104 WEATHER AND FORECASTING VOLUME 24

An Assessment of Warning Procedures for Ice Storms

DAVID A. CALL Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana

(Manuscript received 14 January 2008, in final form 15 August 2008)

ABSTRACT

Ice storms cause substantial damage to the United States every winter season, and the costs have increased in recent years. Accurate prediction and timely dissemination of warnings are effective ways to reduce the effects, because institutions and individuals can take actions to reduce the impacts. The National Weather Service (NWS) is the U.S. government agency charged with issuing warnings of impending ice storms. A survey of NWS warning coordination meteorologists was conducted to assess their awareness of the hazard, procedures followed to warn for ice storms, and level of contact with members of the community. Several warnings issued in advance of a recent ice storm were also examined. The findings of this research are twofold. First, most meteorologists with the NWS perceive the ice storm hazard with a level of seriousness consistent with climatology. Most follow established procedure and actively engage in warning specific groups before a storm. The second finding was that individual offices maintain a high level of autonomy. While this offers valuable flexibility and the opportunity to try new approaches, there is significant variation in the length and tone of ice storm warnings themselves. Additionally, several offices do not contact outsiders or offer general educational products, which may underserve constituents in their forecast areas. To solve these problems, it is suggested that NWS management encourage and support proactive communication policies. The NWS should also analyze the audience of their warning products and consider guidelines regarding intended audience, tone, and length.

1. Introduction and background same manner as . Nonetheless, both sleet and freezing rain are hazardous. Furthermore, an ice Ice storms are a serious hazard that cause millions of storm’s disruption may be extended if cold air follows dollars in damage each year, and catastrophic events are the storm, which limits melting and forces people becoming more common (Changnon 2003). One way to without electricity to use generators (which can cause reduce the costs associated with ice storms is to improve carbon monoxide poisoning) or to travel to shelters. warning procedures, which aids community leaders, first responders, and individual citizens in preparing. Through an analysis of data collected from a question- a. Climatology of freezing rain and ice storm naire and from observation of recent ice storm warn- catastrophes ings, this paper will offer insights into National Weather While there is some disagreement about the exact Service (NWS) ice procedures and sug- frequency of freezing rain [cf. maps in Bennett (1959) gestions for improvement. with those in Changnon (2003)], there is general An ice storm produces freezing liquid precipitation agreement that most of New England, New York, and (ice) in the form of freezing rain that creates a glaze of Pennsylvania annually experience $4 days of freezing ice on objects such as trees, roads, and utility lines precipitation, on average. Areas that typically experi- (Glickman 2000). Generally, a storm with sleet is less ence 3 days of freezing rain annually include the upper catastrophic than one with freezing rain because sleet Midwest, Appalachians, and Columbia and Snake River provides some traction for motorists (Kocin and Uccellini valleys (see also Cortinas et al. 2004). 2004, p. 151) and does not coat terrestrial objects in the In an analysis of property insurance loss data for the period 1949–2000, Changnon (2003) found that the Corresponding author address: David A. Call, Dept. of Geog- overwhelming majority of ‘‘catastrophic’’ storms affected raphy, Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306. states from Texas to Maine, as shown in Fig. 1. States E-mail: [email protected] with 19 or more catastrophic storms during that time

DOI: 10.1175/2008WAF2007111.1

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FIG. 1. Map of the number of times each state experienced losses from ice storm catastrophes from 1949 through 2000. Neither AK nor HI had any losses during this time. Map based on data published by Changnon (2003). include North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, freezing rain is expected (NWS 2005a). The NWS is New York, New Jersey, and all of New England. divided into six regions (Fig. 2), and several of these Two regions show a discontinuity between the risk of have issued supplemental directives regarding ice freezing rain and the occurrence of ice storm catastro- storms. For example, in the northern portion of the phe: the northern Midwest and the Deep South. While Eastern Region, warnings should not be issued unless at most of Minnesota, for example, averages 4 or 5 days of least 1.27 cm (0.50 in.) of freezing rain is forecast (NWS freezing rain per year (Bennett 1959; Changnon 2003; 2007). Some regions and individual forecast offices also Cortinas et al. 2004), only two ice storm catastrophes incorporate nonmeteorological criteria, such as time of occurred there between 1949 and 2000, which is fewer day, in deciding whether to issue warnings (see NWS than in Florida (see Fig. 1 again). Louisiana, Mississippi, 2007 for some examples). Alabama, and Georgia, which typically experience To make accurate forecasts and decide whether or not 1 day of freezing rain per year, registered an average of to issue warnings, forecasters must understand the 15 disasters for the same 52-yr period. Rauber et al. hazards that affect their area and the risks of each (2001) suggested two reasons for this: first, storms in the (Alexander 1993, p. 405; Lopez et al. 1993; Smith 2004, South have a higher moisture content than those in the p. 69). Their understanding is influenced by prior expe- upper Midwest, and, second, their durations are often rience with risks (Halpern-Felsher et al. 2001; Peacock longer. Thus, ice storms in the South, while less common et al. 2005), but expert and lay perceptions of risk often than those elsewhere, are more likely to cause ice ac- vary (Slovic 1987; Peacock et al. 2005; Siegrist and cumulations sufficient for severe damage. Sociological Gutscher 2006). More specifically, if an NWS employee and other environmental factors may also contribute, has little experience with a hazard, warning for the such as variations in the amount of equipment available hazard will be more challenging. Thus, individual em- for mitigation, population density, and forest cover. ployees may overwarn or underwarn, affecting the ability of the larger society to prepare and respond. b. Role of the National Weather Service While much research has shown the importance of The National Weather Service is the primary source accurately understanding risk, the process used to make for disaster warning information in the United States. the decision to warn is less well understood (Mileti and Its employees issue tens of thousands of warnings in any Sorensen 1990, 2–8). But, assuming that a local fore- given year; a small fraction of these are for ice storms. caster makes the decision to warn, it is important that According to NWS regulations, an ice storm warning the warning not only be accurate, clear, and confident, should be issued when more than 0.64 cm (0.25 in.) of but also that it offer guidance about what to do (Mileti

