DOCSLIB.ORG

How Well Do We Know Each Other?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
How Well Do We Know Each Other? How well do we know each other? An experimental study about the effect of feedback on perspective-taking Giordano Tuvo u679980 – 2021705 Master’s Thesis Communication and Information Sciences Specialisation: Business Communication & Digital Media School of Humanities and Digital Sciences Tilburg University, Tilburg Supervisor: D.J. Damen MA Second Reader: Dr. P.J. van der Wijst July 2019 THE INFLUENCE OF FEEDBACK ON PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 1 Abstract Previous research showed that individuals often fail to correctly take other people's perspective. This mistake is argued to result from a cognitive biased known as empathy gap. When individuals fall prey of the empathy gap, they find it difficult to understand what a person in a different emotional state is feeling. People encounter this difficulty because they overestimate the similarities between their own perspective and the one of the other person. In other words, they project their own perspective onto the other's perspective. Consequently, they generate inaccurate perspective-taking judgments. The focus of the present research was to investigate whether receiving information about the other's perspective could influence the correctness of perspective takers judgments. An experiment was conducted in which participants were asked to react to 30 fictitious money distributions. Participants were informed that the sums were divided between them and another person. Individuals who took part in the study were divided into three groups: one group was given explicit perspective-taking instructions, one group received feedback about the other's perspective and one group did not receive perspective-taking instructions nor feedback (control group). It was hypothesised that participants who received feedback about the other person's emotions would make more accurate perspective-taking judgments than participants in the other two conditions. Furthermore, it was expected that explicit perspective-taking instructions would lead to more instances of egocentric projection than the other two instructions types. The findings showed that the type of conditions in which participants were did not have an influence on the accuracy of their judgments about the other's emotional state. Furthermore, participants who received feedback projected their own perspective onto the other more than individuals who received perspective-taking instructions and more than participants in the control condition. We conclude by reflecting on the reasons why the experiment displayed these unexpected results and with suggestions for future research. Keywords: Perspective-taking, Perspective Getting, Egocentric Projection; Accuracy; Emotions THE INFLUENCE OF FEEDBACK ON PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 2 Table of contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 3 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................ 5 The Empathy gap.................................................................................................................... 5 The Egocentric bias ................................................................................................................ 6 Perspective-taking instructions............................................................................................... 7 Method .................................................................................................................................... 11 Design ................................................................................................................................... 11 Participants ........................................................................................................................... 11 Pretest ................................................................................................................................... 12 Procedure .............................................................................................................................. 14 Measures ............................................................................................................................... 16 Results ..................................................................................................................................... 17 Accuracy of judgments ......................................................................................................... 17 Egocentric projection ........................................................................................................... 20 Conclusion and Discussion .................................................................................................... 23 Accuracy of judgments ......................................................................................................... 24 Egocentric projection ........................................................................................................... 24 Limitations and future research ............................................................................................ 24 References ............................................................................................................................... 27 Appendix..................................................................................................................................32 THE INFLUENCE OF FEEDBACK ON PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 3 Introduction Since the beginning of human history, everyone’s life is characterised by interactions between individuals (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011). When two or more individuals engage in a communication exchange, an underlying process immediately starts taking place: understanding each other’s mind (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). As a matter of fact, for effective communication, it is deemed necessary that communicators are aware of the mental state of the other party (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). This is due to the nature of communication, which is not always explicit. In fact, people might not always explicitly state what they mean (Yus, 1999). There might be information which they may be unable or unwilling to disclose or which is not explicitly formulated (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Therefore, receivers need to decode and interpret this implicit information themselves (Yus, 1999). Hence, we can state that understanding the mind and mental state of the person to whom we are talking is a fundamental step for successful