Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 1 THE & GLOBALIZATION

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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

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Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011

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Zaza D.Sc. (History), professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy ALEKSIDZE of Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa AYDIN Professor, Ankara University (Turkey) Irina BABICH D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Deputy Editor-in-Chief EYVAZOV of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of Social and Political Studies (Azerbaijan) Rauf Ph.D., Leading research associate of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the GARAGOZOV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Archil Ph.D. (Geography), Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and GEGESHIDZE International Studies (Georgia) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the GULIYEV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Shamsaddin D.Sc.(Economy), Professor, Rector of the Azerbaijan State Economic University HAJIYEV (Azerbaijan) Jamil HASANLI D.Sc. (History), Professor at (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University MCDERMOTT of Kent at Canterbury; Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.K.) Roin Doctor of History, professor, academician of the Georgian National Academy of METREVELI Sciences, President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians, member of the Presidium of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) Fuad Ph.D. (Economy), Counselor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MURSHUDLI International Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Mehdi SANAIE Professor, University, Director, Center for Russian Studies () S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla Doctor of History, professor, head of the Mediterranean- Center, Institute of YAZKOVA Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

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Editorial Office: THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION © The Caucasus & Globalization, 2011 98 Alovsat Guliyev, AZ1009 © CA&CC Press®, 2011 Baku, Azerbaijan © Institute of Strategic Studies of WEB: www.ca-c.org the Caucasus, 2011 4 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND Farhad INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION HUSEYNOV 6

TURKISH-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AND Rovshan TURKEY’S POLICY IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS IBRAHIMOV 14

GEO-ECONOMICS

ON THE FIRST-GENERATION POST-COMMUNIST REFORMS OF GEORGIA’S ECONOMY Vladimer (A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS) PAPAVA 20

FACTORS DETERMINING THE DIFFERENCES IN FDI INFLOWS INTO AZERBAIJAN’S AND Kamran RUSSIA’S OIL SECTORS AFTER INDEPENDENCE EYYUBOV 30

GEORGIA’S FRESH MINERAL Alexander WATER FOR EUROPE TVALCHRELIDZE, Avtandil SILAGADZE 43

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS AND GEORGIA Solomon PAVLIASHVILI 54

CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION IN GEORGIA: Elene CHANGES, OUTCOMES, CHIKOVANI, AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES Mariam AVALIANI 62 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE PROSPECTS FOR FORMING AND DEVELOPING AN INNOVATIVE ECONOMY Elguja IN GEORGIA MEKVABISHVILI 71

GEOCULTURE

MEMORY, EMOTIONS, Rauf AND BEHAVIOR OF THE MASSES GARAGOZOV, IN AN ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT: Rena NAGORNO-KARABAKH KADYROVA 77

THE FORMATION OF WEST SLAVIC ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN THE CAUCASUS Sudaba (19TH-BEGINNING OF 20TH CENTURIES) ZEYNALOVA 89

GEOHISTORY

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: OLD DELUSIONS AND Jamil NEW INTERPRETATIONS HASANLI 102

THE BYZANTINE COMMONWEALTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE GEORGIAN POLITICAL UNITS Zurab IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 10TH CENTURY PAPASKIRI 126

THE GEOHISTORICAL PRINCIPLES AND SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SYSTEMS Parvin IN THE MUSLIM EAST AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST DARABADI 144

WESTERN ADIGHES AND COSSACKS: TOGETHER AND SEPARATELY IN EUROPEAN EMIGRATION Irina (1919-THE 1930S) BABICH 150

JEWS IN KHAZARIA Moshe BEKKER 167

INDEX THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Vol. 5, 2011 177 6 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Farhad HUSEYNOV

Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Abstract

he author delves into the intricacies mechanisms allow states to realize their ge- T of the geopolitical interests of states opolitical interests. and the mechanisms of their cooper- Several other related issues are like- ation to find out the extent to which these wise discussed.

Introduction

The cooperation of states striving to realize their geopolitical interests is directly associated with anarchy as a political scientific concept. Indeed, many authors have pointed out that anarchy has been at the heart of theorizing about international relations since the time of Thucydides.1 This means that no matter how far contemporary civilization has advanced since the Greek historian, the world political processes remain as ungovernable as ever despite the collapse of totalitarian regimes and the consistently growing number of entities of international law that have embraced democratic and lib- eral values. One author expressed a more or less commonly shared opinion when he wrote: “For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to

1 See, for example: R. Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics, Vol. 40, Issue 3, 1988, p. 317. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION cooperate even when they share common interests.”2 Robert Jervis is of the same opinion: “The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest.”3 This means that at least part of the academic community regards the international system as a set of elements (nation-states) operating amid anarchy.4 Any unbiased student of the historical processes can see that order is relative, while chaos and anarchy are absolute. The great powers are trying to bring relative order to the world and, in this way, establish and perpetuate their control, if they succeed in establishing it in the first place. In this con- text, order is not necessarily a positive phenomenon: it means that rules are applied to a certain state order, a regime. Indeed, if you think of it, the idea of order corresponds to the idea of quality, which is opposed to the idea of quantity. As relative categories, order or the efforts to achieve order reveal man’s systematizing activities and nothing more; this is unrelated to the results—either positive or negative—of this order in any specific region. It is not surprising that the Nazis described their regime as Neuordnung (the New Order). To develop into an order, the new rules presuppose international cooperation. No matter how inhuman a new order may be, it invariably has its own supporters who did not disappear along with the fallen regime. In fact, there is any number of those who would like to see the Hitler or Stalin regimes restored. The following can be identified as the pivotal points of the geopolitical aspects of international cooperation: first, any geopolitical strategy is geared toward a certain world order (both inside and outside any given state); second, this order is found outside the realm of morals and cannot be as- sessed in ethical terms despite the ideology or the slogans behind it; third, the geopolitical strategy intended to establish certain order presupposes international cooperation.

What is Meant by “Geopolitical Interests” and “International Cooperation”

Any country active on the international scene is driven by its geopolitical interests even if it is unable to realize them. The very fact that a state has territory ties its domestic and foreign policy in the most natural and logical way to its geographic location, natural riches (or their absence), proximity to the main transportation and trade routes, its role in the relations of third countries, and the history of its relations with its closest neighbors. Cultural, civilizational, or demographic domination in the world or its part is another factor that stirs up geopolitical interests. Taken together, these factors cause “expansion” of states, cultures, civ- ilizations, or merely populations. All the interests of any countries associated with “expansion” are of a geopolitical nature. The Ancient , for example, expanded to create a Hellenic world outside Hellas proper. They built this world in the Orient. Ancient Rome translated its geopolitical domina- tion into a Mediterranean civilization; it expanded this civilization far and wide to create a world in its “image and likeness” far beyond its initial limits. This means that, driven by geopolitical interests, both and Rome created the Western culture as know it based on the civilizational values of the world of Antiquity. Current Westernization of the world means that the spiritual impulse of these ancient states has not yet been exhausted.

2 J. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 485. 3 R. Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, Issue 2, January 1978, p. 167. 4 See: S.J. Majeski, S. Fricks, “Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations,” The Journal of Conflict Reso- lution, Vol. 39, Issue 4, December 1995, p. 622. 8 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Cooperation means that the cooperating sides have identical interests; in the context of a hap- hazard and barely predictable process (which is world politics), the idea of “interests” comes to the fore as the gist of international cooperation. They change fast in a fast-changing world, which means that political alliances follow the trend. To paraphrase Lord Palmerston, there are no eternal allies in the world—only interests are eternal and perpetual. Cooperation denies violence: as a political process it presupposes that violence is excluded from the relations between sides that have common interests. It is important to note that the absence of violence between the cooperating sides should not be prompted by political or ideological con- siderations or an injunction. It should stem from the logic suggested by identical (even if tempo- rary) interests. The geopolitical nature of cooperation is explained by the fact that some states have to pool forces to stand up to the geopolitical expansion of other states. For example, in the post-socialist (post-Soviet) era, Washington’s determination to establish its hegemony worldwide and to set up a unipolar world order triggered international cooperation. From this it follows that all political allianc- es in the world were and still are guided by geopolitical logic, that is, the instinct of self-preservation and the desire to avoid possible or (frequently) real economic and political violence. Some authors have pointed out that “an adequate level of national security requires regional cooperation.”5 Interstate cooperation at its different levels, up to and including consolidation within all sorts of structures, is clearly associated with the geopolitical interests of states. Here are two examples.

Example One: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The ’s disintegration hailed across the world as a victory of liberal and democratic values bred the hope that fairness would triumph in the new world order and in relation to all nations irrespective of their development level and integration into world civilization. The naïve hopes that fair and polyphonic international relations based on international law were within reach collapsed to be replaced with a grim determination to stem America’s efforts (which it did not bother to conceal) to build a unipolar world. American supremacy, its geostrategic imperatives, and its barely camou- flaged intention to make the entire world a zone of its vital interests6 stirred up concern in the poten- tial zones of its interests. Other states formulated their own vital interests with very specific geopolit- ical implications. They formed alliances of all sorts to protect their geopolitical interests and check American expansion. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was one of them. Its members were driven by identical political and economic interests as an objective prerequisite of their cooper- ation. It is commonly believed that the five countries were driven by the threats to their border area emanating from torn apart by the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Tali- ban, which made it a hub of instability in Central Asia. In 1996, the five countries that signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Sphere in the Border Area set up the Shanghai Five, a new international structure. A year later, they signed an Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces along the Border. The SCO was set up on 15 June, 2001 when 6 heads of state (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) met in Shanghai, where they signed a Declaration that said in part that the SCO “aims at strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborly and friendly relations among member states, en-

5 J. Eyvazov, “The Caucasus: Limits and Possibilities of Regional Cooperation in the Security Sphere,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (28), 2004, p. 128. 6 See: Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, 1997. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION couraging their further effective cooperation in politics, economy, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection and other fields, jointly ensuring region- al peace, security and stability, and creating a new international political and economic order featur- ing democracy, justness and rationality.” The summit also adopted the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, Art 1 of which described terrorism, separatism, and extremism as crimes to be “criminally prosecuted in conformity with the national laws of the Parties.” In June 2002, the SCO heads of state arrived in St. Petersburg for the second summit, which adopted three documents: the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Agreement on the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, and the Declaration of the Heads of Member States of the SCO. On 15 January, 2004, the SCO Secretariat was set up in Beijing and, on 17 June, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) opened in Tashkent. An analysis of these and other documents shows that cooperation was suggested by the instabil- ity created by the region’s proximity to Afghanistan, the threat of which had to be neutralized. On the other hand, the members were inspired by possible economic gains. The documents show that the members were determined to neutralize the negative impact of the financial and economic crisis on their economies. It is more or less clearly implied that the six countries, Russia and China in particu- lar, hope to succeed in stemming America’s political and economic expansion in the world. It is equally clear that the other members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) cannot cope with such global geopolitical tasks. They must be addressed by the two giants (China and Russia), while the four other members should attend to their own geopolitical (particularly economic) tasks and ensure their security. It is not surprising that the SCO members have announced that theirs is an open structure and are doing their best to make it attractive to other regional giants, such as India, Pakistan, and Iran. The member states are trying to capitalize on the disagreements between the United States and the three regional powers, to which the U.S. responded with a statement in which it described India as its natural strategic partner in the 21st century and expressed its concern about the strategic alliance between Russia and China. In July 2005, the Astana Summit adopted a Declaration that said in part: “Considering the completion of the active military stage of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consider it necessary that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-men- tioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.”7 This seems strange: it looks much more logical to pool forces to combat terror; the Declaration, however, pushed the United States and its allies aside. The truth is that despite the ration- ale of America’s military presence in the region, it is invariably interpreted as attempts at geopolitical domination. This makes cooperation within the SCO mainly anti-American. Practically all the documents adopted at the SCO summits speak of the need to implement the earlier decisions. Indeed, it is much easier to sign a document than to fulfill it; all similar agree- ments on political, trade, and economic cooperation, as well as cooperation in the security sphere are adopted to be fulfilled (once they have been signed). This, however, is possible only if all mem- bers profit equally from them; otherwise they remain on paper while the summits continue insisting on their fulfillment. There is an obvious clash of interests—a paradox created by two parallel yet opposite trends. This organization is based on its members’ agreement that they have to oppose American hegemony. On the other hand, the SCO members (which have joined forces for the sake of cooperation) cannot cooperate for the simple reason that their interests, far from being identical, are better described as clashing.

7 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020345.htm]. 10 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

On the whole, in all organizations of the SCO type, the interests of the large nations serve as the main driving force; in the SCO, this role belongs to Russia and China. Moreover, their contradictions, their unity, and their struggle (however banal this may sound) serve to stimulate both the further de- velopment and the future disintegration of the SCO. It is next to impossible for the four countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uz- bekistan) to “fruitfully cooperate” with the two giants (China and Russia). It seems that they are seek- ing a geopolitical alliance with them in the hope of protecting their interests and their security. There is no shortage of examples. Let us take a look at what happened to the American bases in Uzbekistan. For some reason they were permitted, while later, for other equally vague reasons, the Americans were asked to pull out in the shortest time possible. This means that everything the SCO is doing, as well as its viability for that matter, depends on an ad hoc understanding between Russia and China. In some situations, they might achieve an under- standing on certain (very specific) tactical issues to move their cooperation into the practical sphere. In a different tactical context, however, their divergent interests might push them apart to make their cooperation mainly virtual. The efficiency of the SCO, therefore, can hardly be assessed outside spe- cific situations, while the mechanism of neutralization of tactical predicaments should receive full attention. For this reason, any long-term cooperation program within the SCO should take account of all the possible tactical problems that might arise in the future in order to prevent the organization from becoming merely declarative. The above suggests several alternatives for the further development of the SCO and all other similar structures. First, a strong and real external threat might consolidate the alliance to cope with the limited task of opposing the threat and coping with challenges. Second, a realistic approach to cooperation presupposes that potential partners are either aware of a possible clash of interests or are prepared to face such crises. This calls for a preliminary analysis of how they can be neutralized or ignored (not the best of options in either case). Third, the sides might remain unaware of possible conflicts until they have gone too far. It seems that the future of the SCO and other similar structures directly depends on the depth and intensity of the conflicts created by geopolitical situations. Geopolitical disagreements between Chi- na and Russia as two SCO members are unavoidable for the simple reason that Russia is a vast and sparsely populated country, while China’s smaller territory is overpopulated. It has ten times more people within its borders than Russia, with which China shares a common border. These facts account for strategic cooperation inside the SCO; the other four are balancing between the giants. On the other hand, no matter how economically attractive, the SCO’s prospects will not drive the members’ fears (the fear of China’s demographic expansion in particular) away any time soon. Despite the huge economic potential, cooperation among the SCO members is anything but ef- ficient. Certain forces repeatedly overturn energy agreements between China and Russia; this hap- pened, for example, to the contract on equipment deliveries to the Three Gorges Dam hydropower station on the Yangtze. Despite Russia’s wealth of experience, its obvious leadership in the power engineering industry, and the fact that it won the tender, the order was placed in Europe.8 Russia, in turn, upturned the preliminary agreements on China’s involvement in the develop- ment of the Kovytkinsky gas-condensate field in favor of British Petroleum. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was pushed aside when Slavneft put its shares on the market, even though it offered better conditions than British Petroleum. There was no clarity regarding the oil pipe- line from Angarsk in Russia to the Daqing refinery in China, the route of which had been agreed upon at the top level. Later it was decided to send oil from Angarsk to Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan along the route, from which China gained nothing.

8 See: L.I. Shershnev, “Shankhaiskaia organizatsiia sotrudnichestva: rasshirenie ili uglublenie?” available at [http:// www.fnimb.org/doc_shos.htm]. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The so-called Chinese threat is another stumbling block on the road toward genuine rapproche- ment: on the one hand, the SCO countries are cooperating with rapidly developing China, while on the other, they fear its mounting impact. Russia is very concerned about China’s demographic pres- sure on its sparsely populated territory. Kazakhstan does not like what is going on in its energy sector: in 2005, the Board of Directors of Petro Kazakhstan decided to sell the company to CNPC.9 Chinese investment plans in Central Asia are stirring up even more concerns: the region might share the fate of Southeast Asia to become a workshop attached to China. It is not surprising that China insists on economic cooperation within the SCO: it has already appreciated the economy as an instrument of world domination in the 21st century. After gaining a stronger position in Cen- tral Asia, China will rely on the SCO when talking to the United States and Europe. While the EU is moving to western Eurasia, China is spreading far and wide in the continent’s east. Very soon the interests of China and Russia will clash; so far the outcome is hard to predict, however China stands a good chance. It should be said that the Central Asian nations also fear China’s demographic expansion: Ka- zakhstan, the territory of which is more or less equal to that of China, has 100 times fewer people liv- ing in it.10 The above suggests that internal contradictions are much more destructive than external threats. Time will show whether the members can settle them and tame their fears and suspicions to achieve real rather than illusory cooperation. So far, the six members are kept together by the external threat presented by the United States seeking its control over the region; it remains to be seen whether the organization survives when America pulls out of the region altogether. Here is one of the options. To balance out China and Russia, the organization needs new part- ners whose interests will in some ways coincide with and in others contradict those of the giants. It seems that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan need new members more than the other two in the hope of acquiring freedom to maneuver. This is a highly intriguing situation: Russia and China need new members to acquire a firmer stand against the United States and , while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan want the same to stand opposed to China and Russia inside the SCO. Here is another important aspect: can violence be used against any of the SCO members? I have already written that cooperation is based on common interests; this obviously excludes violence. On the other hand, it seems that violence is excluded as long as the external threat remains real; as soon as it retreats, one of the two stronger partners might be tempted to put pressure on the weaker partners, who will have to seek the protection of the other strong partner. This means that Kazakhstan, Kyr- gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are not so much equal SCO members as members that have to maneuver between the other two (stronger) members.

Example Two: NATO

NATO supplies another example of contradictions among its members. Several decades ago, NATO was expected to keep the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in check; both structures insist- ed on their peaceful intentions, but neither missed an opportunity to use violence in pursuance of its geopolitical aims. Their geopolitical confrontation was obvious in all the corners of the world and on all continents.

9 See: A. Milovzorov, “Druzhba protiv Ameriki—delo tonkoe,” available at [http://www.utro.ru/articles/2005/10/ 27/489783.shtm]. 10 See: Ibidem. 12 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Persistent and latent threats to their unity existed in both, however the WTO never betrayed them, while in NATO they cropped up from time to time. Such were the practically permanent contra- dictions between Turkey and Greece, but neither these nor other disagreements were strong enough to trigger centrifugal trends. Everything changed when the Soviet Union and the socialist camp fell apart; the WTO, as the rationale which kept the NATO members together, disappeared. With no WTO in sight, NATO, as the only and therefore dominating structure of military cooperation, lured the former WTO members onto its side. In fact it looked like the answer to the dreams of those who escaped from the socialist camp. It moved close to Russia’s borders; NATO membership for and Georgia is being seriously contemplated; when seen from Russia NATO’s geopolitical strategy can be described as aggressive; every new NATO member is perceived as another threat to Russia’s safety. Today, some NATO members, Germany in particular, disagree over the strategic landmarks, which are not always absolutely clear. Berlin has its own reasons, but, what is more important, in the absence of the communist threat, there is none of former unity that kept NATO together. United Germany disagrees with the United States and tries to trim its hegemonic designs. Some think that Germany interprets NATO as “integrated security.”11 Berlin has formulated the following de- mands: (1) The Alliance should serve as a platform for a political dialog between the U.S. and EU, within which the threats to security of its individual members should be discussed. This means that NATO would split into two parts. The idea of a “dialog” presupposes that there is no agreement among the partners, who guide themselves by the formula: “trust calls for verification.” It is commonly believed that there is an organic unity among the EU members since the EU is a collective participant in the dialog with the United States. This is not true: there is no unity among the EU members. The shared geopolitical interests of the West European countries create an illusion of their unity in the face of the United States. This illusion dates from the Cold War era when the capitalist West was united against the com- munist East in the most natural way. At that time, the West closed ranks because it feared communist aggression; freed from this fear, the NATO members revived their geopolitical interests. Today, the EU members cannot abandon their geopolitical interests, even though consolidation remains high on the agenda, which neutralizes private geopolitical interests. This means that cooperation does not exclude private geopolitical interests and latently accepts violence against partners. Confronted with external threats, members increase their consolidation and neutralize private interests. Consolidation retreats together with external threats, while private interests move to the fore, which explains why any alliance of states is based on a balance of interests. (2) The European Union should play a much stronger role with respect to the United States within NATO. With this aim in view, Germany suggests that non-military (political, law enforcement, and economic) initiatives should be moved to the center. They should be used on a par with military measures to combat terrorism and WMD proliferation and prevent regional conflicts. Transportation routes should receive more attention. Germany associ- ates the civilian component of NATO’s activities with the EU. (3) Germany wants to see Russia’s greater role in the NATO-Russia Council; it is convinced that Russia should be more actively involved in the NATO and EU missions. Significantly, Germany disagrees with its NATO partners over NATO membership for Ukraine and Geor- gia. It should be said that this position creates problems for the United States and, what is

11 G. Tinskiy, “Evropeyskoe protiv atlanticheskogo. Struktury NATO razdiraiut vnutrennie protivorechiia: u SShA i Germanii raznye kontseptsii razvitiia aliansa,” available at [http://otechestvo.org.ua/main/20092/2806.htm]. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

even more important, for Europe. Strange as it may seem, a dialog between the U.S. and EU within NATO does not mean that there is unity in the EU. Europe is bothered by Germany’s activity. If the EU becomes a collective member of NATO, new members will be deprived of the right of veto. No matter what those who prefer to see Europe talking in one voice say, the right of veto is regarded as an instrument of real equality and real cooperation. If de- prived of this important right, new members will feel inadequate; what is more, they will not have the same right within the EU. This means that theoretically the issue of EU unity within NATO will invite two different assessments, even if both are “European.” The idea of a single European voice will be regarded as a step toward closer cooperation; on the other hand, this can be viewed as coercion within the EU; new members will be deprived of their sovereign rights. At first glance, it seems that the anti-Americanism of NATO’s European members deprives the Alliance of its unity and is, therefore, a negative phenomenon. Since Europe is pursuing a potentially splitting policy, it is up to the United States to be reasonable. Indeed, if some of the members of a military bloc, a security umbrella for all members, unite into a group within the bloc, they close ranks against the other members. This is illogical and hazardous; this threatens the military bloc or any other security organization. In fact, any group inside a bloc makes it wobbly, while those left outside can be regarded as victims of violence. On the other hand, the forming of groups inside NATO (this is how I tend to describe the initi- ative of setting up European armed forces and a single European voice) was prompted by geopolitical interests that must be protected. Specialist have pointed out that the idea of all-European armed forces was first voiced in France and Germany in the wake of the 1999 war against Yugoslavia. It is com- monly believed that in 1999 the Americans concentrated on gathering and analyzing intelligence, operational planning, and the handling of troops and pushed the Europeans to the margins of the op- eration. This explains the demand of the European countries at the 1999 Helsinki Summit “to estab- lish a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).”12 This was not an attempt to split NATO but a response to America’s violence. Indeed, the fact that the Americans ignored NATO’s European members during the operation in Yugoslavia can be described as discrimination and violence within a structure set up for cooperation.

Conclusion

International cooperation is a complex process with many aspects and very specific and contra- dictory dynamics related to the structure of the relations inside all sorts of cooperation organizations. This approach to the nature of cooperation suggests that contradictions stimulate the dynamics of political alliances and vice versa: any international alliance remains alive and efficient as long as it is torn apart by contradictions. This is not a-logical—this statement is strictly logical. Third countries, that is, those which cooperate with two or more members of an alliance, should take into account all the contradictions among the member states. The political maneuvering of alli- ances in their relations with third countries does not mean that their strategies change with each polit- ical move. Political maneuvering means that the geopolitical interests of an alliance as a whole do not exclude the private geopolitical interests of any of its members which contradict partners’ geopoliti- cal interests. The CIS, which is gradually losing its integration impact and which was and is brimming with geopolitical contradictions, is the best proof of the above: several of the members united into GUAM, a smaller structure. The SCO and NATO are following a similar and well-trodden path. This

12 D. Tymchuk, “Vooruzhennye sily ES: Evropa protiv NATO?” available at [http://glavred.info/archive/2008/02/ 21/120726-0.html]; [http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/dec1999/euro-d14.shtml]. 14 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION means that geopolitics not only keeps members together, it can also disunite them, the two processes taking place at one and the same time. The geopolitical challenges of our day urge countries to unite; they also urge members of alli- ances to fall apart. This means that none of the blocs now in operation can be described as totally integrated geopolitically. Geopolitical integrity inside alliances depends on the extent to which the geopolitical interests of the member countries coincide.

Rovshan IBRAHIMOV

Ph.D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Vice Principal for Foreign Affairs, Head of the International Relations Chair at Gafgaz University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

TURKISH-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AND TURKEY’S POLICY IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS

Abstract

his article evaluates the factors deter- regional states (Azerbaijan, , and T mining Turkey’s policy in the post-Soviet Georgia), especially on how the develop- Central Caucasus. It focuses particu- ment of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations is influ- lar attention on Turkey’s relations with the encing the regional policy of official Ankara.

Introduction

Turkey’s policy in the Central Caucasus in the post-Soviet period has been taking shape in the context of the practical development of its relations with the regional states. Whereas relations be- tween Turkey and Azerbaijan are strategic in nature, Turkey essentially has no official relations with Armenia, while its relations with Georgia are quite strong and developing on a mutually ben- eficial basis. We will note that Turkey’s ties with Azerbaijan have a strong influence on the development of its relations with Georgia and Armenia. For instance, the energy and transport projects initiated by Azerbaijan, and particularly its corresponding cooperation with Turkey, are boosting the develop- ment of Turkish-Georgian cooperation. At the same time, the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Kara- bakh conflict is seriously hindering the development of Turkish-Armenian relations. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the Post-Soviet Period

Immediately after the newly independent states emerged in the Central Caucasus, Turkey placed priority on its relations with Azerbaijan. This was primarily prompted by the ethnic and histor- ical communality between the peoples of the two states. And it stands to reason that Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence as early as 9 November, 1991. It is common cultural roots that have prompted all the governments in power in Azerbaijan to strive primarily for establishing and then strengthening relations with Turkey. Good relations with this neighboring country have been a priority for all the presidents of Azerbaijan. As early as the beginning of 1992 (23-24 January), President paid an official visit to Turkey, during which the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries was signed.1 Turkey also places high priority on its relations with Azerbaijan. An unspoken tradition has appeared in this country, according to which new presidents, prime ministers, and ministers of foreign affairs usually pay their first official visits to Baku. One of the first of these visits took place on 2 May, 1992, when Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel paid an official visit to the capital of Azerbai- jan. During his visit, the sides signed agreements on cooperation in the economic and transportation spheres.2 After ’s government came to power, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy turned to- ward the West, relations with which were supposed to evolve by adopting Turkey’s state develop- ment model. President Elchibey did not hide his clearly pro-Turkish foreign policy course. Turkey was granted most favored nation conditions in Azerbaijan and Turkish businessmen were offered privileges. Azerbaijan’s obvious pro-Turkish foreign policy orientation under Abulfaz Elchibey, and par- ticularly his vehement pan-Turkic statements, led to a severe deterioration in the republic’s relations with its other close neighbors, Russia and Iran. However, President Abulfaz Elchibey misjudged Turkey’s capabilities, which since the time of Atatürk had been striving to maintain the status quo and avoid any active involvement in international conflicts. Moreover, Turkey was not ready for the new geopolitical situation that formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the whole, the Abulfaz Elchibey government’s attitude toward Turkey was built more on romantic stereotypes of the idea of pan- than on a pragmatic assessment of the real situation in Turkey itself and on the international arena. The gross blunders in foreign and domestic policy, which caused a deep crisis in the country, led to a change in power in Azerbaijan. The government of the National Front was replaced by Heydar Aliev, who had immense experience in state governance, having occupied various high posts in the Soviet government and Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Some ruling circles in Turkey were skeptical and at times even apprehensive about his advent to power in Azerbaijan. These fears were also confirmed by the fact that immediately after Aliev came to power, Azerbaijan joined the CIS again. Moreover, other steps were taken to improve re- lations with Russia, which Turkey perceived as a change in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course to- ward Russia. The new Azerbaijani authorities also understood the need to alleviate the fears and maintain close relations with Turkey. During a visit by Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin to Baku on 19 September, 1993, President Heydar Aliev confirmed that Azerbaijan intended to choose Turkey as the main route for exporting the oil produced at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields. In

1 See: A. Aslanli, Ý. Hesenov, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy under Heydar Aliev, Platin, Ankara, 2005 (in Azer- baijani). 2 See: “Azerbaijan-Turkey,” available at [http://www.analitika.az/browse.php?sec_id=22], 7 November, 2011. 16 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION addition to this, military specialists were to continue training Azeri servicemen, as had been the prac- tice under President Abulfaz Elchibey.3 On 8 February, 1994, President Heydar Aliev paid an official visit to Turkey, during which sev- eral important documents were signed, one of which was the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. In addition, President Aliev spoke in favor again of supporting the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cey- han oil pipeline. The friendly relations between Heydar Aliev and Süleyman Demirel also helped to improve relations between the two countries.4 In so doing, the development of relations not only affected the political sphere, but also the eco- nomic, which in time became the main catalyst of mutually advantageous relations between the two countries. In 1996, Azerbaijan increased the share of Turkey’s TPAO Company in the consortium cre- ated to operate the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields in the Azeri sector of the from 1.75% to 6.75%.5 A strategic partnership was established between the countries in transporting ener- gy resources from the Caspian region and in developing the transport sector. For this purpose, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yýlmaz paid an official visit to Baku on 28 December, 1997. During his visit, the building of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from along the bottom of the Caspian to Azerbaijan was discussed, as well as the possibility of building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Later, on 18 October, 1999, Turkish President Süleyman Demirel also paid a working visit to Baku to discuss the deadlines for signing the documents on building the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline.6

Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations in the Energy and Transport Sphere and Regional Cooperation

On 29 October, 1999, the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakh- stan, as well as the Prime Minister of Turkey and U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, signed the Ankara Declaration expressing these countries’ support of building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipe- line, as well as regulating the transportation of Caspian energy resources to the international markets via this route.7 Less than a month later, at the OSCE summit in , an agreement was signed on the transportation of crude oil through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The agreement was signed by presidents Heydar Aliev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Süleyman Demirel. In order to support the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project and draw Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into the oil project, the U.S., Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan signed the Istanbul Declaration on Building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline.8 As economic relations (mainly in the energy sector) develop between Azerbaijan and Turkey, a certain regional alliance has appeared that also includes Georgia. All three countries are cooperating productively in building transport routes for exporting oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan to the world markets. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline projects

3 See: Sh.T. Hunter, The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of the Transcaucasian States, Crossroads and Conflict, Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ed. by Gary K. Bersch et al., Routledge, New York, 2000, p. 43. 4 See: K. Kasým, The Caucasus after the Cold War, Usak, Ankara, 2009, p. 437 (in Azerbaijani). 5 See: Ibid., pp. 438-439. 6 See: “Azerbaijan-Turkey.” 7 See: Ibidem. 8 See: “Kontrakt veka,” available at [http://www.azerbaijan.az/_Economy/_OilStrategy/oilStrategy_04_r.html], 7 No- vember, 2011. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION have been successfully implemented. Another example of cooperation among the three countries is the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad. This project is distinguished by the fact that its partic- ipants developed and financed it without the support of international financial institutions and third countries. The consortium built the 105-km railroad, 29 km of which pass through Georgia and 76 km through Turkey, using its own funds. Turkey intends to finance the section of the railroad that runs through its territory. Azerbaijan has taken on funding of the Georgian segment. The total amount of freight to be transported will reach up to 15 million tons a year. After the tunnel that is to pass under the Turkish straits to Istanbul has been finished, trains will be able to travel unimpeded from China to Europe, even all the way to London.

Turkish-Armenian Relations and Azerbaijan

Armenia is the only country in the Central Caucasus that Turkey does not have diplomatic rela- tions with. Turkey was one of the first to recognize Armenia’s independence, however, during the subsequent 20 years diplomatic relations were never established between the countries. This was mainly due to the fact that Paragraph 11 of the Declaration on Armenia’s Independence adopted by the Armenian Supreme Council on 23 August, 1990 stated that “the Republic of Armenia supports international recognition of the 1915 in Ottoman Turkey and Western Arme- nia.”9 In so doing, Armenia raised the events of 1915 in the to the international level and made territorial claims by calling part of Turkey’s territory “.” The Armenian diaspora, which was scattered throughout the world and had extensive capabilities, made such claims even before Armenia acquired its independence. Therefore, these claims became a kind of additional megaphone for voicing the interests of the diaspora. Naturally, Turkey had no intention of reconciling itself to this situation and demanded that Armenia withdraw its claims. The relations between the two countries came to a full halt after Armenian troops occupied the Kelbejar district of Azerbaijan in April 1993. This caused Turkey to close its borders with Armenia until it withdrew its troops from Azerbaijan.10 This situation continued right up until 2008, when Turkey began looking for ways to improve its relations with Armenia. Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine constituted the main change in the par- adigm of its foreign policy as a whole and toward Armenia in particular. This doctrine was based on the country’s Zero Problem policy regarding neighboring states and on establishing multilateral rela- tions with them. The change in Turkey’s foreign policy regarding the Central Caucasus and Armenia in particu- lar is related to the change in the geopolitical situation after Russia’s military interference in Georgia in August 2008 and its recognition of the independence of runaway and South . Immediately following Russia’s interference, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan visited Russia, where he first expressed the idea of a Platform of Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus. After receiving support from Russia, Turkey again voiced this idea. This event paved the way to establish- ing relations between Turkey and Armenia.11 The coincidence that the national football teams of both countries found themselves in the same qualifying group at the 2008 European Football Championship helped to mend their relations. In

9 Deklaratsiia o nezavisimosti Armenii, 6 January, 2010, available at [http://constitutions.ru/archives/2910], 8 No- vember, 2011. 10 See: K. Kasým, op. cit., pp. 101-102. 11 See: R. Ibrahimov, “Regional Evaluation of the Georgian Crisis,” in: Turkish Foreign Policy at the Current Stage, ed. by O. Dincher et al., USAK, Karadeniz University, 2010, pp. 342-343. 18 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

September 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gül attended the match of both teams in Erevan, in re- sponse to which Armenian President came to the match in Bursa.12 Following this, contacts between the two countries began to multiply, and there were plans to open the border and establish diplomatic relations. Everything might have gone as planned had it not been for Azerbai- jan’s severe reaction. The Azerbaijani side reacted negatively to the possibility of rapprochement between the sides without any progress being made in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Azerbaijani side insisted that the border be opened at the same time the occupied territories were liberated, since the border between the countries was closed precisely due to Armenian military con- tingents seizing the territory. It is interesting that this disagreement was not the only one that arose between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In addition to the political differences in opinion regarding relations with Armenia, the disagreement also affected the economic sphere, in particular the energy sector. It should be noted that, keeping in mind its geopolitical position, Turkey is trying to develop a new strategy that could turn the country into an energy hub, through which the main routes for transporting oil and gas could pass. In so doing, Turkey counted on purchasing Azeri gas at a reduced price and reselling it to West- ern countries. The price of Azeri gas for Turkey amounted to only $120 for 1,000 cu m, while the price in the West was several times higher. This development of events could in no way suit Azerbai- jan, which refused to sign a new gas delivery agreement with Turkey.13 It should be noted that Turkey characterized this refusal as a lever of pressure on it in its rapprochement with Armenia. This was the first tense situation of its kind in the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. But despite the disagreements, both sides clearly understood that a worsening of relations would not meet the interests of either side. Turkey also understood that improving relations with Armenia by falling out with Azerbaijan was not a price it was willing to pay. Turkey subsequently assured Azerbaijan that further development of relations with Armenia might be possible only if this country began set- tlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and liberation of the occupied territories. On 10 October, 2010 in Zurich, when Turkey and Armenia signed two protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening borders, Azerbaijan’s reaction was much more restrained. Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers Ahmet Davutoðlu and Edvard Nalbandyan signed the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations.14 As expected, these protocols were not subsequently ratified, failing to go through the necessary pro- cedure not only in the Turkish parliament, but also in the Armenian. As a result, after the new legis- lative body was reelected in Turkey in keeping with the parliament’s charter, the protocols were re- moved from the agenda. Draft laws that are not approved at a specific legislative stage are declared null and void.15 The disagreements between the sides led to a re-examination of the relations between the two countries. This situation forced the sides to rethink their relations and raise them to a higher level, whereby it was decided to create a new format of relations between them. This format was the Council of Strategic Cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The first sitting of the Council was held on 25 October, 2011 in the Turkish city of Izmir. During the sitting, approximately 15 documents were signed, one of which was an agreement on the sale of natural gas

12 See: Ç.C. Yýlmaz, “Turkey-Armenia ‘Football Diplomacy’ Scores One for Peace,” 15 October, 2009, available at [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-wins-the-big-game-in-bursa-2009-10-15], 11 November, 2011. 13 See: R. Ýbrahimov, “Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the Energy Sphere: Present State and Pros- pects,” Analitik baxish, No. 4, September-October 2010, Center for Strategic Research under the President of the Azerbai- jan Republic, p. 20 (in Azerbaijani). 14 See: Podmisany turetsko-armianskie protokoly, 12 November, 2009, available at [http://www.mediaforum.az/ rus/.html], 30 October, 2011. 15 See: “V obozrimoi perspektive turetsko-armianskiy protsess vpered prodvigatsia ne budet,” 28 September, 2011, available at [http://www.panarmenian.net/rus/news/79473/], 1 November, 2011. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION from the Shakh Deniz field beginning in 2017 under the development of the second phase of this field. Another important agreement concerns the transit of Azeri gas from the Shakh Deniz field between 2017 and 2042 through Turkey via the pipeline network of Turkey’s Botaº Company.16 The signing of these agreements put an end to a dispute between the sides that had been going on since 2008. This, along with other things, strengthened Turkey’s position in its strivings to turn the country into a re- gional energy hub. On the other hand, Azerbaijan guaranteed itself transit opportunities for transport- ing its natural gas both to the Turkish markets and to the markets of third countries. So it can be said that mutual economic relations are still the main factors in the development of strategic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This is confirmed by the ceremony for laying the foundation of the oil refinery in Izmir that took place during the meeting of the Council of the two countries. Let us remind you that the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic is the main inves- tor, which, along with Turkey’s Turgaz Company, privatized the Petkim petrochemical complex a few years ago. The cost of the refinery is estimated at $5 billion. The new refinery will reduce the import of raw chemicals needed for the Turkish economy by 30%. It is expected that after the produc- tion of petrochemical products increases to 6 million tons a year after 2015, the volume of the compa- ny’s sales for this period will reach $20 million.17

Conclusion

As Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s economic capabilities develop, the quality of relations between the two countries also changes. Formats are being sought for creating stronger relations between the sides. The new reality in the political and economic sphere is creating conditions for institutionalizing bilateral relations. The expansion of economic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey will also have a huge in- fluence on shaping Turkey’s geopolitical vision of the region as a whole. As a result, relations be- tween the two countries will continue to improve. At the same time, ties with Georgia, as a natural component of these relations, will also expand. This country is a geographical link between Azerbai- jan and Turkey, which will also stimulate its development as regional projects are carried out. It can be boldly ascertained that a regional economic zone is being formed among the three countries, in which major energy and transport projects being implemented at the initial stage could create a basis for developing relations in other spheres of the economy too. As for Armenia, as strategic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan expand, it is unlikely that talks will be renewed on normalizing this country’s relations with Turkey until settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict begins. Armenia is a hostage of its own policy regarding its neighbors, which is increasingly leading to its isolation in the region.

16 See: “Analiz: Osobye i strategicheskie otnosheniia—(2) Azerbaidzhan i Turtsiia: Odna natsiia, dva gosudarstva, ot- delnye chekovye knizhki,” 28 October, 2011, available at [http://commonspace.eu/rus/links/6/id1024], 11 November, 2011. 17 See: “V Izmire s uchastiem prezidenta Azerbaidzhana i premiera Turtsii sostoialas tseremonia zakladki funda- menta neftekhimicheskogo predpriiatiia,” 25 October, 2011, available at [http://ru.apa.az/news_206013.html], 11 Novem- ber, 2011. 20 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO-ECONOMICS

Vladimer PAPAVA

D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor, Senior Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies; Principal Research Fellow, Paata Gugushvili Institute of Economics, Ivane Javakhishvili (Tbilisi, Georgia).

ON THE FIRST-GENERATION POST-COMMUNIST REFORMS OF GEORGIA’S ECONOMY (A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS)

Abstract

his article reviews the first-generation ysis of the successful economic reforms T post-Communist reforms of Georgia’s carried out in Poland. economy. It points out the mistakes It focuses special attention on how the made during the reform of post-Communist mistakes were corrected, thus leading to Georgia’s economy and identifies the rea- the Minimum Shock with Maximum Thera- sons for the failure of Shock Therapy in py program that proved favorable for Geor- post-Communist Georgia based on an anal- gia’s economy.

Introduction

Twenty years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the restoration of Georgia’s inde- pendence, an analysis of the processes characteristic of the initial stage of transition to a market econ- omy warrants special attention. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The entire post-Communist space, as well as economic science, was unprepared for the fall of the command economy and the transition to a market economy. This caused the plethora of mistakes made at the beginning of the initial stage of the reforms. The countries that were successful and those that failed in carrying out their economic reforms became apparent from the very beginning. Poland led the group of successful countries. So it stands to reason that many countries began following Poland’s experience, although most of them were not as successful as Poland. This is mainly explained by the fact that neither the prerequisites required for beginning such reforms, nor the realities prevailing in these countries were taken into consideration before the reform process was launched. The reform process in post-Communist Georgia was faulty from the very beginning, although later it was possible to overcome the problems. A study of Georgia’s post-Communist economic reforms is interesting because Georgia became a country where Shock Therapy ‘stretched over time,’ which ultimately ended in a reform program known as Minimum Shock with Maximum Therapy. This article aims to analyze the first-generation post-Communist reforms of Georgia’s economy and the achievements and mistakes made at that stage. This is crucial for a better understanding of the difficulties related to the post-Communist transition economy.

How the Economic Reforms Began

The year 1989, when the idea of national independence first embraced the whole of society, should be considered the starting point of the post-Communist reforms in Georgia. It became a turn- ing point for economists, resulting in the creation of a number of interesting new concepts linked to the idea of economic independence.1 This stage of incipient reforms can provisionally be called the stage of naive comprehension. The second stage of economic reforms started after the election of the Supreme Council in the fall of 1990. At that time, several very important laws on economic reform were passed, though they were unfortunately not implemented effectively. This stage of reform can therefore be considered the stage of reform stagnation.2 After the coup d’état of December 1991-January 1992, the stage of populist economic reform began.3 At that time the government transferred land and housing to the people without compensation in order to enlist the easy support of the population. These redistributive policies caused substantial damage to the agricultural sector and housing construction. In particular, land privatization was car- ried out mechanically and it practically ruined the necessary infrastructure for agricultural production (the system responsible for supplying machinery, fertilizers, and other resources); and without a legal basis for private ownership of land, the efficiency of land tenure was very low. If housing rent had been differentiated according to location and amenities, the money thus received could have been accumulated for further housing development. This became impossible because of the overly hasty, free distribution of housing.4 During this populist stage of economic reform, the Shock Therapy method was launched in Georgia at almost the same time as it was applied in Russia and in accordance with the Russian sce- nario. Was Georgia ready to apply this well-known approach to economic reform?

1 See: V. Papava, “O kontseptsiakh ekonomicheskikh reform v SSSR,” Ekonomika i matamaticheskie metody, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1990. 2 See: V. Papava, “The Georgian Economy: Problems of Reform,” Eurasian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1995. 3 See: V. Papava, T. Beridze, “Problemy reformirovania gruzinskoi ekonomika,” Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhur- nal, No. 3, 1994. 4 See: V. Papava, “O privatizatsii osnovnykh faktorov proizvodstva,” Pravila igry, Fair Play, No. 3, 1992, pp. 97-101. 22 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In order to answer this question, an important distinction of principle should be pointed out concerning the nature of the state. Whether or not a country enjoyed its own independent statehood at the beginning of its reform proved extremely important.5 The countries of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and so on, belonged to the first category, whereas the new countries formed following the disintegration of the U.S.S.R, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, can be classified among the second. The only exceptions among the latter countries were the legal successors of the original larger states because they preserved almost all the attributes of statehood. So, after the disin- tegration of the U.S.S.R., Russia was recognized as its legal successor, retained Moscow as its capital, and preserved all the attributes of statehood, inheriting the institutions of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Hence Russia can be classified among the group of post-Communist countries already pos- sessing statehood. All the other countries had to build their own state institutions, often from almost nothing (to a certain extent, Ukraine and Belarus can be considered exceptions, since, although for- mally lacking independent statehood, they were already members of the United Nations). Georgia was one of the countries facing this situation. It therefore had to manage two major tasks simultane- ously: the need to build new state institutions and undergo the transition from central planning to a market-type economy.6 As is well known, the Shock Therapy method of economic reform was first developed and used in West Germany after World War II. New life was breathed into it in post-Communist Poland with the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan in 1990.7 Implementation of this approach with respect to macroeconomic stabilization requires the active involvement of several different governmental insti- tutions. Shock Therapy cannot be successfully applied in the absence of these crucial institutions, and any attempt to do so is doomed to failure. Georgia’s experience also supports the validity of this view. It is not difficult to demonstrate this. It is enough to elaborate what Shock Therapy means according to the so-called Balcerowicz Plan (considered today to be the modern and already classical version of Shock Therapy) and then to study the mistakes made in implementing Shock Therapy in Georgia, where it blindly imitated the reflections in the Russian mirror.8

The Polish Experience and its Georgian Modification

Shock Therapy generally assumes implementing a tight fiscal policy. It entails the simultaneous adoption of measures involving price liberalization, a considerable reduction in the national budget deficit by canceling budgetary subsidies, and stringent control over the money supply and income of the population. The plan developed by former Polish finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz is consid- ered an excellent modern example of the Shock Therapy method and is frequently referred to favora-

5 See: L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, CEU, Budapest, 1995, p. 146; B. Milanovic, In- come, Inequality and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 3; V. Papava, “O teorii postkommunisticheskoi transformatss ekonomiki,” Obschestvo i ekonomika, No. 7, 2000; V. Papava, “On the Theory of Post-Communist Economic Transition to Market,” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1/2, 2005. 6 See: V. Papava, “The Georgian Economy: From ‘Shock Therapy’ to ‘Social Promotion,’” Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, Vol. 8, No. 8, 1996, p. 252. 7 See: L. Balcerowicz, “Poland, 1989-1992,” in: Political Economy of Economic Reform, ed. by J. Williamson, In- stitute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1994; M. Schaffer, The Economy of Poland, Center for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper, No. 67, LSE, London, 1992. 8 See: V. Papava, “The Georgian Economy: From ‘Shock Therapy’ to ‘Social Promotion,’” V. Papava, “‘Social Pro- motion’ of Economic Reform in Georgia,” Economic Systems, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996; V. Papava, “The Georgian Economy: Main Directions and Initial Results of Reforms,” in: Systemic Change in Post-Communist Economies, ed. by P.G. Hare, Macmillan Press, London, 1999. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION bly by other transition economies. In accordance with this plan (which is the classical version of the modern Shock Therapy approach in post-Communist countries), the following measures were simul- taneously implemented in Poland from the very start: 1. Multiple increases in all types of prices; a deliberate, although it was hoped temporary, in- crease in inflation aimed at ensuring and maintaining market equilibrium; 2. Tight restrictions on the (real) income of the population; 3. A substantial increase in (nominal) interest rates and restrictions of the money supply; 4. Increases in the interest rates on deposits aimed at encouraging the population to save; 5. Sharp cuts in national budget expenses by reducing government investments and by refus- ing to subsidize unprofitable enterprises any longer; 6. Issuing government bonds to help cover the national budget deficit; 7. Regulating the tax system and moving toward a more uniform, Western-type tax structure; 8. Introducing a common rate of exchange of the z³oty to the dollar (involving substantial in- itial devaluation) and ensuring z³oty convertibility in the domestic market; 9. Introducing a common customs tariff in order to restrict imports and stimulate exports; 10. Providing social assistance to the population within the limits of the government’s capacity; 11. Eliminating monopoly positions and effecting a substantial withdrawal of administrative intervention in enterprise activities. The use of Shock Therapy began in Russia on 2 January, 1992. A month later, it began in Georgia. To explain how the Shock Therapy method used in Georgia deviated from the Polish ap- proach, it will be helpful to compare each step taken in Georgia with the corresponding item in the Balcerowicz Plan: 1. The reform of price formation started in Georgia as early as the spring of 1991 when free prices on some types of goods were introduced. Whereas in 1991 these changes were still of an exceptional nature, by February 1992 (that is, a month later than in Russia), radical chang- es had occurred in the price formation system in Georgia. For example, the price of one group of goods and services were liberalized, while the regulated price of another group increased considerably. All this was aimed at balancing the market. Whereas in 1991 the consumer price index stood at 1.8, in 1992 it rose to 25. At the same time, it is worth noting that regu- lated consumer prices increased 68-fold in 1992 compared to1991 (for bread, the main food product in Georgia, this hike was 100-fold). So we can say that the first item of the Balcero- wicz Plan was on the whole fulfilled in Georgia; 2. In 1992, indexation of minimum wages and social security benefits was introduced in Geor- gia. In 1991, this indexation was carried out only once, but in 1992, during price formation liberalization, income indexation was performed six times. In 1991, the minimum wage and the average wage of employees increased compared to the previous year 1.85-fold and 1.26-fold, respectively, and in 1992, compared to 1991, 13.14-fold and 17.94-fold, respec- tively. True, no strict regulatory measures were carried out in Georgia to control increases in the wage fund (as was done in Poland, when in the event of a 2 percent overdraft from the wage fund the penalty imposed on an enterprise was equal to 200 percent of this sum; and if the overdraft was more than 2 percent the penalty was 300-500 percent of the corresponding sum); however, increases in wages and social security benefits lagged behind the price in- creases. Thus it can be considered that item two of the Balcerowicz Plan was also more or less fulfilled in Georgia; 24 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

3 and 4. In 1992, compared to 1991, the interest rate on deposits increased from 2 percent to 5 percent per annum, and for ten-year deposits it increased from 9 percent to 80 percent. This increase in the interest rate still far from reflected the actual inflation rate. It should also be noted that it was generally impossible to restrict the money supply in Georgia in those days by raising the interest rate, because the country had no monetary system of its own; only the ruble of the already disintegrated U.S.S.R. and the newly issued Russian ruble were in cir- culation in Georgia. In the summer of 1992 it was decided to double cash deposits on a deferred with- drawal basis. In particular, on July 25 a decision was made to double cash deposits deval- ued by inflation on 1 August. The population immediately responded by depositing more money in cash deposits. On 1 August, a new decision was made to prolong the time for placing money in cash deposits for doubling until August 10. After doubling the addition- al money could not be withdrawn for another year, unless the money was to be used for privatization (which was, however, suspended at that time in Georgia). As it became rath- er difficult to receive the necessary quantity of bank notes from Russia in a timely manner in the second half of 1992, the money accumulated in this way was paid out as wages and pensions, which essentially prevented the government from restricting the money supply. As a result, it can be concluded that items three and four of the Balcerowicz Plan were not fulfilled in Georgia; 5. In 1992, the share of government investment in the total expenditure of the national budget was not reduced, and until that year it fluctuated within the range of 20-25 percent. The nominal amount of subsidies in 1992 compared to 1991 increased about 5.1-fold. However, in 1991 the share of subsidies in budget spending amounted to the remarkably high level of 47 percent, and in 1992 this was cut back to 30.1 percent. Even so, this does not make it possible to say that item five of the Balcerowicz Plan was realized in Georgia; 6. Government internal bonds were formally issued in 1992. But they were not offered for sale until the fall of 1993 and mainly in order to convert FSU bonds into new Georgian bonds. As for using government bonds to cover the national budget deficit, this did not prove feasible in subsequent years in Georgia.So it is clear that item six of the Balcerowicz Plan was not implemented either; 7. Comprehensive reform of the tax system in accordance with the requirements of the market economy started as early as the spring of 1991. For this reason, it can be considered that item seven of the Balcerowicz Plan was essentially fulfilled in Georgia at that time, al- though it should also be noted that further reform of the tax system is still going on, as it is in many other countries of the world; 8. In 1992, there was no national currency in Georgia, so it was essentially impossible to fulfill item eight of the Balcerowicz Plan; 9. In 1992, general customs tariffs were introduced at rates of 2 percent on imports and 8 per- cent on exports. Obviously, this policy did not favor either import restrictions or the ex- port stimulation, so item nine of the Balcerowicz Plan was clearly not fulfilled in Georgia either; 10. It has already been mentioned that in 1992, as in 1991, there was income indexation, albeit imperfectly applied and subject to lags. At that time, any type of assistance to families with small incomes was disregarded. That is to say, the social protection system did not differen- tiate income levels in a way that supported those with low real incomes. As a result, the real minimum wage in 1992 amounted to only 86 percent of that of 1991. Since, despite the in- come indexation carried out in 1992, targeted assistance to the neediest families was inad- equate, item ten of the Balcerowicz Plan was unfortunately not fulfilled; Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

11. In 1992, legal and government resolutions and decrees restricting monopolistic institutions and practices and promoting competition were issued for the first time in Georgia, although their effective implementation was significantly delayed. True, as early as 1991, the Soviet procedures ensuring centralized supply of resources to enterprises and final customers were disrupted and gradually abandoned, but many elements of state administrative interference in enterprise activity were still preserved. Hence, item eleven of the Balcerowicz Plan was not carried out at that time. Thus, in 1992 in Georgia, eight out of the eleven items in the Balcerowicz Plan (that is, all apart from items one, two, and seven) were not fulfilled. Such important measures as the cancelation or at least serious restriction of budgetary subsidies and tough restriction of the money supply were also neglected. Many of those items were indeed doomed to failure, particularly since there was no independent monetary system at that time in Geor- gia. In these conditions, implementing a defective version of Shock Therapy based only on price lib- eralization could hardly be expected to succeed. In other words, in the absence of corresponding gov- ernmental institutions, it was essentially impossible to make the transition to a market economy using Shock Therapy. In this situation it would have been much more effective to create the various institu- tions necessary both for pursuing the reforms and for building the Georgian state. The populist stage of economic reform ended in the inevitable failure of the abortive Georgian modification of Shock Therapy, and this subsequently gave rise to serious delays in the economic reform process.

Manifestation of Mistakes

The stage of accumulation of mistakes includes 1993 and the first half of 1994.9 One factor resulting in the delayed reforms was outside the economic sphere, while another factor explained the delays in terms of basic mistakes of economic policy. The economy of Georgia (and not only the economy) was neither prepared for the full-scale military operations that started in Abkhazia in the summer of 1992, nor for the civil war that intensified in the fall of 1993. These events seriously strained the national budget, and in 1993-1994 it proved impossible to get the budget approved in advance in the normal manner. The only possible way to cover the resulting deficits was money emissions. Both due to the general amnesty announced in the winter of 1992, and later on through its par- ticipation in military operations (as a country without an army), the crime situation in Georgia wors- ened to the extent that it became too dangerous to conduct most economic activity. As a result, many businessmen left their native land, and this accelerated the outflow of capital. At the same time, undis- guised robbery was replaced by racketeering, which was also detrimental to successful business de- velopment. As a rule, these criminal elements were unable to accumulate wealth. The reason for this was that the overwhelming majority of these people were drug addicts or had links with the drug in- dustry, so there was substantial leakage of stolen property to the neighboring countries from where drugs illegally penetrated into Georgia. In late 1992 and early 1993 the most important policy mistake was made. The government, for some reason, did not expect that it would receive additional banknotes from Moscow, so it put tempo- rary banknotes of Georgia—the coupon of the (NBG)—into circulation.10 Unfortunately, representatives of the Georgian Government and the NBG were unable to take the new

9 See: V. Papava, “The Georgian Economy: Problems of Reform.” 10 See: R. Gotsiridze, “National Currency of Georgia—The Lari,” in: Central Eurasia: National Currencies, ed. by E.M. Ismailov, CA&CC Press, Stockholm, 2008, pp. 164-166. 26 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION currency seriously, sometimes showing a contemptuous attitude toward it. This had a decisive impact on the already serious devaluation process underway. Basically, the nature of the mistake was the il- lusion that it was economically expedient for Georgia to remain temporarily or even permanently in the proposed “ruble zone.” As a result of this unfortunate illusion, the coupon did not become the sole legal tender of payment until July-August 1993 when Russia carried out partial currency reform of its own and withdrew the FSU ruble from circulation. This act made it clear that Georgia would have to introduce its own currency. Uncontrolled credit emissions caused the inflationary process in Georgia. Attempts to solve agricultural problems (e.g., the procurement of agricultural products in the fall of 1993 and carrying out the essential agricultural work in the spring of 1994) from a budget that had been practically non- existent since the fall of 1993 resulted in initially unreported budgetary emissions that ultimately ru- ined the country’s financial system. Georgia developed a hyperinflationary spiral, with inflation gal- loping at a rate of about 60-70 percent per month from 1993 until the fall of 1994. In the long run, this money was not, unfortunately, used for agricultural purposes. In conditions of such high inflation, the coupon could not perform the normal function of sustaining commercial turnover because the real value of the coupon supply was constantly falling. All other things being equal, this promoted wider use of the ruble instead of the coupon as a means of payment.11 In 1991-1992, the foundations of the system of informal relations characteristic of low-income countries12 were laid in Georgia. The incorrect policy of the NBG toward restricting cash circulation (which gave rise, contrary to common sense, to restrictions on the withdrawal of coupons from the banking system) resulted in substantial discrepancies between cash and noncash monetary values. This further restricted the cir- culation of the coupon. Also, state-owned commercial banks tolerated excessive overdrafts, which promoted hidden credit emission. Subsidized prices on bread, gas, electricity, and transport put an additional load on the budget and also prompted budgetary emissions. A serious error was perpetrated in Georgia’s foreign trade policy, which allowed the “unique Georgian” clearing system to be consolidated. Barter was considered the only way to receive gas from Turkmenistan. The price of both Turkmen gas and of many poor-quality goods produced in Georgia was artificially high. According to the “innovators” of this approach, it would result in the creation of an environment for Georgian enterprises that stimulated their activity. It should be mentioned that such an environment for producing poor-quality goods has indeed been created. At the same time, this production had to be purchased by government. In the absence of a proper budget, however, this op- eration could be only partially carried out, and even then only by means of money emission (which also increased inflation). The government purchased most of this production from enterprises using a form of the state order system, with guarantees to pay the corresponding price in the future. Use of the state orders system required a complicated system of quotas and licensing. When receiving loans from different foreign countries and international organizations, in some cases the interest rates and prices on goods bought with the help of loans were artificially increased, and the loans received were partly used in less important directions. Needless to say, this put these enterprises in a difficult finan- cial situation and resulted in the formation of a nonpayment network within the country, which was difficult to stop. It became impossible for the government to gather the full volume of goods within the country to fulfill the barter commodity exchange agreed upon with Turkmenistan. In recent years, the existing difficulties with the Azerbaijan transport route, i.e. the blocking of the railway line pass- ing through Chechnia, have complicated the normal transportation of goods procured by the govern- ment to Turkmenistan, subsequently making it impossible. As a result of these difficulties and mis-

11 See: L. Gurgenidze, M. Lobzhanidze, D. Onoprishvili, “Georgia: From Planning to Hyperinflation,” Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1994. 12 See: Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries, ed. by D.W. Adams, D.A. Fitchett, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION takes, Georgia’s debt to Turkmenistan amounted to about half a billion U.S. dollars over two years. The country’s total external debt rose to $1 billion. Ignoring the interests of enterprise workers and employees effectively impeded the privatiza- tion process in 1992-1993 and held up the restructuring of enterprises into joint-stock companies. Much of this lay behind the energy crisis associated with using loans for purposes other than those intended. This, along with nonpayment of the real cost of power resources (in other words, absurdly low domestic prices), chronic irresponsibility with respect to technical specifications that made it impossible to carry out not only capital renewal, but even routine repairs and maintenance, and constant theft of power equipment containing copper (including wire) to sell in Turkey, gave rise to an unprecedented collapse of production. Moreover, given the general state of disarray in both national and enterprise-level accounting, it became impossible to obtain full information on companies and their activities. This, in turn, artifi- cially exaggerated the already apparent decline in the major macroeconomic indicators and, at the enterprise level, facilitated companies’ efforts to hide their tax liabilities. This stage of economic reform was characterized by extremely imperfect recording of foreign economic activities, inefficient customs procedures, extensive waste of commodity stocks, a decline in the economic role of normal wages, unrecorded expansion of the shadow economy, and the use of humanitarian aid for purposes other than those intended. Overall, the picture of the Georgian econo- my was exceedingly bleak.