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FIG. 2. Map showing NWS regions within the continental United States. and Sorensen 1990, 2–9). Alexander (1993, p. 401) has the ice storm hazard and how they warn both the gen- argued that a warning should include information about eral public and specific audiences, such as emergency how long a potential disaster will last and the expected managers. To focus the research, a series of specific impacts. It follows, then, that a study of NWS warnings questions were devised as listed here: should examine both the decision-making process be- d How seriously do NWS warning coordination mete- hind the warnings and the warning statements themselves. orologists (WCMs) perceive the hazardousness of ice Timely dissemination of warning information has re- storms on both absolute and relative scales? duced the impact of hazards such as severe convective d What products do they, or other members of their storms and snow (Corfidi 1999; Call 2005). Parker and respective offices, issue to warn people in advance of Neal (1990) note that, in general, accurate warnings are a storm? almost always issued, but warning dissemination is the d How much contact do they have with others in need more problematic aspect. In other words, an accurate of information regarding ice storms, such as emer- warning that is not heard or acted upon is of limited gency managers? value. While NWS warnings are available through Na- d Finally, what educational products and programs do tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration they provide to prepare people well in advance of a (NOAA) , previous research has shown storm situation? dismally low awareness of this system (Redmond 1995; Hammer and Schmidlin 2002), with many more people getting warnings through mass media and directly from 2. Methodology friends and family (Hammer and Schmidlin 2002). Thus, some offices have become active in communicating with To answer the research questions, documents about constituents (see Morris et al. 2002; Troutman et al. NWS warning guidelines and procedures were obtained 2001), and the NWS itself has pushed for improved from the NOAA Central Library and various NWS communication with emergency management officials Web sites, and a survey was mailed to 54 NWS WCMs in (NWS 1998). Nonetheless, prior research has not es- April 2006. WCMs oversee warning programs at indi- tablished how widespread such types of communica- vidual forecast offices, engage in community outreach, tions are. It is also unclear what effect the Internet and and coordinate public education campaigns and training other modern technologies have had on warning dis- sessions with members of the hazards community. semination, although they probably have helped. WCMs only issue a small fraction of the warnings from an individual office; this is typically done by the on-duty c. Research questions forecaster, who may or may not be the WCM at any In an attempt to address some of the above issues, the given time. Nonetheless, because of their leadership author examined how employees of the NWS perceive positions, detailed knowledge of warning procedures,

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FIG. 3. Map indicating areas served by each NWSFO in the continental United States. Hatching indicates places outside the study area. and above-average length of service, WCMs were sur- resources such as the work of Dillman (2000) and books veyed. Additionally, it was believed that WCMs, as a by Linda Bourque and Eve Fielder (1995) and Robert group, would be more likely to respond given their Peterson (2000) were used to design the survey. For regular engagement with the hazards community and example, most survey questions were closed-ended others outside of their office. since these are less ambiguous and easier to answer The WCMs surveyed forecast for the 29 states most (Peterson 2000, p. 54); for examples of specific ques- likely to experience a catastrophic ice storm; Fig. 3 tions, see the appendix. Other admonitions common to shows the exact area served by these WCMs. All states the survey design literature, such as ‘‘be brief,’’ ‘‘be within this area experienced greater than 10 cata- specific,’’ and ‘‘be objective’’ were also followed (Peterson strophic ice storms between 1949 and 2000 (refer to Fig. 2000, p. 74). Many of Dillman’s (2000) specific sugges- 1). This survey area includes portions of Texas and all tions for survey construction, such as minimizing the parts of Oklahoma, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and number of ‘‘jumps’’ and having respondents check all states east of the Mississippi River except Michigan, boxes rather than circling responses were also im- Wisconsin, and Florida. Because the focus of this study plemented. Finally, the surveys were pretested by sev- was on an assessment of ice storm impacts and not on eral WCMs not in the pool of participants and revised the frequency of ice, the study area was delimited by ice accordingly. The Institutional Review Board of Syr- storm catastrophes rather than the climatology of acuse University (the author’s home institution at the freezing rain; this eliminated states where freezing rain time) also approved the survey. This research involved is common but catastrophes are relatively rare (e.g., human ‘‘subjects,’’ and all universities require IRB ap- Minnesota). Nonetheless, the author believes that many proval to ensure that federal regulations protecting such of the conclusions are equally applicable to these states. subjects are followed. The survey group included all 23 WCMs in the NWS’s At the suggestion of Dillman (2000, p. 155), each Eastern Region, 20 of 32 WCMs in the Southern Region, participant was contacted four times. This contact oc- and 11 of 38 in the Central Region. Southern and Central curred in March and April 2006. The initial contact was Region WCMs not surveyed either had offices that pri- a prenotice e-mail, and several potential participants marily served areas outside the study region or were lo- responded either positively or with suggestions of al- cated in portions of states that rarely experience an ice ternate, but qualified, people to survey. A week after storm (such as southern Florida). A key objective of such the prenotice e-mail, all potential participants were a large sample was the ability to explore local and re- mailed a paper survey. After another week had elapsed, gional differences in the NWS response to ice storms. ‘‘thank you’’ reminder postcards were mailed; again, To maximize the utility of the survey tool while several participants responded to let the survey ad- minimizing the burden on respondents, survey design ministrator know that they needed additional time or

