HEIDEGGER’S 1924 CLEARING OF THE AFFECTS USING ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC, BOOK II Lou Agosta In Being and Time, Heidegger famously that is, affects feedback into thought and en- notes that the analysis of the affects (pathe\) has able the eruptions of thought of the kind that taken barely one step forward since book II of produce paradigm shifts in science, creativity Aristotle’s Rhetoric (H139).1 in art, and personality transformation in ther- The occasion for this reengagement with apy. These eruptions are a function of the the possibility of a “step forward” is the avail- affectivity of thinking. The boundary is trans- ability of Heidegger’s lecture course at the gressed not only from affectivity to cognition, University of Marburg in 1924 on the Basic but in the reverse direction as well, yielding a Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy.This quality of thought that is densely suffused with course, which includes a detailed analysis of an emotional tonality such as that exemplified book II of the Rhetoric, has been published as in musicality. Nevertheless, I shall include volume 18 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe Nussbaum’s contribution as belonging to the (2002) and just translated (2009).2 Here cognitivist approach because, ultimately, even Heidegger’s penetrating but sparse remarks in if she is able to translate partially between the Being and Time on Befindlichkeit two, she fights continuously against the [“affectivity”] are deepened and implemented incommensurability of thoughts and affects. In in his reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. fact, Heidegger explicitly warns against the The relevance of this reengagement is di- second, top down account—any cognitive de- rect. The dominant view of the affects in con- termining of Befindlichkeit is confused with temporary philosophy is arguably the position surrendering science ontically to feeling that affects are an unclearly expressed proposi- (H138). tion, including the cognitively articulated Rhetoric is the art of doing things with propositional attitude. The position of this es- words, even in a performative sense of speak- say is that the modern propositional account of ing a world of commitments into existence in the affects is cleared away by and does not sur- the community (polis), and Heidegger gives vive a reading of Heidegger’s volume 18 on matters a strikingly innovative twist. The hori- book II of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. zon of this speaking turns out to be acoustics— Lest someone think this is a trivial matter, hearing. The work of rhetoric is speaking and the long and distinguished tradition going listening to one another about what matters: back to the Stoics, in which affects are indis- “rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in tinct cognitions that require clarification, is which the self-interpretation of being-there well articulated in modern times by Anthony [existence] is explicitly fulfilled. Rhetoric is Kenny and then in Martha Nussbaum’s monu- nothing other than the interpretation of con- mental Upheavals of Thought: The Intelli- crete being-there [existence], the hermeneutic gence of Emotions.3 of being-there itself” (1924: 76). Aristotle’s Nussbaum’s position, in particular, is Rhetoric is for those speakers and listeners— highly nuanced, and it is an oversimplification like Heidegger and his audience—whose exis- to say that she is merely a cognitivist about the tence is an issue for them. The three major dis- affects (emotions), pure and simple. One can tinctions or pisteis (views) of the Rhetoric are get to a cognitivist account in at least two engaged: character (e\thos), affect (pathos), ways: first, bottom up, by saying that affects and speech (logos). While the pathe\ in which are unclear cognitions (“thoughts”); alterna- the world is disclosed as mattering to human tively, one can redefine the boundary between being ultimately cannot be completely articu- affectivity and cognition top down such that lated and exhausted by e\thos or logos (or thinking becomes infused with affection— nous), diverse domains of relatedness are pardon the expression, more “touchy-feely”— available where our being-with-one-another PHILOSOPHY TODAY WINTER 2010 © 2010 DePaul University 333 shows up in the speaking and acting in the uation makes a difference gets disclosed to polis, where “polis” is used in the broad sense Dasein initially in affectivity. of engaging with one another as members of Befindlichkeit emerges from pathe\ in the the same human community (1924: 72) of broad sense of the way that human existence is agents and doers.4 over-taken, seized, overcome, by the world. The distinction “Befindlichkeit”—how one Heidegger makes good use of Aristotle’s lan- finds oneself situated affectively—does not guage here: occur in volume 18 as an explicit distinction, but is in the background. But reading the texts Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul from this volume as modern readers, we can- hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say not help but bring distinctions such as that the human being hopes, is brave. ...