Minimum Shock with Maximum Therapy

At the beginning of 1994, Head of the Georgian State Eduard Shevardnadze initiated prepara- tions for implementing an anti-crisis program of macroeconomic stabilization and systemic change. The program began in the spring of 1994, and this gave a good start to the stage of correction of mis- takes committed during the earlier stages of the economic reforms. This new stage of economic reform was also characterized by problems of a noneconomic na- ture. By the spring of 1994 the hostilities in Abkhazia had come to an end. This fact had a positive influence on the economy as a whole, but it also gave rise to a new problem: social protection of in- ternally displaced persons (IDP), which placed a heavy burden on the national budget. Law-enforcement institutions intensified the fight against criminals in order to improve the sit- uation. Definite positive results were achieved, but the country still had a long way to go to solve the problem. Many enterprises, for instance, were afraid to undertake high levels of production for fear of being robbed by organized (including semi-official) and other criminal elements. In the spring of 1994 the government gradually changed its attitude toward the coupon. Accord- ing to the standard policy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it was ready to assist any country that had its own currency and whose government was doing its best to strengthen it. If Georgia stayed within the ruble zone, the IMF would undoubtedly prefer to work with Russia—the country issuing the ruble. This fact undermined the position of those in the Parliament and the Government (like Speaker of the Parliament and the Minister of Finance) supporting the ruble zone, since they would have had to openly advocate regarding the Russian ruble as the sole legal tender. Conversely, it assist- ed those in power who, from the very beginning, realized that the Georgian economy had no prospects without its own national currency. Interestingly, in 1994 a noble but perhaps hopeless experiment was already going on in Kutaisi, where the city authorities were supporting the coupon—the one region of Georgia to do so. All of this, together with the relative stabilization of the Georgian coupon and the worsening depreciation of the ruble, encouraged the population to take the coupon more seriously. 28 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Uncontrolled monetary emissions became impossible owing to the increasing resolve of the authorities of the NBG. In the fall of 1994 the Bank cancelled the prevailing restrictions on the withdrawal of cash from banks under obvious pressure from the IMF. As a result, cash and noncash money values drew considerably closer to each other. In late 1994, on the advice of the IMF, the NBG started regulating the banking system by means of the classical methods widely used elsewhere in the world. In addition to solving other problems, this also prevented the state-owned commercial banks from continuing to work in overdraft condi- tions. Moreover, corporatization of state-owned commercial banks began in the second half of 1994. According to the program developed with the IMF in September 1994, the price of gas and elec- tricity was raised to world levels, the price of bread increased 285-fold(!), subway fares increased greatly, and so did tariffs on other municipal services. Budget-supported employees enjoyed a wage increase, and pensions and social welfare payments were also raised, but these increases lagged con- siderably behind inflation. This enabled a great reduction in the budgetary subsidies needed to cover the discrepancies between consumer and production prices or between production prices and actual costs. This was followed by substantial strengthening of the rate of the Georgian coupon. Whereas before the price rise on bread, one dollar was worth 5.3 million coupons, after the price rise, one dollar was already valued at 2.4 million coupons. This process continued; at the end of 1994 the price of bread increased again by 40 percent and resulted in the establishment of a stable coupon exchange rate (at one dollar = 1.3 million coupons).13 Unfortunately, Georgia could not manage full money recovery on either gas or electricity. How- ever, whereas enterprises and the population did not pay for their gas and electricity supplies, or paid only negligible sums, the cost of bread had to essentially be covered in full by the population. Delays in enforcing these payments encouraged economic entities to be more skeptical about the coupon: trade organizations, enterprises, and banks delayed corresponding money transfers and conducted speculative operations in the currency market, sustaining significant losses in the process. Starting in 1995, when the coupon rate became stable, timely withdrawal of these sums was prevented not only by the sluggishness of the banks, but also by some local authorities using these sums temporarily in order to manage their local budget problems. What is more, the pseudo-protection of enterprises by some representatives of government, and the often groundless fears of the population about interruptions in supply, meant that enforcement of payments by cessation of deliveries—the normal method in market-type economies—was not achieved. Gas supply to the population of Tbilisi did not stop until January 1995. Carrying out a tight- er policy to cover the cost of bread was achieved step-by-step in the first and second quarters of 1995. The impossibility of collecting the full cost of gas and electricity also meant that the government could not revise the corresponding prices because of its general commitment to the reforms. The dol- lar prices of gas and electricity increased every month as a result of the strengthening of the coupon. This led to an artificial increase in the product cost, which primarily had an adverse effect on indus- trial enterprises. Following a review of its commitments to the IMF, the Georgian government re- duced coupon prices. In particular, since April 1995 the cost of gas has been reduced by 35 percent and the cost of electricity by 25 percent. At the same time, the government of Georgia refused to purchase gas after June 1995. Instead, purchases had to be undertaken by immediate consumers, namely Sakenergo (the Georgian State Energy Company), big industrial enterprises, and municipal- ities. To enable consumers to directly purchase gas, the aforementioned Georgian clearing system was, in effect, annulled. All this made it necessary to terminate quotas and simplify licensing. This process soon started. The system of quotas was completely annulled after 1 June, 1995, and licensing was preserved for

13 See: J.-Y. Wang, “From Coupon to Lari: Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Georgia,” Caucasica. The Journal of Caucasian Studies, Vol. 1, 1998; S. Wellisz, “Georgia: A Brief Survey of Macroeconomic Problems and Policies,” Studies & Analyses, Working Papers, No. 87, CASE, Warsaw, 1996. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION only a limited list of goods.14 Order was also reestablished in borrowing and the use of loans based on the practices established in connection with Georgia’s first loans from the IMF and the World Bank. In December 1994, Georgia received the first tranche of a Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) (approximately $39 million) from the IMF. Approval of the national budget by the Parliament at the beginning of 1995, after a two-year interval, can be considered a very important step toward establishing order in Georgia’s financial system. The real significance of this budget was that credit and monetary emissions themselves were not used to balance budgetary revenue and expenditure. In 1995, only 47 percent of the expenditures of the national budget were covered by taxes and the remaining 53 percent had to be covered through the monetization of wheat and flour received as humanitarian aid (mobilizing the proceeds from sales in the national budget). In that way, the unbalanced budget could be balanced without money emis- sion. This was achieved with the help of donor countries and institutions promoting the reforms in Georgia. Unfortunately, the planned macroeconomic indicators for the first two quarters were not achieved, although the actual results improved considerably with each passing month. With the support and efforts of the IMF, most of the countries to which Georgia owed approx- imately $1 billion agreed to debt rescheduling. This allowed the IMF to issue the second credit tranche of the STF at the end of June 1995 (approximately $44 million) and a stand-by loan of approx- imately $113 million. All of this was expected to create conditions for Georgia to preserve financial stability, carry out currency reform, and put the Lari (the national currency) into circulation, avoiding the errors previously committed by the government in connection with the coupon.15 The exchange rate of the national currency was expected to remain unaltered until the end of 1995. After July 1995, the price of bread increased by 7 percent on average, while the wages of budget sector employees increased by an average of 50 percent. In the fall of 1995, there were plans to liber- alize bread prices. The planned elimination of government monopoly in this sphere was expected to make this possible. Beginning on 1 July, 1995, the minimum monthly wage of those employed in the budget sector was just $2.69 and the maximum $12.69. These figures are, of course, very low, although it should be recalled that at the beginning of September 1994 the minimum wage was less than ten cents, and the maximum a little more than one dollar (all evaluated based on the exchange rate at that time without adjustment for purchasing power parity). As for sectoral development, the reforms in Georgia are being implemented most vigorously in healthcare where the reform project was elaborated in close cooperation with experts from the World Bank. A gradual transition to paid medical services and establishing a system of medical insurance began in the public health system. In May 1994, the head of state issued a decree according to which enterprise personnel were given precedence in corporatization. This speeded up the process. At the same time, privatization by means of direct purchases was also encouraged. In 1995, the use of privatization vouchers began in Georgia, as in many other former Communist countries: part of public property was distributed to people free of charge.16 This approach was justified by the necessity to give everyone a fair chance to acquire assets during privatization.17 The success of Shock Therapy in 1994-1995 rests on the paradox “The Worse, the Better.” This situation can be classified as Minimum Shock with Maximum Therapy. Whereas there is a big question mark over the country’s future and its ability to survive, there can be no doubt about

14 See: V. Papava, T. Beridze, “Industrial Policy and Trade Regime in Georgia,” Eurasian Studies, 1996/1997, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1996/1997. 15 See: M. Kakulia, “Before and After the Introduction of the Lari: Georgian National Currency in Retrospect,” in: Central Eurasia: National Currencies. 16 See: A. Silagadze, T. Beridze, “Note on Privatization in Georgia,” in: Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. by B. Kamiñski, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1996. 17 See: V. Papava, “Privatizatsia osnovnykh faktorov proizvodstva,” pp. 92-97. 30 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION whether Shock Therapy was really needed, since under the circumstances the country had no other choice and positive results were almost guaranteed. Another way to describe this situation is a Soft Big Bang.18

Conclusion

Transition to a market economy was on Georgia’s agenda immediately after regaining its inde- pendence. Unfortunately, the first steps toward a market economy were inconsistent. The later at- tempt to blindly copy the Polish model of Shock Therapy was not successful either, which is not sur- prising since Georgia did not even have its own monetary system. Failure of Shock Therapy in Georgia gave the green light to populism in Georgia’s economic policy. As a result, in 1993-1994 Georgia did not have a state budget approved by the Parliament. The country was caught in a hyperinflationary spiral and its temporary currency—the Georgian Cou- pon—was unacceptable to the market and population alike. Steps were taken to achieve macroeconomic stability in a country facing economic failure. These steps included tight monetary policy, liberalization of bread prices, and enhancement of budget discipline. As a result, the Shock Therapy initially started was successfully completed and macroeco- nomic stability was achieved in Georgia in 1995. This made it possible to carry out successful curren- cy reform, which completes the first-generation post-Communist reforms implemented in Georgia’s economy.

18 See: V. Papava, Necroecononics: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism (Lessons from Georgia). New York, iUniverse, 2005, pp. 23-24; V. Papava, “On the Theory of Post-Communist Economic Transition to Market,” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1/2, 2005, pp. 85-86.

Kamran EYYUBOV

Ph.D. Candidate at Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

FACTORS DETERMINING THE DIFFERENCES IN FDI INFLOWS INTO AZERBAIJAN’S AND RUSSIA’S OIL SECTORS AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Abstract

his article examines the FDI inflows tifies the main reasons for Azerbaijan’s ad- T into Azerbaijan’s and Russia’s oil sec- vantage over Russia. The author first gives tors between 1991 and 2006. It iden- a brief explanation of FDI in general, then Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION identifies the different patterns of FDI inflow ing out the main determinants of the differ- into the oil sectors of both Azerbaijan and ences in FDI inflow into the oil sectors of Russia, and concludes his article by point- these two countries.

Introduction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics have been striving to become part of the global economy as new sovereign states. Among these states, the performance of Azerbai- jan and Russia in terms of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in general and into the oil sector in particular, since this plays a very important role in both countries, seems to be the most interesting example. Russia is the largest of the European transition and CIS countries, is well endowed with natural resources, and has a well-educated labor force and large potential market.1 Paradoxically, from the viewpoint of foreign investors, the country is one of the least attractive host countries in this region. During the 1990s-early 2000s, inward FDI into the oil sector remained low; the cumulative annual average figures for Russia’s FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) between 1998 and 2001 amounted to only 7.2%, with FDI stock as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for 2000 being at 12.4%.2 The contrast is particularly great when compared with another important transition country in the CIS region, namely Azerbaijan. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan differs greatly from Russia in the size of its market, education level, economic potential, etc., the country has been one of the most successful CIS countries in attracting FDI in general and into the oil sector in particular. Its figures for inward FDI as a percentage of GFCF between 1998 and 2001 were estimated at 33.5%. Moreover, FDI stock as a percentage of GDP in 2000 amounted to 70.8,3 which was almost 6-fold higher than Russia’s figures. Its FDI inflows into the oil sector accounted for about 70% of GFCF during 1997-2001.4

FDI and the Main Reasons for Attracting FDI

In order to be able to discuss FDI inflow patterns into the countries of interest, first let us define the term FDI. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one econ- omy (‘direct investor’) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (‘direct in- vestment enterprise’).”5 A direct investment relationship is established when the direct investor owns 10% of the ordinary shares or voting power of the direct investment enterprise. The lasting interest, according to the OECD, implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor

1 See: N. Fabry and S. Zeghni, “Foreign Investment in Russia: How the Investment Climate Matters,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 35, 2002, pp. 289-303. 2 See: UNCTAD, “TNCs in Extractive Industries and Development,” World Investment Report 2007, New York and Geneva, 2007. 3 See: Ibidem. 4 See: C. Shiells, “FDI and the Investment Climate in the CIS Countries,” IMF Policy Discussion Paper, European II Department, 2003. 5 See: OECD, Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, Fourth Edition, Paris, France, 2008, p. 17. 32 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise, which does not require absolute control by the foreign investor. According to A.T. Kearney, the main types of FDI in terms of mode of entry are acquisition of a subsidiary or production facility, participation in a joint venture, licensing, and establishment of a Greenfield operation, which is a direct investment in new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities.6 N. Campos and Y. Kinoshita provide another classification of FDI types, distinguishing be- tween market-seeking, asset-seeking, and efficiency-seeking FDI.7 n The first type, which is market-seeking FDI, is also called horizontal FDI, as it involves rep- lication of the production facilities in the host country. The main driving forces behind this type of FDI are the size of the host market and its growth, as well as the impediments to ac- cessing local markets, such as tariffs and transport costs. n The second type of FDI is called resource- or asset-seeking or vertical FDI, which happens when companies invest abroad to acquire resources that are not available in the home coun- try, such as natural resources, raw materials, or low-cost labor. Factor-cost considerations become especially important in the manufacturing sector when multinationals directly invest in order to export. In contrast to horizontal FDI, vertical or export-oriented FDI involves relocating parts of the production chain to the host country. n The third type of FDI, called efficiency-seeking, occurs when a company can gain from com- mon management of geographically dispersed activities in the presence of economies of scale. A. Bevan and S. Estrin, for example, found that prospective membership in the EU, which is conducive to the establishment of regional corporate networks, seems to have at- tracted more efficiency-seeking FDI into the first wave of EU accession countries after the initial announcement of the progress of EU accession.8 From this classification it is clear that FDI into Azerbaijan and Russia’s oil sector could be de- fined as asset-seeking, when foreign firms invest in the sector in order to gain access to natural re- sources, namely oil, which is scarce in their home country but abundant in Russia and Azerbaijan. Thus, we think that since this type of FDI is vertical or export-oriented, one of the main motives for foreign investors were stable taxes, legal guarantees of their investment and ownership, favorable export rights, etc. According to our findings, FDI is extremely advantageous for the host country, providing such benefits as compensating for shortfalls in domestic investments and creating spillover ef- fects.9 The latter occurs when foreign companies make use of domestic financial institutions and distribution networks, or when new supporting businesses are created as a consequence of FDI. In addition, FDI provides the country with know-how, especially regarding management and organi- zational skills. To our mind, apart from the effective restructuring and overall economic gains caused by FDI flows, another important advantage for Russia and Azerbaijan’s oil sectors during 1990s-early 2000s was the technological know-how used by foreign companies mentioned by M. Bradshaw.10 After the

6 See: A.T. Kearney FDI Confidence Index, Global Business Policy Council, Vol. 8, 2005. 7 See: N. Campos, Y. Kinoshita, “Why Does FDI Go Where It Goes? New Evidence from the Transition Econo- mies,” IMF Working Paper, IMF Institute, 2003, pp. 10-18. 8 See: A. Bevan, S. Estrin, “The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment into European Transition Economies,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 32, 2004, pp. 775-787. 9 See: P. Westin, “Foreign Direct Investments in Russia,” Russian Economic Trends, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999, pp. 36-43 (8). 10 See: M. Bradshaw, “Foreign Investment in the Russian Oil and Gas Industry: Lessons from Sakhalin,” in: Pro- ceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Globalisation in Russia’s Regions: The Regional Dynamics of Northeast Asia and Russia’s Globalization in the 21st Century, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea, 2004. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Azerbaijan lacked sufficient knowledge, equipment, and technology to produce oil themselves, which is why FDI helped in terms of bringing qualified special- ists, up-to-date equipment, and leading technology into these countries, which created the spillover effects necessary for further development of the countries’ oil sectors. The existing literature also focuses on the determinants for attracting FDI, taking Dunning’s OLI Theory as a model.11 Dunning argues that three conditions must be satisfied simultaneously for FDI to occur. The firm must have both an ownership (O) advantage, which takes the form of firm-specific assets both tangible (e.g., products or technology) and intangible (e.g., patents or brands), and an internalization (I) advantage, meaning that benefits accrue to the enterprise from exploiting the ownership advantage by choosing to produce abroad internally, rather than through the market by franchising or licensing the product or process internationally. The foreign market, in turn, must offer a location (L) advantage, which is relevant in determining where the firm choos- es to manufacture its products. These location advantages include factor prices, access to custom- ers, government regulations with respect to trade, exchange rates, capital flows, and institutional and political stability, etc. We consider the last determinant in the theory—location advantages—to be the most important, because it includes the notion of investment climate, which is the difference between Russia and Azerbaijan’s performance in terms of attracting FDI into their oil sectors. Speaking about location advantages, there are several determinants foreign investors are look- ing for in the host country. According to N. Fabry and S. Zeghni,12 the globalization era has moved competition from price to quality, thus multinational enterprises are seeking combined advantages: low cost but productive labor, technological competencies, local demand to increase market shares on a local or regional scale, reliable infrastructures, managerial capabilities, and a stable political and institutional environment. This statement is proven by the survey of foreign direct investors conducted in Russia in 2000.13 According to the results, the dominant motive for investment was the large size of the Russian market. Overcoming trade barriers was an equally important reason, not only for those enterprises that pro- duce industrial goods in Russia, but even more for those involved in distribution and sales or in trans- port activities. Moreover, enterprises reported the qualified labor force in Russia to be quite signifi- cant and the low labor costs, as well as the low general production costs, to be relevant to their invest- ment decision. In order to attract foreign investors, host countries, in turn, must develop proactively local and regional markets, stabilize the macro and political environment, develop institutions and legal stability, and promote qualitative upgrading of labor to create local conditions for the transfer of knowledge.14

Inward FDI Patterns into the Azerbaijani and Russian Oil Sectors

Taking into account our findings on the essence of FDI, we will now look at the patterns of FDI in the Russian and Azerbaijani economies in general and in their oil sectors in particular during the

11 See: J. Dunning, International Production and the Multinational Enterprise, Allen & Unwin, London, 1981. 12 See: N. Fabry, S. Zeghni, op. cit. 13 See: R. Ahrend, Foreign Direct Investment into Russia—Pain Without Gain? A Survey of Foreign Direct Inves- tors, Russian Economic Trends, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2000, pp. 26-33 (8). 14 See: N. Fabry, S. Zeghni, op. cit. 34 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

1990s-early 2000s. According to Table 1, despite the fact that FDI inflows into Russia between 1990 and 2006 obviously exceeded those of Azerbaijan, these figures cannot be fully trusted, since they do not take into account the differences in the sizes of the economies. Therefore, we use FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation as the indicator. This indicator is more precise for the present research. Table 1 clearly shows that Azerbaijan’s annual average for 1990-2000 exceeded Russian figures almost 8.4-fold. Later years also show a clear contrast between the FDI inflows of the two countries: in 2004, Azerbaijan was able to attract 72.0% of its gross fixed capital formation com- pared to only 14.3% in Russia; in 2005, the figures were 30.7% and 9.2% for Azerbaijan and Russia, respectively. Table 1

Foreign Direct Investment Overview, Selected Years ($m)

FDI Flows

As a percentage of gross fixed capital formation

2003 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 1990-2000 1990-2000 (annual avg) (annual avg)

Russian Federation

Inward 2,373 7,958 15,444 12,766 28,732 4.4 14.3 9.2 16.3

Outward 1,582 9,727 13,782 12,763 17,979 3.0 12.8 9.2 10.2

Azerbaijan

Inward 450 3,227 3,535 1,679 –601 37.1 72.0 30.7 –9.6

Outward 2 933 1,205 1,221 705 — 24.6 22.3 11.2

S o u r c e: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007, Country Fact Sheets (Russia, Azerbaijan).

Figure 1 complements the general finding, showing that between 1993 and 2006 Azerbaijan received more inward FDI as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation than Russia. The figures from Table 2 measuring FDI stocks as a percentage of gross domestic product comple- ment the results of Table 1 and Fig. 1. According to the estimations by UNCTAD, inward FDI stock flows accounted for only 12.4% and 16.9% of GDP in Russia in 2000 and 2004, respectively, while the similar figures for Azerbaijan were estimated at 70.8% and 157.0% of GDP for the same years. Moreover, speaking about the overall FDI performance and investment appeal of Russia and Azer- baijan, it is worth looking at the UNCTAD FDI index. The UNCTAD four-fold matrix of inward FDI performance15 places Azerbaijan among the front runners, confirming that it has both high present and potential FDI performance. As for Russia, it is in the “below potential” group, which is described as having low FDI performance, although possessing high FDI potential. According to UNCTAD, the In-

15 See: UNCTAD, Inward FDI Performance Index, available at [http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp? intItemID=2471&lang=1]. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Figure 1

FDI Flows as a Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Russia and Azerbaijan

100

80

60

40

20

0

1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 –20

Azerbaijan Russian Federation

S o u r c e: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007, Major FDI Indicators. ward FDI Performance Index, which is the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inflows to its share in global GDP, between 1993 and 2006 Azerbaijan was ranked among the first 35 economies of the 140 examined with an index value of 3.4 (1993-1995), 15.25 (1995-1997), 8.15 (1997-1999), 1.60 (1999- 2001), 12.51 (2001-2002), 17.869 (2003-2005), and 5.43 (2004-2006).16 Russia’s FDI performance is not so impressive, it was ranked 87th in 2004-2006, although it enjoyed considerable progress in 1991-1993, when it was ranked 107th with an index value of 0.28. Russia’s other index values, com- pared to Azerbaijan’s, are 0.37, 0.59, 0.48, 0.32, 0.32, 1.13, and 1.12 for the same years, respectively. Thus it is obvious that Russia’s low figures complement the results of Table 1 and Table 2 and prove Russia’s low and Azerbaijan’s high performance in attracting FDI during the 1990s-early 2000s. Oil and energy resources are among Russia and Azerbaijan’s main exports and FDI in this sector is very important for both countries. According to J. Cukrowski, the oil industry provides a consider- able share of state budget revenues and convertible currency earnings.17 He goes on to say that the share of oil is about 31% in total primary energy production in the Russian Federation, and about 50% in primary energy exports. It is estimated that the oil sector is responsible for about 20% of the total revenue of the state budget and 40% of total earnings from exports in Russia. Judging from Fig. 2, we can say that during 1998-2002 the Russian oil sector was not receiving sufficient FDI, since the majority of FDI went to Russia’ secondary and tertiary sectors. As it is evi- dent from Fig. 3, Azerbaijan’s oil sector, on the contrary, attracted more FDI than its other non-oil sectors. Comparing the figures, we can also conclude that Azerbaijan’s performance after the 1998 crisis was more impressive than Russia’s. While Russia steadily increased its FDI figures to about

16 Ibidem. 17 See: J. Cukrowski, “Russian Oil: The Role of the Sector in Russia’s Economy,” Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2004, pp. 285-296. 36 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2

FDI Stocks as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Region and Economy (%)

1990 2000 2004

Russian Federation

Inward — 12.4 16.9

Outward — 7.8 14.0

Azerbaijan

Inward — 70.8 157.0

Outward — 9.0 30.9

S o u r c e: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005.

Figure 2

FDI Flows by Industry, Russia, 1998-2002 ($m)

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Primary Secondary Tertiary

S o u r c e: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007, FDI in Brief. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Figure 3

FDI Flows by Industry, Azerbaijan, 1995-2002 ($m)

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

–200 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Primary Unspecified

Note: Primary refers to the oil sector.

S o u r c e: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007, FDI in Brief.

$650-700 million by 2002, Azerbaijani’s oil FDI increase was more drastic, reaching $1 billion by the same year. These results are well complemented by A.T. Kearney’s FDI Confidence Index survey, which tracks the impact of political, economic, and regulatory changes on foreign direct investment inten- tions and preferences.18 In 2005, it ranks Russia ninth among primary sector investors, whereas Az- erbaijan is positioned second, clearly representing a more attractive climate for investment.

Main Determinants of the Differences in Inward FDI Flows into the Oil Sectors

Our research has shown that during the 1990s-early 2000s Azerbaijan managed to attract more FDI than Russia into its economy in general and into its oil sector in particular. We think that such difference in FDI inflow patterns into the Russian and Azerbaijani oil sectors during the period stated

18 See: A.T. Kearney FDI Confidence Index. 38 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION was determined by the differences in investment climate, namely political regime, legal guarantees, including production sharing agreements (PSA) and property rights protection, legislation in export rights and taxes, interest group policy, and cultural uniqueness. The political system is one of the determinants of investment climate, which greatly deter- mined the differences in FDI inflows into the oil sectors governed by Russia’s hybrid and Azerbai- jan’s leadership-based policy. At the beginning of the 1990s, Azerbaijan was faced with political turmoil; the war with Armenia put Azerbaijani’s independence at risk. The arrival of Heydar Aliev united the nation and gave a big boost to Azerbaijan’s political motives. The nation believed in its leader and had complete trust in its president. According to Bayulgen, during the period under re- view institutionalized competition for power and influence in the political system was very limited in Azerbaijan, state power was highly concentrated and political order was dominated by the figure of President Heydar Aliev.19 Political groups and the Azerbaijani nation completely supported Heydar Aliev and his decision-making. The opposition groups did not have society’s support to oppose Heydar Aliev’s decisions. In contrast to Azerbaijan’s stable leadership-based system, Russia’s hybrid regime, which was stuck between authoritarianism and consolidated democracy, was characterized by political instabil- ity, weakness of the state, and numerous veto players who could challenge the government’s invest- ment policy. From the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was in a state of permanent political crisis and extreme uncertainty about future government policies, about the stability of political institutions, about the outcome of a seemingly endless cycle of elections, and about the succession to Yeltsin.20 Moreover, according to McFaul’s criteria, the state itself was very weak due to its lack of internal ideological and institutional cohesiveness, its low involvement in social and financial decision-mak- ing, and its inability to implement policy effectively.21 According to J. Watson, there have been fre- quent oscillations in policy within the government, due both to fast changing circumstances and to ideological battles between reformists and conservatives.22 Decision-makers could not overcome the opposition of the veto players by totally excluding them because the challenges tended to be both formally legal and widely perceived as legitimate.23 All of these conflicts and the high rate of turnover of government officials hindered policy continuity and development of a coherent regulatory frame- work for the oil industry. For example, the dissolution of the parliament in 1993 was particularly dis- ruptive for the passage of the law on oil and gas. Thus, the result was policy instability, deadlock, and, in most cases, chaos in the investment environment. Foreign investors had to cope with frequent os- cillations in policy in the present, facing arbitrary, conflict-prone, and aggressive investment terms, as well as remaining mindful of the possibility of destabilization in the future with regard to the direct impact it might have on their own particular project.24 Thus, many foreign investors preferred to make investments in Azerbaijan rather than in Russia because of the greater stability and more centralized political authority of the former. In order to gain a clearer and more detailed picture of the legislative differences between the Azerbaijani and Russian systems, which determine the differences in FDI flows into the countries, we continue by focusing separately on the four main legislative factors (PSAs, property rights, export rights, and taxation systems) that directly affected the investment decision of an oil investor.

19 See: O. Bayulgen, “Facing the Dilemma of Global Capitalism: The Case of Azerbaijan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 2/3, 2003, pp. 209-220. 20 See: W. Tompson, “Financial Backwardness in Contemporary Perspective: Prospects for the Development of Fi- nancial Intermediation in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2000, pp. 605-625. 21 Ibid., p. 610. 22 See: J. Watson, “Foreign Investment in Russia: The Case of Oil Industry,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1996, pp. 429-455. 23 See: O. Bayulgen, “Foreign Investment, Oil Curse, and Democratization: A Comparison of Azerbaijan and Rus- sia,” Business and Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2005, Art 3. 24 See: J. Watson, op. cit. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The attitude of the Azerbaijani and Russian governments toward the adoption of PSAs, which allowed foreign oil companies to agree on individual approaches to their projects with the govern- ments, therefore insuring themselves against any fluctuations in tax regulations and establishing sta- bilization in fiscal and legal terms, was extremely different. Since acquiring its independence, Az- erbaijan has been keen on attracting foreign investors to its oil fields. The rapid adoption of PSA re- gimes helped the country to accomplish this goal. There were 21 successful PSA contracts between foreign oil companies and the Azerbaijani government before 2001.25 As Bayulgen puts it, many oil investors viewed PSA in Azerbaijan as “one-stop shopping.”26 All negotiations between interested parties would start only after direct approval from President Heydar Aliev, and his approval was con- sidered direct support of moving on to contract adoption. The PSA regime in Azerbaijan was very “company-friendly,” as it provided good tax breaks and guarantees on financial security of the oil companies’ investments. This ease in PSA regimes resulted in high FDI inflows into the oil sector, not to mention the fact that almost 2/3 of the total $9 billion investments in the oil sector came via FDI performed before the beginning of this millennium.27 In sharp contrast to Azerbaijan, Russia had many problems with PSA regime adoption. De- spite the fact that President Yeltsin had signed a decree on legislation for regulating PSAs by late 1993, the Duma did not pass the legislation until late 1995 after two years of fierce battles among the political groups.28 The newly adopted legislation was not complete and resulted in ratification of a 1999 amendment to it, which introduced more demands on the investor. Moreover, some of the amendments became law in 2003, which complicated identification of projects with PSA status. As a result, many foreign investors did not think the legislation on PSAs to be sufficient for stimulat- ing FDI and joked about it as being “Progress Stalled Again.”29 Although Russian legislation was generally not restrictive toward foreigners, it should be noted that de jure and de facto business laws were different,30 the actual implementation of laws was very weak and still in need of im- provement. Despite the far greater advocacy of PSA contracts in Azerbaijan compared to Russia, legislation on property rights was actually more favorable for foreigners in latter than former, however with drawbacks in terms of actual property rights protection. The Law on Property of 1991 and the 1996 Land Reform Law in Azerbaijan prohibited foreign citizens from owning land or property in the country. Nevertheless, foreigners were allowed to lease both urban and rural land.31 Many of the for- eign oil companies were able to secure long-term leasing contracts on the land and property where they operated.32 Oil giants BP and Chevron, which were the main participants in the BTC pipeline, secured leasing contracts until the end of the project. Azerbaijani property law was not really favora- ble in long run, but in the short and mid term it was quite conducive and meant that many foreign investors could actually enter 20-30- year lease contracts with the government or private entities. The biggest disadvantage of the property legislation was that it increased operation costs since there were constant rental charges.

25 See: OECD, “Investment Climate in Azerbaijan. Investment Climate and Prospect in Azerbaijan,” OECD Global Forum on International Investment, Mexico City, Mexico, 2001. 26 See: O. Bayulgen, “Foreign Investment, Oil Curse, and Democratization: A Comparison of Azerbaijan and Russia.” 27 See: OECD, “Investment Climate in Azerbaijan. Investment Climate and Prospect in Azerbaijan.” 28 See: J. Watson, op. cit. 29 See: O. Bayulgen, “Foreign Investment, Oil Curse, and Democratization: A Comparison of Azerbaijan and Russia.” 30 See: M. Schaffer, P. Hare, A. Shabunina, “The Great Transformation: Russia’s Return to the World Economy,” CERT Discussion Paper, 2004. 31 See: IMF, Azerbaijan Republic: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report, Washington, D.C., 1997. 32 See: Azerbaijani Government, Information for Investors: Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan, 1995. 40 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russian legislation on property gave more benefits to foreign companies. The 1993 Constitu- tion allowed foreign subjects to own property in Russia.33 This made it easier for companies to move from one project to another. It also cut costs, provided some legal guarantees, and was a good source of protection for the company’s long-term stay in the country. From the purely legal point of view, Russian property law was perfect for foreign investors, but it was not so perfect in real life. Protecting property rights was a real problem, since many companies had to pay private security companies in order to protect their property.34 Private protection was costly and had a negative effect on the overall evaluation of any economic project. However, it should be mentioned that during Putin’s presidency the volatility of property security dropped significantly and became more like de facto legislation rather than de jure. However, despite the fact that during the period under review Russia had better legislation than Azerbaijan in the field of property rights, actual protection of property was absent in Russia, which has a negative impact on the decisions of oil investors. The next legislative fact that determined the difference in FDI inflows into Russia and Azer- baijan during the period under review is export rights. It is essential to have a transparent and sim- plified exporting system from the foreign oil investor’s perspective because oil sector investors usually want to export the obtained crude oil to the world markets. So significant quotas on oil exports and expensive exporting licenses are not very helpful in attracting FDIs into the oil sector. Azerbaijan had very low quotas on oil exports. Those quotas were primarily focused on securing the demand of local consumers. On the other hand, joint ventures with a share of more than 30% of foreign participation were exempted from obtaining export licenses.35 Also, the strategic export tax was set at 70% of the difference between domestic and contracted prices of the exported products.36 This margin of difference actually made it possible for oil companies to make a profit, which would keep them interested in investing in the region. In general, all of these factors in Azerbaijan’s ex- port legislation contributed to the country’s appeal to foreign investors and ensured economic prof- itability. Russia, on the contrary, imposed significant limits on oil export quotas at the beginning of the 1990s. The government introduced a regulation on export trade in 1992. The biggest problem of this regulation was that export tariffs were imposed on revenues and not profits, therefore the high costs and low margin of profit left a lot fields without investment. Also, according to this regulation, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy set the figures of individual and whole quotas on oil exports, which was a huge obstacle for companies. Despite the fact that joint ventures with more than 30% foreign own- ership were exempted from export duties, foreign companies faced difficulties in identifying what proportion of production actually belonged to them in order to be able to export the full extent of their share.37 Yeltsin’s decree No. 1385 actually put an end to export licenses and quotas at the beginning of 1995, but due to rationalization of the pipelines used to transport oil so-called limits on the capacity of exports had to be adopted, which were essentially quotas. Chernomyrdin’s government went back on its decision and eliminated export tariffs by 1996.38 This exemption remained until 1999 when the government returned to export tax adoption.39 Thus, Russia has changed its position on oil export duties many times and is still uncertain about its position on export regulating taxes. This fact made Russian legislation in the field of export rights inferior to the low-tax better-regulated Azerbaijan oil export legislation.

33 See: M. Schaffer, P. Hare, A. Shabunina, op. cit. 34 See: N. Fabry, S. Zeghni, op. cit., pp. 292-293. 35 See: Azerbaijani Government, Information for Investors: Azerbaijan. 36 See: IMF, Azerbaijan Republic: Recent Economic Developments. 37 See: J. Watson, op. cit., p. 439. 38 See: OECD, Investment Guide for the Russian Federation, Paris, 1996. 39 See: J. Cukrowski, op. cit. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The differences in taxation legislation significantly determined the FDI investment climate of the countries of interest as well. The overall taxation system in Russia was complicated. The oil enter- prises paid an average of 30 different taxes to federal and local budgets.40 It was no surprise that un- expected changes in the tax law and the tax law itself were ranked as the biggest problems for foreign investors in Russia according to a survey of 46 enterprises operating in Russia in 2000.41 The entire taxation system was based on revenue rather than on profit. This meant that companies had to pay taxes to the government before knowing whether they were making a profit or operating at a loss. On top of this, there was a lot of corruption involved in the system. Local governments imposed taxes on oil companies that were not envisaged in the federal legislation.42 The tax code did not set forth the exact number of taxes that could be imposed on oil companies or the limit on the total amount of taxes. In short, the Russian tax system placed a heavy burden on businessmen. In 2000, the government started lowering the tax rates and creating a better tax environment,43 but it still needed to be simpli- fied with a clear division between federal and local taxes and take account of all the problems previ- ously mentioned. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan’s taxation system was detrimental to the overall macroeconom- ic situation, oil sector tax legislation was favorable for foreign investors. Like all of its legislation, Azerbaijan created its first tax code on the basis of the Soviet tax code. Due to the social aspects of the communist system, Azerbaijan imposed large tax bills on companies. The tax system was based on automatic debiting of companies’ bank accounts. This practice provided the shadow economy with many transactions that occurred outside the banking sector.44 The corruption level also rose due to growth of the shadow economy. Some economists advised foreign investors to keep up to 30% of profits for “unexpected guests from the tax office.”45 Although these irregularities had a bad effect on the overall macroeconomic situation, they did not affect the oil sector investors much, since most of them enjoyed a separate taxing system through PSAs, thus the taxation environment in the oil sector was more favorable in Azerbaijan than in Russia. This big difference in the FDI-promoting legislation of Azerbaijan and Russia can be explained by the influence of political interest groups, which determined the different FDI patterns as well. The political interest groups could not object to foreign involvement in the oil sector in Azerbaijan. They had very little influence over any decisions taken to attract FDI into the oil sector. The power of veto was almost invincible, so any PSA submitted to the parliament was approved the same day with no more than an hour of debates prior to voting.46 None of the active environmentalist groups were ac- tually able to express their feelings. Attracting foreign investors into the oil sector also fell in line with Azerbaijan’s geopolitical objectives since Azerbaijan wanted to bolster its independence from Russia and gain wider recognition of its problem in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.47 Such smooth interaction between the government and oppressed political interest groups does not apply to Russia. Since Soviet times, oil has been viewed as the country’s national treasure. This ideology continued into present-day Russia, where different political interest groups constantly op- pose legislation that allows foreign involvement. The oil lobby, which is supportive of domestic oil

40 See: OECD, Investment Guide for the Russian Federation. 41 See: R. Ahrend, op. cit. 42 See: M. Ogutcu, Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for Russia’s Modernization. Battling Against The Odds, OECD-Russia Investment Roundtable, St. Petersburg, Russia, 2002. 43 See: J. Cukrowski, op. cit., p. 293. 44 See: IMF, Azerbaijan Republic: Recent Economic Developments. 45 See: L. Abrahams, T. Dragadze, “Azerbaijan” (Ch. 1), in: Investing in the Caspian Sea Region: Opportunity and Risk, ed. by M. McCauley, Cartermill, London, 1996. 46 See: O. Bayulgen, “Foreign Investment, Oil Curse, and Democratization: A Comparison of Azerbaijan and Rus- sia;” P. Rutland, “Lost Opportunities: Energy and Politics in Russia,” NBR Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 5, National Bureau of Asian Research, 1997. 47 Ibidem. 42 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION production, is very strong and has an influence on all levels of government.48 During the period under review, the Our Home is Russia party that ruled the country at the end of the last millennium was the main instrument in the hands of these lobbyists. This party was even seen as Our Home is Gazprom for representing the interests of the oil company.49 Still, the local oil lobbyists faced two major obsta- cles. First of all, the sector was in need of modern technology, so they could not completely block foreign involvement.50 Also, there was no organizational and ideological unity within the group. Despite the difference in opinion among different ministries on foreign investment, the government in general was interested in attracting FDI into its oil sector, since this would increase government rev- enue through taxes. However, it faced stiff opposition in the Duma. Many parliamentary deputies were used by the local oil lobbyists as means of protection from foreign involvement,51 which clearly represented a clash of interests. So while political interest groups in Azerbaijan succeeded in taking fast and significant steps to open up the way for oil sector FDI, Russian political parties could not reach a single decision on FDI into the country’s oil sector. Some scholars have tried to give a different explanation of the differences in the influence level between the interest groups rather than present the plain interest determinants in these two countries. They believe it is not merely political interest, but cultural and historical factors that generate the difference, which we also view as factors influencing the differences in the countries’ FDI inflow patterns. Russia’s cultural uniqueness is seen as the primary factor of its “inhospitable attitude toward foreign involvement.”52 At least at the beginning of the 1990s, viewed foreign involvement as hostile and an attempt to take over the country, which was completely contrary to the historical pride that Russians have gained throughout history by being one of the strongest nations. A good number of politicians saw the idea of “Western colonization” by foreign investors as a threat to Rus- sia’s natural resources and a way for foreigners to gain those resources at knockdown prices.53 The effects of the Cold War were still present in economic terms. Although the government understood the importance of foreign involvement in the oil sector, many politicians objected to it on the mislead- ing basis of cultural uniqueness and independence. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, did not have any ambitions of the same magnitude. It has histor- ically been under the influence of other nations and, as a result, never viewed foreign involvement as a threat to its independence. Azerbaijan’s interaction with other nations actually promoted foreign investment, since people viewed this as a way to open up relations with other nations. The Azerbai- janis wanted to bolster their independence from Russia, which had colonized Azerbaijan for more than 200 years, and any parallels to Russian heritage were not welcomed in the new state.54 FDI was seen as a good way of attracting foreign attention and becoming free of excessive Russian influence. Contrary to Russian politicians, the viewed foreign involvement as a way of showing the world they were independent and did not rely on any particular country.

Conclusion

The above discussion brings us to the conclusion that, during early independence, Russia and Azerbaijan differed greatly in attracting FDI in general and into their oil sector in particular.

48 See: O. Bayulgen, “Foreign Investment, Oil Curse, and Democratization: A Comparison of Azerbaijan and Russia.” 49 See: P. Rutland, op. cit. 50 See: A. Heinrich, J. Kusznir, H. Pleines, “Foreign Investment and National Interests in the Russian Oil and Gas Industry,” Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2002, pp. 495-507. 51 See: J. Watson, op. cit., pp. 429-455. 52 See: Investment Opportunities in Russia and the CIS, ed. by D. Dyker, The Royal Institute of International Af- fairs, London, 1995. 53 See: J. Watson, op. cit. 54 See: L. Abrahams, T. Dragadze, op. cit. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Despite the fact that Russia was one of the largest oil producers in the period under review, it failed to attract sufficient FDI into its oil sector, which was in great need of investments, losing to Azerbaijan, which outperformed Russia’s FDI inflows manifold. According to our findings, these differences in FDI performance were determined by differences in the political regimes, with Azerbaijan’s leadership-based regime being more favorable to foreign investors than Rus- sia’s hybrid one. Moreover, legislation on PSA, export rights, and taxation was more advanta- geous for foreign oil investors in Azerbaijan than in Russia, providing them with more protection and guarantees, lower taxes, and more favorable export regulations. Despite the fact that Russia did have better legislation on property rights than Azerbaijan, in reality actual property rights protection, particularly in the oil sector, was weak or entirely absent and had a negative effect on Russia’s investment climate in general. Finally, such factors as the differences in interest group policy and the cultural and historical uniqueness of both countries also influenced the differences in FDI patterns, making Azerbaijan better governed, more stable, and more hospitable than Rus- sia for oil foreign investors.

Alexander TVALCHRELIDZE

D.Sc. (Geology and Mineralogy), Full Member of the Georgian Academy of Natural Sciences (Tbilisi, Georgia).

Avtandil SILAGADZE

D.Sc. (Econ.), Corresponding Member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Tbilisi, Georgia).

GEORGIA’S FRESH MINERAL WATER FOR EUROPE

Abstract

his article analyzes the issues relat- several preliminary feasibility parameters of T ing to Georgia’s fresh mineral water this project. The authors think the project supplies, their unproductive use today, will be economically profitable for all the and the daily increase in demand for these interested parties, including Georgia. In resources in Europe. addition to the direct economic benefit, Based on this, the authors offer pos- Georgia will significantly raise its role as a sible alternatives for transporting fresh min- partner of the European Union, which will eral water from Georgia to Europe by help to accelerate its integration into the means of a water pipeline and present EU and NATO. 44 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

In 20-30 years, fresh drinking water will be the most expensive raw material in the world mar- kets. According to the U.N.,1 more than 2.8 billion people today have inadequate access to safe drink- ing water. Europe is also facing serious drinking water shortages. By 2025, the whole of Europe will be experiencing a water crisis, but the problem will be the acutest in Southern Europe and the Medi- terranean Basin.2 There are several reasons for these future irreversible changes3: 1. Exhaustion of Europe’s fresh water reservoirs; 2. Increase in the population and, consequently, in the demand for water; 3. A severe drop in atmospheric precipitation caused by climatic changes, which, in turn, will lead to a water shortage of 5 percent (Central Europe) to 25 percent (Southern Europe). Today, more than 80% of EU inhabitants depend on surface water systems for their water sup- ply, whereby the chemical and bacteriological properties of this water do not meet U.N.4 or EU5 standards due to the pollution of surface water with production wastes and agricultural nitrates.6 So the European Union must urgently look for new sources of drinking water to be delivered to the European market in the next 10-12 years. However, this task will be complicated by the world economic crisis, which has caused a severe cutback in the funding of new global projects.7 Although it escaped the brunt of the global economic crisis, Georgia has also been affected by its consequences: economic growth rates and foreign direct investments have perceptibly dropped, while the inflation rate, foreign debts, negative international trade balance, unemployment level, and number of people living below the poverty line have grown. Among its close neighbors (Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia), Georgia brings up the rear in terms of GDP volume per capita.8 What is more, Georgia’s problems have been put down to both the consequences of the war with Russia and to internal processes. The situation later improved to a certain extent, but it still leaves much to be desired. In 2010, the country’s GDP amounted to $11,663.4 million, which is 8.3% higher than the same index for the previous year, but 8.9% lower than the 2008 level. Twenty-seven percent of GDP is funneled into the real sector (in 2006 this figure was 32.9%), including: agriculture, forestry, hunt- ing and fishing—7.3% (in 2006, it was 11.2%), industry—14.7% (in 2006—14.8%), and construc- tion 5.5% (in 2006—6.9%).9 Georgia has essentially used up the large amounts of financial aid it received in grants and loans after the war with Russia, and there is no hope of acquiring new foreign assistance in the near future. So the answer lies in tapping its unused rich internal national resources. Many studies are devoted to this problem.10

1 See: The Millennium Development Goals Report, Published by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, 2008. 2 See: A. Lalzad, An Overview of Global Water Problems and Solutions, London, 2007. 3 See: European Environment Outlook, EEA Report No. 4/2005, European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, 2005. 4 See: Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality, Third edition, Vol. 1, Recommendations, World Health Organiza- tion, Geneva, 2008. 5 See: EU’s Drinking Water Standards, Water Treatment Solutions, Lenntech, available at [http://www.lenntech. com/applications/drinking/standards/eu-s-drinking-water-standards.htm]. 6 See: Water Pollution, European Commission. Environment, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/]. 7 See, for example: The World Bank Annual Report, The World Bank, Washington DC, 2009; World Economic Outlook—Crisis and Recovery, World Economic and Financial Surveys, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 2009; P. Artus, J.-P Betbèse, C. de Boissieu, G. Capelle-Blanchard, La crise des subprimes, La Documentation française, Paris, 2008, and others. 8 See: World Bank Data Base, available at [http://worldbank.org/indicator/]. 9 Geostat Data Base, available at [http://geostat.ge/GDP/; http://geostat.ge/agriculture/]. 10 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, A. Silagadze, G. Keshelashvili, D. Gegia, Georgia’s Socioeconomic Development Pro- gram, Nekeri, Tbilisi, 2011, 312 pp. (in Georgian); A. Tvalchrelidze, P. Kervalishvili, D. Gegia, S. Esakia, S. Sanadze, Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Georgia possesses more natural raw mineral resources than it needs to meet its internal de- mands.11 And many of these resources are of world significance,12 such as its fresh surface and groundwater, the supplies of which are higher than the resources possessed by the whole of Eu- rope.13 So we have a rare coincidence of interests: Europe needs high quality drinking water, while Georgia is interested in exporting it, whereby enhancing its economic development.

Georgia’s Fresh Mineral Water Resources

Georgia has enormous supplies of fresh surface water, which is the subject of a large number of monographic studies.14 But its underground resources of fresh mineral water are even more attrac- tive.15 Georgia’s total reserves of mineral groundwater amount to 49.2 million cu m/day, 10.2 mil- lion cu m/day of which are used for technical purposes, while 6.503 million cu m/day are plumbed from drawned-out wells.16 Table 1 shows the distribution of these supplies in terms of basins and sources. Apart from the Natakhtari, Bulachauri, and part of the Gejini fields, these supplies are essen- tially not used, and most of Tbilisi, for example, obtains its running water from the Zhinvali res- ervoir.17

Georgia’s Economic Development Priorities: Analysis and Immediate Prospects, Sani, Tbilisi, 2002, 167 pp. (in Geor- gian); A. Tvalchrelidze, “Ekonomicheskaia situatsiia v Gruzii posle russko-gruzinskoi voiny,” in: Psevdokonflikty i kvaz- imirotvorchestvo na Kavkaze, Georgian National Committee of the Helsinki Civil Assembly and the South Caucasian In- stitute of Regional Security, Tbilisi, 2009; V. Papava, “Anatomical Pathology of Georgia’s ,” Current Politics and Economics of the Caucasus Region, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2009, pp. 1-18; V. Papava, “Georgia’s Economy: Post- Revolutionary Development and Post-War Difficulties,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2009, pp. 199-213; A. Si- lagadze, Economic Doctrines, Tbilisi, 2010; A. Silagadze, Aspects of Economic Doctrines in Georgia, Peninsula Univer- sity of Technology, Business and Informatics, California, 2010; idem, “Current Financial and Monetary Trends in Georgia,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 4, Issue 1-2, 2010; A. Silagadze, T. Atanelishvili, Modern State Fi- nances of Georgia, International Academy of Sciences, California, 2010; A. Silagadze, S. Gelashvili, Gegenwärtige Fi- nanz- und Monetäre Aspekte in Georgien, Universität Potsdam, No. G-10, 2009; A. Silagadze, M. Tokmarishvili, Chal- lenges of the Post-Communist Financial-Currency Policy, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York, 2009; T. Basilia, A. Silagadze, T. Chikvadze, Post-Transformation: Georgian Economy at the Threshold of the 21th Century, Tbilisi, 2001. 544 pp. (in Georgian), and others. 11 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, Poleznye iskopaemye i mineralnaia resursnaia baza Gruzii, Rudy i metally, Moscow, 2006, 320 pp. 12 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, Economics of Commodities and Commodity Markets, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York, NY, 2011, 903 pp. 13 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, Poleznye iskopaemye i mineralnaia resursnaia baza Gruzii. 14 See, for example: Prirodnye resursy Gruzinskoi SSR, Vol. IV, Gidroenergeticheskie resursy, GSSR Academy of Sciences, SOPS, USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1962; “Gidroenergeticheskie resursy,” in: Altas Gruz- inskoi SSR, Vakhushti Institute of Georgraphy, GSSR Academy of Sciences, Main Department for Geodesy and Cartogra- phy, Tbilisi, Moscow, 1964; Vodnye resursy Zakavkazia, ed. by G. Svanidze, V. Tsomaia, Gidrometeoizdat, Leningrad, 1988; G. Svanidze, V. Gagua, E. Sukhishvili, Vozobnovliaemye energoresursy Gruzii, Gidrometeoizdat, Leningard, 1987; A. Tvalchrelidze, P. Kervalishvili, D. Gegia, S. Esakia, S. Sanadze, op. cit.; A. Tvadchrelidze, A. Silagadze, G. Keshe- lashvili, D. Gegia, op. cit., and others. 15 See: I. Tsulukidze, L. Kharatishvili, D. Gabechava, N. Tsertsvadze, V. Gvakharia, “Podzemnye vody Gruzii— beloe bogatstvo XXI veka,” Gorny zhurnal, No. 4, 2004; A. Tvalchrelidze, Poleznye iskopaemye i mineralnaia resursnaia baza Gruzii; A. Tvalchrelidze, A. Silagadze, G. Keshelashvili, D. Gegia, op. cit. 16 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, Poleznye iskopaemye i mineralnaia resursnaia baza Gruzii. 17 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, A. Silagadze, G. Keshelashvili, D. Gegia, op. cit. 46 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1

Supplies of Fresh Mineral Groundwater in Georgia

Basin/Source Territory Discharge, cu m/day

Bzyb Abkhazian Autonomous Republic 110,600

Baklanovka Abkhazian Autonomous Republic 60,100

Gumista Abkhazian Autonomous Republic 319,700

Kodori Abkhazian Autonomous Republic 320,000

Psou Abkhazian Autonomous Republic 30,000

Kintrishi Abkhazian Autonomous Republic 198,700

Tekhuri Samegrelo and Upper Svanetia 110,600

Gejini Ajarian Autonomous Republic 20,000

Natanebi Guria 6,500

Ozurgeti Guria 93,700

Gubistskali Imeretia 388,000

Kvirila Imeretia 51,900

Samtredia Imeretia 47,100

Liakhvi Shida 250,600

Khashuri Shida Kartli 28,500

Kvaisa Shida Kartli 12,100

Edisi Shida Kartli 51,840

Bulachauri Mtskheta-Mtianeti 190,000

Choporti-Misaktsieli Mtskheta-Mtianeti 140,000

Natakhtari Mtskheta-Mtianeti 302,000

Ksani Mtskheta-Mtianeti 170,100

Tianeti Mtskheta-Mtianeti 73,800

Mukhrani Mtskheta-Mtianeti 586,600

Alazani Kakhetia 938,200

Lagodekhi- Kakhetia 129,600

Bursa Kakhetia 92,600

Napareuli Kakhetia 29,600

Daba Samtskhe-Javakhetia 151,500 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1 (continued)

Basin/Source Territory Discharge, cu m/day

Ablari Samtskhe-Javakhetia 79,800

Bezhano Samtskhe-Javakhetia 33,700

Ikhtila Samtskhe-Javakhetia 38,000

Marneuli Kvemo Kartli 684,700

Gardabani Kvemo Kartli 88,100

Tsalki Group Kvemo Kartli 527,900

Bolnisi Kvemo Kartli 55,600

Dmanisi Kvemo Kartli 91,900

TOTAL 6,503,640

Most of the designated supplies are distributed in four basins of groundwater located as shown on Fig. 1 (on p. 47), the total supplies of which are given in Table 2. Table 2

Total Supplies of Georgia’s Fresh Groundwater Basins

Basin Discharge, cu m/day

Kolkhida 1,756,900

Tirifoni 2,147,200

Javakheti 830,900

Kakheti 1,190,000

TOTAL 5,925,000

The volcanic basin contains large supplies of ultra fresh, almost distilled water of post-volcanic origin.18 The water of the artesian basins is characterized by a healthy degree of miner- alization and has a rich ionic composition. It is non-radioactive and does not contain admixtures of metals, nitrates, or toxic compounds. The typical chemical composition of Georgia’s fresh mineral groundwater is given in Table 3 (on p. 48).19 According to the available data,20 Europe will need an additional 120 million cu m (1214 liters) of running water a year. These resources could easily be mobilized in Georgia, since they amount to only 5% of the supplies of fresh water from the drawned-out wells. Moreover, since mineral water is

18 See: I. Tsulukidze, L. Kharatishvili, D. Gabechava, N. Tsertsvadze, V. Gvakharia, op. cit. 19 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, A. Silagadze, G. Keshelashvili, D. Gegia, op. cit.; I. Tsulukidze, L. Kharatishvili, D. Ga- bechava, N. Tsertsvadze, V. Gvakharia, op. cit.; A. Tvalchrelidze, Poleznye iskopaemye i mineralnaia resursnaia baza Gruzii. 20 See: European Environment Outlook. 48 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Figure 1

Kakheti

artesianbasin basin Tirifoni artesian basin volcanic Javakheti Basins of Georgia’s Mineral Groundwater

Kolkhida artesian basin

a renewable resource,21 if the basins are adequately managed and their permanent piezometric mon- itoring is carried out, these resources will essentially be inexhaustible.

21 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, Development of a Geological-Economic System for Governmental Management of Geor- gian Mineral Resources, John D. & Catherine T. McArthur Foundation, Tbilisi, 1995. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3

General Chemical Properties of Georgia’s Fresh Mineral Groundwater

Unit of Index Value Measurement

Mineralization g/l 0.07-0.22

Cations

Ca2+ mg/l 10-40

Mg2+ mg/l 2.0-9.0

Na+ mg/l 2.5-12

Anions − HCO 3 mg/l 40-77 Cl – mg/l 2.0-12.0

2− HCO 4 mg/l <40

However, in order to fully exclude the possibility of supply exhaustion and reduce the impact of possible accidents at head water intake facilities on water supply reliability, we propose creating a structure of 7 water intake facilities located in all three artesian basins (see Fig. 2). Table 4 shows the amount of water that must be mobilized on average in each basin.

Table 4

Water Resources Mobilized for Europe

Mobilized Water Resources Basin cu m/year cu m/day cu m/min

Kolkhida 27,342,150 74, 910 52.02

Tirifoni 60,874,700 166, 780 115.82

Kakheti 38,974,700 106, 780 74.15

TOTAL 127,191,550 348, 470 241.99

Water Transportation to Europe

Over the past 20 years, Georgia has accumulated sufficient experience in state-of-the-art water bottling and its export abroad. The leading companies in the area are Georgian Glass and Mineral Water, Gewa, Racha Springs, Sairme Springs, and a few others.22 The amount of water to be trans- ported is approximately 500,000-fold higher than the aggregate capacity of these companies. So,

22 See: A. Tvalchrelidze, A. Silagadze, G. Keshelashvili, D. Gegia, op. cit. 50 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Figure 2 – Water Intake Proposed Layout of Water Intake Facility Distribution

whereas there is no difficulty in mobilizing water resources, it being a purely technical problem, se- rious obstacles arise when it comes to delivering the water to the European market. In principle, the task could be solved in two ways: 1. By mobilizing a tanker fleet, or 2. By building a Georgia-Europe pipeline. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

According to simple calculations, a tanker fleet of 400 tankers with a deadweight of 40,000 tons will be needed to transport the designated amount of water. Aside from the fact that this is a very expensive and essentially non-executable alternative, according to the available data,23 the Bosporus only has the capacity to allow another 50 million tons of cargo through its straits, which is five-fold less than the amount of water that needs to be transported. So the only alternative is to build a pipeline system. This possibility also has several advantages: 1. Stable water deliveries; 2. Low net cost of water in Europe; 3. Flexible system of water transportation management; 4. No environmental risks; 5. High transportation safety; 6. Low political risks. There are two possible pipeline routes, which are shown in Fig. 3. Figure 3

Possible Routes of the Georgia-Europe Fresh Mineral Water Pipeline

First route

Second route

23 See: Focus on Ports, Palgrave Macmillan Publ., London, 2007; Factual Report on the European Port Sector, European Sea Ports Organization, Brussels, 2007. 52 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The first route passes through Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Rumania, and Hungary and ends in Austria. The most elemental analysis reveals the following negative features of this route:

1. The route crosses conflict regions—Abkhazia and Transnistria; 2. Russia will play a key role in managing the water resources; 3. The route passes through geographic zones with a severe winter climate; 4. The signing of international agreements will encounter serious difficulties. The second route crosses Turkey, Greece, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia and also ends in Austria. Its positive aspects are:

1. The route largely passes through regions with a subtropical climate; 2. Countries of the European Union, NATO, and their partners will be the interested parties in the project; 3. The route will mainly pass through territories with developed infrastructure;

Figure 4

Possible Inter-European System of Water Distribution Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

4. Water resource management will be carried out exclusively by the interested parties; 5. This route is 800 km shorter than the first; 6. It will be easy for the interested parties to come to terms and sign intergovernmental agree- ments. What is more, if the second route is chosen, it will be easy to develop a pipeline system that will deliver the water directly to the end consumer, as shown in Fig. 4, for example.

Several Preliminary Feasibility Parameters

In contrast to oil, leaks from the pipeline will not be detrimental to the environment. There- fore, planning and building the pipeline will not entail those difficulties that the operators of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline encountered.24 For example, the pipeline can be laid above ground along the sea coast without entailing environmental risks. According to our estimates, the pipeline system should consist of four (main and reserve) parallel pipelines with a pipe diameter of 700 inches (178 cm), in which the water will be under a pressure of 50 atm. The pipeline will be of the

Table 5

Main Project Indices

Index Unit of Measurement Value

Technical water loss % 2

Amount of water reaching the consumer cu m/year 124,647,719

Preliminary price of the water $/l 0.01

Annual sales volume $ 1,246,477 190

Operational expenses $m/year 246

Nominal income $b/year 1

Planning time years 2

Construction time years 4

Planning cost $m 150

Construction cost $b 9

Investment recoupment time years 15

24 See: R. Goodland, Oil and Gas Pipelines. Social and Environmental Impact Assessment: State of Art, Interna- tional Association of Impact Assessment, Frargo, ND, 2005; V. Papava, “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Georgia,” in: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, Vienna, 2005; J. Elkind, “Economic Implications of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” in: The Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, ed. by S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, The Central Asia-Cau- casus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, Uppsala, 2005; B. Inanc, O. Yildiz, Oil Spill Response Preparedness in BTC Crude Oil Pipeline: Turkish Section, Botaº International Ltd., Ceyhan, Turkey, 2005, and others. 54 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION usual design and be equipped with a SCADA supervisory control and monitoring system.25 Table 5 (on p. 53) presents several preliminary feasibility parameters of the project.

Main Conclusions

There is no other alternative to the proposed approach—Europe will be unable to find another cheap source of water of the required quality. So sooner or later, this project is bound to be imple- mented. The project is economically profitable for all the interested parties, including Georgia. In addi- tion to the direct economic benefit, Georgia will significantly raise its role as a partner of the Europe- an Union, which will help to accelerate its integration in the EU and NATO.

25 See: T. Callan, Pipeline Technology Today and Tomorrow, ÖGEW DGMK Herbstveranstaltung, Vienna, 2007.

Solomon PAVLIASHVILI

D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor at the Georgian Technical University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS AND GEORGIA

Abstract

his article examines the special fea- ticipate more actively in the economy, which T tures of regularly occurring economic envisages using corresponding mecha- crises, the emergence of which forms nisms for overcoming the consequences of a consistent pattern. It also studies their dif- crises (drop in the production level, unem- ferential influence on the national economy ployment, and so on). For example, the of different countries, particularly Georgia. economic crisis of the 1930s was overcome Adhering to the Keynesian theory, the by the direct use of state regulation instru- author believes that the state should par- ments.

Introduction

The current world economic crisis was directly caused by the irresponsible and, in many cas- es, unpredictable actions of American mortgage companies, as well as the incorrect use of financial derivatives (futures, swaps, forwards, and so on) and the erroneous assessments of international rating agencies (Standard&Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s). Moreover, the economic policy conducted by the U.S. government in 2000-2007 in fact led to a dangerous gap between the volume of large Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION investment banks’ equity and the resources drawn by them, the sale of low quality mortgage bonds, and so on. This article shows that the world economic crisis had an insignificant effect on Georgia. This was mainly due to the country’s low integration into the global economic processes and the assistance it received from the international community and world financial institutions (totaling $4.5 billion). The article looks at the positive aspects of economic crises and also gives recommendations for overcoming them and creating a model of crisis management.

Economic Crisis as a Consistent Pattern and the Keynesian Approach

Economic crises affect different countries in different ways. This largely depends on the level of their integration into the global economic processes, their foreign trade balance (price ratio of export to import), the existence of transnational companies, and the financial-economic state of neighboring countries. Such factors as geopolitical position and whether the authorities have developed mecha- nisms and ways to protect the country from economic threats are also very important. The severity of an economic crisis in any given country is indicated by the real growth rates of the gross domestic product (GDP), the inflation and unemployment level, the population’s confi- dence in the financial-banking system, the volume of investments and revenue received from them, the degree to which government obligations are carried out, and so on. As we know, “in conditions of stagnation, a relatively lengthy slowdown in production and trade occurs accompanied by an increase in the number of unemployed, a decrease in salaries, and a drop in the standard of living. The government is expected to withdraw the economy from this state and tries, by means of budget financing, to keep the country’s banking and entire economic system afloat.”1 When the drop in the above-mentioned indices is prolonged (two quarters in a row), the economy is said to be in a state of recession; if these indices decline even further, this leads to a depression. The economic crises that began during the first half of the 19th century occurred every 8-10 years, but in the 20th century they began to last longer. In the 1930s, British economist John Maynard Key- nes developed a theory which claimed that the economy develops in cycles. He also precisely defined the main principles of crisis: a drop in the profit rate, ambiguity in the securities market, and various objective and subjective factors relating to loss of confidence in the future. John Maynard Keynes authored the theory of macroeconomic balance. His General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was based on macro-sectoral research. He focused particular atten- tion on the problem of dynamic balance and stability. The main thought in General Theory is that the market mechanism is unable to resolve all eco- nomic growth problems, while wages and prices are not flexible enough. In his work, John Maynard Keynes also focused attention on the balanced ratio of investment to saving and profit. In his opinion, government intervention in the functioning of the economy is needed to avoid an acute crisis, de- valuation, and unemployment. John Maynard Keynes believed that after World War I capitalism was characterized by a low income level which, as he explained it, led to the accumulation of a huge amount of capital and the failure of lucrative investments. The trend toward a decrease in general consumption prevented profit from reaching even the minimum level for ensuring capital efficiency. Such specific conditions in a “rich society” lead to mass unemployment, while existing production capacities are not exploited to their fullest extent. These factors are the direct reason for a crisis.

