North Korean–Cuban Arms Shipment Shows Need to Tighten Sanctions Bruce Klingner

ISSUE BRIEF No. 3996 | JULY 22, 2013 North Korean–Cuban Arms Shipment Shows Need to Tighten Sanctions Bruce Klingner ven by North Korean standards, the story was contraband. Several North Korean freighters made Eodd. To a world used to North Korean exports similar trips to Cuba in recent years and may have of weapons, the seizure of a North Korean ship car- been carrying weapons, though none was inspected. rying arms from Cuba was unique. Pyongyang’s The Chong Chon Gang is registered to North Korea’s attempted transshipment of antiquated weapons largest state-owned shipping company and was pre- revealed much about the North Korean regime. viously detained by Ukraine in 2010 for carrying First, Pyongyang clearly continues to violate narcotics. multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) The North Korean–Cuban military contract is resolutions. Second, the U.N. sanctions are hurt- one component of an extensive effort by Pyongyang ing North Korean finances, forcing the impover- to gain desperately needed cash and resources. ished regime to scramble for cash. Third, the U.N. Besides arms trades, the North Korean government resolutions continue to have loopholes that must be is involved in counterfeiting foreign currencies, pro- rectified. ducing and distributing illegal narcotics and coun- The Chong Chon Gang. Panamanian authorities terfeit pharmaceuticals, and even insurance scams. seized the North Korean freighter Chong Chon Gang Although the obsolete Cuban Missile Crisis–era for attempting to transport Cuban SA-2 surface- weapons pose no military threat, their transship- to-air missiles and MIG-21 fighter planes. Havana ment is a violation of UNSC resolutions. The reso- quickly admitted the arms shipment, declaring that lutions are directed primarily at impeding North the weapons were to be refurbished by North Korea Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, but and returned to Cuba. The explanation is plau- they also prohibit North Korean export or import of sible, since North Korea already has an extensive conventional arms. UNSC Resolution 1718 directs air defense network and would not need the Cuban all nations to “prevent the direct or indirect supply, weapons. sale or transfer to [North Korea of] any battle tanks, The arms shipment is consistent with previ- armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery sys- ous North Korean behavior of shipping arms and tems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems including spare parts.” The UNSC established a Panel of Experts to This paper, in its entirety, can be found at review member countries’ implementation of UNSC http://report.heritage.org/ib3996 resolutions imposed on North Korea. In June 2013, Produced by the Asian Studies Center the panel concluded that North Korea has continued The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE to defy the international community by importing Washington, DC 20002 and exporting missile- and nuclear-related items. (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org The panel also concluded that the vast majority of Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage violations are movements by sea, though it is uncer- of any bill before Congress. tain whether there are fewer movements of illicit ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3996 JULY 22, 2013 cargo by air or whether illicit air transfers are more unsophisticated and old, no nuclear technology was difficult to pinpoint. involved, and they were not destined for Iran. These Judging the Effectiveness of Sanctions. facts will elicit little action other than perhaps add- Critics of U.N. and U.S. sanctions frequently ques- ing a few new entities to the sanctions list. tion their effectiveness, since they have not yet In the past, China—consistently acting like North forced Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and mis- Korea’s defense lawyer in the UNSC—has allowed sile programs. But neither did repeated bilateral and minimalist responses to North Korean nuclear multilateral efforts at negotiation and uncondition- tests, less for ballistic missile tests, and no action at al engagement. Adopting such a narrow viewpoint all after previous North Korean conventional arms overlooks the multifaceted utility of sanctions: shipments were intercepted. Beijing even obstruct- ed any U.N. response to North Korea’s two acts of ■■ They send a strong signal that the global commu- war against South Korea in 2010. nity will uphold U.N. resolutions. If laws are not Closing the Loopholes. Although the intercept- enforced and defended, they cease to have value. ed arms shipment was a relatively minor violation, Washington should use the incident to insist that all ■■ They show that there are consequences for defy- nations fully implement U.N. sanctions. Pyongyang ing international agreements by imposing a heavy clearly continues to defy the international commu- penalty on violators. nity, and action should be taken to prevent North Korean procurement and export of missile- and ■■ They constrain North Korea’s ability to acquire nuclear-related components. the components, technology, and finances to aug- The Obama Administration should press the ment and expand its arsenal. UNSC to close the loopholes in existing resolutions, such as by adding measures to enable military ■■ They impede North Korean nuclear, missile, and means to enforce the sanctions. Current resolutions conventional arms proliferation. do not give naval and law enforcement agencies the authority to board and inspect North Korean ships ■■ In conjunction with other policy tools, they seek on the high seas, even if suspected of carrying nucle- to modify North Korean behavior. ar technology or ballistic missiles. Doing so would prevent recurrences of the Kang Nam and M/V Light The U.N. Panel of Experts concluded that “while incidents of 2009 and 2011, in which the U.S. Navy the imposition of sanctions has not halted the devel- was prevented from boarding North Korean ships opment of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it suspected of being engaged in proliferation. has in all likelihood considerably delayed the [North To this end, the U.N. should add U.N. Charter Korean] timetable…choked off significant funding Chapter 7, Clause 42 authority to the U.N. resolu- which would have been channeled into its prohibit- tions against North Korea rather than the existing ed activities [and] hampered its arms sales and illicit weaker Clause 41. weapon programs. The resolutions are also crucial An Impetus to Action. Panama should be com- in preventing the country from exporting sensitive mended for inspecting and seizing the North Korean nuclear and missile technology.” ship for violating U.N. resolutions. While shipment While the panel was “highly confident that the of obsolete weapons might be dismissed as insignifi- financial measures of the resolutions are in gen- cant, the incident underscores North Korea’s con- eral being effectively implemented by major banks,” tinued efforts to circumvent international measures implementation is less effective in countries with to constrain its nuclear and missile programs and weaker regulations, creating gaps that North Korea illicit activities. The incident should be an impetus exploits. to addressing shortcomings in existing resolutions. Little Likelihood of U.N. Action. Although —Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for the North Korean shipment is another violation Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The of U.N. resolutions, it is unlikely that there will be Heritage Foundation. any meaningful U.N. response. The weapons were 2.

Load more