HEIDEGGER’S 1924 CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS USING ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC, BOOK II

Lou Agosta

In Being and Time, Heidegger famously that is, affects feedback into thought and en- notes that the analysis of the affects (pathe\) has able the eruptions of thought of the kind that taken barely one step forward since book II of produce paradigm shifts in science, creativity Aristotle’s Rhetoric (H139).1 in art, and personality transformation in ther- The occasion for this reengagement with apy. These eruptions are a function of the the possibility of a “step forward” is the avail- affectivity of thinking. The boundary is trans- ability of Heidegger’s lecture course at the gressed not only from affectivity to cognition, University of Marburg in 1924 on the Basic but in the reverse direction as well, yielding a Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy.This quality of thought that is densely suffused with course, which includes a detailed analysis of an emotional tonality such as that exemplified book II of the Rhetoric, has been published as in musicality. Nevertheless, I shall include volume 18 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe Nussbaum’s contribution as belonging to the (2002) and just translated (2009).2 Here cognitivist approach because, ultimately, even Heidegger’s penetrating but sparse remarks in if she is able to translate partially between the Being and Time on Befindlichkeit two, she fights continuously against the [“affectivity”] are deepened and implemented incommensurability of thoughts and affects. In in his reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. fact, Heidegger explicitly warns against the The relevance of this reengagement is di- second, top down account—any cognitive de- rect. The dominant view of the affects in con- termining of Befindlichkeit is confused with temporary philosophy is arguably the position surrendering science ontically to feeling that affects are an unclearly expressed proposi- (H138). tion, including the cognitively articulated Rhetoric is the art of doing things with propositional attitude. The position of this es- words, even in a performative sense of speak- say is that the modern propositional account of ing a world of commitments into existence in the affects is cleared away by and does not sur- the community (polis), and Heidegger gives vive a reading of Heidegger’s volume 18 on matters a strikingly innovative twist. The hori- book II of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. zon of this speaking turns out to be acoustics— Lest someone think this is a trivial matter, hearing. The work of rhetoric is speaking and the long and distinguished tradition going listening to one another about what matters: back to the Stoics, in which affects are indis- “rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in tinct cognitions that require clarification, is which the self-interpretation of being-there well articulated in modern times by Anthony [existence] is explicitly fulfilled. Rhetoric is Kenny and then in Martha Nussbaum’s monu- nothing other than the interpretation of con- mental Upheavals of Thought: The Intelli- crete being-there [existence], the hermeneutic gence of Emotions.3 of being-there itself” (1924: 76). Aristotle’s Nussbaum’s position, in particular, is Rhetoric is for those speakers and listeners— highly nuanced, and it is an oversimplification like Heidegger and his audience—whose exis- to say that she is merely a cognitivist about the tence is an issue for them. The three major dis- affects (emotions), pure and simple. One can tinctions or pisteis (views) of the Rhetoric are get to a cognitivist account in at least two engaged: character (e\thos), affect (pathos), ways: first, bottom up, by saying that affects and speech (logos). While the pathe\ in which are unclear cognitions (“thoughts”); alterna- the world is disclosed as mattering to human tively, one can redefine the boundary between being ultimately cannot be completely articu- affectivity and cognition top down such that lated and exhausted by e\thos or logos (or thinking becomes infused with affection— nous), diverse domains of relatedness are pardon the expression, more “touchy-feely”— available where our being-with-one-another PHILOSOPHY TODAY WINTER 2010 © 2010 DePaul University 333 shows up in the speaking and acting in the uation makes a difference gets disclosed to polis, where “polis” is used in the broad sense Dasein initially in affectivity. of engaging with one another as members of Befindlichkeit emerges from pathe\ in the the same human community (1924: 72) of broad sense of the way that human existence is agents and doers.4 over-taken, seized, overcome, by the world. The distinction “Befindlichkeit”—how one Heidegger makes good use of Aristotle’s lan- finds oneself situated affectively—does not guage here: occur in volume 18 as an explicit distinction, but is in the background. But reading the texts Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul from this volume as modern readers, we can- hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say not help but bring distinctions such as that the human being hopes, is brave. ...“Tosay Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Auslegung,and that the soul gets angry is the same as wanting to Rede from the existential analytic of Dasein to say that the soul builds a house. It would be our reading. It requires an effort of the imagi- better to say not that the soul has pity or learns or nation to momentarily quarantine such distinc- believes something, but that the human being tions, which would only first formally occur does te\ psyche\”[De Anima G 4, 408b11 sqq.].... explicitly in Being and Time, to appreciate the Therefore, the pathe\ are not “psychic experi- originality, power, and perhaps even shock of ences,” are not “in consciousness,” but are a be- Heidegger’s interpretation as it must have ing-taken of human beings in their full being- sounded in 1924 to those hearing his lectures in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that in the class for the first time. Consider: the whole, the full occurrence-context, which is These pathe, “affects,” are not states pertaining found in this happening, in being-taken, belong to ensouled things, but are concerned with a dis- to the pathe. The so-called “bodily state” of position of living things in their world, in the anxiety, joy, and so forth, are not symptoms, but mode of being positioned towards something, also belong to the characteristic being of beings, allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects of human beings. (Heidegger 1924: 133) play a fundamental role in the determination of being-in-the-world, of being-with-and-to- The text does at least three things. First, wards-others. (1924: 83) Heidegger’s anti-psychologism in the modern representational sense is in full evidence. Affects determine being-in-the-world and More on this shortly. Second, the text shows being-with-and-towards-others. Affects show Heidegger less neglectful of the physical (or- up as “making a difference,” as “mattering.” ganic) body than he is usually regarded. The This “making a difference” is what it means “bodily state” in