1 V. Papava, “Problema zombirovaniia postkommunisticheskoi nekroekonomiki,” Vestnik Instituta Kennana v Ros- sii, Issue 15, 2009, p. 38. 56 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

According to Keynes, the Great Depression was also caused by the shortage of efficient de- mand, since savings were not spent on consumption (including investments) and remained in curren- cy form. He came to the conclusion that monetary management is of absolutely no use in overcoming a crisis. Investment must be encouraged with the help of a government budget policy (increase in government investments); this is precisely the way to determine the volume of must-take resources and establish taxes for their owners. Keynes also recognized that the government’s involvement in the economy and an increase in its functions was the way to avoid crisis and achieve successful functioning of the market economy.2 But for many years the International Monetary Fund and World Bank insisted that the former Soviet countries stop all donations from the state budget and eliminate all tax exemptions,3 which entirely contradicts Keynes’ theory. Dynamic equilibrium and the neo-Keynesian theory of economic growth were developed on the basis of Keynes’ theory. The models elaborated by Roy Harrod, Evsey Domar, Nicholas Kaldor, and E. Hansen are extremely important. They are based on Keynes’ idea that the main condition of mac- roeconomic balance is equilibrium between investment and saving.4 In 1936, John Hicks published an article called “Mr. Keynes and the Classics: A Suggested In- terpretation,” in which he looked at the possibility of combining the Keynesian view with the tradi- tional provisions of neoclassicism. Hicks assessed the Keynesian model as a particular case of the economic theory in crisis conditions.5 The Keynesian principle of economic regulation by the state was based on a synthesis with the neoclassical economic theories. Budget policy was recognized as a regulating instrument, particularly in issues relating to aggregate income and expenditure, demand for and regulation of monetary manage- ment, acquisition of profit in the open market, and the use of taxation. Use of this kind of regulation in today’s economy is called the “structural-production (gradualist) model of macro stabilization ... it com- bines in a unique way both Keynesianism and the main postulates of the neoclassical theories.”6 Along with Hicks, Paul Samuelson, Don Patinkin, Franco Modigliani, and James Tobin also deserve recognition for developing the idea of neoclassical synthesis. In his book, Paul Samuelson notes that neoclassical synthesis unites monetary and fiscal policy, which slows down a severe eco- nomic slump, and ultimately eliminates the enormous difference between the macroeconomic and microeconomic theories.7 The economic crisis of the 1930s proved to be the first extremely instructive lesson for the world economy. The reasons for the Great Depression differed from those that led to today’s global econom- ic crisis and, what is more, the consequences of the latter have been much more severe. In the 1930s, demand abruptly fell (mainly due to the population’s low purchasing power), which led to the accumulation of a large amount of unsold “spoiled” goods. This led to the mass bank- ruptcy of commercial, industrial, and transportation companies, as well as large banking structures; there was a catastrophic drop in the cost of securities. In 1932, the volume of U.S. industrial produc- tion fell by 46%; iron production decreased by 79%, steal output by 76%, and car manufacturing by

2 See: R.F. Harrod, K teorii ekonomicheskoi dinamiki, Moscow, 1959, pp. 118-137 (R.F. Harrod, Toward a Dy- namic Economics, Macmillan, London, 1948). 3 See: V. Papava, “Finansovyy krizis i postkommunisticheskiy kapitalizm,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarod- nye otnosheniia, No. 8, 2009, p. 91. 4 See: J.M. Keynes, Obshchaia teoria zaniatosti, protsenta i deneg, Moscow, 1995, p. 62 (J.M. Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936). 5 See: E.G. Dolan, C.D. Campbell, R.G. Campbell, Dengi, banki i denezhno-kreditnaia politika, Moscow, 1996, pp. 332-339 (C.D. Campbell, R.G. Campbell, E.G. Dolan, Money, Banking, and Monetary Policy, Harcourt Scholl, Orlan- do, 1987). 6 R. Asatiani, “The Georgian Economy in an Impasse of Non-Market Capitalism,” Ekonomika, 2009, p. 27 (in Georgian). 7 See: P. Samuelson, Ekonomicheskaia teoriia, Moscow, 1964, p. 396. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

80%. In 1929-1933, 135,000 commercial, industrial, and financial companies collapsed, 5,760 banks went bankrupt, and in 1932 alone, corporate losses amounted to $3.2 billion. Foreign trade also dropped 3.1-fold, half of the country’s population was unemployed, and the economic indices re- turned to the 1911 level. After arming themselves with the Keynesian theory, the U.S. authorities actively intervened in the economy and began to carry out radical measures. In particular, the government began “saving” the financial-banking system by taking steps to raise its stability (the banking system was optimized, the number of banks dropped from 25,000 to 15,000); the export of gold was prohibited. The state took charge of regulating the national economy; to accomplish this, corresponding services were cre- ated in agriculture, industry, and other branches. Carrying out the above-mentioned complex measures enabled the country to withdraw from its catastrophic situation.

Reasons for Today’s World Economic Crisis and Ways to Overcome It

The U.S. mortgage crisis is considered the direct reason for today’s world economic crisis. The lack of market transparency, as well as the merging and intermixing of credit and investment func- tions made it easier for consumers to obtain loans and caused an abrupt increase in the dollar mass in circulation; complete collapse of the banking sector followed. There was also a crisis on the stock exchange caused by the incorrect use of financial derivatives (futures, options, swaps, forwards, and so on), a noticeable increase in the price of oil, and not always correct assessments by international rating agencies (Standard&Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s). It should be noted that the Federal Reserve System and other U.S. regulating structures remained completely inactive during the crisis. The economic policy carried out by the U.S. in 2000-2007 helped the crisis along to a certain extent. In 2004, well-known economist and Nobel Prize-Winner Paul Krugman pointed out directly in his monograph The Great Unraveling that “the U.S. government has made inconsistent promises— promises of benefits to future retirees, repayment to those who buy its debt, and tax rates far below what is necessary to pay for all of it. Something will have to give, and it won’t be pretty. In fact, I think the United States is setting itself up for a … financial crisis.”8 Just when the U.S was celebrating greater economic stability and Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economics believed that the “central problem of depression prevention has been resolved,” signs of a crisis began to show (beginning in 2006). As Paul Krugman noted, “at that time, the professionals of the economic sector were dozing off.”9 But American neo-Keynesian economist, Nobel Prize-Winner Joseph Stiglitz upholds a differ- ent point of view; he thinks that globalization and interpenetration of national economies has been an additional factor in aggravating the crisis. He gives great importance to maintaining the transparency of world, national, and private financial institutions, adhering to general standards, and creating sin- gle world currency reserves. The crisis that unfolded demanded synchronous actions from the G-20 countries. But some European countries did not think it necessary for the state to intervene in the economy; nevertheless, they were compelled to take certain steps.

8 P. Krugman, The Great Unraveling, WW Norton, 2003, p. 136. 9 R. Asatiani, “The World Economic Crisis and the Mainstream of Economic Theory,” Social Economics, No. 1, 2011, p. 45 (in Georgian). 58 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

For example, Germany, which had no intention of forking out large sums, planned to spend 31 billion Euros at the first stage to stimulate the economy, but this amount was rejected as being too small. Later a stimulation packet for 50 billion Euros was offered, plus the guarantee of 100 billion Euros for those banks that could issue loans to help private companies. The state did all it could to save the huge Opel car industry. Talks were held with General Motors, Chrysler, and others to accom- plish this. Other steps included reducing income tax from 15.5% to 14.9%, granting 18 billion Euros to develop infrastructure (for two years), allotting each family a one-time benefit of 100 Euros (for each child), and increasing subsidization in order to allow temporarily closed enterprises to give their workers leave. Moreover, a program started in the country that envisaged paying 2,500 Euros to peo- ple who turned in an old car (9 years and older) and purchased a new one. Even though the German Chancellor was a little late in taking the above-mentioned steps, they raised her rating and promoted her victory at the elections. On 13 February, 2009, U.S. Congress approved the 100-day plan proposed by newly elected President Barack Obama to reduce taxes and issue additional resources to save the economy. This plan was estimated at $787 billion and envisaged carrying out the following measures: streamlining the financial and banking structure, assisting large car companies, creating more than 4 million jobs, purchasing non-liquid assets, and lowering interest rates for a certain contingent of citizens. However, despite the measures taken, unemployment in the U.S. today has reached a level of 9.4%; over the past 50 years, this index has never been higher than 5%. The number of work hours was reduced from 39 to 36, and in September 2009 alone, 263,000 people lost their jobs. In terms of overcoming the consequences of the crisis, Japan, despite its liberal policy, is not that far ahead of the above-mentioned countries. The country’s government issued banks $270 billion in order to extend the terms of loans taken out by the population and various companies; $20 billion was rendered in the form of one-time assistance to families with average and low incomes. But Japanese experts say that the state has done nothing to resolve the problems related to the crisis that began as early as 2007. There can be no doubt that the investment policy conducted by several states has invigorated the global economic environment, but there is another side to the coin expressed in higher inflation. For example, in the 1940s-1950s, the role of monetary management was totally ignored. It was thought that there was some tenuous connection between investment and money supply. So the economic sta- bilization programs primarily envisaged investment in the state budget, which, in turn, gave rise to a new wave of inflation in the 1970s-1980s. On the one hand, mass investment injections promote a revival of the economy and reduction in unemployment, while on the other, they stimulate an increase in the inflation processes we are seeing today. The many years of experience of countries with a market economy shows that the market en- sures an increase in economic efficiency, on the one hand, while it places exorbitant social outlays on people, primarily manifested in an increase in the unemployment level, on the other.10 Several G-20 summits were held in order to elaborate a unified approach to overcoming the global financial crisis. Despite some differences in opinion, the countries’ leaders managed to reach a consensus on the most important issues, in particular state stimulation of the economy, tighter reg- ulation of and greater transparency in the activity of international financial institutions, and minimi- zation of protectionism in trade and other industries. Five trillion dollars were allotted to save the world economy and more than $1 trillion went directly to the International Monetary Fund. In addition, it was decided that the IMF would use part of its international reserves to assist poor countries. It is worth noting that the crisis helped to bring separate regions of the world closer together, intensify cooperation among already existing associations, and promote unified coordinated deci-

10 See: S.P. Pavliashvili, “Osnovnye priznaki regulirovania rynka truda v regione,” Sotsialnyy vestnik (Moscow), No. 3 (17), 2004, p. 92. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sions. For example, the OPEC countries (Iran, , Qatar, Algeria, Angola, Venezuela, the UAE, and others), which control more than 70% of the world oil reserves, are trying to draw Mexico, Russia, and others into their fold. Prospects have also been noted for creating large transnational companies; for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is advancing the idea of creating a unified energy market with Europe.

Influence of the World Crisis on the Georgian Economy

Since 1990, the economic and political system in Georgia has been undergoing changes that resulted in the economy transferring to market methods and the beginning of a chronic economic and social crisis, which is still going on in one form or another today. For example, compared to 1990, the volume of the country’s GDP in 2010 amounted to only 65%. The size of GDP per capita amounts to 82%, while employment reaches 55%. There is no point talking about salaries, real incomes, or other indices of the standard of living. This crisis, which has been manifested in one way or another throughout the entire 20 years of Georgia’s independence, has been directly inherited from the economic situation of the Soviet Union; the same processes are also going on in some of the East European countries. The data presented above show that since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been an unprec- edented drop in production in Georgia (by almost four-fold), which was caused by the destruction of external and internal ties, the inefficiency of the current economic mechanism, unfavorable political events, the civil war, ethnic conflicts, and so on.11 In this way, the centralized economy and undemocratic management have been replaced with political and economic independence. It is no secret that the recommendations of international financial institutions have frequently been mandatory, while the economic changes in the country have been dis- tinguished by their absence of pattern. Georgia was not ready for rapid economic changes; it did not have the necessary experience or corresponding legislative base, not to mention market institutions. The radical changes brought with them an extended economic slump, which was caused by several objective reasons (there were also subjective reasons, but their influence was not as significant). The world economic crisis did not hit Georgia as hard as it might have, which is largely due to the country’s relatively low integration into the world economy. Georgia is a net importer country (its import is almost five times higher than its export), while the products the republic exports do not enjoy particular demand in the world market. Georgia has received a large amount of aid ($4.5 billion) from the international community and financial institutions, which made it possible to retain the lari exchange rate, deflate the inflation processes, and reach a certain level of economic stability. It should be noted that the country’s econ- omy has suffered more from the combat action than from the global economic crisis. One expert justifiably said that the country was saved by the conference in Brussels, at which many European states expressed their willingness to help war-torn Georgia. This gave rise to the “Paradox of War.”12 “Georgia did in fact need [this assistance] since not only the war, but also the global financial crisis and some other factors had placed the country’s economy in the most difficult circumstances… This mon- ey helped to stave off serious misfortunes,” thinks economic expert Nodar Khaduri.13

11 See: G. Malashkhia, Ekonomika chelovechnaia, St. Petersburg, Tbilisi, 2009, p. 245. 12 V. Papava, Economic Transformation and the Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis in the Southern Caucasus, in: Non-Traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus, ed. by M. Aydin, IOS Press BV, Amsterdam, 2011, pp. 23-25. 13 See: “Ekonomiku Gruzii spasla voina,” available at [http://ãðóçîâèê.su/article.php?ID=13771]. 60 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In 2004, foreign direct investments in Georgia amounted to $499 million, in 2005 to $450 mil- lion (the reduced amount was related to completion of the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline), in 2006 to $1,190 million, and in 2007 to $2,041. In 2008, the investments coming into Georgia amounted to $1,564, which was $600 million less compared to the previous year. The reason for this was the August hostilities. In 2009 and 2010, the volume of investments significantly dropped and amounted to $658 and $500 million, respectively. This was due to the global economic crisis which led to a 30% cutback in foreign investments throughout the world. In the past few years, the state’s political will has been instrumental in increasing the amount of investment. All of the state institutions took part in resolving this issue. Economic reforms were carried out in the country aimed at reducing and optimizing taxes, managing inflation processes, simplifying and reducing the number of licenses and permits, alleviating the registration of real estate and taxes, as well as full engagement of the law on bankruptcy. In order to avoid double taxation, corresponding agreements were drawn up with 26 countries, which helped to raise the country’s investment appeal. This was confirmed by the IFC Doing Business-2010 report that presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 183 econo- mies, among which Georgia occupies 11th place; Armenia ranks 43rd, Azerbaijan 33rd, and Russia 120th. The U.S., Hong Kong, New Zealand, and others are the leaders.14 The fact that the often acts as the political guarantor for implementing serious projects is extremely important. In order to stimulate the economy, there are plans to make investments amounting to $750 million from the Georgian budget in 2011; up to $320 million of them will be spent on road infrastructure. The program that envisages including the banking sector in the project to rehabilitate Old Tbi- lisi, stimulating building companies, keeping jobs, and so on is extremely important. Making invest- ments from the budget may not be entirely institutionally correct, but we should not forget that the country is facing difficult economic challenges and must do everything possible to overcome the consequences of the crisis and promote economic growth. It should also be noted that all the leading countries of the world (beginning with the U.S. and ending with Japan) at one time used some form of economic stimulation. So it is not entirely correct to say that the state should not intervene in the investment process. Despite the above-mentioned positive changes being made in recent years and the recovery of the investment climate, we cannot help but note some negative factors that are partially hindering the development of business and inflow of investments and are therefore of detriment to the country’s economy. They include: the unresolved problem of Georgia’s territorial integrity, the hostilities in August 2008, the protracted domestic political tension, the Russian trade embargo (on alcoholic bev- erages and mineral water), the infringement on private property, the underdeveloped stock exchange, the elimination of the anti-monopoly service (it was restored only in March 2011), the weak business associations, and so on. The biggest problems facing the country’s economy are the high inflation and unemployment growth rates. Despite the investment boom, since 2004 inflation has been expressed in single digits (if we do not count 2006, when it reached 11%). In April 2011, annual inflation amounted to 13.5%; such a high level has not been seen for almost 15 years. The price of food has increased enormously (up to 28%): for vegetables and legumes by 36.5%, for vegetable oil and fats by 34.5%, and for bread and cereal products by 25.8% (while meat also went up by almost as much). Prices also went up on trans- port, and the cost of medication and fuel has also risen significantly.

14 Among the former Soviet countries, Georgia was in first place, while Tajikistan and Ukraine are at the bottom of the list; China ranks 83rd, outstripping the other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. It should be noted that the rating was compiled on the basis of indicators that reflect a company’s (or enterprise’s) business activity in terms of starting a business, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, and closing a business. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Inflation is largely caused by dependence on import, since the domestic market cannot provide consumers with locally manufactured products. The situation is also aggravated by the fact that both import and the consumer market are monopolized, since “after elimination of the antimonopoly serv- ice, not only were state guarantees cancelled, but lucrative industries were legally monopolized.”15 For example, the medical sphere is a closed production cycle that includes the manufacture (im- port) and sale of medical preparations, as well as a network of medical institutions and insurance companies. In order to regulate prices and not fall victim to “conspiracy,” certain sectors must be de- monopolized. In so doing, it should not be forgotten that the country’s per capita GDP amounts to $3,000, which is three-fold lower than the average world index. What is more, the unstable political situation in Georgia’s separatist territories is preventing it from fulfilling its function as a transit country, that is, the republic cannot fully realize the opportuni- ties related to its advantageous geographic position. All the above-mentioned factors are having an unfavorable effect on the economic status of the republic’s population.

Conclusion

We believe that in the context of the economic crisis, the state could create new budget stimuli for supporting and implementing innovation processes. The positive aspects of the crisis will make it pos- sible to carry out full democratization of state institutions, make progress toward and search for new ways to manage the economy that envisage free price formation and healthy competition, as well as de- monopolization of certain industrial enterprises. “For Georgia (as for any other country), it is important that international financial institutions not only patch up the holes in the budget, but also hold intelligent consultations. Whereas suffering the government’s mistakes is clearly detrimental to the country.”16 In order to prevent anticipated crises and avoid their negative consequences, Georgia much have a precisely formulated anticrisis program that focuses primarily on developing national produc- tion and substituting imported goods with locally manufactured products. Monetary management must be developed that will promote a decrease in interest rates, stimulate business development, and create new jobs (today’s interest rates are almost 8-10-fold higher than the corresponding indices of advanced countries, which is hindering the country’s economic development). In order to ensure its economic security, the country must draw up a strategy in which both the present reality and the future processes, both in the region and in the world, are taken into account. Economic entities must have detailed information about the policy of the government and Cen- tral Bank in order to draw up a painless anti-inflation policy. This policy should be made public be- fore inflation expectations are formed; the state must in no way lose the economic entities’ confidence in the government and Central Bank. Georgia’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) was of immense importance in promoting full-fledged integration into the international economic system and bringing the country closer to Western standards. This was preceded by lengthy preparatory work. The republic’s main goal is to ensure freer trade movement and avoid undesirable by-effects, one of which is the existence of non-trade barriers. A positive result of Georgia joining the WTO is that domestic goods and services have easy access to the world market. Its membership in the organization has given the republic most favored nation status in trade with 152 countries.

15 T. Akubardia, Economic Policy: Theoretic and Practical Aspects, Tbilisi, 2008, p. 46 (in Georgian). 16 V. Papava, “’Rozovye oshibki’ MVF i Vsemirnogo banka v Gruzii,” Voprosy ekonomiki (Moscow), No. 3, 2009, p. 152. 62 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Rapprochement with Europe, whose GDP amounts to approximately $13 trillion, should be a priority strategic benchmark for Georgia. It must become more actively involved in the European integration processes. This could be promoted by attracting investments, participating in the activity of transnational organizations, intensifying trade and economic relations, and creating joint ventures. It would also be expedient to join the EU’s economic policy decisions relating to agriculture, trade, transport, and other branches. The European Union initiated speeding up the transfer to a free trade regime with Georgia, which is extremely important since it will help the republic’s products to gain access to the European market. The Charter of Strategic Partnership drawn up between the U.S. and Georgia also deserves a positive assessment. In addition to other things, this document envisages intensifying trade and eco- nomic cooperation, which will promote market reforms and liberalization, help to stabilize economic growth, and ensure the creation of new jobs. Moreover, the U.S. will help Georgia to carry out post- war reconstruction and financial stabilization. According to the Charter, Georgia will gain greater access to the U.S.’s preferential trade sys- tem and the possibility of entering a free trade agreement between the two countries will be consid- ered, which will promote a rise in Georgian export. An agreement will also be reached on expanding, protecting, and encouraging bilateral investments.

Elene CHIKOVANI

Ph.D. (Econ.), Professor, School of Business Administration (SBA) (Tbilisi, Georgia).

Mariam AVALIANI

MBA, Project Manager, LEPL Educational and Scientific Infrastructure Development Agency (ESIDA), Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia, Marketing and Project Management Instructor, Georgian-American University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION IN GEORGIA: CHANGES, OUTCOMES, AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Abstract

ince 2004, Georgia has been carrying system. The country intends to bring cur- S out systemic reform aimed at mod- rent legislation into harmony with Europe- ernizing the old, corrupted, customs an legislative regulations, increase reve- Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION nue mobilization through improved cus- successful outcomes, and the future per- toms administration, simplify customs pro- spectives. The first results are encourag- cedures, and refine the customer culture. ing and prove that the customs moderni- Georgia has been applying numerous in- zation strategy has been properly concep- novative approaches throughout this proc- tualized and implemented. However, due to ess. The article focuses on the important the new challenges of today’s world and challenges in the customs system, the cru- Georgia’s geopolitical role in these process- cial transformations and innovations imple- es, further efforts must be made to form a mented during the reformation process, the safe, liberal, and open customs regime.

Introduction

Since independence, the overriding objective of Georgia’s economic policies has been to create and develop a market economy through privatization of state-owned enterprises, deregulation of pric- es, and liberalization of its trade and investment regimes. Much of this was achieved when Georgia established a legislative basis for competitive markets by deregulating prices, rescinding exclusive rights granted to certain economic agents, abolishing restrictions on competition in certain activities, and cutting back on subsidized credits to state-owned enterprises. The trade and trade-related policies pursued during the review period have built on these achievements, helping to bring Georgia’s legal system into harmony with international regulations by introducing or amending legislation in key trade-related areas such as customs. The revision was aimed at simplifying customs procedures and harmonizing both customs legislation and procedures with the European Community Customs Code and the revised Kyoto Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures. Pursuant to the agreements signed with the WTO and European Union, Georgia has pledged to bring customs legislation, procedures, and rates into compliance with WTO and EU regulations, thus creat- ing unified and simplified procedures for importers, exporters, and freight forwarders.

Strategy and Tasks of the Customs Reforms in Georgia

The foundation of customs reform is defined by a number of strategic documents adopted by the government of Georgia: the Strategy of Development of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia and Di- rections of International Assistance for 2007-2011,1 the Public Sector Financial Management Strate- gy for 2009-2013,2 and the Border Management Strategy of Georgia3 approved by Decree No. 59 of 4 February, 2008 of the President of Georgia. The top priority vectors of the European Neighborhood Policy and Integrated Border Manage- ment model created by the EU member states are the main basis for the border management strategy elaborated in Georgia. Meanwhile, specificities proper to Georgia were taken into consideration. Georgian border management strategy is based on common border management model, consist- ing of 4 steps.4 The above-mentioned model includes all the necessary measures for effective border

1 See: Strategy of Development of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia and Directions of International Assistance for 2007-2011, Tbilisi, Georgia, March 2007, 19 pp. 2 See: Public Sector Financial Management Strategy for 2009-2013, Ministry of Finance of Georgia, Tbilisi, Geor- gia, 2009, 19 pp. 3 See: Border Management Strategy of Georgia, approved by the Presidential Decree No. 59, 4 February, 2008, 43 pp. 4 See: Ibid., p. 7. 64 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION management. At each stage of the model, cooperation and collaboration at the inter-agency, intra- agency, and international levels are of crucial importance.5 The main aspects of intra-agency reform are as follows: in 2007, tax, customs, and financial police departments were merged into one unified structure—the Revenue Service of Georgia. The Revenue Service of Georgia (RS) exercises authority throughout the entire territory of Georgia. Prin- ciples of integrated border management are defined by primary legislative acts, such as: the Law of Georgia on the State Border of Georgia, the Customs Code of Georgia, the Law on Food Safety, and other laws. Procedures are described by secondary legislative acts, such as: the joint decree of the Minister of Finance and Minister of Agriculture of Georgia and the joint decree of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia.6 Inter-agency cooperation on SPS includes: implementing integrated management procedures between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture of Georgia, the latter being a policy decision-maker. The ministry defines SPS procedures through its subordinated authority—the Na- tional Service of Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection (NS); the Revenue Service carries out customs and passport control. Integrated management procedures between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia are defined as follows: the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia is a policy decision-maker; RS carries out customs and passport control of passengers and vehicles at main border checkpoints (Sarpi, Sadakhlo, Red Bridge, and Lagodekhi); the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia carries out border control at the border checkpoints. Georgia has launched a number of international agreements aimed at promoting international trade and deepening cooperation. The government of Georgia is rapidly expanding the coverage area of Double Tax Avoidance Treaties. Today Georgia has active Double Tax Avoidance Treaties with 31 states around the world. During the current year, 14 more treaties were added to the list: five of them have already been ratified and nine more are awaiting signing/ratification in the nearest future.7 In order to set up effective mechanisms against transborder crime, bilateral agreements have been elaborated (especially with neighboring countries), and Georgia is adhering to international agreements. Given the complicated economic relations with Russia, especially the embargo imposed on Georgian production, the Georgian government has sensibly decided to sign a Free Trade Agreement with the Republic of Turkey. An Agreement on Preferential Trade, signed on 19 December, 2006, intended granting specific privileges to certain goods and facilitating the import of Georgian goods into the Turkish market.8 In the framework of the above-mentioned agreement, an import quota sys- tem was defined for Georgian goods imported into Turkey. On 21 November, 2007, Georgia and the Republic of Turkey signed a bilateral Agreement on Free Trade.9 In October 2010, the Agreement on Integrated Border Management of the Customs Border CheckPoints was signed.10 The practical side of this agreement implies developing economic ties and a transport corridor. Namely, the agreement decreases the number of procedures at customs checkpoints. None of the procedures will be duplicat- ed.11 This simplification is made possible through the immediate transmission of information be- tween checkpoints, thus increasing the efficiency of customs control, simplifying the time-consuming procedures, and curtailing related expenses. According to the agreement, customs duty was abolished between the two countries. Hence, lowering expenses for importers would result in reduced prices.

5 See: M. Khurtsidze, Degree of Integration of Customs and Border Services in Georgia, Tbilisi, 2010, p. 5. 6 See: Trade Policies and Practices by Measure, Georgia, WT/TPR/S/ xxx, 25 June, 2009, p. 5. 7 See: New Tax Code, Amcham Roundtable, Courtyard Marriott, Tbilisi, 22 September, 2010, p. 5. 8 See: Agreement between Republic of Turkey and Georgia on Preferential Trade, 19 December, 2006, 12 pp. 9 See: Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and Georgia on Free Trade, 21 November, 2007. Ratified by the by Resolution No. 5653-RS, 28 December, 2007, Tbilisi, Georgia, 18 pp. 10 See: Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Government of Georgia on Integrated Management of Customs Border Check Points, 8 October, 2010. 11 See: “Integrated Management of Customs Check Points. News and Events,” 8 October, 2010, available at [www.mof.ge]. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 65 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Besides, all usual taxes (VAT, excise) will be maintained (except on products exempted from taxes: medicines, baby food, etc.). However, quality control of imported products is still problematic for both countries.

Basic Changes in Current Customs Legislation. Tariff System Regulation. Unification of Tax and Customs Codes

Since 2004, significant changes have been implemented on the basis of legislative reform aimed at improving the financial system and bringing it into harmony with international standards. The main objective of the legislative reform was to ensure long-term and sustainable economic development, reduce the value of raw materials and production costs, attract foreign investments, contribute to the free movement of capital, and eradicate corruption through simplification of the customs procedures and creation of a new taxation system. Until 2006, customs duties were differentiated by types of product according to the Law on Customs Tariffs, and 16 rates of the customs duties were active. As a result of the changes in legisla- tion in 2006, only 3 rates out of 16 customs duties (12%, 5%, and 0%) remain.12 Equal rates of cus- toms duties were defined for imported goods from the CIS and other countries beginning on 1 Janu- ary, 2008. Different tax regimes for imported goods that originated in WTO member and non-member countries were abolished. Customs fees were completely abolished as of 1 January, 2011. Since 1 January, 2007, changes have been made in the secondary legislation on the basis of the new customs code in order to harmonize Georgian and European customs legislations. The regulatory acts on customs phyto-sanitary and veterinary control, intellectual property rights, and monitoring of money laundering at the customs border entered into force. It should be mentioned that for the pur- pose of simplifying customs procedures13 and bringing them into harmony with international stand- ards, the following changes have been made to the customs code during the last two years14: —delegation of authority by the head of the Revenue Service to staff members to sign various documents on specific issues on behalf of the customs authorities; —specification of the list of Georgian goods; —cancellation of the obligation to notarize documents proving the authority of the representa- tive body; —solving the problem of exchanging the confidential information by authorizing the Ministry of Finance of Georgia to sign an agreement with customs authorities of foreign countries on further information exchange; setting up a system for exchanging confidential information with the Border Protection Department; —granting foreign citizens (including non-residents) the right to resell goods at the warehouse; —releasing goods if customs liabilities arise that originated on the basis of a declaration after payment in full of all duties or, in cases envisaged by the code, after submitting a warranty on ensuring full customs liability, as well as after part payment of customs duties and submis- sion of a warranty on the residual;

12 See: Tax Code of Georgia, No. 692-RS, 22 December, 2004, Tbilisi, Georgia, Art 2703. 13 See: Ibidem, 242 pp. 14 See: Changes in the Customs Code of Georgia, Ministry of Finance of Georgia, 25 November, 2010, pp. 4-41, available at [www.mof.ge]. 66 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

—granting licenses for duty-free shopping activities to Georgia-based enterprises and entrepre- neurs (physical persons), as well as to foreign enterprises and entrepreneurs, etc. The recent legislative changes, which entered into force on 1 January, 2011, represent a new stage of customs system reform. Unification of the Tax and Customs Codes is the main priority of legislative reform at the new stage of institutional changes. The incorporated tax and customs code aims at increas- ing public trust in the tax system, forming a stable and sustainable tax environment, encouraging busi- ness legalization, removing ambiguities through simplified legal provisions, simplifying tax administra- tion by reducing the tax compliance burden, evenly distributing the tax burden, and using the best inter- national tax practices and EU directives. The New Tax Code envisages unification of tax and customs assets/liabilities of the taxpayers; it exercises (has) significant impact on small enterprises through intro- ducing a new tax regime. The New Tax Code is more systemic and more customer-oriented; it provides simplified reporting procedures, an electronic system of declaration, a less bureaucratic system of nav- igation, fairer and more objective regulations. It also enables quicker and easier resolution of adminis- trative issues and overpayments and more flexibility in managing liabilities and cash flows; it reduces the administrative burden of compliance and taxable income.15 Unification of the tax and customs codes has enabled consolidation of provisions with analo- gous content and principles.16 It resulted in the creation of a single document enabling the actors in- volved in export-import activities to obtain all the relevant documentation and general regulations from the one source. The provisions regulating tax control and the post release customs code regula- tions have been incorporated into one chapter. In addition, bearing in mind the specificities of the customs domain, the provisions regulating preliminary decisions, confidential information, terms, and exchange rates have been combined with the relevant analogous regulations of the tax code. The general provisions regulating tax and customs offences and sanctions have been incorporated into one chapter. Definition of the customs regime and treatment defined by the customs code have been elim- inated and the term for each commodity operation introduced. Customs treatment operations regard- ing passing the goods into state ownership and destruction of goods under customs supervision have been united into the article relating to disposal of goods by the customs authorities. Provisions anal- ogous to the inward and outward processing of goods in the customs territory have been combined into one article. Following unification of the tax and customs codes, tax and customs cards have been combined enabling taxpayers to set off tax claims and liabilities. Refund of excess amounts will be performed automatically by the tax authorities and this regime will concern all the companies using electronic declaration. At the same time, companies are free to leave this regime and return to the old one. The main goal of the unification is to simplify tax management. The autonomous status of the customs service will be abolished and it will be incorporated into the tax service. Customs terminol- ogy will be changed within the framework of tax and customs service unification. The juridical status of the Revenue Service has been changed; it is now a Legal Entity of Public Law.17

Organizational Specifics of the Customs System in Georgia. Administrative Reform

The administrative reform was aimed at defining the obligations and partnerships necessary for cooperating, reorganizing the existing structure, or creating a new one at intra-agency, inter-agency, and

15 See: New Tax Code, p. 5. 16 See: “Unification of the Tax and Customs Codes,” available at [www.mof.ge]. 17 See: New Tax Code, p. 7. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION international levels, and forming a structure that excludes the overlapping of functions and activities of other organizations. Customs functions were revised based on the requirements of fiscal stability and integrated border management: customs authorities control and protection of the state border within their competence in order to defend the domestic market, economy, and population.18 For the purpose of forming successful inter-agency cooperation, convenient legislation is being elaborated in order to allo- cate functions among the border management agencies. Regulatory acts set forth the common regula- tions of cooperation, information exchange, joint use of infrastructure and equipment, and staff training.

The New Staff Development Strategy and HR Requirements— A New Staff Training System

Taking into consideration the main requirements of the Arusha Declaration, significant steps were taken to introduce a new system of Human Resource Management and Code of Conduct, im- prove ethics and the organizational culture, develop leadership and communications, increase trans- parency, and strengthen measures against corruption.19 In 2005-2006, at the initial stage of the re- form, full staff rotation was carried out and all corrupted employees were dismissed, which resulted in the eradication of corruption in the customs system. Moreover, the remuneration and customs of- ficer incentive systems were significantly improved step by step. A new staff development strategy was launched in the Ministry and a staff training and retraining system was introduced.20 The system includes basic training, vocational training, and on-the-job training. The new model of training and career development aims at creating adequate structures for research, training, and development and at establishing an integrated plan of cooperation between the agencies directly involved in training and career development activities. The customs system is staffed with highly qualified professionals. Higher education is mandatory and the interns selected receive the necessary theoretical and practical training. Meanwhile, with the academy’s internal resources and the assistance of international organ- izations, regular training sessions are organized for officials. Joint training sessions are conducted in cooperation with agencies directly involved in border management activities. Periodic skill develop- ment training sessions and TOT (Training of Trainers) courses are held for experienced staff. The Human Resource Management policy includes all stages of career-building from incentives to en- couraging promotion. The HRM policy is based on transparency, accountability, motivation, and equity.21 Anticorruption measures that foresee social guarantees, financial encouragement, internal audit, and frequent rotation are systematically carried out.

Modernization of the Customs Infrastructure

Over the past few years, important steps have been taken to improve Georgia’s customs infra- structure. With financial assistance from the U.S. government, new checkpoints at Red Bridge, La- godekhi, Sadakhlo, Kazbegi, Vale, and Guguti have been activated. Furthermore, the government

18 See: Border Management Strategy of Georgia, p. 16. 19 See: The Revised Arusha Declaration, The Customs Cooperation Council, June 2003 (101st / 102nd Council Ses- sions), Arts 1-9. 20 See: Decree of President of Georgia on Establishment of LEPL-Financial Academy of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia, No. 254, Tbilisi, Georgia, 26 April, 2010. 21 See: Professional Standards, PICARD, WCO, Rue du Marché 30 B-1210 Brussels, Belgium, 46 pp., Tel.: +32 (0)2 209 92 11 Fax: +32 (0)2 209 92 92 E-mail:[email protected] Website [http://www.wcoomd.org], pp. 21-24. 68 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION allocated subsidies for new terminals in Batumi and Poti, which are currently under construction, and reconstruction of the customs checkpoint in Sarpi. Meanwhile, technological schemes for the func- tioning of customs checkpoints and customs posts have been refined. The whole system has been fit- ted out with modern equipment that allows effective customs procedure performance in less time.

Simplification of Border Control Procedures. New Information System— ASYCUDA WORLD

Trade-related policies and the legislative changes in the customs system have contributed to bringing Georgian border control procedures22 into harmony with international regulations.23 The most important changes are24: 1. Reduction in the number of customs procedures from 15 to 7. 2. Simplification of export and import documentation and a reduction in the number of docu- ments from 19 to 9.25 3. Risk-based customs control. The Revenue Service of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia (RS) began developing risk-based customs control and tax audit systems which have been functioning at customs checkpoints since March 2008. Risk assessment is performed on the basis of the ASYCUDA WORLD information system and its supplementary software using price discrepancy and importers/exporters risk analysis. 4. Post-clearance audit has been in force since January 2009. 5. The Gold List Program has been implemented. 6. The data bases of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Revenue Service have been unified on the border. The one-stop principle has entered into the force, thus simplifying procedures and improving the quality of service. 7. Selective checking is performed on the basis of the risk analysis information system. Simpli- fied customs procedures are performed by customs officers that imply the possibility of de- claring and exporting goods while postponing duty payment for 30 days.26 8. The list of goods subject to licenses and permits has been significantly reduced: the permit for transit of veterinary goods has been abolished; the procedure for issuing a certificate of origin has been simplified and it can be obtained directly from the customs authority. 9. Passport control. When crossing the border in different means of transportation, passport control and other border procedures were conducted by different agencies at different places. Following the reform, passport control in such cases at main customs checkpoints (Sarpi, Sadakhlo, Red Bridge, and Lagodekhi) is performed by the customs authority. Consequently, when crossing the border, integrated procedures are conducted.

22 See: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 23 See: International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto Conven- tion), Entered into force on 25 September, 1974, Customs Cooperation Council (World Customs Organization), Rue du Marché 30 B-1210, Brussels. 24 See: Trade Policies and Practices by Measure, p. 3. 25 See: Customs Legislation Reform, Ministry of Finance of Georgia, 2010, p. 7. 26 See: Georgian Customs, Presentation on Current Customs Reforms, Tbilisi, Georgia, 2010, p. 7. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

10. The obligation to present phyto-sanitary and veterinary permits has been abolished for the transit of controlled commodities. 11. Selective weighting has been introduced. Previously, all means of transportation entering from foreign countries were weighed at the customs checkpoints in order to reveal overload above the norm. Following the reform, the number of weighed means of transportation has been significantly reduced and selective weighing introduced.

New Approaches and Improved Business Environment. License and Permit System Reform and Administration

The business environment in Georgia has gone through significant changes in recent years. Since 2005, regulations and barriers to business entry have been streamlined and the number of busi- ness activities subject to licenses and permits reduced by 84%. Licensing procedures have been sim- plified, and the one-stop approach to business regulation has been adopted. Further, entry barriers in the form of minimum capital requirements have been reduced. As regards the regulation of ongoing business, operational licensing, permits, and other compliance systems, including taxes and customs, have become more business-friendly. Contract enforcement has been strengthened by reforming court procedures for commercial disputes.27 As a result of the changes in the Law on Entrepreneurs (1994), in 2005, 2006, and 2007, busi- ness registration has become easier and more efficient, taking only three days for legal entities and one day for individuals; there are no restrictions on the foreign ownership of companies in Georgia.28 The Law on Licenses and Permits (2005) sets forth the list of activities subject to licensing.29 The law considers approximately 50 other types of activities subject to special permission, including the following: import and export of weapons, impact on the environment, construction, customs warehouse, etc. The administrative license-issuing body is required to issue an administrative act on granting a license within 30 days after an application has been filed and an administrative act on granting a permit within 20 days after an application has been filed. A license or permit is automati- cally granted in the event that the administrative body does not respond to the application within the deadline. In some areas of business activity, the mandatory time for issuing licenses and permits is even shorter. In 2005, Georgia adopted a new law on Food Safety and Control which, unlike the former So- viet GOST food safety system, emphasizes controlling the production process itself rather than the final product. The cornerstone of the new law is the OECD approach based on Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) of the food safety system, which implies constant control at all stag- es of food production and the packaging process.30 The National Service of Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection established in 2006 is responsible for inspection and control. The Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection Service became fully functional (including market surveillance) in January 2010. Hence, it now bears the sole responsibility for food safety, excluding border control, which was transferred to the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance.

27 See: Trade Policies and Practices by Measure, p. 15. 28 See: Ibid., pp. 15-16. 29 See: Law of Georgia on Licensing and Permits, No. 1775–RS, Tbilisi, Georgia, 24 June, 2005, pp. 5-11. 30 See: Trade Policies and Practices by Measure, pp. 20-22. 70 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION New Mechanisms of Border Cooperation

The new mechanism of border cooperation was set up within the framework of the South Cau- casus Integrated Border Management (SCIBM) program. SCIBM is a regional program aimed at sup- porting the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in introducing and implementing the Integrated Border Management Strategy. Along with the SCIBM program, UNDP is providing assist- ance to the ongoing reforms in the area of border management and complements the efforts of the local governments. Georgia has made notable progress since 2005 in reforming its border management agencies. It has endorsed the Border Management Strategy and its Implementation Plan. Important steps have been taken in terms of documentary control, customs inspection, and the improvement of the legal basis, infrastructure, and working conditions for personnel.

Improving Customer Service

In order to simplify the system, a new form of service has been introduced for taxpayers—the electronic declaration system. In 2009, significant steps were taken toward implementing this service. In March 2009, the service already enabled the electronic submission of all the types of declarations. Electronic submission is possible on the basis of a declaration submitted by a representative of the importer when making a statement on the declaration of goods. When declaring goods electronically, excess money can be automatically refunded; physical persons presenting a declaration electronically have been released from the obligation of submitting a VAT invoice. In 2009, the Ministry of Finance of Georgia held a number of training courses aimed at popularizing the system and familiarizing the taxpayers with it. Open Doors days were held at the service centers of the Revenue Service of Geor- gia, where relevant practical examples were considered and leaflets describing the electronic declara- tion procedures were distributed. Taxpayers can use the service of the call center—077 toll-free and benefit from the service’s free consultation.

Main Perspectives of the Reform in the Future

The main directions of the future reforms are simplification of the service for taxpayers31; sim- plifying the declaration procedures and declarations on goods imported by physical persons; sim- plifying the export procedures for physical persons (to release goods with a customs value of up to 10 000 GEL from the obligation to present a declaration); transferring the right to issue a certificate of origin to the customs authorities32; simplifying customs procedures in the event of the temporary admission of goods (accession to the Istanbul convention on temporary admission); establishing the institution of advance customs declaration and advance customs decision; setting up a personal tax agent system for large taxpayers33; developing an electronic declaration system; setting up an infor- mation exchange system between the Revenue Service and Public Registry; creating a unified data base on issuing a certificate of origin; electronic processing of customs inventories of means of med- ication; setting up an ASYCUDA WORLD electronic system at places of customs operations; reflect- ing phyto-sanitary and veterinary border quarantine and sanitary quarantine control procedures in the

31 See: Public Sector Financial Management Strategy for 2009-2013 Years. 32 See: Action Plan of the Public Sector Reform Strategy for the 2009 Year, Tbilisi, 2009, p. 3. 33 See: Ibid., pp. 11-12. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION electronic data system; installing special Tracker Systems software for licenses and permits, etc. Planned activities also include building a new training complex for the Finance Academy.

Conclusions

During the past few years, Georgia has embarked on a dynamic and comprehensive customs reform program. Its main components include simplifying and reducing tariff levels; introducing a risk management system based on streamlined customs procedures; highly automated and completely paperless administration; and improved human resource management with a drastic change in person- nel and high motivation. Georgia has also introduced a unified Customs and Tax Administration and legal system which resulted in a business-friendly and effective customer culture, improved adminis- tration procedures, and revenue mobilization. Most of these reforms meet international regulations and standards and feature daring and creative innovations that may be successfully implemented by other countries pursuing customs modernization.

Elguja MEKVABISHVILI

D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor, Head of the Chair of Economic Theory, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE PROSPECTS FOR FORMING AND DEVELOPING AN INNOVATIVE ECONOMY IN GEORGIA

Abstract

his article takes a look at some of the sian Market with the participation of the T special features of incorporating the three Central Caucasian countries and, in Georgian economy into the globaliza- so doing, incorporating them into econom- tion processes and analyzes the external ic globalization. and internal conditions of this integration. The article raises the question of the It examines different alternatives for inte- need for a drastic change in the economic grating the Georgian economy into the glo- development model and for a transition bal economy, focusing particularly on the from the widely declared so-called Singa- problem of regional integration, which im- pore model to the European model of a plies creating a Common Central Cauca- regulated market economy. It associates the 72 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION prospect of further economic progress in It examines the main factors, contra- Georgia with the formation of an innova- dictions, and results of the transition of tive economy based on intellectual labor Georgia’s present-day economy to a path and innovative activity. of innovative development.

Introduction

Reform of the post-communist system is still going on, which is affecting Georgia’s integration into the global economy and giving rise to profound contradictions. Present-day world practice con- firms that no country can evolve without complying with the fundamental principles of globalization. Based on this, the country’s full-fledged incorporation into globalization is a strategic goal which, along with the task of successfully completing the reform, defines the strategic logic of Georgia’s economic development. It is important that the country keep its identity and uniqueness intact while engaging in these processes. It is universally accepted that when undergoing general civilizational development, countries should retain dialectical unity between their common features of socioeco- nomic development and their unique traditions and culture. Correspondingly, hypertrophying another country’s albeit successful experience and its perfunctory duplication when building a new economy and new society is just as unacceptable and detrimental as when a country hyperbolizes its unique features and endlessly calls for so-called sovereign democracy. The political leadership and sociopolitical elite should not only set themselves a strategic goal, but also define the long-term objective of the country’s socioeconomic development—rebuilding society in keeping with a model of development that will best unite Georgia’s old traditions and rich culture with post-modernistic innovative approaches.

Some External Political and Economic Aspects of Integrating Georgia into the Global Economy

Georgia’s participation in globalization requires resolving many urgent and controversial is- sues: how willing is the country to yield some of its national sovereignty in exchange for this partic- ipation? How do the penalties incurred from loss of some of its economic and political independence tally with the benefits gained from globalization? How should the country be incorporated into glo- balization—independently or by participating in regional associations? Georgia is a country oriented toward European values, and its gravitation toward Europe has a long history. It is obvious that the most acceptable and natural path to globalization is restoring his- torical justice and returning the country to the European family, which implies Georgia’s prospective membership in the European Union. Integration into the European Union should be a priority strate- gic task for any Georgian political force that comes to power. Nevertheless, this is a very long and complicated process which entails reaching the high standards of the so-called Copenhagen Criteria. The most important of these economic criteria is per capita GDP, which at present in the Euro- pean Union amounts to an average of $22,000. In the European Union’s poorest countries—Portugal and Greece—these indices amounted to 50% and 55% of the general EU level at the time they joined the union, respectively. For any new country expressing the wish to join the European Union, this index should be no lower than 40-45%. It is clear that integration into the European Union of a post- communist country like Georgia requires fundamental preparations aimed at creating the proper con- Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ditions in all spheres of public life and, on that basis, ensuring a breakthrough in socioeconomic de- velopment. It will be an important step for the five post-Soviet countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) if the European Union grants them associated membership. At the first stage, this would imply more lenient trade conditions with the EU. Unfortunately, at present, declaration of tasks to facilitate Georgia’s integration into the EU is often accompanied by practical steps that not only are failing to bring the country closer but, on the contrary, are moving it further away from fundamental European values. One such step is total dereg- ulation of the economy, in the wake of which (after 2004) most of the regulating structures were abol- ished.1 Elimination of the antimonopoly service and amendments to the labor legislation that foster total violation of the rights of hired workers are particularly unacceptable in this context. In this respect, Georgian legislation directly contradicts the labor legislation of European coun- tries. At present, monopsony is typical of Georgia’s labor market and other markets are characterized by the same high level of monopolization, which significantly reduces public prosperity. There is an objective need for a drastic change in the economic development model and a tran- sition from the so-called Singapore model to the European model of market economy regulation. Within the framework of this approach, we suggest drawing up a mega project with the participation of scientists from different spheres provisionally called “Return to Europe: Steps on the Way to Inte- gration into the European Union” and developing optimistic, pessimistic, and neutral scenarios for bringing Georgia’s most important socioeconomic indicators closer to the Copenhagen Criteria. The most interesting of the different alternatives for integrating Georgia into the global econo- my is the one that implies creating a Common Central Caucasian Market involving the three Central Caucasian countries,2 thus incorporating them into the globalization processes.3 As we have already noted, three of the five post-Soviet countries, with respect to which the European Union is discussing associated membership, represent the Central Caucasus, which clearly shows that Europe perceives the Central Caucasus as a single region. Developing economic integration in this region is vitally important. Moreover, European strategists often consider the Central Caucasian region to be closely related to the Central Asian region, which expands the framework of future subregional integration even more.4 Keeping in mind the above, Professor Vladimer Papava offers a new term “Central Cau- caso-Asia,”5 which is a combination of the two words “Caucaso” (from “Caucasus”) and “Asia.” He writes: “When talking about Central Caucasia as a single region, it should be noted that its lack of political and cultural homogeneity prevents it from becoming integrated.”6 Indeed, taking into ac- count the acute and profound crisis between two of the Central Caucasian states, Azerbaijan and Ar- menia, the prospect of economic integration in this region appears even more remote. Despite this, the policy of the Central Caucasian states should rely on the principle “from peaceful settlement of con- troversial issues to sustainable integration.” To put it differently, “ways to establish strategic econom- ic partnership (and not simply cooperation) in the Central Caucasus are becoming of paramount im- portance.”7 In the globalized world, the prospects for Georgia’s development as a post-communist country are largely determined by external factors, although in addition to them an important role is played by internal conditions that can only be incorporated into the socioeconomic development model on the

1 See: N. Khaduri, “Mistakes Made in Conducting Economic Reforms in Postcommunist Georgia,” Problems of Economic Transition (New York), Vol. 480, No. 4, 2005. 2 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus. Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press AB, Stock- holm, 2006, p. 7. 3 See: Ibid., p. 98. 4 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentral’nyi Kavkaz. Istoria. Politika. Ekonomika, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2007, pp. 95-96. 5 E. Ismailov, V. Papava, Tsentral’naia Evrazia. Geopoliticheskoe pereosmyslenie, Stockholm, 2010, p. 75. 6 Ibidem. 7 E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus. Essays on Geopolitical Economy, p. 98. 74 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION basis of a new paradigm. In this model, Georgia’s current reality must be kept in mind, the economy of which has been functioning throughout the country’s years of independence within the framework of an inert model that relies on old relations and its former potential. Georgia’s present-day economy is income-driven, the theoretical essence of which has been analyzed in depth in works by well-known French economist, Professor Ivan Samson.8 The gradualist path of development, i.e. the preservation and use of old organizational struc- tures, is essentially unrealizable in Georgia today. The only acceptable path is modernization9 of the economy and the whole of society along with it, which implies implementing high technology and promoting an innovative breakthrough, bypassing all transition forms and structures.

Shift in Paradigm of Economic Development: Transition to Building an Innovative Economy

In contemporary economic literature, socioeconomic progress is often viewed as a transition from one stage of competitive development to another. The following stages are designated: (a) an economy oriented toward production factors (foreign financial resources and cheap manpower are singled out in particular); (b) an economy oriented toward production investments; and (c) an economy oriented toward innovations based on intellectual labor and innovative activity. The transition of Georgia’s present-day economy to the innovative sphere is intrinsically related to resolving two groups of problems: (a) creating objective and subjective conditions for successfully carrying out an innovative breakthrough and (b) developing ways, methods, and tools for carrying out this process. The first group is related to an analysis of the current stage of education and science in Georgia and an assessment of the efficiency of government policy in these spheres. Georgia has long been known for its rich educational and scientific traditions and developed scientific and intellectual potential. As early as the 12th century, two academies were founded in which students, along with acquiring theoretical knowledge, also learned how to apply it in practice. In Soviet times, illiteracy was entirely eliminated. Georgia ranked among the top countries in terms of number of students and pupils, and not only in the Soviet Union, but also throughout the world. Science as a vital economic resource and the main driving force behind contemporary society is intrinsically related to the education system. Until the 1990s, Georgia had significant potential and a wealth of advanced experience, which is shown by the data presented below. By 1990, 29,000 scientists were engaged in science in Georgia, including 1,400 doctors of science and more than 11,000 PhDs. Around 6,000 researchers were engaged in scientific activity at the institutes of the Georgian Academy

8 See: I. Samson, “Medium-Term Prospects for the Georgian Economy,” Georgian Economic Trends, February 2008; idem. “The Search for a Development Path: Challenges for Georgia,” Georgian Economic Trends, March 2006. 9 Modernization in the classical understanding means a transfer from a traditional to a contemporary society, the development of which is defined by public institutions. Present-day Georgia has already gone through this kind of mod- ernization. Correspondingly, by modernization we mean the need for a postmodern transition, the gist of which is trans- ferring to a post-industrial society. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of Sciences, including approximately 450 doctors of science and more than 3,000 PhDs. A total of 115 scientific-research institutes and four R&D organizations were in operation. These indices are ex- tremely high for a small country with a population of only 4.5 million people. Georgia’s academic schools of mathematics, physiology, psychology, physics, and medicine enjoyed world renown. The destructive processes of reform of the post-communist system in Georgia had an extremely negative effect on the development of science. By 2007, the number of scientific institutions dropped to 92, while R&D organizations were eliminated altogether. The number of researchers dropped by more than half. At the same time, science “aged.” For example, the share of scientists older than 65 increased from 23.4% to 29.2%. At present, science in Georgia is in a state of deep stagnation, one of the most important reasons for which is the state’s insufficient attention to this sphere. Fundamental studies and their funding are considered too much of an extravagance for a small country facing the problems of systemic reform. It is thought that priority should be placed on incorporating the results obtained in science in devel- oped countries. This approach, which we believe to be erroneous, is reflected in the practice of fund- ing scientific projects. For example, in 2010, the state budget allotted only 7.74% of the total amount allocated for the Ministry of Education and Science, 0.69% of the total budget funds, and 0.22% of the country’s GDP to scientific research programs.10 In terms of these parameters, Georgia not only lags far behind the advanced countries, but also behind the average world index. Every year the world spends 1.7% of its GDP on scientific research, whereby developed countries spend 2.3% and developing countries 1.0%. In Georgia, per capita spending on science amounts to approximately $6.2, whereas the aver- age amount throughout the world is $170.6. GDP in terms of parity purchasing power (PPP) per capita in Georgia amounts to $4,700, while throughout the world it is approximately $9,800. Con- sequently, while Georgia lags economically behind the average world level 2.1-fold, in terms of spending on science, it lags behind 27.5-fold. With respect to specific countries, it lags economi- cally (per capita GDP) behind the U.S. 10-fold and in terms of spending on science 194.5-fold; behind Germany 7.4-fold and 136.1-fold; behind Japan 7.2-fold and 195.4-fold; behind Israel 5.9-fold and 205.3-fold; and behind Latvia 3.7-fold and 17.4-fold, respectively. In 2007, the world spent $1,137,900 on scientific research, which was 44.3% higher than the same index for 2002. It should be noted that in the indicated period, world GDP rose by only 25.6%. So the increase in spending on science was higher than the increase in the world economy. The devel- oped countries accounted for 75.9% of the total spending on science, whereby the U.S. and Canada accounted for 34.7%, the European Union for 22.9%, and the CIS countries for only 2.4%. In addition to science, spending on education is impermissibly low in Georgia, amounting to 3.2% of budget expenditures and falling significantly behind the same indicators for developed (Ger- many—4.6%, the U.S.—5.3%, Israel—6.9%, and so on) and for most of the post-Soviet countries (Russia—3.5%, Latvia—5.1%, Belarus—6.1%...). In terms of aggregate spending on education and science, Georgia lags far behind the recommended U.N. minimum permissible level for this index (6% of GDP) and the index for developed and most of the post-communist countries (in the U.S., it is 8.0%, in Germany—7.2%, and in Israel—11.4%). A priority vector in the economic development of present-day Georgia is not innovative produc- tion based on high technology, but performing transit and tourist functions, which in no way helps to solve the task of efficiently incorporating Georgia into the global economy. Based on this, a drastic change in economic policy and making an innovative economy the priority of the country’s rational state development strategy are of utmost importance. So a National Innovative Strategic Initi- ative project must be drawn up, within the framework of which a mid-term Innovative Georgia— 2025 project should be singled out. This project could focus on the following:

10 These and all the subsequent data are taken from the documents of “Saqstat”—the Georgian National Statistics Service. 76 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Capitalizing on and institutionalizing the national intellect. n Forming strategic thinking and vision. n Promoting the emergence of an innovative culture in society. n Creating an efficiently functioning educational system. n Ensuring institutional, legal, organizational, and financial-economic conditions for develop- ing science. The project could be divided into three stages lasting five years each. Each stage should end in specific results that will signify the launching of the next stage. For example, the main result of the first stage should be creating the necessary institutional environment for an innovative economy in the context of macroeconomic stabilization in the country. The main content of the second stage should be launching the driving force of an innovative economy and ensuring economic growth on a qualitatively new technological basis. At the final third stage, functioning of a highly effective eco- nomic system based on the latest technology and network organization of production should be achieved, which will ensure a high standard of living for all the citizens of Georgia. A particularly important task is to provide resource support of the formation and development of an innovative economy. A significant resource is the high intellectual potential that the country still possesses. However, although it is a necessary component, it is still not enough to make an innovative breakthrough. Large investments are needed, primarily in modern technology, without which the existence of an innovative economy is impossible.

Conclusion

In today’s world, there are several models for implementing high technology which imply both attracting foreign capital and mobilizing internal resources to achieve this goal. The most acceptable model for Georgia, in our opinion, is developing small and medium innovative companies and ensur- ing their leading role in the country’s economy. World experience shows that small venture enterpris- es play a vital role in the development of innovative business. Innovative business support in many countries has led to the creation of an efficiently function- ing economic system. Keeping in mind this experience, it is the state that should play the role of main catalyst in forming an innovative economy, which will make it possible for the republic to become rationally incorporated into the globalization processes and occupy the niches that are still free in the world (regional) market of high-tech and scientific-intensive commodities. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Rauf GARAGOZOV

Ph.D. (Psychol.), Leading Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

Rena KADYROVA

D.Sc. (Psychol.), Assistant Professor, Chair of Psychology, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

MEMORY, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR OF THE MASSES IN AN ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT: NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Abstract

n order to explain possible socio-psy- (“ethnic fears”) to instill corresponding so- I chological mechanism of the intereth- cial attitudes conducive to ethnopolitical mo- nic conflicts the authors have suggest- bilization. These specific narrative templates ed a theoretical model which links together (not any text that might stir up negative such factors as historical narratives, collec- feelings against any other group, but spe- tive memory, the media, emotions, group cific texts that interpret the events accord- identity, and the behavior of the masses. ing to a certain template) are described as According to the authors, in most cases, powerful instruments for molding mass con- conflicts unfold according to the following sciousness for the simple reason that they scenario: the media circulate very specific fully correspond to already existing expec- narrative templates which fan emotions tations and attitudes (the collective memo- 78 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ry patterns). The theory is supported by between and Azerbaijanis in empirical material derived from the conflict Nagorno-Karabakh.

Introduction

Like any other conflict, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh contains a great share of psychological motivations which (as distinct from political and legal aspects) rarely become an object of scrutiny. Having skimmed the serious problems of lack of understanding between the conflicting sides (riveted to negative stereotypes, hostile attitudes, negative opinions, and negative feelings), most experts hasten to plunge into the conflict’s legal and political depths. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the psychological component deserves a detailed analysis especially in the context of the recently intensified talks. In fact, better knowledge of the psycholog- ical factors behind any conflict reveals the roots of potential conflicts, clarifies their course and points to the ways to settle them. This knowledge is no less important in the context of post-conflict recon- ciliation: today experts in the theory of conflicts, political psychology, and other related disciplines are showing much more interest than before in the psychological aspects of conflicts (perceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, prejudices, and collective memory). This article offers a model which explains how the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict flared up and analyzes the role of collective memory in its emergence and possible settlement.

Collective Memory and Ethnopolitical Conflict

Many authors admit that collective memory can be used to fan ethnic conflicts as well as to quench them.1 Few political scientists, however, concentrate on the phenomenon of collective mem- ory because the very concept is too vague and too multidimensional to be treated as an analytical category. More likely than not it is treated as a metaphor, which explains why the analysts demon- strate excessive caution when referring to collective memory. To reveal a possible connection be- tween collective memory and ethnic conflicts we should probably specify our understanding of this concept.

Collective Memory: The Sociocultural Model

Several earlier works offer a very detailed description of the collective memory model,2 there- fore here we offer an overview of the idea and dwell on the elements without which the Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict cannot be correctly assessed.

1 R. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Eu- rope, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; P. Rich, “Identity and the Myth of : A Reassessment,” Review of International Studies, No. 25, 1999, pp. 425-437; J. Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982; S.J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell Univer- sity Press, Ithaca, 2001; D.R. Smock, Religious Perspectives on War, USIP Press, 2002. 2 R.R. Garagozov, “Collective Memory and the Russian ‘Schematic Narrative Template’,” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, pp. 55-89; idem, “Collective Memory: Patterns and Manifestations, Part 1,” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008, pp. 13-98; idem, “Collective Memory: Pat- terns and Manifestations. Part 2,” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008, pp. 3-97; idem, Metamorfozy kollektivnoy pamyati v Rossii i na Tsentralnom Kavkaze, Nurlan, Baku, 2005. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ideas and categories elaborated within the sociocultural approach are very important for our model of collective memory,3 within which collective memory is interpreted as mediated by various sorts of narratives, historical narratives in particular. In this sense, all types of historical narratives (annals, chronicles, history textbooks, etc.) can be considered as cultural instruments that mediate collective memory, while some of their forms affect collective memory in a very specific way. James Wertsch points to the abstract and highly generalized form of narrative that underlies all sorts of nar- ratives, which he calls a schematic narrative template.4 The templates differ from culture to culture; to be identified they demand special approaches and are used as a model according to which narratives of the most important historical events are cre- ated (even if they hardly fit the schematic template). J.V. Wertsch has identified the Russian schemat- ic narrative template, which he describes as “triumph over the alien force.”5 We have found out6 that templates are the product of a set of intertwined political, religious, sociocultural, historical, and even psychological circumstances; the State and the Religious institutions, which supervise historical stud- ies and the production and consumption of historical texts, have a special role to play in the creation, preservation, and reproduction of templates. After taking root in the mass consciousness through all types of cultural and historical socializa- tion, templates develop into special forms of collective experience (a pattern of collective remember- ing)—the groups’ sustainable and widespread ideas about its past; its heroes’ acts and motivations and the acts and motivations of aliens recorded in historical texts, textbooks, cultural artifacts (literature and art), social institutions (museums, complexes, and exhibitions), and the memory policy. Patterns blend with other aspects of collective experience and “become explicit in individual and group behavior.”7 This explains why narrative templates are invariably reproduced in new con- ditions and new generations (which avoided the earlier practices of brainwashing) and why patterns remain an inalienable part of group identity.

Collective Memory, Emotions, Social Attitudes, and Mass Behavior

We all know that recollections of the past stir up both positive and negative sentiments in any individual; this has been experimentally established and does not call for further confirmation. The question is whether remembering past events (which took place in the distant or recent past of an eth- nic or national group with which the individual associates himself rather than something that hap- pened in his personal past) can affect individual emotions, perceptions, attitudes, and behavior? If it can, then what is the range of emotional impacts? To provide the answers to both questions let us take a look at how psychology understands memory. It distinguishes between several types of memory, including episodic, procedural, and seman- tic.8 Episodic memory is remembering individual events; procedural memory deals with habits and skills, while semantic memory preserves knowledge about the social and natural environment.

3 J.V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002. 4 Ibid., p. 62. 5 “The Russian schematic narrative template consists of the following elements: 1. “An initial situation” … in which Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others is disrupted by: 2. The initiation of trouble or aggression by an alien force, or agent, which leads to: 3. A time of crisis and great suffering, which is: 4. Over- come by triumph over the alien force by the Russian people, acting heroically and alone” (ibidem.) 6 R.R. Garagozov, “Collective Memory and the Russian ‘Schematic Narrative Template’,” Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, pp. 55-89. 7 A.L. Kroeber, C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, Papers of the Peabody Mu- seum of American Archaeology & Ethnography, Harvard University, Cambridge, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1952, pp. 181-198. 8 R.L. Solso, Cognitive Psychology, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1988. 80 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Collective memory is semantic since events that took place in the past and were not experienced individually cannot be stored in episodic memory. So we can paraphrase the above question by asking what role emotions have to play in semantic memory? Alan Lambert supplied the following answer: “Certainly, we can have positive or negative appraisals of events and objects we have not had any personal experience [with] at all. For example, semantic memory can include knowledge about all sorts of people and historical events (e.g. Adolf Hitler, Mahatma Gandhi, the crash of the Hindenburg, the coronation of King Louis VIII) about which we may have positive or negative feelings, even in the absence of any personal experience. Moreover, depending on the event in question and the type of knowledge that one has acquired about it, the intensity of such emotions can sometimes rival those associated with episodic memories. For example, few people alive at the current time personally ex- perienced the Holocaust. However, knowledge of the event itself and the vivid photographs that doc- ument its existence can trigger exceptionally strong reactions in people, even if they were born long after the event took place.”9 This means that reproduction (revival) in the (semantic) memory of an individual of certain in- formation may breed (negative or positive) emotions and feelings. The same author has correctly pointed out that emotions of this type create very different contexts when they grip an individual or vast masses of people.10 In his classical work about crowd psychology, Gustave Le Bon described this phenomenon and cited corresponding examples. Here is another example: there is a well-known effect called “rally under the flag”: in response to a military threat, the public closes ranks around the president and dem- onstrates a high degree of support.11 These examples confirm the role of episodic memory; however for the purposes of this article we are more interested in semantic memory. Indeed, how can certain ideas about the historical past stir up identical feelings in vast popular masses? We do not know about studies of processes, the mechanisms of which can transform historical representations of the past into strong emotions in large numbers of people simultaneously. Here is our idea about how this happens.

