Educational Considerations
Volume 6 Number 1 Article 6
9-1-1978
Moral education and moral choice
George Dixon The Ohio State University
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Recommended Citation Dixon, George (1978) "Moral education and moral choice," Educational Considerations: Vol. 6: No. 1. https://doi.org/10.4148/0146-9282.1972
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Are traditional foundational Most people concerned with moral education are lamillar with the Individual/collective dilemma In rerms of disciplines adequate to the two beliefs that seem to work in opposition to one another. On the one hand, we assert that actions which educational experiences they can be judged as moral or immoral necessarily Involve in· analyze? dividual choice. As moral agents, we can be neither praised nor blamed If we have no degree of choice or con· trol over our decisions and actions; one of the defining charac teristics or ac tions that we call "moral" Is just this fact of individual responsibility. Ethical theories which focus on this factor of individual responsibility and duty share a Kantian emphasis on the formal aspects of moral decisions. Moral But there is obviously more to moral decision than in· dividual duty and private choice. We must also assert that moral decisions are Influenced by circumstances outside education the individual, circumstances that are connected with the time and place of choice, with specific rather than formal factors, with the history of the individual as it is situated between past experiences and expectations for the future. and moral Moralists of the utilitarian persuasion would, in fact, calculate just such factors to the point of explaining how an individual is most likely to decide a moral question. Their emphasis on the collective or social side of the choice relationship aligns them rather clearly with the methods and emphasis of the social sciences. It is in this apparent conflict between Kantian or formalistic ethical theories and their utilitarian or naturalistic counterparts that we find one source of difficulty for the moral educator con· cerned with the foundations of his field. For example, if the moral educator looks to philosophy to clarify this relationship between Individual choice and social Influence, he finds that the problem by George Dixon gets worse before It gets better. Philosophers In this cen· tury, with a few notable exceptions, have regarded moral The Ohio State University decisions as matters of private preference and individual feeling. They have preserved the necessarily Individual aspect or morality, but only at the cost of putting most moral questions beyond reasonable discussion and public evaluation. The result for moral educators has too often A question of continuing importance for the foun. • been one of reducing their task to helping students clarify dations of education is whether the traditional loun· their individual values, and while this Is a worthy vocation, dational disciplines are adequate to the educational ex· it just begins to scratch the surface of the process of periences they help us analyze. Of course, this is not just a moral choice and value formation. For such clarification concern ol educators; researchers in loundational areas must Ignore the social nature of morality; moral con· are also led, at least occasionally, to ask how adequate sensus becomes little more than the tabulation of private their methods are for the analysis of human experience interests. After individual value preferences have been generally. But the question seems more persistent and clarified, the teacher must indeed be ready to move on bothersome for ed ucators who use the methods of quickly to the next topic of discussion; modern sub· philosophy and the social sciences to understand jectivlst theories of morality offer little help on the tough ed ucational experiences. Somehow the greater need 10 issues that logically follow Individual clarification. connect theory with educational practice makes the The moral educator can tu rn to the social sciences for question or methodological adequacy more immediate for help in understanding how external factors condition the educational researcher. who can't as easily push this moral choice, for the social sciences seem to concentrate con.earn into the background or wait for another gen· on exactly those social or external factors that the values eratlon of research before translating theory into practice. clarification approach tends to ignore. But that strength in Certainly II is more convenient to push concern for explaining how and why people choose and act as they do method into the background and get on with the research comes to the social sciences at Its own high cost. For the at hand, for such problems are perennially troublesome conclusion that seems implicit In most social science and usually tied into classical philosophical paradoxes research is that external lactors determine Individual that defy quick resolution. One such paradox that is decisions and actions; the moral responsiblllty that especially troublesome in education generally and par educators seek to enhance turns out to be an illusion. ticularly puzzling in moral education is the In· From a social science perspective, actions can be ex dividuallcollective relationship mentioned by Professor plained and even predicted, but In the course of such Klohr in his essay " Emerging Foundations for Curriculum research we seem to remove the action ooing studied Theory.'" from the realm of morality. That Is, we can hardly praise or
20 WVC/\ TIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017 1 Educational Considerations, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 6
blame a person for " having made a choice" if that person has had a choice in the same way that Skinner's hen has had an egg.'