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FIG. 4. Map of subregions used to represent data geographically. Solid black lines indicate NWS region boundaries. Unless noted otherwise, white areas were not surveyed. another survey copy. Finally, after 1 month’s time, a Table 1. The average participant has been a WCM at his final e-mail reminder (with an attached electronic copy) or her current office for 7.7 yr, but some respondents was transmitted to any remaining nonrespondents. Only had just begun serving as a WCM. All survey respon- two WCMs responded to this last request for assistance. dents have substantial work experience with the NWS; The author is unaware of any systemic problems with the average length of service is more than 21 yr, and the either the survey or its implementation. Most respon- minimum length is 11 yr. Interregional variations in dents replied within 3 weeks, and the last response ar- length of service are small and had no apparent effect on rived 6 weeks after the first contact. Two participants the results. chose to complete the survey electronically instead of a. WCM opinions about hazards with pencil and paper, but this did not seem to affect their responses. Any respondent who indicated an in- Survey respondents were asked to rate the serious- terest in the results was sent a summary of the responses ness of nine hazards from ‘‘not serious’’ to ‘‘very seri- in late 2006. ous’’; ‘‘not applicable’’ was also an option. (To view the Survey data were summarized and analyzed using actual text of this and other survey questions, please Microsoft Excel and MINITAB. The results were also refer to the appendix.) The seriousness terms corre- displayed graphically on maps. However, to protect sponded to numerical values, where 0 represented not respondent confidentiality, WCMs responses were applicable and 5 indicated very serious. If a WCM did combined within 12 subregions as shown in Fig. 4. Each not rate a hazard, a value of 0 (not applicable) was as- subregion consists of at least three offices, and in all sumed, although this was uncommon. subregions at least half of the WCMs responded. These Table 2 shows the mean rating value for the nine subregions are clearly too small for detailed analysis; hazards. Flooding was universally considered a high rather, they were created to help visualize the data threat. Not only was flooding considered the most se- spatially. rious hazard in the Eastern Region (and second most serious in the other regions), but the ratings for flooding had the smallest standard deviation and range for all 3. Results regions. WCMs in the Southern and Central Regions Thirty-nine of 54 potential participants (72%) respond- rated tornadoes as more serious than flooding, but ed, which is much better than typical mail survey WCMs in the Eastern Region viewed these as less se- response rates, which are on the order of 30%–50% rious than flooding. (Goyder 1985; Baruch 1999). As shown in Table 1, re- The winter hazards of ice storms and snowstorms gional response rates were 65% for the East, 85% for were considered serious in all three regions, but less so the South, and 64% for the Central. Basic demographic than tornadoes and flooding. Not surprisingly, Southern information about the respondents is also displayed in Region WCMs rated ice storms and snowstorms as less

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TABLE 1. Demographic information about the study participants.

All WCMs Eastern WCMs Southern WCMs Central WCMs Participation rate 39 of 54 (72%) 15 of 23 (65%) 17 of 20 (85%) 7 of 11 (64%) Amount of In current For the In current For the In current For the In current For the experience (yr) job NWS job NWS job NWS job NWS Mean 7.7 21.3 8.5 23.1 7.1 20.1 7.6 19.1 Std dev 4.5 7.3 4.9 6.2 4.5 8.1 3.9 7.7 Median 10.0 20.0 10.0 24.0 6.5 17.0 5.0 18.0 Min 0.0 11.0 0.0 12.0 0.3 13.0 4.0 11.0 Max 13.0 38.0 13.0 33.0 13.0 38.0 12.0 35.0

of a threat relative to other hazards due to their less the mid-Atlantic ranked ice storms low in comparison to frequent occurrence. other hazards. As a group, WCMs in the Ohio Valley The assessments of the seriousness of other hazards, subregion considered ice storms to be the most signifi- such as hurricane winds, , chemical spill, cant hazard they faced (equal to tornadoes) but there is terrorism, and wildfire, showed more inter- and intra- no clear explanation for why; it may simply be a sam- regional variation. Hurricane-related hazards had such pling artifact. large deviations that the means are irrelevant; WCMs Meteorologists were also asked about the recurrence near coastal regions tended to rate hurricane hazards interval of ice storms. Most WCMs in the Eastern Re- with values of 5, while their inland counterparts chose gion reported a recurrence interval of every 0.5–2 years. values at the opposite end of the scale such as 0 or 1. The large range in this number reflects the latitudinal Figure 5a shows the mean absolute ratings for ice extent of the Eastern Region of the NWS, which storms by subregion. Because freezing rain is less stretches from Maine to South Carolina. WCMs in the common in the south, WCMs in the southern United Southern Region generally reported an ice storm re- States tended to rate ice storms as less serious than their currence interval of anywhere from 1 to 5 yr. In the northern counterparts. Nonetheless, the highest seri- Central Region, the respondents reported experiencing, ousness ratings for ice occurred in the Oklahoma– on average, one or two ice storms per year. These values Arkansas subregion. This is probably because an ex- are similar to those reported by Bennett (1959) and ceptional pair of ice storms adversely affected the re- Changnon (2003), indicating that study participants are gion in December 2000. well aware of the frequency of ice storm occurrence in Figure 5b shows the rank of ice storms relative to their individual forecast areas. other hazards for each subregion. Additionally, the highest ranking hazard in each subregion is also dis- b. Ice storm products issued by NWS offices played. Like Fig. 5a, WCMs in the north and west tend Section 3 of the survey requested information about to consider ice storms among the most serious hazards ice warning products issued by the NWS and the criteria they face, while those in the south focus on more fre- used in the decision-making process. A scenario in- quent threats, such as tornadoes and hurricanes. A lack volving a hypothetical ice storm was presented. Partic- of recent ice catastrophes may explain why WCMs in ipants then responded to a series of questions regarding the products they would issue, when they would issue those products, and what criteria they would use in TABLE 2. WCM seriousness ratings of various hazards (maximum seriousness 5 5). deciding to issue such products. If an ice storm was ‘‘expected’’ in 72 h, most WCMs Hazard Eastern Southern Central surveyed would issue an advisory or special weather Chemical spill 2.6 3.2 2.4 statement (SPS) immediately, except for several Flooding 4.1 4.1 3.9 Southern WCMs who preferred to wait for another run Hurricane winds 3.1 2.4 0.0 or two of the computer models. In general, a 30% Ice storm 3.4 2.8 3.9 Snowstorm 3.6 2.6 3.4 confidence level was expected before an SPS would be Storm surge 2.0 1.1 0.1 issued, although 10% of respondents would also con- Terrorism 3.0 2.7 1.9 sider nonmeteorological criteria, such as the day of the 3.2 4.5 4.1 week or potential threat to utility operations in making Wildfire 3.0 3.8 1.7 their decision. The majority of WCMs would also discuss

