ISPI DOSSIER April 2021 CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE edited by Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti CLIMATEUNRAVELLING CHANGE THE : IN THE STATE, POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SPACE ARMED VIOLENCE MarchApril 2021 2021 ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

everal post-Soviet states are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Furthermore, two of the worst environmental disasters of our times – the Chernobyl Snuclear accident and the Aral – happened in the post-Soviet , with implications that have crossed state and time boundaries. This dossier highlights the major environmental and climate-change-related crises affecting the area and the diverse national and regional approaches to tackle them. What is the approach of — one the biggest energy producers and polluters in the — with regards to climate change? Can transboundary crises spur regional cooperation in the South and Central ? What is the role of civil society in holding governments accountable in this domain?

* Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti is a research fellow at the Russia, Caucasus and Centre at ISPI. Her areas of interest include Russian foreign policy, EU-Russia and Russia-Turkey relations, and EU neighbourhood policies (especially with Eastern neighbours). She is a member of WIIS (Women in International Security), an international network dedicated to increasing the influence of women in the field of foreign and defence policy.

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Table of Contents

1. TIME TO TALK CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET REGION Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti (ISPI)

2. WHAT DOES THE GREEN DEAL MEAN FOR RUSSIA? Elena Maslova (MGIMO)

3. OIL AND NATURAL GAS EXPLOITATION IN THE RUSSIAN Maria Morgunova (UPPSALA UNIVERSITY)

4. DECARBONIZATION AND ENERGY TRANSITION: THE NEED TO DIVERSIFY RUSSIA’S ECONOMY Angelina Davydova (JOURNALIST)

5. FROM THE BOTTOM UP: RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS Maria Chiara Franceschelli (SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE; FLORENCE)

6. THE DISASTER AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA Stefanos Xenarios (NAZARBAYEV UNIVERSITY)

7. A GREENER BRI IN CENTRAL ASIA? Giulia Sciorati (ISPI and UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO)

8. CAN CLIMATE CHANGE TRIGGER COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS? Nika Chitadze (INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY)

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CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE April 2021 ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

limate change - or climate crisis, as some media outlets relabelled it - is Cincreasingly getting attention from governments and civil societies worldwide. The words and actions of high-profile activists such Time to Talk Climate as Greta Thunberg and organisations such as Change in the the EU - which launched the Green Deal, an ambitious plan to achieve carbon neutrality by Post-Soviet Region 2030, and embraced a green foreign policy - contributed to this trend. But it was probably the links between climate change and the Covid-19 Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti pandemic that most aroused concerns. While ISPI there is still no evidence linking climate change to the spread of Covid-19, scientists stress that climate change alters how humans relate to other species, hence heightening the risks for the emergence of infectious diseases. There is also growing debate around the need to design holistic economic measures to address the rising inequalities caused by climate change and the pandemic.

Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti is a Research Fellow at the Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia Centre at ISPI. | 5 COMMENTARY

The post-Soviet region is no stranger to these Yet, Maslova claims that the status of a “green global discussions about the environment. and a responsible player” may contribute to This dossier does a great job highlighting the enhancing Russia’s global status, while a EU- major environmental and climate-change- Russia green dialogue has the potential to offer related crises affecting the area and the diverse a platform for the normalisation of relations approaches (or lack thereof) to tackle them. (“win-win strategy”) in areas such as science and technology, as well as civil society and business. ALL EYES ON RUSSIA Angelina Davydova also highlights Russia’s When talking about environmental issues in need to diversify the economy, including the post-Soviet space, all eyes are on Russia, decarbonising its energy sector, as more given its geopolitical and energy importance. and more countries decide to follow a zero- The country is one of the biggest energy emission path. Yet, she argues that political producers and exporters globally - and one elites and companies, including major fossil fuel of the biggest polluters, emitting 1,617 million producers, still perceive climate change as a metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions per distant and long-term risk. Decarbonisation year. Recent disasters in northern , such and clean energy strategies are largely as the June 2020 oil spill - with over 21,000 tons insufficient, despite Russia’s huge physical and of diesel spilt into the Arctic , making it economic potential in renewable energy. one of the largest oil spills in Russian history - or the July wildfires burning down an area larger Russia’s dependence on its energy exports is a than Greece, made headlines. Meanwhile, the common explanation for the Kremlin’s interest recent release of the HBO series Chernobyl - in the Arctic, which hosts an estimated 22% of based on the worst nuclear accident in history ’s undiscovered oil and natural gas and is - reopened old scars in many Russian citizens projected to be a major driver for geopolitical and sparked a fierce political debate on both competition. Maria Morgunova offers a nuclear safety and political freedoms, to the nuanced picture of Russia’s ambitions and point that Russian state TV decided to make its actual constraints in the Arctic. She claims own version of the series. that the region will stay among the Kremlin’s top geostrategic priorities but questions the Elena Maslova kicks off the discussion by role of oil&gas as a backbone of the Russian emphasising Russia’s paradox of being an strategy. Indeed, Morgunova lists a set of issues active participant in the global environmental hindering Russian ambitions when it comes agenda while facing both a severely to resources’ exploration and exploitation: the deteriorating environmental situation at home need for new technical approaches and huge and economic overreliance on oil&gas exports. investments is matched by a reality of harsh