which anxiety (fear) or joy is when Heidegger says the Befindlichkeit—his expressed in facial features or physical ges- terminology for the complex of moods, emo- tures are not symptoms of hidden, underlying tions, sensations, passions, and the felt aspects pathe\. They are the very being of the pathe\ of existence—is that out of which something themselves—nothing is hidden, though, of in the world (already) matters to an individ- course, not displaying an affect is always a ual’s existence (Heidegger 1927: H137–38).5 privative and derivative option. The fear is im- Individual human existence is not merely or mediately available and present in the wide purely spontaneous. Dasein is not only or al- eyes and grimace—the joy in the laughing ways the cause. Rather, Dasein is also at the ef- eyes and smile. Third, the text provides the fect of circumstances—and, thus, affected. “being taken of human beings in their full be- Dasein is at the effect of its affects, which dis- ing in the world” as a precursor to close the world, its situation and Dasein in it. thrownness—the “that it is and has to be.” “Be- Affects deliver Dasein over to such contin- ing taken” is a kind of inside out “thrownness.” gency—thrownness and the related facticity. This text yields the full sense of Befindlichkeit The situation disclosed in affectivity is the when combined with the above-cited text on source of what makes the context engage the how our affectivity determines (even subordi- individual in such a way that it matters to the nates) our beliefs and cognitions to the matter- individual. The source of how and why the sit- ing disclosed to Dasein. PHILOSOPHY TODAY 334 © 2010 DePaul University Just as a Befindlichkeit can be articulated in beyond the concrete being of human beings, a a diversity of possibilities, interpretations, and characteristic way of being that could be gath- expressions in speech, no one of which is in- ered into the logos and articulated in speech trinsically superior to the other, likewise an af- (135). This is the crucial passage (and argu- fect can be articulated—one might say “trans- ment) for the thesis of this essay that the cogni- lated”—into a variety of different apophantic tive (propositional attitude) approach to the af- propositions expressing declarative content. fects is incomplete, that something essential But the translation is incomplete and indeter- escapes. In the following passage, the nous is minate. Something escapes. That something is “more than human being can be” and escapes precisely the way in which the Befindlichkeit upward and the pathos is (so to speak) simulta- and the affect as a derivative form thereof neously pulled downward by its hyle\ (mate- make the world matter to us as individual rial). Consider: Dasein. It is the difference between a piece of information “I am afraid of the snake” and the As such, nous is apathes [De an. G 4, 429a15], immediate reaction, for example, in which a “that which nothing can touch.” . . . Thus nous, certain Charles Darwin, visiting the snake in relation to the being-opened-up of being-in, house at the zoo, literally jerked his head back- is more than the human being can be since the wards when the cobra, safely contained behind way that the human being takes up this possibil- the glass, struck directly at him. The pattern is ity, nous,isdianoeisthai. Insofar as nous consti- the same even with those reactions that are not tutes the being-opened-up of the human being, hard-coded reflexes but rather a function of the it is a dia, insofar as living is determined by lupe\ social pretences and colonization of the notori- and hedone [pain and pleasure as the marks of ous das Man—the inauthentic but seemingly pathe], nous is the basic condition of the possi- inescapable “the one” (the “they self”)—in our bility of being-in-the-world, which as such comportment, behavior, and relatedness stands out behind the particular concrete being (distractedness). of individual human beings. (1924: 135) While it is an over-simplification, the three pisteis (views) of the Rhetoric into e\thos, pa- The nous is a-pathe\s. It is incommensura- thos, and logos, correspond to the interrelated ble with the pathe\tika—against thinking distinctions of Verstehen, Befindlichkeit, and (dianoeisthai). Nous is untouchable — “that Rede in the existential analysis of Being and which nothing can touch” —in a way that ordi- Time. The first correlation (e\thos ~ Verstehen) nary human existence is constantly touched by is perhaps the most controversial association particular affects and the totality of a world and arguably the least relevant either to that matters affectively. In this context, nous Heidegger’s thesis in volume 18 or to ours in maps to understanding as the locus of possibil- this essay. However, one can get a sense of how ity and pathe\ to Befindlichkeit with its back- well the correlation fits in that e\thos (charac- ground marks of pain and pleasure [lupe\ and ter) is the source of phrone\sis and the “most hedone] in the openness where human exis- decisive positive possibility” that the speaker tence is situated. Heidegger and Aristotle drive has at his disposal (1924: 112). Character is a nous back in the direction of pathe\: “possibility engine” for the speaker, percolat- Book 1, Chapter 1 of De Anima investigates the ing up significant and relevant insights, to per- suade and enroll others in a possibility and pro- extent to which nous, as a basic determination ject of implementing the possibility by being of the being of human beings, is a basic charac- an example of integrity and openness for pos- teristic of this way of being; and the extent to sibility. The speaker wins over the audience to which the human being only constitutes a defi- her (or his) belief, not only by logic and a pas- nite possibility of the being of nous....This sionate delivery but, just as significantly, by universality of the possibility of grasping [in who she is as a possibility, exemplifying integ- nous] is something that is not to be equated with rity and trustworthiness of character. the concrete being of the human being, which is Turningtothepathe\, according to always at the moment. What grounds this possi- Heidegger, the analysis at the level of Aris- bility of grasping everything, which grows out totle’s Rhetoric requires that the pathe\ have, beyond the human being and its concrete being? HEIDEGGER’S CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS © 2010 DePaul University 335 . . . Aristotle discusses the pathe\ as those phe- pect (ekstasis) of futurity even at the heart of nomena in which it is shown that the concrete contingency and thrownness based out of the being of human beings can only be understood past. Next, the formal definition of fearfulness, if one takes it in its fullness. ...Itis,aboveall, fearing as such [Furchtsamkeit], is a possibil- decisive that we lose our composure, as in the ity that is already disclosed in the world as case of fearing without encountering something something that is freed into the clearing that in the environing world that could be the direct Dasein opens up and there comes to matter to occasion of fear. (1924: 139–40) Dasein as threatening. Finally, that about which Dasein fears is Dasein itself. All In