So far in this analysis I have stretched the opposing Ct(IMtht $:;1')1>~ M >'.(>"U !4t: of th ~ '.1 :.;;1 SM1 " I0111. l!M•Jt poles of the individual/collective paradox, si mplifying "'"'~"PP.::1.it'lll>~ ()'<~C10!J~ll<.'~S ~11:1 ~l'l:~r llfC each position and ignoring those developments in t. ;1.111l$l•>!" t.· l. IJJ~lmnt h.- 1'1;11 iSl•,,,;nt n~Nr~I ~nd Ob ~IC'.Ct ;,( j•l\'o.'li 1,1r1> }0(flll . .... philosophy and the social sciences which have worked to 1:,) i;• i ~11 ~ll"I~· :•".).111 Ctltll1 \'I(.\' Ylf'Ol'V.>t<"· t C.:" tNIP·lll': "ll• (
disciplines, so that it is usually Quite difficult for 3. 9:-od•: FALL. 19i 8 21 https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol6/iss1/6 DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1972 2 Dixon: Moral education and moral choice to make his own moral choice. Secondly, Kohlberg con· social perspectives, beyond the limited connections now tends that the greater comprehensiveness of the latter made in Chart I. stages of his hierarchy provides an objective progression So, as valuable as Kohlberg's research and inter· In the structure If not in the content of ethical judgments prntations have been, we are still left with the unre and moral explanations. Thus the value neutrality or sub solved dilemma of individual choice In a world that is un· jectivity of the values clarification approach, for example, avoidably social. We have not been able to approach the is replaced in Kohlberg's curriculum with a formal ob· strict standard that Robert Paul Wolff sets forth in his jectivity. analysis of Kantian ethics: There is much more to Kohlberg's theory of moral development, and much of it is helpful and convincing. ... an adequate foundation for moral theory requires But one quickly notices the Kantian emphasis in some coherent way of understanding men's actions Kohlberg's theory, especially as it focuses on lhe both as causally determined, predictable, natural cognitive factors Involved in moral decisions and ac tions. events and as rationally initiated, pol Icy-directed ac· Kohlberg has indeed preserved individual choice through lions. None of the familiar dodges, relaxations of the the various stages of moral development, but seems to conflict, or reinterpretations designed to dissolve Ig nore those factors that seem external and non·cognitive, the problem will do.... If any sense is to be made of factors that have been analyzed in great detail by the responsibility and acllon, then one and the same bit social sciences. of behavior which can be explained physiologically, Kohl berg's Justi fication tor proceeding in this manner predicted statistically, and brought within the scope Is that the cognitive aspects of moral development are the of a scientific theory must also be capable of being most important factor we have so far discovered. He consistently unders1ood as Issuing from the would admit that non.cognitive and utilitarian factors in· autonomous aclion of practical reason.' fluence moral decisions, but he holds little hope for con· But this is precisely the challenge that Habermas necting inlernal and external factors, or individual and takes up in his reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory. He ROLE COMPETEN C & ANO STAGES OJ= M ORAL CONS C IOUSN GSG A9• ~eqv isite Stages or lde-0 of tfle l'hi losophical Ago Leve l Levol of Cowir.unication Reciprocity irora I con- Good l i fe Range Rccon- 1.evel :-.ciousnP.r.~ SLl'uCti01) maximum pleasure/ incomp lete l min imu·u un- rec.iprocfty pleaStlntness act,Ol\S and <;1€nera l i zed throush niltur" l dnd I thelr conse desire/ Obedience soc.icJ I i ~a QUence~ aversior. cnv i ron.-nt naive co.'lplete h@'doni<.n 2 ditto through reciprocity exchange culturally Rotes interpreted 3 concrete n:>r- groups of 1>r1- 11 needs inccxnplete ali ty of pri- m11 ry refer- rec i pY"OCity o:ary groups ence 1JersOn$ Ho rm sys terns (concrete I lb dut i es} 4 C0 1)C re ~e u'X) r- 11:eu11,)ersh f ;> U'ov9ht ac- ~ I i ty o f secon in ~ol Stfcal cord ing to dary gr'OvPS commun1 ty ordered rules un i v~rs. a 1 i ze d desir•/ 5 c ivi 1 1 ibet'ties a'lers. ion al l a.; cltl~ens ra tiona l A (uses) public welfare na tu'l"'a l law 1 111 P,.inciples univet'sal i zed complete .11 11u.. ns forral istic. duties reciprocity 6 ..oral 1r-. a,s private persons ethic Ill universalized interpretation 7 roral and all as •tc"bers universal 1 in- of need polHic>.I of • f iclltlolls guistic ethic f reed01n world society From Dick iioward , "r-'.oral 3eve l oproent .:i ud tuu Jdent1ty: .~Clari f ication~" l_elos ?7: p. 180. 