TIME TO TALK CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET REGION | 6 COMMENTARY

climate conditions, remoteness, Western Furthermore, a joint “water-energy-food- sanctions, absence of infrastructure and, most climate approach” can spur economic growth importantly, offshore ice conditions in the Arctic, and water supplies safety for the whole region. despite the impact of global climate change Several factors can hinder regional cooperation, on the Arctic’s ice cover. Not to mention the though. One of them is external actors. Giulia serious environmental concerns that come with Sciorati claims that in Central Asia, China's an oil&gas-centred approach. Such concerns role as the main external economic actor are taken increasingly seriously by Russia’s civil through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) society. Maria Chiara Franceschelli explains risks aggravating existing environmental that, despite climate change not being a crucial challenges. China’s projects in Central Asia topic in Russian public debate, environmental imply expanding transport infrastructures by sentiments are growing within civil society. land, while its regional energy projects continue However, most Russian ecological groups to be mainly based on coal, oil, and gas. Hence, need to compromise with the political she concludes, China’s aim to build greener power to carry out their activities, hence societies has not fully travelled along the BRI. failing to convert discontent and criticism into sharp actions that can really challenge Another stumbling block for regional the government’s strongly resource-oriented cooperation is intra-regional conflicts. This model. has been the case for Central Asia, though today it applies mainly to the South Caucasus. REGIONAL CRISES FOSTERING After reviewing the three South Caucasian REGIONAL COOPERATION? countries’ poor record on environmental Climate change and environmental degradation policies, Nika Chitadze remarks that only affect most post-Soviet states. Some of today’s the end of hostilities between worst ecological disasters have deep roots and Armenia can lay the foundations for and implications transcending state borders. cooperation on environmental protection The desertification of the Aral Sea, for instance, issues at the regional level. He points at was caused by the Soviet heavy industrialisation Georgia’s possible role as a mediator and the of the agriculture sector in Central Asia and EU as a driver for change through its Eastern still has a dramatic impact on all of the Partnership Programme, which includes all the five Central Asian republics. As Stefanos three South Caucasus countries. Xenarios explains, a regional approach on Notwithstanding the severe environmental water conservation, agricultural policy and challenges facing the post-Soviet region, the water priorities is the only possible answer to time is ripe for the beginning of a serious the mitigation of the Aral Sea desertification. discussion about climate change. Relevant

TIME TO TALK CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET REGION | 7 COMMENTARY

external actors’ green policies, growing public opinions’ interest in environmental issues, and clear economic drivers for a more sustainable development can lead to a new green momentum and help soothe deep- seated political grievances in the region.

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n 1994 Russia ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Isubsequently took part in all of its Conferences of the Parties. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, was ratified by Russia in What Does the Green 2004. Developed countries, including Russia, Deal Mean For Russia? have committed themselves to an annual 5% emission reduction compared to 1990 levels. But for Russia, these commitments do not imply a real “environmental breakthrough”. Elena Maslova To give an idea, in 2000, for example, MGIMO emissions were 40% lower than in 1990. In 2015, the Russian authorities reported that greenhouse gas emissions from all sources were 44% below the 1990 levels, one of the biggest reductions in the world. In 2015, the Kyoto Protocol was replaced by the Paris Agreement, which Russia adopted in 2019. In the same year, the national climate change adaptation plan for the first phase for the period 2020-22 was approved. Subsequently, a new concept of “climate

Elena Maslova is an Associate Professor at the Department of Integration Studies and a Senior Researcher at the Centre of European Studies of the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University. | 9 COMMENTARY

change adaptation” appeared in Russian "green consensus". The status of active political and legal discourse, providing for player in the green agenda is also essential for the development and implementation of participation in the decision-making process. operational and long-term measures. Regional RUSSIA’S CLIMATIC AND and federal authorities are now developing ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION an appropriate legal framework to ensure adaptation, in particular a system of targets Despite the figures, the climate situation and statistical indicators, methodological in the country does not leave much room recommendations on climate risk assessment, for optimism. The ecological and climatic etc. Regional climate adaptation plans must be situation is unfavourable, even critical, in approved by May 2022. some of the country. Russia is one of the world’s worst performers in CO2 Moreover, to implement the Paris Agreement, emissions, after China, the US and India. a Strategy for the Long-Term Development of The structure of greenhouse gas emissions the Russian Federation with Low Greenhouse by sector has remained stable over the last Gas Emissions until 2050 has been adopted. decades, with the energy sector accounting for This document has been heavily criticised by around 80%. Emissions of air pollutants from the environmental community, in particular for stationary sources are closely correlated with its lack of ambition - the proposed scenario the structure of the country’s economy; in assumes a 48% reduction in emissions by 2050, 2019, the largest sector in terms of emissions which essentially means maintaining the current from stationary sources was manufacturing level of emissions. (33.9%), followed by mining, including oil and In addition to commitments to participate in gas, coal and metal ores (28.7%). global climate action, Russia has developed Experts assume that Russia is warming 2.5 its own national projects, most notably the times faster than the global average due to national “Ecology” programme for 2019-24. its northern latitude; in 2020 temperatures Increasingly, this “green response” is also in the hit new record levels. reflected at corporate level, where, contrary Environmental problems such the pollution of to global trends, most «green companies» are water bodies by industrial waste and rubbish, engaged in non-ecological production, but are flooding and thawing of permafrost, illegal striving to minimise their "ecological footprint" - logging and forest fires, as well as unauthorised e.g. Rusal, Sibur and Alrosa. landfills, are increasing year by year. Another Hence, not only is Russia a participant in crucial problem is energy efficiency, in the global environmental agenda but it also particular that of buildings. According to politically supports the emerging global