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FIG. 5. Maps showing (a) the average absolute rating of the ice storm hazard and (b) the average rank of ice storms relative to other hazards, by state group. White areas were not surveyed or had no response. Labels in (b) indicate the highest-ranked hazard in each subregion. the potential for ice storm in a hazardous weather out- while in the Eastern Region, minor wobbles in the track look (HWO); see Fig. 6 for an example. A hazardous of a nor’easter can make forecasting the location of ic- weather outlook, issued daily, provides specific details ing difficult (Kocin and Uccellini 2004, p. 177). Another about the potential for hazardous weather in the next idea, suggested by a reviewer of this article, is that this day or two and then describes, in general terms, the difference could reflect different internal policies at the potential for severe weather during the remainder of the NWS regional level. Southern WCMs would wait next week. Several WCMs, all in the South, would also slightly longer to issue a watch. This likely has to do with consult with other offices before issuing an SPS or the rarity of freezing rain there. HWO that discussed the potential for an ice storm. One Objectively, most WCMs would not issue a watch until wrote that it is important for adjacent forecast offices to they were at least 50% confident that 0.64 cm (0.25 in.) or issue a ‘‘unified statement of issuance.’’ In this case, more of ice would occur. In comparison to the criteria whether an HWO or SPS would be issued largely de- used to decide whether or not to issue an HWO or SPS, a pended on the proactive behavior of adjacent offices.1 greater number of WCMs in the South would also in- As the time before the hypothetical storm decreased, corporate nonmeteorological factors, such as expected WCMs would issue a watch, similar to that impacts of the storm, in their decision-making process. shown in Fig. 7. A watch product, unlike an HWO, in- By contrast, WCMs in other regions were not more (or cludes a headline and more detailed, but jargon-free, less) inclined to consider nonmeteorological factors. weather discussion. Central Region participants were As the storm drew closer, WCMs would issue warn- more likely to issue an early watch than their counter- ings or advisories depending on how much ice was ex- parts elsewhere (see Fig. 8). This probably reflects less pected; see Fig. 9 for a warning. Like watches, warnings uncertainty in predicting ice storms for that region, and advisories include headlines and a nontechnical description of the weather. However, they also have specific details, such as expected accumulation amounts 1 Since the time of the survey, the Eastern Region has elimi- and call-to-action statements, such as a request to avoid nated the use of special weather statements (SPSs) in this capacity unnecessary travel. Additionally, warnings and advi- (NWS 2007). Eastern Region policy now agrees with those already in force in the Southern and Central Regions. Thus, respondents sories cover a smaller geographical area than a watch. now would only issue advisories or discuss the storm in HWOs 72 h Generally, WCMs would issue a warning or advisory in advance. about 24 h in advance, as shown in Fig. 10. Just under

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FIG. 6. An example of a hazardous weather outlook, which merely suggests that a winter storm is possible.

40% of WCMs (15/39) would issue a warning 12–24 h 1.27 cm (0.5 in.) in deciding whether to issue an advisory prior to the storm, while about 46% (18/39) would issue or a warning, while two WCMs (one each in the East a warning 24–36 h in advance. The entire group of and South) would use a lower threshold of either 0.13 WCMs was slightly more inclined to issue a warning cm (0.05 in.) or 0.32 cm (0.125 in.), respectively. These earlier than an advisory, but this did not hold true for findings are in line with NWS regulations for ice storm individual regions, which all showed slightly different warnings, which suggest the same threshold, subject to distributions (cf. Figs. 10a and 10b). ‘‘local definition’’ (NWS 2005a); the Eastern Region, as The criteria used to choose between a warning or an of the time of this survey, had adopted a more stringent advisory were very clear. In almost all cases, anticipa- definition of 1.27 cm (0.5 in.) for New England, New tion of at least 0.64 cm (0.25 in.) of ice was needed for a York, and northeastern Pennsylvania (NWS 2007). Al- warning, while a lesser amount corresponded to an ad- though these criteria seem exact, measuring and veri- visory. A few WCMs would use a higher threshold of fying ice accumulations is quite challenging (Ryerson

FIG. 7. An example of a for an ice storm. This statement includes details about the weather scenario, describes the potential for harm, and suggests a course of action for readers.

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making process—in contrast to the Southern WCMs, who were more likely to consider impact in earlier stages of the warning process. Nonetheless, this differ- ence is relatively minor, as WCMs in all three regions noted that forecaster discretion was also a criterion used to make the decision between warning and advisory. Both the Eastern Region (NWS 2007) and Central Region (NWS 2005b) supplements to the NWS regula- tions for winter weather products (NWS 2005a) en- courage this behavior. In conclusion, assuming foreknowledge of an ice storm, WCMs would generally discuss the product first in hazardous weather outlooks, and then in special weather statements and winter storm watches, in line with the ‘‘tiered approach’’ outlined in NWS directives. Shortly before the storm began (and while it was oc- FIG. 8. Dot plot illustrating when participants (by region) would curring) they would issue winter storm warnings or ad- issue a winter storm watch for a hypothetical ice storm, assuming visories depending on how much ice they expected. foreknowledge. Although the objective criteria for issuing watches, warnings, and advisories are fairly clear, some WCMs, and Ramsay 2007). This survey did not specifically ad- in all three regions, commented that they considered dress whether the current thresholds are appropriate or nonmeteorological factors in deciding what products to how the use of them may affect the warning process. issue. Future researchers may wish to investigate these ques- c. Warning procedures tions. Besides the quantitative criteria, several WCMs, Section 4 of the survey asked how WCMs communi- mainly in the East, noted that impact was a factor that cate information regarding forecasted ice storms to they would also consider in this part of the decision- specific groups likely to take action, such as emergency

FIG. 9. An example of an ice storm warning. This statement has a relatively short discussion of the weather scenario (cf. Fig. 7), but it includes explicit information about how much ice is expected and what impacts the ice will cause. It also has multiple call-to-action statements (cf. Fig. 7).