Modeling the Processes which Reflect the Ties between Collective Historical Representations and Social Behavior

The above suggests that, first, semantic memory may contain information about the past of the group to which an individual belongs and which can or may cause positive or negative emotions. Second, there should be certain mechanisms able to activate certain elements of semantic memory, that is, certain historical representations, perceptions, and reminiscences. This is how, in our opinion, collective memory can contribute to the instigation of an ethnic conflict. At first, the patterns of collective memory are activated through media representation of specific narratives that reproduce the past or interpret certain contemporary events in line with the traditional schematic narrative templates typical of any given culture. In fact, specific narrative templates resurface in the public consciousness and group discourse; interpreted according to certain schematic narrative templates, they invigorate the corresponding pat- tern of collective memory to become a potential trigger of conflicts.

9 A. Lambert, “How Does Collective Memory Create a Sense of Collective?” in: Memory in Mind & Culture, ed. by P. Boyer, J. Wertsch, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 204. 10 Ibidem. 11 J. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, Wiley, New York, 1973. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Waves of nationalism raised by simplified historical interpretations that smack of myths are mainly responsible for the emergence and popularity of similar narratives. Some think12 that na- tionalism is an ailment of societies immersed, without preparation, into freedom of the press and democracy. Here is what the same authors have to say: “Historically and today, from the French Revolu- tion to Rwanda, sudden liberalizations of press freedom have been associated with bloody out- bursts of popular nationalism. The most dangerous situation is precisely when the government’s press monopoly begins to break down. During insipient democratization, when civil society is bur- geoning but democratic institutions are not fully entrenched, the state and other elites are forced to engage in public debate in order to compete for mass allies in the struggle for power. Under those circumstances, governments and their opponents often have the motive and the opportunity to play the nationalist card.”13 The policy of glasnost proclaimed in the Soviet Union shortly before its disintegration intro- duced, for the first time in the country’s history, freedom of public discussion to make it a hostage of the nationalist rhetoric and mythologization inevitable in a society with no institutions and regula- tions of professional journalism, critical approach to opinions, and forum for civilized exchange of opinions. Any attentive observer will inevitably detect that the nationalist outbursts across former Yugo- slavia and the Soviet Union were predated by wide-scale circulation of specific historical narratives in the media.14 As a rule, similar texts, mainly of the “victim” type, simplify the past, brim with emo- tions, and rely on myths and old insults.15 This is what can be found on the “surface” of narratives of this type; however, deep inside they reproduce specific schematic narrative templates which actualize the patterns of collective memory of groups eager to join ethnopolitical struggle. We all know that propaganda is most effective if it cor- responds to the sentiments of the audience or ties together a new idea and old sentiments.16 For this reason, such narratives affect the minds and feelings of members of ethnonational groups to an extent that cannot but amaze external observers and students of ethnopolitical conflicts. In other words, this effect stems from two prerequisites: definite patterns of collective memory shared by all members of any given group and the excessive content of narrative templates, which add vigor to these patterns, in the narratives which appear in huge numbers to interpret current situation and/or the past. If any given group has no patterns of collective memory to be actualized through narratives of a certain (“victim”) type, it remains immune to any amount of victim narratives put into circulation: they will never produce any noticeable effect. This means that ethnic entrepreneurs and political elites can transform the collective memory patterns into instruments for fanning ethnopolitical conflicts. They rely on the memory policy to re- vive old patterns and actualize cultural patterns in order to mobilize the nation by reminding it about old insults, humiliations, and violence. In this way, people are pushed to ethnic dividing lines with a conflict just round the corner.

12 J. Snyder, K. Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” in: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. by M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote, S.M. Lynn-Jones, S.E. Miller, Mass., MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 61-96. 13 Ibid., p. 62. 14 A memorandum on what was described by “genocide of the Serbs” signed by many members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, a specific “victim” narrative, is one of the pertinent examples. It appeared in the press in 1986 and, to an extent, triggered what later developed into a crisis (see: V.P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Con- flict,” in: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. by M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote, S.M. Lynn-Jones, S.E. Miller, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000, pp. 132-168; J. Snyder, K. Ballentine, op. cit.). 15 S.L. Kaufman, op. cit. 16 D. Kinder, D. Sears, “Public Opinion and Political Action,” in: Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by G. Lindzey, E. Aronson, Vol. 3, Random House, New York, 1985, pp. 659-741. 82 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Theoretical Aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

As any other ethnopolitical conflict, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a very complicated phenomenon with numerous problems and huge destructive potential in the very heart of one of the world’s important geopolitical regions. It differs, probably, from many other ethnopolitical conflicts by the large number of erroneously interpreted facts and misrepresentations caused by several factors. Two of them deserve special mention. n First, at its initial stage, when the region was part of the Soviet Union, information was care- fully dosed out and distorted by the central and local communist structures, which means that no objective or verified information could be obtained. n Second, many of the observers and students knew next to nothing about the region’s past and cultural roots. These were the two most important factors; the actual list is much longer. Here is another impor- tant consideration: despite the 22 years that have passed since the conflict began, during which the re- gion changed beyond recognition (the Soviet Union disappeared; the South Caucasian countries became independent, while observers and academics acquired access to first-hand information about the region), many important facts about the conflict and its origins remain vague and highly debatable. Let us go back to the conflict’s earliest stage, which puzzled many in its scope and impacts. We will not discuss events that are well known and described in detail in all sorts of special publications, but shall dwell only on one aspect: ethnopolitical mobilization17 of the Armenians of Nagorno-Kara- bakh and Armenia. This is the key to a correct understanding of what happened in the past and what is going on now. There are seven episodes described in various publications18 that adequately describe the pace, scope, and dynamics of the political mobilization of the Armenians: n Episode 1 (the beginning): 13 February, 1988, a group of Karabakh Armenians had staged an unprecedented event in Lenin Square: an unsanctioned political rally. Several hundred people gathered and made speeches calling “for the unification of Ka- rabakh with Armenia” (the Armenian S.S.R.). n Episode 2: 15 February, at a meeting of the Armenian Writers Union, one of the more out- spoken groups in society, the poet Silva Kaputikian spoke up in support of the Karabakh Armenians. n Episode 3: 18 February, protests about the environment attracted few people. The environ- ment was the safest and most “nonpolitical” subject for protest. n Episode 4: 20 February, 30,000 demonstrators rallied in Erevan to support the Karabakh Armenians. n Episode 5: 22 February, over 100,000 people rallied in Erevan to support the Karabakh Ar- menians. n Episode 6: 23 February, 300,000 gathered in Erevan to support the Karabakh Armenians. n Episode 7: 25 February, 700,000 rallied in Erevan to support the Karabakh Armenians.

17 By ethnopolitical mobilization we mean a process in the course of which an ethnic community becomes politi- cized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations and organizes itself into a collective entity with all the necessary resources for political action (see: M. Esman, Ethnic Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1994, p. 28). 18 Information is borrowed from Th. De Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York and London, 2003 and verified, as much as possible, with other sources. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In less than two weeks, the ethnopolitical mobilization of Armenians in the form of ethnopoliti- cal rallies reached its peak.19 How was the exceptionally high level of political mobilization achieved within such a short time in Erevan, separated from Nagorno-Karabakh by hundreds of kilometers?20 No available publications offer a special analysis of high ethnopolitical mobilization and the vehe- mence of public response; however, many observers have accepted partially or completely what Pravda, the national Soviet newspaper, wrote at the time.21 Opinions differ: some authors blame “social, cultural, economic, or political discrimination against the Armenian minority in Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azeri majority living side by side with the Armenians” or “the centuries-old hatred” between the Armenians and Azeri, “two incompatible ethnic and religious identities,” or a combination of all three factors.22 In an effort to find a theoretical explanation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Svante Cornell has identified several factors behind the conflict, including the struggle of “antagonistic identities” caused by “centuries-old hatred,” external support of the Armenian diaspora, the absence of demo- cratic institutions in the U.S.S.R., which deprived the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh of the chance to lodge their complaints and express their dissatisfaction, etc. This puts Cornell’s book into a class in itself. Svante Cornell relied on T.R. Gurr’s conception of ethnopolitical action to explain the Armeni- ans’ ethnopolitical mobilization (one of the factors behind the conflict) by the high level of their co- hesion. However, a high level per se cannot be regarded as sufficient for a group’s social or political mobilization. It remains unclear what caused the complaints and dissatisfaction. The author23 has admitted that there was no severe social, economic, cultural, or even political discrimination against the Armenian minority; in fact, the local Armenians lived better than people in many other Soviet regions and had cultural and political autonomy. It can also be said that the conflict was not triggered by “centuries-old hatred”: Armenians and Azeri have many common cultural features; until the late 19th century they did not fight and, on the whole, coexisted without much trouble. The above leaves one wondering whether it was Moscow that fanned the conflict, if the social, economic, and discriminatory factors are excluded? As distinct from Yugoslavia, in which the central communist government in Belgrade was guilty of fanning national hatred, Moscow can hardly be accused of the same. So the question, “What brought a great number of Armenians into the streets of and Erevan?”, remains pending. Thomas de Waal was one of the first researchers of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to point to the inadequacy of the above approaches and explanations. He investigated the sides’ widely different ideas about their past and pointed to the official propaganda of hatred, mythologization, etc: “More

19 T.R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, USIP Press, Washington, DC, 1993. 20 At the earliest stage, the rallies were organized by clandestine or semi-clandestine Armenian nationalist organi- zations that had become much more active during the past few years (see: Th. de Waal, op. cit.). At that time, however, there organizations did not have enough organizational, administrative, or information instruments to mobilize the people within a very short period. Some think that the rallies were staged by the Armenian authorities, the KGB in particular, to ward off the imminent danger of losing power created by Gorbachev’s perestroika (L. Grigorian, “Chto proiskhodit v Ar- menii,” Strana i mir, No. 1, 1989, pp. 35-38). This explains the scope and intensity (the republican political elite had enough administrative, organizational, and financial resources). Even if we accept this explanation, the vehemence of the popular rallies and its source remain unexplained. 21 In an article “Emotsii i razum. O sobytiiakh v Nagornom Karabakhe i vokrug nego” (Emotions and Reason. On the Events in Karabakh and Around It) which appeared in Pravda on 21 March, 1988, its authors, answering the question “What brought a great number of Armenians into the streets of Stepanakert (former name of the capital of Karabakh) and Erevan?” wrote: “Obviously, tens of thousands of Armenians were not driven by the desire to be united with Armenia. They were driven into the streets of Stepanakert by their dissatisfaction with the social and economic situation in the Au- tonomous Region in which their national and other rights were infringed upon.” 22 S.E. Cornell, Conflict Theory and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Guidelines for a Political Solution? Triton Publishers, Stockholm, 1997. 23 Ibidem. 84 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION than any others in Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, the conflict was all but inevitable because its caus- es lay in the ‘deep structure’ of the relationship between its two parties in late Communist times. Four elements—divergent national narratives, a disputed territorial boundary, an unstable security ar- rangement and lack of dialogue between the two parties—had made fissures that would break Arme- nia and Azerbaijan apart, as soon as trouble began. Yet because the problem was both so new and so profound, no mechanism was found—or has yet been found—to repair the damage.”24 He has answered the above question with: “Uncomfortable as it is for many Western observers to acknowledge, the Nagorny Karabakh conflict makes sense only if we acknowledge that hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were driven to act by passionately held ideas about his- tory, identity, and rights (italics mine.—R.G.). That the vast mass of these ideas was dangerous and delusory does not make them any less sincerely felt… The ideas expanded inside the ideological vac- uum created by the end of the Soviet Union and were given fresh oxygen by warfare. The darkest of these convictions, the ‘hate narratives,’ have taken such deep root that unless they are addressed, nothing can change in Armenia and Azerbaijan.”25 His conclusion about a great role of conflicting historical ideas (or even myths) in the emer- gence of the conflict is very important. He is moving in the right direction, even though he limited himself to very general conclusions. Three points cause objections: n first, he left aside the vaster context of the Turkic-Armenian relations (for example, the Ar- menian-Azeri conflicts of the early 20th century), outside which the vehemence of this con- flict remains puzzling.26 n Second, many peoples in the world have “bad narratives” about each other; not all of them, however, start conflicts. It seems that conflicts are started by “bad narratives” of special types in special conditions that have not yet been identified. n Third, the “hate narratives” mentioned by De Waal do not date to the Soviet Union’s last years, as he erroneously thinks. They were circulated before the Soviet Union and the Armenian and Azerbaijanian Soviet So- cialist republics appeared on the map. We shall demonstrate below that the “hate narratives” continue the old Armenian historiographical tradition that preserves and reproduces the Armenian schematic narrative template rooted in the .

The Armenian Schematic Narrative Template

It has been demonstrated earlier27 that the Armenian historiographic tradition develops its sche- matic narrative template, “a staunch people surrounded and tortured by enemies,” which consists of the following components: 1. The initial situation: the Armenian people are living in glorious times which are disrupted by enemy intrigues, as a result of which

24 Th. de Waal, “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Origins, Dynamics and Misperceptions,” available at [http:// www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/origins-dynamics-misperceptions.php], 2005. 25 Th. De Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, pp. 272-273. 26 This context is well represented in: J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy, Turks & Armenians. A Manual of the Armeni- an Question, Committee on Education. Assembly of Turkish American Association, Washington, D.C., 1989. 27 R.R. Karagezov (Garagozov), Metamorfozy kollektivnoy pamiati v Rossii i na Tsentralnom Kavkaze, Nurlan, Baku, 2005. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

2. the Armenians fall victim to aggression, 3. they have to live through a period of suffering and difficulties, 4. if they remain loyal to their faith, they overcome their enemies; if they betray their faith, they are defeated. Many of the Armenian historical narratives contain so-called “hate narratives” addressed to peoples of other confessions and cultures because the Armenian Church, the main producer of histor- ical texts and their main custodian, intended to preserve and increase its influence on the minds and hearts of its followers.28 In the course of time (especially between the end of the 18th and the early 20th centuries), this template was persistently planted in the Armenians’ collective memory through Armenian historical compositions printed in huge numbers, teaching of history in the Armenian religious schools, etc. Later, having become part of the nation’s collective experience, the template developed into a pattern of the Armenian collective memory with its highly specific impact on the nation’s collective behav- ior, perception of neighbors, and thinking. Still later, in the 19th century with the advent of the secular “epoch of nationalism,” the Arme- nian schematic narrative template was somewhat modified by Armenian intellectuals. They replaced the template’s religious foundation with a nationalist one: the “Armenian people” or nation replaced the “Armenian faith”; the Armenian nationalist-minded intelligentsia modified the religious ideolo- geme in which the old formula, “the fate of the Armenians depends on their loyalty to their faith,” was replaced with the following nationalist wording: “the fate of the Armenians depends on their loyalty to their people.” In other words, the Armenian schematic narrative template that appeared in the fold of the Ar- menian Church to be later adjusted by the Armenian nationalists to their political aims and ambitions geared the various layers of Armenian culture (including collective memory), in a very obvious way, toward traumatic experience and instilled a very specific friend/foe perception. The results have been manifested in the psychological makeup of a “siege mentality;” the Armenians see themselves as “an island of civilized Christian ‘Europeans’ among a hostile sea of Asian Muslims.”29 The tragic events that took place in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 supplied the Armenian template with a very specific content. From that time on it reads, “Armenians, a Christian people surrounded and tortured by Turk- ish Muslims.”

Patterns of Collective Memory and Ethnopolitical Manifestations: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

It seems that the presence of this specific pattern of Armenian collective memory was an impor- tant factor behind the Karabakh conflict. Here are certain confirmations of the above. We have demonstrated that “a staunch people surrounded and tortured by enemies” is the cen- tral pattern of the Armenians’ collective memory and the main national myth they present every time under certain (or, rather, uncertain) circumstances. The tragic events that took place in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 filled the pattern with specific content: the Turks (and the Azeris regarded as Turks)

28 Ibidem. 29 See: S.E. Cornell, op.cit.; E.M. Herzig, “Armenia and the Armenians,” in: The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, ed. by G. Smith, Longman, London, 1996. 86 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION became the main enemies. In the absence of a similar pattern in their collective memory, the Azeris refused for a long time to regard the Armenians as enemies. This pattern instilled fear in the Armenians for their future30 and what David Lake and Donald Rothschild described as “ethnic fears”31 in their intergroup strategic interactions conception. They have written that in most cases ethnic conflicts are triggered by group fear of its future: (a) the fear of assimilation and (b) the fear of physical extinction. Intensified in periods of anarchy and weakened state power, these fears create so-called dilem- mas of intergroup strategic interaction, which pave the way to conflicts. Ethnic fears can be a product of rational (choice in uncertain situations) and irrational (political myths and emotions) factors. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic fears were fanned by mounting anarchy and weakening central power and were rooted in the specific features of the Armenians’ collective memory. When activated, this pattern of collective memory could produce ethnic fears in the Armenians; it could produce narratives which would reproduce the specific Armenian schematic narrative tem- plate multiplied by the media, ethnic entrepreneurs, and leaders. Here is one of the many examples of such narratives, a quintessence of the narratives which appeared in the Armenian public discourse and which accumulated all the key arguments exploited by the Armenian activists at the early stages of the conflict. We have in mind Nagorny Karabakh. Istoricheskaya spravka (Mountainous Gharabagh. Historical Background) prepared by the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R. and edited by G.A. Galoian and K.S. Khudaverdian; 45 thousand copies of it were published in Erevan in 1988.32 This fairly thin leaflet contains five chapters. This work, described by its authors as a scholarly publication of a reference nature,33 is organ- ized in strict accordance with the main components of the Armenian schematic narrative template. n Chapter One (“Mountainous Gharabagh from Ancient Times Until 1917”) offers a glimpse into the past; it is intended to prove beyond a doubt that since ancient times the region be- longed to the Armenians and Armenia. All historical facts are geared toward the “glorious past” of the area with its predominantly Armenian population, which fully corresponds to the first component of the Armenian schematic template (“the Armenian people are living in glorious times”). n Chapter Two (“Mountainous Gharabagh from 1918 Until 1923”) describes the events which resulted in setting up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) as part of the Azerbaijanian S.S.R. The authors blamed the “erroneous” decision on the ominous figure of Stalin in full conformity with that part of the Armenian template which says, “the Armenians fall victim to aggression.” n Chapter Three (“The Problem of Mountainous Gharabagh in Light of the Leninist Under- standing of National Self-Determination”), the shortest of the five, does not belong to the Ar- menian template. In 1988, the authors had to refer to communist rhetoric, ideological pat-

30 An Armenian respondent said to De Waal: “Fear of being destroyed, and destroyed not as a person, not individu- ally but destroyed as a nation, fear of genocide is in every Armenian” (Th. de Waal, Black Garden, p. 78). 31 D.A. Lake, D. Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” in: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. by M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote, S.M. Lynn-Jones, S.E. Miller, Mass., MIT Press., Cambridge, 2000, pp. 97-131. 32 For its English version see [http://www.karabakh-online.narod.ru/Artsakh.html]. 33 It is not our task to discuss whether the authors were right or wrong; we deem it necessary to point out that since the authors posed themselves the task of justifying the claim to the region of one of the contending sides, this work (as all documents of this type) is inevitably biased and tendentious, while the facts were carefully selected and no less carefully interpreted. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

terns, and the postulates of Marxism-Leninism to remain in the mainstream of the prevailing communist ideology. n Chapter Four (“Problems of Demographic and Socioeconomic Development of the Autono- mous Region of Mountainous Gharabagh”) returns to the Armenian schematic narrative tem- plate to confirm that “Armenians have to live through a period of suffering and difficulties” draped in the garbs of economic, cultural, social and, most important, demographic decline, namely, shrinking of the Armenian population as compared with the Azeri population.34 n Chapter Five (“Events in Mountainous Gharabagh and Its Surrounding Regions”) fully cor- responds to the last element of the Armenian narrative template, “if Armenians remain loyal to their faith, they overcome the enemies; if they betray their faith, they are defeated.” The authors insisted that the Armenian rallies in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia “were not inci- dental, nor were they provoked by outside factors”; they merely spoke of the nation’s deter- mination to “correct the injustice.” The authors pointed to the cohesion among the Armeni- ans inside and outside the country, who in the face of severe tests were determined to fight to the end. While the authors adjusted the Armenian schematic narrative template to the rules of academic discussion, many other narratives that appeared at the same time were much cruder and much more direct.35 The narratives that reproduced the specific Armenian schematic template actualized the pattern of Armenians’ collective memory (“a staunch people surrounded and tortured by the Turks”) accom- panied by corresponding ethnic fears. The actualized Armenian template of collective memory developed into a huge force behind the Armenians’ ethnopolitical mobilization: “After the protests in Karabakh, Soviet Armenia rose up in a series of vast street demonstrations. Armenia was one of the most homogeneous and self- confident republics in the U.S.S.R., yet no one, including the leaders of the demonstrations them- selves, anticipated what energy they would release. It seemed that the Nagorny Karabakh issue had the capacity to touch a deep nerve inside Armenians. Explaining how Karabakh could suddenly bring hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets, the political scientist Alik Iskandarian uses the term ‘frozen potential.’ ‘The Karabakh factor was frozen, but it needed absolutely nothing to bring it to the surface,’ he says. Even those who knew almost nothing about the sociopolitical sit- uation in Karabakh itself felt that they could identify with the cause of Armenians encircled by ‘Turks’ (a word that in the Armenian vernacular applies equally to Turks and Azerbaijanis).”36 To a certain extent, these imaginary fears served as a powerful catalyst for the Armenians’ lightning political mobilization. This suggests that the conflict was developing according to the following scheme: the media circulate very specific narrative templates which fan emotions (“ethnic fears”) among the Armenians to instill corresponding social attitudes conducive to ethnopolitical mobilization. These specific nar- rative templates (not any text that might stir up negative feelings against any other group, but texts that interpret the events according to a certain template) are highly efficient because they fully cor- respond to already existing attitudes (the collective memory patterns). It seems that our model explains the phenomenon of ethnopolitical mobilization of the Armeni- ans and the conflict and offers a range of possible conflict-settlement recommendations.

34 The only table is entitled “Autonomous Region of Mountainous Gharabagh Population Size and Distribution by Nationality (per 1,000 person)”, available at [http://www.karabakh-online.narod.ru/Artsakh.html]. 35 The book by Armenian journalist Zori Balayan Ochag (The Hearth) published in Erevan in 1987 is the best ex- ample of crude and direct representation of the template or, for example, “ten thousand leaflets were printed and flown into Nagorno-Karabakh… On the night of 12-13 February absolutely all post-boxes of Stepanakert received these leaf- lets” (Th. de Waal, Black Garden, p. 20). 36 Ibid., p. 22. 88 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Changing Narratives, Changing Memory, Changing Emotions and Attitudes

The above suggests that the collective memory of the Armenians has played an important role in the conflict. The question is: How can collective memory be readjusted to cause a change in or soften up the Armenians’ social attitudes to achieve reconciliation? In other words, which of the narratives can bring the desired result? Experts in social policy show us where to move in search for the answers to these questions. They demonstrated that texts which lay the blame for violence and conflict on a third party help to quench hostility and create reconciliatory attitudes.37 More recent studies of public opinion issues demonstrated that even deeply embedded persua- sions may change when people answer differently worded questions.38 Confronted with arguments which present the old situation in a new light or when they have to consider new evidence, people might change their opinions. Under certain conditions, differently worded questions may force peo- ple to change their attitudes.39 Here is a classic example: “Two experiments examined the effect of news frames on tolerance of the Ku Klux Klan. One framed the rally as a free speech issue, while the other framed it as a disruption of public order. Participants who viewed the free speech story ex- pressed more tolerance of the Klan than participants who watched the public order story.”40

By Way of a Conclusion

In the long-term perspective, peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (and all the other conflicts in the Caucasus for that matter) will require a totally new historical discourse, a new history which, as distinct from the old one concerned with nation-building, will bring reconciliation among peoples. The political elites should abandon their old practice of reproducing old templates and place a “social order” for new narratives leading to new historical interpretations and defusing old enmities. The international community, which wants peaceful settlement, can create a special pro- gram of action designed to alter the memory policy, to which the conflicting sides are still devoted. This suggests a question related to both the theoretical and practical aspects of the same prob- lem: What narratives will help to soften up the attitudes of warring sides that have been brainwashed to hate each other over the past few decades? This calls for special research; the authors hope to sup- ply their results in the near future.

37 K. McGraw, “Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts,” The American Polit- ical Science Review, Vol. 85, December 1991, pp. 1133-1157. 38 Political Persuasion and Attitude Change, ed. by D. Mutz, P. Sniderman, R. Brody, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996. 39 J. Druckman, “On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who can Frame?” Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, 2001, pp. 1041- 1066; A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science, Vol. 211, 1981, pp. 453-458. 40 Th. Nelson, R.Clawson, Z. Oxley, “Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, 1997. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Sudaba ZEYNALOVA

Ph.D. (Hist.) (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE FORMATION OF WEST SLAVIC ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN THE CAUCASUS (19TH-BEGINNING OF 20TH CENTURIES)

Abstract

his article takes a look at various as- tion of West Slavic ethnicities to the Cauca- T pects of the migration policy pursued sus and uses statistics to show the dynam- by Russian czarism in the Caucasus ics of the quantitative indicators of the Polish that resulted in significant changes in the and Czech communities that formed in the ethnodemographic structure of the Cauca- region during the period under review, as sian region in the 19th-beginning of the 20th well as the special features of their resettle- centuries. The author focuses on the migra- ment and economic and sociocultural life.

Introduction

The Caucasus is a region of the world that boasts a multitude of different cultures, rich historical past, and diverse ethnic map. It is also a region with a long history of interaction among many differ- ent ethnic cultures that ultimately formed the distinctive features of the Caucasian subculture. For centuries, the Europeans have been drawn to the Caucasus, a region with abundant natural resources, a rich historical and cultural heritage, and ethnographic diversity. At the end of the 18th-be- ginning of the 19th centuries, representatives of European ethnicities migrated en masse to the Cau- casus where they formed communities throughout the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries. This was promoted by the favorable conditions in the region for socioeconomic development and preserving ethnocultural identity, ethnocultural values, and ethnographic features.

Migration Policy of Russian Czarism and Ethnodemographic Changes in the Caucasus

When the conquered the Caucasus, new ethnosocial processes and changes began in the ethnodemographic structure of the region. During the 19th-beginning of the 20th cen- turies, non-indigenous people from both outside and inside the Russian Empire migrated en masse 90 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to the Caucasus and settled there. The migration processes that took place in the Caucasus in the 19th century under the czarist migration policy were of both a targeted compulsory and voluntary nature. This migration policy covered a wide range of social and ethnic groups. The main objective of colonization was to create a strong ethnosocial foundation by integrating non-indigenous people into the local population, in so doing ensuring ideological control and economic support of the territory, as well as accommodation of land poor and landless peasants from the central regions of the Russian Empire. Imperial colonization in the Caucasus cannot be considered strictly Russian in the ethnic sense. Many different ethnicities were drawn into the czarist migration policy—Russians, Ukraini- ans, Germans, Greeks, , Czechs, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Estonians, and so on. This migration policy can provisionally be divided into several stages. At the end of the 18th-first half of the 19th century, czarism carried out mass and targeted deportation of the Russian and Ukrainian population, German colonists, Greek migrants, Polish servicemen, and exiles to the Caucasus. However, during the second half and end of the 19th century, after the peasant reform, re- settlement of various ethnic communities was of a partially spontaneous and voluntary nature, sup- ported and encouraged by czarism. During these years, due to the economic and industrial develop- ment of the region, mass deportation began of the land poor Russian peasantry from the central prov- inces of Russia, as well as of German colonists, Estonian, Moldavian, Czech, Bulgarian, and other peasants. The inflow of European migrants into the cities of the Caucasus also increased at this time due to the industrial boom. There was quite a large number of white-collar workers, specialists in various spheres, businessmen, and so on among these migrants. As a result, the period from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th centuries was characterized by the development of capitalism and industrial-economic growth, which largely promoted greater migration and movement of the non-indigenous population both from outside the region and from within the boundaries of the Rus- sian Empire to the Caucasus. By the beginning of the 20th century, the representatives of more than 20 ethnicities from out- side the Caucasus lived alongside the indigenous people in the region. The time, reasons, and circum- stances of the appearance of these people in the Caucasus varied. The nature of the migration process- es also differed, which could largely be divided into two groups: 1) migration directed and carried out by the state; and 2) spontaneous migration, during which primarily small groups and families moved.1 The changes in the ethnodemographic map of the Caucasus, as well as the migration processes, had a direct impact on the quantitative indices of many local ethnicities and alien ethnic communities. In particular, within a short space of time, new European ethnic communities appeared on the ethno- demographic map of the region, the quantitative indices of which gradually grew due to the constant inflow of migrants that continued throughout the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries. This is graph- ically shown by the data of censuses and statistical sources. The quantitative indices of European eth- nic communities in the Caucasus at the end of the 19th century can be examined on the basis of the data provided by the First Universal Population Census of the Russian Empire of 1897. We will note that as early as the beginning of the 20th century, the formation of European ethnic communities in the Caucasus was essentially complete. Representatives of the European ethnicities who moved to the Caucasus en masse and mainly lived compactly in the cities and villages formed as ethnic communities and the long-standing diasporas. In the 1920s, the quantitative indices of the European ethnic communities were registered and the ethnic composition of the Caucasus was spec- ified in greater detail in the all-Union census of 1926.

1 See: N.G. Volkova, Etnicheskiy sostav naseleniia Severnogo Kavkaza v XVIII-nachale XX veka, Nauka Publish- ers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 193-197. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1

Quantitative Distribution of European Ethnic Communities in the Caucasus According to Native Language Based on the 1897 Census2

Administrative- territorial

Unit Greek Polish Latvian German Moldavian Lithuanian- Belorussian Roman, incl. Finnish, incl. Est (Estonian) Russians, incl. French, Rumanian, Russian, Ukrainian,

Baku 77,681 1,439 371 158 3,430 — 622

Elizavetpol Governorate 17,875 616 148 143 3,194 558 16

Zaqataly District 434 115 — — 11 2 —

Daghestan Region 16,044 1,630 537 78 261 — 50

Kars Region 27,856 3243 956 51 430 32,593 484

Tiflis Governorate 85,338 6,167 1,420 814 8,329 27,116 199

Kutaisi Governorate 7,476 793 242 184 290 4,372 8

Batumi Region 9,956 911 191 160 369 4,717 31

Sukhumi District 6,011 234 123 138 406 5,393 607

Black Sea Governorate 34,546 731 88 1,091 748 5,969 821

Erivan Governorate 15,937 1,385 485 363 210 1,323 403

Stavropol Governorate 803,192 961 199 110 8,601 1,715 1,532

Kuban Region 1,737,908 2,719 1,086 5,444 20,778 20,137 2,446

Terek Region 314,644 4,173 841 221 9,672 958 203

The sociopolitical and socioeconomic processes that took place in the Soviet period had an effect on the ethnodemographic structure of the Caucasus. In the 1920s-1940s, after Soviet power was established in the Caucasus, there was mass emigration of the population abroad. De-kulakiza- tion, repressions, forced exile, and deportation of the indigenous Caucasian people, as well as of the alien ethnic groups living in the region, in addition to the combat action in the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, had a direct influence on the ethnic composition and demo- graphic development of the Caucasus. In particular, representatives of European ethnic communi- ties—all of the German population and some of the Greek and Polish population—were deported

2 See: Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1908 god, Tiflis, 1907, pp. 108-124. 92 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2

European Population of the Transcaucasus According to the 1926 Census3

Transcaucasian Azerbaijan Georgian Armenian Nationality S.F.S.R. S.S.R. S.S.R. S.S.R.

Russians 336,178 220,545 96,085 19,548

Ukrainians 35,423 18,241 14,356 2,826

Byelorussians 3,767 2,867 540 360

Germans 25,327 13,149 12,074 104

Poles 6,324 2,460 3,159 705

Greeks 57,935 904 54,051 2,980

Estonians 1,043 168 871 4

Latvians 944 569 363 12

Lithuanians 572 285 283 4

Moldavians 316 156 142 18

French 347 58 282 7

Italians 257 77 172 8

Czechs and Slovaks 237 87 143 7

Bulgarians 203 40 160 3

Table 3

European Population of the North Caucasian Territory and the Daghestan A.S.S.R. According to the 1926 Census4

North Caucasian Territory Daghestan A.S.S.R.

Nationality Total Urban Rural Total Population Population Population Population

Russians 3,841,063 1,009,342 2,831,721 98,197

Ukrainians 3,106,852 353,791 2,753,061 4,126

Byelorussians 51,317 28,697 22,620 178

3 See: Naselenie Zakavkazia. Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 g. Kratkie itogi, Transcaucasian Central Statis- tics Board, Tiflis, 1928, p. 8. 4 See: Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 goda, Vol. 5, Krymskaia A.S.S.R., Severo-Kavkazskiy kray, Dagestan- skaia A.S.S.R., Moscow, 1928, pp. 52-56, 342. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3 (continued)

North Caucasian Territory Daghestan A.S.S.R.

Nationality Total Urban Rural Total Population Population Population Population

Poles 18,425 12,588 5,837 460

Czechs and Slovaks 3,780 1,286 2,494 20

Serbs 277 133 144 1

Bulgarians 2,798 762 2,036 44

Latvians 4,573 2,582 1,991 73

Lithuanians 2,292 1,718 574 69

Estonians 5,201 962 4,239 33

Germans 93,915 12,734 81,181 2,551

English 59 40 19 —

Swedes 82 70 12 1

Dutch 10 8 2 13

Italians 308 242 66 1

French 164 135 29 10

Rumanians 562 201 361 58

Moldavians 9,546 446 9,100 491

Greeks 32,178 11,125 21,053 82

Finns 322 128 194 9 and exiled from the Caucasus. After rehabilitation, only a small number of them returned to the region.5 Thus, in the 19th-beginning of the 20th century, significant changes occurred in the ethnodemo- graphic structure of the Caucasus caused by the czarist migration policy, migration processes, and mass resettlement of members of the non-indigenous population both from outside and inside the Russian Empire. Russian czarism’s migration policy brought new ethnic elements into this historical- ly ethnically diverse region and promoted the appearance, formation, and increase in the size of the new ethnic communities, the area of historical dispersion of most of which stretched far beyond the Caucasus. In the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries, new European ethnic groups appeared in the region—Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Germans, Swedes, Moldavians, Rumanians, Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and others, most of whom founded monoethnic settlements, settled in mixed villages, or resided in the cities. These diaspora groups went through a long process of social adapta- tion and, preserving their cultural values and special features of national identity, were able by and

5 See: S.M. Zeynalova, Formirovanie evropeyskikh etnicheskikh obshchin na Kavkaze (XIX-pervaia polovina XX vv.), Mutarjim, Baku, 2010, pp. 33-56. 94 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION large to become part of the polyethnic and subcultural expanse of the region, thus leaving their mark on the history of the Caucasus. Representatives of the West Slavic ethnicities—Poles, Czechs, and a small number of Slo- vaks—formed some of the ethnic communities that settled and lived for a long time in the Caucasus. Migration of members of the West Slavic ethnicities to the Caucasus should be viewed as a whole within the framework of the czarist migration policy and the migration processes that took place in the 19th century.

Polish Community in the Caucasus

The Polish community was the largest of the West Slavic ethnicities that moved to and lived for a long time in the Caucasus. The migration of Poles and formation of a Polish community in the Caucasus differed from similar processes that ended in the formation of European communities in the region. The differences were expressed in the reasons for migration and the course it took, on the one hand, and directly in the social adaptation and formation of the Polish ethnic community, on the other. After the divvying up of the Rzeczpospolita and the Napoleonic wars, most of Poland went to the Russian Empire, which led to resettlement of groups of the Polish population in different regions of the empire, including in the Caucasus. The resettlement of Polish migrants in the Caucasus in the 19th century can be described as both compulsory and voluntary. When examining the migration of Poles to the region, several main cause-effect trends can be identified: (1) migration to the Caucasus of Poles from Napoleon’s army who were prisoners-of-war and recruits from Poland to the regular Russian troops as a result of military colonization of the region; (2) compulsory deportation of Poles as political exiles accused of participating in Polish upris- ings; and (3) voluntary migration of Poles from other provinces to the Caucasus. At the end of the 18th century, Polish soldiers serving in Russian squadrons began arriving in the Caucasus. Poles primarily settled in the region as servicemen in the Caucasian army forces. It is known that Polish legions took part in the Napoleonic wars. After defeat of Napoleon’s troops, many Polish prisoners-of-war were sent to the Caucasus to serve in the army. On the other hand, recruits from the Kingdom of Poland were also sent to the Caucasus to serve in the army. Thus, quite a large number of Polish officers served in the military units stationed in the Caucasus on fortified lines.6 The length of service in the Caucasus was quite long and afterwards many Poles and their families stayed on permanently. The largest category of the Polish population in the Northern Caucasus was composed of exiled Poles, participants in the national uprising of the 1830s and 1860s in Poland. After the Polish uprising of 1830-1831 was suppressed, hundreds of convicts were exiled to Siberia, recruited into the army, or sent to live in remote provinces of Russia, including in the Caucasus, despite the amnesty declared by Russian czarism.7 In the 1830s, Polish exiles began descending on the Caucasus en masse. A large number of exiled Poles also appeared in the Caucasus after repression of the 1863-1864 uprising. As

6 See: V.B. Vinogradov, Sredniaia Kuban: zemliaki i sosedi, Armavir, 1995, pp. 128-132. 7 See: Istoriia Polshi, in three volumes, Vol. 1, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1954, pp. 438- 453, 464. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION a result, from the end of the 18th century right up until the 1860s, the Polish ethnic community in the Caucasus was formed mainly from exiles (participants in the Polish uprisings) and Polish servicemen sent to the region. After expiration of their active service or the end of their exile term, many Poles decided to stay on permanently. However, after czarism declared amnesty, some of the Polish exiles returned to their historical homeland. Polish servicemen and exiles were deployed in legions throughout the Caucasus. In particular, a large number of Poles served in Azerbaijan in the Zaqataly and Husar districts. A large number of Polish servicemen were deployed at military posts in Georgia and the Northern Caucasus. At the be- ginning of the 1830s, a large group of Polish officers of the Chernigov Infantry Regiment and Lithua- nian Squadron exiled to the Caucasus served in Vladikavkaz. Many Poles served in the 76th Kuban Infantry Regiment that formed the basis of the First Maykop Garrison. Their descendants built a Cath- olic church in Maykop at the beginning of the 20th century.8 Some researchers believe that a total of 25-30,000 Poles served in the Caucasian Corps in 1840.9 In the second half of the 19th-beginning of the 20th century, the size of the Polish population in the Caucasus grew. Migration intensified due to the rigorous increase in capitalist relations and indus- trial development in the region. Along with representatives of various ethnicities, Polish specialists in different spheres began coming to the Caucasus, mainly engineers, physicians, lawyers, architects, and white-collar workers. This migration wave of the Polish population was voluntary and mainly associated with the good accommodation and job prospects in the region. When examining the statistical sources of the second half of the 19th-beginning of the 20th cen- turies, it can be concluded based on demographic and qualitative indices that the Polish population was one of the largest European ethnic groups in the Caucasus. In particular, according to the 1897 census, a total of 17,264 people who considered Polish their native language lived in the Transcau- casus and 7,853 in the Northern Caucasus.10 According to the 1926 census, 6,324 Poles lived in the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R., 2,460 of whom lived in the Azerbaijan S.S.R, 3,159 in the Georgian S.S.R., and 705 in the Armenian S.S.R. Four hundred and sixty Poles lived in the Daghestan A.S.S.R. A total of 18,425 Poles lived in the North Caucasian Territory, 12,588 of whom were city- dwellers and 5,837 rural residents.11 Due to the demographic growth that occurred as a result of the migration processes and natural population increment, the number of Poles living in the Caucasus in the 1930s increased to around 25-30,000. Changes in the quantitative indices were caused by burgeoning of the ranks of recruits and exiled Poles, the independent and voluntary resettlement of Poles in the region, as well as the return of some of the Polish exiled settlers to their historical homeland after amnesty was declared. As can be seen from the statistics presented above, most of the Polish population lived in the cities, and only a small number resided in rural areas. For example, at the end of the 19th century, there was a small population of Polish state-owned farmers (53 farms, 231 people) living in the Tran- scaucasian Territory who settled in the Tiflis province.12 A small number of Poles also lived in mixed rural settlements in the Northern Caucasus. A large number of Poles settled in large cities—the industrial and cultural centers of the Cau- casus—Baku, Tiflis, Ekaterinodar, Stavropol, Vladikavkaz, and others. According to the data for 1884, 10,263 Poles lived in the Northern Caucasus, including 8,444 in the Kuban Region (2,400 in

8 See: O.V. Matveev, “Poliaki goroda Maykopa (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX vv.),” available at [http:// slavmir.orthodoxkuban.com.ru/2008/08/21/ov_matveev_poljaki_goroda_majjkopa.html]. 9 See: R.F. Badirbeyli, Poliaki v Azerbaidzhane v XIX-nach. XX vv., Author’s dissertation for a Ph.D. in History, Baku, 1985, pp. 9-14. 10 See: Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1908 god, pp. 108-124. 11 See: Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 goda, Vol. V, pp. 52-56, 342; Naselenie Zakavkazia. Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 g. Kratikie itogi, p. 8. 12 See: I.G. Antelava, Gosudarstvennye krestiane Gruzii v XIX veke (proreformennyy period 1864-1900 gg.), Vol. II, Georgian S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Publishers, Tbilisi, 1962, pp. 281-283. 96 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ekaterinodar). The number of Poles in Vladikavkaz increased during general colonization of the territory by means of migrants from the Warsaw province and other provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, the Baltic states, and the Russian provinces, mainly Voronezh. In 1882, there were 1,021 people in the city, in 1899, 1,037, and by 1914, 1,879 people were living there. According to the 1897 census, the size of the Polish population in Stavropol amounted to 711 people.13 A large number of Poles lived in the large cities of the Southern Caucasus—Baku and Tiflis. According to the data of a one-day census conducted in Tiflis on 25 March, 1876, 1,592 Poles lived in the city.14 According to the data for 1886, 1,093 Poles lived in Baku.15 The inflow of Poles into the Caucasus also intensified during World War I. Masses of Polish refugees showed up in the cities of the Cau- casus—Baku, Tiflis, Vladikavkaz, and others. According to the Baku census of 1913, 1,770 Poles lived in the city.16 A large number of Polish residents was designated in Baku during a one-day census carried out in 1917, according to which almost 2,000 Poles (1,982) lived in the city.17 The size of the Polish population in the cities of the Caucasus decreased during the 1920s after Soviet power was established. In contrast to the representatives of other European ethnic groups who moved to the Caucasus and founded compact settlements, for example, Germans, Greeks, Czechs, Estonians, and so on, the Poles mainly lived in the large cities and did not have national settlements. As mentioned above, only a small number of Poles lived in the rural areas, mainly in mixed settlements. In order to retain control over the Polish population, the Russian government did not strive to create national settlements for the Poles.18 On the other hand, most of the Poles who moved to the Caucasus were noblemen, white- collar workers, members of the military, and members of the clergy by birth, and only a few were peasants. These strata of the population were mainly city-dwellers who had difficulty adapting to rural life. However, despite the control over the activity of the Poles, most of the Polish natives were able to quickly adapt to the new living conditions and occupy a certain socioeconomic niche. In addi- tion to engaging in private business activity, Poles served in the civil service and army. There were quite a few high-ranking military officers, prominent scientists and teachers, artists, physicians, and well-known architects among the Polish population living in the Caucasus. The Polish community in the Caucasus was characterized by a high social status and level of literacy. For example, in the mid- 1920s, according to the statistics, among the representatives of the European ethnic communities in the Transcaucasus (with a total of no less than 3,000 people), more than 75% of Poles and Germans ranked first in terms of level of literacy per 1,000 people, there being 831 Poles of this category per 1,000 people and 755 Germans per 1,000 people.19 By the beginning of the 20th century, Polish communities with a high level of ethnocultural consolidation had formed in the large cities of the Northern and Southern Caucasus. The Polish com- munity settled in very compact districts in some cities, Vladikavkaz for example. The Poles opened several private establishments—stores and medical and educational institutions. At the beginning of the 20th century, a Roman Catholic school and , which was restored in the 1930s, functioned in Vladikavkaz.20 In the 1840s, a Catholic church was built in Stavropol, at which a prima-

13 See: “Poliaki na Kubani: istoria i sovremennost,” available at [http://poloniakuban.by.ru/polish_kub.htm]; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1908 god, p. 122; Z.V. Kanukova, Staryy Vladikavkaz, Iriston, Vladikavkaz, 2002, 310 pp., available at [http://nocss.ru/projects/24/gl1_p2.php]. 14 See: Sbornik svedeniy o Kavkaze, ed. by N.K. Zeydlits, Vol. VI, Tiflis, 1880, pp. 134-138. 15 See: M.B. Muradalieva, Goroda Severnogo Azerbaidzhana vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka, Baku University Pub- lishers, Baku, 1991, p. 82. 16 See: Perepis Baku 1913 g., Part III, Naseleniie, Baku, 1916, p. 5. 17 See: Izvestiia AzTsSU, No. 4, 1922, p. 34. 18 See: I.V. Tsifanova, Polskie pereselentsy na Severnom Kavkaze v XIX veke: osobennosit protsessa adaptatsii, Author’s dissertation for a Ph.D. in History, Stavropol, 2005, pp. 21-27. 19 See: “Gramotnost naseleniia ZSFSR,” Ekonomicheskiy vestnik Zakavkazia, No. 9, 1928, p. 5. 20 See: Z.V. Kanukova, op. cit. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ry school and charity society functioned.21 The largest Polish community was in Kuban. Many noble- men, servicemen, physicians, teachers, and businessmen had a significant impact on the development of the Kuban Region. They included public prosecutor of the Ekaterinodar District Court V. Rakov- sky, head physician of the Ekaterinodar Military Hospital and founder of the Goriachie kliuchi Health Resort M. Rymashevsky, noblemen, Kuban industrialists P. Bukovsky and G. Kozlovsky, founder of the Anapa health resort V. Budzinsky, and others. The Polish population of Kuban was distinguished by high social activity. Poles were particularly active in Ekaterinodar. In 1893, a Roman Catholic church was built and consecrated in Ekaterinodar, at which a parochial school was opened. A Roman Catholic church also functioned in Armavir, which ran a Roman Catholic academy for Poles and a library. At the beginning of the 20th century, a Polish club called Ognisko functioned in Ekaterinodar. In 1920, there were three Polish schools in the Kuban-Black Sea Region in Armavir, Novorossiysk, and Ekaterinodar.22 The Polish community represented a significant social stratum in the South Caucasian cities of Baku, Tbilisi (Tiflis), and Batumi. Polish exiles settled in Azerbaijan, where they served in military garrisons. There were talented poets, scientists, and engineers among the Polish exiles to the Southern Caucasus. Tadeusz Lada Zablotsky (1813-1847) was a Polish poet who lived for more than a decade in the Caucasus. He was one of those exiled in 1837 to serve in the Caucasian Corps for participating in the anti-monarchial movement. In 1841, he went to Guba and then to Shemakha. Travelling through the southeast of the Caucasus, he devoted many of his literary works to this region, studied the national Caucasian languages, and translated Azerbaijani folk songs and folklore. Vladislav Stshelnitsky (1820-1846) was another Polish poet exiled to the Caucasus to serve in the army. Many of his literary works were written in , Shemakha, and Baku. Living for a long time in Karaba- kh, he wrote about this area in his Caucasian Essays.23 One of the exiled Poles was Ludwig Mlokosevich, who was sent to do military service in the Caucasus in 1851 and studied the biology of the region and cultivated rare species of plants. He car- ried out hydrometeorological observations in Zaqataly, studied the flora and fauna, and participated in botanic and zoological expeditions around Azerbaijan, Daghestan, and Georgia.24 The development of industry in Azerbaijan created favorable conditions for an inflow of Polish specialists. Poles who graduated from Russian higher educational institutions—physicians, pharma- cists, engineers, officials, etc.—were sent to Azerbaijan in the last third of the 19th century. Baku had the largest concentration of Poles in Azerbaijan. In the variegated ethnic makeup of Baku, the Poles were distinguished by a high level of education and occupied many executive posts in the army, state administration, and industry. In particular, at the end of the 19th century, a Pole called Stanislav Despot-Zenovich was the chairman of the Baku City Duma. The Polish Rylsky family was engaged in business activity at the Baku oilfields. Some of the Polish officers held posts in the military adminis- tration in Azerbaijan, in particular, Physician Seropsky (head of the military hospital in Baku in 1831), Major Kanonensky (military commandant of Baku in 1839), and Colonel Miklashevsky (mil- itary commander of the Muslim provinces of the Caucasus). In 1847, nine high-ranking Polish white- collar workers served in Azerbaijan, in particular, head of the district military headquarters Major General M. Gursky, Major F. Dobzhansky, and others. In the second half of the 19th century, quite a large number of Polish physicians worked in Baku. By 1889, there were nine Polish physicians prac- ticing in Baku.25

21 See: I.V. Tsifanova, op. cit. 22 See: Poliaki na Kubani: istoria i sovremennost; V.B. Vinogradov, Sredniaia Kuban: zemliaki i sosedi, Armavir, 1995, pp. 128-132. 23 See: G.G. Abdullabekova, Temy i inspiratsii Azerbaidzhana v polskoi literature XIX veka, Ozan, Baku, 1999, pp. 46-48, 67. 24 See: “Ludwig Mlokosevich,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 5, 2001, pp. 10-13. 25 See: R. Badirbeyli, “Poliaki v Azerbaidzhane v XIX i nachale XX veka,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 2, 1999, pp. 2-4. 98 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The most vibrant representatives of the Polish population in Azerbaijan were Polish archi- tects—Yu. Goslavsky, K. Skurevich, Yu. Ploshko, E. Skibinsky, K. Borisoglebsky, and others, whose designs were used to build a whole series of extremely beautiful architectural buildings in Baku and other cities. Polish architect Yuzef Vikentievich Goslavsky (1865-1904) was born in War- saw and soon after graduating from the Petersburg Institute of Civil Engineers was sent to Baku. Between 1893-1900, he designed and supervised the construction of several fundamental buildings, including the of Zeinalabdin Tagiev (now the Azerbaijan National History Museum), the building of the women’s Muslim school, the building of the city Duma (now the building of the Baku Executive Power Branch), the Tagiev Theater (now the musical comedy theater), several residential buildings in the center of the city, and so on. Architect Yuzef Ploshko’s designs were used for the Ismailiye building (now the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan), residen- tial buildings on Telefonnaia Street (now ) commissioned by Baku oil industrialist Musa Nagiev, the Palace of Murtuz Mukhtarov (now the ), and so on.26 Polish geologists made a significant contribution to the development of geology of the Cauca- sus, particularly Vitold Zglenitsky (1850-1904) and Pavel Pototsky (1879-1923) who studied the oil- fields and mineral deposits in Azerbaijan, as well as promising oil-bearing zones on land and in the Caspian Sea.27 Polish scientists living in Azerbaijan, particularly A. Makovelsky (the history of philosophy), P. Zdrodovsky (microbiology), and others, made a significant contribution to the development of various branches of science. Among Azerbaijan’s music intelligentsia of the beginning of the 20th century, famous musician Leopold Rostropovich (1892-1942), who came from a noble Polish family, can be mentioned. The events of his creative life between 1925 and 1931 were associated with Baku. Leopold Rostropovich was a professor at the Azerbaijani State Conservatory. His son, Mstislav Rostropovich (1927, Baku-2007, Moscow), who became a world renowned musician, philanthropist, and patron of the arts, was born in Baku. People in Azerbaijan today still highly esteem his memory.28 There was a large Polish community in Georgia. At the end of the 19th-beginning of the 20th cen- turies, many Polish officials, military, scientists, and artists lived in Tiflis. Yuzef Khodko (1800- 1881) held a prominent place in topography and cartography. After serving several army terms, in 1840 he was appointed to the Caucasus to engage in geodesic and topographic studies. During his service in the Caucasus, Khodko carried out several fundamental scientific studies regarding trig- onometric measurements of the Transcaucasian Territory and topographic photographs of the Northern Caucasus. In 1858, the military-topographic department of the main headquarters of the Caucasian army was established in Tiflis, to which Major General Khodko was appointed head. He was also an honorary member of the Caucasian Department of the Russian Technical Society and possessed various state awards.29 At the end of the 19th century, Polish engineers worked in Tiflis, among whom Boleslav Stat- kovsky can be mentioned. After coming to Tiflis to serve in the army in 1847, he took part in rebuild- ing the Military Georgian Road and in building the Tiflis-Poti railroad. General Vladislav Kaluso- vsky, who was sent to the Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century, worked for many years in the military-topographic department of the Caucasian Military District in Tiflis. He took military-top- ographic photographs and drew many topographic maps, including the map of Tiflis.30

26 See: Sh. Fatullaev-Figarov, Tvorchestvo polskikh arkhitektorov v Baku, Baku, 2004; Sh.S. Fatullaev, Gradostroitelstvo i arkhitektura Azerbaidzhana XIX-nachala XX veka, Stroyizdat, Leningrad, 1986, pp. 65-66, 82, 158-162, 218, 276, 405. 27 See: Polskie neftianiki v Azerbaidzhane na rubezhe XIX-XX vekov, Baku, 2008, pp. 47-56. 28 See: O. Iushanina-Makovelskaia, A. Kostin, “O Polshe i poliakakh v Azerbaidzhane,” Azerbaidzhan i azerbaid- zhantsy v mire, No. 2, 2009, pp. 165-171; Mstislav Rostropovich, Baku, 1997, pp. 29-32. 29 See: “Yuzef Khodko,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 5, 2001, pp. 3-5. 30 See: “Boleslav Statkovsky,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 7, 2002, pp. 8-10; “Puteshestvuia po stranitsam proshlo- go,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 8, 2002, pp. 5-12. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Spiritual values were extremely important in the life of the Polish community of the Caucasus. Most of the Polish population were Catholics. At the beginning of the 20th century, Catholic churches were built in almost all the large cities of the Caucasus with a large Polish population. Charity soci- eties and parochial schools functioned in them. We will note that the Polish population was known for its activity in social life. At the beginning of the 20th century, Polish social organizations, such as Polish House, charity societies, libraries, and so on, functioned in the large cities of the Northern and Southern Caucasus (in Vladikavkaz, Ekaterinodar, Baku, Tiflis and others). In particular, at the be- ginning of the 20th century, social-charity organizations existed in Baku, in the activity of which members of the Polish intelligentsia participated. The first association of Poles called The Roman Catholic Society was established in Baku in 1903 to carry out philanthropic activity. In 1909, an as- sociation called Polish House was registered, the charter of which set forth its main objective as pro- moting cultural development of the Polish population of Baku. At the beginning of World War I, Polish House helped refugees from Poland.31 Polish public organizations—Polish House, a Polish theater, and a library—also functioned in Tiflis at the beginning of the 20th century. In the 1920s, a Polish school functioned in Georgia.32 In 1909-1911, a Catholic church designed by Yuzef Ploshko was built in Baku. The Rylsky family of Polish industrialists, as well as Vitold Zglenitsky, took active part in financing the activity of Polish House and building the Catholic church. The Catholic church, most of the parishioners of which were Poles, was destroyed during the “militant atheism” in the 1930s. The dean of the parish, Roman Catholic priest Stefan Demurov, like many other members of the clergy, was arrested during the years of repression.33 The fact that deputy Stanislav Vonsovich represented the Polish national council in the faction of deputies from the national minorities in the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) also demonstrates the public activity of the Polish population.34 Due to the fact that most of the Polish population in the Caucasus lived in cities and did not have national settlements, in contrast to the German and Greek communities, the ethnocultural character- istics of the Polish community were determined by urban attributes. The Polish community solici- tously preserved elements of the national and spiritual culture, language, customs and traditions passed down from generation to generation. On the whole, in their lifestyle, the Poles adhered to and followed European and Christian values and dogmas. By preserving its national identity, the Polish community, which successfully underwent sociocultural adaptation, was able to harmoniously blend into the socioeconomic and sociocultural life of the cities of the Caucasus.

The Czech Community in the Caucasus

The migration of groups of the Czech population to the Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century was voluntary and supported by Russian czarism. The Czech migrants founded their own settlements in the region and engaged primarily in agriculture. Czech migrants appeared in the Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century as a result of the migration wave, migration policy, and prospects for economic development in the region. Along with

31 See: R. Badirbeyli, op. cit. 32 See: A. Kozbelevskiy, “Iz istorii poliakov Gruzii,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 9, 2002, pp. 13-14; M. Komakhia, “Georgia’s Slavic Population,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007, pp. 132-143. 33 See: A. Khodubski, “Polsko-azerbaidzhanskie sviazi i istoriko-memuarnaia literature (do nachala XX v.),” in: Azerbaidzhansko-evropeiskie literaturnye vsaimosviazi, Elm, Baku, 1983, pp. 202-209; “Yan Chapla: Katolicheskaia tserkov,” Azerbaidzhan i azerbaidzhantsy v mire, No. 1, 2007, pp. 72-75; Iu. Guretskiy, “Katolicheskaia tserkov v Azer- baidzhane,” Kavkazskaia Poloniia, No. 12, 2003, pp. 5-9. 34 See: Azerbaidzhanskaia Demokraticheskaia Respublika (1918-1920). Parliament, Azerbaijan Publishers, Baku, 1998, pp. 23-26; Azerbaidzhanskaia Respublika. Dokumenty i materialy 1918-1920 gg., ed. by J.B. Guliev, Elm, Baku, 1998, p. 215. 100 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Czechs, a small number of Slovaks also moved to the Caucasus and settled there. As a result of the Czech farmers being deprived of their land, they began moving to the Russian Empire, where Czech settlements appeared in the second half of the 19th century in Volyn, the Crimea, and the Northern Caucasus. On the whole, by the beginning of the 20th century, the Czechs had established several settlements in the Kuban Region and —the village of Pavlovka (migrants from Moravia at the end of 1870-beginning of 1880s), the village of Varvarovka (the Taman Branch of the Kuban Region, and from 1904 the Novorossiysk District of the Black Sea Governorate), the villages of Vladimirovka, Mefodievka, Borisovka, Glebovka (the Novorossiysk District), the villages of Te- kos and Teshebs (along with the Poles), the Georgiev hamlet (village of Anastasievka) (the Tuapse District), and the hamlet of Mamatsev (along with Poles) (the Maykop Branch).35 According to the 1926 census, a total of 3,780 Czechs and Slovaks lived in the North Caucasian Territory, 1,286 of whom were urban and 2,494 rural residents. A small number of Czechs and Slo- vaks lived in the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R.—237 people, 143 of whom settled in the Georgian S.S.R. and 87 in the Azerbaijan S.S.R.36 The Czechs took part in the development of various branches of agriculture and industry in the region. After settling in the Caucasus as farmers, they devoted much attention to the development of farming and cattle breeding in their settlements. The Czechs made a significant contribution to the development of the beer-brewing industry in the Northern Caucasus. Whereas Germans were initially engaged in beer brewing, beginning in the 1870s, this sphere of activity became the specialization of Czech beer brewers and wine growers. Special mention should be made of Fyodor Geiduk who helped to establish the manufacture of Abrau-Durso champagnes in the region.37 The Czechs also actively demonstrated their skills in various spheres of the local economy and cultural life of Armavir. At the end of the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries, the J. Grzyb beer brewery, O. Lozhansky oil-pressing factory, and the Stepanek Bros. Czech Prague sausage factory functioned in Armavir.38 In the Southern Caucasus, Czechs lived in small numbers in the cities and were mainly white-collar workers and specialists in various spheres. In particular, hydraulic engineer Nikolai Šmalcel, opera singer Joseph Rátil, singer Gertrude Šmalcel, artist-designers Franz Novak and Joseph Brouèek, physician Ivan Pøbil, and others can be named among the well-known members of Georgia’s Czech population.39 The Czechs, who lived in the Caucasus for almost a century, retained their cultural and ethnographic characteristics, which were expressed in the settlers’ everyday life and material and spiritual culture. In particular, the Czech villages were reminiscent of European settlements with public institutions—a church, rural council, and school—in their centers. A farming and cattle-breeding way of life was charac- teristic of the Czech population of the Caucasus. Beer brewing was developed in the hamlet of Mamatsev, while meat and dairy stock-raising was characteristic of the Czech settlements in the Black Sea Governo- rate. The absolute majority of Czechs in the Caucasus were Catholics. Catholic churches and prayer houses were built in several Czech villages—Varvarovka, Pavlovka, and Teshebs.40

35 See: Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar po istorii Kubani s drevneishikh vremen do oktiabria 1917 goda, Elvi, Krasn- odar, 1997, p. 553; I. Kuznetsov, Chekhi Kavkaza, Bulletin No. 1, Publication of the Center of Pontic-Caucasian Studies at the Chair of History, Sociology and International Relations of Kuban State University, available at [http://history. kubsu.ru/pdf/kn2-122.pdf]. 36 See: Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 goda, Vol. V, pp. 52-56; Naselenie Zakavkazia. Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 g. Kratkie itogi, p. 8. 37 See: V. Pukish, “Cheshskie korni rossiiskogo shampanskogo,” available at [http://smyslov.livejournal.com/ 720160.html]. 38 See: S.N. Ktitorov, “Etnicheskiy sostav naseleniia Armavira po dannym torgovopromyshlennykh spiskov,” in: Dikarevskie chteniia (4). Results of Folklore and Ethnographic Studies of the Ethnic Cultures of Kuban for 1997, Papers of the Scientific-Practical Conference, Belorechensk, 1998, pp. 18-21. 39 See: M. Komakhia, op. cit. 40 See: I. Kuznetsov, op. cit. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Throughout the 20th century, changes occurred in the life of the West Slavic ethnic communi- ties, as well as of the other European ethnic communities living in the Caucasus. The size of the Polish and Czech population in the region perceptibly decreased as a result of the repatriation during World War I, the repressions, de-kulakization, and compulsory deportations of the 1930s-1940s of the Sovi- et period, and the emigration in the 1990s.

Conclusion

The Russian czarist migration policy in the 19th-beginning of 20th centuries led to an increase in the size of the non-indigenous population in the Caucasus and the appearance of new ethnic com- munities, the historical homeland of whom was far beyond the region. Migration was both compulso- ry and voluntary. There were landless peasants, exiles, and also population groups of different ethnic origin who moved to the Caucasus during economic development. The migration waves during the 19th century promoted the appearance and gradual increase in the size of the European ethnic communities, among whom representatives of Western Slavic ethnic- ities—Poles and Czechs—can be noted. The largest was the Polish community, which settled in the Caucasian cities and mainly represented different strata of the urban population—white-collar work- ers, scientists, teachers, businessmen, industrialists, servicemen, etc. Groups of Czech residents es- tablished several settlements in the Northern Caucasus and on the Black Sea coast. The Czech com- munity was mainly engaged in farming and agricultural production. Polish and Czech ethnic communities continued to form throughout the 19th century, but this process was completed by the beginning of the 20th century. They became successfully integrated into the economic and social life of the region, but in so doing were able to preserve their national and cultural values and ethnographic characteristics far from their historical homeland. This was vividly manifested in building churches and opening national schools, in the activity of public organizations and charity societies, and in their lifestyle in general. 102 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Jamil HASANLI

D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at Khazar University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: OLD DELUSIONS AND NEW INTERPRETATIONS1

Abstract

he author takes a look at the ethnic Azerbaijan, into a target of Armenian ter- T and political processes that unfolded ritorial claims. The recent discussions or- in Karabakh from the early 19th cen- ganized by the Russian Regnum Informa- tury to the early 1920s. Prof. Hasanli re- tion Agency show that in recent years eve- lies on a vast body of historical sources rything related to the Karabakh issue has to analyze the events and demonstrate been falsified. This adds special historical that in 1920 Soviet power transformed Ka- and political importance to what is exam- rabakh, one of the Muslim khanates of ined below.

