CHAPTER XVIII WHEN Reviewing the 2Nd and 5Th Australian
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CHAPTER XVIII STEP BY STEP. (1) THE MENIN ROAD WHENreviewing the 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions1 before they moved to the front, Sir Douglas Haig (according to an authentic Australian record) told Brigadier-General Carruthers, D.A. & Q.M.G., I Anzac Corps, that if we (the two Anzac corps) did our job, the Germans would have to leave the coast . If we could keep up our efforts through September, we should have the Germans beaten. It was G.H.Q. and headquarters of Second Army that laid down the '' wearing clown " principles in accordance with which the Second Army on September 20th would direct its first blow in this process, against the main ridge at Ypres. The application of the principles was left to the corps commanders, and, by the normal procedure, the main work in producing the detailed tactical plan fell on Birdwood's chief-of-staff, the leading staff officer of the A.I.F., Major-General C. B. B. White. To some extent, other corps conformed to this plan; and, as the methods for this and for the ensuing operations were almost identical, it will be well to explain them in some detail. The most important new2 principle was that the infantry must not advance too far to preserve physical freshness and good organisation. It was consequently accepted by Birdwood and White as axiomatic that, on the main ridge at any rate, 1,500 yards was the limit of a prudent day's advance,a and even this must be achieved in several stages. The second new principle was that, as far as possible, all attacks must have a wide front, and that, in the interval between the main thrusts, local piecemeal operations must be a~oided.~Although the front which I Anzac took over was disadvantageous for the attack, the right and centre being thrown back instead of 'On Aug 29. 'These principles were new only in the sense that though advocated throughout in C H.Q staff memoranda, they had not before heen' adopted in th~sbattle. They had been much discussed since 1915. 'It was also assumed that it must be possible to lay the artillery barrage a.000 yards beyond the farthest objective, and to deal with German batteries far beyond that. 'This rule did not always hold, hut few such operationa succeeded. 735 736 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Aug.-Sept., 1917 forward, yet, as Birdmood laid down in his preliminary instructions, “the remedy must not be an operation on a narrow front.” General Plumer constantly set his face against proposals for small piecemeal attacks to straighten ragged edges left by the main strokes.6 General Gough, however, was ordered by Haig to continue harassing the enemy towards Poelcappelle, principally to distract attention from the Second Army’s preparations. The enemy was not harassed-three efforts made to improve the front, on September 6th, 7th, and roth, were on each occasion defeated. General Harington wrote on September 5th to White that, owing to certain difficulties as to the time for starting his main attack, Gough suggested that the Second Army also should undertake a preliminary local advance in the I Anzac sector at Nonne Bosschen. “ Sir Herbert will have none of it,” the letter says. “ Nothing previous to zero.” Other important points were laid down, mostly in tactical instructions issued by Second Army Headquarters. It was pointed out that the attacking troops must no longer expect to meet an enemy holding definite trench-lines. As the enemy’s plan now was to let the attack penetrate and then to strike it swift and hard, the Germans disposed themselves so that their forward area was held only by a front line of scattered posts, with machine-guns distributed chequer-wise over a wide area behind it. The real line of resistance lay in rear of all this, with supports, reserves, and more machine- guns distributed in great depth. The British plan must there- fore be to seize, not trench-lines, but consecutive heights or other positions favourable for defence, a separate force or “ line ” of troopss being charged with taking each position and digging in there so as to hold against any counter-stroke. The force attacking the earlier objectives might be lighter, and the advance there deeper and quicker, than in the later stages. The last stage must be the shortest and slowest, and carried out by the strongest force, which must be prepared to meet immediate counter-attack. In this warfare the bomb would obviously be less used than of late, and the rifle more.’ But the main defence would be the artillery barrage. As the barrage had to deal not ‘See f 716 8 Each line would consist of several “ waves.” 7 The 1st Aust. Division requisitioned for 3.100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 36,000 hIills grenades. and 16,000 rifle-grenades for its attack. h h*1 vi wCL e, jl i m L Aug.