particular, the example in the last sen- roads—and fears—lead to Dasein; and Dasein tence points to the understanding of affects as is inevitably the about which (woran) of fear. disclosive of a whole way of being-in-the- Even if a person is afraid of an expensive repair world, not just particular things. We are dis- of the leaking roof of his house, the fear is that comforted or de-composed in fear without a Dasein lacks proper shelter and will be ex- particular fearful thing being encountered. posed to the storm. Thus, section §30 and its This indicates a disclosure of Dasein’s being- resonance with the 1924 lectures is a strong re- in-the-world as a totality that is at stake. How- minder that Heidegger provides a robust ac- ever, Heidegger does not yet call out the para- count of the emotions in all their everyday digm of being-towards-death (as he will a few complexity and richness. The existentialist years later). Instead, following a close reading reading that focuses only on the mood of anxi- of Aristotle, Heidegger gives a short account ety in the face of death misses the nearly seam- of an example in terms of the Aristotelian four less continuity with the work of the early causes. The physician sees anger as a boiling Heidegger as it is carried forward from the rich up of blood in the heart and of the bodily tem- and diverse details of Aristotle’s Rhetoric into perature – an early version of the hard-wiring Being and Time (granted that such material of our biology to its expression in a somatic-fa- was not necessarily available to the initial cial program; the rhetorician, going decisively existentialist reading). beyond psychological representations, sees While the logos emerges from the pathe\ and anger formally as seeking pay-back, an impla- the two are inextricability required to complete cability towards others; the cause as final pur- one another, the relationship is not reductive, pose (or “target”) is an individual, group, or unidirectional, or even complete in the sense idea that matters to human existence and at that there is no conflict or struggle. Conflict which one takes aim; and, finally, anger has and incompleteness are a part of the expression certain immediate causes, which act as trig- of pathe\ by logos and the feedback of logos gers, such as insults, slights, disdain, the into pathe\. At the level of the 1924 text, this es- imagined or actual dishonoring of people and tablishes the incommensurability of pathe\ and their cherished ambitions, goals, and ideals. nous—in our interpretation—the incomplete- This analysis maps closely to that provided ness of articulating pathe\ as cognitions (prop- by Heidegger in §30 of Being and Time, “Fear ositional attitudes). If further textual evidence as a Mode of Affectivity” (H 140–42). Closely, is required, the inexhaustibility of the pathe\ by but not identically, since the material cause the logos extends beyond knowing in the fol- drops out of both the Rhetoric and §30, and is lowing: only completed in the 1924 lectures by refer- ences to De Anima. Thus, that in the face of We still have to come to an understanding in which we fear, the fearsome,6 is encountered what follows as to how fear and the pathe\ stand within the world as a trigger that has danger in connection with logos....Insofar as the (“dangerous objects”) as its context of involve- pathe\ are not merely an annex of psychical pro- ments. The engaging thing is that, even as the cesses, but are rather the ground out of which fearsome comes at Dasein out of the world, speaking arises, and which what is expressed like a charging lion or run-away Toyota, grows back into, the pathe, for their part, are the Dasein’s fear is fundamentally a function of basic possibilities in which being-there itself is the possibility that the danger will pass by and primarily oriented toward itself, finds itself. miss Dasein, thus revealing the temporal as- The primary being-oriented, the illumination of PHILOSOPHY TODAY 336 © 2010 DePaul University its being-in-the-world is not a knowing, but tertaining mixed emotions. Welcome to the rather a finding oneself that can be determined real world—it happens often. We are thrown differently, according to the mode of being- into ambivalence, and these mixed feelings there of a being. (1924: 176; italics deleted from come at us humans as a function of our contin- the original for readability) gency and thrownness. How this is reconcil- able with the rationality of the emotions re- The being-oriented and being-in-the-world quires further argument and modifies our of pathe\ are “not a knowing.” However, the conception of rationality in interesting ways, pathe\ are a source of different possible under- according to Greenspan.8 standings and interpretations that can, in turn, The Aristotelian answer here is that ratio- be articulated in the logos. In a sense, this gives nality is a task, a work-in-progress that re- indirect, limited comfort to the cognitivist ap- quires our being-with-one-another in the en- proach to the affects, since it acknowledges the gaged speaking and acting of the polis in order continuity and indispensability of logos and to implement a community in which humans pathe\ (and nous); and yet it indicates the flourish, at least for those who Aristotle has de- inexhaustibility of pathe\ as a source of further fined as belonging to the “in group.” The distinctions for being-in-the-world. Heideggerian answer is that Befindlichkeit If one wishes to rise above the level of readily encompasses ambivalence, and is not Heidegger’s textual interpretation of the Rhet- propositionally analyzable “all the way oric, no matter how innovative, and, using down.” For Heidegger, the possibilities of our Heidegger’s 1924 text as a springboard, mar- Befindlichkeit are inexhaustible, for whenever shal additional arguments against the cog- one possibility is implemented on the thrown nitivist approach to the affects, one does not basis of our nullity, other possibilities are nec- need to look far. Phenomena such as emotional essarily passed over and fade back into the ambivalence and the cognitive impenetrability background of dispositions and latent abilities. of affects provide counter-examples to the If further example is needed that the affects cognitivist paradigm. cannot be completely articulated in proposi- The cognitivist (“propositional attitude”) tional attitudes of belief and desire, then the approach to affects is shown to have a counter- evidence that affects are impervious to beliefs example by Pat Greenspan (1980). 