Accounting Research Center, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News Author(s): Douglas J. Skinner Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 38-60 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Accounting Research Center, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2491386 . Accessed: 02/07/2012 02:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. Blackwell Publishing and Accounting Research Center, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Accounting Research. http://www.jstor.org Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 32 No. 1 Spring 1994 Printed in U.S.A. Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News DOUGLAS J. SKINNER* 1. Introduction This paper provides evidence on corporate voluntary disclosure practices through an examination of the earnings-related disclosures made by a random sample of 93 NASDAQ firms during 1981-90.' I find that, consistent with prior studies, earnings-related voluntary disclo- sures occur infrequently (on average, one disclosure for every ten quarterly earnings announcements); good news disclosures tend to be point or range estimates of annual earnings-per-share (EPS), while bad news disclosures tend to be qualitative statements about the current quarter's earnings; the (unconditional) stock price response to bad *University of Michigan.