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FIG. 10. Dot plots illustrating how far in advance of an ice storm WCMs would issue (a) a warning or (b) an advisory, assuming foreknowledge. managers. Questions fell within two categories: those participant noted that he or she is called instead. This relating to ‘‘call to action’’ statements and those related finding was encouraging because good communication to ‘‘calling outsiders’’ (specific groups of customers). between government agencies is important, and it helps Out of 39 survey respondents, just over half (20/39) the NWS disseminate warnings. As shown in Table 3, reported the existence of a prepackaged call-to-action nearly all WCMs contact local and state emergency statement. The low percentage was surprising because managers in advance of an ice storm, and the vast ma- prepackaged statements improve warning communica- jority speak with local media. Few WCMs directly tion, insofar as forecasters can compose and revise the contact political leaders, but a substantial number were wording on a quiet day instead of during a busier severe unsure. Many offices conduct conference calls with weather situation. Prepackaged statements can also be emergency managers and other first responders, and the produced for a variety of different ice storm scenarios. WCMs are not sure if politicians are listening in. An- One WCM in the Central Region provided five sample other reason for the uncertainty was because the paragraphs as examples of prepackaged statements amount of contact between emergency managers and from his office. Individual forecasters could then choose politicians varies from place to place—something be- the text that best fit the forecasted scenario, and as- yond the survey respondents’ knowledge. suming that the forecast did not change, the message Contacts between WCMs and utility companies var- would not change from shift to shift. ied geographically. About half of the Eastern WCMs There is no geographic clustering of offices with contacted utility companies and more than half of the prepackaged statements. While all offices in the lower Southern WCMs did. No Central WCMs contacted Mississippi subregion that responded to this survey had utility companies, but only three Central WCMs an- statements, only 25% of those in the adjacent Southeast swered this question directly (the rest left it blank), so it did. No offices in the Carolina or mid-Atlantic subre- is unclear if this finding is a sampling artifact, a result of gions had prepackaged statements, but most in the a different regional policy, or due to some other factor. Virginias did. Since the mapped pattern of such state- In fact, more than a dozen WCMs did not respond to ments (not shown) cannot be attributed to climatology, this question at all. Several WCMs added comments of recent ice storm disasters, or NWS regions, perhaps the interest. An Eastern WCM reported that there was no existence of such statements is simply the result of in- need to contact utilities because that is the job of private dividual forecaster initiative.2 vendors and not the role of the NWS. Another WCM Thirty-five WCMs work at offices that directly contact reported a practice of contacting small utilities but not specific groups to warn of ice storms, and an additional large ones, perhaps because smaller companies would be less likely to have meteorologists on staff or contracts with private vendors. 2 It is also worth noting that at least one reviewer strongly dis- Finally, nearly all WCMs reported that the decision to agreed with this finding. Perhaps in the time since the survey was call outsiders rests with the lead forecaster on duty, al- administered, more offices have developed these statements. though that person often seeks the opinion of other

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TABLE 3. Summary of responses regarding contact with outsiders.

Group contacted Yes (all) Yes (East) Yes (South) Yes (Central) Unknown* (all) No (all) Local political leaders 6 1 5 0 11 18 Local emergency managers 32 10 16 6 1 2 State political leaders 4 1 3 0 13 18 State emergency managers 30 11 13 6 2 3 Local media 23 3 15 5 6 6 Utility companies 12 6 6 0 11 12

* Unknown was not available as a response; it was assumed if the response was left blank. meteorologists at the local office [such as the WCM or necticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and the meteorologist in charge (MIC)]. Respondents in the Georgia should consider instituting winter awareness Eastern and Central Regions often have some guide- events, especially since these states have all experienced lines (or rules of thumb) that suggest a consideration of catastrophic ice storms within the past half-century. the forecasted amount of ice or the expected impact. In Another interesting pattern is that states with winter contrast, most offices in the Southern Region have no awareness days (as opposed to weeks) are clustered in formal criteria that determine whether or not to call the Great Plains and along the west bank of the Mis- outsiders, and two Southern Region NWS Forecast Of- sissippi River. This is likely because this area includes fices (NWSFOs) have a very low threshold (e.g., any ‘‘tornado alley,’’ and governments and meteorologists threat of winter precipitation), probably due to the rarity prefer to focus on weather hazards that are more of winter precipitation in their forecast areas. In sum, it probable. seems that individual forecasters have substantial dis- Additional questions in this section sought informa- cretion when deciding whether or not to call outsiders. tion about educational newsletters and workshops. Thirty-one WCMs have workshops that include a dis- d. Educational and outreach programs cussion of ice storms, while six WCMs (including four in This section of the survey was concerned with the the Southern Region) do not. Of the 33 WCMs who NWS’s educational offerings for the general public and have newsletters, nearly half (17) mail out newsletters specific groups. The purpose was to see what types of with information about ice storms. Interestingly, almost educational products various NWS offices provide well two-thirds of WCMs in the Eastern Region did not mail in advance of ice storms. out newsletters, while in the other regions one-third of Many state governments sponsor an annual winter WCMs did not, although a few WCMs noted that they weather awareness week (some may sponsor just a ‘‘day’’), post items to their forecast office’s Web site in addition and all NWSFOs involved in this study participate—if their to or instead of mailing. (Since the survey did not spe- home state sponsors one. NWS employees participate cifically ask about online newsletters, it is possible that by issuing public information statements discussing some WCMs who post online exclusively may have in- various winter hazards and ways for constituents to stay dicated that they have no newsletter.) The majority of safe. Respondents devote either 21%–40% or 41%– WCMs (62.5%) send newsletters to 100–500 people, 60% of the discussion to ice storms. Assuming a 5-day although one Eastern Region WCM (in an area that week, this equates to 1–3 days. experiences lake-effect snow) reported sending news- Because state governments proclaim winter aware- letters to more than 1000 people! When asked about ness events, the NWS lists participating governments on what specific groups received their newsletters (e.g., their Web site (Magnus 2006). Figure 11 shows which emergency managers, media), most WCMs did not re- states held winter weather awareness events in 2004 and spond. Since few know what groups are represented on 2006; data for 2005 were not available. While it is not their mailing lists or visiting their Web sites, a survey or surprising that Florida and Arizona do not have winter other assessment method may help WCMs better un- awareness events, several northeastern states, such as derstand their audience. Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, also lack these events. The last group of survey questions asked for greater Winter awareness weeks are a good opportunity for detail about workshops that include a winter weath- members of the NWS, emergency managers, planners, er discussion. A typical workshop might feature pre- and the general public to review procedures and pre- sentations by NWS employees of the latest product pare for winter events (Peterson and Perry 1999). innovations and safety information, as well as dia- Governors or emergency management directors in Con- logue (often informal) between NWS employees and