WHAT DOES THE GREEN DEAL MEAN FOR RUSSIA? | 10 COMMENTARY

Roshydromet, about 1000 hazardous hydro- inaction is much higher than the cost of action. meteorological phenomena are registered Implementing the Green Deal does not just in Russia every year, with 35 to 45% of these require additional funding and investment, but phenomena causing significant damage to also a restructuring of the economic system. the economy and livelihood of the local This, of course, applies first and foremost to population. the EU member states though: the Visegrad countries have taken a tough stance and have In October 2020, a sociological survey voiced their reluctance to accept this pan- was carried out in Russia, entitled ‘The European green levelling. At the same time, the Environmental Agenda: 10 months before “coronacrisis” could be a convenient excuse to the Duma elections’. Among other things, postpone the Green Deal’s implementation . the data revealed that more than 60% of Brussels, however, for its part, is convinced that interviewees assess the ecological situation the Green Deal is key to its growth strategy and in Russia as favourable, while 53% believe even foreign policy. that the ecological situation in Russia has slightly deteriorated. The majority of Russians, Today, the EU is already a globally recognised however, do not seem to be concerned environmental leader (representing only 7.5% with environmental issues. This is indirectly of global emissions). The EU is not only confirmed by another survey stating that more establishing itself as the flagship of international than half of Russians (63%) have never heard of climate policy, but it is also establishing the eco-activist Greta Thunberg. the environment as an essential principle, particularly in its approach to third countries. THE EU’S GREEN DEAL DIPLOMACY The EU has already proposed to make the Paris For Russia, the Paris Agreement does not pose Agreement an essential element of all future a serious threat, as the stated target remains comprehensive trade agreements. unambitious. However, the European Union’s In other words, environmental norms and Green Deal might pose a bigger challenge; standards are becoming part of the EU’s Russia is not taking part in it and is not making normative power. For instance, one of the any commitments, but the imminent drop EU’s main arguments for active involvement in demand for Russian energy implies a in the Arctic is that pollution there harms the significant reduction in revenue for the lives of Europeans and autochthonous peoples Russian budget. living in EU territory (though the EU has no The EU is sending some important messages to Arctic territories). The EU has already called Russia: climate change makes no winners; on the International Maritime Organization ecology has no boundaries; the cost of to ban the use of heavy fuel by Arctic ships on

WHAT DOES THE GREEN DEAL MEAN FOR RUSSIA? | 11 COMMENTARY

environmental grounds. If it does not agree, the policy or to choose the paradigm of green EU has threatened to ban all foreign ships using development, albeit gradual. Obviously, the such fuel from entering its ports. second scenario requires much more effort and implies high costs - financial, technological and GLOBAL CHALLENGE MEANS managerial. GLOBAL COOPERATION Russian-European relations will depend on Implementation of the Green Deal confirms the the path Russia chooses: the EU has already EU’s status as a global environmental leader made its choice. Russia and the EU member and, since the environment has no national states are linked culturally and economically, borders, the EU expects to be able to extend but the economic link is and will continue to its regulatory power beyond its territory. The be weakened by the EU’s declining energy situation may become particularly acute in imports. EU-Russia green dialogue has the the Arctic. potential to create new bridges between On a global level, the Russian government the sides and serve as a platform for the fully supports the climate agenda and sets normalisation of relations (“win-win strategy”) competitive if not exactly ambitious goals. At in areas such as science and technology, as the national level, however, the situation well as civil society and business. This, however, is different and the environment is not can only happen if the EU pursues a strategy protected adequately. With the adoption of of gradual engagement, and not one of the European Green Deal, Russia finds itself at “pressure and punishment”, which has proven a crossroads. There are two scenarios: either ineffective on several occasions in the case of to continue the current passive environmental Russia.

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he Arctic has always been very important for Russia. First, it makes up Ta considerable part of the country’s territory. Second, the region hosts important transport and military infrastructure. Finally, Oil and Natural Gas it possesses significant natural resources Exploitation in the potential, which is not limited to oil and natural gas, but also includes minerals, timber, fish, and Russian Arctic other resources including land itself. However, interest in the natural resources of the Arctic and its economic potential seems Maria Morgunova to be prevailing. The global interest in oil and (Uppsala University) natural gas was especially noticeable from the early 2000s due to stably high oil prices, growing energy demand, and bonanza-like projections for the oil and natural gas resources to be found offshore in the Arctic. The Arctic offshore basins are considered highly promising for oil and natural gas resources according to the Geological Survey investigation.

Maria Morgunova is lecturer and researcher at the Department of Civil and Industrial Engineering, Industrial Engineering and Management of the Uppsala University. | 13 COMMENTARY

The early 2000s demanded more investments often seen as the key driver of the future socio- in Arctic infrastructure and even more in oil economic development of the region. and natural gas exploration offshore. However, According to recent governmental strategic macroeconomic conditions, including falling documents including the renewed “Strategy crude oil prices and an overall global shift for the development of the Arctic zone of towards climate change mitigation and the Russian Federation and ensuring national greener energy have ruptured this trend, security for the period up to 2035”, Russia’s making the economics and public acceptance view of the Arctic region’s development of these resources questionable. Even one has shifted from the expansive exploitation of the strongest arguments for exploring the of just natural resources, with rather Arctic offshore oil and natural gas resources rapid infrastructure development, to a - energy security - is losing its weight due to more conscious socio-economically centred the increasing availability of other more flexible approach. Oil and natural gas resources are and decentralised options to supply energy. nevertheless a backbone of this process, as the From the pool of the circumpolar countries and projected volumes for oil production according those that have geographical access to the to the Strategy should reach 26% of the total , so far only Russia and to a certain produced in Russia, gas 79%, and liquefied extent maintain rather active interest natural gas production should expand 10 times. in exploiting oil and natural gas resources Respective freight traffic along the Northern Sea offshore in the Arctic. Worth mentioning is that Route is expected to increase seven times. the Norwegian Arctic is characterised by milder climate and ice conditions. Such intense development plans naturally require considerable intensification of In the case of Russia, research exploration for oil and natural gas resources shows that economics is not always a offshore in the Arctic. However, the enormous decisive factor for oil and natural gas oil and natural gas resources projected to be resource exploitation, even though Russia’s found require new technical approaches for considerable interest in developing the Arctic their exploration and exploitation, as well as region can also be explained by the Russian huge investments. Harsh climate conditions, economy’s strong dependence on oil and remoteness, absence of infrastructure - and, natural gas (accounting for up to 40% of budget most importantly, ice conditions offshore in the revenues). Onshore Arctic oil and natural Arctic - are the factors significantly increasing gas resources have served as the basis for risks and costs. Despite global climate change, exports since the 1960s, but oil and natural gas which according to the scientific evidence resources in the offshore and coastal areas are affects the ice cover of the Arctic, the operating