communication. Luckily, it is well-known that people have an innate ability to understand and represent others’ mental state (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Individuals can try to do so by observing their counterparts’ explicit and implicit behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). For instance, when we witness people opening their birthday present, we unconsciously evaluate whether or not they genuinely like the item they have just received by observing their words, facial expressions, body language etc. Nevertheless, reading people's minds seems far from being easy and attempts to fully understand our communication partner are, often , not successful (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). For example, we might think that people like the gift they have just received because we are focusing on the words of gratitude they pronounce, but their facial expression might disclose emotions which we are failing to interpret. The question that arises here is why do these mistakes take place? An answer to this question can be found in the concept of perspective-taking. Perspective- taking revolves around the idea of “putting yourself in other people’s shoes” and trying to perceive the situation from the other individual’s point of view (Batson & Salvarani, 1997). Although the THE INFLUENCE OF FEEDBACK ON PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 4 given definition might lead the reader to think that perspective-taking is likely to result in accurate interpersonal understanding, previous research showed that taking the other person perspective is, oftentimes, not successful (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004). One of the reasons why perspective-taking is frequently associated with scarce interpersonal understanding is the fact that people fail to understand the emotional state of someone who is experiencing feelings that differ from their own (Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning, & Nordgren, 2013). This cognitive bias is known as the “empathy gap” (Loewenstein, 1996) and is caused by people’s tendency to assume that their perspective and the one of other individuals are more similar than what they actually are (Ross & Ward, 1996). However, it may happen that these similarities are only in the mind of the perspective taker and this might result in erroneous perspective-taking judgments when the other person's state of mind actually differs from these expectations (Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning, & Nordgren, 2013). The erroneous judgments caused by the empathy gap raise the question of if perspective-taking is actually effective when it comes to attempting to understand other people's minds. Eyal et al. (2018) discussed a different way in which an accurate picture of the counterpart’s mind can be created: perspective getting. This concept can be described as the case in which people whose perspective is being taken disclose insights about their emotional states (Eyal, Steffel, & Epley, 2018). This information can be seen as a feedback, which is the information given by a person to another about his or her understanding or
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Behavioral Economics in Context Applications for Development, Inequality & Discrimination, Finance, and Environment
    Behavioral Economics In Context Applications for Development, Inequality & Discrimination, Finance, and Environment By Anastasia C. Wilson An ECI Teaching Module on Social and Environmental Issues in Economics Global Development Policy Center Boston University 53 Bay State Road Boston, MA 02155 bu.edu/gdp Economics in Context Initiative, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, 2020. Permission is hereby granted for instructors to copy this module for instructional purposes. Suggested citation: Wilson, Anastasia C. (2020) “Behavioral Economics In Context: Applications for Development, Inequality & Discrimination, Finance, and Environment.” An ECI Teaching Module on Social and Economic Issues, Economics in Context Initiative, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, 2020. Students may also download the module directly from: http://www.bu.edu/eci/education-materials/teaching-modules/ Comments and feedback from course use are welcomed: Economics in Context Initiative Global Development Policy Center Boston University 53 Bay State Road Boston, MA 02215 http://www.bu.edu/eci/ Email: [email protected] NOTE – terms denoted in bold face are defined in the KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS section at the end of the module. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IN CONTEXT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 4 1.1 The History and Development of Behavioral Economics .......................................................... 5 1.2 Behavioral Economics Toolkit:
    [Show full text]
  • Concepts and Implications of Altruism Bias and Pathological Altruism
    Concepts and implications of altruism bias and pathological altruism Barbara A. Oakley1 Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309 Edited by John C. Avise, University of California, Irvine, CA, and approved April 9, 2013 (received for review February 14, 2013) The profound benefits of altruism in modern society are self-evident. Pathological altruism can be conceived as behavior in which However, the potential hurtful aspects of altruism have gone largely attempts to promote the welfare of another, or others, results unrecognized in scientific inquiry. This is despite the fact that instead in harm that an external observer would conclude was virtually all forms of altruism are associated with tradeoffs—some reasonably foreseeable. More precisely, this paper defines path- of enormous importance and sensitivity—and notwithstanding that ological altruism as an observable behavior or personal tendency examples of pathologies of altruism abound. Presented here are the in which the explicit or implicit subjective motivation is in- mechanistic bases and potential ramifications of pathological altru- tentionally to promote the welfare of another, but instead of ism, that is, altruism in which attempts to promote the welfare of overall beneficial outcomes the altruism instead has unreasonable others instead result in unanticipated harm. A basic conceptual ap- (from the relative perspective of an outside observer) negative proach toward the quantification of altruism bias is presented. consequences to the other or even to the self. This definition does Guardian systems and their over arching importance in the evolution not suggest that there are absolutes but instead suggests that, of cooperation are also discussed.