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FIG. 11. Map showing states with winter awareness events in 2006. All but five states had similar events in 2004 (see comments and notes). Sources: NWS (2004) and Magnus (2006). constituents, but there are no official specifications for anything, while about one-third of other WCMs pro- workshops. Twenty-three WCMs host such workshops vided feedback. Several WCMs in the South noted that (including all seven Central Region respondents), nine the relative rarity of storms in their forecast areas causes do not (with about equal numbers in both the East and them to approach ice storms differently from other South), and the remaining seven WCMs skipped the weather events. For example, one Southern WCM question (presumably because they had no workshops). commented that because any winter weather is rare, If an office has a workshop, the media are almost always ‘‘we have taken a stance that public impact is a higher invited; in fact, three offices have workshops exclusively priority over accumulation amounts.’’ Another noted for media. Other groups commonly invited to attend that ‘‘communication is critical because local govern- workshops include emergency managers, and, less ment is not set up to deal with impacts.’’ A third WCM commonly, SKYWARN observers. A few WCMs invite commented that ice storms are challenging to forecast other government officials, utility companies, or any since any mention of snow or ice shuts the area down, member of the general public, but these WCMs com- regardless of whether it occurs. These comments indi- pose less than one-third of the total group. Nearly two- cate that WCMs in the Southern Region are well aware thirds of WCMs host one to four workshops annually, of the limitations of local government and the general with equal portions of the remainder hosting fewer or public, and they are independently working to reduce more workshops. The median attendance at workshops impacts arising from these limitations. varied greatly within each region, but WCMs in the Eastern Region were more likely to host a workshop for 4. Analysis of actual ice storm warnings a large group (see Table 4).3 In early 2007, soon after the survey results were an- e. Miscellaneous comments alyzed, a catastrophic ice storm—perhaps the most severe In the final section of the survey, participants could offer additional comments, feedback, or elaboration on TABLE 4. Median attendance at workshops with ice storm previous answers. There was an unexpected geographic information. variation in response: almost no Eastern WCMs wrote Median All Eastern Southern Central attendance regions Region only Region only Region only 1–5 0 0 0 0 3 One reviewer commented that NWS offices are increasingly 6–10 5 1 1 3 involved in regional conferences, often in partnership with local 11–20 5 2 2 1 American Meteorological Society (AMS) and National Weather 21–30 8 2 3 3 Association (NWA) chapters. Unfortunately, the survey did not 311 5410 ask about these activities.

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FIG. 12. Ice storm warnings from three adjacent NWSFOs affected by the same ice storm. Only portions discussing potential impacts are shown here. NWS text messages are typically in all capital letters and frequently use ellipses. since the aforementioned December 2000 storms— There are three major differences between the de- affected a broad area of the United States from Oklahoma scriptions of expected impacts. Perhaps the most obvi- to the eastern Great Lakes. One area hit especially hard ous difference is in the various lengths. The Tulsa was southern Missouri. This storm provided an oppor- forecaster summarizes everything in two short para- tunity to view actual NWS warning procedures and text. graphs, while the St. Louis forecaster uses more than Since NWS employees followed the warning procedures 250 words to discuss expected impacts. Another major as discussed in the previous section, this discussion will difference is in the intended audience. The Tulsa focus on the warning text itself. warning is primarily directed at government officials in Figure 12 shows portions of ice storm warnings issued Oklahoma and Arkansas, as it calls on them to ‘‘prepare in early 2007 by National Weather Service Forecast to house many people’’ and notes that ‘‘supplemental Offices in Tulsa, Oklahoma; Springfield, Missouri; and heat sources will be required.’’ In contrast, the St. Louis St. Louis, Missouri. These products are disseminated on warning is directed at individual members of the general NOAA All-Hazards Radio, the World Wide Web, and public; it includes six imperative sentences and two by media (but often edited). Only the portions that other sentences with the subject ‘‘you.’’ The Springfield discuss anticipated impacts are included here. As shown warning does not seem to be directed at any particular in Fig. 12, NWS meteorologists appropriately focus on group. Finally, the intensity of the language varies as power outages and transportation disruptions—the well. While the Springfield warning mentions use of ‘‘ex- most likely problems associated with an ice storm—but treme caution’’ with ‘‘improvised heating devices’’ and need to better direct their products toward similar au- suggests avoiding travel because it is a ‘‘dangerous sit- diences and determine the appropriate length and tone. uation,’’ the warning from St. Louis says ‘‘You can die!’’