OIL AND NATURAL GAS EXPLOITATION IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC | 14 COMMENTARY

conditions are to be no less challenging and situation is further exaggerated by sanctions require intensive technological adaptation. on technological transfers for oil and natural There are also numerous ecological concerns gas exploitation, which not only limit current including those related to climate change. The operations but considerably increase ecological ecological and environmental statements of the risks. operating companies regarding these overall However, despite limited exploration activities exploration activities have become much offshore in the Arctic, there is dramatica more visible, but the actual grade of change development in the production of liquefied towards more ecologically responsible natural gas (LNG) in close proximity - on choices is hard to estimate. the Yamal and Gyda peninsula, driven by the The intensity of exploration and drilling Novatek company. Yamal LNG - the pioneering operations offshore in the Russian Arctic can liquefied natural gas project (16.5 million be characterised as currently very limited. tons per year, MT/y), has now been followed With only two governmental companies by the Arctic LNG-1, 2 and 3 projects (total - Gazprom and Rosneft - eligible to conduct announced capacity of two out of three such operations offshore, drilling activities projects is approximately 40 MT/y), and also by resulted in only a few wells. As a result, the the Obskiy LNG project (4.8 MT/y). The total Prirazlomnoe oil field is the only one that planned capacity of more than 60 MT/y of operates offshore in the Russian Arctic (not liquefied natural gas by the late 2020s - early including horizontal drilling and 2030s (approximately 17% of global trade offshore areas). Such a slow pace, of course, volumes as of 2019) is naturally resulting in very does not match the strategic plans, and raises intense exploration work along with building the serious concerns for the decision-makers. respective infrastructure and ice fleet. International capital does not have access To conclude, the Arctic region’s development, to the oil and natural gas exploitation in the its resources, the potential synergetic Russian Arctic due to the implied EU and US effect from industrial activities (including sanctions of 2014, which are continuously infrastructure, transportation and transit), progressing. Although oil and natural gas and not the least the region’s geopolitical exploration activities in the Arctic and especially significance, are most likely going to keep offshore are strongly supported by the it high on the list of strategic priorities for Russian government, the Russian companies Russia, whether or not oil and natural gas themselves have limited resources to resources are going to be a big part of this ensure and sustain the desired level of development. operational growth. The overall challenging

OIL AND NATURAL GAS EXPLOITATION IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC | 15 CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE April 2021 ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

ussia, one of the world’s leading suppliers of fossil fuels, is facing new challenges: Ras the world is entering a zero-emission path, the country’s future will largely depend on diversification of the country’s economy, Decarbonization and including decarbonizing its energy sector. Energy Transition: With more countries setting their net-zero The Need to Diversify targets and developing their decarbonization strategies, new economic risks appear for Russia’s Economy large oil and gas exporters, including Russia. These risks are already being discussed in the country but a clear strategy to address these Angelina Davydova challenges is still lacking. Journalist For many years, Russia has been a quiet if not absent player in the global climate debate. Climate change has not been taken seriously on the political, economic and social levels. In many ways, Russia arrived rather late to realize the importance of the issue and is trying to catch up on it now.

Angelina Davydova is the Director of an NGO "Office of Environmental Information', based in St. Petersburg, Russia. She is an environmental and climate journalist, regularly contributing to Russian and international media. | 16 COMMENTARY

With climate skepticism (or avoidance) means further drastic changes not only for widespread within Russia’s political, social the country but for the whole world. On the and media landscape even ten years ago, other hand, two further drivers: the realization the situation is drastically different now. The of economic risks resulting from decreasing ”turn” towards and interest in the climate global demand for oil, natural gas, and coal, agenda originated around 2009, when then- resulting from the decarbonization policies of president Dmitry Medvedev came to the other countries, and EU plans to introduce COP-15 in Copenhagen, signing a Climate the carbon border adjustment mechanism Doctrine, which became the basis for (CBAM) as part of the Green Deal plan, seem all further climate policies in the country. to have been a wake-up call for Russian climate Since then, Russia has joined the Paris awareness. Agreement, submitted its first (rather The impact of climate change policies unambitious) NDC (Nationally Determined worldwide has long been discussed by Russian Contribution, a country’s emission reduction researchers, experts and environmentalists. goal under the Paris Agreement), drafted its However, here I would argue that is it still first (also rather unambitious) long-term low being taken as a very distant and long-term carbon development strategy, is working risk, both by political elites and by companies, on its first legislation introducing carbon including major fossil fuel producers, who still reporting for large polluters and voluntary hope for growing or at least stable markets for carbon projects for companies but with no their commodities at least until 2030, which, binding carbon price in sight, with the exception together with a wide-spread preference for of an emission trading experiment due to be short-term planning and quick profits make it a launched in the Sakhalin region in the very Far factor which is not strong enough to tackle the East of the country. current system now. There were several drivers behind these However, a more recent phenomenon, changes, moving the country towards that is, the CBAM, seems to be a much realization of the importance of the climate more powerful factor in bringing new life to agenda. Among them – observed and forecast climate discussions (and possibly actions) climate risks, from melting permafrost to forest on the political and business levels. Since fires, droughts in the south of the country summer 2020, Russian officials and company and floods in the west. Russian scientists representatives have been engaging in keep warning that the climate is warming various official/unofficial, open/closed 2.5 times faster than the world average in discussions and consultations about the Russia, especially in its Arctic regions, which new mechanism. Even though the CBAM