7 She fo- is useful. Zenon Pylyshyn is credited with cuses on emotions as opposed to affects or coining the term “cognitive impenetrability,” moods, but much of what she argues applies with specific reference to visual perception; generally. Her counter-example extends at but the applications extend beyond the compu- least to the assertion that the emotions are logi- tational context of information processing in cal in any ordinary interpretation of the princi- the visual system to affectivity, belief, and de- ple of contradiction. The example of ambiva- sire at large.9 The evidence that the individual lence where an individual holds two contrary is not really dealing with a belief (a candidate or even contradictory emotions about a single for cognitive verification) is that the individual event, outcome, individual, or situation sug- still feels there is something uncanny and un- gests that mixed emotions do not behave as comfortable about that snake, even though it is propositions in any ordinary way. Greenspan rubber. The complex “Fear—snake—danger” succeeds in establishing that it is really about does indeed contain a belief component, and it one and the same individual that we simulta- is one that becomes accessible and visible as neously and with respect to the same property the affective complex gets translated from the experience satisfaction and frustration, happi- undifferentiated Befindlichkeit of being-in- ness and unhappiness, hope and fear—as the-world into the derivative, de-worlded, cor- when, speaking in the first person for empha- responding cognitive system. Yet the rubber sis, a friend receives a promotion that I had my- snake still gives the individual an uncanny self hoped to receive. For this penetrating anal- feeling. What does not get translated is the is- ysis, we are grateful (and without mixed sue why it should matter. The snake becomes a feelings). Emotional ambivalence is com- reminder that Dasein is an individual being mon—love and hate, hope and fear, joy and whose being is an issue for itself. Nothing is sorrow. We have no trouble authentically en- lost in the translation—nothing except the af- HEIDEGGER’S CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS © 2010 DePaul University 337 fect itself. In another example, I know that fly- (and nous)to pathe\ applies across all the ma- ing on a commercial airplane is much safer jor distinctions of pathe\—hard-coded, than getting behind the wheel of a car. Yet as I affective responses (“gut reactions”), social sit back in my airplane seat (let’s say) I am still pretences, eruptive emotions, moods— intermittently fearful, my palms get sweaty as whether inauthentic or authentic, and includ- the plane is taxiing toward the runway, and I ing cognitive impenetrability. This is a rich experience a dryness in my mouth (i.e., fear) area for additional research. Let us engage in that I never experience in getting behind the some as inspired by Heidegger’s lecture and wheel of a car. And I know which is safer—fly- related distinctions. ing. Examples where true belief or knowledge (1) Pathe\ are candidate instances of “social does not make a difference to one’s affects are pretences” built around roles in human rela- common. Darwin knew the cobra was safely tions at the level of the inauthentic das Man locked away behind the plate glass in the zoo. (the “they self”). In social pretences such as ro- Yet he immediately jumped back when the mantic love, the rebel without a cause, or a snake struck. Of course, this is a reflex-like re- woman scorned, Dasein takes over its affect action; and it would go too far to assert that from its everyday way of being with other indi- affects are mere reflexes. They are much viduals in superficial community under the richer. Yet they share a reflex-like function in colonization of das Man.11 Heidegger’s that they are impervious to what the individual 1924 lectures undertake what can best be de- knows (believes). scribed as a tour de force interpretation of Ar- It goes beyond the level of Heidegger’s (or istotle, enumerating nine different ways in Aristotle’s text) to complete the analysis of which a human being encounters others as these examples. Yet we can marshal distinc- frightening (1924: 172; Rhetoric 1382b). I tions from these thinkers to do so. In the case of suggest that every one of them, without excep- some fears such as snakes and the affect of dis- tion, is inauthentic. In each case, the other is gust, we may actually be dealing with a hard- implicated as the source of fear, and without coded response.10 Evolution and natural selec- the other, the pathe\ would not be; yet the fear is tion hands down such responses to our contin- due to something lacking in integrity, under- gent thrownness of a being-in-the-world of the handed, or deceptive. ancient environment of evolutionary adapta- In each case, a social pretence takes center tion on the savannah plains of east Africa. We stage (Rhetoric [1924: 172; Rhetoric 1382]). are embodied creatures and we have to bring (i) Those who are literally partners in crime are forward our facticity and transform it as best afraid of one another. Those who commit a we can. In the case of fear of flying, what is dis- crime together expect to be compromised by closed in the coach section of an airplane the other’s lack of trust. The supposed pretence (among other things) is a world in which the of honor among thieves gives way to simple passenger has limited personal space, no distrust and direct betrayal. (ii) When a power- choice, and no control. One need not be a psy- ful individual is unjust, this is a source of fear, chiatric case to find that such an extreme loss since he has the power to inflict pain on one. of control is threatening to the integrity of The tyrant often pretends to catch someone in a one’s existence or to discover a pattern of lie or inconsistency before the individual vic- threat activation that is impervious to (many) tim “disappears” or is publicly crushed in a rational beliefs and arguments. As noted show trial. (iii) Those that have been injured above, what does not get translated cognitively are expected to lash out in return at those be- is the issue why it should matter. The fear of lieved to have caused them injury. The pre- flying becomes a reminder that Dasein is an in- tence is that two wrongs make a right. (iv) dividual being whose being is an issue for it- Those who know they have injured another (as self. Once again, nothing is lost in the in the previous item (iii)) and are anticipating a translation—nothing except the mattering, the reprisal are made even more dangerous in a affect itself. fearful spiral of tit-for-tat. Again, two wrongs The proponent of the cognitive, proposi- do not make a right, but spawn an entire series tional attitude cannot escape by saying this is a of fear-inducing wrongs. (v) Individuals com- special case. The incommensurability of logos peting for the same stakes in a situation of scar- PHILOSOPHY TODAY 338 © 2010 DePaul University city—in what we would today call a “zero sum The social pretences of Twelve Angry Men game”—are afraid of one another. The pre- and Rebel without a Cause—in the movies of tence is that there really is not enough to go the same titles—are taken over from our con- around, even if the scarcity has been artifi- ventional understandings of possibilities as re- cially manufactured, thereby generating even ferred to by das Man. Here the translation from more fear. (vi) Those that have nothing to lose pathe\ to logos fails, not because the meaning and so lose all fear themselves are in an power- is so deep and significant, but rather because it ful position to inspire fear in others precisely is so superficial and ambiguous. The rebel since they have no hope of escaping distress, without a cause is the owner of a free floating but are able to inflict it. (vii) Those that, thanks narcissistic rage in search of a target on which to superior position or power, have already to