Isaiah Friedman, British Miscalculations: the Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918– 1925 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2012), Pp

162 Book Reviews / Bustan: The Middle East Book Review 4 (2013) 153–207

Isaiah Friedman, British Miscalculations: The Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918– 1925 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2012), pp. 378. ISBN 978-1-4128-4749-0

In this interesting analysis of British policy toward the Middle East during the period following World War I, Isaiah Friedman demonstrates how key figures in the British government, such as Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, failed to formulate a foreign policy that could serve British interests and thereby promote stability in the region. While astute politicians such as Winston Churchill and keen observers such as Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, Colonel Frederick Kisch, and others managed to read the changing circumstances in the region more accurately, they failed to convince the government to make the necessary adjustments. Basing his claims on abundant primary source material, Friedman argues that the architects of British foreign policy failed to come to terms with the pan-Muslim and national movements that were on the rise at that time in Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan, Persia, Mesopotamia (i.e., present-day Iraq) and Palestine. With overwhelming evidence, Friedman demonstrates that the very tools which Britain used to promote its interest in the region, such as the Arab Legion, were the ones that, in the long run, undermined its hold there. Furthermore, he shows how the regimes and the personalities that Britain propped up in the hope that these would enhance its strategic position in the region actually turned against it; he argues that the policy makers in Whitehall operated under the erro- neous assumption that the Muslim world was divided, and that Arabs and Turks were not likely to unite in opposition to their rule. Friedman argues that a rare opportunity was missed when British policy makers failed to exploit the opportunity to mend fences with Kemal Atatürk’s new regime, which came to power in Turkey in the aftermath of World War I, as neither Lloyd George nor Curzon appreciated the force of Turkish nationalism. This anti-Turkish trend in British policy persisted; despite Atatürk’s efforts to reach an understanding with Britain, the policy makers in Whitehall remained reluc- tant to change the existing policy: that Turkey abide by the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, which imposed on it territorial concessions that it could not accept. He then goes on to argue that in addition to Churchill, there were savvy politicians in various government agencies, such as the India Office and the General Staff, who grasped that Turkey had emerged from World War I as a new state with indepen- dent aspirations; that it no longer posed a threat to British interests; and that it was beneficial to maintain good relations with its rising hero, Atatürk in order to prevent the danger of a Turkish-Bolshevik alliance that was likely to jeopardize Britain’s position in the region. The author demonstrates how the British failed to understand the power of

Arab nationalism and the Egyptian liberation movement through analyzing the events that led to Egypt’sindependence. He explains how the failure to work with the liberation movement had dire consequences for Britain’s strategic interests in that country; Britain lost control of the Suez Canal Zone, and its attempt to restore control eventually led to a costly and disgraceful withdrawal from Egypt. Friedman’s analysis of British policy toward Afghanistan and Persia is no less revealing. Britain’sreluctance to recognize the force of nationalism in these countries had led to dire consequences. Soviet influence increased in both countries and Britain had difficulties finding allies. Friedman demonstrates how Bolshevik propaganda spread rapidly following Britain’s refusal to accept Afghanistan as a participant in the postwar Peace Conference. Both Lloyd George and Curzon are portrayed as politicians who were trapped in the old and outmoded colonial policy of the past, oblivious to the winds of change and to the impact of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s ideas regarding self-determination. The rigid- ity of Lloyd George and Curzon was such that they failed to realize that old colonial instruments such as the Treaty of Sèvres and the Anglo-Persian Agree- ment of 1919, which did not provide Persia guarantees against Soviet penetra- tion, were not suitable to the postwar period. Moreover, the argument presented in the book is that both Lloyd George and Curzon lived with the illusion that there was a certain measure of good will toward Britain in the Muslim world, and that no drastic changes or adjustments in foreign policy were needed. The author maintains that both in Turkey and Afghanistan there was willingness to come to terms with Britain, but the policy makers in Whitehall failed to exploit the opportunity by making the necessary adjustments. Analyzing Britain’s campaigns in Mesopotamia, Friedman shows how both Lloyd George and Curzon based their policy on the false impression that the Arab population in this region was essentially antagonistic to Turkey, and that driving a wedge between Arabs and Turks would be an easy task. However, neither in this region nor in any other were the Muslims willing to cooperate with the British against Sultan Mehmet VI, whom they regarded as their legitimate military and spiritual leader guiding them against the Western infidels, despite the fact that he had already lost much of his power. Friedman’s analysis of the British campaigns in Mesopotamia is both informative and revealing. He demonstrates how ill-equipped and disorganized the British troops were, and he pro- vides evidence that the severity of the calamities experienced by the British troops was concealed from the British public. Turning to the Greco-Turkish conflict of 1918–1920, Friedman demonstrates how the policy makers in Whitehall imposed harsh terms on Turkey, siding with Greece despite the fact that Atatürk had demonstrated willingness to come to terms with Britain. Neither Lloyd George nor Curzon were willing to reassess their pro-Hellenic attitude, despite repeated warnings from officials who