DECARBONIZATION AND ENERGY TRANSITION | 17 COMMENTARY

rulebook is still not clear, various estimates of recently announced that Russia’s classification potential economic losses by Russian exporters of ”green” projects (which is currently being of fossil fuels, metals, chemicals, etc., have developed by the country’s state-owned been made public in the country. That process development corporation, Veb.RF), among led to companies’ increasing interest in the others, will also include projects in the area of climate/decarbonisation agenda, as well nuclear energy. Yet plans to push for nuclear as ESG reporting and investment. Russian energy at the international and domestic companies are active in their SDG/ESG levels as a solution to climate change are met corporate reporting and in their interaction with with criticism from Russian environmentalists, partners/investors/customers from the EU; who see nuclear energy as a “too slow and however, within Russia, they’re still criticizing ineffective solution to the climate problem” and blocking any attempts to introduce presenting “undeniable risks”. ambitious carbon regulation, said Russia’s Yet, a specific plan for decarbonization, energy presidential climate envoy Ruslan Edelgeriev in transition and economy diversification are his recent interview. still not there. Most economic and energy Still, recent years have seen some modest development documents as well as socio- development of renewable energy, even economic strategies predict growth in fossil though the country is still far behind global fuel production and consumption (and base trends in green energy: wind and solar account economic growth on these sectors), thus for 1% in installed generation capacity and for foreseeing increasing GHG emissions (at 0.3% in energy generation. Now that hydrogen least for some). However, as many experts has become a new trend (with blue and pink argue, the hidden truth is that Russia does hydrogen named as the preferred kinds), the indeed have huge physical and economic government has approved a plan for hydrogen potential in renewable energy, “green” energy development, with Gazprom, Novatek hydrogen generation, as well as other and Rosatom being potential major players in prospective “green” sectors from resource- the new sector. Russia’s government will efficient and climate-smart agriculture to push for global recognition of nuclear sustainable forestry, and other sectors. The energy as carbon-free and climate-friendly, question now is when the strategies, plans Russia’s Vice Prime Minister responsible for and policies will be updated to reflect the new environmental and climate policy, Viktoria global reality. Abramchenko, suggested in her report to President Vladimir Putin. Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov also

DECARBONIZATION AND ENERGY TRANSITION | 18 CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE April 2021 ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

ver the last few years, environmentalism has proven to be an increasingly Opressing civil society issue and climate change concerns spreaded across civil society. However, Russian From the Bottom Up: environmentalism hardly has common traits Russian Environmental with its Western counterparts. While 2019 was the culminating year of Greta Thunberg Civil Society Groups and the youth movement Fridays For Future in the West, similar initiatives did not enjoy such popularity in Russia, they did not gain Maria Chiara Franceschelli importance within the public discourse and Scuola Normale Superiore they had virtually no influence on policy- making processes. Russian environmentalism can either represent a core part of political opposition movements, when contentious, or pragmatically side with the authorities in order to maximise efficiency, when non-contentious. In fact, Russian environmentalism is strongly tied to sensitive matters of a territorial nature, such as centre-periphery issues. In recent years, social movements pushing

Maria Chiara Franceschelli is a PhD candidate at Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence, where she focuses on social movements in Russia. | 19 COMMENTARY

forward openly contentious environmental Buddhists coexist. In Bashkortostan, people initiatives against local and/or federal insurged following the proposal to deforest a policies have sprouted all over Russia and wide wooden area to build a baking soda plant, reached mass participation. Among the greatest which was then postponed. A similar discourse examples are the protests in the village of is also coherent with the 2020 protests Shies, in the Arkhangelsk region. Here, the in Khabarovsk, which, despite not being federal administration and the Moscow City environmentally oriented, can be considered Council planned to build a 5000-hectare a reaction to the blatant interference in local garbage dump to fill with Moscow’s municipal affairs that the Kremlin showed by arresting waste, since the capital’s waste disposal system Governor Sergey Furgal and replacing him with is no longer able to process garbage because someone who had never been to Russia’s Far it exceeds the local structures’ capacity. As a East before. We see, then, how these protests response, the locals have been organising feature a markedly socio-environmental demonstrations and uprisings for three years, trait, are inherently political and go beyond which were often very violent and spared no the environmental scope. injuries or casualties, but led to the partial Non-contentious environmentalism also halt of the construction process. Besides the plays a significant role in Russia’s political and environmental discourse in itself, as in the will societal landscape. Russia’s major cities host to preserve a fragile ecosystem and the well- a constellation of grassroots environmental being of the land and its people, these protests social movement organisations (SMOs) and featured a strong emancipatory localist NGOs. They mostly provide environmental attitude. In fact, Moscow’s plans are perceived services and sustainable solutions to make as yet another colonialist-like attack of the up for infrastructural deficiencies, which federal centre on a remote territory, which, are usually excluded from the institutional consequently, finds itself deprived of its dignity; agenda. Such services usually include separate its lands and peoples significantly endangered. waste collection and recycling, education and Similar narratives marked the 2019 protests training in sustainable practices, installation of in Komi, where an identical landfill was being sustainable infrastructure in private institutions, constructed, and earlier in Ekaterinburg, cleaning of public spaces and other similar where the main city park was about to be practices. wiped out and replaced by an Orthodox church, In fact, despite playing a minor role in the as planned by the Kremlin-backed regional public discourse, environmental sentiments administration - in a city that is not an Orthodox are growing among civil society, and many stronghold and where Christians, Muslims and civil groups tend to face such concerns with

FROM THE BOTTOM UP: RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS | 20 COMMENTARY

sharp pragmatism. In order to avoid harsh influence local policymaking processes from repression and to maximise their efficiency, within, but following a bottom-up approach. the majority of environmental SMOs and Moreover, their non-contentious and non- NGOs adopt a non-contentious approach. politicised nature makes them versatile They focus on service provision rather than and adaptable to a much larger audience. on political activism, work side-by-side with Lastly, these organisations are among the state within the boundaries of existing the primary sources of information about legislation, and often make use of the state’s environmental issues, practices and solutions resources. Their presence is convenient to the among civil society, and have the opportunity authorities as well, as these associations de to bring environmentalism much closer to facto make up for the state’s shortcomings citizens than the government’s agenda actually without focusing on the political implication of plans to do. such deficiencies. Instead, they meet the needs While the dynamics of contentious of environmental civic minorities, while relieving environmental action are clear-cut, non- the authorities of such duties. contentious environmental movements These NGOs and SMOs do not openly are surely more ambiguous. Their challenge the status quo, although their mere action and strategy are the results of existence stresses the blatant inefficiency of a conscious compromise between state infrastructures in the field of sustainability. efficiency, ideology and the genuine risk They markedly avoid politicised stances and of repression. While their action is to be rarely go beyond legitimate policy-oriented praised as one of the most pervasive and requests when addressing the people in power. capable remedies to Russia’s patchy and Nevertheless, their role is politically and sloppy implementation of a sustainable socially important for a number of reasons. environmental policy, their non-political position Their intense lobbying activity with other and their formal cooperation with a state organisations and institutions often results upholding a strongly resource-oriented model in fruitful alliances with (or direct roles in) foster disillusionment with Russia’s direction public institutions, especially at the municipal regarding environmentalism. level. Public institutions tend to be rather open to non-contentious environmental SMOs and NGOs as they do not represent a threat and, as mentioned earlier, their cooperation often brings about beneficial outcomes. This eventually results in the opportunity to