    [Show full text]
  • Psychological Science
    Psychological Science http://pss.sagepub.com/ Symmetry in Cold-to-Hot and Hot-to-Cold Valuation Gaps Geoffrey Fisher and Antonio Rangel Psychological Science 2014 25: 120 originally published online 12 November 2013 DOI: 10.1177/0956797613502362 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pss.sagepub.com/content/25/1/120 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Association for Psychological Science Additional services and information for Psychological Science can be found at: Email Alerts: http://pss.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://pss.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav >> Version of Record - Jan 10, 2014 OnlineFirst Version of Record - Nov 12, 2013 What is This? Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cendri Hutcherson on January 10, 2014 PSSXXX10.1177/0956797613502362Fisher, RangelSymmetry in Empathy Gaps 502362research-article2013 Research Article Psychological Science 2014, Vol. 25(1) 120 –127 Symmetry in Cold-to-Hot and Hot-to-Cold © The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Valuation Gaps DOI: 10.1177/0956797613502362 pss.sagepub.com Geoffrey Fisher1 and Antonio Rangel1,2 1Division of Humanities and Social Sciences and 2Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of Technology Abstract Individuals commonly mispredict their future preferences when they make decisions in a visceral state different from their anticipated state at consumption. In the research reported here, we asked subjects to bid on different foods while exogenously varying their hunger levels at the time of decision and at the time of consumption. This procedure allowed us to test whether cold-to-hot and hot-to-cold gaps are symmetric in size and driven by similar mechanisms.
    [Show full text]
  • A User's Guide to Debiasing
    A USER’S GUIDE TO DEBIASING Jack B. Soll Fuqua School of Business Duke University Katherine L. Milkman The Wharton School The University of Pennsylvania John W. Payne Fuqua School of Business Duke University Forthcoming in Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making Gideon Keren and George Wu (Editors) Improving the human capacity to decide represents one of the great global challenges for the future, along with addressing problems such as climate change, the lack of clean water, and conflict between nations. So says the Millenium Project (Glenn, Gordon, & Florescu, 2012), a joint effort initiated by several esteemed organizations including the United Nations and the Smithsonian Institution. Of course, decision making is not a new challenge—people have been making decisions since, well, the beginning of the species. Why focus greater attention on decision making now? Among other factors such as increased interdependency, the Millenium Project emphasizes the proliferation of choices available to people. Many decisions, ranging from personal finance to health care to starting a business, are more complex than they used to be. Along with more choices comes greater uncertainty and greater demand on cognitive resources. The cost of being ill-equipped to choose, as an individual, is greater now than ever. What can be done to improve the capacity to decide? We believe that judgment and decision making researchers have produced many insights that can help answer this question. Decades of research in our field have yielded an array of debiasing strategies that can improve judgments and decisions across a wide range of settings in fields such as business, medicine, and policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Are We Fooling Ourselves? Grade 11
    english language arts Are We Fooling Ourselves? Grade 11 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 3 Unit Licensing Copyright © 2015 University of Pittsburgh All rights reserved. No part of these materials may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system. In accordance with the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, the scanning, uploading, and electronic sharing of any part of these materials without the permission of the publisher constitutes unlawful piracy and theft of the author’s intellectual property. To contact the Institute for Learning (IFL), write to: Institute for Learning, University of Pittsburgh, 3939 O’Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTY: The IFL MATERIALS are provided “as is.” The UNIVERSITY does not warrant the IFL MATERIALS will meet Your requirements, operate without interruption, or be error free. UNIVERSITY makes no representations and extends no warranties of any kind, expressed or implied, including but not limited to warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement. INDEMNIFICATION: The entire risk as to the use and performance of the IFL MATERIALS is assumed by You. You shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless UNIVERSITY, its trustees, officers, employees, and agents, for and against any and all claims, demands, damages, losses, and expenses of any kind (including but not limited to attorneys’ fees), relating to or arising from any use or disposition by LICENSEE of the IFL MATERIALS. MAINTENANCE: UNIVERSITY is not obligated to provide maintenance or updates for the IFL MATERIALS. However, any maintenance or updates provided by UNIVERSITY shall be covered by this Agreement and may, at UNIVERSITY’s discretion, require payment of an additional license fee.