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/02/21 01:19 PM UTC FEBRUARY 2009 C A L L 117 in regard to burning charcoal in enclosed areas. In ad- intensity of the warning language to an appropriate dition, the St. Louis warning includes numerous call-to- level for the audience and forecasted situation. action statements, such as methods to travel safely, precautionary plans for power outages, and a suggestion 5. Discussion and conclusions to stock up on firewood, water, and candy bars. Perhaps the most unusual admonition comes from the St. Louis Thirty-nine National Weather Service warning coor- office in urging people to seek shelter if power is lost: dination meteorologists completed a survey asking for ‘‘Do not be too proud to accept public assistance such as their opinions of the ice storm hazard and about the heated shelter areas.’’ It is unclear whether these call- techniques they use to warn the government and the to-action statements originated from the specific office, general public. Participants completed the survey either the specific forecaster, or more general software used by with pencil and paper or electronically in April 2006, various NWS offices; nonetheless, these statements are and there were no known major problems with the much more numerous and forceful than those used by survey’s design or implementation. the other offices. To summarize, there are major dif- Because severe ice storms are less common than other ferences in the three warnings with regard to length, meteorological hazards (especially in the southern intended audience, and tone. United States), it was interesting to observe that WCMs A positive finding is that all the statements have in- in all regions accorded them a relatively high level of formation about power outages, which have the longest- seriousness. On average, the participants considered ice lasting and most widespread impacts in ice storms (Call storms the third most serious hazard they face. How- 2007, p. 45). The statements from the Missouri offices ever, there were significant regional differences; WCMs also warn against unnecessary travel, a sensible sug- in the Southern Region were more concerned about gestion when roads are ice covered. However, the tornadoes and wildfires than WCMs elsewhere, which forecaster from Springfield devotes more text to dis- agrees with climatology. Even so, Southern WCMs, as a cussing travel disruptions than to power outages, which group, seem realistic in assessing the limitations of local is not appropriate given that power outages are a much government in dealing with both ice storms and winter more substantial disruption, often lasting for weeks as weather in general. Evidence of this comes from the opposed to days (Call 2007, p. 46). On the other hand, criteria they use in deciding what watch and warning the St. Louis and Tulsa statements include numerous products to issue and their additional comments pro- call-to-action statements, which are greatly beneficial to vided at the end of the survey. end users. Thus, while all three statements focus on WCMs are also aware of the criteria they consider in power outages, which is appropriate, the Springfield issuing HWOs, SPSs, watches, and warnings relating to statement should have less information regarding travel ice storms due to the fact that NWS Headquarters and disruption and should include at least a few call-to-action NWS regions have established clear criteria separating statements. the products (NWS 2005a,b, 2007). Even so, local More generally, there are several steps that the NWS forecasters still have a relatively high level of discretion can take to improve the impact statements for ice in deciding what products to issue and whom to call, storms. First, it should assess what the audience is for rather than being required to get approval from super- these statements and then tailor them accordingly. In visors. This probably comes out of the high levels of other words, should the NWS focus on warning gov- autonomy each individual forecast office has. Although ernment officials (as Tulsa does), individuals (as St. it was promising to see that a number of WCMs already Louis does), speak generally (as Springfield does), or consider social factors such as potential impact, timing, attempt to focus on another group? Second, the NWS and the preparation of their region in deciding what should determine how much warning information to products to issue and when, more WCMs should in- include. The St. Louis impact statements were part of a corporate such factors into their decision-making pro- with more than 500 words, which cess. is probably an excessive length. Finally, the intensity of An encouraging finding was the high level of com- the warnings varied, with the St. Louis warning being munication between NWS meteorologists and people the most dramatic. While this storm was, in fact, severe outside their offices. Nearly 95% of participants com- enough to warrant strong language, the NWS may wish municate with outsiders in preparation for an ice storm, to provide guidance for offices to avoid overplaying or with many contacting local emergency managers. WCMs underplaying the potential for disaster (see discussion in as a group also respect the division of labor between Troutman et al. 2001). Additionally, some coordination government and private industry in regard to contacting between adjacent offices would help with adjusting the utility companies. Many do not contact utility companies

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/02/21 01:19 PM UTC 118 WEATHER AND FORECASTING VOLUME 24 and several noted an unwillingness to contact large length and tone of the warnings. Most WCMs are pro- companies. Nonetheless, it may be prudent for them to active in communicating the threat of ice storms with track contact with utility companies to avoid complaints government officials, media, and others that can take from private forecasters. actions to protect the general public, but more WCMs Many WCMs are proactive in providing educational should consider nonmeteorological factors when issuing information for interested members of the general watches and warnings. Some WCMs should also create public through newsletters (either mailed or electronic) or expand their educational offerings regarding ice and through workshops. Those that are not providing storms. These criticisms aside, it seems that when aim- such information should consider this part of their ing to protect life and property in relation to ice storms, mission in helping to protect life and property. Those WCMs are accurately assessing the ice storm risk and already providing information should consider issuing appropriate forecast products. expanding their mailing list or hosting more workshops; perhaps they could learn from their colleagues who al- Acknowledgments. The author thanks the partici- ready host multiple workshops or send information to pants for taking the time to offer thoughtful and in- more than 1000 customers. Workshops especially are a sightful responses. Additional thanks are due to the great way to build ties between NWS employees and Roscoe Martin Fund of Syracuse University for finan- important community figures involved in warning and cial support, and Mark Monmonier, Susan Millar, protecting the public, such as broadcasters and emer- Adam Burnett, and several reviewers for helpful feed- gency managers. These relationships may prove helpful back on this paper. during later severe weather events (see Reaugh and Mowry 2005 for an example). APPENDIX The size and configuration of the study area un- doubtedly affected the results insofar as WCMs in the northern part of the Central Region or the Western Selected Survey Questions Region might have different ice storm opinions. But, The original survey included thirty-nine questions; since catastrophic ice storms are less of a threat in those selected questions are listed below. Demographic areas, it seems unlikely that their perceptions of the questions and those not discussed in the article are not seriousness or outreach programs would be significantly included. Parenthetical statements describe the choices greater. Given that the WCMs in the Southern Region available to respondents. seem as adequately prepared as their counterparts elsewhere (despite less frequent storms), it does not 1) How seriously do each of the following hazards seem likely that WCMs outside the study area would be threaten your CWA? (The following hazards were much less prepared. Additionally, the regional differ- listed in a table: chemical spill, flooding, hurricane ences in this study were generally small. The main ex- winds, ice storm, snowstorm, storm surge, terror- ception was in the ratings given to hazards, which ism, tornado, wildfire, and other—please specify. greatly varied from region to region, but generally (Respondents could select from a scale of ‘‘0/not agreed with the climatology of hazards. applicable’’ to ‘‘5/very seriously.’’) Another limitation of this study was its focus on the 2) On average, how many ice storms occur each year communication of ice storm information. There was no in your CWA? (Respondents could select one of assessment of whether products are issued with suffi- the following choices: more than 5, 3–5, 1 or 2, 0.5 cient lead time to allow for preparation or whether (about 1 every 2 yr), 0.2 (about 1 every 5 yr), or people receiving the warnings actually take action. Fu- never.) ture research may wish to examine these issues. These This general statement prefaced the next group of are important parts of the warning process, and a failure questions concerning specific products: ‘‘For the ques- in timeliness or action diminishes the efficacy of the tions below, assume that you expect an ice storm to issued warnings. begin in 72 hours, and the weather before it begins will To conclude, 39 WCMs responded to a survey in be fair.’’ April 2006 regarding how they communicate informa- tion about ice storms. Most participants are well aware 3) What is the criterion(-a) would be used in deciding of the seriousness of the ice storm hazard and are taking whether or not to issue an SPECIAL STATE- appropriate actions in warning and preparing the public, MENT or HAZARDOUS WEATHER OUT- but an assessment of the actual warning products is LOOK highlighting the storm? (Respondents needed to determine the audience and appropriate were asked to list up to three criteria.)

