Securing the Bomb: an Agenda for Action

Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Bunn, Matthew and Anthony Wier. 2004. Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action. Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Published Version http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/securing-bomb-agenda- action Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30310543 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Securing the Bomb An Agenda for Action MATTHEW BUNN ANTHONY WIER PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMMISSIONED BY THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE MAY 2004 www.nti.org/cnwm © 2004 President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America The co-sponsors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly state: Reproduced from Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Manag- ing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2004). Project on Managing the Atom Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Fax: (202) 495-8963 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.managingtheatom.org �� Nuclear Threat Initiative 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 Fax: (202) 296-4811 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.nti.org A companion website to this report is available at http://www.nti.org/cnwm This report is dedicated to the thousands of Americans, Russians, and others who are working to ensure that nuclear stockpiles are secure and accounted for, and cannot fall into hostile hands. May they get the support they need. TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ vii INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 UPDATING THE THREAT ......................................................................................................... 9 DEBUNKING SEVEN MYTHS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR THEFT ................................................................10 Myth 1: Terrorists Do Not Want to Carry Out a Nuclear Attack ....................................................................... 11 Myth 2: Terrorists Could Not Realistically Get a Nuclear Bomb or Nuclear Material to Make One ............... 13 DEMONSTRATED TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL THREATS ..................................................................................................... 14 Myth 3: Terrorists Could Not Make a Nuclear Bomb if They Had the Material (Or Set Off a Bomb if They Had One) ............................................................................................................ 17 COULD TERRORISTS PRODUCE THEIR OWN BOMB MATERIAL? ..........................................................................................18 Myth 4: Only State-Sponsored Terrorists Could Plausibly Carry Out a Nuclear Attack .................................25 Myth 5: Border Defenses Can Reliably Prevent Nuclear Bombs or Materials from Being Smuggled Into the United States ..............................................................................................26 NUCLEAR TERRORISM: WHY HASN’T IT HAPPENED ALREADY? ..........................................................................................27 Myth 6: Nuclear Terrorism Can Be Reliably Prevented With Offensive Military Action .................................29 Myth 7: States Will Not Seek to Obtain Stolen Nuclear Material ....................................................................29 PRIORITIZING THE MOST URGENT DANGERS .......................................................................................................30 Nuclear Security in Russia Today .....................................................................................................................31 KEEPING NORTH KOREAN BOMB MATERIAL OUT OF TERRORIST HANDS ..............................................................................32 The Threat From Research Reactor Fuel ..........................................................................................................36 Security of Pakistan’s Stockpile .......................................................................................................................38 A Global Threat .................................................................................................................................................38 KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND PROGRESS IN THE PAST YEAR ................................................ 39 CROSSCUTTING DEVELOPMENTS .......................................................................................................................40 SECURING NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS ................................................................................................43 Securing Metric 1: Security Upgrades on Former Soviet Nuclear Material .....................................................45 ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE SECURITY ...........................................................................................................................48 Securing Metric 2: Security Upgrades on Russian Sites Containing Warheads ..............................................51 WARHEAD SECURITY: THE SAGA OF THE SLOW “QUICK FIX” ...........................................................................................52 Securing Metric 3: Vulnerable Non-Russian Sites with Material Removed or Secured ..................................56 GAPS IN CURRENT PROGRAMS TO REMOVE HEU FROM VULNERABLE SITES .........................................................................58 INTERDICTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING .................................................................................................................60 Interdicting Metric 1: Key Border Posts Trained and Equipped to Detect Nuclear Smuggling ......................62 Interdicting Metric 2: Major Ports Shipping to the United States Trained and Equipped to Detect Nuclear Smuggling .......................................................................................................................63 STABILIZING EMPLOYMENT FOR NUCLEAR PERSONNEL .........................................................................................64 Stabilizing Metric 1: Key Nuclear Weapons Scientists Given Short-Term Grants ...........................................68 Stabilizing Metric 2: Excess Nuclear Weapon Scientists and Workers Provided Sustainable Civilian Work ............................................................................................................69 Stabilizing Metric 3: Russian Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure Eliminated ...................................................71 MONITORING NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND REDUCTIONS ..........................................................................................72 Monitoring Metric 1: Russian Nuclear Weapons and Materials Subject to Declarations ..............................73 Monitoring Metric 2: Nuclear Weapons and Materials Subject to U.S. or International Monitoring ............73 WHAT ARE THE MAIN IMPEDIMENTS TO ACTION? .......................................................................................................... 74 ENDING PRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................76 Ending Metric 1: Reduction in Russian Weapons-Usable Material Production ..............................................77 REDUCING NUCLEAR STOCKPILES .....................................................................................................................78 Reducing Metric 1: Reduction in Russian Warhead Stockpile ........................................................................78 Reducing Metric 2: Reduction in Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Stockpile ..............................................79 Reducing Metric 3: Reduction in Russian Plutonium Stockpile .......................................................................79 SUMMARY: HOW MUCH OF THE JOB IS DONE? ...................................................................................................81 THE BUDGET PICTURE ......................................................................................................... 83 TOTAL THREAT REDUCTION FUNDING ................................................................................................................83 PROPOSED FY 2005 FUNDING FOR CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WARHEADS, MATERIALS, AND EXPERTISE ...........................86 Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials .....................................................................................................87 Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling .......................................................................................................................89

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