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he Soviet era brought heavy industrialization of the agriculture Tsector in Central Asia (CA), aiming at the expansion of cotton (called “white gold”) cultivation but also at an increase in The Aral Sea Disaster and cereals and other staple crops. The need to Implications for produce sufficient cotton fabric for the USSR, achieve food security and employability for Regionalism In Central Asia local communities and for settlers from other Soviet Republics revolutionized agricultural production in CA. A major focus was given to Stefanos Xenarios fostering education about agricultural water Nazarbayev University management in the region by establishing, as early as in 1923, the currently named Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Agricultural Mechanization Engineers, the second largest institute of its kind in the USSR after Moscow. The ‘’hydraulic mission’’1 in CA peaked from the early 50s till the 80s with the construction of enormous hydraulic engineering infrastructures like the Karakum Canal (1,375km in length - one of the longest

Stefanos Xenarios is Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy in Nazarbayev University and Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute of Water Policy in the National University of Singapore. | 22 COMMENTARY

water supply canals worldwide), which were to Aral Sea into which they were emptying, and blame for the desiccation of the Aral Sea. The leading to the salinization and creation of infrastructures in CA consisted of reservoirs, the Aralkum with insurmountable costs channelization, embankments, intensive to the entire Aral Sea basin. irrigation, often supported by the use of pump The Tajik and Kyrgyz SSRs, into which stations for drilling groundwater but also for more than 80% of the entire Amu Darya diverting freshwater to numerous primary and rivers flow, were regulating and secondary canals. The two major rivers the water discharged through reservoirs, of Amu Darya and Syr Darya, together with providing abundant agricultural water their tributaries, were heavily exploited by supply during the summer in the Uzbek discharging continuously less water to the and secondarily Kazakh and Turkmen SSRs

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and avoiding flooding incidents in the the decrease in water could lead to droughts in winter season. The water released from the summer and floods in winter. The rhetoric of the Tajik and Kyrgyz sides was compensated for by former Uzbek President Islam Karimov about energy (mainly coal) provision, mostly in winter ten years ago on potential water conflicts in and food (staple crops) supply from the lowland case of hydropower expansion in the upstream SSRs by creating a large interdependence countries was of major concern for the entire between CA republics and framing the region. regionalization concept. CA was one of the Even in those hard times, it was understood that few regions worldwide where a water-energy- although national priorities took precedence food (WEF) nexus concept was introduced, over regionalization, the inherent transboundary yet without considering the irreversible damages being done to the very same water water complexity and Soviet legacy of sources that made the region progress. The commonly shared systems could not be severe impacts were known from Gorbachev’s neglected. Mirziyoyev’s regime in era, but the Soviet collapse increased the has sent clear messages of reconciliation magnitude of the Aral disaster as there was no with upstream countries by encouraging funding to mitigate and partly reverse the regionalization initiatives on energy-water drying up process. and food systems in CA and proposing In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse in 1991, to support the construction of multi- the by then independent CA countries strove for purpose reservoirs upstream in exchange water security by requesting their own share for benefit-sharing on energy and irrigation in the Aral basin according to national priorities. supply. Regional cooperation initiatives have The upstream and poorer countries of Tajikistan been also taken in by further and Kyrgyzstan were struggling to increase their focusing on Aral restoration though the well- hydropower potential and provide sufficient known revival of the “smaller Aral” or North domestic energy especially in the winter Aral Sea as it is better known. Climate change season. For this reason, the existent reservoirs accelerates the need for regionalization upstream were switched from agricultural as glaciers in Pamir and Tien Shan largely to hydropower mode by collecting water in hosted in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are quite spring and summer and releasing water in the susceptible to weather extremes and are bound winter. The downstream countries, Uzbekistan, to heavily affect water systems in CA. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, requested to The lesson learnt from the previous and current retain their agricultural water shares from Soviet restoration initiatives is that unless a regional times and were dismayed by the switch of the approach is followed on water conservation, upstream reservoirs to hydropower mode, as agricultural policy, and water priorities among

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CA countries, efforts will hardly come to CA country by suggesting how they could fruition. Regionalization has to be prioritized reconcile their national interests through a not only for the mitigation of the Aral Sea commonly approved framework on water desertification but for the re-ignition of a water- and its pertinent energy, food and climate energy-food-climate approach to support implications. Freshwater sources are the the economic growth and robustness of CA major component for regionalization and the countries by also improving the conservation of trigger for CA countries to take advantage of the lifeline waterways in the region. their enormous geostrategic potential, natural resources and high knowledge capacity A recent study indicated the importance for reinstating as much as possible of the Aral of water security and priorities for each Sea and avoiding similar disasters in future.

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1. ‘’The history of water development in Aral Sea Basin of water management in the Aral Sea Basin", in: is a paradigm of a hydraulic mission. The hydraulic S. Xenarios, D. Schmidt-Vogt, M. Qadir, B. Janusz- mission means the ideology of conquering water Pawletta, I. Abdullaev, (eds.), The Aral Sea basin: water resources, constructing and enhancing nature for the for sustainable development in Central Asia, London needs of human society by engineering infrastructure and New York: Routledge, 2020, pp. 86-99. (capturing, delivering and using) and other means’’, cit. in I. Abdullaev, K. Wegerich, J. Kazbekov, "History

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fter the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in September 2013, China Aunderwent major changes in domestic growth objectives. Green growth became a paramount vector of the country’s overall A Greener BRI strategy. At the September 2020 United Nations in Central Asia? General Assembly, for instance, President Xi Jinping announced the country’s aim to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.