    [Show full text]
  • Emotional Paternalism
    Florida State University Law Review Volume 35 Issue 1 Article 1 2007 Emotional Paternalism Jeremy A. Blumenthal [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2007) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol35/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW EMOTIONAL PATERNALISM Jeremy A. Blumenthal VOLUME 35 FALL 2007 NUMBER 1 Recommended citation: Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2007). EMOTIONAL PATERNALISM JEREMY A. BLUMENTHAL* I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 2 II. WHY PATERNALISM? .......................................................................................... 6 A. Defining Paternalism ................................................................................... 6 B. Justifying Paternalism................................................................................. 10 C. Literature on Social Science and Paternalism............................................ 14 III. IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL BIASES FOR PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION ..................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Security and Cognitive Bias: Exploring the Role of the Mind
    SECURE SYSTEMS Editors: Patrick McDaniel, [email protected]; Sean W. Smith, [email protected] to machine rules; it’s where users Security and Cognitive experience frustration and is the medium through which that frus- tration is conveyed. Bias: Exploring the Role While we practitioners have spent the last 40 years building fan- cier machines, psychologists have of the Mind spent those decades document- ing ways in which human minds systematically (and predictably) Sean W. Smith | Dartmouth College misperceive things. Minds are part of the system, and cognitive biases tell us how minds get things wrong. (For quick introductions to this field, seeRational Choice omputer security aims to to patch holes, but balancing those in an Uncertain World, an under- C ensure that only “good” updates while keeping mission- graduate-level textbook;2 Cognitive behavior happens in computer critical applications running un- Illusions, a graduate-level book;3 systems, despite potential action impaired is tricky—many users just or Stumbling on Happiness, more by malicious adversaries. Conse- give up. (Stuxnet was lauded for casual reading.4 A pioneer in this quently, practitioners have focused the number of 0-day holes it used, space, Daniel Kahneman— a Nobel primarily on the technology to pro- but five-year holes would suffice to laureate— also has a new book out, hibit “bad” things—according to penetrate much of our information Thinking, Fast and Slow, for a gen- some set of rules—and to a lesser infrastructure.) Savvy home users, eral audience.5) extent on the structure of such rules. trying to (legally) share music files Unfortunately, fieldwork and with another household computer, To What Extent Might anecdotes report how we con- will struggle over drop-down menu This Affect the Usable tinue to get the rules wrong.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward a Conceptual Model of Affective Predictions in Palliative Care Erin M
    Vol. 57 No. 6 June 2019 Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 1151 Review Article Toward a Conceptual Model of Affective Predictions in Palliative Care Erin M. Ellis, PhD, MPH, Amber E. Barnato, MD, MPH, Gretchen B. Chapman, PhD, J. Nicholas Dionne-Odom, PhD, Jennifer S. Lerner, PhD, Ellen Peters, PhD, Wendy L. Nelson, PhD, MPH, Lynne Padgett, PhD, Jerry Suls, PhD, and Rebecca A. Ferrer, PhD National Cancer Institute (E.M.E., W.L.N., J.S., R.A.F.), Bethesda, Maryland; The Dartmouth Institute (A.E.B.), Lebanon, New Hampshire; Carnegie Mellon University (G.B.C.), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; University of Alabama at Birmingham (J.N.D.-O.), Birmingham, Alabama; Harvard University (J.S.L.), Cambridge, Massachusetts; The Ohio State University (E.P.), Columbus, Ohio; and Washington D.C. Veteran’s Affairs Medical Center (L.P.), Washington, District of Columbia, USA Abstract Context. Being diagnosed with cancer often forces patients and families to make difficult medical decisions. How patients think they and others will feel in the future, termed affective predictions, may influence these decisions. These affective predictions are often biased, which may contribute to suboptimal care outcomes by influencing decisions related to palliative care and advance care planning. Objectives. This study aimed to translate perspectives from the decision sciences to inform future research about when and how affective predictions may influence decisions about palliative care and advance care planning. Methods. A systematic search of two databases to evaluate the extent to which affective predictions have been examined in the palliative care and advance care planning context yielded 35 relevant articles.
    [Show full text]
  • On Reducing an Empathy Gap: the Impact of Selfconstrual and Order Of
    553 The British Psychological British Journal of Social Psychology (2011), 50, 553–562 Society C 2011 The British Psychological Society www.wileyonlinelibrary.com Brief report On reducing an empathy gap: The impact of self-construal and order of judgment ∗ Karl-Andrew Woltin1,2 , Vincent Y. Yzerbyt1 and Olivier Corneille1 1Universite´ catholique de Louvain, Belgium 2Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, Belgium Empathy gaps, in which individuals exaggerate self–other similarities or differences, generate errors in social judgments. We investigated whether changing individuals’ self- construal may reduce one specific empathy gap: the illusion of courage. Participants primed with independent or interdependent self-construal made judgments about their own and other people’s willingness to dance in public. Participants in the interdependence condition showed a reduction of the empathy gap, but only when judging the other first. This finding highlights that simple contextual manipulations have the potential to reduce egocentric biases in social judgments. People often face the challenge of predicting and understanding the psychological states of others. When mastered, this ability brings about social and material benefits and eases interpersonal functioning (Ickes & Simpson, 1997). For example, adequately estimating to what extent a colleague will feel anxious about performing in front of others is relevant when deciding whether to sign up for a team stage performance. Just how well do people engage in this task? Overall, research suggests that they perform rather poorly due to egocentric biases. That social judgments are egocentrically biased has long been recognized in social psychology (e.g., Katz & Allport, 1931; Krueger, 1998). When inferring others’ mental states, people first recruit their own states and then adjust from there (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004).
