Isabel Schnabel : Interview in Die Welt
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Payments and Market Infrastructure Two Decades After the Start of the European Central Bank Editor: Daniela Russo
Payments and market infrastructure two decades after the start of the European Central Bank Editor: Daniela Russo July 2021 Contents Foreword 6 Acknowledgements 8 Introduction 9 Prepared by Daniela Russo Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a 21st century renaissance man 13 Prepared by Daniela Russo and Ignacio Terol Alberto Giovannini and the European Institutions 19 Prepared by John Berrigan, Mario Nava and Daniela Russo Global cooperation 22 Prepared by Daniela Russo and Takeshi Shirakami Part 1 The Eurosystem as operator: TARGET2, T2S and collateral management systems 31 Chapter 1 – TARGET 2 and the birth of the TARGET family 32 Prepared by Jochen Metzger Chapter 2 – TARGET 37 Prepared by Dieter Reichwein Chapter 3 – TARGET2 44 Prepared by Dieter Reichwein Chapter 4 – The Eurosystem collateral management 52 Prepared by Simone Maskens, Daniela Russo and Markus Mayers Chapter 5 – T2S: building the European securities market infrastructure 60 Prepared by Marc Bayle de Jessé Chapter 6 – The governance of TARGET2-Securities 63 Prepared by Cristina Mastropasqua and Flavia Perone Chapter 7 – Instant payments and TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) 72 Prepared by Carlos Conesa Eurosystem-operated market infrastructure: key milestones 77 Part 2 The Eurosystem as a catalyst: retail payments 79 Chapter 1 – The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) revolution: how the vision turned into reality 80 Prepared by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell Contents 1 Chapter 2 – Legal and regulatory history of EU retail payments 87 Prepared by Maria Chiara Malaguti Chapter 3 – -
G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance Issues Report MAKING the GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM WORK for ALL
PRESS STATEMENT G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance Issues Report MAKING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM WORK FOR ALL BALI, INDONESIA, 12 October 2018 - The G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance (the Group) has released its report on proposed reforms for a more effective international monetary and financial system. The report, ‘Making the Global Financial System Work for All’, was presented on 11 October to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. It will also feature in discussions at the 2018 Institute of International Finance (IIF) Annual Membership Meeting on 12 October 2018, the Roundtable organised by the CGD, LSE, RBWC and UI1 on 13 October 2018, and other fora in the coming weeks. “Our central challenge is to create a cooperative international order for a world that has changed irreversibly: one that is more multipolar and decentralised in decisions, yet more interconnected, and with challenges ahead that are much larger and more pressing than we have seen in decades.” - G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance The Group’s proposals for reforms in global financial governance fall under three themes: Achieving greater development impact: Collaborating across the system Securing the benefits of interconnected financial markets: Reforms for global financial resilience Overall Governance: ‘Making the system work as a system’ “We must make it possible for developing countries to finance sustainable current account deficits, where they are fundamentally needed at their stage of development, without the recurring bouts of instability that set back growth.” - G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance The Group has benefited from consultations with a broad range of national authorities, the IFIs, many other thought leaders from civil society, think tanks, academia and philanthropies, and private sector experts. -
Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents
CENTRE for REGULATORY STRATEGY EMEA Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents CONTENTS HIGHLIGHTS COVID-19 BANKING CAPITAL MARKETS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND OTHER CONTACTS Highlights In Ireland, the Central Bank published the outcome of its thematic review of fund management companies. It was found that a significant number of firms have not fully implemented the framework for governance, management and oversight in fund management companies. The European Commission published a consultation on AIFMD. This ask respondents whether fund delegation rules should be accompanied with quantitative criteria or a list of core functions that cannot be delegated. For a full list of COVID-19 related regulatory, monetary and fiscal policy initiatives, please see our report available here. COVID-19 Speech by Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, on EU Spain's experience with risks and ECB vulnerabilities in the corporate sector as a result of the COVID-19 crisis Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board at the ECB, on the Speech by Luigi Federico Signorini, ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic Deputy Governor at the Bank of Italy on mobilising private finance for a Interview of Christine Lagarde, green recovery and hence “building President of the ECB on the role of the back better” ECB in non-normal times Macroprudential bulletin covering the Speech by Randal K Quarles, Vice usability of capital buffers Chairman for Supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ECB - -