lock in order to bring to expression (and caused an injury to an inferior are feared as be- completion) a personal indignation that had ing able to do so again. The pretence on the nothing to do with the target either necessarily part of the inferior individual is that one is im- or even contingently. Other examples of social portant or significant enough to be worth the pretences include the shame of a woman scorned, wearing Hester Prynne’s scarlet let- further injury or, on the part of the superior 12 one, that he cares enough to do so. (viii) The ter, in Hawthorne’s novel of the same. weak are to be feared in so far as, if they are out Let consider one example in detail. The to ruin an individual, and hiding their intention twelve angry men—actually it was eleven stealthily, then they may prepare a surprise at- since one of them kept his wits about him— tack that they will one day launch. The pre- were angry about rising urban crime in the tence is that the weak are interested in starting context of the 1950s in the USA, based on a a fight with the stronger. (ix) Enemies who stereotype of switch-blade wielding Hispanic wear their heart on their sleeves are not be street gangs; and, thus biased, were about to convict an innocent defendant of murder. All feared, since they are open; but those who are but one of them “knew” that the accused was sly, deceptive, or reserved and pretend to be guilty. The accused fit the stereotype. He fit the one’s friend are to be feared. The pretence is social role. He fit the profile of the pretence that of a “smiling face that pretends to be your provided by conventional wisdom of das Man, friend.” though Heidegger’s distinction obviously does Other modern examples of pathe\ as social not occur in the film. Thus eleven of the twelve pretences include forms of infatuation and ro- jurors themselves fit their own profile of men mantic love. The idealization of one another angry about urban decay and the misbehavior by star-crossed young lovers such as Romeo of the anonymous stereotype. The circumstan- and Juliet is not based on a healthy process of tial evidence was compelling. Only one indi- getting to know one another, albeit deeply vidual suspected (“knew”) that he did not moving as a narrative in spite of that. Neither is know. This opened up a possibility not envi- Juliet as wonderful as Romeo imagined, nor sioned in the social pretences governing the Romeo as magnificent as Juliet idealized him conversation in the court, in this case not only to be. If their tragic story had not taken the dra- with the accused and with his fellow jurors, but matic turn it did in Shakespeare, Juliet would with gang members’ actual practices in using soon be tired of picking up Romeo’s dirty switch-blade knives. Based on the one, lone, socks upon his return from a hard day at court; holdout juror’s interpretation of the distinction and Romeo would be tired of Juliet’s nagging between stabbing upwards versus downwards about her in-laws. In another example, in the with the switch blade—he was able to articu- pre-ontological folktale, nothing is more cer- late authentically what was possible to his fel- tain than that after the injunction “you may low jurors, namely, that the accused was open every door in the castle, but do not open falsely accused and indeed innocent. The that one” the hero or heroine will immediately anger vanishes in a puff of instrumental do so; likewise, with Romeo and Juliet taking a practice as the jurors acknowledge a near fatal romantic interest in one another. An irresist- misinterpretation. ible attraction immediately followed upon the (2) Next, let us consider pathe\ as what are prohibition of contact and communication. (in effect) hard-coded somatic patterns, for ex- HEIDEGGER’S CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS © 2010 DePaul University 339 ample, to laugh when tickled, to cry when open question not addressed at the level of deeply disappointed by loss, to take flight thrownness or Aristotle’s material cause. when outnumbered by hostile forces, or lash While fundamental ontology does not wait out indignantly when insulted. Even though for the scientific results of neurology to make a we humans are able to interrupt these immedi- contribution, and while the results of empirical ate reactions that overtake us, and, thus inter- science remain empirically valid and subject to vening with deliberation, are able to recapture refinement, revision, or even refutation, we our freedom in at least some instances, still should not be too surprised to learn that co- such patterns point to Dasein’s contingent Befindlichkeit, Mitsein, and Mitdasein have an thrownness (embodiment) in Heideggerian implementation mechanism that is identified terms and hyle\—material cause—in Aristote- at the level of neurology. What is surprising is lian terms. It is possible that Heidegger would that the neuronal mechanism should be so rela- be dismissive of the results of the scientific dis- tively simple. Instead of a neural network of covery of mirror neurons and the social neuro- amazing complexity and a causal thicket of se- science opened up by fMRI research. Yet an al- mantic opacity, a granular one-to-one map- ternative reading is that he leaves a place for ping between the mirror neuron systems of two the results of scientific research, albeit as a de- individuals is functioning to produce the re- rivative form of being-in-the-world, knowl- sults. The Cartesian myth that humans are un- edge.13 related cogitos was debunked by Heidegger as The short version of such research is that the part of his original contribution. The surpris- same areas of the brain relevant to pain are acti- ing thing is that a neurological correlate to vated in observing an individual experience such debunking has surfaced. We are related, pain as are activated by the individual’s di- even at the physiological level. Whether such rectly experiencing the painful stimulus. This an account will survive the onslaught of fur- is worth repeating – the one observing and the ther properly skeptical scientific inquiry is a one experiencing pain show the same areas of valid (and open) question. However, the rec- the brain are activated, albeit with less inten- ommendation to Heidegger scholars, at least sity on the part of the observer. No one is say- for the time being, is to enjoy a moment of sci- ing that such neuronal activity provides a gen- entific satisfaction. eral law of causation between mind and body. (3) Finally, pathe\ provide the basis of au- It remains the case that correlation is not cau- thentic commitments. Of course, Heidegger sation. Rather an implementation mechanism gives the classic, existential example of this as subserving a communicability of affect be- the mood of anxiety in the individualizing con- tween human beings in the world is suggested. frontation with death.14 Human existence uses Thus, those philosophers are stopped short, this confrontation with death as disclosed in who, for example, propose a thought anxiety to shatter the complacency and dis- (Gedanken) experiment in which two individ- traction of the domination of the everyday— ual subjects are imaginatively linked at the das Man—and engages in an authentic choice level of their physiologies