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Semantics for Opaque Contexts Author(S): Kirk Ludwig and Greg Ray Source: Noûs, Vol Semantics for Opaque Contexts Author(s): Kirk Ludwig and Greg Ray Source: Noûs, Vol. 32, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 12, Language, Mind, and Ontology (1998), pp. 141-166 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676144 . Accessed: 19/11/2014 12:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wiley is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Noûs. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 150.209.80.79 on Wed, 19 Nov 2014 12:40:42 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PhilosophicalPerspectives, 12, Language,Mind, and Ontology,1998 SEMANTICS FOR OPAQUE CONTEXTS Kirk Ludwig and Greg Ray University of Florida 1. Introduction In this paper, we outline an approachto giving extensional truth-theoretic semanticsfor what have traditionallybeen seen as opaque sententialcontexts.2 If the approachoutlined here is correct,it resolves a longstandingcomplex of prob- lems in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. We take as our startingpoint the requirementthat any semantics for a natural language be compositional, that is, that it provide an interpretationof each of the infinity of sentences in it on the basis of a finite primitive vocabularyand a finite numberof rules. At least since Frege,3it has been recognized that sentences such as (1), (1) Galileo said that the earth moves, present aprimafacie difficulty for the project of providing a compositional se- mantics for naturallanguages. A compositional semantics for a fragment of En- glish which does not include sentencesof indirectdiscourse, psychological attitude sentences (henceforth 'attitude sentences'), modal sentences, sentences about entailments,and similarconstructions can be given straightforwardlyin the form of a first-orderinterpretive truth theory for the language.4The approachbreaks down when we turnto sentences such as (1), whose truthvalue is not a function of the truth value of the embedded sentence 'the earth moves'. In general, one termcan be substitutedfor anotherin 'that-clauses'salva veritate only if they are synonymous. Perhaps the most popular solution to the problem of providing a compositional semantics for naturallanguages aims to exploit this fact by treat- ing that-clauses as referringto intensional entities-entities (at least as) as finely individuatedas the meanings of sentences. We outline an approachto providing a compositional truth-theoreticsemantics for opaque contexts which does not requirequantifying over intensional entities of any kind, and meets standardob- jections to such accounts. This content downloaded from 150.209.80.79 on Wed, 19 Nov 2014 12:40:42 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 142 / KirkLudwigandGregRay The account we present aims to meet the following desiderataon a semantic theory T for opaque contexts: (D1) T can be formulatedin a first-orderextensional language; (D2) T does not requirequantification over intensionalentities i.e., mean- ings, propositions,properties, relations, or the like in its treatmentof opaque contexts; (D3) T capturesthe entailmentrelations thathold in virtue of form between sentences in the language for which it is a theory; (D4) T has a finite numberof axioms. We will not attemptto provide a complete account of how to carry out the pro- gram we propose, but ratherillustrate the approachfirst with respect to indirect discourse,and then illustrate how it can be extendedsystematically to otheropaque contexts. The approachwe adopt is inspiredby, though also very differentfrom, Don- ald Davidson's paratactic account in "On Saying That."5A central insight of Davidson's account of indirect discourse was that the content of what is said when someone utters a sentence such as (1) can be capturedby representingthat person as representingwhat he uttersafter 'that'as standingin a semanticrelation to somethinguttered by the subjectof the sentence. It is roughly this featureof the account which we will preserve.We reject, however, Davidson's analysis of sen- tences of indirect discourse as paratactic,and their assertion as involving a de- monstrativereference to an utterance.The approachwe adopt allows us to avoid all of the major objections advanced against Davidson's proposal, and can be extended systematically to other opaque contexts. To develop the approach,we will present it as a response to a numberof difficulties which arise for the para- tactic account. In §2, we give a brief overview of the project of truth-theoreticsemantics. In §3, we review the paratacticaccount and a range of difficulties that have been raised for it. In §4, we provide an alternativeproposal that draws on a central insight of Davidson's but which rejects two central features of his account, and show how the proposal enables us to respond to the objections to the paratactic account. In §5, we sketch some proposals for extending the account to other opaque contexts, and conclude in §6. 