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The London School of Economics and Political Science Who Runs the Radio Commons? The Role of Strategic Associations in Governing Transnational Common Pool Resources Irina Iordachescu A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, January 2015 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 96,735 words. 2 Abstract This thesis investigates how collective action is achieved in the governance of transnational common pool resources, taking the example of the electromagnetic radio spectrum as a global common. The thesis asks what determines variation in operational and collective choice property arrangements in common pool resources such as the radio spectrum. The radio spectrum represents the totality of radio frequencies used for wireless communications around the world. It is a transnational resource that exhibits properties of other common pool resources: a) high rivalry in consumption and b) difficulty in excluding non-contributing beneficiaries from its use. This study demonstrates that the presence of a public actor – even one with established authority at transnational level such as the Commission of the European Union – cannot fully explain variations in the configuration of property arrangements in the radio resource. Instead, this study finds that private actors in the electronic communications industry – i.e. service operators and system developers – define rules of access and rules of use in the transnational radio resource, by means of negotiating the configuration of technology systems used to extract value from the resource. In addition, this study finds that industry actors are able to define common operational rules to access and use a transnational frequency pool even in complex situations of heterogeneous economic interests and heterogeneous technology capabilities. They reduce uncertainty in these complex situations by increasing participation in decision-making and by developing mechanisms of information exchange and mutual monitoring in industry associations. When industry actors agree these common rules of management, and reinforce them with common rules of exclusion, they are more likely to negotiate operational arrangements based on principles of common exclusive property rather than individual exclusive property in the transnational radio resource. These findings are derived from the analysis of four case studies, which trace the development of operational rules in five radio frequency bands across time. By revealing the central role of industry associations in defining property arrangements in transnational commons such as the radio spectrum, this research seeks to contribute to the debate about the nature and scope of private transnational governance of common goods. 3 Acknowledgements The idea for this research has sparked from a personal passion for interdisciplinary research. The complete work, however, wouldn't have been possible without the unwavering support of a number of indispensable individuals and organisations. I hold the greatest gratitude for Professor Martin Lodge and Professor Damian Chalmers, who supervised this thesis. Their remarkable expertise and comprehensive guidance have been a permanent source of motivation throughout the years. Their patience and rigour have steered this research through the most fascinating debates, questions and answers I had ever the opportunity to be part of. Beyond their fundamental academic role in supervising this thesis, Martin and Damian are role models of professional integrity and commitment. I also hold the highest gratitude for Professor Colin Scott and Dr Paul Copeland, who examined this doctoral research. Their clear and constructive review has been so valuable for consolidating the contribution of this research as well as for providing the encouragement to take its findings onto new and exciting directions of study. I would like to express my gratitude to the Center for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR) at the LSE, to the Department of Government at the LSE and to the Ratiu Family Foundation for their financial support in the early years of this research. Their contribution has been extremely valuable at a crucial point in the development of my work. It helped me conduct research at a number of key institutions that coordinate radio spectrum policy at transnational and international level, including the Commission of the European Union, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations and the International Telecommunication Union. I am also greatly indebted to the experts who have shaped radio spectrum policy throughout the years and who were so generous to offer their time and knowledge for discussion. In particular, I would like to extend my highest gratitude to Ruprecht Niepold, Mark Thomas, Pearse O’Donohue, Geoffrey Myers, Thomas Wehmeier, Marcel Opris, Catalin Marinescu and Oana Vladescu. While their expert advice is invaluable for this research, any errors found in this thesis are mine alone. I would also like to thank the staff at Informa for providing free access to the WCIS Database, to the staff at the ITU Library for hosting me while I explored their valuable archives and to the staff at the LSE Library for providing quick access to so many rare resources. I would also like to express my highest gratitude to three individuals who have sparked my interest in political science, regulation and economics. Professor Wolfgang Deckers holds a singular place in my academic development, having pushed me to question the political givens from the first day at university. Professor Damian Chalmers holds an equally special place in my academic life, having sparked my interest in regulation and law during the MSc, and having so skilfully sustained it to the present day. Bridget Rosewell has had a distinctive and valuable impact on my professional development, encouraging me to think boldly and critically about economics, during my time at Volterra Partners. I have immense gratitude for my father, Danut Iordachescu, who contributed with valuable support to my academic life and who encouraged me to be unafraid of crossing the divide between engineering and political science. It saddens me that he has passed on before seeing this final work. I am also very thankful to Mihaela Iordachescu for her generous support and friendship throughout the years. 4 A huge debt of gratitude goes to my partner, Roland Brass. Without his care, patience and affection, it would have been impossible to sustain this commitment. Roland has the loving nature that makes order out of chaos and smiles out of misery, such important skills when one spends long days at the desk. I am also indebted to Roland for proofreading the final version of this thesis. My greatest debt of gratitude goes to my parents, who taught me to be curious, to respect knowledge and to be persistent. I dedicate this thesis to my father, Andrei Stanciu, who will remain the powerhouse of my enthusiasm for research. It saddens me that he has passed on before he could see me hold the final draft of this thesis. Ever most importantly, I dedicate this thesis to my mother, Livia Stanciu. She is the most extraordinary example of passion, ambition and commitment to her profession. I dedicate this thesis to my parents. 5 Table of Contents List of Acronyms 11 Introduction 17 Chapter 1.Collective Action in Shared Resources: The Theoretical Framework 29 1.1 Framing the problem of collective action 29 1.1.1 The problem of collective action in shared resources 32 1.1.2 Who fixes problems of collective action in shared resources 33 1.1.3 Where to fix problems of collective action in shared resources 36 1.1.4 How to fix problems of collective action in shared resources 40 1.2 The Radio Spectrum as a Transnational Common Pool Resource 45 1.2.1 The Three I’s –interference, intellectual property and interconnection 47 1.2.2 Who fixes problems of collective action in the radio spectrum 54 1.2.3 Where to fix problems of collective action in the radio spectrum 57 1.2.4 How to fix problems of collective action in the radio spectrum 60 Chapter 2. Collective Action in Shared Resources: The Analytical Framework 65 2.1 Parameters of the Analytical Framework 67 2.1.1 The Role of Public and Private Actors 69 2.1.2 The Diversity of Private Actor Interests 71 2.1.3 The Diversity of Private Actor Capabilities 72 2.2 Case Selection 75 2.2.1 The Presence of a Public Actor 77 2.2.2 The Diversity of Interests and Capabilities of Private Actors 78 2.3 Methods 79 2.3.1 Process Tracing 80 2.3.2 Network Analysis 82 2.4 Conclusions 84 Chapter 3. Regulating the 900 MHz Band: Devising Operational Rules in Regional Pools 85 3.1 The Formation of Actor Strategies in the Wider Governance of Telecommunications 87 3.1.1 The Structure of the System of Governance in Telecommunications 88 3.1.2 The Initial Position of the Public Actor 91 3.1.3 The Initial Distribution of Private Interests and Private Capabilities 94 3.2 The Process of Private Rule-Making in the 900 MHz Band 99 3.2.1 Negotiating Rules of Access 100 3.2.2 Negotiating Rules of Use 103 3.3 The Impact of Private Association on the Choice of Property Systems 109 3.3.1 The Nature of Private Association 110 3.3.2 The Nature of Property Arrangements in the 900 MHz Frequency Pool 115 3.4 Conclusions 117 Chapter 4.