via a radio transmit- and commitment. In this example, human exis- ter after having been artificially de-worlded. tence is individualized down to its ownmost We no longer need to imagine such a thought potentiality and is alone—no one can die experiment. The mirror neuron system (MNS) Dasein’s death for it. Dasein is authentic—and and fMRI studies provide all the access re- all alone. Yet there are examples of pathe\ that quired to disclose the affective resonance of disclose Dasein in relation to other individuals two individuals at the level of emotional conta- and do so authentically. gion, vicarious experience, or synchronized We must guard against a misunderstanding behaviors such as contagious yawning. Our here. It is not that any given set of pathe\ are in- co-Befindlichkeit extends further downwards trinsically authentic or inauthentic. For exam- into the somatic infrastructure, though obvi- ple, it is not that fear is inauthentic and anxiety ously without individual awareness of it, than authentic. It is true that Heidegger privileges was previously thought to be the case. How the mood of anxiety in the face of death as such contingencies are further elaborated for disclosive of Dasein as whole and as an indi- possibilities of human understanding is an vidualized self subsequently capable of au- PHILOSOPHY TODAY 340 © 2010 DePaul University thentic projects and commitments. Yet it is While fear reveals threatening objects (in- easy to think of examples of inauthentic anxi- cluding other individuals) and anxiety dis- ety. The caricature of existentialism in which closes the totality of Dasein, there are pathe\ anxiety paralyzes the existential hero, who is that disclose another Dasein—Dasein as the unable to choose, is one example. Next, the vi- other individual. Almost without exception, carious anxiety created in the theatre during Aristotle’s discussion of diverse pathe\ pro- scenes of suspense, anticipation, or high ex- vides examples of the disclosure of others. pectation, provides another instance. Finally, There are entire groups of affects, both the free floating anxiety of classical neurosis inauthentic and authentic, that Heidegger un- that emerges in phobias, paranoia, and obses- covers thanks to Aristotle’s work in book II of sive compulsive rituals (or, more exactly, the the Rhetoric which Dasein cannot experience prohibition of such rituals) also come to mind. without the availability of the other individ- In every case, the anxiety is arguably in- ual.16 Many affects such as righteous indigna- authentic because the individual is engaged at tion—at which we are about to look—or guilt, at a level distinct from an anticipatory reso- shame, jealousy, and so on—make a social ref- luteness that makes a difference to Dasein’s erence to the other who is essential for the life commitments or at a level in which Dasein emergence and functioning of the affect in engages in self-deception. We saw nine exam- question. ples of inauthentic fear. Yet authentic fear is A wonderful example of the Befindlichkeit that which is experienced in choosing to go of righteous indignation, essentially a social forward into danger in spite of feeling afraid. reference and response to the conduct of the Of course, the warrior in battle who knows that other person (or group), is disclosed in the lab- oratory by R. H. Frank in the Ultimatum Game he is at risk and feels afraid yet advances any- 17 way is a paradigm case here. But not only war- (UG). I hasten to add that Heidegger’s dis- riors. The individual who stands at the end of tinctions are not ones used by Frank, but, as we shall see, bringing them to Frank’s work with the street where he lives and sees a tornado the passions is illuminating. In the UG, one bearing down on him knows at that moment player is given a set amount of money—say authentic fear and is strongly motivated to run twenty dollars. He is then required to hand and take cover. Likewise, anyone who has to over, at his own discretion, a portion of the speak truth to power—for example, Mandela, money to a second player. If the second player Gandhi, or King—and does so, not recklessly, declines the offer, then both players get zero; but with deliberation and commitment to the otherwise, they get to keep the cash according cause (fairness, liberation, equality, and so on) to the proposed offer. From a rational point of experiences authentic fear. It does not deter- view, where rationality is defined in terms of mine the action. It does not stop the speaker. narrow self-interest, if player #1 offers one out But it is there, at least initially. of twenty dollars, then player #2 would still be All of the pathe\ are capable of being re- better off taking it, since one dollar is more cruited as inauthentic social pretences or, al- than zero dollars, which is what #2 had at the ternatively, as the authentic basis of commit- start. However, that is not what happens in the ments including commitments to others. In real world. Such “low ball” offers by player parallel with and contrast to social pretences, #1 are overwhelmingly refused by player #2. there are certain pathe\ that are possible only in The second player forfeits his own narrow self- authentic interrelation with another individ- interest. Of course, the questions are: Why? ual, which loom large in Heidegger’s analysis What does it mean? of the Rhetoric. Arguably, Heidegger might The standard interpretation is that the offer have usefully brought forward one or more ex- indicated above is grossly unfair. The individ- amples of pathe\ that disclose an other Dasein ual is dishonored by the offer, even insulted by instead of putting all his analytic eggs in the the lack of respect displayed in such a pre- single basket of anticipatory resolutions to- sumptuous proposal. This leads to righteous wards death as disclosed in anxiety, resulting indignation (a particularly nuanced form of in a Dasein that is indeed authentic but seem- anger) and the punishing (sanctioning) of oth- ingly always alone.15 ers’ unfair behavior, a sanction that also has a HEIDEGGER’S CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS © 2010 DePaul University 341 negative consequence for player #2, though deal!”