22 EDUCATIONAL CONSJD£RA TIONS Published by New Prairie Press, 2017 3 Educational Considerations, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 6 adds to the developmental psychology emphasis of likely to come under the scru tiny of his students. Sec· Kohlbilrg's work a sociological dimension, one that ondly, these topics are sure to provide the teacher with more relates the six stages to the process of socialization. By puzzling moments than are likely to occur within the sup thus drawing on the work of George Herbert Mead and posedly neutral values clarification curriculum. The Talcott Parsons, among others, Habermas moves teacher might even find that simple questions, like those Kohlberg's theory lrom a monologic basis to a dialogic abOut cheating, lead finally to discussions concerned with basis. Another way to describe Habermas' direction is in things like the function of testing In the schools, a topic terms of the social contract theory that underlies so much that seems complex no matter how advanced one's stage of our social and political thought. Habermas would pose of cognitive development. two questions of the fami liar social contract theory that Th is last example points, however, to an additional has its counterpart in Kohlberg's Fifth Stage: 1) How do benefit of Habermas' approach. That is, Habermas is able moral agents entering into a social contract become to posit a Seventh Stage of moral development, one that responsible agen ts in the first place? and 2) How do the In moves beyond a Kantian base in universalized duty to a terests of Individuals combine to constitute universal prln· basis in moral and political freedom. This base is dialogic ciples, thal Is, how are ethical universals formed? and social rather than monologlc and subjective. At this From a historical perspective, both questions can be stage, we have more than the formal goal of Stage Six to traced back to Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics. Both serve as an end point for our theory of moral development. point to the weakness in Kohlberg's theory, and in for· we can now consider the consequences as well as the malistic ethics generally, namely, their static and In· form of our moral deliberations, we can take into account dividualistlc foundation. But what is most important here factors like human needs and welfare, and we can finally is that Habermas calls our attention to the dynamic and add a certain degree of content and specificity to ethical social nature of moral development. He brings to theory and moral education. Kohlberg's theory much-needed sociological insights Into To sum up, we might say that Habermas wants to con· how we become aware of ourselves as agents acting In the sider social and external factors without reducing ethics world, into how we come to see the interaction of in· to a utilitarian calculation; at the same time, he wants to tent ions and consequences in our actions, and of how we preserve individual choice without adopting the ab· gradually recognize norms and the conditions for apply Ing stractness of ethical formalism. His efforts certainly need those norms to our decisions and actions. greater development and application, but they do offer us Once again we must note that Habermas' recon· a view of moral education that avoids the subjective and struction Is a detailed and complicated critique, as one inconsequential flavor of so much of what passes as can see from the various columns in Chart II. But his moral education. In contras t, Habermas' reconstruction broadening of Kohlberg's base gives moral educalors a provides a basis for taking moral education seriously. It better theoretical foundation for their work in schools, one not only offers us a compelling explanation of the in· that moves beyond a static conception of already-formed terac tive nature of ethical universals and the interplay be· individuals aligning themselves with already·es tablished tween individual autonomy and social constraints, but it moral principles or stages. As a result, a student's accounts for those conditions that surround moral question about why he can't follow his private value education and ultimately moral choice. position and cheat on the next test need not create a crisis In the moral education curriculum. In fact, from Haber. Notes mas' perspective, such a question would provide the op 1. Klohr, Paul R., " Emerging Foundations for Curriculum portunity to consider a number of important ethical Theory" (This issue) Issues. Rather than avoid the issue, a teacher could ad· 2. Skinner, B.F., "On Having a Poem," Saturday Review, vance the discussion by asking the student to consider July 15, 1972, pp. 33-35. the nature of conventional classroom rules against 3. Jurgen Habermas, " Moral Development and Ego Iden· cheating, the tension that usually exists between private tity," Telos, 24: pp. 41 ·55. See also Dick Howard, " Moral Interest and social welfare, and the role that the teacher Development and Ego Identity: A Clarification," Telos, often fulfills In the classroom as enforcer of society's 27: pp. 176·82. rules and regulations. 4. Robert Paul Wolff, The Autonomy of Reason (New York: Admitted ly, these topics may prove hazardous for the Harper and Row, 1973), p. 217. moral educator. In the first place, the teacher's own role Is f /JVCI\ 1IONAL CONSIDERATIONS, Vol. (o. No. ·1. F•ll, 1978 23 https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol6/iss1/6 DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1972 4