Journal of Moral Philosophy (2020) 1-25 Shaming, Blaming, and Responsibility Lucy McDonald St John’s College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
[email protected] Abstract Despite its cultural prominence, shaming has been neglected in moral philosophy. I develop an overdue account of shaming, which distinguishes it from both blaming and the mere production of shame. I distinguish between two kinds of shaming. Agential shaming is a form of blaming. It involves holding an individual morally responsible for some wrongdoing or flaw by expressing a negative reactive attitude towards her and inviting an audience to join in. Non-agential shaming also involves negatively evaluating a person and inviting an audience to join in. Yet it is not a form of blaming, because the shamer does not hold the target morally responsible for anything. For example, we non-agentially shame people for their body shapes, for having periods, or for being victims of rape. Non-agential shaming involves the expression of an emotionally toned objective attitude, like disgust. While agential shaming enforces social norms, non-agential shaming enforces social standards. Keywords blame – reactive attitudes – responsibility – shame – shaming Shaming is in vogue. It is the subject of several best-selling books, and every day we encounter news stories and social media posts about ‘slut-sham- ing,’ ‘body-shaming,’ and ‘mom-shaming.’1 Sometimes shaming is subjected to hand-wringing over its dangerous consequences, and other times it is encouraged, with demands that perpetrators of wrongdoing be ‘named and 1 See Jon Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (London: Picador, 2015) and Jennifer Jacquet, Is Shame Necessary?: New Uses for an Old Tool (London: Penguin Books, 2016).