv - CONTENTS Page 1. Origin and Purpose of the Mission 1 2. Summary of Conclusions and Recolll!l1endations 1 3. Mauritius Off-shore Bank Fisheries - The Problem 2 4. Reasons for the Decline in the Mauritian Bank Fishery 3 5. The Bank Fishery - Constraints on Development 6 6. Fisheries in the National Context: An Evaluation of Alternative Policies for Assuring Fish Supply to Mauritius 7 7. Strategy for Development of National Off-shore Fisheries 10 8. Action Prograrmne to Prepare for Off-shore Fisheries 11 APPENDIXES I. Definition of the Mission 14 II. Mission Execution 15 III. A Description of the Mauritian Off-shore Bank Fisheries 17 IV. Distribution and Consumption of Frozen Bank Fish 24 V. Potential of Mauritian Fisheries other than the Bank Fisheries 27 VI. Vessel Budgets 29 HI. Evaluation of Long-term Policies for Bank Fisheries 41 VIII. Type of Vessel 47 IX. Outline of a Short-term Action Programme 51 - I - !. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE MISSION For some time the Government of Mauritius has been view.ing with concern the decline of the Mauritian owned and managed bank fishing industry. It has also become aware that surface swimming tuna is not exploited anywhere near its potential yield in the Western Indian Ocean and that there might be a future for the country's fishing industry in thi~ area. The Ministry of Fisheries considers state participation a means to resurrect the bank fishery. It is felt that a national fishing company could be more efficient than most private bank fishing companies and that it would be able to attract technical and financial aid on concessionary tenns; something which private fishing companies usually cannot. The bank fishery was discussed with an IOP mission which visited Mauritius in May 1979. It was then agreed that later in the year another IOP mission would review the bank fishery anu identify alternative government policies for revitalizing the industry. A national fishing company would be studied by the mission as one way of solving the problems of the industry. It was subsequently decided that the mission would consist of U.N. Wijkstrom, Fishery Industry Officer (Economics}, FAO, Rome, and T. Kroepelien, FAO Fisheries Adviser to the Government of the Seychelles. This report, addressed to the Government of Mauritius, through the Ministry of Fisheries, contains the findings, ,conclusions, and reconnnendations of Messrs. Wijkstrom and Kroepelien who visited Mauritius in September and October 1979. The terms of reference agreed upon for the Mission are contained in Appendix I. Appenuix II aescribes in abstracted form the contacts made by the mission during its stay in Mauritius. Conclusions and recommendations are summarized in the following section. 'L. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOi:,IMENDATIONS 2.1 Conclusions 2.1.1 Situation of the bank fisheries There are no reasons to believe that the Mauritian bank fishing industry will recover on its own effor~s. It seems likely that Mauritian-owned vessels will not be exploiting the larger off-shore banks, within the near future, unless something is done to support the industry. 2.1.2 Reasons for decline of the Mauritian bank fishery The root cause of the decline of the industry is human, not biological or technological. In particular, the decline of the industry has been caused by inexperienced company management, use of second hand vessels as mother ships, a profit squeeze, insufficient government support to the industry, and inexperienced union leadership. 2.1.3 Constraints on solutions There are no quick solutions to the (long-·growing) problems of the bank fishing i.ndustry. There is no single action or measure which will save the industry; the solution must come in the form of a package deal or action programme requiring the efforts of managers, fishermen, union leaders, and government officers, There are no indications that a short-term action programme would be easier to implement through a national fishing company than through the Ministry of Fisheries working with management and unions. The bank fishery is limited by (a) a maximum harvestable catch of the order of 10 OOO tons per year, (b) reliance on manually operated handlines, and (c) a decrease in the average yield per fisherman and day as the fishery expands, It seems likely that the bank fishery will come under severe economic strain as time goes by; the mission doubts that it will be economically viable during the late 1990s. In one to two years' time, fisheries for surface swimming tunas (skipjack and small yellowf in) may be shown to be an economically more interesting proposi­ tion than the bank fisheries. 2.2 Recommendations 2.2.1 Objectives for government policy It should be a Government policy or objective that an efficient off-shore fishery shall be developea by 1985 to identify the details of such a fishery and prepare the ground for its efficient conduct, a two year period of preparations (1980 and 1981) by Government, company management and unions will be necessary. The Government should negotiate with management and unions to develop for the 1980-1981 period a short-term action programme for creating national off-shore fisheries. Appendix IX contains the mission's views of the scope and content of a workable and effective programme. 2.2.2 Key parts of the short-term action programme The key parts to such a programme are as follows: (a) to educate and train Mauritians to make possible an efficient fishery, be it bank or tuna fisheries; (b) to develop the information needed for detailed feasibility studies on (I) fisheries for skipjack and yellowfin, and (2) for bank fisheries with improved mother ships; (c) to manage foreign and local bank fishing vessels so that total supplies of frozen bank fish reaches at least 3 kg per person and year from 1980 onwards; and (d) to employ a naval architect to design the optimum mother ship, including a study of both the construction of new vessels and the use of second-hand vessels (e.g. tuna longliners or Atlantic long-distance trawlers). 3. MAURITIUS OFF-SHORE BANK FISHERIES: THE PROBLEM At the time of this writing, the Mauritian Bank Fishery has virtually ceased to exist. The fishery had been in decline since the mid-1970s when nine mother ships were operating, The two largest ships stopped fishing in 1979 and at the start of the summer season (1979) only two smaller vessels were fishing, the smallest of which did not fish the larger and more distant banks. Naturally the Government views these developments with concern. The industry at one time employed some 400 to 500 people and supplied 3 300 tons to the Mauritian market (1974). By permitting the purchase of bank fish from Korean vessels, fishing Mauritian waters, the Government has prevented this production problem from affecting consumers. Nevertheless, during 1979 ...there has been a shortage of "bank fish" in the local market; a shortage which in the short' run apparently can only be reduced through the use of more Korean vessels. The Government is now faced with the problem of whether or not to try to restore the Mauritian bank fishery to create employment for those fishermen who used to work on the vessels. If not, Government must attempt to adapt ~hem to the requirements of other parts of the economy. Further, the Government must develop a long-term policy to obtain the volume and type of fish which traditionally has come from the banks. If it decic.les to restore the Mauritian bank fishery, the problem of how this best can be done remains, 4. REASONS FOR THE DECLINE IN ThE MAURITIAN BAJ.'i!K FISHERY 4.1 Principal Causes The mission has identified five causes for the decline in the local bank fishing industry: (i) management inexperienced in fishery ventures, (ii) use of second-hand vessels not designed for bank fishery, (iii) profit squeeze, (iv) insufficient technical support from the Government to the industry, and (v) inexperienced union leadership.