Giulia Sciorati Domestic green goals notwithstanding, the ISPI and University of Trento nexus between China’s BRI projects and the green development of host countries had sparked debates for years. Even in Italy, after the 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with China, concerns arose about China’s potential acquisition of the Trieste port and the impact that the passage of Chinese mega-cargo ships from the Piraeus port in Greece through the would have on maritime ecosystems. Although similar considerations were raised around the world, Central Asia’s geographic

Giulia Sciorati is Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Chinese Studies at the University of Trento, working on a project investigating China’s relations with Central Asia. She also serves as Associate Research Fellow at ISPI Asia Centre, for the China Programme. | 27 COMMENTARY

position and hosting of a large number of major and gas), which had been an asset for the Chinese infrastructural projects put the region development of Central Asian exporters in under the spotlight for green development the past but today risk discouraging regional concerns. energy transitions.

THE RISKS OF PRIORITISING TRANSPORT MULTIDIMENSIONAL CHALLENGES AND ENERGY PROJECTS The BRI’s Central Asian segment spans a large Central Asia is a crucial region for China’s territory that comprises numerous cultural BRI. From China’s viewpoint, Central and natural sites. According to UNESCO, the Asia’s geographic position makes it a key BRI currently crosses no less than thirteen passageway to Western European markets world heritage sites in Central Asia, mainly and Middle Eastern energy resources. As protecting unique ecosystems and crop and the first segment of the BRI’s land route, in animal species. There are many environmental the last eight years Central Asia has become challenges affecting Central Asia today that home to forty-two Chinese-financed projects, the BRI is at risk of aggravating. Above all, the mainly in the transport and energy sectors. expansion of transport infrastructures is bound Recent estimates contend that the region has to reduce/fragment natural habitats and received up to US$25.5 billion from China since endanger roaming species. Also, greater 2013, second only to . mobility through transport infrastructures runs the risk of introducing invasive species, The expansion of railways and highways, in affecting crop production and eventually food particular, remains a priority for Beijing. In security. Moreover, as China-financed regional 2020, the pandemic exacerbated this trend energy projects continue to be mainly involving by putting maritime transport on hold. As a coal, oil and gas, they are bound to have a consequence, Central Asian railways proved strong impact on climate and to increase vital during the acute phase of the health waste: at least for now, China’s aim to build crisis: health and home office supplies, for greener societies has not fully travelled along instance, travelled from China to the BRI. Indeed, Central Asian countries have almost exclusively on these routes. Still, land launched several environmental rehabilitation transport infrastructures are environmentally projects in an effort to confront Soviet-era mine costly for host countries because they tailings. Similar problems arising from BRI mine fragment ecosystems and have the potential to projects, though, risk piling upon existing mining destroy biodiversity. As for the energy sector, issues, especially as standards on sustainable energy projects remain mainly linked to non- resource governance are seldom adopted in renewable resources (such as coal, oil full.

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Lastly, water remains the geopolitical resource The Chinese government acknowledged that has been contested the most in Central this issue long ago. At the first "Belt and Road Asian history. Water conflicts, in fact, are a Forum on International Cooperation" back in tangible regional threat. Water diversion to carry 2017, President Xi Jinping had stressed that out economic projects is an established practice China and BRI partners “should pursue the new in China, and is now likely to be implemented vision of green development and a way of life also in Central Asia, thus heightening the risk and work that is green, low-carbon, circular of water scarcity and pollution. and sustainable”. The path is thus traced, but China has yet to learn to consider the unique If the environmental costs of BRI projects in environmental pressures that characterize Central Asia are not comprehensively taken each BRI partner, if the BRI is to contribute to into account , climate-induced natural promoting green societies around the world. disasters will be more frequent, as regional environmental pressures will rise. In this case, though, the foundation of Central Asia’s participation in the BRI will be undermined. BRI-facilitated national economic growth, in fact, will be nullified by the rising costs of natural disasters. Tajikistan is a case in point, as the country loses 3 to 5 GDP points to natural disasters every year.

MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS Although a large number of BRI projects in Central Asia continue to be associated with unsustainable practices, China has set standards expected to convey national green efforts to BRI partners. Among others, the "Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition" aims to help China’s partner countries to achieve UN-led Sustainable Development Goals, especially in the domains of biodiversity protection and sustainable transport and infrastructure development.

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limate change is affecting the entire South Caucasus region, which includes Cvast mountain ecosystems and remote coastal areas. The human security implications of climate change are likely to Can Climate Change become more pronounced over time. Trigger Cooperation Several recent studies confirm that in the South Caucasus? the average annual air temperature is steadily increasing. For example, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 2019 Global Climate Nika Chitadze Summary, the combined land and ocean International Black Sea University temperature has increased at an average rate of 0.07°C per decade since 1880; however, the average rate of increase since 1981 (0.18°C) is more than twice as great. As a result, extreme weather events such as hurricanes and heat waves have intensified over the past decades. Georgia, Amenia and Azerbaijan are prone to a range of hazards such as landslides and floods, all of which are exacerbated by climate change and result in

Nika Chitadze is Professor and coordinator of the Doctoral Program at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the International Black Sea University (IBSU) and the Director of the Center for International Studies. | 30 COMMENTARY