    [Show full text]
  • Linking Design Thinking with Innovation Outcomes Through Cognitive Bias Reduction Jeanne Liedtka
    J PROD INNOV MANAG 2015;32(6):925–938 © 2014 Product Development & Management Association DOI: 10.1111/jpim.12163 Perspective: Linking Design Thinking with Innovation Outcomes through Cognitive Bias Reduction Jeanne Liedtka “Design thinking” has generated significant attention in the business press and has been heralded as a novel problem-solving methodology well suited to the often-cited challenges business organizations face in encouraging innovation and growth. Yet the specific mechanisms through which the use of design, approached as a thought process, might improve innovation outcomes have not received significant attention from business scholars. In particular, its utility has only rarely been linked to the academic literature on individual cognition and decision-making. This perspective piece advocates addressing this omission by examining “design thinking” as a practice potentially valuable for improving innovation outcomes by helping decision-makers reduce their individual level cognitive biases. In this essay, I first review the assumptions, principles, and key process tools associated with design thinking. I then establish its foundation in the decision-making literature, drawing on an extensive body of research on cognitive biases and their impact. The essay concludes by advancing a set of propositions and research implications, aiming to demonstrate one particular path that future research might take in assessing the utility of design thinking as a method for improving organizational outcomes related to innovation. In doing so, it seeks to address the challenge of conducting academic research on a practice that is obviously popular in management circles but appears resistant to rigorous empirical inquiry because of the multifaceted nature of its “basket” of tools and processes and the complexity of measuring the outcomes it produces.
    [Show full text]
  • Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 2000, Vol. 79, No. 1, 66-76 0022-3514/00/55.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3S14.79.1.66 Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect Leaf Van Boven and David Dunning George Loewenstein Cornell University Carnegie Mellon University In 5 studies, the authors examined people's perceptions of the endowment effect, or the tendency to value an object more once one owns it. In the 1st 2 studies, the authors documented egocentric empathy gaps between owners and buyers regarding the endowment effect: Both owners and buyers overestimated the similarity between their own valuation of a commodity and the valuation of people in the other role. The next 2 studies showed that these empathy gaps may lead to reduced earnings in a market setting. The final study showed that egocentric empathy gaps stem partly from people's misprediction of what their own valuation would be if they were in the other role. A formula that will work wonders for you [is to] try honestly to see Thompson & Hastie, 1990). To buy a house at the lowest possible things from the other person's point of view.—Dale Carnegie, How to cost, for example, a prospective home buyer must estimate accu- Win Friends and Influence People rately the home owner's lowest selling price; the home owner, in turn, has an equivalent interest in estimating the home buyer's Accurate perspective taking is widely recognized as an impor- tant ingredient of successful social interaction (Higgins, 1980; maximum purchase price.
    [Show full text]
  • Changing Places: a Dual Judgment Model of Empathy Gaps in Emotional Perspective Taking
    CHAPTER THREE Changing Places: A Dual Judgment Model of Empathy Gaps in Emotional Perspective Taking Leaf Van Boven*, George Loewenstein†, David Dunning‡, Loran F. Nordgren} *Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado, USA †Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA ‡Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA } Department of Organization Behavior, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA Contents 1. Introduction 118 2. Dual Judgments in Emotional Perspective Taking 121 2.1 Social projection 122 2.2 Self-judgment as social judgment 124 3. Empathy Gaps in Self-judgment 127 3.1 Varieties of empathy gaps 127 3.2 Empathy gap explanations 129 4. Empathy Gaps in Emotional Perspective Taking 131 4.1 Visceral drives 131 4.2 Social anxiety 134 4.3 Loss aversion and the endowment effect 139 4.4 Empathy gaps from desensitization 142 4.5 Summary 143 5. Implications for Social Behavior 144 5.1 Behaving badly 145 5.2 Behaving better by bridging empathy gaps 148 6. Implications for Social Judgment 149 6.1 Correspondent inferences 150 6.2 Social evaluations 151 6.3 Denigrating disabilities 152 6.4 Public policy evaluation 153 7. Empathy Gap Moderators 154 7.1 Perceived self-other differences 154 7.2 Differential weighting of self-predictions 155 7.3 Experience and expertise 157 7.4 Culture 159 # Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 48 2013 Elsevier Inc. 117 ISSN 0065-2601 All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407188-9.00003-X 118 Leaf Van Boven et al.
    [Show full text]