2. Truth-theoretic semantics A truth-theoreticsemantics aims to provide a compositional meaning theory for a naturallanguage L by exploiting the recursive machineryof an interpretive truth theory for L.6 An interpretive truth theory for L employs metalanguage terms that interpretobject language terms for which satisfaction conditions are given (making explicit context sensitivity). A theoremproved solely on the basis of the content of the axioms (henceforth a ' T-sentence') will then meet an analog This content downloaded from 150.209.80.79 on Wed, 19 Nov 2014 12:40:42 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Semanticsfor OpaqueContexts / 143 for naturallanguages of Tarski's convention T. Theorems will have the form (T), where 's' is replaced by a structuraldescription of a sentence of L. (T) (S)(t)(s is true as potentially spoken by7 speakerS at time t in L iff p). Relativizationof the semanticpredicates to speakerand time accommodatescon- text sensitive features of naturallanguages. (Henceforth, this relativizationwill be indicated by subscripts on the semantic predicates, as in 'true[St]', and uni- versal quantifiersbinding these variables will be suppressed.)A theorem is in- terpretiveif 'is true[S,t]in L iff' may be replaced by 'means[St] in L that' salva veritate. For example, from ' "I am tired"is true[Sft]in English iff S is tired at t' we may infer ' "I am tired"means[S t] in English that S is tired at t'. An interpre- tive truththeory thus puts us in a position to provide an interpretationfor every sentence of the object language with no more ontological resources than are re- quired for the theory of reference. A few cautions are in order.The project of a compositional semantics is not to analyze primitive expressions, but to reveal semanticstructure (the predicate'tired' above, e.g., receives no analysis).It thereby aims to capturethe structureof a complex practical ability, the ability to speak and understanda language. It is no part of this task to represent that ability as constitutedby propositionalknowledge of the theory. 3. The paratactic account The paratacticaccount treats (1) as having the form of (2). (2) Galileo said that. The earth moves. In the first sentence of (2), 'that' is treatedas a demonstrativethat when used in an utteranceof (2) typically refers to the utteranceof ' The earthmoves' . The first sentence of (2) is represented as having the truth conditions in (3) (we ignore tense throughoutfor the sake of simplifying the presentation),8 (3) 'Galileo said that' is true[St] in English iff Galileo said ref('that',S,t), where 'ref('that', S, t)', read as 'the referenceof "that"as potentially spoken by S at t', instantiatedto speakerand time yields the object then demonstratedby the speaker.9Davidson provides a paraphraseto make clear the intended interpreta- tion of 'said', which is given in (4). (4) 'Galileo said that' is true[5t] in English iff there is an assertion u of Galileo's such that u samesays10with ref('that', S, t), where 'samesays' holds between two utterancesiff they are intertranslatable.ll On this account, the apparentintensionality of the context following 'that' in (1) This content downloaded from 150.209.80.79 on Wed, 19 Nov 2014 12:40:42 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 144 / Kirk Ludwig and Greg Ray disappears.The verb 'said' is treatedas a two-place extensional relation holding between a speaker and an utterance.The difficulty of incorporating(1) into an extensional truth-theoreticsemantics vanishes. As Davidson says (p. 106), ...sentences of indirectdiscourse...wear their logical form on their sleeves (except for one small point). They consist of an expression referringto a speaker,the two-place predicate 'said', and a demonstrativereferring to an utterance.Period. The device by which Davidson makes this advance, however, gives rise to a numberof difficulties.12 One obvious difficulty for the paratacticaccount is that it represents what intuitively is one sentence as two (that is, it's paratactic).l3 Call this 'the syntax objection'. This objection turns out to be connected with a numberof other dif- ficulties which
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