—the individual also gets no money. not as great a loss for #1 (who loses $19) while And it is this latter case where the rubber of #2 only loses $1. righteous indignation meets the road of mutual The less standard interpretation, though respect. consistent with the above-cited intuition on ba- One thing is clearly demonstrated, based on sic fairness, is that this conclusion is the result experience. Players in the underdog position of a process of reasoning that is akin to Aris- overwhelming refuse such low offers. When totle’s phrone\sis, deliberation about what is asked why, they say the offers are “unfair,” good for the human being in context, rather “disrespectful,” even “dishonoring.” In a than a rationally mathematical optimization. broader sense, of course, we start to get the To deploy the distinctions of the Rhetoric, the idea that a broad sense of rational self-interest logos is the mathematical calculation that ar- does extend to being treated fairly, not just in ticulates the explicit judgment that one dollar the long run, but in individual instances. is more than nineteen. Duly noted. The pathos What is clear is that when an individual ex- is the disclosure of righteous indignation periences (whether expressed or not) righteous based on the possibility—conspicuous by its indignation at a dishonored agreement, broken absence—of a division of the assets that treats promise, or unfair proposal, the affects are be- each participant with respect and gives each a ing recruited to sustain the social reference and mutually satisfying share of the proceeds. The relatedness of an authentic commitment to e\thos is the intelligibility of the situation—in- treat other individuals or groups with honor tegrity in a broad sense of workability (not and respect. The eruptive affect of righteous necessarily one that blames or praises) that as- indignation supports the commitment of a fair signs one individual the function of division distribution, and, in other scenarios, this af- and the other that of approval of the division. fects supports people keeping their agree- The proposed division of one part of twenty ments—at the cost and impact of everyone get- does show a certain character—or more pre- ting less. An entire class of affects requiring cisely lack thereof—and one that, in most social referencing to others, such as shame and cases, arouses the response of righteous indig- guilt and including moral sentiments, contrib- nation. utes to solving the problem of how creatures of If one would like to discover a paradigm limited generosity and strong self-interest can context disclosive of righteous indignation, reasonably adhere to commitments. In this this is what it looks like—being asked to agree case, the holder of the dollars does not want to to get one dollar while the other gets nineteen. be the target of righteous indignation and is Both parties have some power—the one to pro- incented to make a division with reard to the pose a distribution, the other to veto it. Now $20 that captures at least a semblance of bargain! equity, enabling both parties to feel they are Keeping in mind our earlier discussion of better off. the proposition approach to affects (pathe\), the Thus, pathe\ such as righteous indignation, situation is rich in propositional content. Yet guilt, shame, or jealousy do not seem like the message is delivered as a decision, “Deal!” transformations of simple anger or fear, on the or “No deal!” based on the pathe\ that emerges one hand, or love, on the other. That is because from social reference to the other in interrela- they are not. The last two groupings—social tion. Yes, the pathe\ gets translated into some pretenses and irruptive reactions—include propositional content, but the latter does not pathe\ that we cannot experience alone. We can exhaust the nuances of the interrelational con- only experience them with the participation text and why it matters. The latter also moti- and involvement of other individuals. They are vates the decision, the commitment, and it is interrelational as such. Other than that, there is the mattering that discloses how the situation nothing—no feature or function—that these engages the participants, not cognitively but divergent pathe\ have in common—not the af- affectively as beings-in-the-world to whom fective content (feeling), not the behavior, or if things matter. The individual who proposes a one looks “under the hood”, not the neurology losing division of one dollar to nineteen not or endocrinology; not the source or target; nor only gets the propositional content “No the object or cause. Note that these are real PHILOSOPHY TODAY 342 © 2010 DePaul University pathe\. It is just that the category of pathe\ en- relatively deep and rich. How this maps to compasses complex and diverging phenom- Heidegger’s distinction of Befindlichkeit is in- ena. dicated at the level of the text above (§30 of If one begins to suspect that Aristotle’s Being and Time, “Fear as a Mode of pathe\ are an ad hoc grouping, albeit based on Affectivity” [H 140–42]) as the way the world Aristotle’s customary comprehension and is disclosed to Dasein. rigor, and assembled together for the benefit of There is a final pathe\ in which the other training the speaker in rhetoric, one should be Dasein is disclosed that also goes beyond that also able to find examples of all of the distinc- articulated in Heidegger’s work on Aristotle. tions that fall into each of the diverging catego- For this, of course, Heidegger eventually ries—hard-coded response, social pretense, turned to Kant. It proposes a paradigm of irruptive reaction, and mood. That is indeed affectivity toward the other which Heidegger the case. Completely varying examples of an- explicitly refers to as “respect” [Achtung]in ger will display distinct aspects corresponding his Kant book with regard to authentic being- to each of the four distinct groups. For exam- as-self (1929: 165; also coincidently in §30).18 ple, anger is a response to automobile driver A For Heidegger, human interrelations have an cutting off driver B in heavy rush hour traffic irreducible dimension of integrity as whole- on the commute home. Anger is a social pre- ness, not in the narrow sense of judging and tence as in the suburban person angered at the evaluating the other’s behavior in its minute rising crime rate in inner city neighborhoods moral idiosyncrasies and ethical peculiarities, where he does not live. Anger is righteous in- but in the sense of a practice that determines dignation as one reads that human rights activ- the experience of respect towards others that ist Aung San Suu Kyi is still under house arrest leaves the other whole and in integrity, ab- in Myanmar. Finally, anger shows up as a sim- stracting from all the contingent circum- mering and slow burn of a pervasive mood that stances, the conflicts of interest and self-inter- results in a calculated payback, as a person is ests that shape and bias a person’s perceptions, passed over for a promotion that she feels she deserves, secretly applies for and accepts a job inclinations, and judgments. elsewhere, quitting her current position on The idea that every experience of the other short notice. Sadness is a basic response to a has at its kernel a nucleus of respect for the lost puppy. Sadness is a social pretense as in other leads to a (dis)interested openness to mourning for a significant other in one’s life what is occurring, leaving the other complete with whom one has had little contact and a dif- and whole in the other’s own experience of ficult relationship. Sadness is an irruptive re- possibilities. The other is left with the aware- action as when a father is disappointed—and ness that he or she is not alone but free to create saddened by—the behavior of his teenage son, and express possibilities and make commit- who, for example, was caught drinking irre- ments no matter how limiting one’s facticity sponsibly, watering down the vodka to replace (thrownness) may seem to be in the moment. that which he had consumed. Sadness will be a The mood of respect is a paradigm here, which pervasive mood, as when contemplating the does not necessarily mean an awareness of the autumn of life and how short it is. In every morallaw(asitwouldinKantoreven case, each of the pathe\ is valid in itself, but Scheler); rather it means a clearing for the does not necessarily have a common feeling other to create possibilities. (Of course, an eth- that extends across the instances, nor a specific ics of Mitdasein has subsequently been de- set of behaviors that are required. The hard- rived.19) It means a clearing for care, in the coded response and irruptive reaction are hard strict Heideggerian sense, in which care in- to fake, especially if one looks at micro expres- cludes the other in a being-with that is recep- sions of facial muscles and considers the costs tive to the other as whole and existing in what’s to both parties. Social pretence often lacks possible for Dasein in the full sense of an au- feeling or constant feeling. The mood lacks thentic interrelation of committed speakers corresponding behavior, though the feeling is and listeners in community.20