Introduction

The Kazan meeting of the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia rekindled an interest in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, most publications grossly distort both the pre-Sovi- et history of its unification with the Russian Empire and the vicissitudes of Soviet history. The fact that professional historians distort or even falsify history cannot but cause concern and regret. I won-

1 The article was first published in Russian by the Regnum Information Agency on 25, 26, 27 and 30 July, 2011. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION der who profits from these distortions? Indeed, who needs history adjusted to the current political context? The truth can easily be recovered from numerous documents in which the military and diplomatic services of the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia carefully registered the facts and which are kept in Russian archives. Some time ago, the Regnum Information Agency published a series of articles by S.N. Tarasov, a fellow student, in which he discussed the recent history of the mountainous part of Karabakh. He doubts that it was part of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918-1920, while trying to create an alternative story related to the well-known declaration of Nar- iman Narimanov of 1 December, 1920, and insists that Stalin transferred the mountain part of Ka- rabakh to Azerbaijan in 1921 (which is not true). He relies on archival documents, but instead of clarifying the issue his selection distorts the far from simple circumstances even more. This cannot but cause regret.

How the Karabakh Khanate was United with the Russian Empire: the True Story and Its Distortions

Russia, which came to Karabakh in the early 19th century, created a new political situation; it was seeking social and ethnic support among the Armenians, which pushed to the fore the Christian element in Karabakh. In fact, the disagreements of our days are rooted in the early 19th century. In 1801, having conquered Georgia, Russia approached the borders of contemporary Azerbai- jan. In March 1803, Commander of the Russian Caucasian Army General Tsitsianov began a siege of Ganja, the largest of the Azeri cities; on 3 January, 1804, Russian troops, which had broken the fierce resistance of the city inhabitants headed by Javad , entered the city. To gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus, the Russians needed the Karabakh, Sheki, and Shirvan khanates, the strongest in this region. During the protracted talks, Prince Tsitsianov threatened the khanates with the sad fate of Ganja and argued that Russia’s military might made its patronage the best option for the three khans. The Russian commander, who was rubbing up against Iranian interests in the region and knew this, preferred the wait-and-see policy, a wise decision in view of the Muslim khanates’ considerable mil- itary potential. In 1805, broken by the pressure, ruler of Karabakh Ibrahim Khalil Khan signed a Promise on Oath with Russia, the first legally binding document; the first step toward uniting Karabakh to Russia had thus been made. The treaty signed in the Kurakchay military camp became known as the Treaty of Kurakchay; its eleven articles gave Russia all the advantages. From that time on, the Karabakh Khanate became a Russian protectorate: it renounced its right to deal with third states and with its neighbors on its own; the khan was expected to pay Russia an enormous annual tribute of 8,000 chervontsy (24 thousand Russian rubles); cover the upkeep expenses for his grandson held hostage at the Tiflis residence of the commander-in-chief; and accept a unit of 500 Russian soldiers stationed at the Shusha fortress. Russia, in turn, pledged not to interfere in the khanate’s internal affairs—the only concession Ibrahim Khalil Khan wrung from the Russian negotiators. As soon as the treaty was signed, on 8 July, 1805, Czar Alexander I made the khan a Russian lieutenant-general; from that time on, he was ex- pected to obey the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in the Caucasus. As a diplomatic document, this treaty meant that the Karabakh Khanate became a Russian protectorate as a Muslim state.2

2 See: “Treaty between the Karabakh Khan and the Russian Empire on the Transfer of the Khanate under Russia’s Power of 14 May, 1805,” State Historical Archives of the AR (GIAAR), rec. gr. 130, f. 14, sheets 245-248 (all archival 104 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Having captured the strategically important Karabakh Khanate, the Russians could move on to occupy the rest of Azerbaijan. The khanate’s mountainous part allowed Russians to control the west of the country. The rest proved easy; the task was made even easier by the khans, who, unable to agree on the common future of their peoples and khanates, failed to close ranks in the face of Russian pres- sure. Prince Tsitsianov was prompt to grasp the advantages of joining Karabakh to Russia under the Kurakchay Treaty of 22 May, 1805. In a letter to the Russian emperor, he described the new acquisi- tion as the “gate to Azerbaijan;” he wrote that Karabakh moved Georgia closer to Baku “which we expect to capture this fall.”3 The Azeri khans, very much afraid of Iran but still hoping it would win the first Russo-Iranian war (1804-1813), followed the ups and downs of the hostilities with bated breath; the Russian army, in turn, did not trust the local Muslims very much. In 1806, when Iran attacked Shusha, Major Lisanevich, who was in command of the Russian garrison, murdered Ibrahim Khalil Khan and all his family to prevent unpleasant surprises on his side; he spared Mekhti Kuli Agha, one of his sons. The military rank of lieutenant general of the Russian Army the emperor conferred on the khan was obviously no more than symbolic. Having disposed of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, Russia pre- served the status of its khanate: on 10 September, 1806, under a deed of Emperor Alexander I, Mekhti Kuli Agha replaced his father as ruler of Karabakh. The deed signed by His Imperial Maj- esty on September 1806 said in part: “We send Our amiable loyal subject M.-Gen. of the Karabakh land and heir Mekhti Kuli Agha. Our Imperial Grace and Kindness. Having conferred on you and all the people of the Karabakh land the grace of the Supreme Deed in the last year of 1805 to receive you as Our loyal subjects and the benevolent adoption of all conditions which your late father and Our General of the Infantry Prince Tsitsianov set in the interests of the people and your house for all times, We were sorry to hear of the incident which caused the death of Your father Ibrahim Khalil Khan. Today, being assured that you not only remained determined to perform your duty to Our Imperial throne, but that You also served our troops on your own initiative, We reward this commendable confirmation of your loyalty by appointing you khan of Shusha and Karabakh and allow you to own this land under Our Supreme patronage, the patronage of the state and protection of the Russian Empire, to which you should pledge your loyalty as a subject and recognize Our power over yourself. By Our supreme will, We hereby entrust both you and your future descend- ents with all the obligations of the Karabakh Khanate and the rights and advantages attached to it and confirmed word for word in this deed. By this We entrust you with the task of ruling the Kara- bakh people with meekness and fairness and We are convinced that you and your heirs will be unshakable in your devotion to Our Imperial throne and faithful performance of your obligations in accordance with the demands of your loyalty. This, Our Imperial deed, was issued with the hope and as proof of Our Royal benevolence to you and the people of Karabakh; it was personally signed and sealed with the State Stamp. Signed: Alexander.”4 The Russian emperor presented Mekhti Kuli Agha with a flag and a saber decorated with pre- cious stones as a symbol of his new position. Like the Treaty of Kurakchay before it, the imperial decree of 1806 (the Treaty’s legal extension), which appointed Mekhti Kuli Agha ruler of Karabakh, in short, all the documents relating to both the mountainous and valley parts of Karabakh, which was being gradually occupied, speak of the members of the Javanshir House as rulers whom all social groups had to obey. The new khan hated the Iranians and mistrusted the Russians, who exterminated his family, yet as appointed khan he had certain obligations to perform and had to demonstrate cau- tion; his anti-Iranian feelings eventually prevailed. documents are in Russian unless otherwise stated); Akty Kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy komissii. Arkhiv Glavnogo up- ravlenia namestnika Kavkaza, Vol. II, ed. by Commission Chairman A.D. Berge, Tiflis, 1868, p. 705. 3 Akty Kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy komissii, Arkhiv Glavnogo upravlenia namestnika Kavkaza, Vol. II, p. 698. 4 “Vysochaishaia gramota general-mayoru Mekhti Kuli Agha ot sentyabrya 1806 goda,” Akty Kavkazskoy arkhe- ograficheskoy komissii. Arkhiv Glavnogo upravlenia namestnika Kavkaza, Vol. III, Tiflis, 1868, pp. 336-337. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The victory over Napoleon allowed Russia to tighten up its Eastern policy. General Yermo- lov, who was appointed as of the Caucasus in 1816, regarded the Muslims as potential enemies; he used any more or less plausible pretext to liquidate the khanates, which at any moment could have become the driving force behind a liberation movement. Armenian General V. Mada- tov, who represented the governor in Northern Azerbaijan, likewise demonstrated a lot of zeal; together they moved steadily toward their aim: in 1819, the Sheki Khanate was liquidated. Unable to stand the Russians’ pressure any longer, Mekhti Kuli Khan fled to Iran, and the Karabakh Khanate became a Russian province. Russian writer and diplomat Alexander Griboedov wrote that 3 thousand Muslim families followed the khan. Two years before that, Mustafa Khan of Shirvan escaped to Iran. The khanates were liquidated in violation of the earlier signed treaties. In 1826, the second Russo-Iranian war began with Karabakh serving as the battleground once more. The Irani- ans, who besieged Shusha for 48 days, had to retreat. On 10 February, 1828, the sides signed a new peace treaty in the village of Turkmanchay outside Tabriz under which the khanates of Northern Azerbaijan, including Karabakh, as well as the and Irevan khanates, finally became parts of the Russian Empire. Unification of the Transcaucasus and Russia abounds in illuminating details. Recently, some Armenian and Russian historians and part of the political establishment have been saying that Kara- bakh was attached to Russia as part of Armenia. Today, some Russian and Armenian historians insist that throughout the 18th century Armenians comprised 97 percent of the population in Karabakh.5 If this is true, why was it the Karabakh Khanate headed by the famous Turkic tribe of Jawanshirs rather than the Armenian state which appeared in Karabakh in the mid-18th century? Three percent of the total population stands no chance of establishing their own state and ruling the other 97 percent: this has never happened in human history. Any attentive researcher of the international legal documents of the period will never fail to question the formula according to which Russia acquired not only Karabakh, but also Armenia. Georgia became part of Russia under the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1801, while the Azeri khanates joined Russia under the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) treaties. The question is: what treaty made Armenia and the territories it claims part of Russia? Prominent Armenian historians did not look far: disdaining the ethics of academic studies, they preferred to ignore the well-known historical facts to write: “Under the Treaty of Gulistan of 1813, which ended the Russo-Persian war of 1804-1813, Russia acquired the Ganja and Karabakh khanates together with the other northeast- ern provinces of eastern Armenia (the Lori-Pambak, Shamshadin, Zangezur, Kafan, and Shoragel uezds)… Under the Treaty of Turkmanchay (February 1828), which ended the second Russo-Per- sian war (1826-1928), Russia acquired the Erevan and Nakhchivan khanates and the Ordubad uezd. In this way, East Armenia became part of Russia.”6 To prove their point, they refer to a documen- tary collection published by G. Yuzefovich in St. Petersburg in 1869.7 They insist their falsifica- tions, even though they know that neither the Gulistan nor the Turkmanchay treaties published in Yusefovich’s collection say anything at all about the Armenian lands, either eastern or western; no Christian lands are mentioned either. The documents relate to the Muslim khanates, their territo- ries, and their unification with Russia. The Irevan Khanate was a predominantly Muslim state; this is amply confirmed by Russian historical sources. In 1828, when the so-called Armenian Region was set up in the territories of the Irevan and Nakhchivan khanates, three quarters of its population were Muslims. General Paskevich wrote to the Chief of General Staff to express his displeasure

5 See: V.A. Zakharov, S.T. Sarkisian, “Azerbaidzhano-karabakhskiy konflikt: istoki i sovremennost,” in: Mayen- dorfskaia deklaratsia 2 noyabrya 2008 goda i situatsia vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, Collection of articles, Moscow, 2008, p. 230. 6 Nagorny Karabakh: istoricheskaia spravka, Erevan, 1988, pp. 14-15. 7 See: Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom, politicheskie i torgovye, Collected and published by G. Yuzefovich, St. Peters- burg, 1869, pp. 208-214. 106 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION with General Krasovsky, who was appointed in 1827 as head of the “interim administration” of Irevan, and with member of the interim administration Archbishop Nerses, accusing the former of “giving free rein to Archbishop Nerses in everything and of harmful protection of the Armenians, while three quarters of the region’s population were Muslims.”8 The lost status turned the khanates, including Karabakh, into a colony; it was a long process and took several decades, during which the administrative division of the Transcaucasus changed several times to reach its final configuration in the latter half of the 19th century. The khanates of Northern Azerbaijan were replaced with military administrations; Karabakh, with Shusha as its center, became part of the Muslim District administered by the Military-District Head of the Muslim provinces. The new division contradicted the ethnographic, historical, religious, and everyday specifics of the local people, Karabakh being the most glaring example of this. Demography began developing into a polit- ical instrument. On 19 July, 1811, at the beginning of Armenian resettlement, the Russian administra- tors submitted a document to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs which said that out of 12 thou- sand families, 2,500 were Armenian and the rest Muslim.9 In 1823, the Russian administrators prepared the Description of the Karabakh Province based on ethnographic and confessional statistics. This valuable historical source says that there were 600 settlements in Karabakh, 450 of them were Muslim; the others (150) were registered as Arme- nian10 . This highly reliable source says that in 1823 there were 20,095 families in the Karabakh Region (15,729 of them being Muslim and 4,366, or 21.7%, Armenian). Russian researchers and official publications of the 19th century dealing with state politics supply an unbiased picture of Karabakh.11 According to the population census of 1832, there were 20,456 families in Karabakh; while the share of Armenian families increased to 31.6%.12 Whereas in 1823, in Shusha, the center of Ka- rabakh, 1,111(72.5%) out of a total of 1,532 families were Muslim and 421 (27.5%) were Armenian, in 1832, the share of Armenian families increased to 44.9% due to Armenian settlers. Russian military historian Vassily Potto wrote that the first large group of Armenians arrived in Karabakh in 1828; on 16 March, 1828, 40 thousand Armenian families moved from Iran to the Irevan Province; later, be- cause of food shortages, 5 thousand of them (the first group of migrants) had to live for a long time on the banks of the Arax River before being finally sent to Karabakh.13 Russian writer Sergey Glinka, likewise, supplied interesting information about the Armenian migrations from Iran to Karabakh. An address by G. Lazarev, an activist of Armenian migration, to the Persian Armenians testifies to the political nature of resettlement. He wrote: “Christians! I have received reliable information that certain ill-wishers are spreading not merely stupid lies, but are also trying to frighten those who have applied for permission to move to blessed Russia in order to force them to retreat from their cherished wish. To disprove this and in conformity with the trust the Arme- nian people have placed in me, as well as in keeping with the obligation imposed on me by our Com- mander-in-Chief, I announce that our generous Monarch of Russia allows all who wish to find a safe and happy home in His state to move to Erivan, Nakhchivan, and Karabakh, anywhere you would like to live. There you will receive enough fertile land, partly sown, of which only a tenth part is tilled for

8 V.A. Potto, Kavkazskaia voyna. Persidskaya voyna 1826-1828 gg., Vol. 3, Stavropol, 1993, pp. 594-595. 9 See: Prisoedinenie Vostochnoy Armenii k Rossii, Erevan, 1972, pp. 560-561. 10 See: Opisanie Karabakhskoy provintsii, sostavlennoe v 1823 godu, po rasporiazheniiu glavnoupravliaiushchego v Gruzii Ermolova, deystvitelnym statskim sovetnikom Mogilevskim i polkovnikom Ermolovym 2-m, Tiflis, 1866, 415 pp. 11 See: Grazhdanskoe upravlenie Zakavkaziem ot prisoedineniia Gruzii do namestnichestva Velikogo Kniazia Mikhaila Nikolaevicha. Istorichesky Ocherk, Compiled by V.N. Ivanenko on instructions of the Department of Military History, Tiflis, 1901, 525 pp.; V.A. Potto, Kavkazskaia voyna. Persidskaya voyna 1826-1828 gg., Vol. 3, Tiflis, 1901; I.I. Shavrov, Novaia ugroza russkomu delu v Zakavkazye: predstoiashchaia rasprodazha Mugani inorodtsam, St. Pe- tersburg, 1911. 12 See: Grazhdanskoe upravlenie Zakavkaziem…, p. 146. 13 See: V. Potto, op. cit., Vol. 3, Stavropol, 1993, p. 591. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the State. —For six years you will be exempt from dues of all kinds, the poorest of you will receive help; —Those who have real estate at home may, after sending their families to Russia, leave agents behind to sell their property; under the Treaty of Turkmanchay, you have five years to accomplish this; —You will leave behind your Motherland, which you love, but the very thought that you are moving to a Christian land should enrapture you. Today, scattered across the Persian lands, Christians will see themselves united; do you know how the Great Monarch of Russia will reward your loyalty? Hurry up! Time is short.—By sacrificing small things for a short time, you will acquire everything forever.”14 According to the same author, “Armenians from different villages adjacent to Turkman- chay started moving to Karabakh.”15 He also wrote: “In three and a half months, over 8 thousand fam- ilies crossed the Arax.”16 In the spring of 1828, when the flow of Armenian migrants was moving toward Arax, Ivan Paskevich gave instructions for the poorest to be settled in Karabakh; this is con- firmed by Russian authors.17 This explains why in 1832 Armenians accounted for 31.6% of the prov- ince’s population; the Muslims comprised the other 68.4%.18 Beginning in 1828, Armenian migration to the Muslim provinces of the Transcaucasus (and to Karabakh among other places) was regulated by Art XV of the Treaty of Turkmanchay.19 Under Emperor Nicholas I’s decree of 21 March, 1828, an “Armenian Region” was set up in the former Irevan and Nakhchivan khanates: “On the strength of the treaty signed with Persia, the Irevan and Nakhchivan khanates, which was detached from Persia to be united with Russia, should be called an Armenian Region everywhere, this name should become part of Our title.”20 The second volume of Favorite, a historical chronicle of the times of Catherine the Great written by Valentin Pikul, a widely popular 20th-century author, describes an interesting episode in a conver- sation between Count Potemkin and the empress where the count tells her that he summoned Suvorov (a brilliant Russian military commander.—J.H.): “I’ll ask the archpriest of Kronstadt to convince him to make it up with his wife. Then I shall convene a meeting: him and myself, and a couple of Armenians—Lazarev and Argutinsky. They are quick on the uptake—they have already chosen Erivan as the capital. “‘What can they do with it if they have no state?’ “‘If there is no state now, there will be a state in the future,’ said Potemkin.” Russian general and Georgian Prince A. Chavchavadze was appointed head of the “Armenian Region.”21 At that time, the Muslims comprised 75% of its total population; while the war was still going on, there were 49,875 Muslims and 20,073 Armenians living in the Irevan Region. As soon as the “Armenian Region” was set up, 45,200 Armenians moved there from neighboring countries.22 Simi- lar processes went on in the Nakhchivan Region: by the time the Russians had occupied it completely, there were 17,138 Muslims and 2,690 Armenians living there. As soon as the khanate was liquidated, 10,670 Armenians arrived within a very short period of time. More or less similar processes were underway in the Ordubad part of the Nakhchivan Khanate: 1,340 Armenians moved in to join the 2,388 Armenians already living there to balance out the 7,247 Muslims.23

14 S.N. Glinka, Opisanie pereseleniia armian Adderbidzhanskikh v predely Rossii, Moscow, 1831, pp. 107-111. 15 Ibid., p. 48. 16 Ibid., p. 92. 17 See: Ibid., pp. 90-91. 18 See: Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladeny za Kavkazom v statisticheskom, etnograficheskom, topograficheskom i finan- sovom otnosheniakh, Tiflis, 1836, p. 267. 19 See: Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoy imperii, Vol. III, St. Petersburg, 1830, p. 130. 20 Ibid., pp. 272-273. 21 See: Akty Kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy komissii. Arkhiv Glavnogo upravlenia namestnika Kavkaza, Vol. VII, Tiflis, 1878, p. 487. 22 See: Obozrenie Rossiiskikh vladeny za Kavkazom, p. 229. 23 See: Ibidem. 108 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In 1911, Russian researcher N. Shavrov published a book called New Challenges to the Russian Cause in the Transcaucasus—Upcoming Sale of Mugan to Aliens based on historical documents, in which he wrote that in 1828-1830, 40 thousand Armenian families had moved to the Transcaucasus from Iran and 84,600 of them had arrived from Turkey; they settled in the Elizavetpol and Irevan gubernias where Armenians had been practically unknown. He wrote: “Out of the 1 million 300 thou- sand Armenians who now live in the Transcaucasus over 1 million are newcomers. Russia moved them there.”24 The desire to make the Transcaucasus a predominantly Christian region was too strong; however the local specifics suggested caution.

“Under the Musawat Government, the Whole of Karabakh was Part of Azerbaijan”

On 28 April, 1920, Soviet troops occupied Baku. Russian troops entered Karabakh a month after they had occupied Baku; Azerbaijan lost its independence; some time later this happened to Georgia and Armenia. In this way, in two years, Russia, now Soviet Russia, regained its grip on the Transcaucasus. Soviet power detached bits and pieces of Azerbaijan’s territory. In the first years of Soviet power, when the Center joined primordial Azerbaijani lands to Armenia, Nariman Nar- imanov, unable to reconcile himself to this injustice, wrote to Lenin to complain that the lands which had, beyond a doubt, been part of Azerbaijan under the Musawat government had become disputed areas under Soviet power. He warned that the common people were aware of all this and were discontented.25 From the very first days of Soviet power, the Armenians in Karabakh and elsewhere demon- strated a lot of activity; their violence against the Muslims was not punished, mainly because Azer- baijan and its army were not strong enough, while the troops were demobilized. On 29 June, 1920, Sergey Kirov informed People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin that the Dashnaks were exterminating Muslims and Russians: “Only 15 thousand of the 30-thousand Rus- sian population in the Kars Region remained; the others either fled to Turkey or Russia or were killed.”26 On 19 June, N. Narimanov, M. Mdivani, A. Mikoyan, and A. Nurijanyan sent a telegram to Chicherin in which they informed him of the Dashnak army’s onslaught and its success in Kazakh and Kedabek. A copy sent to Grigory (Sergo) Orjonikidze in Vladikavkaz contained the following telltale passage: “The Armenians are in fact in a state of war with Azerbaijan. As for the allegedly disputable Karabakh and Zangezur, which have become part of Soviet Azerbaijan, we categorically state that these places should, without doubt, in the future too, remain within Azerbaijan.”27 On 22 June, 1920, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, enraged by the fact that the well-known Bolsheviks working in the Caucasus, Baku and, on the whole, Azerbaijan were dead set against the Center’s pol- icy, complained to the Politburo of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) about “the lack of discipline among the Baku comrades and the scandalous contradiction between their actions and the line of the C.C.” He wrote

24 N.I. Shavrov, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 25 For more detail, see: “Results of Soviet Construction in Azerbaijan,” Report of N. Narimanov to V. Lenin. 15.09.1921, Russian State Archives of Social-Political History (RGASPI), rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 1219, sheet 12; Letter of N. Narimanov to V. Lenin, Archives of Political Documents at the Administration of the President of the Azerbaijan Re- public (APD UDP AR), rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 71, sheet 51. 26 Telegram of S. Kirov to G. Chicherin. 29.06.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 2178, sheet 1. 27 Telegram of N. Narimanov, M. Mdivani, A. Mikoyan, A. Nurijanyan to G. Chicherin. 19.06.1920, State Ar- chives of the Azerbaijan Republic (GA AR), rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 211, sheet 115. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION that if the disputed territories captured by Russia were transferred to Azerbaijan, an agreement with Armenia would be impossible.28 People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin followed his own, very specific logic. He went on to explain to Lenin that “so far Russia is not transferring these lands to the Armenians so as not to offend the . When conditions for the Sovietization of Geor- gia and Armenia appear, the problems will disappear of their own accord.”29 His numerous explana- tions and telegrams sent to Lenin, Orjonikidze, and Narimanov make it abundantly clear: Karabakh was nothing but “small change” and bait in the talks with Armenia. Stronger Armenian claims to the mountainous part of Karabakh forced those Bolsheviks who were well known in the Caucasus (N. Narimanov, M. Mdivani, A. Mikoyan, and B. Naneishvili) and even members of the Military Council of the 11th Army, Zh. Vesnik, M. Levandovsky, and I. Mikhaylov, to send a letter to the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) which said: “We believe that it is our duty to inform the C.C. of our concerted opinion about Karabakh and Zangezur; the decision which is planned as intermediate in the talks with Armenia will contradict the interests of the revolution in the Caucasus. Under the Musawat government, the whole of Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan. The inseparable cultural and economic ties between Karabakh and Zangezur and Baku, which em- ployed tens of thousands of workers from these provinces, and the complete isolation of these prov- inces from Erevan were confirmed in 1919 by the Congress of Armenian Peasants of Karabakh which, even under the Musawat regime (which was insufferable for the Armenians) and despite provocation by Armenian agents, resolutely supported complete unity with Azerbaijan on the con- dition that a peaceful life be guaranteed for the Armenians.” The authors concluded that the Mus- lim masses would regard Soviet power as perfidious if it proved unable to preserve the old borders of Azerbaijan. They wrote that this would be taken as Armenian-philism or as the weakness of Soviet power and warned against indecision in the question of Karabakh and Zangezur “so as not to turn Azerbaijan into a mongrel supported by the Red Army and handed out to the Armenians and .”30 In an effort to make Soviet recognition of Armenia look official Chicherin tried to convince Orjonikidze that Soviet Russia needed a compromise with the Dashnak government of Armenia: “The Azerbaijani government has described as disputable not only Karabakh and Zangezur, but also the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd. The latter has never been disputed and even the Musawat government al- ways regarded it as Armenian. Without it, Armenia will have practically nothing left. After resisting for a long time, the Armenian delegation at the peace talks agreed to accept Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed territories in the hope of finally acquiring large chunks of them. The delegation is firm about the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd. On the other hand, we need an agreement with the Azerbaijani government so that our treaty with Armenia does not contradict the demands of Azerbaijan. We ask you to use your exceptional influence in Baku to convince the Azerbaijani government to yield on its demand to describe the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd as a disputed territory and limit it to Karabakh and Zangezur.”31 After receiving Chicherin’s ciphered telegram of 2 July, 1920 and discussing the issue with newly appointed Envoy Plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia to Armenia B. Legran and A. Gabrielyan, Orjonikidze informed Moscow directly that “Azerbaijan insisted on the immediate and unconditional unification of Karabakh and Zangezur. I think this should be done since economically both uezds are attached to Baku and have absolutely no ties with Erivan. The Bayazet Turkish Army, which has wedged its way in, has made this especially obvious. According to Comrade Gabrielyan, the Armeni-

28 See: Letter of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin to the Politburo of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.), 22.06.1920, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 2a, sheet 9. 29 G. Chicherin’s reply to Lenin’s enquiry. June 1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 2, inv. 1, f. 1451, sheet 1. 30 Letter of Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoyan, Naneishvili, Vesnik, Levandovsky and Mikhaylov to the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 10.07.1920, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 44, f. 118, sheet 25-27. 31 G. Chicherin’s ciphered telegram to G. Orjonikidze. 02.07.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 3c, f. 2, sheet 3. 110 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION an delegation will undoubtedly accept this. In this case, it will be possible to convince Azerbaijan to drop its claims to the other regions. I think that Karabakh and Zangezur should be immediately united with Azerbaijan. I will force Azerbaijan to grant autonomy to these regions; this should be done by Azerbaijan, but in no way should this be mentioned in the treaty.”32 By means of another direct com- muniqué, Orjonikidze informed Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin in so many words that the Armenian government had deliberately misinformed them: “Today Gabrielyan told me that the Armenian dele- gation will accept immediate unification of Karabakh and Zangezur with Azerbaijan if it drops its claims to the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd and the Nakhchivan Region. We have agreed among ourselves that when we are in Baku we will talk to Narimanov about this. You can see for yourself that there is no lack of clarity or understanding. I assure you that we are fully aware of our peaceful policy and are sticking to it. I am convinced, and this is my deepest conviction, that to strengthen Soviet power in Azerbaijan and to keep Baku in our control, we must join Nagorno-Karabakh; its valley part is out of the question: it has always been Azeri and part of Zangezur. Azerbaijan has guaranteed safety of the Armenians living there. We shall grant autonomy and organize the Armenian population without moving Muslim armed units there.” He deemed it necessary to warn: “Any other decision will shatter our position in Azerbaijan and will give us nothing in Armenia. I know that we might need Armenia under certain political circumstances. The decision rests with you; we shall follow suit. Let me tell you that this treatment of Azerbaijan undermines our prestige among the broad masses of Azeris and creates fertile soil for the efforts of our adversaries.”33 After the April coup of 1920, Orjonikidze remained for some time on the side of Azerbaijan, which was considered “Soviet power’s firstborn in the Caucasus” in its relations with Georgia and Armenia. Some people in Moscow did not like this; the irritation being especially obvious in the Peo- ple’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Georgy Chicherin, who headed this group, blackmailed Or- jonikidze, whom he called a latent Orientalist and lover of the Muslims. Orjonikidze parried the at- tacks by saying that he had nothing to do with Muslim nationalism and there was not a single Tatar among his ancestors.34 Orjonikidze knew who was stirring up the trouble in the Center and had to go directly to Na- dezhda Allilueva, an official in the Council of People’s Commissars and Stalin’s wife, with a request to tell Stalin that Chicherin and Karakhan pushed me into a tight corner once more.”35 Chicherin was of a different opinion; in a telegram to Orjonikidze dated 8 July, he wrote: “We all know that the time will come for Armenia’s Sovietization; it is too early to do this now. The best we can do now is to declare Karabakh and Zangezur disputed areas; to do this we need an agreement from the Azerbaijani government. We badly need this; we should sign an agreement with Armenia. The situation in the world demands this; this can be done if we declare Karabakh and Zangezur, and only them, disputed areas.”36 Chicherin and Karakhan pushed the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs toward cooper- ation with Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijan. On 16 July, Orjonikidze, unable to withstand the pressure, telegraphed Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin with a request not to enter a peace treaty with Ar- menia before the Azeri delegation arrived. He wrote: “The local comrades are very concerned about the possibility of peace with Armenia without involving Azerbaijan.”37 Anastas Mikoyan, member of the C.C. Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Bolsheviks), was of the same opinion. On 29 June he wrote to Orjonikidze: “We are all enraged by the Center’s policy toward Karabakh and Zangezur. You

32 G. Orjonikidze’s reply on direct line to G. Chicherin’s telegram of 2 July about the disputed territories claimed by Azerbaijan and Armenia. July 1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 3c, f. 2, sheet 6. 33 Direct reminder to Lenin, Stalin and Chicherin. July 1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 3c, f. 2, sheets 8-9. 34 See: Telegram from G. Orjonikidze to G. Chicherin. 1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 17, sheet 53. 35 Direct note to N. Allilueva. 07.07.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 3c, f. 2, sheet 20. 36 Telegram from G. Chicherin to G. Orjonikidze. 08.07.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 17, sheet 60. 37 Telegram from G. Orjonikidze to V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and G.K. Chicherin. 16.07.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 3c, f. 2, sheet 12. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION should also defend our opinion in the Center. We have nothing against peace with Armenia but not at the expense of Karabakh and Zangezur.”38 This shows that, strange as it may seem, Soviet Russia and Dashnakian Armenia were en- gaged in secret negotiations about Azerbaijan, to which it was not invited and to which it had not agreed. The developments in Armenia copied what had happened with Georgia a month before: a lot of interesting information had traveled in the ciphered parts of the telegram Orjonikidze and Kirov sent to Lenin and Stalin. They believed that a treaty with Georgia without clarifying the position of Azerbaijan was fraught with failure: “We want to know why we are signing a treaty with Georgia and refusing to sign a treaty with friendly Azerbaijan. If you have different plans for Azer- baijan, why are we being kept in the dark?” In the ciphered part they warned: “You should not put forward the name of Karakhan as the author of the Eastern policy. Here the Zakataly scandal (the reference is to the promise to transfer the Zakataly District to Georgia under the Moscow Treaty of 7 May, 1920.—J.H.) is interpreted as Armenian perfidy.”39 Lev Karakhan, who filled the post of Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, did play an important role in shaping and realiz- ing the anti-Azeri policy of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia. The ciphered and open documents of the time directly point to him as the main plotter. Grigory Orjoni- kidze wrote in an open letter: “Karabakh is another Zakataly of our Commissariat for Foreign Af- fairs. An enormous provocation is underway here: it is rumored that this is stirred up by the Arme- nians in Moscow.”40 Despite the Center’s unprecedented pressure on Azerbaijan, the gap between the Azeri and Armenian positions remained as wide as ever. The talks between Kirov and People’s Commissar M. Huseynov and the Armenian representatives in Tiflis ended in nothing. On 6 August, he wrote to Chicherin that he had only convinced the Azeris to cede the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd to Arme- nia; the Azeris regarded the rest, that is, the Nakhchivan Uezd, Ordubad, Julfa, Zangezur, and Karabakh, as decidedly their own. The Armenian representatives were no less determined to claim the regions. The Azeris argued that under the Musawat government these regions had belonged to Azerbaijan and that, therefore, if it ceded them, Soviet power would lose its prestige in the eyes of the Azeris, Iranians, and Turks.41 On 10 August, 1920, the talks in Moscow and Irevan ended in a treaty of six articles, four of which dealt with a deliberately fanned territorial dispute with Azerbaijan. Under Art 2, the troops of the R.S.F.S.R. occupied the disputed regions of Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan; the Armenian troops remained in a specified strip. Art 3 said that the occupation by Soviet troops of the disputed territories did not predetermine the answer to the question about the rights of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic to these territories. The same article further stated that the temporary occupation by the R.S.F.S.R. of these territories was intended to create conditions con- ducive to a peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan; in the future, the issue, said the Treaty, would be settled by means of a comprehensive agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the R.S.F.S.R.”42 Russia hastened to sign the treaty with Armenia be- cause, the same day, Turkey and the Entente signed the Sevres Treaty, under which Armenia could have gained a lot. The Russian Soviet diplomats feared, with good reason, that Armenia might be tempted and would fall under the influence of the Entente. Under pressure from Moscow, the half- baked diplomatic document was signed; Armenia was promised the Azeri lands previously trans- formed by Soviet Russia into disputed territories.

38 Telegram of A. Mikoyan to G. Orjonikidze. 29.06.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 17, sheet 134. 39 Ciphered telegram of G. Orjonikidze and S. Kirov to V. Lenin and I. Stalin. 12.06.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 2c, f. 2, sheets 9-11. 40 Telegram from G. Orjonikidze to G. Chicherin. 1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 17, sheet 304. 41 See: Letter of S. Kirov to G. Chicherin. 06.08.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 80, inv. 4, f. 102k, sheets 1-2. 42 See: Treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Republic of Armenia. 10.08.1920, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/II, sheets 11-12. 112 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

From the very first days of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, much was done to transform the pri- mordial Azeri lands into disputed territories; this is best illustrated by the Russian-Armenian trea- ty. On 19 June, 1920, Grigory Orjonikidze, dispatched to Azerbaijan, telegraphed Lenin and Chicherin that Soviet power had been proclaimed in Karabakh and Zangezur and that both areas believed themselves to be part of Azerbaijan. He deemed it necessary to warn: “In any case, Azer- baijan cannot survive without Karabakh and Zangezur. I think that we should invite an Azeri rep- resentative to Moscow to discuss all the issues related to Azerbaijan and Armenia before the treaty with Armenia is signed; repetition of the Zakataly scandal stirred up by Armenians will undermine our position here.” The Treaty of 10 August between Soviet Russia and Armenia, of which Azerbaijan was not informed, can be described as a logical result of the political course of the Central Bolshevist govern- ment and of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in particular, designed to infringe on the interests of Azerbaijan. Some people placed the stakes on Armenia in the territorial disputes between the two republics; some of the top officials in Moscow never hesitated to tell lies and never shunned provocations. Long before the treaty was signed, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin wrote in his report to Lenin: “The Azeri government has claimed Karabakh, Zangezur, and the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd along with Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and Julfa… This combination should not be accomplished by Rus- sian hands—this is unacceptable. We should remain objective and unbiased. It would be a fatal mis- take for our Eastern policy to rely on one national element against another national element. If we take any lands from Armenia and transfer them to Azerbaijan, our policy in the East will be distorted.”43 G. Chicherin managed to present at least some of his ideas as official and transform them into instruc- tions for the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front sent in the name of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) not to let either Azeri or Armenian officials into the disputed territories. The territories described as disputed were in fact parts of Azerbaijan and were still controlled by the Azeri authori- ties. This meant that Chicherin’s instructions were nothing more than a violation of Azerbaijan’s sov- ereign rights and territorial integrity. The new leaders of Azerbaijan found themselves in a quandary: on the one hand, enticed by revolutionary zeal, Azeri Soviet power imagined that it was close to Soviet Russia; on the other, So- viet Russia, the workers’ and peasants’ ally, detached the lands which had undoubtedly belonged to Azerbaijan under the previous government. This looked ugly, even to the Soviet officials dispatched from Moscow to Azerbaijan. The injustice was glaring. In a long report to Lenin, N. Soloviev, one such person, who filled the post of Chairman of the Council of National Economy of Azerbaijan S.S.R., wrote: “People pinned their hopes on Moscow, but the peace treaties with Georgia and Arme- nia, under which chunks of Azeri territory with Muslim population were transferred to these repub- lics, shattered, if not killed, these hopes. The Muslim masses concluded that Moscow had not only captured Azerbaijan, but also increased Georgian and Armenian territories at its expense... The treaty with Armenia under which it acquired part of Azeri territory with Muslim population and a railway of immense strategic and economic importance which blocked the only corridor uniting Azerbaijan with Turkey was the heaviest blow. The ordinary Muslims were puzzled, while certain members of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan explained that the treaty had been compiled on the instructions of influential Armenians who filled high posts in the Center and called themselves Communists while being conscious or unconscious nationalists.”44 Nariman Narimanov was enraged by Soviet Russia’s arbitrariness toward Azerbaijan; he knew that these provocations had been devised and realized by People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs

43 Copy of a memo to V.I. Lenin. 29.06.1920, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 2a, sheets 13-14. 44 See: Information of N.I. Soloviev to V.I. Lenin “Our Policy in Azerbaijan in Two Months (May-June) after the Coup. 1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 17, inv. 84, f. 58, sheet 15. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Chicherin (who since the summer of 1919 had been dead set against Narimanov’s Eastern policy) and his deputy Lev Karakhan. Their posts as heads of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Af- fairs allowed them to shape and realize the foreign, especially Eastern, policy of the Soviets. In his opposition to Chicherin, Narimanov tried to rely on Lenin, who had pronounced many high-sound- ing words and been lavish with his promises. Still expecting Lenin to be fair and unbiased, he wrote to him in mid-July: “Comrade Chicherin’s telegram shows that you are receiving biased informa- tion or that the Center has succumbed to those who are still cooperating with what remains of Deni- kin’s crowd against Soviet power in Azerbaijan. If the Center wants to sacrifice Azerbaijan and keep Baku and its oil and renounce its Eastern policy, it is free to do this. I deem it my duty, how- ever, to warn you: you will not be able to keep Baku separated from the rest of Azerbaijan with the perfidious Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks as your neighbors. On the other hand, I would like to find out what the Center thinks about us, the Muslims, and how it dealt with these important is- sues without us. The Center was free to mistrust us, but such senior officials as Orjonikidze and Mdivani, likewise, disagree with its decision. Let me plainly say that with its decision about Kara- bakh the Center deprived us of our weapon, etc. It added plausibility to the provocative statements of the Musawat Party, which is holding forth that the Muslim Communists allegedly sold Azerbai- jan to Russia, a country which recognizes the independence of Armenia and Georgia and, at the same time, insists for some reason that the areas which belonged beyond a doubt to Azerbaijan before Soviet power, become disputable. Comrade Chicherin says that we should obey the Center’s policy, but is the Center aware that it is using us as a screen? We are told in plain terms: ‘You can- not secure the absolutely undisputed territories, but you are holding forth about liberating the East.’”45 In another letter to Lenin, Narimanov informed him about a serious threat to Azerbaijan: “The situation is catastrophic. The Center has recognized Georgia and Armenia as independent states and recognized Azerbaijan’s independence. At the same time, the Center has transferred undisputed Azeri territories to Armenia. Had they been transferred to Georgia, public opinion could have been pacified, but the fact that they were given to Armenia and the Dashnaks is a fatal and irreparable mistake.”46 Soviet Russia preferred to ignore Narimanov’s resolute and sometimes even oppositional stand; it followed the policy of humiliation of Azerbaijan devised by the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. On 20 July, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin telegraphed Narimanov with a great deal of sarcasm: “So far neither you, nor Orjonikidze have clarified in your telegrams why you and the local Communists are dissatisfied with the occupation of Karabakh and Zangezur by Russian troops and why you want, without fail, their formal annexation to Azerbaijan… We should establish good relations with Armenia because if Turkey turns against us, Armenia, even Armenia of the Dashnaks, will serve as an outpost of our struggle against the advancing Turks.”47 In another letter, Georgy Chicherin deemed it necessary to warn the Politburo of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) that relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia should be treated as part of Russia’s Turkish policy: “When discussing the Azeri-Armenian disagreements, I have always pointed out that if the Turks acquired aggressive trends in the Caucasus, Armenia will serve as a barrier and will defend us.”48 As Soviet Russia was consolidating its position in Azerbaijan, the republic was gradually being turned into a toehold for the Bolsheviks’ regional policy; its natural resources and territories were used to lull the Georgian and Armenian bourgeois republics and to create conditions conducive to Sovietization of Armenia. On 23 September, 1920, Boris Legran sent a ciphered telegram to Lenin in

45 Letter of N. Narimanov to V.I. Lenin, July 1920, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 71, sheets 41-42. 46 For the letter of Narimanov to Lenin, see: N. Narimanov, K istorii nashey revolutsii v okrainakh (Letter to I.V. Sta- lin), Baku, 1990, p. 117. 47 Urgent telegram of G. Chicherin to N. Narimanov. 20.07.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 2097, sheet 1. 48 Letter of G. Chicherin to the Politburo of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 05.10.1920, Foreign Policy Archives of the Rus- sian Federation (AVP RF), rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, Folder 232, f. 52987, sheet 40. 114 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION which he described Soviet Russia’s intentions regarding the Azeri territories: there is no danger in transferring Zangezur and Nakhchivan to Armenia. The very idea that Russia needed these territories for its liberating military operations in the Turkish and Tabriz sectors was utopian. One could not disagree with the territorial claims of Azerbaijan. Moscow’s objective and subjective considerations would undoubtedly satisfy Azerbaijan; as for Karabakh, it was possible to insist on its unification with Azerbaijan.49 In another of his telegrams dated 24 October, 1920, this time addressed to Chich- erin, Boris Legran described his agreements with the Armenians regarding the Azeri territories: “The Armenians categorically insist that Nakhchivan and Zangezur immediately be recognized as theirs. I pointed out that without Azerbaijan this issue cannot be resolved and that it can be raised only if the Armenians drop their claims to Karabakh. After long discussions they agreed, with minor stipula- tions, to renounce their claims to Karabakh.”50 After a short while, however, late in November 1920 when Soviet power had been established in Armenia, the struggle for the mountainous part of Kara- bakh entered a new stage.

Why the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) Treated the Karabakh Issue as “Strictly Confidential”

As soon as Soviet power was established in Armenia on 29 November, 1920, the Communists returned the Karabakh issue to the political agenda. On 30 November, 1920, Chairman of the Azer- baijan Revolutionary Committee (Az.R.C.) Nariman Narimanov and People’s Commissar for For- eign Affairs Mirza Huseynov congratulated the Armenian Revolutionary Committee in a telegram. The telegram, however, did not entirely correspond to the decision adopted by the joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan held on 30 November. Nar- iman Narimanov’s speech at the grand meeting of the Baku Soviet on the occasion of establishing Soviet power in Armenia and the Declaration he read on 1 December, 1920 also contained certain contradictions. The Declaration said: “Soviet Azerbaijan, which intends to appease the fraternal Armenian working people fighting the Dashnaks who have spilled and are spilling the innocent blood of our best Communist comrades in Armenia and Zangezur, declares that from this time on territorial is- sues will never cause bloodshed between two peoples who have been neighbors for centuries; the territories of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan uezds are an inalienable part of Soviet Armenia. The toiling peasants of Nagorno-Karabakh are granted the right to complete self-determination; all military actions in Zangezur are being suspended, while the troops of Soviet Azerbaijan are being pulled out.”51 It should be said that the Declaration of 1 December contradicts the decisions of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) of 4 and 30 November. On 4 November, 1920, after discussing the Russian-Arme- nian treaty, the meeting of the Politburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) attended by Stalin and Orjoni- kidze decided that “the suggestion that Nakhchivan and Zangezur should be transferred to Arme- nia is disadvantageous both politically and strategically.” On 30 November, 1920, however, the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) passed a decision on the transfer of Zangezur to Armenia (the Nakhchivan is- sue was not discussed). Several days later, on 2 December, Envoy Plenipotentiary of the

49 See: B. Legran’s telegram to V.I. Lenin. 23.09.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 21, sheet 144. 50 Secret telegram of B. Legran to G. Chicherin. 24.10.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 2178, sheet 20. 51 Kommunist, 2 December, 1920. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

R.S.F.S.R. in Armenia Boris Legran pointed out that Soviet Russia had recognized only the transfer of Zangezur (out of the three territories mentioned above) as legal.52 The Declaration Narimanov read on 1 December mentioned Nakhchivan in addition to Zangezur as the territories transferred to Armenia. Jörg Baberowki of Humboldt University asserts that in the summer of 1920 Narimanov under the pressure of Orjonikidze agreed to transfer Zangezur, Karabakh and Nakhchivan to Armenia.53 The text which appeared in the Baku newspapers had been falsified by Orjonikidze. On 1 De- cember, he informed Legran and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. Georgy Chicherin of the following in a ciphered telegram: “Azerbaijan has already responded and transferred Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Armenia.”54 On 2 December, in another telegram, he informed Lenin and Stalin of the following: “Yesterday Azerbaijan announced that Na- khichevan, Zangezur, and Nagorno-Karabakh were transferred to Soviet Armenia.”55 On Stalin’s initiative, two days later “good news” appeared in Pravda. Stalin’s article based on a distorted tele- gram written when Soviet power was established in Armenia, which appeared on the same day in Izvestia, was later included in Volume IV of Stalin’s Works and reappeared in the collection of arti- cles Vneshnyaya politika SSSR (Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.). It still remains a favorite with certain authors.56 The question arises: Was Grigory Orjonikidze misinformed, or was it a lie? When Soviet power was established in Dilijan, G. Orjonikidze discussed the issues mentioned in the Declaration of the government of Azerbaijan with Amayak Nazaretyan by direct telephone line and said in particular that “today, the Soviet gathered for its gala meeting in Baku where Narimanov read the Declaration of the government of Azerbaijan, which pointed out that there were no longer borders between Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan. From this day on, the territory of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan uezds has became an inalienable part of Soviet Armenia. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been granted the right to self-determination. The riches of Azerbaijan—oil and kerosene—have become the riches of both republics.” Overjoyed, A. Nazaretyan exclaimed: “We shall start shouting in the press: Bravo, Azeris!”57 This means that the Declaration of the Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee of 1 December, 1920 was “slightly” changed by the Bolsheviks. Two Baku newspapers (Kommunist on 2 December, 1920 and Bakinsky rabochy on 3 December, 1920) wrote about the “right to self-deter- mination” granted to the toiling peasants of Nagorno-Karabakh, while on 7 December, 1920 the Ar- menian Kommunist informed readers that “Nagorno-Karabakh has been recognized as part of the Armenian Socialist Republic.” The flagrant falsifications enraged Nariman Narimanov. In June 1921, he instructed People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mirza Huseynov, who was in Tiflis, to inform the Caucasian Bureau about his true opinion on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.58 Did anyone in Armenia see the real text of the Declaration? We know that the text signed by Narimanov and Huseynov was telegraphed to the Armenian Revolutionary Committee. After reading the document, Askanaz Mravyan (a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee) informed Armenian representative in Moscow Saak Ter-Gabrielyan that Azerbaijan had announced that Zange-

52 See: Radiogram of B. Legran to G. Orjonikidze. 02.12.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 33, sheet 16. 53 See: J. Baberowski, Vrag est vezde. Stalinism na Kavkaze, Moscow, 2010, p. 237 (Jörg Baberowski, Der Feind ist überall: Stalinismus im Kaukasus, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich, 2003, p. 882.) 54 G. Orjonikidze’s ciphered telegram to Legran and Chicherin. 01.12.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 33, sheet 12. 55 G. Orjonikidze’s letter to V. Lenin and I. Stalin, 02.12.1920. RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 33, sheet 20. 56 See: “Narodny komissar po delam natsionalnostey I.V. Stalin o pobede Sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii,” Izvestia, 4 December, 1920; Vneshnyaya politika SSSR. 1917-1920, Vol. I, Moscow, 1944, p. 532. 57 Conversation between A.M. Nazaretyan and G.K. Orjonikidze by direct telephone line. 01.12.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 37, sheet 1. 58 See: K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy avtonomnoy oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoy SSR. Dokumenty i materialy, Baku, 1989, p. 89. 116 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION zur and Nakhchivan had been united [with Armenia] and that a referendum would take place in Nagorno-Karabakh.59 The collection of documents Velikaya Oktyabrskaya sotsialisticheskaya revolutsia i pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia) published in 1957 in Erevan contained the original text of the Declaration kept in the Central State Archives of Armenia.60 Since the mid-1980s, however, Armenian authors have been using the “doctored” text; recently some Russian politologists have been indulging in the same. This is not the first and certainly not the last manipulation with the Karabakh documents. Why did Narimanov suggest in his Declaration that Zangezur be transferred to Armenia? The idea belonged to the Politburo of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). Grigory Orjonikidze was behind this Declara- tion; this means that the man convinced that Zangezur belonged to Azerbaijan suddenly changed his mind. Why? He wanted to drive a wedge between Azerbaijan and Turkey to reduce to naught Tur- key’s potential threat to Azerbaijan. On 23 November, 1920, Stalin, while travelling from Baku to Moscow, used a direct line from Rostov-on-Don to inform Lenin that, according to Orjonikidze, the Turks’ desire to establish a common border between Turkey and Azerbaijan looked threatening and that the Turkish plans could be upturned by transferring Zangezur to Armenia.61 This explains why the Turks regarded the treaty between Soviet Russia and Dashnak Armenia and friendly relations between these countries when Armenia became Soviet to be an obstacle on Turkey’s road to the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus.62 Back on 4 November, 1920, during his “famous” trip to the Caucasus, Stalin attended a joint meeting of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) and the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.), which listened to Legran’s report on the situation in Armenia and passed a decision. Point “b” of the document, which related to the discussed treaty between Russia and Armenia, said the following: “To inform, at the same time, that the Politburo insists that the point on the transfer of Nakhichevan and Zangezur (sug- gested by Moscow.—J.H.) is not advantageous either politically or strategically and can only be car- ried out in an emergency.” Point “d” instructed Nariman Narimanov to substantiate the Politburo’s opinion about Nakhchivan and Zangezur.63 This meant that there was no Karabakh problem at all initially, which was why it was not dis- cussed. On 20 November, 1920, a diplomatic mission of Soviet Russia arrived in Erivan to monitor the talks between Turkey and Armenia underway in Gumri and to sort out Armenia’s territorial claims to Azerbaijan and Georgia. People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin was informed that “today, the continued existence of the Armenian people depends not so much on military force as on diplomacy. We should abandon party romanticism and arm ourselves with grim realism.” The dip- lomatic mission deemed it necessary to remind the people’s commissar that “when talking to the Turks in Batumi (at the peace conference held in Batumi in May-June 1918.—J.H.), Kachaznuni and Khatisyan agreed to transfer Karabakh to Azerbaijan.”64 Despite the fact that on 1 December, 1920, Nariman Narimanov made public the Declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan and Karabakh (both its valley and mountain parts) still belonged to Azerbaijan. Under the Moscow Treaty of 16 March, 1921 between

59 See: From a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee (A. Mravyan) to representative of Soviet Arme- nia Ter-Gabrielyan. 04.01.1921, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheet 14. 60 See: Velikaya Oktyabrskaya sotsialisticheskaya revolutsia i pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii, Erevan, 1957, pp. 437-438. 61 See: Conversation between Stalin and Lenin by direct line. 23.11.1920, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 52987, sheet 47. 62 See: Letter of B. Legran to G. Chicherin. 22.12.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 212733, sheet 5. 63 See: Protocol No. 4 of the joint meeting of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) and Caucasian Bureau. 04.11.1920, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 22, sheet 20. 64 The Diplomatic Representatives of Soviet Russia in Erivan to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin. November 1920, GA AR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 38, sheet 15. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, the Nakhchivan Region became an autonomous territory as a protectorate of Azerbaijan on the condition that it would never cede protectorate to a third state. This revived the problem of the mountainous part of Karabakh as an urgent issue between Azerbai- jan and Armenia. On 3 June, 1921, members of the Caucasian Bureau, G. Orjonikidze, F. Makharadze, N. Nar- imanov, A. Myasnikov (Martuni), I. Orakhelashvili, A. Nazaretyan, and Yu. Figatner, candidate for bureau member, Secretary of the C.C. of the Azerbaijan C.P. G. Kaminsky, and member of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Georgia, Sh. Eliava, attended a plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). Its evening sitting was expected to discuss three questions: (1) the Azerbaijani issue; (2) the issue of Zangezur; (3) the nomads. Protocol No. 6 deals with the decisions on the first and third points; the second was discussed separately in the Addendum to the Protocol,65 which started all the trouble. n First, as distinct from Protocol No. 6, the decision on Zangezur, which consisted of 7 points, was marked as “strictly confidential.” n Second, of the seven points only six dealt with Zangezur, while Point 5 said: “The declara- tion of the Armenian government should mention that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Ar- menia.”66 This meant that Armenia was “strictly confidentially” instructed to issue a government declara- tion saying that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Armenia. On 12 June, the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) of Armenia issued a decree on joining the mountainous part of Karabakh to Armenia. The decree said: “Proceeding from the declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and from the agreement between the socialist republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is declared that from this time on Nagorno-Karabakh has become an inalienable part of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia.”67 The same day, A. Myasnikov and M. Karabekyan signed the document; three days later, on 15 June, it was discussed by the C.C. C.P. of Armenia, which passed the following decision: “The decree on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and Soviet Armenia should be published.” The same sitting discussed the fifth point of its agenda on dispatching a representative to Karabakh; it was decided “to send Comrade Mravyan together with Pirumov, Akop Ionisyan, Ter-Simonyan, and a group of other comrades to Karabakh;”68 the government issued a corresponding decree, which the Armenian Rev- olutionary Committee published a week later, on 19 June. Askanaz Mravyan was appointed chargé d’affaires extraordinaire in Nagorno-Karabakh. As distinct from the Decree of the CPC of Armenia of 12 June, the Declaration of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee did not mention the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia; this was not discussed by the republics which had never concluded any legally valid agreement either. It seems that the authors of the Decree were inspired by the “strictly confidential” decision on the Zangezur issue which the Caucasian Bureau had passed on 3 June 1921. The sitting was chaired by Orjonikidze

65 See: Protocol No. 6 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 03.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 76rev. 66 Addendum to Protocol No. 6 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 03.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 77. 67 Bakinsky rabochy, 22 June, 1921, 68 Protocol No. 8 of the meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia. 15.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 105, sheet 11rev. 118 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION with Figatner acting as a secretary. The decree of 12 June did not mention the 3 June decision of the Caucasian Bureau because, first, it was “strictly confidential” and second, the Caucasian Bureau was not empowered to pass decisions of this kind. In fact, the first step in this direction was made after the Moscow Treaty of 1921 when the government came up with a document of six points entitled The Basic Premises on Uniting Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia. It said that the mountainous part was separated from Lower Karabakh by a low mountain range. Convinced that this mountain range should be joined to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenians argued that, first, this zone was allegedly used by the Armenians and, second, there were strips of arable land. Art 5 of the document is especially inter- esting. It reads: “The transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia should be naturally accompanied by the transfer of so-called , a narrow mountainous strip between Karabakh and Zangezur. Its very specific location and the nationalist sentiments of its population, however, might cause certain problems. The following should be done to neutralize possible complications: this area is situated higher than the northern Shusha-Gerusi road and consists of six village commu- nities with a total population of 27 thousand. This area can be transformed into a canton governed by the Republic of Armenia or, as a last resort, placed under Azerbaijan’s protectorate.” The sixth, concluding, article of the document states the true intentions of the Armenian government in clear terms: “The Kaladarasi and Jamilli communities with their predominantly Armenian population are found to the south of Kurdistan in the Akkara valley. This strip with a road offers the only con- nection between Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh as a future single administrative unit with a sin- gle administration. Without this, there is no sense in joining Nagorno-Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia.”69 In May 1921, the Armenian government, guided by the above and never bothering about the legal arguments, unilaterally decided to join Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The plenary session of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia held on 23 May, 1921 appointed Akop Ionisyan as envoy of Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. After listening to D. Pirumov, who informed the plenum about the statement of the Zangezur commission, the meeting ruled the following: “The note to Azerbaijan should be postponed until the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is clarified at the next plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the R.C.P. (B.).”70 In May, Armenia obviously took practical measures to join Nagorno-Karabakh and overcome Azerbaijan’s resistance. The Armenians were informed of the upcoming discussion of the problem at the June plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). What caused the hasty and legally untenable actions designed to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia? What was behind Armenia’s actions and the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) in May-June 1921? The answer is simple. On 15 June, the commission on border problems among the Transcauca- sian republics was to meet in Tiflis. On 2 May, 1921, the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau set up a commission of representatives of the three republics headed by Sergey Kirov to delimitate the administrative borders.71 On the eve of the Tiflis meeting, the Caucasian Bureau (by its decision of 3 June) and the Armenian government (by a decree of 12 June) wanted to confront Azerbaijan with the accomplished transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. On 26 June, the CPC of Azerbaijan discussed A. Karaev’s report about his trip to Nagorno- Karabakh and Nakhchivan and decided that the Armenian claims to Nagorno-Karabakh should be

69 The Basic Premises on Uniting Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia. 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 137, sheet 7-7rev. 70 Protocol No. 4 of a meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia. 23.05.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 105, sheet 5rev. 71 See: Protocol No. 2 of the sitting of the Caucasian Bureau of C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 02.05.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 57. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION studied and summarized in a detailed report to the Council. A group of three (Shakhtakhtinsky, Vezi- rov, and Aliev) was set up to cope with the task. It was decided to suspend the powers the Armenian government had extended to Mravyan until the group had completed its report and to inform G. Or- jonikidze, Chairman of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee A. Myasnikov, Navy Commissar of Azerbaijan A. Karaev, and A. Mravyan of this decision.72 On 27 June, Narimanov, in fulfillment of the decision, informed G. Orjonikidze and A. Myas- nikov by telegraph that the CPC of Azerbaijan had unanimously deemed the unilateral decision on Nagorno-Karabakh passed by the Armenian Revolutionary Committee without discussion at the CPC of Armenia and the arrival of A. Mravyan in Nagorno-Karabakh as envoy extraordinary of Armenia to be an unprecedented political and tactical mistake. It was also requested that Mravyan be immedi- ately recalled. On 27 June, a joint sitting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan discussed the problem of borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia and dismissed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue raised by A. Bekzadyan as untenable in view of the region’s obvious eco- nomic bias toward Azerbaijan. Likewise, it was administratively and economically untenable to di- vide the localities with Armenian and Azeri populations between the two republics. On the basis of Narimanov’s declaration, involving Armenian and Muslim villagers in wide-scale Soviet construc- tion was suggested as the only answer. It was also suggested that all discussions be discontinued until relevant information had arrived from Tiflis. Even before the sitting adjourned, A. Shirvani, instruct- ed by Narimanov,73 informed Huseynov in Tiflis of this decision. His message said in part: “The Council of People’s Commissars has agreed with the decision. Comrade Narimanov asked me to in- form you that the question must be resolved in this way, otherwise the Council will divest itself of all of its responsibilities, since if this is the way Soviet Armenia wishes to make a good impression on the Dashnaks and the non-party masses, we should bear in mind that by the same token we will be reviv- ing anti-Soviet groups in Azerbaijan similar to the Dashnaks.” At this point Narimanov took the receiver and said to Huseynov: “Tell them that this is the unan- imous opinion of Politburo and Orgburo. My declaration, to which they refer, merely said: ‘Nagorno- Karabakh is being granted the right to free self-determination.’” Nariman Narimanov said: “Today we sent you a telegram, with copies to Sergo, Myasnikov, and Karaev, to inform you that Comrade Mravyan has been recalled from Karabakh.” Narimanov asked Huseynov to tell Orjonikidze that “our Armenian comrades are only thinking about the territory and are not concerned about the wellbeing of the poorest Armenian and Muslim groups or about strengthening the revolution.”74 Who allowed the Armenians to speak in the name of the Azeri leaders? Later, however it turned out that it had been Orjonikidze and Kirov who gave the Armenians this permission. Having concentrated real power in the Caucasus, they were looking for ways to transfer Karabakh to Arme- nia. It was they who handed Narimanov the telegram on 26 June with Bekzadyan’s idea about di- viding Karabakh on national-ethnic grounds. The telegram read: “If you want to know our opinion, it is the following: to smooth out the friction and establish genuinely friendly relations when deal- ing with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, we should be guided by the principle that none of the Arme- nian villages should be united with Azerbaijan, just as none of the Muslim villages should become part of Armenia.”75

72 See: Protocol of a sitting of the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan. 26.06.1921, GA AR, rec. gr. 411, inv. 1, f. 12, sheet 1. 73 See: Protocol No. 20 of the sitting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 27.06.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 1231, sheet 64. 74 Conversation of A.G. Shirvani and N. Narimanov by direct phone line with M.D. Huseynov. 27.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 215, sheet 14. 75 Telegram of G. Orjonikidze and S. Kirov to N. Narimanov. 26.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 229, sheets 1-2. 120 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The same day, 27 June, Huseynov, on Narimanov’s instructions, moved the issue to the Cauca- sian Bureau, which ruled the following: “An extraordinary plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) must be convened immediately. The following telegram should be sent to comrades Narimanov and Myasnikov: ‘The Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) suggests that when you receive this you must immediately depart to attend the extraordinary plenum of the Caucasian Bureau to discuss delimitation of the republics. There are six members of the Caucasian Bureau in Tiflis; if you fail to arrive, their decision will be considered final, therefore we insist that you go there at once.’”76 On 28 June, the CPC met once more under N. Narimanov’s chairmanship. Myasnikov’s Decla- ration, which proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh part of the Armenian S.S.R., was declined; the meeting discussed the possibility of recalling Mravyan, extraordinary representative of Armenia in Nagorno- Karabakh. After this, Narimanov departed to Tiflis to attend the plenary meeting of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) scheduled for 4 July, 1921.

Why Are the Armenians Falsifying the Well-Known Documents of the Caucasian Bureau Relating to Nagorno-Karabakh and Implicating Stalin?

The famous sitting of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) of 27 June, 1921 never con- sidered the historical and ethnographic aspects; the decision was based on Karabakh’s economic pull toward Azerbaijan. On 4 July, however, at another plenum of the Caucasian Bureau attended by Sta- lin, Kirov, future head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (three weeks later he would have to become Secretary of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) of Azerbaijan.—J.H.), and Orjonikidze (the Transcauca- sus republics’ curator) voted for the following resolution: “To include (italics mine.—J.H.) Nagorno- Karabakh in the Armenian S.S.R. and limit the plebiscite to the mountainous part.”77 The plenary session was attended by member of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) Stalin and members of its Caucasian Bureau Orjonikidze, Makharadze, Narimanov, Myasnikov, Kirov, Nazaretyan, Orakhe- lashvili, Figatner; Breitman (Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Rus- sian Young Communist League), and members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia Tsintsadze, Mdivani, and Svanidze. The discussion revealed two opposite opinions. The participants were invited to vote for the following: (a) Karabakh should remain (italics mine.—J.H.) part of Azerbaijan (Narimanov, Ma- kharadze, and Nazaretyan voted “for”; Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Kirov and Figatner, “against”); (b) The plebiscite should be carried out throughout the entire territory of Karabakh among the Armenians and Muslims (Narimanov and Makharadze voted “for”).

