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Substantive Influences on the Use of Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Freda F

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Substantive Influences on the Use of Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Freda F Boston College Law Review Volume 23 Article 1 Issue 4 Number 4 7-1-1982 Substantive Influences on the Use of Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Freda F. Bein Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr Part of the Evidence Commons Recommended Citation Freda F. Bein, Substantive Influences on the Use of Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 855 (1982), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol23/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW VOLUME XXIII JULY 1982 NUMBER 4 SUBSTANTIVE INFLUENCES ON THE USE OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE I FREDA F. BEIN" * To the extent that the end sought is the disposition of the particular case according to the applicable rule of substantive law, the correct or better answers to questions of fact should be given.' While legal scholars may disagree on the primary purpose of the trial, 2 most probably would agree that whether a tribunal seeks "fairness" or I Copyright © 1982 by Boston College Law School * Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School (the author will be join- ing the faculty of Hofstra University Law School in September, 1982). • * The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance and encouragement of her colleagues and friends. Professors Allan Axelrod, John Hyman, Robert Carter, Alan Schwarz, Arthur Kinoy, John Payne, Mark Roe, Annarnay Sheppard, Victoria Morrison, Paul Tractenberg, J. Allen Smith of Rutgers University Law School and John J. Slain of New York University Law School, all reviewed one or more drafts of parts of this article that related to their respective areas of expertise. All offered insights and suggestions that have been incorporated herein. ' Michael and Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact: I, 34 CoLum. L. REV. 1224, 1231 (1934). The primary purpose of the trial is held by some to be an investigation of the truth. Michael and Adler, supra note 1, at 1228-31. Others, however, declare that the purpose of the trial is to settle disputes fairly. For example, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has observed: Our society, including especially the legal profession, is wedded to trial procedure for finding disputed facts, and the courts have no occasion to reject what seem to be the democratic desires. The objective is accordingly fair hearing, not accuracy. Indeed, the legal system often affirmatively reaches for something other than the truth. A jury is instructed that a defendant it believes guilty should be found not guilty unless it finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction is inconsistent with accuracy, and so is the extra burden of proof in a deportation case under Woodby a. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966). When conclusive evidence has been illegally obtained, the known truth is rejected. On nonfactual issues, the ob- jective often is not truth; great decisions are often policy-motivated departures from historical intent embodied in a writing a court or agency is interpreting. K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, S 10.4, at 319 (2d ed. 1979). It is probably simplistic to assume that an emphasis on either "truth" or "fairness" as the primary goal of the trial system necessarily excludes the recognition or desirability of the other aim. Cf. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan, Hearsay Dangers] ("Certainly a lawsuit is not, and can- not be made, a scientific investigation for the ascertainment of truth, but rather is, and must con- tinue to be, a proceeding for the orderly settlement of a dispute between litigants. But just as cer- tainly its objective must be to discover a basis for that settlement which is as close an approxima- tion of the truth as is possible in the circumstances in which the court has to function." Id. at 184-85). 855 856 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:855 "truth," its results should, in most instances, settle disputes according to the substantive law.' To realize this goal, the rule governing the admissibility of hearsay, like all rules of evidence and procedure, is designed to assist in the set- tlement of disputes according to the substantive law.* Thus, the general ban on hearsay operates properly when it keeps the Trier from considering proof that would defeat the aim of dispute settlement in accordance with the substantive law. Exceptions to the hearsay rule also serve the end of proper dispute settle- ment by allowing the Trier to gain knowledge of hearsay necessary to imple- ment the substantive Iaw. 5 That both the general rule banning hearsay and the exceptions allowing in some hearsay evidence ultimately serve the same end may seem counter- intuitive to the student who narrowly focuses on the usual rationales for the ban 3 While a detailed treatment of jurisprudential thought is beyond the scope of this arti- cle, the statement in the text seems axiomatic. Some of those who might argue for "fairness" as the primary aim of dispute settlement would presumably also argue that in those few instances in which the substantive law is itself perceived as "unfair," the result of a given case should not conform to that law. Manipulation of results might presumably be accomplished by manipulat- ing a rule of procedure to accomplish a "fairer" result than that commanded by the substantive law (and the latter manipulation might, of course, undermine the substantive law itself). An in- teresting discussion of cases which take this approach is found in Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 722-40 (1975). 4 This article does not attempt to set forth any new theory about the relationship be- tween laws of procedure, evidence and substance. Rather, old learning and commonly held beliefs form the basis of much of this article. These principles, however, are rearranged and reconsidered for the purpose of stimulating further research, discussion and debate. To the ex- tent that the ideas expressed herein are commonplace, no attempt is made to cite every source in which the same or similar ideas may be found. This article also does not attempt to define the terms "substance" and "procedure" in any novel way, nor does it purport to choose among the many definitions that have been pro- posed. An understanding of the discussion herein requires only the usual intuitive meanings of these terms. "[R]ules of substantive law govern the rights and duties of men in their ordinary relations with each other or the body politic, while procedural rules govern the means whereby these rights may be maintained or redressed." F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 2 (1st ed. 1965). See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring) (deter- mining whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or state law should govern the manner of serv- ice in a diversity suit). A rule may be properly characterized as substantive where it might "substantially affect . primary decisions respecting human conduct," id, at 475, and pro- cedural where it has "no effect on primary stages of private activity." Id. at 477. Further refinements, when necessary to an understanding of the text, are made ex- pressly. Profs. Michael and Adler argue that all adjective rules should serve this purpose. See Michael and Adler, supra note 1. There is a dilemma here that in a few instances may be resolved when exceptions to the hearsay rule are created. Prof. Robert Cover put the dilemma succinctly in the context of a discussion of Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813). The plaintiffs in Hepburn were held in servitude. Id. at 294. They claimed descent from a free maternal ancestor and sought to introduce multiple hearsay under the exception for statements of pedigree to prove the fact. Id. The Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that the statement was inadmissible under the exception. Id. at 295. Prof. Cover observes that whether to relieve the plaintiffs of the problem of lack of proof by admitting the evidence involves "trading off the disutility of 'im- properly' adjudicating someone a slave because no evidence save hearsay exists as to the freedom of an ancestor against the disutility of possible incorrect adjudications of freedom on the basis of unreliable evidence." Cover, supra note 3, at 731 (footnote omitted). Prof. Cover then observes in a footnote, "Insofar as the exceptions to the hearsay rule relate to rational goals, they are July 1982] THE HEARSAY RULE 857 and its exceptions,. The usual rationales for exceptions almost always seem to conflict with the justification for the hearsay ban. 6 Generally, the ban on hearsay is justified by reference to the need for adversarial cross-examination.' While not perfect, cross-examination is the only means available for probing the accuracy of a witness' perception, memory, sincerity and narrational skills.° This probing, in turn, has been justified by the assumption, somewhat verified by social scientists, that each person gathers and communicates impressions of the world around him in a unique fashion. 9 Cross-examination allows the adversary the opportunity to largely representative of this trade-off." Id. at 731 n.34. See also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 1420, at 251-52 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (suggesting that the trade-off is accomplished by reference to the "reliability" of the hearsay.) Examples of exceptions that were originally created with these trade-offs in mind are cited in note 26 infra.
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