HEIDEGGER’S CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS © 2010 DePaul University 343 ENDNOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max credited with coining the term, its application ex- Niemeyer, 1927); Being and Time,trans.Joan tends beyond visual systems and the concept can be Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996); Being and found in both Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson Emotions in Man and Animals (Chicago: University (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). ‘H’ cited inline of Chicago Press, 1965), and Sigmund Freud, “The refers to the Niemeyer edition pagination as usual. Unconscious,” in General Psychological Theory, ed. 2. Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian P. Rieff (New York: Collier, 1963); Standard Edition Philosophy, trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. (S.E.) 14:166–215. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 10. “Hard-coded” or “hard-wired” are relative terms, 2009). The translation of Aristotle’s pathe\ as “af- and the biological plasticity and ability of the ner- fects” is a compromise but is guided by the examples vous system to recover, even from severe failures including the full range of emotions, feelings, and such as cerebral stroke, is significant. However, this moods engaged by Heidegger such as fear, anger, plasticity occurs over weeks and months, not min- joy, hatred, and so on. Even in Being and Time, utes or hours. Heidegger considers a full range of human emotions: 11. This useful expression, “colonization,” is borrowed “And how about the temporality of such moods and from John Riker of Colorado College. affects as hope, joy, enthusiasm, gaiety? Not only 12. See also “wild pig” behavior and ghost possession as fear and anxiety, but other moods, are founded exi- examples of social pretences in certain Polynesian stentially upon one’s having been; this becomes cultures discussed by Ian Hacking in his The Social plain if we merely mention such phenomena as sati- Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard ety, sadness, melancholy, and desperation” (H345). University Press, 1999). 3. Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion, and Will (London: 13. The functional magnetic resonance imaging appara- Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); Martha C. tus is abbreviated “fMRI.” See J. Decety and T. Nussbaum, Eruptions of Thought: The Intelligence Chaminade, “When the Self represents the Other: A of Emotions (New York: Cambridge University New Cognitive Neuroscience View on Psychologi- cal identification,” Consciousness and Cognition Press, 2001). To the best of my knowledge, 12 (2003). J. Decety and P. L. Jackson, “The func- Heidegger is not referenced by either of these au- tional Architecture of Human Empathy,” Behavioral thors. and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews 3 (June 2004): 4. All of these terms—polis, horizon, acoustics—take 71–100; J. Decety and C. Lamm, “Human Empathy on new resonances in Heidegger’s reading. through the Lens of Social Neuroscience,” The Sci- 5. “In der Befindlichkeit liegt existenzial eine entific World Journal 6 (2006): 1146–63. In all fair- erschliessende angewiesenheit auf Welt, aus der her ness, it should be noted that some such fMRI studies Angehendes begegnen kann” (H137–38). “Matters” are being challenged, but not those by Decety et al. is the Angehendes—that which “goes towards” the cited here. See Edward Vul, Christine Harris, Piotr individual from out of the disclosed world and mat- Winkielman, and Harold Pashler, “Puzzlingly High ters to the individual because it is coming at him. Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personal- 6. “Das Wovor der Furcht, das Furchtbare . . .” (H 140). ity, and Social Cognition,” Perspectives On Psycho- 7. See especially the classic essay by P. Greenspan, “A logical Science 4, no. 3 (2009): 274–90. But see also Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic the reply by Mbwmba Jabbi, Christian Keysers, of Emotion,” in Explaining Emotions, ed., A. O. Tania Singer, Klaas Enno Stephan, “Response to Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience by 1980), 223–51. The modification of rationality is en- Vul,” pending publication: http://www.bcn- gaged by R. H. Frank, Passions within Reason: The nic.nl/replyVul.pdf. Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: W. W. 14. The example of mood (Stimme) is discussed Norton, 1988), a text that will be engaged shortly. exhaustively in Being and Time, and will not be en- 8. Pat Greenspan, “Practical Reasoning and Emotion,” gaged here as a stand-alone paradigm, except where in A. Mele and P. Rawlings, eds., Rationality (New necessary for the reading of the text. York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 206–21. 15. Lou Agosta, Empathy in the Context of Philosophy 9. Zenon Pylyshyn, “Is Vision Continuous with Cogni- (London: Macmillan, 2010), 28, figure 1.1. tion? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Vi- 16. As is well known, Heidegger also includes a pene- sual Perception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences trating analysis of the Kantian affect of respect as 22 (January 1999): 341–423. Though Pylyshyn is disclosive of the humanity of the other person as rep- PHILOSOPHY TODAY 344 © 2010 DePaul University resented by the moral law in Heidegger’s first Kant 19. See Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the book. Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein (New York: 17. R. H. Frank, Passions within Reason. Naturally, Cambridge University Press, 1998); Lawrence J. Frank does not deploy the distinctions logos, ethos, Hatab, Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contribu- pathe. tions to Moral Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman 18. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Meta- and Littlefield, 2000); John H. Riker, Wh It Is Good physics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: In- diana University Press, 1962); Heidegger’s to Be Good (New York:Jason Aronson, Inc., 2010). Gesamtausgabe Band 3: Kant und das Problem der 20. I acknowledge the works of Larry Hatab and John Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Riker for inspiring my engagement with these is- Klostermann, 1991). sues..

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