76 Protocol No. 5 of a sitting of the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 27.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 2, sheet 73. 77 Protocol No. 11 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 04.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 118. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(c) The mountainous part of Karabakh should be joined to Armenia (Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, and Kirov voted “for”). (d) The plebiscite should be carried out only in Upper Karabakh (Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Fi- gatner, Kirov, and Nazaretyan voted “for”).78 The protocol contains a note: Comrade Orakhelashvili was absent when the vote on Karabakh was taken. This was a much more honest position than that of future Secretary of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Kirov and Orjonikidze, who repeatedly demanded in his telegrams to Lenin and Chicherin that both the valley and the mountainous part of Karabakh be left in Azerbaijan. They voted “for” on the two last points. The adopted decision violated Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. This made people wonder why Orjonikidze and Kirov, who several months earlier “could not imagine Azerbaijan without Karabakh,” changed their minds in June 1921 and voted against Az- erbaijan at the 4 July sitting of the Caucasian Bureau. Were they guided by the Center’s secret in- structions? Here is an explanation: the Moscow Treaty of 16 March, 1921 between Soviet Russia and Tur- key (with a point which preserved Nakhchivan within Azerbaijan on the condition that Azerbaijan would never cede protectorate to a third state) turned Nagorno-Karabakh into a target of secret and then open discussions at the Caucasian Bureau in June-July 1921 and triggered attempts to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia by force. The text and the political sense of the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of 4 July was frequently falsified and misinterpreted. The Armenian authors performed a “minor” operation by replacing the verb “include” with the verb “keep within.” Nariman Narimanov stated resolutely that “because the Karabakh issue is so important to Azerbaijan, I believe it necessary to transfer the final decision on it to the C.C. R.C.P.” It was thanks to his protest that the meeting arrived at the following decision: “Since the Karabakh issue has caused serious disagreements, the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) believes it advisable to transfer the final decision to the C.C. R.C.P. (B.).”79 This meant that the same sitting discussed the Karabakh issue as Point 5 of the agenda; the decision passed by a majority vote after Narimanov’s statement (Point 6) annulled the previous results. This issue was never discussed in the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) because, first, Orjonikidze had renounced his previous erroneous position and, relying on Nazaretyan, demanded that the decisions of the previ- ous plenary session on Karabakh be revised.80 On 5 July the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau adopted the following decisions on Point 2 of the agenda in view of the firm position of N. Narimanov and G. Orjonikidze’s retreat from his previous stand: (a) proceeding from the need to maintain national peace between the Muslims and the Armeni- ans, the economic ties between Upper and Lower Karabakh, and its constant contacts with Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh should be left (italics mine.—J.H.) within the Azerbaijan S.S.R. with broad regional autonomy and its administrative center in the town of Shusha, which belongs to the autonomous region (for—4; abstained—3); (b) the C.C. of Azerbaijan should be instructed to identify the boundaries of the autonomous region and present the results to the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) for approval; (c) the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. should be instructed to talk to the C.C. of Armenia and the C.C. of Azerbaijan about a candidate for the post of commissar extraordi- nary of Nagorno-Karabakh;

78 See: Ibidem. 79 Ibid., sheet 114. 80 See: Protocol No. 12 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 05.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 122. 122 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(d) the C.C. of Azerbaijan should be instructed to identify the volume of rights of the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and present the result to the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. for ap- proval.81 When commenting on the repeal of the first “fair decision” on the Nagorno-Karabakh, the Ar- menian side referred to Stalin’s unexpected arrival in Tiflis, who had allegedly pulled the strings for the Azeris in his usual manner. We have established that Stalin had arrived in Tiflis earlier, late in June and could not, therefore, suddenly arrive at the plenary meeting of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) on 5 July. Why do the Armenian historians who falsify the historical documents of the Caucasian Bureau implicate Stalin in “keeping” (“transferring” being their favorite term) Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan? Because the crimes perpetrated under Stalin give the Armeni- ans a chance to present themselves as victims of the totalitarian regime and create the semblance of “fairness restored.” The Armenian authors and politicians who accuse Stalin of all misfortunes are fully aware of the truth about these dramatic sittings of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). Protocols No. 11 (the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of 4 July) and No. 12 (the 5 July session) provide an absolutely clear picture. Stalin, who was present at both sessions, said nothing about Karabakh. Pro- tocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) of 2 and 3 July is kept together with the protocols of 4 and 5 July in the same record group. Any impartial researcher will discover Stalin’s name at the top of the list of those present at these plenums.82 It was Addendum to Protocol No. 8 that registered “the fact of the appearance of nationalist ‘Communist’ groups in the Communist organizations of the Transcaucasus, which were fairly strong in Georgia and Armenia and weak (in terms of their numbers and quality) in Azerbaijan.”83 The results of the discussion of the Zangezur (3 June, 1921) and Nagorno-Karabakh (4-5 July) issues were caused by a wave of Communist nationalism in Armenia raised by the fact that the Moscow Treaty (March 1921) between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey had registered the sta- tus of the Nakhchivan Region and the attempts of the Center to quench this wave. On 15 April, 1921, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Armenia A. Bekzadyan (who headed the Arme- nian delegation at the Moscow talks) sent a long letter of protest to Chicherin in which he accused Soviet Russia of failing to protect the interests of the Armenians. The letter said: “The Armenian delegation finds it very important to point out that the Turkish delegation at the conference acted as a protector and defender of the Muslim population of the Transcaucasus and of the interests of Soviet Azerbaijan in particular.”84 A. Bekzadyan was concerned about the fact that Turkey had managed to retain Nakhchivan, a border point of great importance for its safety in the east, within Azerbaijan. He deemed it necessary to stress that “the conference’s decision on the Nakhichevan and Sharuro-Daralaghez issues deprived Armenia of the possibility of administering Zangezur, which belongs to it, in a normal way.”85 Georgy Chicherin wrote a letter to Saak Ter-Gabrielyan, who represented the Soviet govern- ment of Armenia, informing him of the above, by saying that he was amazed by Bekzadyan’s at- tempt to justify what the Armenian delegation had been doing at the Moscow conference and push the guilt onto the Russian delegation. He wrote that the Armenians with whom he had been com-

81 See: Protocol No. 12 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 82 See: Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 02-03.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheets 87-88; Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) with representatives of local party organizations and trade unions. 02-03.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 59, sheet 14. 83 Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) with representatives of lo- cal party organizations and trade unions. 02-03.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 59, sheets 12, 14. 84 A. Bekzadyan’s letter to G. Chicherin. 15.04.1921, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheets 58-59. 85 Ibid., sheet 62. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION municating were well-aware of the conference’s main aim and had never complained of its deci- sions.86 Chicherin sent a more or less similar telegram to Boris Legran in Tiflis, which said: “I strongly object to the way Bekzadyan is trying, first, to heap the guilt on the Russian delegation and, second, to purge the Armenian delegation of accusations in front of readers or listeners, of whom I know nothing, by distorting the facts and suppressing information of which the Armenian delegation was well aware.”87 The Armenians resorted to blackmail of this sort to be able to take advantage of an opportune moment (in the context of the closed discussions of the Moscow Treaty) to appropriate Karabakh and pull the Center to their side. The Armenian leaders, who had remained silent at the Moscow Confer- ence, suddenly formulated their claims to Soviet Russia; they obviously wanted Karabakh as a com- pensation of sorts. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue was discussed once more on 5 July at the insistence of Orjonikidze and Nazaretyan. Some of the Armenian authors, however, wrote (for obvious reasons) that it was Narimanov, not Nazaretyan, who together with Orjonikidze put the question back on the agenda on 5 July.88 In their joint article, which appeared in Moscow, V. Zakharov and S. Sarkisyan revived the erroneous state- ment that Nagorno-Karabakh had not been transferred to Azerbaijan until 5 July and associated this decision with Stalin’s name.89 It is a well-known fact, however, that Stalin had been in Tiflis since the end of June 1921. Why did Stalin come to Tiflis in late June 1921? Anyone seeking an answer should look at the documents of the plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Georgia held on the same day as the plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). On 7 July, the plenary meeting of the Caucasian Bureau, at which Stalin was also present, was still in session. It passed a decision to join the neutral zone between Armenia and Georgia to Armenia. The same day, its members, having discussed the question of join- ing the area at and Khram to Armenia, transferred it to the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Georgia to be discussed at its next plenary meeting. The documents show that the plenary meeting was held the same day and that it was attended by all the members of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) apart from Narimanov. The verbatim report registered that all members arrived at 11:00 a.m., while Stalin and Orjonikidze showed up later, at 12:25 a.m. The meeting first discussed the Batumi question and asked Stalin to inform them about his negotiations with the delegation of Ajaria. The second issue on the agenda was related to the state- ment Nariman Narimanov made at the meeting of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July to the effect that the Muslim population of Georgia should be given more attention. The plenary meeting suggested that the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Georgia should entrust Omar Faig (Namanzade) with this task. The same day, the plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Georgia discussed another point worded as On Setting up the Peoples’ Commissariat for the Muslims of Georgia. The plenary meeting approved the idea and cre- ated a commission headed by Omar Faig (with Kavtaradze, Kvirkeli, and Tumanov as members) to discuss the organizational forms and functions of the new commissariat. The plenary meeting asked the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Azerbaijan to dispatch 3 or 4 Muslim communists to form the core of the new structure. The plenary meeting also discussed two more issues on its agenda (On the Press and On the Cheka of Georgia) before moving on to the main issue which brought Stalin from Nalchik to Tiflis,

86 See: G. Chicherin’s letter to Ter-Gabrielyan. 21.04.1921, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheet 63. 87 G. Chicherin’s telegram to B. Legran. 22.04.1921, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheet 65. 88 See: G. Melik-Shakhnazarov, “Politizatsia istorii kak istochnik napryazheniya mezhnatsionalnykh otnosheniy,” in: Mayendorfskaya deklaratsia 2 noyabrya 2008 goda i situatsiya vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, Collection of articles, Moscow, 2008, p. 311. 89 See: V.A. Zakharov, S.T. Sarkisyan, “Azerbaidzhano-karabakhskiy konflikt: istoki i sovremennost,” in: Mayen- dorfskaya deklaratsia 2 noyabrya 2008 goda i situastiya vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, p. 221. 124 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION namely, changes in the leadership of Georgia. Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Geor- gia Philip Makharadze pursued a relatively independent policy; he clashed with Orjonikidze and, in general, was not a favorite with the C.C. C.P.R. (B.). Under the pretext of the far from simple sit- uation in the country, Stalin suggested that he should be replaced by Budu Mdivani. The majority (6 votes “for” and 4 abstentions; together with the votes cast by the members of the Caucasian Bureau, 9 votes “for” and 4 abstentions) made Budu Mdivani head of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia. For many years, Armenian and some Russian historians looked in vain for Karabakh’s impact on this situation. Stalin, however, came to Georgia to replace more or less independent Philip Ma- kharadze, who had quarreled with Orjonikidze, with more pliable Budu Mdivani. In November 1921, Orjonikidze raised the question of removing Makharadze not only from Georgia but from the Cauca- sus on the whole. On 2 November, he wrote to Lenin and Stalin once more: “Philip should be imme- diately removed from the Caucasus.” In mid-August 1921, when talking on the phone to Orjonikidze, Alexander Myasnikov said that treatment of the Karabakh issue in Armenia had become more or less loyal.90 On 19 July, 1921, after discussing the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July and N. Nar- imanov’s trip to Tiflis, the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan ruled that “Nagorno-Karabakh re- mains an inalienable part of Soviet Azerbaijan with the right to internal self-administration within the Soviet Constitution with the regional Executive Committee as its governing body.”91 Moreover, in his report, Narimanov spoke about the administrative borders between Azerbaijan and its Transcau- casian neighbors and informed that Nagorno-Karabakh remained an inalienable part of Soviet Azer- baijan within the Soviet Constitution with the right to self-administration. On 20 July, the day after the meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan and after hearing what Aligeidar Karaev had to say about the situation in Karabakh, the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) decided to set up a commission of representatives of the people’s commissariats of internal affairs, justice, and foreign affairs to draft a constitution of the autonomous region.92 The decisions of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July began to be implemented in the first days of August. On 1 August, 1921, an extraordinary Congress of the Soviets of the 2nd Part of the Shusha Uezd was held in the village of Kendhurt. L. Mirzoyan, who was invited to represent the Council of People’s Commissars, delivered a report in which he proved that economically, spiritually, political- ly, and ethnically Karabakh was closely connected with Baku as the center of Azerbaijan. He de- scribed the decision of the Caucasian Bureau to set up an administrative unit subordinated directly to Baku in the mountainous part of Karabakh as absolutely correct93 and promised that with the estab- lishment of an autonomy all the problems would be resolved. On his return, Mirzoyan supplied a detailed report in which he wrote, in particular, that the Karabakh issue had been created (and fanned) by top party and Soviet officials, on the one hand, and by the Armenian nationalist-minded intelli- gentsia, on the other.94 After 5 July, it was rumored that the Armenians had been evicted from Karabakh to Armenia (L. Mirzoyan mentioned in his report that the rumors were started by nationalist-minded Armenians); gradually this “information” reached the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). It should be said

90 See: A. Myasnikov’s talk with G. Orjonikidze by direct telephone line. August 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 177, sheet 4. 91 Protocol of a sitting of the CEC of Azerbaijan. 19.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 31, sheet 122. 92 See: Protocol No. 22 of the meeting of the Political and Organizational Bureau of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Azerbai- jan. 20.07.1921. APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 18, sheet 94; RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 92, sheet 51. 93 See: Protocol of the extraordinary Congress of the Soviets of the 2nd Part of the Shusha Uezd. 01.08.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 18, sheets 120-120rev. 94 See: Report by L. Mirzoyan at the C.C. Az.C.P. (Copy to the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.)) about his trip to the mountainous part of Karabakh. 03.08.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 95, sheet 3rev. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION that all those who were displeased with the decisions of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July acted through Kirov (when he was elected First Secretary of the C.C. of the Community Party of Azerbaijan). In August 1921, Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau Figatner wrote to Kirov that allegedly after the de- cision of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July to keep Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, “many Arme- nian villages were moved from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.”95 After receiving this information, Kirov immediately asked Karaev and Mirzoyan (who were in Karabakh) to clarify it. They answered that there was an opposite trend: in the first months of Sovietization of Azerbaijan Muslims started moving away from Karabakh to other places. The decision of the Caucasian Bureau on an autonomous status for the mountainous part of Karabakh forced the Center to closely follow the relevant developments. In a letter to Sergey Kirov, First Secretary of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), dated 22 May, 1922, Stalin wrote the following with a great deal of sarcasm: “They say that Fonstein, a “native” of Karabakh, represents it in the Central Execu- tive Committee of Azerbaijan.”96 In his letter dated 18 June, Kirov explained to Stalin that he had been deluded and listed the members who represented Karabakh at the CEC.97 At the same time, the Center was playing into the hands of the Armenians; it tried to prevent subordination of the party organization of Karabakh to the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. On 1 August, 1922, however, Kirov and Matyushin, who headed the organizational department of C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), telegraphed to Mos- cow: “The territory of Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, while its party organization is part of the Az.C.P.”98 On 7 July, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan crowned three years of pre- paratory work with a decree on setting up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. This is how the struggle over the territorial affiliation of Nagorno-Karabakh which began in the first years of Soviet power in the Transcaucasus ended. On 27 May, 1924, Nariman Narimanov wrote the following to Stalin: “Under Mirzoyan’s strong pres- sure, Nagorno-Karabakh was made an autonomous region. I was not able to accomplish this, not because I was against the autonomy, but because the Armenian peasants themselves did not want this. Meanwhile, Mirzoyan, assisted by the Dashnak teachers, tilled the soil and pushed the deci- sion through the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee.”99 He knew that the trouble for Azerbaijan did not stop there; he predicted that the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh was the beginning of a future tragedy.

By Way of a Conclusion

Back in the 19th century, Alexander Griboedov, a Russian diplomat and poet, wrote: “We … have been holding forth long enough about how to convince the Muslims to accept their current prob- lems as not lasting forever and how to eradicate their fears that Armenians will seize the land on which they were allowed to settle temporarily.”100 The fears proved justified: the Armenians put down roots in the Azeri lands and eventually became hostile toward the true owners of the land. At one time, Ilya Chavchavadze addressed the Armenians who found shelter in Georgia: “Whether we

95 Information supplied by Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) Figatner to Kirov. August 1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 129, f. 107, sheet 58. 96 Stalin’s letter about the situation in the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the representative of Karabakh in the CEC of Azerbaijan. 22.05.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 558, inv. 11, f. 746, sheet 1. 97 See: S. Kirov’s confidential letter to Stalin. 18.06.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 558, inv. 11, f. 746, sheet 2. 98 Telegram sent by Kirov and Matyushin to the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 01.08.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 80, inv. 25, f. 2, sheet 1. 99 N. Narimanov, K istorii nashey revolutsii v okrainakh (Pismo I.V. Stalinu), Baku, 1990, p. 59. 100 A.S. Griboedov, Sochinenia v dvukh tomakh, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1971, pp. 340-341. 126 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION had a lot or not we gave you shelter, put a roof over your heads, and befriended you. Don’t treat us as enemies in our own home!”101 Throughout the 20th century, the Azeris deeply regretted the hospital- ity with which they treated the Armenians. In the last two decades, this regret has become even more agonizing.

101 I. Chavchavadze, Armianskie uchenia i vopiiushchie kamni, Tiflis, 1902, p. 123.

Zurab PAPASKIRI

D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Sukhumi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

THE BYZANTINE COMMONWEALTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE GEORGIAN POLITICAL UNITS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 10TH CENTURY

Abstract

utstanding Russian Byzantine schol- the neighboring states (not only the Slavs O ar Dimitri Obolensky introduced the and Rumanians as Dimitri Obolensky be- term “Byzantine Commonwealth” as lieved) belonged to the Byzantine cultural a concept in his fundamental work The and political arena; however, the Byzan- Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Eu- tine Commonwealth was not a mechanism rope, 500-1453 (published in 1971). He of political subjugation. He proceeds from described the Byzantine Commonwealth this premise to dwell on the central as- as a “supranational community” of sorts pects of the relations between Georgia and rooted in Orthodoxy and the idea of pri- Byzantium and to assess the Georgian macy of the Byzantine emperor. The trend in Byzantine foreign policy in the first present author demonstrates that many of half of the 10th century.

Introduction

For nearly a millennium, the remained a superpower responsible for the political climate in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, Hither Asia, and the Mid- dle East. Being involved in a never-ending confrontation with Sassanian Iran, later with the Arab Caliphate, and still later with the Seljuk Turks, the Byzantine Empire never dropped its efforts to draw the neighboring Christian countries and peoples into the sphere of its interests as the leader of Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the East Christian world. Over time, the Empire created a cultural and political entity of sorts which comprised its vassal neighbors and the countries oriented toward . This entity, or the Byzantine Commonwealth, a term coined by prominent Russian student of Byzan- tium Dimitri Obolensky, was a “supranational community of Christian states of which Constan- tinople was the center.”1 It was rooted in “the unity of Orthodoxy, the idea of metapolitical dom- ination of the Byzantine emperor, and in the Byzantine culture and jurisprudence accepted by other countries.”2 It should be said that prominent Byzantinists slightly readjusted what Obolensky meant by the Byzantine Commonwealth. Alexander Kazhdan, another luminary of Russian Byzantine stud- ies, was not quite satisfied with the “too narrow interpretation … of the geographic limits of the ‘Commonwealth’;” he was quite right to point out that “the commonwealth was not limited to the Balkans, the northern shores of the Danube and the Northern Black Sea coast. It stretched to Italy, the Caucasus and the Euphrates area.” He deemed it necessary to emphasize that the “ideological and political reality of the Middle Ages, even if registered in terms of dependence, had nothing in common with real dependence” and that “the hierarchy of the Byzantine Commonwealth” was a factor of self-awareness rather than political subjugation.3 According to Academician Litavrin, another prominent Russian Byzantinist scholar (he was the first to offer his opinion about Obolen- sky’s monograph4), the real interests of the countries which belonged to the so-called common- wealth had little in common. They perceived the community as a cultural and confessional unity, while the Byzantine Empire placed the stakes on politics,5 which means that a Byzantine looked at “the commonwealth as an ‘imagined paradise’ and ideological justification of imperial foreign policy designed to attain this ideal … while the subjects of the ‘dependent’ country treated it as a moral-ethical conception and nothing more … therefore it (“community” as Litavrin described it.—Z.P.) had no real political or administrative-hierarchical structure.”6 It should be said that some think that the Byzantine Commonwealth was not a “real structure” but rather a delusion of those who ruled the empire.7 Recently, it has become obvious that the Byzantine Commonwealth conception calls for a more creative approach. According to Academician Litavrin, for example, the following questions should receive clear answers: “Was the vast East Christian area which stretched from the Holy Land to the Baltic tied together into a political and legal structure? Were there any definite contractual, outside the church, contacts between these countries and Byzantium as the center of the area and among them? And finally, was there any practical meaning in the system of fictitious kindred ties (the close- ness of which varied from country to country) between the basileus and the rulers of the East Christian neighbors? Could it be that this system was nothing more than one of the ceremonial and diplomatic ploys designed to strengthen the empire’s influence in the area?”8

1 D. Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe 500-1453, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971, p. 341. The Russian translation of this work was published in the book: D. Obolensky, Vizantiyskoe sodruzhestvo natsii. Shest vizantiyskikh portretov, Moscow, 1998. 2 A. Voytenko, “Review of D. Obolensky, Vizantiyskoe sodruzhestvo natsii. Shest vizantiyskikh portretov,” availa- ble at [http://old.russ.ru/journal/kniga/99-03-04/voit.htm]. 3 See: A.P. Kazhdan, “D. Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe 500-1453, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971. Annotation/review,” Vizantiyskiy vremennik, Vol. 35, Moscow, 1973, p. 262. 4 See: G.G. Litavrin, “D. Obolensky, Vizantiyskoe soobshchestvo gosudarstv. Vostochnaya Evropa. 500-1453 (re- view),” Voprosy istorii, No. 2, 1972, pp. 180-185. 5 See: G.G. Litavrin, Vizantiya, Bolgaria, Drevnyaya Rus (IX-nachalo XII vv.), St. Petersburg, 2000, p. 355. 6 G.G. Litavrin, “D. Obolensky, Vizantiyskoe soobshchestvo gosudarstv. Vostochnaya Evropa. 500-1453 (re- view),” pp. 182-183. 7 S.A. Ivanov, Vizantiyskoe missionerstvo: mozhno li sdelat iz “varvara” khristianina? Moscow, 2003, p. 343. 8 G.G. Litavrin, “Foreword to the book Rus i Vizantiya: Mesto stran vizantiyskogo kruga vo vzaimootnosheniyakh Vostoka i Zapada,” in: Tezisy dokladov XVIII Vserossiyskoy nauchnoy sessii vizantinistov. Moskva. 20-21 oktyabrya 2008 goda, Moscow, 2008, p. 4. 128 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It is not my intention to join the polemics around this highly important problem of principal importance for contemporary Byzantine studies; I am absolutely satisfied with Obolensky’s concep- tual approach and believe that, on the whole, his idea of the Byzantine Commonwealth corresponds to historical reality. This means that throughout its history,9 the Byzantine Empire was perceived not only by its rulers,10 but also by its Christian neighbors, as a center and leader of the entire Christian Orthodox world.11 In fact, not only the Christian Orthodox countries, but also Grigorian Armenia, were regarded as part of the Byzantine Commonwealth.12 This article can be described as an attempt to identify Byzantine policies in relation to the Geor- gian states in the first half of the 10th century and their international status and to decide whether they can be described as part of the circle of countries and peoples which belonged to the Byzantine Com- monwealth in the period under review.

An Overview of Byzantine Imperial Policies in the Georgian and Armenian Areas and the Hegemonic Ambitions of King Adarnase II Bagrationi of “the Kartvelians”

At the turn of the 10th century, the Byzantine Empire treated the Georgian and Armenian polit- ical units with caution and did all it could to draw them onto its side in its confrontation with the Arab Caliphate. Under Leo VI the Wise (886-912), the empire lost some of its foreign policy and military might, hence its relatively passive behavior: it had to preserve what it had rather than strive toward wider international impacts.13 This became obvious for the first time in Byzantine history under Basil I (866-886) in 885 when the Arab Caliphate made Ashot Bargatuni king of Armenia. The Byzantine

9 According to Obolensky, in the Late Middle Ages the “cultural unity not only survived the catastrophic events of 1180-1240 but … acquired a new content and strength” (D. Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe 500—1453, p. 203) (see also: V.A. Zolotovsky, “Voennye aspekty vneshney politiki Vizantii pri pervykh Paleologakh (K uyasneniyu spetsifiki ‘Vizantiyskogo sodrizhestva natsiy’),” in: Rus i Vizantiya: Mesto stran vizantiyskogo kruga vo vzaimootnosheniyakh Vostoka i Zapada, p. 56). 10 For more detail, see: Yu.G. Sokolov, “K probleme ‘Vizantiyskogo sodruzhestva gosudarstv’: strany vizantiysko- go kruga glazami romeev v pervoy polovine XIII veka,” in: Rus i Vizantiya: Mesto stran vizantiyskogo kruga vo vzai- mootnosheniyakh Vostoka i Zapada, pp. 120-126. 11 It should be said in this connection that the Arabian geographic works of the 10th century “treated the Byzantine Commonwealth … as a geopolitical reality. In particular, al-Istahri and Ibn Nawkal identified ‘four empires (mamlakat),’ which they treated as the pillars of world order (italics mine.—Z.P.): the Caliphate (mamlakat al-islam) ruled from Bagh- dad by the sovereign of the faithful (amir al-muminin); Byzantium (mamlakat ar-Rum) headed by the czar (malik), who lives in Constantinople; China (mamlakat as-Sin), the ruler of which (sakhib) lives in the city of Kayfeng; India (mam- lakat al-Hind), with the czar (malik) as its head, who lives in the city of Kannauj” (I.G. Konovalova, “Predstavlenie o Vi- zantiyskom sodruzhestve gosudarstv v arabskoy geograficheskoy literature X veka,” in: Rus i Vizantiya: Mesto stran vi- zantiyskogo kruga vo vzaimootnosheniyakh Vostoka i Zapada, pp. 76-77). 12 For more detail, see: V.A. Arutyunova-Fidanyan, “Kontaktnye zony v sisteme ‘Vizantiyskogo sodruzhestva gos- udarstv’,” in: Rus i Vizantiya: Mesto stran vizantiyskogo kruga vo vzaimootnosheniyakh Vostoka i Zapada, pp. 15-17. 13 It has been more or less commonly agreed that, on the whole, Byzantium pursued a fairly successful foreign pol- icy in the latter half of the 9th and the first half of the 10th century (see: A.P. Kazhdan, “Vneshnepoliticheskoe polozhenie imperii v seredine IX-seredine X veka,” in: Istoria Vizantii, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1967, p. 188, available at [http://historic.ru/ books/item/f00/s00/z0000048/st018.shtml]), however, from time to time the empire suffered serious foreign policy de- feats, the effects of which lasted for fairly long periods of time. This happened during the reign of Leo VI the Wise (see: A.A. Vasiliev, Istoria Vizantiyskoy imperii, Vol. I, available at [http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_we/vaa161.html]; A.P. Ka- zhdan, “Vneshnepoliticheskoe polozhenie imperii v seredine IX-seredine X veka,” p. 190). Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 129 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION rulers were baffled, but Basil I could not object; he even expressed his pleasure. According to prom- inent Armenian historian of the 10th century, Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi (John of Drasxanakert) “the great Greek Emperor Basil … concluded an important treaty on peace, obedience, and friendship with our King Ashot, calling him his favorite son14 and drawing him into all the royal [developments] of his state.”15 As historians rightly pointed out, the Byzantine emperor tried to demonstrate his rights to Armenia and his suzerainty over Ashot.16 The Byzantine rulers treated Smbat Bargatuni (890-914), who succeeded Ashot, in the same way when he sent a friendly letter to Emperor Leo VI the Wise. Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi wrote: “Meanwhile Smbat, having finally consolidated [his] rule, sought … peaceful and friendly relations with everybody. In the first place, according to the alliance established by [his] father, he, being a mild and unpretentious man, did not move away from the sincere friendship of Leo, the emperor of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, and sent numerous and suitable gifts as a token of his respect. This explains why the emperor reciprocated not with scanty but with lavish gifts and honors... Most importantly, by signing a union of friendship, the emperor made Smbat his ‘favorite son’ (italics mine.—Z.P.).”17 These honors, however, did not bestow the royal status (of basileus) upon Ashot and Smbat. They were addressed as Archon ton Archonton (prince of princes, a rough analogue of the Armenian ishkhanats ishkhan or Georgian eristavt-eristavi). Imperial diplomacy was guided by the Byzantine conception that treated the emperor as “vicar of Christ and protector of the Christian Church. None of

14 Historians have drawn attention to the formula “favorite son.” It is believed that it (as well as “spiritual son”) was actively used in the “system of international-legal relations of Byzantium.” Authors of historical works pointed out that the “so-called spiritual family of the Byzantine emperor was probably invented for bilateral relations between By- zantium and any other state. The relations between the emperor and the members of this ‘family’ were of a triple na- ture: (1) ‘spiritual brothers,’ who under certain conditions could claim a certain degree of equality; (2) ‘spiritual sons’; and (3) ‘friends,’ which was the lowest rank. The title ‘spiritual son’ was conferred on a long line of Bagratuni kings and survived at least until Ashot III (953-977). One of the possible contenders to the Armenian throne invariably held the title of ‘friend.’ The ‘family’ system coexisted with other regulators of international-legal relations, particularly with the Armenians” (H. Draskhanakerttsi, Istoria Armenii, Transl. from the Old Armenian, introduced and commented on by M.O. Darbinyan-Melikyan, Erevan, 1986, Note 140 to Chapter XXIX, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus/ Drash/frametext3.htm]) (see also: K.N. Yuzbashyan, review of “Constantine Porphyrogennetos, De administrando Imperio,Translation, foreword and commentaries by R.M. Bartikyan,” Erevan, 1970 (in Armenian), Vizantiysky vremen- nik, Vol. 37, 1976, p. 266; idem, Armyanskie gosudarstva epokhi Bagratidov i Vizantiya IX-XI vekov, Moscow, 1988, pp. 81-82). 15 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 119. In the 13th century, Vardan Areveltsi, another Armenian historian, sup- plied more detailed information: “Eunuch Nikita arrived from the same Emperor Basil… with many gifts to ask for a crown from Ashot because Vahan, Bishop of Taron, had convinced Basil that he descended from the clan of Arshakuni since his mother was an Armenian… Basil wanted Bagratuni to crown him, which Ashot did…” (Compilation of Histo- ry by Vardan the Great, Transl. by N.O. Emin, Moscow, 1861, p. 109). As for the assertions that Basil I allegedly sent a royal crown to Ashot Bagratuni (see: A.A. Vasiliev, op. cit.; A.P. Kazhdan, “Vneshnepoliticheskoe polozhenie im- perii v seredine IX-seredine X veka,” p. 191), they are not confirmed by the sources (at least there is no mention of this in the work by Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi to which Vasiliev referred); however, this possibility should not be ex- cluded. The Georgian chronicles (in particular the work by Juansher Juansheriani) registered that the Byzantine imperi- al court used to send royal crowns to leaders of other countries (in this case to Erismtavari Mir and Archil of Kartli) (see: J. Juansheriani, “Life of Vakhtang Gorgasali,” in: Kartlis tskhovreba (Chronicle of Kartli), The Georgian text based on all the main manuscripts was prepared by Prof. S.G. Kaukhchishvili, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1955, p. 239; idem, Life of Vakhtang Gorgasali, Translated, introduced and commented on by G.V. Tsulaya, Tbilisi, 1986, p. 104) (on the same subject, see also: “Byzantine Diplomacy and Political Changes in Western Georgia in the First Half of the 8th Centu- ry,” in: Georgian Diplomacy. Annual, IV, Tbilisi, 1997, p. 307; Z.V. Papaskiri, “From the Political History of Western Georgia-Abkhazia” in his book Abkhazia is Georgia, Tbilisi, 1998, pp. 114-120; idem, “Once More on Georgia’s For- eign Policy Status in the 8th Century,” in: Proceedings of the Sukhumi State University, V, The Humanitarian, Social and Political Sciences Series, Tbilisi, 2008, pp. 449-451, available at [http://sou.edu.ge/files/samecniero%20 mushaobis%20koordinacia/ssu_shromebi_5_%282008%29.pdf], all in Georgian). 16 See: A.N. Ter-Gevondyan, Armenia i Arabsky Khaliphat, Erevan, 1977, pp. 237-238. 17 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 129, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus/Drash/ frametext4.htm]. 130 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the foreign rulers could aspire to become his equal.”18 It was part of the Byzantine political doctrine that proceeded from the idea of the unique nature of Byzantine statehood inherited from the Roman Empire19 and that (the Byzantine conception of power and the related ceremonial) Grigori Ostrogor- sky, one of the grandees of the world Byzantine studies, aptly described as a “specifically Byzantine political religion.”20 The above suggests that the Byzantine rulers could remain outwardly indifferent to the title of “King of the Kartvelians” held by Adarnase II because of the highly unfavorable international con- text. Constantinople, however, could hardly accept his provocative aggressiveness and military-polit- ical moves against Armenian King Smbat Bagratuni because of its confrontation with the Arabs, which obviously interfered with the empire’s far-reaching designs. This deserves a more detailed in- vestigation. According to Georgian and Armenian sources, King Adarnase II of “the Kartvelians” was a strong political leader, his military-political and diplomatic power stretching far beyond the Georgian political area proper to involve Armenia. This became obvious in 890 when, after the death of King Ashot Bagratuni, his son Smbat and his brother Abas, Smbat’s uncle, both claimed the throne. Adar- nase II seized the opportunity presented by the conflict to invade Armenia and, despite Abas’ frantic efforts to prevent his movement inside the country, reached Smbat and “after removing his mourning clothes dressed him in royal attire.”21 This had little in common with the diplomatic rules of the time: Smbat ascended the throne thanks to the active diplomatic (and, possibly, not only diplomatic) support of the Georgian king: he was not only present at the coronation but interfered in the domestic affairs of the neighboring state to establish an acceptable political regime there. The fact that the Georgian king’s political activity went far beyond the diplomatic limits was confirmed by the strong indignation of certain groups of the Armenian political establishment (Abas Bargatuni, in particular). Driven by indigna- tion, he decided to act: on the way back, “[Atrnerseh] was taken prisoner, put in irons, and locked in the fortress of Kars.”22 Smbat Bagratuni had to use his diplomatic skills and military force to release his patron.23 This means that Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi confirmed Adarnase II’s special (or even cen- tral) role in establishing political order in Armenia. Some Armenian authors tend to overestimate the role Smbat Bagratuni played in Adarnase Bagrationi’s coronation ceremony (about which Hov- hannes Draskhanakerttsi also wrote) and to ignore the role of the Georgian king in putting Smbat on the Armenian throne. Viada Arutyunova-Fidanyan, for example, deemed it necessary to point out the following when writing about Adarnase II: “Adarnase … King of Kartli24 (888-923) was

18 Z.V. Udaltsova, “Diplomatia,” in: Kultura Vizantii. Vtoraya polovina VII-XII vv., Moscow, 1989, p. 246. In 812, Constantinople had to recognize, for the first time in its history, the imperial status of the King of the Francs: “Karl Au- gust, crowned by God, great and peaceful Roman Emperor;” the Byzantine imperial court, however, specified: “From that time on, it became the official rule to supply the title basileus (of the Byzantine emperor.—Z.P.) with ‘of the East Romans (Byzantines)’. This means that Karl was recognized as an emperor of “the Frankish rather than Roman kingdom.” (G.G. Litavrin, “Politicheskaya teoriya v Vizantii s serediny VII do nachala XIII veka,” in: Kultura Vizantii. Vtoraya polovina VII-XII vv., pp. 69-70; Z.V. Udaltsova, op. cit., p. 250). Later, in 927 the Byzantine rulers recognized the Bul- garian king as a basileus (see: Z.V. Udaltsova, op. cit.). 19 See: Z.V. Udaltsova, op. cit., p. 241. 20 G. Ostrogorsky, “Die byzantinische Staatenhierarchie,” Seminarium Kondakovianum, Vol. 8, 1936, pp. 43-44; Z.V. Udaltsova, op. cit., p. 246. 21 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 122. 22 Ibidem. 23 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 24 Regrettably, V.A. Arutyunova-Fidanyan and some other historians (but not Georgians) tend to misinterpret the title of the “Kartvelian King” and believe that they were kings of (historical Kartli). A.N. Ter-Gevondyan, another Armenian historian, wrongly wrote about Adarnase II as “prince of Kartli” (see: A.N. Ter-Gevondyan, op. cit., p. 240; italics mine—Z.P.).Ya.N. Lyubarsky, another prominent Russian student of Byzantium, made a similar mistake. When Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 131 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION crowned by Smbat I the Martyr (italics mine.—Z.P.);”25 when writing about Smbat Bagratuni,26 she stubbornly ignored the role the Georgian king played in Smbat’s ascension to the Armenian throne. In the late 9th century, his interference in the domestic affairs of Armenia and hectic activities inside and outside his country earned Adarnase II international recognition, made him one of the most prominent regional political figures, and enabled him to claim the leading role throughout the Transcaucasus. This first became obvious in 904 when he tried to interfere in the conflict between the Kingdom of “the ” and Smbat Bagratuni, King of Armenia. The crisis between the West Georgian state and Armenia of the Bagratides went back to the last quarter of the 9th century when the Armenian Bagratides joined in the fracas over the so-called Kartlian heritage (in fact, Shida Kartli, the historical domain of the Kartlian kings and later erismtavari).27 Unable to recon- cile himself to another attempt of the king of the Abkhazians Konstantine III (893-922) (Konstanti according to the Chronicle of Kartli and Konstandin according to Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi) to capture Shida (Inner Kartli), the Armenian king besieged Uplistsikhe, the region’s administrative and political center.28 Adarnase II at first sided with the Armenians.29 In a critical situation, the conflicting sides agreed to peace talks, at which King Konstantine III represented the Abkhazians. In an effort not to allow the king of “the Abkhazians” to retain Shida Kartli, the Georgian king disrupted the talks, took Konstantine III prisoner, and transferred him to Smbat Bagratuni. For some time, the West Georgian king remained his prisoner; later the Armenian king let him go.30 Under the peace treaty between Armenia and Konstantine III, the Armenian king returned “Uplitsikhe and all of Kartli” to the king of “the Abkhazians.” The treaty was further confirmed by a dynastic marriage.31 Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi explained this by the desire of the people of Egrisi () to have a “stronger king.”32 We cannot exclude the possibility that the ambitious ruler of -Klarjeti (very much concerned about the much closer relations between the two kings and the fact that Kon- analyzing the information supplied by Theophanes Continuatus about the arrival in Constantinople (in 922-923) of Ashot Bagrationi, son of Adarnase II, Lyubarsky referred to the latter as the Kartlian king and specified that “traditionally the kings of Kartli also had the title of curopalates; when his father died, Ashot came to Constantinople to claim the title” (Prodolzhatel Feofana, Zhizneopisanie vizantiyskikh tsarey, Prepared for publication by Ya.N. Lyubarsky, Second revised edition, Aleteya, St. Petersburg, 2009, p. 250). The commentator obviously confused two different titles—the “King of Kartli” and the “King of the Kartvelians.” In fact, the Kartvelian kings, who officially claimed the right to be the legal heir to the kings and erismtavari of Kartli (historical Iberia, that is, the East Georgian kingdom) at that time (in the first quarter of the 10th century) did not control the whole territory of Tao-Klarjeti inherited from Ashot Bagrationi, the last head of the Kartlian state he founded in the early 9th century. This new Georgian unit was conventionally called the Tao- Klarjeti Princedom (or country of the curopalates); it was also called the Kartvelian (not Kartlian) Kingdom. At that time, the name Kartli was applied to the much smaller territory of Shida Kartli (Inner Kartli). 25 See: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, Ob upravlenii imperiey, Text, translation and commentaries edited by G.G. Litavrin and A.P. Novoseltsev, Moscow, 1989, p. 408; Note 15 to Chapter 43, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/ Texts/rus11/Konst_Bagr_ 2/text45.phtml?id=6402]. 26 See: Ibid., p. 407, Note 11 to Chapter 43. 27 For more detail, see: N.A. Berdzenishvili, Problems of Georgian History, Vol. VIII, Tbilisi, 1977, p. 305; M.D. Lordkipanidze, “The Domestic and International Status of Georgia between the and 1080s,” in: Essays of the History of Georgia, Vol. III, Tbilisi, 1979, pp. 191-192; A.P. Abdaladze, Relationships among the Political Units of the Transcaucasus in the 9th-11th Centuries, Tbilisi, 1988, pp. 169-211 (all in Georgian). 28 See: “Matiane Kartlisa,” in: Kartlis tskhovreba, p. 262; Letopis Kartli, Translated, introduced and commented on by G.V. Tsulaya, Tbilisi, 1982, p. 51. 29 See: H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 153, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus/Drash/frametext5.htm]. 30 See: Ibid., p. 154. 31 “Matiane Kartlisa,” p. 263; Letopis Kartli, p. 52 (see also: Z.V. Anchabadze, Iz istorii srednevekovoy Abkhazii. VI-XVII vv., Sukhumi, 1959, p. 121). 32 H. Draskhanakerttsi, History of Armenia (786-925), Text in Armenian with Georgian translation, research and indices published by E.V. Tsagareyshvili, Tbilisi, 1965, p. 114 (translated into Russian as “even worse oppressor” (see: H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit.). 132 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION stantine III regained Kutaisi) wanted to change the political regime in Western Georgia. In this con- text, it seems doubtful that Smbat Bagratuni set King Konstantine free “to demonstrate that he was grateful to the king of Virka (Adarnase II.—Z.P.), who was of Konstantine III’s father-in-law.”33 The Armenian author wants to convince us that Smbat Bagratuni liberated the king of “the Abkhazians” because the king of Virka (Adarnase) wanted this. This, however, contradicts another piece of infor- mation supplied by the Armenian Catholicos, according to whom “the king of Virka was very angry because Kostantid had been released contrary to his will (italics mine.—Z.P.). In his irritation, he began secretly arming his warriors against his unpretentious avenger Smbat.”34 Later events confirmed beyond doubt that Konstantine III had been set free without consult- ing Adarnase Bagrationi and that Smbat Bagratuni had infringed on the hegemonic designs of the king of the “Kartvelians.” Certain facts suggest that after finding out about Adarnase II’s suspi- cious activities in Western Georgia, Smbat Bagratuni decided to set his recent enemy King Kon- stantine III of “the Abkhazians” free and return him Kartli to avoid an “Abkhazian-Kartvelian” consolidation. This buried Adarnase’s hopes of capturing Kartli. This was not all. It seems that the Armenian king performed a U-turn in his attitude toward the “prisoner” because of certain develop- ments in Byzantium. I have already written that in the 880s-890s, the Byzantine leaders tried to draw the Armenian kings onto their side. Leo VI the Wise, for example, recognized the priority of Smbat Bagratuni in the Armenian political expanse and conferred the title of “favorite son” on him, which, de facto, regis- tered Byzantine sovereignty over Armenia. As could be expected, this irritated Caliph al-Mu’tadid (892-902) to the extent that he demanded that ruler of Azerbaijan Muhammad Ibn Abi’l Saj al Afshin (who earlier, in 892,35 declared Smbat king of Armenia in the name of the Caliph) should start puni- tive actions.36 At first Smbat managed to pacify the irritated ostikan of Azerbaijan37 ; later Afshin invaded Armenia and destroyed it,38 but the Caliphate failed to remove Smbat Bagratuni from the patronage of Byzantium and had to accept him, once more, as king.39 This means that by 904 the Byzantine emperor still retained a certain amount of control over Smbat Bagratuni, his “favorite son,” despite the frantic opposition of the Caliphate. At the same time, the Byzantine Empire cooperated (probably on an even greater scale) with the Kingdom of “the Abkhazians.” Despite the fact that late in the 8th century the “Abkhazian” Kingdom, the sovereign West Georgian state,40 came into being on the anti-Byzantine wave to spite Constantinople,41 throughout the 9th century the relations between the empire and official

33 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit. 34 Ibidem. 35 See: Z.M. Buniyatov, Azerbaijan v VII-IX vv., Baku, 1965, p. 209; A.N. Ter-Gevondyan, op. cit., p. 240. 36 For more detail, see: Z.M. Buniyatov, op. cit., pp. 209-211. 37 According to Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi, Smbat sent a pacifying letter to Afshin in which he expressed his sur- prise at the ostikan’s anger: “Why are you getting angry and bearing down on us for no reason at all? If it is because I be- came friends with the emperor, I did it in your interests as well…” (H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 130, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus/Drash/frametext4.htm]; italics mine.—Z.P.). 38 See: Ibid., pp. 134-135; Z.M. Buniyatov, op. cit., pp. 209-210. 39 Calif al-Muktafi (902-908) cut down the dues, recognized Smbat as his vassal, and once more sent him “magnif- icent royal gowns and a royal crown…” (H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 149; italics mine.—Z.P.). 40 For more on the national and state makeup of the Kingdom of the Abkhazians, see: Z. Papaskiri, “‘Ab- khazskoe’ tsarstvo—gruzinskoe gosudastvo,” in: Istoricheskie razyskania, Annual of Scholarly Papers of the Abkhaz- ian Branch of the Ekvtime Takaishvili All-Georgia Historical Society, VIII-IX, Tbilisi, 2006, pp. 68-106, available at [http://sites.google.com/site/saistoriodziebani/dziebani 2005-2006]. The same text can be found in: Z. Papaskiri, I vosstala Gruzia ot Nikopsii do Darubanda, Tbilisi, 2009, pp. 24-54, available at [http://sites.google.com/site/zpapaskiri/ publications-russian] (see also: Z. Papaskiri, Abkhazia. Istoria bez falsifikatsii, Second revised edition, Tbilisi, 2010, pp. 24-54). 41 For more detail, see: S.N. Janashia, “On the Time and Conditions in Which the Abkhazian Kingdom Appeared,” in: Proceedings in 3 vols, Vol. II, Publishing House of the AS of the GSSR, Tbilisi, 1952, pp. 331-333 (in Georgian); Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 133 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Kutaisi gradually improved to develop, in the 880s, into a partnership and close cooperation. Rela- tions improved when the imperial leaders resolutely supported, both diplomatically and militarily, fugitive Crown Prince Bagrat, who fought for his legitimate right to the throne of the Leonidas in Western Georgia.42 From that time on, the Byzantine Empire and the Kingdom of “the Abkhaz- ians” maintained good-neighborly relations; their cooperation continued in the first half of the 10th century, which is confirmed by Byzantine43 and Georgian44 sources. This background suggests that the Byzantine emperor could have interfered, in a most active and determined way, in the conflict between Smbat and the king of “the Abkhazians” to demand that his “favorite son” immediately set free Konstantine III, his loyal ally. I have written above that this buried the King of “the Kartveli- ans’” hopes of capturing Kartli. As could be expected, Adarnase II never forgave the perfidy of his former partner and ally. Resolved to depose and execute him and add Armenia to his domains, he started by luring onto his side those Armenian nakharars (headed by Honorary Nakharar Khasan, “ishkhan and manager of all royal possessions,”45 who refused to obey Smbat. Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi wrote that “Khasan transferred the Ani fortress to Atrnerseh (italics mine.—Z.P.).”46 Smbat, however, moved faster: he meted out cruel punishment on the rebellious nobles, but instead of fighting the King of “the Kartve- lians,” he invited him to enter a peace treaty.47 As an Armenian historian, Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi kept within his own (and medieval Armenian) historiographic tradition: Smbat Bagratuni was presented as a powerful potentate who had to fight Adarnase II, a mere instrument in the hands of the Armenian nakharars. “They (the mutinous nakharars.—Z.P.) decided to murder [king] Smbat and make [Atrnerseh] king of Armenia. In this way, they persuaded him to join their perfidious [coup].”48 The Armenian Catholicos went even fur- ther; he wrote that Adarnase II demonstrated complete obedience: “Atrnerseh … repented … and pleaded the king for forgiveness. And the merciful [king] … gave him peace, yet took his elder son as hostage.”49 Very much like their predecessors, contemporary Armenian historians treat the events of 904 in a very tendentious way. Viada Arutyunova-Fidanyan, for example, was obviously carried away by the passionate medieval Armenian author when she wrote that Smbat Bagratuni “was invariably merciful toward his defeated royal neighbors (Konstantine of Abkhazia and King Atrnerseh) (ital- ics mine.—Z.P.).”50 Margarita Darbinyan-Melikyan, who translated Hovhannes Draskhanakertsi’s work into Russian, offered a strange comment, to say the least, to what the Armenian chronicler had

Z.V. Anchabadze, op. cit., pp. 101-104; Z. Papaskiri, “‘Abkhazskoe’ tsarstvo—gruzinskoe gosudastvo,” pp. 89-90; idem, Abkhazia. Istoria bez falsifikatsii, p. 42. 42 For more detail, see: Z. Papaskiri, “Specifying the Foreign Policy Orientation of the ‘Abkhazian’ Kingdom,” in: Georgian Diplomacy. An Annual, Vol. 6, Tbilisi, 1999, pp. 325-335. The same publication can be found in: Z. Papaskiri, Georgia Rebelled from Nikopsia to Daruband, pp. 184-195 (all in Georgian). 43 This is confirmed, in particular, by the messages of Patriarch of Constantinople Nicholas the Mystic to the “Ab- khazian” kings which bear obvious traces of friendly and allied relations between the Kingdom of the “Abkhazians” and the Byzantine Empire late in the 9th-first third of the 10th century (see: Georgika. Information of Byzantine Writers about Georgia. The Greek text with Georgian translation published and commented on by S.G. Kaukhchishvili, Vol. IV, Part II, Tbilisi, 1952, pp. 212-218). 44 The good relations between Kutaisi and Constantinople were reflected in the information supplied by “Matiane Kartlisa” that King Giorgi II of the “Abkhazians” sent his two sons to Byzantium (see: “Matiane Kartlisa,” p. 270; Letopis Kartli, p. 56; Z. Papaskiri, “Specifying the Foreign Policy Orientation of the ‘Abkhazian’ Kingdom,” p. 333). 45 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 156, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus/Drash/frametext5.htm]. 46 Ibidem. 47 See: Ibid., p. 157. 48 Ibid., p. 156. 49 Ibid., p. 157. 50 V.A. Arutyunova-Fidanyan, “Obraz Vizantii v armyanskoy srednevekovoy istoriografii X veka,” Vizantiysky vremennik, Vol. 52, Moscow, 1991, p. 119. 134 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION written: Smbat Bagratuni “took his unfaithful nakharars from him (Adarnase II.—Z.P.),51 blinded them all by putting out their eyes, and sent some of them to the Byzantine emperor and others to the Egerian king.”52 The Russian translation reads: “Smbat sent his blinded nakharars to the Byzantine emperor as a sign of his ‘filial’ respect for his ‘father’ and to the Abkhazian king his loyal vassal (italics mine.—Z.P.).”53 This is absolutely illogical: no matter how much our Armenian colleagues want to accept as true everything Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi wrote in his time about the omnipotence of the kings of Ar- menia, in this case the very mention of the “Egerian” king together with the emperor of Byzantium shows that the West Georgian king was an authoritative leader and that Smbat Bagratuni highly re- spected him. We cannot exclude the possibility that Konstantine III, who did not need a stronger rival (Adarnase II) in the Georgian political expanse, sided with the king of Armenia who dispatched the disgraced nakharars to him to show his gratitude. The peace between the king of “the Kartvelians” and Smbat Bagratuni proved short-lived; later (in 909-910) Adarnase II moved once more against the Armenian king on the side of Yusuf ibn abu- Saj54 (Abul Kasim according to Georgian sources)55 appointed in 908 by Caliph al-Muktadir (908- 932) a new viceroy of Arminia-Azerbaijan.56 Ruler of Vaspurakan Gagik Artsuni and Shapukh Ba- gratuni sided with the Georgian leader to fight together with the Arabian emir. Smbat was defeated.57 No matter how hard he tried, the Armenian king failed to appease the stern ruler of Arminia-Azerba- ijan with diplomatic means. Yusuf ibn abu-Saj invaded Armenia; having plundered it he moved on to Georgia where he plundered Tbilisi, Kartli, Samtskhe, and Javakheti.58 Adarnase II’s aggressive actions against the Armenian king helped the Arab Caliphate to go ahead with its plans, which infringed on Byzantine interests in the East. Yusuf ibn abu-Saj’s inroad undermined the position of Smbat Bagratuni and his main ally King Konstantine III of “the Abkhaz- ians” in Eastern Georgia. At the same time, the invasion of Samtskhe-Javakheti did not chip the Geor- gian ruler’s political image; in fact, it strengthened his political position. There is every reason to believe that this was when he captured Shida Kartli.59 The hegemonic ambitions of the “Kartvelian” king became even stronger after Smbat Bagratuni died the death of a martyr in 914 when the power struggle intensified in Armenia. Adarnase II became involved on the side of Smbat’s son Ashot (“Erkat”), who finally ascended the throne with his active diplomatic (and probably military) support. This is confirmed by none other than the main chronicler of Armenia, Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi, who wrote that it was the king of “the Kartvelians” (the

51 The fact that the treacherous nakharars of Smbat Bagratuni were in Tao at the court of Adarnase II means that he initiated the march on the Armenian king. 52 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit. The king of “the Egerians” is the king of “the Abkhazians.” When writing about the “Egerian country,” the author meant Egrisi, that is, Western Georgia. Since the late 8th century, it was called Abkhazia (the country of the kings of “the Abkhazians”). The fact that he who wrote in the first quarter of the 10th century called the kings of “the Abkhazians” the kings of the Egrissi (“Egerian” kings) means without a doubt that the Georgian neigh- bors knew which of the states was called Abkhazia late in the 8th century (see: M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gosudarstv,” in: Ocherki istorii Gruzii, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 1988, pp. 285-286; Z. Papaskiri, “‘Ab- khazskoe’ tsarstvo—gruzinskoe gosudastvo,”, pp. 92-93). 53 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., Note 19, Chapter XLI. 54 See: A.P. Abdaladze, op. cit., p. 48; V.G. Silagadze, Arabian Rule in Georgia, Tbilisi, 1991, p. 167 (in Geor- gian). 55 See: Matiane Kartlisa, Translation, introduction and notes by M.D. Lordkipanidze, Tbilisi, 1976, p. 74, Note 82; Letipos Kartli, pp. 51-52. 56 See: Z.M. Buniyatov, op. cit., p. 212. 57 See: Ibid., pp. 212-213; V.G. Silagadze, op. cit., p. 166. 58 See: Z.M. Buniyatov, op. cit., pp. 213-214; V.G. Silagadze, op. cit. 59 This is indirectly confirmed by the information supplied by Crown Prince Vahushti that King Giorgi II of the Abkhazians conquered Kartli “after Adarnase II Curopalates was already dead” (Vahushti, “History of the Georgian King- dom,” in: Kartlis tskhovreba, Vol. IV, Tbilisi, 1973, p. 793). Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 135 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION king of Virka) who “having realized that God was on Ashot’s side and that God helped him to succeed in all good deeds,60 achieved complete understanding with Ashot’s army and crowned him, whereby he reigned instead of his father (italics mine.—Z.P.).”61 Driven by his unbounded desire to glorify the Armenian Royal House of Bagratuni, the Armenian Catholicos spared no effort to denigrate the deci- sive role of the Georgian leader in settling the Armenian crisis; he went as far as saying that the Geor- gian king was nothing short of a vassal of the Armenian royal court. According to the Armenian chronicler Adarnase II, after crowning Ashot Bagratuni, recognized that “his was the dignity of an autocrat (italics mine.—Z.P.).”62 It is absolutely clear, however, that this time (very much as before when he put Smbat Bagratuni on the throne), Adarnase II was acting on his own initiative and in his own interests. In fact, this showed, once more, the far-reaching political ambitions of the king of “the Kartvelians” and his ob- vious desire to become the only ruler in the Georgian and Armenian political expanse. Significantly, at this time, the Byzantine influence in the region was at its lowest.63 According to Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi, Emperor Leo VI (886-912), who was resolved to help Smbat Bagratuni, died before he could do anything. His brother Alexander (912-913), who ascended the throne after him, was too preoccupied with political troubles at home to bother about the Armenian king.64 In 918, Adarnase II acquired a serious problem on his own doorstep in the person of Gurgen (eristavt-eristavi), another member of the Bagrationis of Tao-Klarjeti; in 919-920, in the conflict over the Albanian region of Uti, driven by his mounting political ambitions, he moved against Armenian King Ashot “Erkat.”65 Later, in 922-923, Gurgen became even more actively involved in the Uti con- test, in which he stood against King Adarnase II of “the Kartvelians” and Armenian King Ashot. Very concerned about Gurgen’s ambitions, Adarnase II joined forces with the Armenian king.66 Since Constantinople patronized Ashot Bagratuni, it could probably engineer an alliance to tame the unruly Georgian curopalates. Simultaneously, the empire increased its diplomatic activities in Georgia and Armenia on the initiative of Patriarch of Constantinople Nicholas the Mystic,67 who was involved in personal corre- spondence with many secular and religious figures in the neighboring countries.68 One of his letters to the Armenian Catholicos reveals that he had also written to King Adarnase II of “the Kartvelians.” According to the Patriarch of Constantinople, in his letters he called on the Georgian leaders “to for-

60 Some think that Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi pointed “to the idea of the sacral nature of royal power not typical of Armenian political thought” (V.A. Arutyunova-Fidanyan, “Obraz Vizantii v armyanskoy srednevekovoy istorio- graphii…”, p. 118). 61 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 177; John of Drasxanakert, op. cit., p. 195. 62 Ibidem. 63 See: A.P. Kazhdan, Vneshnepoliticheskoe polozhenie imperii v seredine IX-seredine X veka, p. 190. 64 See: H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., pp. 171, 177. It should be said that some historians (M.O. Darbinyan-Meli- kyan) doubt what Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi wrote about the attempts of the Byzantine leaders to help Armenia; they believe that this happened not in 912-1913 but before 910 (see: H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., Note 106, Chapter XLV, available at [http://www. vostlit.info/ Texts/rus/Drash/primtext5.phtml]). 65 John of Drasxanakert, op. cit., pp. 234-235. 66 See: A.P. Abdaladze, op. cit., p. 155. 67 See: Nicholas the Mystic twice, in 901-907 and in 912-925, filled the post of Patriarch of Constantinople (for more detail, see: N. Volkov, “Nikolay Mistik, Patriarkh Konstantinopolsky (896-925),” in: Pribavleniya k tvoreniyam sv. Ottsov, Part 20, Book 2, 1861, pp. 163-265, available at [http://www.bogoslov.ru/tso/text/344159 /index.html]. 68 All those who studied his letters to secular and spiritual leaders of the neighboring states agree that they contain valuable information about the empire’s foreign policy contacts at the state and Church levels (see: A.P. Kazhdan, R.M. Bartikyan, “Poslanie konstantinopolskogo patriarkha Nikolaya I,” in: Nicholas I, Patriarch of Constantinople: Let- ters, edited and translated by R. J. H. Jenkins, L.G. Westerink, Washington, 1973 (Review), Istoriko-filologichesky zhur- nal, I, 1976, p. 277. For more detail about Nicholas the Mystic, see also: Ya.N. Lyubarsky, “Zamechaniya o Nikolae Mis- tike v svyazi s izdaniem ego sochineniy,” Vizantiysky vremennik, Vol. 47, Moscow, 1986, pp. 101-108), even though this information should be used with caution. 136 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION get mutual disagreements and turn to friendship, unity, agreement, and peace among themselves and with all the ishkhans of Armenia and Alvank; to unite so as to fight together against an ungodly ene- my—the sons of Apusech—so as not … to perish together and … cause trouble for the neighboring peoples.”69 This shows that the Armenian Catholicos attached great importance to Adarnase II’s position; this explains why he personally “tried to convince the king of Virka to follow his advice and per- suade him to embark on the road of peace, friendship, and complete harmony with all the ishkhans and teras of the Armenian and Virka countries … who took an oath in writing.”70 The talks between the king of “the Kartvelians” and the Armenian Catholicos were successful: they agreed on a joint plan which probably envisaged that the Georgian leader would help Ashot Bagratuni to ascend the Armenian throne. It was the Armenian Catholicos Ioann who prepared Ashot Bagratuni’s visit to Constantino- ple in 914,71 where he was “received with pomp and in a much grander style than other grand princ- es.”72 Ashot also enjoyed military support. It is believed that he returned to Armenia with Byzan- tine troops which took part in several military operations.73 Later, when Ashot “Erkat” had consol- idated his power, Sebük, the new ruler of Azerbaijan, recognized his ambitious title of shakhan- shah.74 Still later, however, when the Armenian king fell into the trap of his own intrigues, Con- stantinople refused to tolerate his diplomatic meanderings any longer. It put at the head of the army which invaded Armenia and was beaten back from Dvina by the joint forces of Bagratuni and Sebük.75 It seems that Adarnase II, a recent ally of the Armenian king, had nothing to do with the anti- Byzantine maneuvers; by that time, he was one of the pillars of Constantinople in the region, which is fully confirmed by the fact that after his death in 923 his son Ashot, who succeeded him on the throne, received the title of curopalates from Byzantium. Some of the Byzantine sources (in a work by so- called Theophanes Continuatus)76 supply a very detailed description of the sumptuous reception of

69 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit, p. 189, available at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus/Drash/frametext6.htm]. It should be said that when commenting on this letter, M. Darbinyan-Melikyan never missed the opportunity to stress, once again, that the status of the Armenian kings was higher than that of the Georgian leaders. “When writing about the curopalates and the leaders of the Abkhazians and other ishkhans of Armenia and Alvank,” writes she, “Nicholas the Mystic says nothing about King Smbat I. If he did not know that he had died, he should have mentioned Smbat I, whom Byzantium placed higher than the other feudal potentates of the Transcaucasus, above the curopalates and the head of the Abkhazians… (italics mine.—Z.P.)” (see: Ibid., Note 42, Chapter LIV). 70 Ibid., pp. 189-190. 71 Ibid., Note 82, Chapter LIV. There is another date of the visit. In the past, prominent Russian scholar of Byzanti- um A.A. Vasiliev agreed with A.J. Saint-Martin that Ashot had visited Constantinople in 921 (A.A. Vasiliev, “Vizantiya i araby. Politicheskie otnosheniya Vizantii i arabov za vremya Makedonskoy dinastii. Imperatory Vasily I, Lev VI Filosof i Konstantin VII Bagryanorodny (867-959),” in: Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo fakulteta Imperatorskogo S.-Peterburg- skogo universiteta, Part LXVI, St. Petersburg, 1902, pp. 216-217). According to A.P. Kazhdan, this happened after the 920 message of Nicholas the Mystic “to Armenian Catholicos Ioann, in which he called on all Caucasian rulers to discon- tinue their feuds and unite for the fight against the Arabs. After that, an imperial ambassador arrived in Armenia with nu- merous gifts. He invited Armenian King Ashot III to revive their union and friendship. In 921, Ashot himself visited Con- stantinople, where the emperor received him with honors…” (A.P. Kazhdan, Vneshnepoliticheskoe polozhenie imperii v seredine IX-seredine X veka, p. 191; italics mine.—Z.P.). 72 H. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 198. 73 See: A.N. Ter-Gevondyan, op. cit., p. 244. 74 See: Ibid., p. 245. 75 See: Ibidem. 76 The visit of the Georgian curopalates to Constantinople was described by Pseudo-Symeon Magister (for more detail, see: A.P. Kazhdan, “Khronika Symeona Logofeta” (the Logothetenchronik), Vizantiysky vremennik, Vol. XV, Moscow, 1959, pp. 132-138) and by Continuatus of George Hamartolos’ “Chronicle” (for more detail, see commentaries by Academician S.G. Kaukhchishvili to the work by Theophanes Continuatus Georgika. Information of Byzantine Writers about Georgia…, pp. 331-333, footnote). Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 137 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the new Georgian leader77 at the imperial court.78 It should be said that the new curopalates did not receive the title of King of “the Kartvelians” which had belonged to his father and which was be- stowed on David Bagrationi, his brother.79