-Sept., 19171 THE MENIN ROAD 737 with mere trench-lines, but with enemy posts extending far back through the crater-field, it must be no longer a single line of bursting shells, but a storm of shell-fire 1,000 yards deep. This must comprise five successive lines of shells or bullets with 200 yards’ intervals-the nearest line laid down by 18-pounders, the next by 18-pounders combined with 4.5-inch howitzers, aid the other three by the machine-guns, the 6-inch howitzers, and the 8- and 9.2-inch howitzers and 60-pounders.s At the end of each stage of the attack in order to catch any counter-attack that might approach while the troops dug in, all lines of the barrage except the firste would move steadily ahead z,ooo yards into the enemy’s country. They would suddenly return, and the whole barrage would then conduct the next “line” of infantry to the next objective, until the final objective had been reached. At that objective, while the troops entrenched, both the light protective barrage and the heavy I‘ roaming ” barrage would at intervalslO cease, to descend again later in the hope of catching some counter-attack. After, say, eight hours’l the whole barrage would end, but it would come down again locally wherever called for by message or S.O.S. signal. It was also usually put down on the whole front for an hour at dawn on the day after the attack, that being a probable time for a counter-attack.l* hfost of the available machine- gun companies would be employed on the barrage, but the attacking brigades were allowed to take their own companies with them, not, as earlier in the war, for offensive purposes, but to secure immediately against counter-attack the ground 8 These five linea were known as ‘I A,” ’‘ B,” “ C,’:, “ g.” and,‘“ 9’’ In the I Anzac barrage on Sept. 20 the interval between D and E was only io0 yards. The 60-pdr. shells gave depth to the barrage, throwing their pellets far forward. The barrage of Sept. 20 differed from that of I1 Anzac at Messines (see pp. 573-4) in that all its lines crept forward at regular pace. The heavy howitzers nevertheless did not merely fire blindly. but at each lift each of them aimed at any pillbox or other special target which happened to lie in its lane at that range. @Thefirst (18-pdr.) would remain aoo yards from the troops as a protective barrage. 10These intervals were usually so arranged that the troops were never wholly uncovered. On Sept. 20 the I Anzac barrage was to last 8 hours 8 minutes. ”As the machine-guns covering the advance could not range deeply beyond the final objective, the barrage machine-guns would he massed in two equal bodiet the first, to participate in all except the farthest stage of the creeping barrage. the second, emplaced much farther forward, to lay a barrage on any counter: attack after the final objective had been gained. On Sept. zo as the final objectire was not deep, the machine-guns for the creeping barrage also aAswered S O.S. signals after the advance. In addition, by a prearranged system they concentrated their fire on any area close in front of their own or the neighbouring divisions when called upon to do 80. 31 738 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Aug.-Sept., 1917 seized at each objective. Except for these mobile guns, the machine-gun force of the corps, which at Gallipoli had been controlled by battalions, at Pozieres by brigades, and later by divisions,l5 was now operated as a single instrument under the corps machine-gun officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Hore. In these great set-piece attacks the artillery was controlled on an even larger scale, by the artillery commander of the army. The whole artillery of I Anzac operated as a unit under the corps artillery commander (Brigadier-General Napier). Divisional commanders nevertheless remained responsible for seeing that the barrage planned by the corps staff suited the needs of their infantry. The first consideration that presented itself to Generals Birdwood and White, in applying these principles in a plan for seizing the ridge, was that the advance meplanforSept. 20 along the ridge involved two separate tasks, first, that of thrusting back the enemy in front, and, second, that of holding the right flank which, unlike the left, would not be covered by a general advance of the line there. White calculated that the flank protection of the ground gained Iiy I Anzac at each blow would require the special attcntinn of one division, and in the preliminary plan drawn up on August 28th he therefore recommended that the tasks should be separated, I Anzac concentrating its strength upon the advance, and the protection of the right flank being made the special task of the next (X) corps.