“Tosay Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Auslegung,and that the soul gets angry is the same as wanting to Rede from the existential analytic of Dasein to say that the soul builds a house. It would be our reading. It requires an effort of the imagi- better to say not that the soul has pity or learns or nation to momentarily quarantine such distinc- believes something, but that the human being tions, which would only first formally occur does te\ psyche\”[De Anima G 4, 408b11 sqq.].... explicitly in Being and Time, to appreciate the Therefore, the pathe\ are not “psychic experi- originality, power, and perhaps even shock of ences,” are not “in consciousness,” but are a be- Heidegger’s interpretation as it must have ing-taken of human beings in their full being- sounded in 1924 to those hearing his lectures in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that in the class for the first time. Consider: the whole, the full occurrence-context, which is These pathe, “affects,” are not states pertaining found in this happening, in being-taken, belong to ensouled things, but are concerned with a dis- to the pathe. The so-called “bodily state” of position of living things in their world, in the anxiety, joy, and so forth, are not symptoms, but mode of being positioned towards something, also belong to the characteristic being of beings, allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects of human beings. (Heidegger 1924: 133) play a fundamental role in the determination of being-in-the-world, of being-with-and-to- The text does at least three things. First, wards-others. (1924: 83) Heidegger’s anti-psychologism in the modern representational sense is in full evidence. Affects determine being-in-the-world and More on this shortly. Second, the text shows being-with-and-towards-others. Affects show Heidegger less neglectful of the physical (or- up as “making a difference,” as “mattering.” ganic) body than he is usually regarded. The This “making a difference” is what it means “bodily state” in which anxiety (fear) or joy is when Heidegger says the Befindlichkeit—his expressed in facial features or physical ges- terminology for the complex of moods, emo- tures are not symptoms of hidden, underlying tions, sensations, passions, and the felt aspects pathe\. They are the very being of the pathe\ of existence—is that out of which something themselves—nothing is hidden, though, of in the world (already) matters to an individ- course, not displaying an affect is always a ual’s existence (Heidegger 1927: H137–38).5 privative and derivative option. The fear is im- Individual human existence is not merely or mediately available and present in the wide purely spontaneous. Dasein is not only or al- eyes and grimace—the joy in the laughing ways the cause. Rather, Dasein is also at the ef- eyes and smile. Third, the text provides the fect of circumstances—and, thus, affected. “being taken of human beings in their full be- Dasein is at the effect of its affects, which dis- ing in the world” as a precursor to close the world, its situation and Dasein in it. thrownness—the “that it is and has to be.” “Be- Affects deliver Dasein over to such contin- ing taken” is a kind of inside out “thrownness.” gency—thrownness and the related facticity. This text yields the full sense of Befindlichkeit The situation disclosed in affectivity is the when combined with the above-cited text on source of what makes the context engage the how our affectivity determines (even subordi- individual in such a way that it matters to the nates) our beliefs and cognitions to the matter- individual. The source of how and why the sit- ing disclosed to Dasein. PHILOSOPHY TODAY 334 © 2010 DePaul University Just as a Befindlichkeit can be articulated in beyond the concrete being of human beings, a a diversity of possibilities, interpretations, and characteristic way of being that could be gath- expressions in speech, no one of which is in- ered into the logos and articulated in speech trinsically superior to the other, likewise an af- (135). This is the crucial passage (and argu- fect can be articulated—one might say “trans- ment) for the thesis of this essay that the cogni- lated”—into a variety of different apophantic tive (propositional attitude) approach to the af- propositions expressing declarative content. fects is incomplete, that something essential But the translation is incomplete and indeter- escapes. In the following passage, the nous is minate. Something escapes. That something is “more than human being can be” and escapes precisely the way in which the Befindlichkeit upward and the pathos is (so to speak) simulta- and the affect as a derivative form thereof neously pulled downward by its hyle\ (mate- make the world matter to us as individual rial).