On the Relations between Constantinople and the Bagrationi of Tao-Klarjeti

Starting in the 920s, Constantinople consistently refused to grant the high Byzantine court title of curopalates to the king of “the Kartvelians” to avoid concentration of power in the hands of one member of the House of Bagrationi.80 For this reason, none of the later curopalates—Sumbat I Bagrationi († 958), Adarnase III († 961), or Adarnase IV († 983)—was titled the king of “the Kartvelians.”81 This proves that from the very beginning the Byzantine rulers were irritated with the national institution of sovereign state (royal) power in Georgia and that earlier (at the turn of the 890s), it appeared contrary to the will of the Byzantine emperor and without his permission.82 This also explains why the imperial leaders persisted in their rejection of the royal status of the kings of “the Kartvelians” and avoided giving the Georgian kings (and even the kings of united Georgia) the title of basileus. In short, inside the Georgian political expanse, the king of “the Kartvelians” was regarded (al- beit formally) as the head of the House of Bagrationi, whereas outside it, in Byzantium, the current curopalates was regarded as such. On the whole, the empire skillfully manipulated the court titles, including the title of curopalates, and arranged the titles as it saw fit. The title of curopalates meant that its bearer was a vassal of the empire who enjoyed special favors and honors bestowed on him by Constantinople,83 and, to a certain extent, it raised his political rating. Nevertheless, the Byzantine Empire did not carry much political weight inside the Iberian curopalates-dom. From time to time, members of the House of Bagrationi openly resisted the em- pire’s encroachments on their sovereignty. The Bagrationis’ refusal to obey became obvious under (919-944) when imperial powers tried to seize Ketseon, a badly needed toe- hold against Theodosiopolis (Erzurum)84 built by Emperor Theodosius (408-450) (captured by the

77 In his work Theophanes Continuatus did not specify who was meant by “Ivir curopalates” who had visited the cap- ital of the empire in 922-923; Academician Kaukhchishvili, however, who relied on his painstaking analysis of information supplied by the Byzantine chronicler arrived at a well-justified conclusion that it was Ashot Bagrationi, son of curopalates Adarnase (see: Theophanes Continuatus, Georgika. Information of Byzantine Writers about Georgia…, pp. 330-331, foot- note). Prominent Russian student of Byzantium Ya. Lyubarsky who published the Russian translation of the “Chronicle” of Theophanes Continuatus was of the same opinion (see: Prodolzhatel Feofana, Zhizneopisanie vizantiyskikh tsarey, p. 250. On the work of Theophanes Continuatus see also: A.P. Kazhdan, “Iz istorii Vizantiyskoy khronografii X v. 1. O sostave tak nazyvaemoy ‘Khroniki Prodolzhatelya Feofana,’” Vizantiyskiy vremennik, Vol. XIX, Moscow, 1961, pp. 76-96). 78 See: Prodolzhatel Feofana, Zhizneopisanie vizantiyskikh tsarey, pp. 249-250. 79 See: M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gosudarstv,” p. 323. 80 See: Ibidem. 81 See: Ibidem. 82 See: Z. Papaskiri, “Establishment of the Institution of the ‘King of Kartvelians’ and Some Problems of the Rela- tionships between Byzantine and Tao-Klarjeti,” in: Jubilee Days of Academician Ilya Vekua, The Sukhumi Branch of the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Abstracts of Papers Presented at the Scientific Conference, Tbilisi, 1995, p. 75; idem, “Specifying the Foreign Policy Orientation of the ‘Abkhazian’ Kingdom,” p. 330; M. Lordkipanidze, Z. Pa- paskiri, “Emergence of New Kingdoms-Princedoms in Georgia and Their Place in International Relations. Internal Di- plomacy (9th-first quarter of the 10th century),” in: Essays on the History of Georgian Diplomacy, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1998, pp. 191-193 (all in Georgian). 83 See: D. Obolensky, “The Principles and Methods of Byzantine Diplomacy,” in: XII Congres Internationale D’Etudes Byzantines, Ochride, 1961. Rapports II, p. 58; M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gos- udarstv,” p. 323. 84 See: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., pp. 417-418; Note 16, Chapter 45, available at [http://www. vostlit.info/Texts/rus11/Konst_Bagr_ 2/text45.phtml?id=6402]. 138 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Arabs in the mid-7th century). From that time on, the issue figured prominently on the Byzantine Eastern political agenda.85 Late in the 9th century, it acquired special urgency; in 895, Byzantium made a failed attempt to recapture the city; in 901-902, it twice tried to drive the Sarrasins out without much success.86 The Byzantine leaders obviously needed Ketseon.87 Here is the story told by Constantine Por- phyrogennetos: “Ruler Leo, the basileus88 and Ruler Roman89 and our royal dignity, many times tried to capture the fortress of Ketseon so as to bring their troops” [into it] … “and they tried to convince the curopalates and his brothers90 that as soon as Theodosiopolis was taken they would have the for- tress back. The Ivirs (Iberians) refused because they liked the people who lived in Theodosiopolis91 and did not want to see it plundered. They objected to Ruler Roman and all our royalty: ‘If we do this we shall dishonor ourselves in the eyes of our neighbors, for example, the Magister and Exousiastes [ruler] of Avasgia,92 Vasparakanite,93 and the rulers of the Armenians.94 They might start saying that the basileus treats all Ivirs, as well as the curopalates and his brothers, as ungodly people; he does not trust them and, therefore, took the fortress away from them. It would be much better if the basileus dispatched a turmarches95 or a basiliscus to install himself in the fortress of Ketseon and supervise it.” Unwilling to see Theodosiopolis plundered or, more likely, not to interrupt the bread supplies, they disobeyed and never surrendered the fortress, despite the written promises that it would be returned to them as soon as Theodosiopolis was captured.96

85 For more detail, see: A.N. Ter-Gevondyan, “Pervy etap obrazovaniya arabskoy pogranichnoy oblasti (assugur),” in: Kavkaz i Vizantiya, Issue 2, Erevan, 1980, pp. 21-27. 86 See: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit. 87 The exact site of the fortress remains unknown. At one time, Academician Brosset wrote that the fortress Ket- seon of Constantine Porphyrogennetos was the Georgian town of Kajta kalaki (“the town of kajes, forest deities, demons) on the River Chakvistskali or Artaani, or more likely Tsunda (M. Brosset, Additions et eclaircissements a l”Histoire de la Georgie, St.-Petersburg, 1851, p. 146). P.I. Ingorokva identified Keteson with “Kajta kalaki,” but placed it on the south- ern borders of Georgia in the upper part of the Euphrates Gorge, on the so-called Kartli Route (later known as “Gurji- Bogaz” (P.I. Ingorokva, Georgi Merchule, Georgian Writer of the 10th Century, Tbilisi, 1954, p. 61, in Georgian). Acad- emician Kaukhchishvili placed Ketseon in about the same locality (at Ash-kala) (Constantine Porphyrogennetos, “De ad- ministrando Imperio,” in: Georgika. Information of Byzantine Writers about Georgia, p. 266). According to well-known Belgian student of Byzantium E. Honigman, Ketseon was close to “Kartlis-keli (Turkish Gurji-Bogaz) on the road leading from Theodosiopolis” to Tao within the domains of the Iberian Bagratides (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 418, Note 18, Chapter 45). E. Danielyan believes that the fortress was situated in the village of Kes, to the west of Ar- zurum (E. Danielyan, “Lokalizatsiya krepostey Kets i Mazdat,” Vestnik obshchestvennykh nauk, No. 8, 1976, pp. 75-76; Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit.). 88 Emperor Leo VI the Philosopher (886-912). 89 Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos (919-944), co-ruler of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos. 90 The crowned scholar did not mention the curopalates by name, but there is a well-justified opinion that the refer- ence is to Ashot (son of Adarnase II) and his brothers David, Bagrat, and Sumbat (Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 418, Note 20, Chapter 45). It should be said that recently historians believed that the reference was to Adarnase II himself (see: Z. Papaskiri, “The Georgian Political World in the ‘Byzantine Commonwealth’ (First Half of the 10th Century),” in: Is- toriani. Collection of Scholarly Papers Dedicated to the 70th Birthday of Roin Metreveli, Tbilisi, 2009, p. 171, in Georgian). 91 In another part of his work Constantine Porphyrogennetos pointed out that “the Iberians preserved their love and friendship with the people who lived in Theodosiopolis, Avnikiot, Mantsikierts, and all of Persia” (see: Konstantin Ba- gryanorodny, op. cit., p. 197). 92 The reference probably is to well-known Western Georgian leader, Giorgi II, King of the Abkhazians (922-957) (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 418, Note 21, Chapter 45). 93 Some think that this refers to King Gagik I Arzruni of Vaspurakan (908-943) (Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 418, Note 22, Chapter 45). 94 Reference is to the Ani Bagratides (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, p. 418, Note 23, Chapter 45). 95 Commander of a turma (squadron) “part of the military contingent of a province who was also commandant of that part of the military-administrative unit in which his turma is stationed” (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 418, Note 24, Chapter 45) (for more detail, see: V.V. Kuchma, “Obespechenie bezopasnosti vyzantiyskoy armii v voennykh kam- paniyakh kontsa X veka,” in: V.V. Kuchma, Voennaya organizatsiya Vizantiyskoy imperii, St. Petersburg, 2001, p. 345). 96 See: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., pp. 197-199; Constantine Porphyrogennetos, op. cit., pp. 265-266. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 139 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The disagreements over the fortress revealed much more important border disagreements be- tween the empire and the Georgian Bagratides. The Basean area moved to the fore in a diplomatic contention: the Georgian curopalates insisted on his right to “the entire Phasiana and the fortress of Avnik … because he possessed the chrysobulls of blessed Basileus Romanos and our kingliness. He sent the document to us with Protospatharius Zurvanel,97 his azat.”98 After scrutinizing the docu- ments, the Byzantines dismissed them as “having no power” because the chrysobull of Emperor Ro- manos I Lekapenos contained merely a “promise of the curopalates, who confirmed it with an oath signed in his own hand to remain loyal to our royal dignity, fight our enemies, defend our friends, capture fortresses, and perform other feats to please us.” In turn, Romanos I Lekapenos promised that “if he (the curopalates.—Z.P.) remains as loyal and as reasonable as he is today, then he and his rel- atives will preserve their power and their domination while [the basileus] will not change his borders but preserve them in conformity with the agreements with the previous basileuses and will not violate his borders.”99 The Byzantine rulers insisted that they had never tried to push the Georgian leader “out of the old territory of his country.”100 Moreover, Constantinople preferred the curopalates to remain in pow- er and to “dominate” those “places of the Agaryans” which “he himself or his relative Adranase,”101 a magister, had conquered or would conquer “using their own resources.”102 On the other hand, Con- stantinople was of a different opinion about the territories which the Georgian curopalates “had not conquered using his own resources,” namely Theodosiopolis, Avnik, and Mastat,103 because they were situated “on this side of the River Erax, that is, Phasis”…104 Constantine Porphyrogennetos pointed out that “the basileus and his army repeatedly routed it … burnt down its villages, while the curopalates never plundered it. After its villages had been devastated by our kingly troops, the Ivirs stole up, captured them, and tried to seize the fortress... When Theodosiopolis was taken, the Ivirs approached [Mastat] and captured it. Therefore, they had no grounds for demanding the fortresses of Mastat and Avnik (italics mine.—Z.P.).”105 Learned Emperor Constantine Porphyrogennetos pushed these arguments aside: since “the curopalates is a loyal and true slave and friend” of the empire, Byzantium should meet him halfway and “in accordance with his request establish the border along the Erax, that is, Phasis.”106 He suggested that the Georgians acquire “the left side, in the direction of Iviria [Iberia],” while “the right side, which looks toward Theodosiopolis and the fortress and villages,” should remain in Byzantine possession. Constan- tine Porphyrogennetos concludes the passage by stressing once more that “true … right does not justify the curopalates’ claims either to the lands on this side of the river or on the other side,” since “it was our kingly troops which took the Theodosiopolians prisoner and burned the land; at no time did the Ivirs

97 Some think that Zurvanel (Chordvanel-Chorchaneli), mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogennetos, was father of well-known Georgian military and Church figure of the latter half of the 10th century John-Tornike (see: Constantine Por- phyrogennetos, op. cit., pp. 267-268). It should be said that V.A. Arutyunova-Fidanyan was wrong when she tendentious- ly wrote that he belonged to the Armenian (Chalcedonian) creed (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., pp. 418-420, Note 26, Chapter 45). 98 See: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 199. 99 Ibidem. 100 Ibidem. 101 This refers to curopalates Adarnase († 961) (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 420, Note 29, Chap- ter 45). 102 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, op. cit., p. 269. 103 According to researchers, Mastat/Mastaton was a fortress to the east of Erzerum (see: Konstantin Bagryanorod- ny, op. cit., pp. 420-421, Note 30, Chapter 45; for more detail, see: E. Danielyan, op. cit, pp. 79-80). 104 As was correctly pointed out in many publications, in this case “the Arax is not confused with the Phasis (Rio- ni)” and that “on its upper reaches,” the Arax “was called the Basen (Fasianh)” (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 421, Note 31, Chapter 45). 105 Ibid., p. 201. 106 Ibidem. 140 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION move against Theodosiopolis and plunder it without our troops. At all times they treated the Theodosi- opolians as friends and traded with them. They only talked about capturing Theodosiopolis, but never wanted this. I have written that our kingly troops, acting out of love for the curopalates, wanted to make the River Erax, or Phasis, the border between the sides. This means that [the Ivirs] should be satisfied with these domains and not demand more107 (italics mine.—Z.P.).” According to Constantine Porphyrogennetos’ fairly long story, the Georgian Bagratides won the diplomatic contention with Constantinople on the border issue. Guided by political considera- tions, the Byzantine leaders pushed aside the weighty legal arguments in favor of good relations with the Georgians, who thus acquired parts of the Basean area. The “diplomatic scandal” around the fortress of Artanuji was more confirmation that the Bagrati- des of Tao-Klarjeti were fairly independent of the empire. It all started when one of the Bagratides (Ashot known as Kiskas)108 decided to transfer the fortress to the Byzantine emperor because of hostile relations with his son-in-law Gurgen. It seems that Romanos I Lekapenos tried to profit from this; his instructed one of the top-ranking nobles—patricius and drungarius of the fleet Proto- spatharius Constantine—who was expected to dress Ivir Kurkeny,109 another member of the House of Bagratides, “in the gown of a magister” in the name of the emperor, and had to travel to Tao-Klarjeti for this purpose—“to urgently go to Patricius Asoty … and accept his fortress of Ardanutsi.”110 Protospatharius Constantine hastened to fulfill this mission; “he entered … the fortress of Pat- ricius Asoty” and, with suitable ceremonies, hoisted the banner of the empire over the fortress of Ar- tanuji. In this way, “everyone learned that Patricius Asoty … had presented the fortress of Ardanutsi to the basileus.”111 Constantine Porphyrogennetos wrote that “as soon as they saw this, the Ivirs and Magister Kurkeny and Magister David, brother of curopalates Asoty, wrote to the basileus: ‘If Your Majesty agrees to this and your kingly troops move into the interior of our country, we shall stop serv- ing Your Majesty and ally with the Sarrasins since we can wage battles and wars against the Eastern Romans. If forced, we might move our troops against the fortress of Ardanutsi, as well as against its environs and the Eastern Roman Empire itself112 (italics mine.—Z.P.).” This diplomatic demarche of the Georgian Archons proved successful: the emperor, who feared that the Georgians might “ally with the Sarrasins and move the Persian troops against the Eastern Roman Empire,” decided to retreat and shifted the blame to his envoy who had allegedly acted “according his own wrong decision.”113 This was followed by another “order (of the emperor.—Z.P.) full of insults and threats.” The emperor or- dered Patricius Constantine to immediately leave the fortress together with “Asoty, son of late curopalates Adranase, and bring him to Constantinople to confer on him his father’s title of curopalates.” After receiving the order, the imperial envoy immediately “left Patricius Asoty … in his fortress of Ardanutsi … took Asoty, son of curopalates Adranase, and brought him to the city where the basileus made him curopalates.”114

107 Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., pp. 201-203. 108 Kiskasi (Georgian), lively, animated (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 422, Note 4, Chapter 46, avail- able at [http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus11/Konst_Bagr_2/text46.phtml?id=6403]). 109 This person is usually associated with Gurgen eristavt-eristavi († 941), a well-known member of the House of Bagrationi mentioned above. In around 918, he became the main rival of King Adarnase II of the Kartvelians. Academi- cian S.N. Janashia, in turn, did an excellent job, which allowed him to prove absolutely correctly and beyond any doubt that Kurkeny of Constantine Porphyrogennetos was eristavt-eristavi Gurgen (see: S.N. Janashia, “Information Supplied by Constantine Porphyrogennetos about the Bagrationi of Tao-Klarjeti,” in: Proceedings, Vol. V, Tbilisi, 1987, pp. 258-266, in Georgian). 110 Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 205. 111 Ibid., p. 207. 112 Ibid., p. 209. 113 Ibid., p. 211. 114 Ibidem. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 141 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

This settled the crisis.115 The attempt of the Byzantine leaders to acquire Artanuji, a point of key importance in Georgia and the Transcaucasus,116 failed. This means that the Byzantine Empire carried little political weight in Georgia; its influence was obviously not enough to dispose of the Georgian territories as it wanted. Academician Javakhishvili was quite right when he wrote that dependence on the empire had been purely formal and that the relations between Byzantium and the Georgian states looked more like an alliance between senior and junior kingdoms than political dependence.117 In- deed the fact that Constantinople dispatched officials (in particular patriciuses) on diplomatic mis- sions to Georgia speaks of the high degree of sovereignty of the Georgian Bagratides. Such missions were only sent to sovereign states.118 This should not be taken to mean that Tao-Klarjeti was completely independent of Constantino- ple.119 Academician Javakhishvili’s formula “an alliance of senior and junior kingdoms” aptly de- scribed the situation. Even if the entire Georgian political expanse (the Kingdom of “the Abkhaz- ians,” the Kakhetian Chorepiscopal state, and Ereti)120 could not be regarded as part of the Byzantine Commonwealth, the Kingdom of “the Kartvelians,” was seen as such.

Certain Aspects of the Relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Kingdom of “the Abkhazians” in the First Half of the 10th Century

Byzantium demonstrated even more caution when dealing with the Kingdom of “the Abkhaz- ians,” and with good reason. As distinct from the Tao-Klarjeti alliance formed by Ashot Bagrationi, this political unity took shape amid sharp confrontation with the Byzantine Empire.121 Throughout the 9th century the relations between the “Abkhazian” Kingdom and Byzantium remained strained

115 Academician Javakhishvili, in turn, dated this event to 923-944 (see: I.A. Javakhishvili, “History of the Geor- gians,” Book II, in: I.A. Javakhishvili, Works, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 1983, p. 112, in Georgian). Today, it seems that P.I. In- gorokva supplied a more exact date (see: P.I. Ingorokva, op. cit., pp. 62, 102). In his work, Constantine Porphyrogennetos clearly pointed out that the members of the House of Bagrationi were fighting for the title of curopalates after the death of Adarnase II curopalates (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 207) and that his son Ashot received his title when the incident had been settled (see: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., p. 211). This means that this event took place no later than 922-923. 116 Constantine Porphyrogennetos pointed to the strategic, commercial, and economic value of Artanuji, the center of Tao-Klarjeti and residence of Ashot Bagrationi, who founded this new Georgian political entity. “The fortress of Arda- nutsi is very strong; it offers a big rebate like a small town. Goods from Trabzon, Iviria, Avasgia, from all the Armenian countries, and from are brought here and the fortress profits hugely from this. The environs of the fortress of Arda- nutsi, which is called Artsi, are vast and fertile; they are the key to Iviria, Avasgia, and the Miskhi” (see: Konstantin Ba- gryanorodny, op. cit., p. 205). 117 See: I.A. Javakhishvili, op. cit., p. 112. P.I. Ingorokva was of the same opinion (see: P.I. Ingorokva, op. cit., pp. 58-68). 118 See: Z.V. Udaltsova, op. cit., p. 253. 119 For more detail, see: Sh.A. Badridze, “From the History of the Political Structure of the ‘Kartvelian Kingdom,’” in: Proceedings of the Tbilisi State University, Vol. 113, Tbilisi, 1965, pp. 255-261 (in Georgian). 120 In this respect, the title of Patricius, which belonged to King Adarnase of Ereti in the early 10th century, speaks volumes (see: “Matiane Kartlisa,” p. 264; Letopis Kartli, p. 52; M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gosudarstv,” p. 227). This means that although the Byzantine emperors hardly possessed real power in the East Georgian political units (the Kakhetian Chorepiscopal state and the Kingdom of Ereti), they still tried in one way or another to reg- ister their imperial ambitions when dealing with these states. 121 For more detail, see: S.N. Janashia, “On the Time and Conditions of the Emergence of the Abkhazian King- dom,” in: Proceedings, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 1952, pp. 331-333; Z.V. Anchabadze, op. cit, pp. 104-105. 142 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and far from simple; in any case, there are no signs that the empire affected the political processes in Western Georgia in any noticeable way. From time to time, the interests of Constantinople and Kutai- si coincided; in some cases, the two states even acted together. This all changed around the 880s when Crown Prince Bagrat regained the throne of the king of “the Abkhazians” with the empire’s active military and diplomatic support.122 There is every reason to believe that good-neighborly or even allied relations survived under King Konstantine III of “the Abkhazians” (893-922), who succeeded Bagrat I on the throne. This is confirmed by the fact that the “Abkhazian” Kingdom acquired Church sovereignty; “the Abkhazian” Catholicosate appeared, which was independent of the Constantinople Patriarchate. It seems that this happened at the request of the Abkhazian side against the background of the much warmer relations between Byzantium and Western Georgia established when Bagrat I ascended the throne. This was the first tangible result of political cooperation between Kutaisi and Constantinople.123 The process continued in the 920s-950s; this is confirmed by information extracted from letters written by Patriarch of Constantinople Nicholas the Mystic to the Georgian leaders, the kings of the Abkhazians among them. The letters to Exousiastes of Abasgia124 are seemingly addressed to one per- son—Grigor (King Giorgi II of “the Abkhazians”). Some think that at least one letter (No. 51) was ad- dressed to Konstantine III, father of Giorgi II.125 Those who think so argue that the Patriarch of Constan- tinople applied the term “exousiastes” (ruler or potentate) and “splendid exousiastes” only to the king of “the Abkhazians.”126 Historians have drawn our attention to the fact that the title exousiastes was higher than archon and that it was applied to closer political allies. The Greeks regarded exousiastis as repre- sentatives of Byzantine power in their countries.127 At the same time, Byzantine diplomats deemed it necessary, for political considerations, to recognize the “royal dignity” of the West Georgian leader.128 The so-called keleusis (orders) can be viewed as more confirmation of the high rating of the Kutaisi throne. The Byzantine emperors sent them to the rulers of neighboring countries; the orders to the “exousiastes of Abasgia” were addressed to the “Devout Ruler and Splendid Exousiastes of Abas- gia”129 and stamped with a gold bulla of two gold soliduses.130 A similar bulla was invariably attached to the keleusis sent to the “Majestic (Ýíäïîüôáïôïí) Curopalates of Iberia.”131 This means that the emperor treated the leaders of the two main Georgian political units more or less equally, therefore it is not quite right to say that the empire treated the kings of “the Abkhazians,” “who had a fundamentally different value”132 in the eyes of the emperors, differently from the Iberian

122 See: “Matiane Kartlisa,” p. 261; Letopis Kartli, p. 51 (see also: Z. Papaskiri, “Specifying the Foreign Policy Ori- entation of the ‘Abkhazian’ Kingdom,” pp. 325-335; idem, I vosstala Gruzia ot Nikopsii do Darubanda, pp. 184-195). 123 For more detail, see: Z. Papaskiri, “On the Chronology of the Establishment of the Abkhazian Catholicosate,” in: Shota Meskhia—90, Jubilee Collection Dedicated to the 90th Birthday of Shota Meskhia, Tbilisi, 2006, pp. 201-213 (in Georgian); the same publication can be found in: Z. Papaskiri, I vosstala Gruzia…, pp. 171-183. 124 Georgika. Information of Byzantine Writers about Georgia, pp. 212-218. 125 See: C. Toumanoff, “Chronology of the King of Abasgia,” Le Museon, No. 69, 1956, p. 81; Nicholas I Patri- arch of Constantinople. Letters, Washington. Text and Translation by R.J.H. Jenkins & L.G. Westerinck in: Corpus Fon- tium Historiae Byzantinae. VI. Washington, 1973. Ñ. 547—549; I.Sh. Agrba, Vzaimootnosheniya Abkhazskogo tsarstva i Vizantii (konets VIII-X vv.), Synopsis of the PhD thesis, Moscow, 1989, p. 7; E.K. Ajinjal, Iz istorii Abkhazskoi gos- udarstvennosti, Sukhumi, 1996, p. 31. 126 I.A. Javakhishvili, op. cit., p. 110; M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gosudarstv,” p. 297. 127 See: Ibidem. 128 See: Georgika. Information of Byzantine Writers, p. 217; M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodal- nykh gosudarstv,” p. 297. 129 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, op. cit., p. 292. 130 See: Constantine Porphyrogennetos, op. cit.; M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gos- udarstv,” p. 298. 131 Constantine Porphyrogennetos, op. cit., p. 291; M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gos- udarstv,” p. 298. 132 M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Emergence of New Feudal Principalities,” in: Essays on the History of Georgia, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 1973, p. 435 (in Georgian). Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 143 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION curopalates. The “Abkhazians” were treated as independent rulers. As an argument in favor of the above, the fact that the members of the House of Bagrationi were “merely called archons (princes)” and “were awarded with Byzantine court titles”133 is not very convincing. I am convinced that the title of curopalates did not lower the authority of the leaders of the “Kartvelian” Kingdom: it added to their authority inside and outside the country. It has been proven by documents that the kings of “the Ab- khazians” never declined Byzantine court titles, however, strange as it may seem, none of them was honored with the title of curopalates. Here is a tale-telling fact: the most powerful of the Kutaisi rul- ers, King Giorgi II of “the Abkhazians” (922-957), to whom I referred above, was mentioned only as a magister.134 The title “Devout Ruler and Splendid Exousiastes of Abasgia” was not higher than “Majestic Curopalates of Iberia.” In short, while the Kutaisi throne had more sovereignty than other Georgian units, Constantino- ple treated the Bagrationi as more important which is confirmed by the title of curopalates being re- peatedly conferred on members of this dynasty as the leaders of the Georgian political expanse. This issue could have been passed over in silence; however, the quasi-scholarly speculations of some of our Abkhazian colleagues made this impossible. Historian Ermolay Ajinjal, well known for his anti- Georgian sentiments, insists that the Kingdom of “the Abkhazians” was an Abkhazian national state and refers to A. Kolautz when writing that “the rank of the kings of Abazgia was higher than that of the rulers of Iberia (italics mine.—Z.P.).”135 This does not mean that I refuse to admit that King Giorgi II of “the Abkhazians”was a powerful monarch. In the 920s-950s, he was the recognized leader of the Georgian political world and boldly interfered in the political processes in Eastern Georgia; in this way, he not only finally added Shida Kartli to his domains, but also established a de facto diktat of the Kutaisi throne over the Kakheti and Ereti. At that time, “the Abkhazian” Kingdom controlled the Northern Caucasus, which explains why the Byzantine rulers, probably with good reason, gave the “Devout Ruler and Splendid Exousiastes of Abasgia” the credit for Christianizing the Alans-Ossets. According to what Nicholas the Mystic wrote, the imperial leaders consulted Giorgi II about other important foreign policy problems (unrelated to the region) and took his opinion into account. “As for what you wrote about the Bulgarians,” he wrote to King Giorgi, “I do not know what sort of Divine Will guides (the king of Bulgarians.—Z.P.), who still remains devoted to perfidious enmity and does not seek peace (italics mine.—Z.P.).”136 In the late 9th century, the Byzantine Empire had serious complications in its relations with Bulgaria, the ambitious leader of which, Simeon I, not only declared sovereignty, but also claimed the imperial throne. Nicholas the Mystic was directly involved in the conflict settlement; he called on the Bulgarian king to discontinue resistance and accept the emperor’s supreme power.137 The empire lost the battle; Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos had not only to recognize the sovereignty of the Bulgarian state, but also accept the royal status of Peter, who ascended the throne after Simeon I.138 The very fact that the Patriarch of Constantinople, the main architect of imperial foreign policy, discussed vi-

133 M.D. Lordkipanidze, “Vozniknovenie novykh feodalnykh gosudarstv,” p. 298. 134 See: Konstantin Bagryanorodny, op. cit., pp. 197, 203; Constantine Porphyrogennetos, op. cit., pp. 264, 277. 135 See: E.K. Ajinjal, op. cit., p. 14. 136 Georgika. Information of Byzantine Writers…, pp. 216-217. 137 According to the Patriarch of Constantinople, “the western (that is, Balkan) lands belong to East Romans’ pow- er, which means that the Bulgarians usurped them and, in violation of the law and in defiance of justice, temporarily took them away from the empire. Today, Simeon has gone even farther—he challenged the person chosen by God and the kingdom of God. Therefore he should be severely punished as a tyrant and a rebel; he can be destroyed even though he belongs to the same faith” (G.G. Litavrin, “Politicheskaya teoriya v Vizantii…,” p. 76). Nicholas the Mystic was still peacefully disposed and called for an end to the “fratricidal war,” whereby he considered it mandatory that “the relations between the empire and Bulgaria should be such that the supremacy and priority of the power of the basileus would cause no harm” (ibid., p. 76). 138 For more on the relations between Byzantium and Bulgaria, see: G.G. Litavrin, Bolgaria i Vizantitya v XI-XII vv., Moscow, 1960, pp. 254-255; A.P. Kazhdan, “Vneshnepoliticheskoe polozhenie imperii v seredine IX-seredine X veka,” pp. 198-200. 144 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tally important military and political issues with King Giorgi II of “the Abkhazians” is one of the best proofs of the high authority of this outstanding West Georgian leader outside his own country.

Conclusion

The above has proven that, at the turn of the 10th century, the Georgian political world was fairly closely connected with the Byzantine Empire and regarded as part of the Byzantine oecumene, or the Byzantine Commonwealth. This did not mean, however, that the Georgian leaders, either of the House of Bagrationi or the kings of “the Abkhazians,” were nothing more than common vassals of the Byzantine emperors. There are grounds to say that relations with the empire developed within the framework of “an alliance of senior and junior kingdoms,” although the Georgian political leaders pursued independent policies which frequently clashed with the empire’s interests in the East.

Parvin DARABADI

D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at the International Relations Chair of Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE GEOHISTORICAL PRINCIPLES AND SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN THE MUSLIM EAST AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat; But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth! Joseph Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) The Ballad of East and West

Abstract

his article attempts to examine sever- lution of the military-political systems in the T al aspects of the geohistorical princi- Muslim East and the Christian West. It trac- ples and specific features of the evo- es the historical roots from which these sys- Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 145 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tems stemmed in the Middle Ages and in East in the context of the dynamics of the Modern and Recent History. It analyzes the geopolitical changes in the correlation of experience of the many-century military- forces on the world arena over the past political standoff between the West and the one-and-a-half millennia.

Introduction

The dramatic events of the first decade of the 21st century evoked by the failure of the so-called multi-culturalism policy in Europe, the subsequent intensification of anti-Islamic and anti-Christian trends in the societies of several leading countries of the West and East, and the terrorist acts carried out by both Christian and Muslim extremist forces have revived the conflict between these two major civilizational-religious communities, their ideologies, and their values. Certain events in Christian Europe and the Muslim East have brought into clear relief Huntington’s intercivilizational clashes, which are fraught with much greater danger for the whole of mankind than even a potential military clash between nuclear powers. Along with this, in the new century, an entirely new sociopolitical global phenomenon is emerging—geoterrorism—the brain child of geopolitics of the 21st century, whereby the methods of conducting armed conflict engaged in by the international terrorist structures and the antiterrorist coalitions opposing them differ little from each other. It is enough to observe the military-political processes unfolding in the first decade of the current century in Iraq and Afghani- stan, as well as in the past year in the Arab East. All of this prompts us to turn to the past and examine the previous multi-century period of West- East confrontation, particularly since ominous signs of the revival of crusades and clashes of civiliza- tions are becoming evident in the new century. This might mean that a global political collapse could happen much sooner than a planetary environmental disaster.

The Historical Roots of the Military-Political Systems in the Muslim East and the Christian West

One of the most important components of historical development in the Muslim East and the Christian West over the almost one-and-a-half millennia covering the Middle Ages, as well as Mod- ern and Recent History, has been the formation and enhancement of their military-political systems. Whereas the military organization of the leading Christian countries of medieval Europe was formed on the basis of the ancient Greek and Roman military systems, military affairs in the countries of the Muslim East throughout the entire Middle Ages developed on the basis of the military experience of the previous two millennia, in particular, that relating to the Assyrian-Median, Byzantine-Persian, and Hun-Turkic military systems. In so doing, it synthesized to a certain extent the main elements of the three largest military systems of this era—the Arabian, Persian, and Mongol-Turkic.1 At the same time, specific local sociopolitical, socioeconomic, national-ethnic, and cultural- psychological features left their mark on the development of the military systems of the largest states of the Muslim East—the Arabian Caliphate and then the Timurid, Ottoman, and Safavid empires, the religious factor being a pivotal element.

1 See: E.A. Razin, Istoriia voennogo iskusstva, in 3 volumes, Vol. 2, OOO Izdatelstvo Poligon, St. Petersburg, 1999, pp. 109-123, 203-211, 226-248. 146 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Islam, which came into being at the beginning of the 7th century on the Arabian Peninsula, was, according to 19th century German military historian Hans Delbrück, a “military-political organiza- tion of the people”2 in the Middle Ages, and the main principles of jihad, as well as the moral-ethnic standards for carrying it out set forth in the holy Koran, became the solid ideological base that ensured the grandiose victories of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates and subsequently blended intrinsical- ly into the military systems of the medieval Muslim states of the East, primarily the states of the Tur- kic Seljuks and the Timurid, Ottoman, and Safavid empires. Throughout the Middle Ages, the Muslim East was the only civilized neighbor of Christian Europe. The entire Middle Ages passed in the grips of almost continuous military-political confron- tation between these two civilizational-religious unions. By the time the European crusaders reached the Middle East at the end of the 11th century, Islam had already succeeded in embodying elements of the three main military-political systems of the East: the Arabian, Persian, and Turkic, each of which made its contribution to building the strength of Islamic warfare. The high efficiency of the Eastern military system was demonstrated during the crusades of the 11th-13th centuries when despite several initial impressive achievements, they generally ended in failure for the West. It is no accident that this was the time when several European countries created their own military-religious organizations—monastic-knightly orders that existed right up until the 16th century. It was light cavalry, firearms, and several tactical improvements that came to the West through the East. The appearance in the Middle East of a new powerful military-political force in the form of the Turkic Seljuks at the beginning of the 11th century, and then of the Turko-Mongols at the beginning of the 13th century, made a significant contribution to improving the military systems of several large states of this region which ultimately became a driving force for four centuries, beginning with the 14th century right up until the 17th century, in the Timurid, Ottoman, and Safavid empires. They in- trinsically united the main elements of the essentially kindred desert Arab and steppe Turkish military organizations. The Arab-Turkic military system predominated throughout the Muslim East right up until the Early Modern Period. As in the Arabian East, religious and military factors merged in these military systems, making it possible for them to exert relatively strong military-political pressure on the countries of the West over the span of three centuries, in the 14th-16th centuries. In particular, the military power of the Ottoman Empire reached such a level in the 16th century that the leading war-torn countries of West- ern Europe were only able to withstand them due to the contradictions between the leading powers of the medieval East—the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Dynasty. In turn, the real Turkish threat to Europe in the 15th-16th centuries prompted several Christian states—Venice, Portugal, Spain, England, the Papacy, the German states, etc.—to create an anti-Ot- toman military-political coalition with the Muslim states of Aq Qoyunlu, and then with the Safavids, who were trying, in turn, to control the traditional trade routes and, primarily, the Great Silk Road linking China and India with the Western markets. This required gaining access to the Black and Mediterranean seas. In turn, the West was pursuing far-reaching geopolitical goals aimed at creating favorable conditions for imminent colonial expansion in Asia, clashing with each other and, in so doing, weakening the two mighty Eastern monarchies—the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Dynas- ty. What is more, by the end of the 15th century, the Spaniards, by gradually destroying the Arab- Moorish emirates, succeeded in becoming a sufficiently strong centralized state with their own pow- erful ocean fleet on the southwest flank of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula. This created prerequisites for the leading European states, with the help of the strong sea power that formed at this time, to implement a geopolitical strategy called Anaconda that envisaged estab- lishing control over and suffocating the coastal territories of the Afro-Asian countries. These inten- tions were fully implemented as early as the 18th-19th centuries when the capitalist West, on the crest of the industrial revolution, surged far ahead of the hopelessly backward feudal East.

2 H. Delbrück, Istoriia voennogo iskusstva v ramkakh politicheskoi istorii, Vol. III, Moscow, 1938, pp. 149-150. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 147 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Principles and Specific Features of the Military-Political Systems in the West and East in the Early Modern Period

Having rebuffed the onslaught of the Muslim East by the beginning of the 17th century, the Chris- tian West began to gradually take up the military-strategic initiative. The great geographical discoveries radically changed the geopolitical appearance of the world. The development of the main sea trade routes under the control of the Western Europeans led, against the background of the decline of the car- avan trade as a whole, to a breakdown in the traditional trade and economic ties the Middle East had formed over the centuries with both the European countries and with India and China. This was one of the main reasons for the economic and accompanying military-political decline of the entire Muslim East at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries. An important geostrategic factor also played its part: the coun- tries of the Muslim East, which remained at the level of the times of Sinbad the Sailor, did not become the possessors of sea power, which comprised, according to the concept of American Admiral Alfred Mahan, three main components—a naval fleet + a commercial fleet + naval bases, for, as Bernard Carra de Vaux noted at one time, “Muslims … on the whole are not reputed to be great lovers of the sea.”3 Possessing immense sea power by that time, thalassocratic Western Europe, which was relative- ly limited in the spatial respect, was able to win a geopolitical battle against the vast tellurocratic East, which, for several reasons, had fallen into a prolonged stupor, from which it was only aroused by the threatening reverberations of the 20th century. The West’s powerful economic upswing at the beginning of the 17th century, which was prompted by the appearance of large centralized states in Western Europe with relatively stable polit- ical regimes, could not help but also have an impact on the development of the military systems form- ing at that time in the great European powers—England, France, Spain, and Austria, as well as in Prussia and Russia at the beginning of the 18th century. As early as the late Middle Ages, it became utterly clear to Europe that supremacy on the seas was a prerequisite for continental hegemony. The practice of sea battles and major naval expeditions was institutionalized in Europe into targeted development and became an important element of the dynamic striving toward maximum expansion of spheres of influence. It was precisely in the 17th- 18th centuries that sea powers with strong military fleets appeared. The formation of a centralized military organization and regular armies and navies, the possession of high-tech firearms for those times, and the improvement of strategy, tactics, and operational art during the waging of the numer- ous wars in Europe could not help but promote a qualitative increase in the military potential of the leading European nations and, on the whole, gave the West a strategic advantage during the colonial wars in the East. Thus, the East lost to the West primarily in the struggle for supremacy on the seas. At the same time, it was precisely the presence of a large fleet in the Mediterranean that made it pos- sible for the Ottoman Empire to hold out until the beginning of the 20th century. On the whole, the economic backwardness of the Eastern countries designated at that time also had an impact on the development of their military systems, which made it possible for the West European countries to begin legitimate colonial expansion toward the east and the south. When addressing the evolution and enhancement of the military systems in the countries of the Muslim East in the Modern History, it must be noted that although the first attempts were made at the beginning of the 19th century in several Eastern countries, particularly Turkey and Persia, to bring their armed forces into harmony with the advanced European military system, this did not yield the expected effect, which was clearly demonstrated by the numerous Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian wars of the 18th-19th centuries. Possessing strong sea power in the form of the Black Sea and Caspian

3 B. Carra de Vaux, Arabskie geografy, Leningrad, 1941, p. 23. 148 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION naval fleets and advanced military organization for that time in the form of a regular army, Russia was able to establish a niche for itself in the expanses of the Black and Caspian seas and significantly expand the land borders of its empire, bringing the Crimea and Caucasus under its wing, as well as Turkestan in the second half of the 19th century. This was primarily due to the fact that warfare in the Muslim countries of the East at that time did not correspond to the demands of the times since it was still under the direct influence of the ex- isting archaic feudal sociopolitical system. Moreover, the East lagged significantly behind the far advanced leading Western nations, including semi-feudal Russia, in economic and scientific-techni- cal terms. As French Emperor Napoleon I noted in his letter to Persian Shah Fatali written in 1806, although “the people of the East are courageous and gifted, their lack of knowledge in certain skills (meaning the art of war.—P.D.) and careless attitude toward discipline, which increase the power of the armies, are for them a great disadvantage in the war against the North and West.”4 In turn, Frederick Engels emphasized at the end of the 19th century that warfare as expressed in the military doctrines, charters, and directives of the European countries could not in itself change the appearance of the armies of the Eastern countries if the necessary conditions were not available. At the same time, he noted that this, however, did not mean that the Eastern nations could not be taught European tactics. In order to inculcate the European military system in the Eastern nations, it was first necessary to create an officer corps and enlist non-commissioned personnel trained in accordance with the latest European system, free of the old national prejudices and throwbacks, and capable of inspiring the new formations. The experience of forming national armed forces in the countries of the East during the second half of the 20th century clearly confirmed the accuracy of these arguments. When touching on such an important feature as national mentality, including in military affairs, Frederick Engels wrote the following as early as 1857 about the Afghans in particular: “The geo- graphical position of Afghanistan, and the peculiar character of the people, invest the country with a political importance that can scarcely be over-estimated in the affairs of Central Asia… The Afghans are a brave, hardy, and independent race… With them, war is an excitement and relief from the mo- notonous occupation of industrial pursuits. The Afghans are divided into clans, over which the vari- ous chiefs exercise a sort of feudal supremacy. Their indomitable hatred of rule, and their love of in- dividual independence, alone prevents their becoming a powerful nation; but this very irregularity and uncertainty of action makes them dangerous neighbors, liable to be blown about by the wind of caprice, or to be stirred up by political intriguers, who artfully excite their passions.”5 These thoughts were clearly confirmed during the military-political events in Afghanistan in the 20th century and are still pertinent at the beginning of the 21st century.

The 20th Century—A New Stage in the Evolution of the Military-Political Systems in the West and the East

The complete military-technical supremacy of the West over the East achieved by the industrial revolution and by the improvements made in the political systems of the great powers was clearly confirmed in the 20th century. At that time, the specific historical military traditions of the East were manifested during the numerous wars and armed conflicts that went on throughout the past century when the constant attacks on the rear and flanks of the enemy, night raids and ambushes, strikes on

4 Quoted from: Kh.M. Ibrahimbeili, Rossia i Azerbaidzhan v pervoi treti XIX veka (Iz voenno-politicheskoi istorii), Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 85. 5 F. Engels, “Afghanistan,” in: K. Marx, F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 18, Articles for The New American Cy- clopaedia, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 149 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION supply lines and support bases, skillful use of the conditions of mountain and desert locations, and so on comprised the tactics for conducting armed struggle. It was these features that formed the basis of the theory of irregular (petty, partisan) warfare elaborated during the First World War and carried out successfully in practice by British Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence during the Arabs’ military operations against the Turkish army in the desert expanses of Arabia. It is no accident that it was this expert on petty warfare who coined the phrase that “making war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup off a knife.”6 This experience was enriched during several subsequent large and small wars in some of the Muslim countries of Asia and Africa, particularly in Algeria against the French colonial army in the 1950s, in Afghanistan against the Soviet troops in 1980s, and in Somalia against the American troops at the beginning of the 1990s, and proved its high efficiency. A similar situation can also be seen to one extent or another in the antiterrorist NATO operation in Afghanistan against the Taliban. On the whole, the experience of combat action of the armed forces of the countries of the Mus- lim East against foreign invasions over the past few decades shows that the aggressor can only be successfully rebuffed in contemporary conditions if armed formations have reached a high degree of expertise in the use of contemporary weapons, are able to make skilful use of various means for or- ganizing all kinds of progressive fire, as well as stable anti-tank and air defense, have been trained in both immobile defense and delaying action and are able to rapidly switch from one form of combat to another, and, in particular, have the ability to fight in special conditions—at night, on the march, when rebuffing amphibious and vertical assault, and in densely population metropolises. On the whole, the rich experience of waging national liberation wars in Asia and Africa in the 1950s-1980s showed the high efficiency of the three-component structure of military building in these countries—regular troops; local (regional) formations; and partisan and self-defense contin- gents. This structure made it possible to draw the highest number of local residents into combat action against aggressors.7 Rational synthesizing of the time-tested Western and Eastern military systems in several large Muslim countries of the Middle East with significant human and natural resources, huge territories, and a relatively developed industrial-technological base promoted effective development of their military potential. They were able to build their own national armed forces and military industries in compliance with contemporary demands and in keeping with the local conditions that best suited them. At the same time, in the present conditions of the information-technological revolution, even possessing nuclear weapons does not guarantee protection of a country’s sovereignty. As world experience shows, victory is achieved by combat action, that is, an organized armed physical and ideological struggle that has a sufficiently stable political and material-technical base in direct proportion to the availability of economic resources and the state’s sociopolitical structure. In so doing, a strong and stable economy forms the foundation of the military might of any state. Both objective and subjective factors guarantee victory in a war: a more flexible and stable rear, a more powerful economic base, political unity of the people and, consequently, greater persistence, endurance, perseverance in battle, strong moral and ideological foundation of the armed forces, and the people’s strong desire for victory. To this should also be added the best weapons, innovated, trained, and war-experienced command and personnel, as well as the willingness of the soldiers to give their life for their Homeland and nation. Outstanding German military theoretician Carl von Clausewitz noted as early as the beginning of the 19th century that great aims form the spirit of war. He also emphasized that “if the leader is filled with high ambition and if he pursues his aims with audacity and strength of will, he will reach them in spite of all obstacles.”8

6 Quoted from: B.H. Liddel-Hart, Lawrence of Arabia, Da Capo Press, Reprint edition, 22 March, 1989, p. 135. 7 See: Vooruzhennaia borba narodov Afriki za svobodu i nezavisimost, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 374- 375; Vooruzhennaia borba narodov Azii za svobodu i nezavisimost, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 311. 8 K. Clausewitz, O voine, Eksmo, Midgard, Moscow, 2007. 150 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Conclusion

At present, as incidentally in the past, only the fatal split in the Muslim East, in contrast to the Christian West that consolidated into powerful military-political unions after World War II, primarily in the form of NATO, is giving the latter the opportunity to put effective military pressure on several Eastern countries in critical situations. Whereby contemporary high, scientific-intensive, military technology is making it possible for the leading countries of the West to conduct non-contact warfare with as few losses as possible in terms of manpower and materiel.9 The local wars and armed conflicts of the beginning of the 21st century are akin to police operations under the guise of multi-national forces aimed at overthrowing undesirable regimes (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya). In turn, the Muslim East, by rejecting the Western Christian values imposed on it, is trying to preserve its civilizational-value essence, often resorting to so-called asymmetric wars, the avant- garde role in which is played by the forces of international terrorism with their outlandish ideas about a World Caliphate. At the same time, creation of a collective security system in the countries of the Muslim East in the form of military-political blocs or unions like NATO and the EU could promote more successful opposition to the next so-called crusades, i.e. so-called peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, and similar military interventions that often accompany so-called friendly fire, thus ensuring their national security and genuine independence. But for several objective economic and subjective polit- ical reasons, this does not look very likely in the near future, and can even be said to be utopian.

9 See: V.I. Slipchenko, Voiny shestogo pokoleniia. Oruzhie i voennoe iskusstvo budushchego, Veche, Moscow, 2002, pp. 34-38.

Irina BABICH

D.Sc. (Hist.), Leading Research Fellow at the Department of the Caucasus, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation).

WESTERN ADIGHES AND COSSACKS: TOGETHER AND SEPARATELY IN EUROPEAN EMIGRATION (1919-THE 1930S)1

Abstract

he author draws on private archives tween members of the Caucasian ethnici- T of Caucasian emigrants in France to ties (the Western Adighes in particular), on discuss the changing relations be- the one hand, and Russians and Cossacks,

1 I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, France, for the op- portunity to use its archives and libraries in France in 2008-2011. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 151 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION on the other, in 1920-1930s in the context hoped to return with them to their native of European emigration. Dr. Babich dwells land freed from the Bolsheviks. As part of in detail on the Adighes who, having ar- the Caucasian community, the Adighes rived from the Kuban Region, felt a certain were inevitably aware of their kinship with affinity with the . At the those who initially belonged to another po- early stage of their life in emigration they litical camp.

Introduction

The 1917 revolution and Bolshevik power in the Northern Caucasus drove away the huge num- bers of those who lived in the region and refused to continue living there under the new power, includ- ing the Western Adighes from the Kuban Region which they had shared with the Kuban Cossacks. At the early stage of their life abroad they gravitated toward the Kuban Cossacks in the hopes of soon returning home together after the Bolsheviks had been driven away from their land. On the other hand, as part of the Caucasian community, the Adighes were attracted to these ethnically kindred people even though they belonged to a different political camp. This article discusses the relations between the Western Adighes (known at that time as the Kuban mountain-dwellers) and the Kuban Cossacks (residents of the Kuban Region) who found themselves in emigration amid other numerous Cossack groups. This article is based on the materials from several private archives now kept in Paris; descend- ants of Caucasian émigrés carefully preserve the private papers of their ancestors who were forced to emigrate in the 1920s. The record group which contains documents related to the life and activities of Alimardan bek Topcibashi (referred to in Russia and sometimes in Azerbaijan as Topchibashiev/Topchibashev),2 who figured prominently in the public life of the Russian Empire and Azerbaijan, supplied a wealth of interesting information. A lawyer, A. Topchibashev (Tiflis 1862-Paris 1934) actively promoted the modernization of Islamic life in the Caucasus in 1900-1917 as a member of the State Duma and out- side it. As one of the Azeri delegates dispatched to the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) which set up the League of Nations, he found himself in emigration together with the rest of the Azeri delega- tion. When in emigration Alimardan Topchibashev never abandoned his public and political efforts to free Azerbai- jan from Bolshevik power and to preserve it as part of the Russian Empire. Later he promoted the idea of Azerbai- jan’s independence. He was convinced that the shortest route to the desired aim lay through a Confederation of the Peoples and States of the Caucasus (the North Caucasian peoples were also included). This explains why his con- tacts with North Caucasian emigration in France and in Europe in general were close and highly productive. In fact, he was the only representative of the Southern Cauca- sus in European emigration who treated the North Cauca- sian peoples and members of North Caucasian emigration

Photo 1

Alimardan bek Topchibashev (from the Internet).

2 See: “Archives personnelles de Alimardan Topcibasev,” CERCEC, EHESS, par autorisation spéciale. 152 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Photo 2

Aliakber bek Topchibashev (Archive of Alimardan bek Topchibashev, France, Paris).

with respect, attention, warmth, and kindness, which is amply shown by the materials from his archive on which this article is based. The archive of Aliakber bek Topchibashev, the oldest of Alimardan’s three sons (Aliakber born in 1896, Rashid born in 1902, and Enver born in 1912) supplied a lot of in- teresting information about the life and activities of the North Caucasian émigrés in Europe. Educated as an Orien- talist, he remained his father’s most dedicated assistant un- til the latter’s relatively early death in 1934 when he plunged into public and political activities in Paris and close contacts with people from the Northern Caucasus. In fact, his archive revealed extremely interesting documents about the life and activities of the most prominent North Caucasian emigrants.3 I also used materials from the private archives of the Hadjimoukoff family.4 Vassily Hadjimou- koff was born in 1878 into the family of well-known Bjedugh Prince Temtetch (Nikolai) Hadjimou- koff who was on Russian service. Vassily Hadjimoukoff graduated from the Department of Oriental Languages of St. Petersburg University, served in the Foreign Ministry, and filled diplomatic posts in Turkey, Jerusalem, and Mac- edonia. He returned to his native land Adigey to fight the Bolsheviks along with the Volunteer Army; he retreated from the Caucasus with Wrangel and his army and, in 1920, returned to the Diplomatic Mission in Constantinople (Is- tanbul). Three years later he moved to Marseilles where he lived for almost the rest of his life. He spent the last few years in a retirement home for Russian émigrés in Sainte- Geneviève-des-Bois where he was buried in the Russian cemetery in 1956.

Photo 3

Vassily Hadjimoukoff, photo from the archive of Sébastien Hadjimoukoff, France, Paris.

3 See: “Archives personnelles de Aliakber Topcibasev,” CERCEC, EHESS, par autorisation spéciale. 4 I am deeply grateful to the Hadjimoukoffs for their permission to familiarize myself with the materials from their family archive. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 153 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Delegation of the Kuban Rada and the Mountain-Dwellers of the Northern Caucasus at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919-1920

The history of the emigration of the Caucasian peoples began at the Peace Conference opened in Paris in 1919 which attracted delegations from several regions of the former Russian Empire that wanted independence. Here is what representatives of seven republics wrote to French Premier Georges Clemenceau, who chaired the conference, on 8 October, 1919. The letter was signed by Al- imardan Topchibashev (Azerbaijan), A.M. Chermoev (the Northern Caucasus), S.R. Puska (Estonia), N. Chkheidze (Georgia), L. Bych (the Kuban Republic), J. Seskis (Latvia), T. Parushevich (Lithua- nia), and Count Tyszkiewicz (Ukraine).5 Each of the republics supplied its own Declaration of Inde- pendence; all of them together wrote a joint Declaration of Independence dated 7 June, 1991. It said that the states which appeared in the territory of the former Russian Empire were “based on the principles of democracy” and needed “recognition as entities of international law.” The document went on to say: 1. “The Russian Bolsheviks wanted to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in the entire territory of former Russia, while the Russian reactionary circles wanted to establish military dictatorship in the same territory and restore Russia of the previous period in which the peo- ple were enslaved (italics mine.—I.B.).” Both forces were determined to fight the “newly formed democratic republics.” 2. These states were “rich in primary products indispensable to foreign countries;” they, in turn, badly needed the products of other states. The delegations asked Clemenceau to recognize these states as independent entities of interna- tional law. The great powers, however, preferred to keep the issue on the backburner until the so-called Russian Question had been resolved. This shows that at the first stage of emigration the Kuban and Caucasian émigrés acted together. The same year another document appeared (found in the archive of Alimardan bek Topchibashev)—Agreement among the Republics of Azerbaijan, the Northern Cauca- sus, and Kuban in which the sides pledged to mutually rec- ognize their political independence and state sovereignty and to extend, if needed, military, political, diplomatic, and financial support. The sides also stated that they deemed it necessary to establish relations with Georgia and Arme- nia.6 Another version of the same document had the fol- lowing addition: this agreement appeared because the sides “are aware of their common aims and interests in the strug-

Photo 4

Luka Bych (from the Internet).

5 See: “Archives personnelles de Alimardan Topcibasev,” CERCEC Libraray, case IX. 6 See: Ibid., case XI. 154 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION gle for national liberation and political independence and the need to consolidate democratic order in their countries.”7 Luka Bych (Bich), a prominent Cossack public figure born in 1870, was one of the leaders of the Kuban Cossacks. An excellent economic manager, he did a lot as the mayor of Baku; in 1917-1918, he served as Chairman of the Kuban Territorial Government; in 1919, he was appointed head of the dele- gation of the Kuban Republic at the Paris Peace Conference and had to remain abroad. He lived in Prague where he first taught municipal law at the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy and was later ap- pointed as its rector; he died in 1945. The Kuban People’s Republic was formed in the territory of the former Kuban Region and the Kuban Cossack Army Administrative Unit when the Russian Empire fell apart; it survived in 1918- 1920); on 16 February, 1918 it formed a government with Luka Bych as its head. According to the Provisional Statute on the Supreme Power Structures in the Kuban Territory, the Kuban Rada of 98 members (45 Cossacks, 45 people of other social groups, and 8 mountain- dwellers) elected by “legally qualified” local people (with full rights)—Cossacks, mountain-dwell- ers, and local peasants—was the only governing body. Executive power belonged to the Cossack Army government of ten members (three of them represented the mountain-dwellers and people of other social groups) accountable to the Legislative Rada. In the political sphere the Rada insisted on continued observation of the Cossack rights and privileges; members of other social groups (not Cos- sacks or mountain-dwellers) were deprived of certain rights. In the economic sphere the Rada intend- ed to preserve traditional landownership and land use to encourage private property. A.J. Basniev has written that the Western Adighes unanimously supported the Cossacks.8 There were several Kuban mountain-dwellers among the cabinet members (Adighe Aytek Namitok (Nami- tokov) was one of them); Vassily Hadjimoukoff was deputy of the Kuban Rada. Aytek Namitok was born on 2 February, 1885 (according to other sources, he was born in 1892) in the Ponejukay aul; he graduated from a grammar school in Stavropol and the Department of Law of St. Petersburg University. He was Minister of Justice in the Kuban government and accompanied Luka Bych to the Paris Peace Conference as a member of the delegation. According to the personal file of Vassily Hadjimoukoff found in his family’s private archive (Paris, France), on 28 October, 1917, “the Circassian population elected him deputy of the Kuban Territorial Rada.” Between 28 February and 20 August, 1918, he served in the Mounted Circassian Regiment and took part in the Kornilov March (the so- called Ice March). On 28 August, 1918, he was re-elected deputy of the Kuban Rada. In 1920, he emigrated to Con- stantinople where he served as chief translator at the Diplo- matic Mission in Constantinople.9 The following people were also elected to the Kuban Territorial Rada: S. Shakhim-Girey, K. Natyrbov, P. Kot- sev, P. bek Sultanov, Kh. Khubiev, S. Siyukhov, K. Ulagay, and M. Khatgogu. Together with Namitok, they formed the so-called Adighe faction.10

Photo 5

Aytek Namitok (from the Internet).

7 “Archives personnelles de Alimardan Topcibasev,” case II. 8 See: A.J. Basniev, “Adygskiy parlamentarizm nachala XX veka,” available at [www.vestnik.adygnet.ru]. 9 Formulyarny spisok V.N. Hadjimoukova, Private archive of the Hadjimoukoffs, Paris, France. 10 See: A.J. Basniev, op. cit. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 155 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Photo 6

Sultan Shakhim-Girey (from the Internet).

All of them, except for Seferbi Siyukhov, emigrated, which explains why their personal qualities are very impor- tant for a better understanding of the relations between the Kuban Cossacks and the Caucasian mountain-dwellers in emigration. Sultan Shakhim-Girey (Shekhim-Girey), a Circas- sian, born in 1880 in the Kuban Region; graduated from the Department of Law, Kharkov University; practiced law in the Kuban Region; in 1917-1919, filled the post of deputy speaker of the Kuban Rada; emigrated to Turkey and died there in 1921. Murat (Murad) Khatgogu (Gatagogu, Khatgogou), a Circassian; in 1917, took part in the First Free Congress of the Representatives of the Mountain-Dwellers of the Ku- ban Region and Black Sea Gubernia; in 1919, replaced Sultan Shakhim-Girey (who had resigned) as deputy speaker of the Kuban Legislative Rada; in 1919, he was arrested by Denikin’s officers and expelled; lived in Prague. Kuchuk Bakhti-Girey Natyrbov, a Western Adighe; born in 1878 (his father was Bakhti-Girey Natyrbov); graduated from St. Petersburg University; worked in the administration of the Chita Gu- bernia; emigrated first to Paris, but soon (in 1923) moved to the United States. The family preserved its contacts with the North Caucasian people in France and Germany: Murat and Islam Natyrbovs kept in touch with Geydar Bammat in Paris in the 1920-1950s.11 Pshemakho (Pshemaf) Kotsev (Kosok), a Circassian, born in 1884 in the Sarmakovo aul; grad- uated from the Department of Law of St. Petersburg University; worked as a lawyer; served as Chair- man of the Government of the Mountain Republic; emigrated to Turkey, where he died many years later in 1962. I have no information about the other émigrés—Pasha bek Sultanov, Khasambi Khubiev, or Kaspolet Ulagay—no traces of them have been found so far in archival materials. Kaspolet Ulagay, an Adighe, son of an officer, and a councilor of state, was a civil servant in the Kuban Region. In February 1917, he was elected to the Kuban Legislative Rada where he represented the Circassians. There is no information about his life in emigration, but his son Kuchuk Ulagay (1893-1953) was well known. He served in the Volunteer Army and lived in emigration in Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia; his father probably lived with him. In 1920, the Kuban Cossack and Caucasian émigrés held common meetings also attended by Luka Bych; on 2 November, 1920, one of such meetings was held at Abdul Chermoev’s place12; it was

11 See: The author’s interview with a relative of G. Bammat, Paris, 2009. 12 Abdul Mejid Chermoev (Tapa), a Chechen, born on 3 March, 1882 in Grozny, died on 28 August, 1937 in Lausanne, buried in Bobigny; his father was General Artsu Chermoev. He graduated from a military school and joined the Imperial Guard; in 1901 went into business; before World War I the oil discovered on his land outside Grozny made him rich; Chairman of the First National Government of the Republic of the Northern Caucasus; in May 1917, the first con- gress of the mountain-dwellers elected him Chairman of the Central Committee of the Alliance of the North Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers; he was an active supporter of the Mountain Republic; in 1919, emigrated to France; served as head of the Foreign Delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference and Chairman of the North Caucasian Foreign Delegation, close follower of G. Bammat; took part in the general Caucasian conference in Paris in 1921; signed the Declaration on Setting up a Caucasian Union of Independence, Paris, 1921. 156 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION attended by several Azeris (A. Topchibashev, J. Hadjibekov, Sh.-I. Islamov, and Ya. Mekhtiev) and two people from the Northern Caucasus (A. Namitok and V. Djabagi).13 The new draft Treaty on Cooperation among Azerbaijan, the Republic of the Union of the Mountain-Dwellers of the Northern Caucasus, and the Kuban Republic is dated October 1920.14 The document said in particular: “Proceeding from our unshakable conviction of the unity of historical destinies and shared aims and interests of these peoples in their struggle for national liberation and political independence and for joint protection of democratic republican order, it should be recog- nized that the present treaty of fraternal unity be entered on the following conditions: “1. The governments of Azerbaijan, Kuban, and the Mountain-Dwellers shall mutually recog- nize the political independence and sovereignty of the sides to the Treaty. “2. They shall provide mutual military, political, economic, and financial support. “The Treaty will be signed by representatives of the Delegations at the Peace Conference in Paris.”

The Kuban Cossacks and the National Committee for the Liberation of the North Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers, Constantinople, 1920

Another organization of mountain-dwellers—the National Committee for the Liberation of the North Cau- casian Mountain-Dwellers—was set up in Constantino- ple in 1920 to fight Bolshevism together with the Cos- sacks. A. Kazakov15 has written that it was also known as the Committee for the Liberation of the North Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers and the Mountain Monarchic Center. The Hadjimoukoffs’ archive supplied a certain amount of information about the National Committee. It was founded by General F. Bekovich-Cherkassky (who represented Kabarda), V. Hadjimoukoff (who repre- sented Kuban Circassians),16 General Ya. Khabaev (Osse- tia), and General S. Malsagov (Ingushetia).17

Photo 7

Safarbek Malsagov (from the Internet).