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4) Assume the criterion(-a) will be met. How far in 15) (If yes) Which statement best describes how your advance would you issue the product listed above educational programs include a discussion of ice that highlights the storm? (Respondents were storms? (Respondents could select one of the asked to select a twelve hour time period; periods following choices: ‘‘We have a program exclu- included 0–12 h, 12–24 h, etc., up to 60–72 h.) sively about ice storms,’’ ‘‘Ice storms are part of a program about all types of winter weather,’’ ‘‘Ice The previous two questions were repeated, with the storms are part of a general program about all same format, for ‘‘watch,’’ ‘‘advisory,’’ and ‘‘warning.’’ types of severe weather.’’) 5) What would the title of the WARNING product 16) Does your office annually mail out information be? (Respondents could select one of the following about ice storms (winter weather) to select groups? choices: winter storm warning, winter weather ad- 17) (If yes) Which of the following groups receive visory, ice storm warning, or other.) these mailings? [Respondents could select any 6) Does your office have previously created special answers that applied: emergency managers, other impact statements in regards to ice storms? government officials, media, skywarn/co-op ob- 7) (If yes) What organization(s) created these state- servers, members of the general public, other.) ments? [Respondents could select any answers 18) (If yes) How many people are on your mailing list that applied: my NWSFO (when I was here), my (total for all groups)? (Respondents could select NWSFO (before I came here), another NWSFO one of the following choices: 1–100, 101–500, 501– (write identifier, if known), NWS regional office 1000, 1001–2500, more than 2500.) (write regional office, if known), NWS headquar- 19) Does your office hold workshops that discuss ice ters, emergency managers, department of trans- storms (winter weather)? portation, or unknown.] 20) (If yes) Which of the following groups are invited to 8) (If yes) When were these statements first created? attend? (Respondents could select any answers that (Respondents were asked to write how many applied: emergency managers, other government years previous, if known.) officials, media, skywarn/co-op observers, utility 9) Does your office directly contact people outside companies, members of the general public, other.) the office to warn of ice storms? 21) (If yes) How many workshops are held, on aver- 10) (If yes) Which of the following groups do you or age, annually? (Respondents could select one of employees of your office contact directly? (Re- the following choices: less than 1, 1–4, 5–9, 10 or spondents could select any answers that applied: more.) local political leaders, local emergency managers, 22) (if yes) What is the median attendance at the state political leaders, state emergency managers, workshop(s)? (Respondents could select one of local media (newspapers, radio, television), utility the following choices: 0–5, 6–10, 11–20, 21–30, 31 companies, other: please specify). or more.) 11) Who decides when outsiders should be called? [Respondents could select one of the following choices: WCM, MIC, SOO, lead forecaster, re- REFERENCES gional office, other: please specify, combination: please specify.] Alexander, D., 1993: Natural Disasters. Chapman and Hall, 632 pp. 12) Are specific criteria (e.g., expected accumulation, Baruch, Y., 1999: Response rate in academic studies—A com- parative analysis. Human Relations, 54, 421–438. time of year, etc.) used to decide when outsiders Bennett, I., 1959: Glaze: Its and climatology, geo- are contacted? (If yes, respondents were asked to graphical distribution, and economic effects. Quartermaster list the criteria.) Research and Engineering Center Tech. Rep. EP-105, 234 pp. 13) During your annual Winter Weather Awareness Bourque, L. B., and E. P. Fielder, 1995: How to Conduct Self- week, approximately what percentage of informa- Administered and Mail Surveys. Sage, 264 pp. Call, D. A., 2005: Rethinking snowstorms as snow events: A re- tion disseminated to the public pertains to ice storms gional case study from upstate New York. Bull. Amer. Meteor. exclusively? (Respondents could select one of the Soc., 86, 1783–1793. following choices: 0%–20%, 21%–40%, 41%–60%, ——, 2007: An integrated hazard analysis of ice storm impacts, 61%–80%, 81%–100%, or ‘‘My office does not have warnings, and emergency plans. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of a Winter Weather Awareness week.’’) Geography, Syracuse University, 200 pp. Changnon, S. A., 2003: Characteristics of ice storms in the United 14) Does your office conduct educational programs, States. J. Appl. Meteor., 42, 630–639. such as workshops or conferences, that include a Corfidi, S. F., 1999: The birth and early years of the Storm Pre- discussion of ice storms? diction Center. Wea. Forecasting, 14, 507–525.

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