Four Essays on Capital Regulation of Banks
Four Essays on Capital Regulation of Banks Schriftliche Promotionsleistung zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor rerum politicarum vorgelegt und angenommen an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg Verfasser: Eva Schliephake Geburtsdatum und -ort: 01.02.1983, Karl-Marx-Stadt (heute Chemnitz) Arbeit eingereicht am: 20. Juni 2013 Gutachter der schriftlichen Promotionsleistung: Professor Dr. Roland Kirstein Professor Dr. Abdolkarim Sadrieh Datum der Disputation: 24. September 2013 The Essays This collection of essays analyzes optimal capital requirement regulation and its effects on the incentives of stakeholders. The first essay, written together with my supervisor Roland Kirstein was recently published in the Journal of Money Credit and Banking. It analyzes under which conditions a binding capital requirement reduces the incentives of banks to undercut in prices. Based on the strategic capacity commitment model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) we show that if the immediate recap- italization insufficiently costly, capital requirement regulation induces banks that compete in Bertrand competition to behave like Cournot competitors. Formally, the binding capital regulation changes the strategic price setting Bertrand game into a two stage game, where banks first have to commit to a loan supply capacity before they compete for loan interest rates. This de- creases the loan supply and increases loan interest rates, resulting in higher profits for banks compared to the unregulated case. In this thesis, I add the online appendix to the published version that provides all the proofs of the propositions. This appendix was not part of the publication due to capacity limits within the journal. The second essay builds on the results of the first essay and analyzes the impact of reduced competition on the efficiency of capital requirement regulation in establishing financial stability. -
Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the “VIII
Societal responsibility and central bank independence Keynote speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the “VIII. New Paradigm Workshop”, organised by the Forum New Economy Frankfurt am Main, 27 May 2021 Central banking in times of shifting societal concerns The best contribution that central banks can make to economic prosperity is to maintain stable prices: this was the broad consensus among academic scholars and policymakers emerging in the late 1970s when inflation in many advanced economies had surged to double-digit levels, thereby eroding purchasing power and hitting the poorest in society the hardest (Chart 1). Chart 1 Consumer price inflation (1960-1990) (year-on-year change, %) Source: IMF. The delegation of the task of maintaining price stability to an independent and accountable institution with a clear mandate has proven successful in solving the underlying time inconsistency problem while upholding democratic principles. This underpins the large degree of political independence that most central banks enjoy, including the ECB, which consistently ranks as one of the most independent central banks in the world (Chart 2). 2/17 Chart 2 Measures of central bank independence (index, 0-1) Source: Dall’Orto Mas et al. (2020), “The case for central bank independence”, Occasional Paper Series, No 248, October. Note: Indices calculated by Bodea and Hicks (2015) and Garriga (2016). Index values in Bodea and Hicks (2015) refer to 2014 (data for the ECB refers to 2010); index values in Garriga (2016) refer to 2012. The values correspond to the unweighted indices of central bank independence. Values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of independence. -
Two Proposals to Resurrect the Banking Union by Luis Garicano
Two proposals to resurrect the Banking Union: the Safe Portfolio Approach and SRB+1 Paper prepared for ECB Conference on “Fiscal Policy and EMU Governance”, Frankfurt, 19 December 2019 Luis Garicano2 Member of the European Parliament Professor of Economics and Strategy, IE Business School (on leave) Abstract Nearly eight years after its inception, the European Banking Union is crumbling. None of its two stated objectives—breaking future contagion between banks and sovereigns, and creating a true single market for banks—have been achieved. In fact, the banking market is more fragmented now than it was at the inception of the Banking Union, as home and host regulators for cross-border European banks fight to ensure sufficient capital and liquidity in each market that a bank might operate in. The reason for this state of affairs is that, of the planned “three pillar” structure