severe infrastructure damage, casualties, and Several strategies and programs related economic losses. to poverty, sustainable development, and renewable energy have been implemented, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEASURES but few of them include measures to adapt TO FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE to climate change, and in general, concern At the political level, the countries of the about climate change remains limited to South Caucasus are active participants in those directly involved in environmental global climate change policy. All three states protection. For example, according to a 2021 are Parties to the United Nations Framework Poll conducted by the Office of the National Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Democratic Institute in Georgia, the majority support international efforts to keep the global of Georgians are concerned about economic average temperature rise below 2°C - a goal challenges (72%) and not environmental and set at the Conference of the Parties in Paris in other issues. The Georgian government is December 2015 within the framework of Paris thus more focused on solving socio-economic Agreement. All three countries presented their problems. When planning other important climate commitments (INDCs)1 before the economic activities in sectors such as UNFCCC, setting specific emission reduction energy, healthcare or tourism, despite some targets and pledging their commitment to achievements in these areas, all three South implementing adaptation plans. Caucasus countries lack adequate measures Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have to adapt to climate change. developed national security strategies. Moreover, climate change is not taken into Although none of these states consider consideration for important technical and climate change to be a clear threat to national financial measures, such as building standards security, protection from natural and man- and insurance schemes, and adaptation made disasters, as well as the implementation planning does not sufficiently consider of rational environmental practices, are the impact of climate change on the most recognised as important factors in ensuring the vulnerable populations, such as women. None safety of the population, and in a broader sense, of the South Caucasus countries have national security. The Climate Commitments adopted climate change legislation to (INDCs) of Armenia and Georgia highlight stimulate the implementation of adaptation climate change-related security threats in measures. sectors such as agriculture. Across the region, Disruptions to the hydrological cycle caused by there are concerns about food security, climate change can lead to tensions between biodiversity loss and water vulnerability. upstream and downstream water users if

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their likelihood of occurring is disregarded in THE WAY AHEAD water management. A system of linkages The security risks posed by climate between agriculture, energy, and water is change are of national and regional importance. critical, especially in coordinating sector action At the local level, ongoing institutional and at the national level and between upstream municipal reforms may provide opportunities and downstream countries. Currently, none for specific climate change adaptation of these three neighbouring countries measures to be put in place outside the capitals has signed agreements on water use with of the region, but progress is hampered the others, but significant progress has by lack of coordination between central been made in the preparation of bilateral administrations and local municipalities, as agreements. well as lack of knowledge and resources The current situation is likely to be affected to adapt to climate change. Based on the by political events. Georgia has ratified an findings of recent research and consultation Association Agreement with the EU, which with national experts to assess areas of special requires cooperation on a range of sectoral concern for climate change and security, a policies, including measures to adapt to number of areas were identified where climate climate change. The Eurasian Economic change can disrupt socio-economic systems, Union (EAEU), of which Armenia is a member, threaten infrastructure or livelihoods, or primarily focuses its efforts on the economic compromise security, exacerbating political integration of member states, providing a or social tensions. These areas include: framework for common transport, agricultural Regional / cross-border: and energy policies, but not necessarily directly targeting the cooperation aspects • North Armenia and Southern Georgia; of these policies in the field of climate • Border territory in north-west Azerbaijan change. The economies of the South Caucasus and north-east Georgia (Alazani / Ganikh countries remain fragile and, so far, climate river basin) change adaptation activities have been National: largely supported by external donors. A few measures have been taken at the state level • Yerevan and Ararat Valley (Armenia) in Azerbaijan, where the government has • Lake Sevan (Armenia) invested in flood prevention, rehabilitation and • South Armenia reforestation activities, but they are still only a • South-East Armenia handful of actions. • Kura-Araks lowland (Azerbaijan) • Baku and (Azerbaijan)

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• Adjara and Coastal zone of the Black Sea in 2012-2019 and reached 697,250 ha in 2019. (Georgia) The forestry sector was reformed, and a new • Tbilisi (Georgia) forest code was adopted. Unprecedented international financial support for Georgia • Mtskheta-Mtianeti Region (Georgia) for this important reform was provided • Kakheti (Georgia) by the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which • North-West Georgia allocated €33 million to the country. Environmental problems in the South To reduce air pollution, fuel quality has been Caucasus are particularly acute in Georgia. For controlled since 2017. A new European system instance, one of the research exercises carried for reducing air pollution from industrial facilities out by the Parliament of Georgia and partner and emission control was developed, and the organisations is a thematic survey on the air Parliament of Georgia adopted legislative quality in Tbilisi. This revealed that despite amendments in two readings. The draft law on numerous steps taken by the government, the “Environmental Responsibility” was drafted in problem of air pollution in the country remains accordance with European requirements and acute and its damage to health is significant, adopted by the Parliament in three readings in suggesting the need for the development March 2021. and coordinated implementation of effective In general, governments in the South measures. Caucasus, from the local to the regional Studies have shown that Georgia ranks 50th level, should take immediate action to in the world in the relative number of deaths cope with climate change impacts and their attributable to air pollution. According to security implications. Some of the proposed the data for 2018-2019, the average content areas of activity within environmental policy, of PM2.5 solid particles in Tbilisi exceeds the including the programmes in the framework allowable norm by 15%, while the NOx content of the Environment and Security Initiative, exceeds by 33-58%. However, it was revealed suggest the need to strengthen cross-border that the main cause of air pollution is vehicle cooperation as well as for more consistent emissions, as well as the abundance of older and targeted international support. Ending vehicles in the country. the military conflict between Azerbaijan and At the same time, the steps taken to improve Armenia and signing a ceasefire agreement, as the environment in Georgia are noteworthy. In well as devising some initiatives for the possible particular, as a result of the reforms, protected development of economic cooperation areas were expanded, and the area of between the two countries can lay the protected territory increased by 288,539.5 ha foundations for cooperation on environmental

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protection issues among the three South Caucasus countries in the future. Georgia, 1. Ahead of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties which has good relations and close ties with (COP21) , attending countries publicly outlined what both Armenia and Azerbaijan, has the potential post-2020 climate actions they intended to take to mediate between the two countries to under the new international agreement, known as achieve greater regional environmentalism. For their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions example, Georgia could host a regional forum (INDCs). The climate actions communicated in these on environmental issues with the participation of INDCs largely determine whether the world will achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement: the representatives of governmental and non- to hold the increase in global average temperature to governmental sectors of Armenia, Azerbaijan well below 2°C, to pursue efforts to limit the increase and Georgia (with the possible involvement to 1.5°C, and to achieve net zero emissions in the of foreign experts) to consider and develop second half of this century. More at https://www.wri. appropriate recommendations to improve org/indc-definition the environmental conditions of the South Caucasus. The EU could also play a proactive role, as environmental aspects are among the spheres of cooperation of the EU Eastern Partnership Programme, which includes all the three South Caucasus countries.

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