of the Banking Union, only its “first pillar” (the Single Supervisory Mechanism), is working smoothly. The “second pillar”, the Single Resolution Mechanism, is being circumvented, along with the bank resolution framework, while Member States continue to spend taxpayer money to prevent investors from incurring losses. The “third pillar”, a European deposit insurance, has been paralyzed for four years. This paper aims to provide a politically and economically viable path to revive our Banking Union. This path rests on two legs. First, creating a model “Safe Portfolio” and incentivizing banks to move toward it. Such “Safe Portfolio” would be the basis for a market-provided European Safe Asset without joint liability. Second, empowering the Single Resolution Board by reforming the resolution framework and setting up a European deposit insurance. -
Swiss Monetary Policy As Viewed by the European Central Bank
Jean-Claude Trichet: Swiss monetary policy as viewed by the European Central Bank Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 22 June 2007. * * * Madame la Présidente de la Confédération suisse, Monsieur le Président du Gouvernement du Liechtenstein, Ministers, Excellencies, Dear President of the Bank Council of the Swiss National Bank, Dear Jean-Pierre Roth, Dear Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Dear fellow Governors, Ladies and gentlemen, It is an immense pleasure for me to be here today with such a distinguished audience to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The SNB is to be especially congratulated because, in spite of the turbulences which have characterised the period since 1907 – two world wars, the Great Depression, and the Great Inflation – it has succeeded in delivering, on average, a remarkably low inflation rate. I regard a historical and international perspective on Swiss price stability as being especially appropriate. A historical and international perspective: a low-inflation country It has been noted that, notwithstanding the Great Inflation episode, and the temporary inflationary outbursts corresponding to the two world wars, the United States should correctly be characterised, when seen from a very long-run perspective, as a low-inflation country. This is a claim made, in particular, by Bradford DeLong in his analysis of the US inflationary experience since the time of the Civil War.1 Historical experience suggests that Switzerland deserves such a characterisation to a significantly greater extent. -
ELFA Briefings
ELFA Briefings ELFA Legal & Regulatory Update 31/08/2020 – 04/09/2020 Key Highlights: • This Legal & Regulatory Update covers the week commencing 31/08/2020. • Pre-Emption Group extends additional flexibility for equity placings to 30th November 2020. • RFRWG releases recommendations for SONIA loan market conventions. • ESMA publishes list of thresholds for shareholder identification. • ESMA publishes call for evidence in context of review of transparency requirements for equity and non-equity instruments. • ESMA publishes its second Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities (TRV) report of 2020. • ESMA confirms Securitisation Regulation requirements entry into force on 23 September 2020. • EBA publishes its 2019 annual report on resolution colleges. • FINMA initiates enforcement proceedings against Credit Suisse regarding their observation and security activities. • IOSCO reminds stakeholders of deadline for its principles on outsourcing consultation. • ICMA’s AMIC responds to ESAs’ consultation on Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation. • ICMA’s AMIC responds to ESMA’s consultation on guidelines for NCAs when they consider potential financial stability risk associated with leverage in AIFs. • Central Bank of Sweden (Riksbank) announces that it will start purchasing corporate bonds in September. • In this update, we also cover some of the most important news on leveraged finance published by the Financial Times and Thomson Reuters during the week Bank of England (BoE) • The link between bank competition and risk in the United Kingdom: two -
The First Twenty Years of the European Central Bank: Monetary Policy
Working Paper Series Philipp Hartmann, Frank Smets The first twenty years of the European Central Bank: monetary policy No 2219 / December 2018 Disclaimer: This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. Abstract: On 1 June 2018 the ECB celebrated its 20th anniversary. This paper provides a comprehensive view of the ECB’s monetary policy over these two decades. The first section provides a chronological account of the macroeconomic and monetary policy developments in the euro area since the adoption of the euro in 1999, going through four cyclical phases “conditioning” ECB monetary policy. We describe the monetary policy decisions from the ECB’s perspective and against the background of its evolving monetary policy strategy and framework. We also highlight a number of the key critical issues that were the subject of debate. The second section contains a partial assessment. We first analyze the achievement of the price stability mandate and developments in the ECB’s credibility. Next, we investigate the ECB’s interest rate decisions through the lens of a simple empirical interest rate reaction function. This is appropriate until the ECB hits the zero-lower bound in 2013. Finally, we present the ECB’s framework for thinking about non-standard monetary policy measures and review the evidence on their effectiveness. One of the main themes of the paper is how ECB monetary policy responded to the challenges posed by the European twin crises and the subsequent slow economic recovery, making use of its relatively wide range of instruments, defining new ones where necessary and developing the strategic underpinnings of its policy framework. -
Europe and the Euro
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Europe and the Euro Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi, editors Volume Publisher: The University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-01283-2 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ales08-1 Conference Dates: October 17-18, 2008 Publication Date: February 2010 Chapter Title: How Central Bankers See It: The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond Chapter Author: Stephen G. Cecchetti, Kermit L. Schoenholtz Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11670 Chapter pages in book: (327- 374) 9 How Central Bankers See It The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz 9.1 Introduction Otmar Issing: “There was a clear view from a number of outside observers that we would fail and that it would be a disaster in any respect.” As late as 1997, less than a year before the European Central Bank (ECB) was scheduled to come into existence, there was widespread skepticism about whether the European Monetary Union (EMU) would begin on schedule as a broad union and, in some quarters, whether it would happen at all. Yet here we are a full decade after the advent of EMU and today there are fi fteen countries where the euro is legal tender. The twenty- one members of the Governing Council of the ECB make monetary policy for a region of 320 million people with a gross domestic product (GDP) of roughly €9 trillion. -
Options for the ECB's Monetary Policy Strategy Review
STUDY Requested by the ECON committee Options for the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy Review Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies Authors: Yvan LENGWILER and Athanasios ORPHANIDES EN PE 652.753 - September 2020 Options for the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy Review Abstract The ECB is the most important institution for the success of the EMU. It started successfully but the crisis revealed weaknesses related to the incomplete nature of the EMU. The ECB was too timid in using its power, which deepened the euro crisis and led to divergences that threaten the viability of the EMU. With suitable modifications of its monetary policy strategy, and better use of the authority delegated to it, the ECB could greatly improve its success in fulfilling its mandate. This document was provided by Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. AUTHORS Yvan LENGWILER, Faculty for Business and Economics, University of Basel Athanasios ORPHANIDES, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE Drazen RAKIC EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Janetta CUJKOVA LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN ABOUT THE EDITOR Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising -
Unelected Power? Independence Monetary Policy
Pro & Contra Pro & Contra 3,5 Min. Central banks Unelected power? Independence Monetary policy In the debate about interest rates, central banks are the key protago- Independence was bestowed upon one central bank after another and it nists. Their decisions have far-reaching consequences, but unlike took only a few years before most major central banks had been given a statute in which independence and the goal of price stability were key democratically elected governments, their power is not vested in them elements. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992/93 was a prime example, while the Bank of England was a relative latecomer in 1997. by way of election. Is this a problem? Sir Paul Tucker, former Deputy The following period of low inflation and robust growth confirmed the empirical findings. Central bank independence was a key precondition Governor of the Bank of England, and Professor Otmar Issing, former for the implementation of the right monetary policy. chief economist and former member of the Executive Board of the ECB, discuss the topic in an exchange of emails. MODERATORS Felix Schütze und Dirk Stauer ILLUSTRATION Merlin Flügel Felix Schütze wrote on 7 February 2019 at 1.47pm Are central banks too independent? Otmar Issing wrote on 11 February 2019 at 8.23pm For a long time, the independence of central banks was not an issue internationally. Germany and the Bundesbank were the exception. In 1948, i.e. before the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Allies – or to be more precise the US – imposed independence upon the newly established Bank deutscher Länder.