13 See: “Archives personnelles de Àlimardan Topcibasev,” CERCEC Libraray, case XI. 14 See: Ibidem. 15 See: A.V. Kazakov, Deyatelnost organov bezopasnosti Kabardino-Balkarii po neytralizatsii podryvnykh aktsy emigrantskikh organizatsiy v 20-kh-50-kh gg. XX veka, Ph.D. thesis, Moscow, 2005. 16 See: Obshchee delo newspaper, No. 186, 17 January, 1921; Archive of Sébastien Hadjimoukoff (great grandson of Vassily Hadjimoukoff), Paris, France. 17 See: Yakov (Beta) Khabaev, an Osset of the village of Novoosetinskaya, was born on 1 October, 1870, educated at a military school, and served in the Imperial Guard as Major General. Safarbek Malsagov, an Ingush, was born in Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 157 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

According to the materials found in the Archives des Affaires Étrangères de France, Mikael Khalilov (Khalil-Pasha) (1856-1936) was one of the committee members. Born in Daghestan, he served in the Russian Army, was promoted to general, and, along with other committee members, figured prominently on the political scene of Daghestan (he was the last premier of the Mountain Re- public); in 1920, he was appointed president of the Constantinople Caucasian Committee.18 The committee members belonged to the North Caucasian military elite who served in the Rus- sian army. Throughout the 19th century, the Russian Empire consistently created a pro-Russian elite from among the mountain-dwellers, military service being one of the obvious spheres. Young Caucasian boys were enrolled in military schools and served in the Russian army.19 By 1917, five members of the future Caucasian Committee had been faithfully serving Russia for many years and were dedicat- ed to it; they supported the Russian Empire and the Russian monarchy and, most importantly, accept- ed Russia’s presence in the Northern Caucasus as logical and useful. The National Committee for the Liberation of the North Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers based its program on the following linchpins: 1. Recognition of General Wrangel as Supreme Commander. 2. Complete neutrality with the Entente and the Kemalists. 3. Organization, under favorable conditions, of an army of Turkish muhajirs (people of North Caucasian origin) to organize an anti-Bolshevist movement in the Caucasus. The Program went on to say that “the Committee, which does not pursue political aims, is the only representative structure of the Russian Muslims (italics mine.—I.B) abroad and has been recog- nized as such by General Wrangel.” The Committee obviously intended to fight with Wrangel to restore the Russian Empire and the monarchy, which means that they wanted to see the Northern Caucasus part of the Russian Empire. The document had the following note: “The Committee will work toward unification with the anti- Bolshevist forces, primarily with the Cossacks.” At the first stage, there were plans to join forces with the Ukrainian National Committee. Information extracted from archival materials is supported by information about the Commit- tee for the Liberation of the North Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers found in File 541 (“strictly con- fidential”) of the Cheka Foreign Department dated 24 January, 1922. In addition to the above-men- tioned committee members, the Cheka document mentioned Pshemakho Kotsev as one of the mem- bers. A. Kazakov mentioned Sultan Klych-Girey—a well-known Kuban Circassian (1880-1947), Major General of the Russian Army—as a member. He and Bekovich-Cherkassky graduated from the Elizavetgrad Cavalry School, commanded a hundred in the Mounted Circassian Regiment of the Native (Wild) Division during World War I and fought with the Volunteer Army.20 The Cheka document said that the Committee supported by the Turkish authorities had formed a mounted regiment of mountain-dwellers under the command of the Angora (Ankara) government stationed on the Soviet border.21 A. Kazakov pointed out that the Constantinople Caucasian Commit- tee established close ties with the Supreme Monarchic Union formed in France.22

Vladikavkaz in 1868; graduated from a military school in Elizavetgrad; commanded the Mounted Osset Division; was promoted to general; fought with the Volunteer Army; was appointed as ruler of Ingushetia under General Denikin; in 1920 emigrated to Constantinople along with the army. 18 December 1920, Diplomatic representation of Russia in Constantinople. Document addressed to the High Com- missioner of France at Constantinople, 10 January, 1921. Archive des Affaires Étrangères de France, No. 3812. 19 For more detail, see: I.L. Babich, “Vzaimosvyaz sovremennykh gorskikh ideologiy i natsionalnykh interesov Rossii na Severnom Kavkaze,” in: Severnyy Kavkaz v natsionalnoy strategii Rossii, ed. by V.A. Tishkov, Institute of Eth- nology and Anthropology RAS, Moscow, 2008, pp. 171-186. 20 See: A.V. Kazakov, op. cit. 21 See: Russkaya voennaya emigratsia 20-40-kh godov, Vol. I, Moscow, 1998, pp. 549-550. 22 See: A.V. Kazakov, op. cit. 158 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In 1920 in Adigey, before he emigrated to Constantinople, Vassily Hadjimoukoff published a newspaper in Circassian to inform the people and prepare them for the struggle against the Bolshevist agitators. “The mountain-dwellers found the old and the new regime equally unacceptable,” however “if they have the chance to choose between them, the mountain-dwellers being as friendly with the Cossacks as ever, will go for state-building along with the Volunteer Army, will prefer to remain the subjects of Great, Indivisible, and Democratic Russia, and will unquestionably obey the decisions of the Constituent Assembly.”23 The life span of the National Committee for the Liberation of the North Caucasian Mountain- Dwellers in Constantinople proved short, about twelve months, for several reasons. First, late in 1922 another committee—the Committee for the Liberation of Azerbaijan and the Mountain-Dwellers of the Northern Caucasus—appeared in Constantinople, which attracted the National Committee mem- bers. In emigration, the Azeris were working toward setting up an independent state, outside the Rus- sian Empire, which meant that the monarchist mountain-dwellers had very little in common with them.24 According to L. Sotskov, those in Turkey who extended financial support were paying for the idea of independence of the Caucasus rather than restoration of the monarchy, which meant that the National Committee was doomed from the very beginning.25 On 16 March, 1921, the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey signed a friendship and cooperation treaty which ruled out subversive activities in Turkish territory. Many of the committee members left Constantinople for European states where their lives took a different turn; some of them revised their previous ideas. What happened to the members of the Caucasian Committee? In 1923, Vassily Hadjimoukoff moved to Marseilles, where he stayed away from French politics. His great grandson Sébastien Had- jimoukoff told us that once Vassily had visited Paris to attend a “Caucasian meeting of sorts, but never repeated this trip.”26 He remained loyal to his ideas but was not very disappointed about the downfall of the Russian Empire. In emigration he remained an Adighe, but preferred Russians to the Cauca- sians. He spent the last years of his life in a retirement home for Russian émigrés in Sainte-Geneviève- des-Bois and was buried in the local cemetery. There is an Orthodox cross on his grave. Yakov Khabaev also went to France and lived in Paris where he limited his involvement in public activities to Russian military organizations—the Council of All-Cossack Alliance in France; the Union of the Order of St. George Holders; and the Union of Russian Military Invalids in France. Because of his Caucasian roots, he joined the Association of Refugee Mountain-Dwellers of the Northern Caucasus, the only North Caucasian organization in France with no political undertones, which made it attrac- tive to North Caucasians of different political convictions. General Khabaev represented the Ossetian Aul Organization at the so-called Congress of Foreign Emigrants convened in 1925 in France. Safa- rbek Malsagov moved to Poland and stayed away from politics. Mikael Khalilov remained in Istan- bul; he was no longer involved in political activities, but he wrote for the Gortsy Kavkaza (The Cau- casian Mountain-Dwellers) journal (1928-1934). Fyodor Bekovich-Cherkassky moved to Paris to become an active member of the “Russian monarchist organization of Nikolay’s supporters” (Grand Prince Nikolay, former Supreme Com- mander of the Russian Army who lived in France in emigration was one of the main contenders to the Russian throne). General Bekovich-Cherkassky joined several military unions and was a board mem- ber of the Union of Holders of the St. George Order; the Union of Officers of the Caucasian Army; the Union of the Former Students of the Nikolay Cavalry School; and the Alliance of the Cuirassiers of the Imperial Regiment. Despite his Caucasian roots, he stayed away from the Caucasian, obviously anti-Russian, organizations in France determined to set up independent states in the Caucasus rather than restore the empire. He was, however, a member of the Alaverdy Caucasian Society which pur-

23 The Hadjimoukoffs’ archive. 24 See: “Osetinskaya emigratsya,” in: Istoriya Severnoy Osetii. XX vek, Moscow, 2003, p. 299. 25 See: A.F. Sotskov, Neizvestny separatism. Na sluzhbe SD i Abvera: iz sekretnykh dosye razvedki, Moscow, 2003, p. 28. 26 My interview with Sébastien Hadjimoukoff, Paris, 20 March, 2011. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 159 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sued cultural rather than political aims. During World War II he deliberately moved further away from the Caucasian movements which supported the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union; there is information that he was one of the leaders of the Russian anti-fascist resistance in Paris. He adopted Islam and changed his name to Tembot; on 16 November, 1953 he was buried in the Muslim cemetery in Bobigny outside Paris; his wife, Kalmyk Nadjivat Kaplanova, outlived him by over 25 years; she spent the last years of her life in the Home for Russian Military Invalids in Montmorency where she died in 1979 and was buried in the same cemetery.27

The All-Kuban Conference: The Kubans and the Mountain-Dwellers, Prague, 1921

On 10 September, 1921, an initiative commission met in Prague to pass a decision, first, on an All-Kuban Conference28; according to Luka Bych, by November 1921 there were 10 thousand (mostly military) émigrés from the Kuban region.29 Second, it was decided to invite the following people to the planned conference: members of the Presidium of the Kuban Extraordinary Territorial and Legislative Rada, members of the Paris and Transcaucasian parliamentary delegations of Kuban; and the acting Ataman and Chairman of the Government and the Ataman and Chairman of the Government elected on Lemnos Island. The following people were among those invited: F. Aspidov, L. Bych, I. Bely, L. Be- lashov, F. Voropinov, V. Vinnik, A. Gordienko, V. Ivanis, P. Kurgansky, S. Manjula, V. Naumenko, A. Namitokov, who was member of the Paris Parliamentary Delegation, G. Omelchenko, Pavlogradsky, T. Rogovets, V. Savitsky, D. Skobtsov, Sultan Shakhim-Girey, Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Rada and Comrade of Chairman of the Territorial Rada, and I. Timoshenko. Shakhim-Girey and Namitokov (Namitok) were the only two mountain-dwellers invited to the congress. Third, the commission drafted an Address to All Émigrés from the Kuban Region. Fourth, it was decided to ask the Caucasians (Azeris in particular) for financial support. On 15 September, 1921, the Azeri delegation, its Chairman A. Top- chibashev to be more exact, received a request for money (in the amount of 5 to 10 thousand francs) to pay for the all-Kuban conference. The Committee preferred to dispatch A. Namitok, an Adighe, to re- ceive the money. The document described him as a press secretary of the Kuban delegation. The Azeri delegation discussed the request and decided to allocate 5 thousand francs; A. Nam- itok signed for the sum.30 The Azeris accompanied their decision with an assessment of the Kubans and the Caucasians: “While agreeing with the Kuban Delegation that the Azeris and the Kubans have common interests, namely, liberation of Azerbaijan and the Kuban Region from Bolshevik occupa- tion, the Azeri Delegation expects that in future, under corresponding conditions, the Azerbaijan Republic and the other republics of the Caucasus will arrive at the conviction that they need close political and economic alliance with the Kuban Region.”31 On 21 September, 1921, the chairman of the Azeri delegation received a letter of thanks from the Kuban delegation32 signed by Chairman Vyacheslav Savitsky.33

27 See: “Nekrolog,” Russkaia Mysl, No. 3247, 1979. 28 See: “Archives personnelles de Alimardan Topcibasev,” CERCEC Libraray, case VII. 29 See: Ibid., case XI. 30 See: Ibid., case VII. 31 Ibidem. 32 See: Ibidem. 33 Vyacheslav Savitsky, born on 7 March, 1880 in Ekaterinodar, died on 12 February, 1963 in Hollywood, the U.S. He graduated from a military school in Orenburg and studied at the St. Petersburg Technological Institute, which he quit to enter the Nikolay Cavalry School from which he graduated and joined the Imperial Guard. In November 1917, was appoint- ed head of the military department of the Kuban Region; late in 1917-1918, served as advisor to the Kuban Government. 160 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

On 3 November, 1921, Luka Bych wrote a “confidential letter” to Alimardan Topchibashev in which he described the All-Kuban Conference in Prague as a conference of “Kuban political and public figures.” He wrote that the conference was convened in order “to consolidate the democratic forces of the Kuban Region under slogans of strengthening and consistently realizing the principle of the region’s independence, fighting occupants of all hues, and tilling the soil for future friendly asso- ciations with natural allies—independent states which would emerge on the ruins of the Russian Empire… One of the main tasks of the conference was to put an end to the polyarchy in Kuban claimed by the government in emigration and self-proclaimed contenders to power.” Luka Bych pointed out that the conference split into those who supported independence and those who thought in terms of a “united and indivisible Russia.” While the former wanted an independent state instead of the Kuban Region, the latter spoke about driving the Bolsheviks out and restoring Russia; they sided with Wrangel. “This means,” he wrote, “that some of the Kubans moved to the camp of enemies of democracy in general and of Kuban democracy in particular,” therefore, those who supported the idea of the Russian Empire and agreed with Wrangel were the enemies of the other Kubans. “The rest of the conference participants united into a Democratic Union for Kuban Independence.”34 From this it follows that the Caucasian Committee in Constantinople and the Kuban Delegation with Kuban Adighes among its members pursued opposite aims. At the first stage Luka Bych wanted cooperation with the Caucasian delegations and sought their financial support. With these aims in view he informed the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia about his political position and asked them for money for the Democratic Union for Kuban Independence.35

The Caucasians and Boris Savinkov, 1922

Alimardan Topchibashev’s archive contains a highly interesting document “On Sentiments among the Cossacks Abroad”36 dated 30 January, 1922. The “strictly confidential” document originated from the Information Bureau of the Society for Defense of the Motherland and Freedom set up in 1921 in Warsaw by Boris Savinkov. This large terrorist structure united people of different political convic- tions; its leader deemed it necessary to involve the Caucasians in his struggle against Bolsheviks. I found another protocol of the delegations’ meeting, this time in French rather than in the usual Russian. It took place in 1921 and was attended by A. Khatisov, Akharoyan [A. Agaronyan], M. Mager- ramov, A. Chkhenkeli (who chaired the meeting), S. Mdivani, P. Gegechkori, A. Topchibashev, A. Cher- moev, Prince M. Sumbatov, and Prince A. Avalov,37 who discussed cooperation between the Caucasian delegations and Savinkov. Abdul Chermoev opened the meeting with an outline of Savinkov’s nature and his organization: it was, he said, “the first Russian group which understands that we are working for our common cause. Other Russian groups think that we are working against Russia. Our aim is to organ- ize the lives of people as they themselves want and what we are doing is not hostile to Russia.” He sug- gested that contacts with Savinkov be continued, but, he said, first “the very possibility of such contacts”

Fought with the Volunteer Army and took part of the 1st Kuban (Ice) March in the ranks of the Kuban unit. On 12 March, 1918, he was promoted to colonel and became member of the Kuban Territorial Government for military affairs; was sent to France as a member of the Kuban Delegation in Paris where he remained in emigration. On 2 December, 1919, was excluded from the lists of the Kuban Cossack Army; promoted to major-general in the fall of 1918; in 1921, became chairman of the Kuban Delegation in Paris; in 1919, signed a treaty between the Kuban Region and the Mountain Republic. 34 “Archives personnelles de Alimardan Topcibasev,” CERCEC Libraray, case XI. 35 See: Ibidem. 36 Ibid, case VII. 37 See: Ibid., cases II-III. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 161 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION should be studied. Abdul Chermoev believed that official contacts with Savinkov be better avoided and that contacts be established through third parties, namely through “other Russian groups.” Support was unanimous; Avetis Agaronyan, in particular, confirmed that “no official docu- ments should be signed with the Savinkov group because this amounted to interference in Russia’s internal affairs. Contacts should be sought through other groups.” Alimardan Topchibashev advised “caution when gathering information in Paris and London about the group and its activities. Contacts can be established through the representatives of the Caucasian republics in Poland.” Savinkov, in turn, asked the Caucasian delegations for money, but his request was declined.

The Kuban Cossacks and Western Adighes Break Up, 1922

The fact that the document “On Sentiments among the Cossacks Abroad” is kept in Topchiba- shev’s archive means that Alimardan received it directly from Savinkov. The document said that Cossack emigration in Europe, which numbered 30 thousand, believed that the struggle against the Bolsheviks was far from lost and that it was prepared for further action. Boris Savinkov went on to describe the political trends among the Don Cossacks: the Democratic Union for the Revival of Cos- sacks; supporters of “new tactics”; supporters of Ataman Bogaevsky and the Don government; sup- porters of General Krasnov; then he offered his opinion about the Kuban Cossacks. According to his information, Aytek Namitok had “completely ruptured his relations with the Kuban Cossacks” and cut short business and political contacts with Luka Bych. The latter had left Prague for Marienbad (Czechoslovakia); there were about two thousand Cossack émigrés in Czechoslovakia. Aytek Namitok radically changed his life: he became an active supporter of the North Caucasian (Mountain) Delegation headed by Abdul Chermoev; in 1927, he joined the Temporary United Na- tional Center of Azerbaijan and the Northern Caucasus38 and became one of the editors-in-chief of the Prometheus journal, which agitated for Caucasian independence.39 In 1924, he was among those who founded the Caucasian Golden Fleece Lodge (1924-1926); was founder and member of the Prometh- eus Lodge (1926-1931); in 1930, served in the Commission set up to draft a Pact of the Caucasian Peoples (where he represented the North Caucasian peoples), and became one of the closest associ- ates of Alimardan Topchibashev. Politics was not his only occupation—he was active in the academic sphere as well. After grad- uating from the Sorbonne, he joined the Club for Caucasian Studies, where he delivered several lec- tures (“Whence the Name of the Caucasus?” in 1935; “Problems of Caucasian Ethnology: Georgians and Circassians,” 1937); after moving to Turkey, Aytek Namitok did not abandon his academic stud- ies; he published several books, including Fables des Tsey Ibrahim (Paris, 1938); Origines des Cir- cassiens (Paris, 1939), and Récits Oubykh (Paris, 1955). Murat Khatgogu and A. Tsalikov organized a Union of Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers in Prague; its slogan “A strong man and a waterfall will find a way” was well suited to the Union’s main aim: “National-cultural renaissance and economic prosperity of the Caucasian mountain-dwellers.”40 The Union started a journal Kavkazskiy gorets (The Caucasian Mountain-Dweller); its editors deemed it necessary to point out that the journal “was not interested in purely political issues because they might disunite the mountain émigrés,” yet they were tempted to blame the Russian imperial regime because

38 See: Ibid., cases XIII-XIV. 39 See: Ibidem, in French. 40 The Kavkazskiy gorets journal, Prague, 1925. Published by the Union of Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers in the Czechoslovak Republic, ed. by Murat Khatgogu, No. 2-3. 162 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

“the pre-revolutionary czarist regime interfered with study of the Caucasus. It did everything it could to separate the mountain intellectuals from their people; moreover, it stifled all manifestations of national self-awareness (the bitter fate of Osset poet Kostá (Hetagurov.—Ed.) is ample evidence of this.”

Pro-Russian and Anti-Russian Camps among the North Caucasian Émigrés

The first issue of the newly established journal Kazachiy vspolokh (The Cossack Tocsin) carried an article by Osset Cossack Nikolay Bigaev entitled “Gorsko-kazachiemu emigrantskomu stu- denchestvu” (To the Mountain Cossack Émigré Students) which later appeared in the Kavkazskiy gorets journal. It called on the young mountain émigrés to abandon “national ambitions” and to unite with Russian émigrés. Its author, Colonel Bigaev, was an officer of the Russian Caucasian Army who served in the Guard of the Royal Viceroy in the Caucasus during World War I. In 1915, he was ap- pointed head of the Guard of Grand Prince Nikolay Nikolaevich, joined the White Movement, and emigrated to Czechoslovakia where he lived in Prague. In 1925, he stood at the head of the Russian All-Arms Union in Czechoslovakia, took part in the Eurasian Seminar in Prague in 1928, belonged to the Russia military organization in Prague in 1935, and in the 1920-1940s headed the Caucasian Comradeship Organization which functioned in Prague. At all times he tried to keep “national antag- onism” in check.41 He was elected as first chairman of the newly formed Union of Caucasian Moun- tain-Dwellers set up in Prague in 1923 (Kabardin Elmurza Bekovich-Cherkassky was among the board members). Nikolay Bigaev was replaced with Murat Khatgogu as chairman on the strength of an open letter of Elmurza Bekovich-Cherkassky published in the Kazachiy vspolokh journal.42 A couple of years later the same Elmurza Bekovich-Cherkassky started a discussion with anoth- er pro-Russian North Caucasian émigré. In 1929, the Vozrozhdenie (Renaissance)43 newspaper car- ried two articles by Ismail Baev44 about the separatist sentiments of the Caucasian mountain-dwell- ers. He presented his pro-Russian ideas, “bitingly criticized the national-liberation movement of the mountain-dwellers, and supplied historical arguments in favor of an alliance between the Caucasian mountain-dwellers and the Russian Empire.” It was Elmurza Bekovich-Cherkassky who once more, in 1929, used the Gortsy Kavkaza journal to rebuff the pro-Russian sentiments. The Gortsy Kavkaza (Les Montagnards du Caucase) was published for six years, between 1928 and 1934, as an heir to the Volnye gortsy (The Free Mountain-Dwellers) journal which appeared ear- lier in Prague. It comes as no surprise that Elmurza Bekovich-Cherkassky was its editor-in-chief from the third to the ninth issues. The journal was published by the People’s Party of the Caucasian Moun- tain-Dwellers with its headquarters in Paris. As its member and the editor-in-chief of its journal, Bekovich-Cherkassky published several articles in the third to ninth issues. Issue 8-9 carried his arti- cle45 in which he criticized Ismail Baev’s article on separatism of the mountain-dwellers.

41 See: Kazachiy vspolokh, Prague, No. 1, 1925. 42 See: Ibid., pp. 86-91. 43 Vozrozhdenie, a Russian newspaper published by Russian émigrés in Paris between 1925 and 1940, this moder- ately conservative monarchic newspaper was published by A. Gukasov and edited by P. Struve and Yu. Semenov. 44 Ismail Baev, an Osset, one of the three Baevs émigré brothers. Georgy Baev (1868-1939), defense lawyer who made an academic career in Germany, was the best known of them. He lived in Berlin and worked at the Department of Ossetian Studies of Berlin University; on an assignment of the London Biblical Society he translated The Bible into the Ossetian language and published sources related to the history of the Caucasus (The Terskiy Kazak journal, Belgrade, No. 38, 1939). Little is known about the second brother Ivan. He lived in France and died in 1982 in a retirement home for Russian émigrés in Cormeilles-en-Parisis; Ismail, the third of the Baev brothers, lived in Belgrade, Serbia. 45 See: E. Bekovich-Cherkassky, “‘Vozrozhdenie’ o separatizme gortsev Kavkaza,” Gortsy Kavkaza (Les Montag- nards du Caucase), ed. by E. Bekovich-Cherkassky, Paris, No. 8-9, September-October 1929, pp. 13-17. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 163 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

He deemed it necessary to point out that Baev believed that the mountain-dwellers “should not seek national independence because of the tragic fate of the Adighes” caused by the Russian-Cauca- sian war (he had in mind the forced resettlement of the Adighes in the Ottoman Empire).46 He dis- missed this argument as unimportant for the cause of Caucasian independence. Ismail Baev’s second argument—the so-called “achievements of Russian enlightenment”—was merely pushed aside. His opponent believed that “many mountain-dwellers from the valleys close to the urban centers became addicted to the pernicious aspects of urban life (italics mine.—I.B.) when involved in relations with towns and cities. This undermined the people’s family and communal life and their spirit previously strong in the patriarchal mountain auls.” “As a result,” the author went on to say, “religious muridism, sheikism, abrek (robber) crimes, and other unhealthy symptoms of dissat- isfaction of the spirit with its fate and the desire of the popular masses to live separately according to their own traditions of everyday life and the adats and to guard themselves against Russian influence developed beyond all proportions.” Elmurza Bekovich-Cherkassky was convinced that “the Cauca- sian mountain-dwellers are an extremely nationally active element while their intelligentsia is nation- ally passive.” He saw the problem of the mountain-dwellers in the absence of their own intelligentsia while they as a people were united: “We explain our unity by the fact that the religious and social existence of the mountain-dwellers is based on the old historical cultures which for many centuries have shaped the specifics of the masses of mountain-dwellers.”47 He lamented that the Russians in charge of the Vozrozhdenie newspaper had chosen a Caucasian to plant their ideas among the émigrés. In 1933, the Gortsy Kavkaza journal published in France carried an anonymous article entitled “O, Servum Pecus” which is very important for a correct interpretation of “anti-Russian” and “pro- Russian” sentiments. Its anonymous author wrote: “As there is no Sun without sunspots, there is no nation without renegades, career seekers, and toadies, in short, people who have lost the feeling of their national specifics and spiritual contacts with their own people, who assess things from the point of view of their own gain, and who try to subordinate the interests of the people to their own. Our own ‘monarchists’ (supporters of monarchic Russia) and the supporters of the ‘united and indivisible Russia’ of all hues belong to the same category. They are scattered across many countries as ‘Russian émigrés’; they treat the Nansen passport as a symbol of their closeness and ‘unity’ with the Russian people and with ‘everything around’ that ‘smells of Russia’ rather than as a heavy burden placed on us by the stupidity of our high patrons in Geneva. The phrase ‘Russian culture’ fills them with admi- ration (not always quite sincere), even if their practical knowledge of it was acquired in Russian tav- erns and nightclubs. The word ‘independence’ sends them into rage; they begin accusing those who have not yet lost the ability to blush like Italian patriots or their sense of national shame of every mortal sin. In their works they follow the old patterns and exploit our disunity and the weakened na- tional front. Our supporters of the ‘united and indivisible idea,’ our ‘truly Russian mountain-dwell- ers’ are the spiritual heirs of those who in the past served as blind instruments in the hands of Russians and allowed the and Ingush to quarrel. Many of them take the activities of the ‘Osset Com- mission for the Conversion of the Ossets and Ingush to Christianity’…, which filled Ossetia (and Abkhazia) with drunken Russian priests and homosexual monks-missionaries and which divided the Ossets and Abkhazians into two parts with different religions, as the ‘beneficial’ influence of ‘Rus- sian culture.’”48 It should be said that more likely than not the Kuban Adighes associated themselves with the Cossacks. In France, Cossack Fyodor Eliseev organized a dance ensemble of Cossack-jigits who per- formed with great success around the world. There were two Kuban Circassians in the troupe—Peyuk Khachimizov and student Chukov.49

46 See: Ibid., pp. 18-19. 47 Ibid., p. 27. 48 “O, Servum Pecus,” Gortsy Kavkaza, ed. by B. Baytuganov, Paris, No. 41, July 1933, pp. 2-3. 49 See: Kazachia djigitovka. On materials from the archive of Kuban Cossack F.I. Eliseev, Krasnodar, 2003, p. 43. 164 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Territorial Disagreements between the Kuban Cossacks and the Kuban Mountain-Dwellers

After a while it turned out that these two émigré groups could not agree on certain territorial issues. The Cossacks wanted to include the territories which belonged to the Western Adighes in their republic; the Adighes objected. This started a process of gradual “ethnization” of the Kuban moun- tain-dwellers who drifted away from the Cossacks toward the Caucasians. The Kuban Cossacks were accused of “sowing strife among the mountain-dwellers.” One of the members of the People’s Party of the Mountain-Dwellers of the Caucasus who used “A Common Mountain-Dweller” alias analyzed Ignatovich’s articles about the Cossacks’ “Great Power” ambitions, which appeared in the (Free Cossacks) kazachestvo journal in Paris in 1929. A Common Mountain- Dweller wrote that the editors of the Gortsy Kavkaza journal, on the whole, hailed the very fruitful ef- forts of the Volnoe kazachestvo journal to develop and consolidate the ideology of Cossack independ- ence. The author went on to say: “The editors believe it their duty to point out the Cossacks’ ‘Great Power’ ambitions and the still alive imperial ideology borrowed from the philosophy of Russian etatism, as well as their desire to resolve the Cossack problems by widening the gap which divides the mountain- dwellers and decreasing their territories. The mountain-dwellers cannot accept this as a method of re- solving the problems which exist between the Cossacks and mountain-dwellers.”50 Ignatovich asserted that “the Common Mountain-Dweller was convinced that ‘the mountain- dwellers infringe on Cossack rights and Cossack territory’ and that the mountain-dwellers want to set up a Caucasian confederation which the Cossacks believed to be dangerous for them, while in fact this is not the case: to weaken the mountain-dwellers the Cossacks should capture as much land with mountain population as possible and push the mountain-dwellers high into the mountains (italics mine.—I.B.).”51 Murza bek was even harsher. In his article “K voprosu o severnykh granitsakh Respubliki Gort- sev Kavkaza” (On the Northern Borders of the Republic of the Caucasian Mountain-Dwellers), he wrote: “Not so long ago a group of ideologists of Cossack ‘Great Power’ ambitions appeared among the émigrés and unfolded its banner of independence on the pages of the Volnoe Kazachestvo jour- nal… At first it was talking about an independent state shared by three Cossack groups: the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban, and .”52 In emigration the mountain-dwellers and the Cossacks could not agree on territorial issues, namely, in which territories they planned to set up their independent states. The mountain-dwellers demanded that they should be treated fairly.53 “When writing in the journal about us, the Mountain-Dwellers, Mr. Bily included only the Kuban mountain-dwellers in Cossackia, while Mr. Ignatovich also counted the Kabardins among them; the Ossets were left with a choice—either to retreat to Georgia or, more likely, settle in Cossackia. The numerically small group of Terek Cossacks, which Russia pushed by force into essentially the very heart of the mountain- dwellers’ main territory, will also become part of Cossackia, etc. This territorial program contradicts what the mountain-dwellers want for themselves … and it has become the main factor of the relations between the Cossacks and the mountain-dwellers, which will develop in an undesirable direction.” This means that both groups claimed the same territory as their historical homeland.54

50 Ryadovoy Gorets (alias), “Gorskiy vopros na stranitsakh zhurnala ‘Volnoe Kazachestvo’,” Gortsy Kavkaza, ed. by E. Bekovich-Cherkassky, Paris, No. 4-5, May-June, 1929, p. 10. 51 See: Ibid., p. 16. 52 Murza bek, “K voprosu o severnykh granitsakh Respubliki Gortsev Kavkaza,” Gortsy Kavkaza, Editorial Board, Paris, No. 13-15, February-March 1930, p. 33. 53 See: Ibid., p. 34. 54 Ibid., p. 35. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 165 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The author went into the history of the disputed territory and concluded that the Cossacks of the Terek Region of the Mountain Republic were new settlers.55 “The mountain-dwellers’ right to the entire Terek area is incontestable … while the Cossacks are not in the majority, even the relative majority, not only in the area but also in its part, the so-called Terek district… This means that the claims of the V.K. are absolutely unfounded. If satisfied they will violate, for no reason, the historical rights of the mountain-dwellers and favor a small part of the local population, the Terek Cossacks… The mountain-dwellers regard all encroachments on the trans-Kuban area as an encroachment on the property of the people… It goes without saying that the Cossacks have not, and cannot have, any grounds to claim the Black Sea coastal stretch, which is the indisputable property of the mountain- dwellers. They, however, are prepared to cede a small fraction of the northern part of the coastal stretch with the port of Novorossiysk (italics mine.—I.B.) with the understanding that the interests of the Mountain Republic in this port of exceptional importance will be guaranteed in the form of its involvement in the port’s management and special customs rules applied to the transit shipments brought in and out of the Mountain Republic.”56 The North Caucasian who used the Common Mountain-Dweller alias wrote that Issue 51-52 of Volnoe Kazachestvo had carried articles by Bily on the territorial dispute with the mountain-dwellers. The Common Mountain-Dweller tried to persuade the Cossacks to drop their territorial claims.57 In his article “K voprosu o severnykh granitsakh Respubliki Gortsev Kavkaza,” Murza bek asserted the historical rights of the mountain-dwellers to the North Caucasian Cossack-settled territories.58 He wrote further that the historical homeland of the Cossacks was limited to the Don area, “therefore,” he insisted, “the Cossacks cannot claim territories beyond their primordial lands and, because of consid- erations related to the state’s domestic policies, will have to repatriate the Cossacks who, for the sake of Russian imperialism, played the role of military colonialists on the lands of others.”59 In his article “O ‘Volnykh Kazakakh’” (On the Free Cossacks), Haji Abu-Bekir insisted that the Cossacks had no rights to the North Caucasian lands.60 Temur Bazyrykkho, another Caucasian mountain-dweller, like- wise, was dead set against the Cossacks’ territorial claims.61 In 1933, the Don Cossacks who support- ed the idea of independence started the Don journal in Prague to refute the territorial claims of the North Caucasian mountain-dwellers.62 An open letter of the Cossacks to the mountain-dwellers of the Prometheus movement which appeared in 1937 in the journal published by the Don Cossacks clarifies many points in the relations among the Kuban mountain-dwellers, Caucasians, and Cossacks.63 Sultan Kilech-Girey,64 a person well known in Europe (mentioned above as a member of the Kuban Rada), caused another problem in the émigré political community.

55 See: Ibid., pp. 36-37. 56 Ibid., pp. 41, 44, 49. 57 See: Ryadovoy Gorets, “Otgoloski proshlogo,” Gortsy Kavkaza, Editorial Board, Paris, No. 13-15, February- March 1930, pp. 51-58. 58 Murza bek, “K voprosu o severnykh granitsakh Respubliki Gortsev Kavkaza,” Gortsy Kavkaza, Editorial Board, Paris, No. 17-18, June-July 1930, pp. 39-50. 59 See: Ibid., p. 55. 60 See: Haji Abu-Bekir, “O ‘volnykh kazakakh’,” Gortsy Kavkaza , ed. by B. Baytuganov, Paris, No. 34, December 1932, pp. 3-11. 61 See: T. Bazyrykkho, “Appetity ne po chinu,” Severny Kavkaz (Le Caucase du Nord—North Caucasia), ed. by B. Baytugan, Paris, No. 16, August 1935, pp. 14-17. 62 See: “Khronika,” Gortsy Kavkaza, ed. by B. Baytuganov, Paris, No. 40, June 1933, p. 29. 63 See: Kazachiy golos, No. 1, 1937. 64 Sultan Klych-Girey (Kelet-Girey, Kelech-Girey, Kilech-Girey, Sultan-Girey), a Kuban Circassian born on 15 March, 1880 in the Ulyap aul (according to other sources, in Maykop), graduated from the Elizavetgrad Cavalry School; during World War I commanded a hundred in the Mounted Circassian Regiment of the Wild Division; in 1917 took part in the Kornilov revolt and the Ice March; during the Civil War commanded a unit and a brigade of the Kuban Division. In 1918-1920, commander of the Circassian-Terek (Wild) Division; upon routing of the Volunteer Army he or- ganized Cossack units, later he emigrated to France. 166 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In 1937, the Cossacks learned that Sultan Kilech-Girey had joined the Caucasian Prometheus group which fought for the Caucasus’ independence from Russia. Don Cossack Kalmyk Shamba Nyu- delich Balinov, who wrote the open letter, himself a well-known personality who lived in Paris, wanted to know: “What do the mountain-dwellers think about the Kuban area? The sultan is not only a moun- tain-dweller himself but also a citizen of the independent Kuban area of which the Kuban Circassians have been and remain an inalienable part. Does Sultan Kilech-Girey look at the mountain part of the Kuban as the territory of the Caucasian Confederation (italics mine.—I.B.)?” He concluded with the following: “I should say here that the Kuban Region will never agree to lose part of its territory.” This shows that the Cossacks never regarded the Kuban mountain-dwellers as part of the North Caucasian community.

The Cossacks and the Caucasians, Late 1930s

On the eve of World War II, when the Nazis plans and activities had become obvious to all, the North Caucasians addressed the Cossacks once more. In 1938, the Kazachy golos (The Voice of the Cossacks) journal, an independent organ of the Don Cossacks published in Paris, carried an article by Tambiy Elekkhoti, a prominent Ossetian émigré, called “Istoricheskie zadachi Kavkaza” (The Histor- ic Tasks of the Caucasus)65 based on his contribution to the meeting of Société Savante held in Paris on 9 June, 1938. He pointed out that “in the coming storms, the Caucasus will have to choose between the fighting forces of integral nationalism and order (Hitler and Germany) and world Marxism headed by Moscow. It goes without saying that we shall side with those determined to squash Moscow. The author deemed it necessary to specify: “In this way, we see that we should support the Nazi regime and Hitler. We all associate the future of the Caucasus with the anti-communist forces and resolutely reject any compromises with Marxism or its representatives.” Tambiy Elekkhoti deemed a revived alliance with the Cossacks useful for the common cause.

Conclusion

The history of the relations between the Caucasians and the Cossacks (and Russians) in general, and the Western Adighes and Kuban Cossacks, in particular, reveals the traces of the Russian Empire left in the minds and political ideas of the mountain-dwellers who lived in the Kuban Region before the revolution. On the one hand, as an Adighe sub-ethnicity, the Western Adighes gravitated toward the North Caucasian peoples in general and the Kabardins in particular. On the other hand, living side-by-side with the Kuban Cossacks, the Western Adighes acquired a feeling of community with them, which greatly affected their political and national biases in emigration. This was a result of the fairly wise policy of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus, which created a mountain elite in the Northern Caucasus, mainly among the Adighes and Ossets. The most able boys were chosen for military and civilian education and corresponding careers in St. Petersburg. In emi- gration they were long unable to discard the idea of their peoples’ continued existence within the Russian Empire; after a while, however, national feelings prevailed.

65 Kazachy golos, No. 10-12, 1938. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 167 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Moshe BEKKER

Research Fellow at the Human Rights Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

JEWS IN KHAZARIA

Abstract

he author relies on novel approach- allegations of those who insist that the T es to chronicles and historical docu- khagan (believed to be a reincarnation of ments to disprove what medieval and the god Tengri on Earth) and the top crust certain contemporary authors write about of the country’s nobles embraced Juda- the Khazarian origin of the East Europe- ism (if this had happened it would have an Jews. He explains why the Jews of the been a gross violation of the central Judaic Sassanid and Byzantine empires migrat- dogmas). The author cites the results of ed to the Caucasus and further on to Atil, the latest genetic studies of the Jews the capital of Khazaria, and how they be- which prove beyond a doubt that the came military leaders and made the title Sephardic, Ashkenaz, and Mizrahi Jews of Bek (supreme commander of the army descended from common Mid-Eastern an- of khaganate) hereditary. He disproves the cestors.

Introduction

Professor of History at Tel Aviv University Shlomo Sand has revived the already denounced as absolutely ungrounded theory that the East European Jews descended from the , one of the .1 I should say that Prof. Sand is not the first to bring this theory into circulation. In the mid-20th century, prominent linguist Naftali Anisimov voiced a similar idea with regard to the Moun- tain Jews: “Today we can say, without taking the risk of being wrong, that the Tat Jews did not de- scend from the Israeli (Jews) and that they were originally followers of Zarathustra (fire worshippers) and not of the ‘religion of the Israelis’.” He supported the above with the following facts: “1. The Tats, called ‘Mountain Jews,’ have nothing to do with the Jews whom the Assyrian kings brought to Iran and Media as slaves. 2. It was the Jews who in the 7th-8th centuries, or even earlier, escaped from Rome who brought the faith of Moses to the Khazars. 3. The Khazars and, probably, Jews who escaped from Rome to the Caucasus brought the faith of Moses to some of the Tats, who along with other Tats, were fire worshippers (it is im- plied that since they brought the faith they also intermarried with the Tats.—M.B.). 4. The Tat Jews, Muslims, and Christians were a single people divided by religion—the faiths of Moses, Christ, and Muhammad.”2

1 See: S. Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People, Verso Books, 2009, 332 pp. 2 Quoted from: Ya. Agarunov, Bolshaya sudba malenkogo naroda, Moscow, 1995, p. 23. 168 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

What academic arguments these are! A linguist should have known that the language is not al- ways an indication of nationality, which is especially true of the Jews, who over the course of time had to change their language many times. Recently, until the 1940s, most of the Jews of Eastern Europe used Yiddish (which was very close to German); today it is rarely used, if ever. In Israel, the Jews revived Hebrew; in the United States, they use English; in Russia, Russian, and in Iran, Farsi (a lan- guage very close to the language of the Tats). It was language, not their ethnic origin, that all the Tats had in common. I shall demonstrate below that it was the Jews of Sassanian Iran who fled to Khazaria and Jewish runaways from Byzantium who later joined them. Arthur Koestler made an attempt to fight anti-Semitism by insisting on the Khazarian roots of the Jews. In his highly original work, The Thirteenth Tribe. The Khazar Empire and Its Heritage, he began the history of European Jews from the Khazarian Khaganate and concluded: “Should this turn out to be the case, then the term ‘anti-Semitism’ would become void of meaning.”3 Some Soviet ideologists like the idea as a handy instrument for de-legitimizing the State of Israel. A detailed account can be found in Put k miru na Blizhnem Vostoke (The Road to Peace in the Middle East) by E. Dmitriev and V. Ladeykin.4 The authors have fallen into the trap of the misinterpreted correspondence between bek (pech) (hereditary supreme commander of the khaganate army) Joseph ben Aaron and Hasdai ibn Shaprut, a top-ranking official of Caliph of Cordoba Abdrakhman III. Yehuda ben Halevi, an out- standing medieval poet and thinker of Spain, author of the much acclaimed Sefer ha-Kuzari, was the first to fall into the trap. He amazed the world, in poetic form, with the fact that there was a “Jewish state,” the Khazarian Khaganate, on the Volga.

Routes of Migration

Let us examine the facts. Joseph ben Aaron “wrote that the Khazars descended from Yaphet, that is, they were not Semites,”5 and told the story of how Jews arrived in Khazaria. At that time, the state of the Khazars was headed by khakan (khagan or khan, the title of the Mongolian and Turkic rulers) from the Turkic dynasty of Ashina (Tribe of Wolf) whom the Khazars invited to defend their country, a common practice at that time. The Slavs of Ancient Rus invited Norman Prince Rurik and his host to protect their country against the nomads. The Khazars were quite satisfied with their Turkic khan: “He roamed together with his staff along the lower reaches of the Volga, between Volgograd and Astrakhan of our time. In the spring, they all moved to the Terek to spend the summer in the area around the Terek, the Kuban, and the Don. When the cold weather re- turned, they went back to the Volga. The Khazars did nothing to maintain their khan. He never de- manded taxes and lived on what his nomadic camp produced. The khan and the top military who ar- rived with him were quite satisfied with the gifts of their subjects; they introduced no taxes and never engaged in trade.” Still, “the Turkic beks and tarkhans were an alien element for the rest of the coun- try.”6 The same applies to the Jewish merchants who arrived in Atil; the Turks who belonged to the ruling class were not liked, while the Jews “lived separately and had practically no contacts with the locals.”7 Dozens of other nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes found themselves under the ruling dynas- ty: the Kama , Burtases, Suvars, Mordovians-Erzya, Cheremices, Vyatiches, Severyans, and Polyane Slavs. “The Alans, Kasogs, Circassians, , and Magyars also paid tribute to the

3 A. Koestler, The Thirteenth Tribe. The Khazar Empire and Its Heritage, Random House, New York, 1976, p. 17, available at [http://www.fantompowa.info/13th%20Tribe.pdf]. 4 See: E. Dmitriev, V. Ladeykin, Put k miru na Blizhnem Vostoke, Moscow, 1974. 5 P. Kokovtsov, Evreysko-khazarskaya perepiska v X v., Leningrad, 1932, p. 3. 6 L. Gumilev, Drevnyaya Rus i Velikaya step, Moscow, 1989, p. 67. 7 Ibidem. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 169 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Khazarian khakan.”8 As often happens, they all were known under the blanket term “Khazars.” For the same reason, the Jews, who for historical reasons lived in Khazaria, were known as Khazars. Elias Bickerman wrote the following in his Institutions de Seleucides: “Those who lived under the king belonged to his state.”9 The Torah gives a detailed account of how Abraham bought the cave of Machpelah from Ephron the Hittite (Genesis 23:7-19), which does not mean that this Biblical charac- ter was a Hittite. He probably lived under a king of the Hittites and paid tribute to him, hence his name. This is as true as the fact that a Jew whose family name is Polyak or Polyakov is not a Pole; neither is a Jew with the name of Deutsch a German. We all know “how the British colonized India and the French Indochina. They came to these colonies to earn money, do business, etc. After working and serving in India, Indochina, or Africa, they all went back home without becoming Indians, Vietnamese, or Africans.”10 With no metropoli- tan country of their own, the Jews had nowhere to go back to; they had to settle in Atil, the capital of the khaganate, and lived there separately from everyone else. As pagans, the Khazars had numerous gods, but their shamans were not particularly adverse to the religion of the Jews. In fact, there were Persian and Byzantine communities in the khaganate with good experience of dealing with Orientals. Driven away from Babylon by Persian King Cyr the Great, who captured it in 539 B.C., Jews came to Iran when the Achaemenid Empire was still alive. According to the Book of Esther, they spread to 127 regions and enjoyed extensive rights. Over time, however, the Zoroastrian magi, the adepts of the dominating religion in the Sassanid Empire who feared the mounting impact of Christianity and who were unable to distinguish between and Christianity, incited Shahanshah Yazdegerd II (438-457) against Christians and Jews not guilty of proselytism. Jews fled the country in great numbers. Repressions continued and even intensified under Shahanshah Firuz (459-484), so the Jewish exodus continued. Jewish refugees settled in large numbers in the mountains of Daghestan; other groups reached the Volga delta and Atil, the capital of Khazaria. Lev Gumilev offered the following details: “The Jews were involved in the movement of the Mazdakids, which made them even less welcome in Iran of the Sassanids. This happened in 529.”11 In his article published in Vestnik drevney istorii, Yu. Solodukho went into even greater detail: “Throughout the centuries the Jewish population of Iran enjoyed a great deal of independence: the Jews were ruled by the exilarch (a hereditary post) who ruled all the other provinces; he was responsible for law and order in the villages and towns where Jews lived, in the markets, etc. As the supreme judge for all the Iranian Jews, he had the right of ‘stick and whip’ and could pass death sentences even though under the Sassanids he had no such right, at least formally. This official represented the Jewish population and presented its interests to the king and the top crust. He also collected taxes for the state treasury.”12 Young and very energetic, Mar-Zutra won the post in fierce clashes over it. At that time, Sassanian Iran was torn apart by disagreements between the old nobility and the young class of landowners and their ideologist Magus Mazdak. He not merely represented the new class, but also preached equality for all, which gave Shah Kavad a chance to undermine the position of the big landowners. The troubles which swept the country weakened the central government; Mar-Zutra did not waver: “In 522 he organized a riot and, with a unit of 400, set up a small state of his own with the capital in Mehoza, which survived until 529.”13 The riot was quenched, Mar-Zutra captured and executed, and his post lost all its previous significance. The Jews involved in the riot had to flee the country. This means that there were several Jewish exoduses; not welcome in Christian Byzantium, the Jews had to leave the empire. According to Gumilev, “after coming to the Caucasus the Jews forgot

8 L. Gumilev, Otkrytie Khazarii, Moscow, 1966, p. 6. 9 E. Bickerman, Gosudarstvo Selevkidov, Moscow, 1985, p. 6. 10 L. Gumilev, Ot Rusi k Rossii, Ekopross, Moscow, 1992, p. 33. 11 Ibid., p. 34. 12 Vestnik drevney istorii, No. 3-4, 1940, p. 134. 13 Ibidem. 170 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION their old way of writing” and many of the Judaic traditions. “They still observed Shabbat and some other rites.”14 In Khazaria, a country situated on the main trade routes between the North and the South and the West and the East, the Jews gained the opportunity to be involved in transit trade: “Khazaria was an active trade partner of Persia, Kwarazm, and the Byzantine Empire in the south and with Rus, Great Bulgaria, and Great Perm in the north.”15 It should be said that since the Khazarian Khaganate was a country of nomads (cattle breeders), land-tillers, orchard growers, and fishermen, there was a niche for Jewish merchants and artisans. After amassing considerable wealth, the Jews developed political ambitions and a natural desire to convert their money into political clout. Concentrated mainly in the capital where, according to medieval travelers and geographers, “there were no brick buildings, the palace of the khan being the only exception,”16 while all other people lived in felt tents (yurtas) or wooden houses, the relatively small number of Jews became the most powerful and influential group. This happened because the Ashina dynasty had degenerated into “fainéants” (“do-nothing kings”) very much like the Merovingians (the descendants of Clovis) who were replaced by the Caro- lingians (the dynasty started by Charles Martel, the majordomo of the last king of the previous dynas- ty). His son, Pepin the Short, became king of the Franks. The Carolingians, too, did not escape the fate of the “do-nothing kings”: Hugh Capet, Duke of France, was elected as a king and started the Cape- tian dynasty (from which the Valois, Bourbons, and Orleans branched off). Here is another example from the other side of the globe. Since 1192, Japan was ruled by shoguns (military leaders) from the clans of Miyamoto, Fujiwara, and others, the emperors being merely figureheads. The Meiji Revolu- tion of 1868 put an end to this practice. What should the Jews have done in a similar situation in a country of pagans where they remained the only close-knitted group? They revived their religious and national unity to make the “weak khakan with no real power” a nominal ruler. “The state was ruled by the ‘pech’ or, rather, malik. He and his advisors were all noble Jews, the real masters of a multiethnic state and members of the most profitable trade enterprises... ‘Diarchy’ in Khazaria was a huge swindle: once every twelve months the lawful khan was presented to the people” during a pagan festival dedicated to the god Tengri. “The rest of the time the head of the Judaic community was wringing the Khazars and neighboring peoples dry to gather enough money to hire mercenaries to keep the same people in check”17 and to protect the country’s borders. This is what Lev Gumilev wrote, probably with good reason. “No one, however, tried to con- vert the local population to Judaism. The Judaic sages devotedly retained Jehovah’s covenant for the chosen people, who have now accumulated all the boons created by their dominant position.”18 The same author wrote: “There is another delusion; some think that the Khazars were converted to Judaism. This was impossible in the Middle Ages because Judaism is a gene-theistic rather than a proselytic cult; the few people converted were seen as the ‘plague of Israel’.”19 This means that the “citizens of free Khazaria” hardly hastened to synagogues to be converted to Judaism: they had enough gods to pray to, including the main god Tengri reincarnated in the khakan. “Foreigners who relied on superficial impressions to write about Khazaria” and who probably met only the Jewish rulers relied on the principle that rulers determine the faith. “They thought that all those they had met were Judaic Khazars, but neither the Jews nor the Khazars had any doubts about this.”20 If the Jews in Khazaria were Orthodox Judaists, they were unlikely to chase pagans across their camps and pastures to perform circumcision, find out whether they knew enough Hebrew to read the Torah, or whether they obeyed the halakha and kashruth.

14 L. Gumilev, Ot Rusi k Rossii, p. 34. 15 L. Gumilev, Otkrytie Khazarii, p. 3. 16 Ibidem. 17 L. Gumilev, Drevnyaya Rus i Velikaya step, p. 74. 18 Ibidem. 19 L. Gumilev, Skazanie o khazarskoy dani, available at [www.Litru.ru]. 20 L. Gumilev, Drevnyaya Rus i Velikaya step, p. 67. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 171 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It should be said that the hereditary power of the pechs (appointed by the khakans) did not last long. Everything ended in the usual way: to avoid persecutions Jews thronged in great numbers from other countries in search of cozy niches and protection until the patience of the Khazarian nobles snapped: they could not and did not want to tolerate the power of people of an alien race and alien faith any longer. In the capital, the large Jewish community became strong enough to interfere in the tribal affairs of the beks and tarkhans in an effort to replace them with their own people. This is quite natural: at all times the center seeks control over the provinces to build up a strong vertical of power, while the provinces resist for all they are worth. Indeed, if the Khazarian nobles had embraced Juda- ism, they would have never gone against the co-religionists; this would have been unthinkable. The very fact of a conflict between the ruling alien minority and the Christian, Muslim, and pagan major- ity shows that Judaism remained limited to the Jews. There are numerous medieval eyewitness accounts of the Khazarian religious patchwork. Ibn- ul-Aziz, a merchant and traveler, wrote that “the king (but not the khakan.—M.B.) was a Judaist, while his subjects were mostly followers of Muhammad and Christ; pagans were in the minority, but there were even fewer Jews.” The same author said that “in 868 (that is, 100 years after the coup ac- complished by members of the Jewish community), the Kozars adopted the law of Muhammad.”21

Jews in Power

There is no agreement on how the Jews captured power in Khazaria. Joseph ben Aaron wrote in his letter to Hasdai ibn Shaprut that Judaism “descended” on the khaganate from the sky. We cannot accept as true the legend that an angel, which appeared to the khakan as he slept, convinced him to embrace a monotheist religion. This is a more or less common subject exploited by chroniclers of many countries to prove that the faith adopted by the ruler was the true one. Normally, the storytellers described how representatives of the three Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) presented their faiths to the ruler. It seems that in Khazaria this legend was needed to add legitimacy to the military coup perpetrated by the Jews. Academician Dmitry Likhachev “has established that many of the chronicled stories never reflected the truth but were merely borrowed from earlier chron- icles or were inventions pure and simple.”22 The examples are numerous: Virgil wrote Aeneid to jus- tify the rule of Emperor Augustus by proving that he had descended from Venus. The Khazarian story resurfaced, practically word for word, in many Russian chronicles which described how Prince Vladimir adopted Byzantine Christianity in 988. As the story goes, representatives of the three Abrahamic religions arrived to present their evi- dence of the true nature of their faiths. In Ancient Russia, Orthodoxy was planted with sword, axe, and fire in which hundreds of magi and thousands of pagans perished. Khazaria escaped this fate: for a long time all religions lived peacefully side by side. In fact, the Jewish community could not use force to impose one faith on the country: its mercenaries were all Muslims. Other authors offered other stories of how the Jewish community came to power. Pavel Koko- vtsov, a prominent scholar, wrote: “A certain Jew initiated a return to Judaism; his bravery in battle was duly rewarded: the Khazars elected him their king (pech.—M.B.). Under the influence of his re- ligious wife, he decided to go back to the faith of their ancestors.”23 It seems that, having risen so high, the undaunted warrior took this for a sign of God and “changed his Turkish name to Sabriel.” This document shows that the khakan did not embrace Judaism, but that the Jews returned to the faith of ancestors. In fact, this was not the first time that the Jews had moved away from Judaism (this

21 H. Karamzin, Istoriya gosudarstva Rossiyskogo, Vol. I, Kniga, Moscow, 1988, p. 323. 22 L. Gumilev, Skazanie o khazarskoy dani. 23 P. Kokovtsov, op. cit. 172 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION happened during the Hellenic Age, at the dawn of Christianity when the situation was highly critical, and during Soviet power). Gradually, the Jewish rulers were identified with the Khazars. According to Lev Gumilev, “Bulan merely revived the Judaic traditions which the Jews had nearly forgotten and assumed the name Sabriel; in the 9th century it was wise Obadiah who instituted the coup which transferred power to the Jews. Old documents described him as ‘a wise and God-fear- ing man, trusting in his Creator with all his heart’.” The new ruler “drove the Turks (but not the khakan.—M.B.), who made up the bulk of the army, out of the country. Obadiah relied on mercenar- ies—Pechenegs and Guzes (who were Turks.—M.B.).”24 This means that the Jews probably led an uprising of the lower classes against the top crust (something similar happened during the 1917 rev- olution in Russia). The same author further wrote: “The Jewish government of Khazaria used mercenaries from Gur- gan, who were paid for the victories they won. After serving their contracted term, many of them came back rich people. Sometimes defeats were punished with death.”25 These warriors “won the battles over the Guzes on the River Yaik, over the Bulgars on the Kama, against the Burtases on the River Sakmar, and over the Savirs on the Donets. The Gurgans, however, refused to fight against the Daylemits, their co-religionists. In her article “Etapy stanovlenia iudaizma v Khazarskom kaganate” (The Stages of the Development of Judaism in the Khazarian Khaganate), Z. Lvova quotes the Bulgarian chronicle of Gazi-Baraj Tarihi (1229-1246), to which she refers as the Cambridge Document, which says, “They, the Jews, always fought alongside them and became one people with them.”26 The author further wrote: “The only thing which set the Jews apart from the Khazars was their devotion to the Commandment of circumcision and the Shabbat. ‘There was no king (pech.—M.B.) in the land of Khazaria; rather ‘they would appoint whoever achieved victory in war over themselves as chief officer of the army.’ And this went on until the day the Jews, very much as usual, went to war with them and one of them demonstrated an extraordinary force with his sword and put the enemies who attacked the Khazars to flight. According to their custom, the people of Khazaria appointed him their military leader.”27 This is a telling fact. First, this Jew “was not a convert, but a Jew by birth.” His personal bravery and self-sacrifice were the best confirmation of the loyalty of the Jewish community to the people of Khazaria. As pagans, the Khazars were indifferent to the faith of their hero. The same was registered among other pagan peoples. The Mongolian rulers from the Ilkhanid dynasty (the state of the Hulag- ids) frequently invited their Jewish subjects to rule the country. The names of several of them have reached us: Saad-ad Davla, who was responsible for the state’s domestic and foreign policy; Muhaz- zam-ad Davla, head of the administration of Tabriz, and Labid Ben Ari-r Rabi, chief administrator of Azerbaijan. Second, Joseph ben Aaron wrote that the Khazarian khakan adopted Judaism to legiti- mize power which the Jewish community had usurped through a military coup. The Cambridge Document also mentioned that the “hero of Khazaria” the people elected as their military leader was “remotely descended from the early Jewish settlers, and his wife Serakh convinced him to adopt Judaism.”28 “Under his rule, Jews from Baghdad, Horasan, and the Greek lands (the Byzantine Empire.—M.B) flocked to Khazaria.” They supported their co-religionists who came earlier to Khazaria to “strengthen their faith.” This is “indirectly confirmed by what the chron- icles say about the marriage between Aybat and a Jewess from Bukhara. Judging by what Gazi-Baraj wrote, in Tengrian society a marriage between a noble Khazar, let alone khakan, and a foreign woman of a different faith was impossible.”29 How should we treat information about the Khazarian top crust adopting Judaism? We should be brave enough to reject it as false. The same source informs us that “after appropriating the post of

24 L. Gumilev, Ot Rusi k Rossii, p. 35. 25 L. Gumilev, Drevnyaya Rus i Velikaya step, p. 70. 26 Z. Lvova, Etapy stanovleniya iudaizma v Khazarskom kaganate, available at [sir35.ru]. 27 Ibidem. 28 Ibidem. 29 Ibidem. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 173 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION bek, the Jews finally made this post hereditary. The Jewish top crust had no respect for the provincial pagan nobles who, while remaining nominally the subjects of a Turkic khakan who was close to them religiously and ethnically, fell under the power of ethnically and religiously alien people.”30 Conflict was inevitable: one spark was enough to start a major fire. A fire did break out when Ben Amin proved unable to stop the Mojars (probably the Magyars, that is, Hungarians) who were advancing on Atil. “The White Khazars (the elite.—M.B.) closed ranks around the khakan. Ben Amin was deposed and strangled while the loyal clerics were buried alive. Later the Black Khazars put a Tengrian Urus on the throne.” According to the chronicles, later “the Muslims prevailed.”31 This could be expected because the mercenaries in military service were Gurgans who professed Islam. The Jews of Khazaria were concentrated in Atil, the seat of the khakan, which is easily ex- plained by the fact that it was a center of transit trade and the main storage place, Khazeran, which shared the island with the capital of Khazaria. The Khazars did not mint their own coins, which meant that commodity-money relations in their state were undeveloped. It should be said that at that time cities were fairly small and sparsely populated. For example, Jerusalem of King David’s time covered an area of 1.5 hectares populated by about 2 thousand people. Four hundred years later, shortly before the First Temple was destroyed, there were up to 20 thousand living in the city. First, by that time the Jews had been a settled people for about 600 years and had acquired a developed urban infrastructure and a state with a vertical of power. Second, they were monotheists with a hereditary autocrat to rule them. At the time Jews arrived in their lands, the Khazars had been mostly nomads with their towns looking more like small nomadic camps than anything else protected by a rampart and a paling (rarely by a stone wall). As was already mentioned, the capital could boast only one brick building, the res- idence of the khakan; merchants, travelers, historians, and geographers never ventured too far: they preferred towns, the hubs of political and economic life, their markets, and the elite with a certain amount of purchasing power and knowledge. This explains why all of them described the capital where the khakan lived rather than the nomadic camps of his subjects. This is where history was made: he who ruled Atil ruled the country, while the nomadic nobles remained more or less free of central power. It was Genghis Khan alone who managed to rely on iron discipline and his unquestioned authority to blend the Tatar and Mongolian tribes into an empire. At all times tribal chiefs were (and remain) more or less autonomous: today this is true of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and some of the African countries. Medieval historian, geographer, and traveler Al-Istakhri wrote in his The Book of Roads and Kingdoms that in Khazaria “the Jews were in the minority, while the Muslims and Christians formed the majority.”32 This fact alone disproved what Shlomo Sand wrote about mass giur (conversion to Judaism) of the Khazarians, allegedly the ancestors of the East European Jews. The names the Jews of Khazaria chose for their children were very much in tune with the times (the same can be said about Hellenism and the Soviet period, while in America, Jews have mostly American names, in France, French, in the Netherlands, Dutch, in Germany, German, etc.).

Modern Science on Jewish Genes

Not infrequently medieval Georgia had to beat off Khazarian inroads. “A Georgian chronicle, echoing an ancient tradition, identifies them with the hosts of Gog and Magog—‘wild men with hid- eous faces and the manners of wild beasts, eaters of blood’. A well-known medieval historian Movses Kaghankatvatsi [the reputed author of a historiographical work on Caucasian Albania] refers to ‘the

30 Ibidem. 31 Ibidem. 32 N. Karamzin, op. cit., p. 323. 174 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION horrible multitude of Khazars with insolent, broad, lashless faces and long falling hair, like women.’ Lastly, Arab geographer Istakhri, one of the main Arab sources, has this to say: ‘The Khazars do not resemble the Turks. They are black-haired and are of two kinds, one called the Kara-Khazars [Black Khazars], who are swarthy verging on deep black as if they were a kind of Indian, and the white kind [Ak-Khazars], who are strikingly handsome.”33 We can surmise that the tribes described under the blanket ethnonym of “Khazars” consisted of several ethnic groups such as , , Bulgars, Magyars, , Burtases, Sabirs, , Utughurs, Kutrigurs, Kabars, etc., who probably be- longed to different races. When it comes to genetics the blunders of Shlomo Sand become even clearer. There are no Bashkirian, Hunnic, or Uyghur types (or of any other tribe) among the Jews. I have in mind the Israe- lis born from two Semitic parents and whose Semitic roots go back ten generations. The latest finding proved that all Jews, irrespective of the country they live in, descended from the Jews of the Middle East. According to latest scientific data, fifty generations (at least 1,000 years) are needed for a pop- ulation to become half mixed with another population to produce a new line. The Khazarian Khaga- nate lived under Jewish rule for slightly over 150 years, that is, not long enough to produce a new line. In fact, the Jews comprised no more that 10 percent of the Atil population. The island on which the capital stood surrounded with orchards, melon fields, and fisheries was fairly large, yet its population could not have been over 5 to 6 thousand. This means that 500-600 Jews could hardly change the ethnogenesis of the European Jewry even if they mingled with the locals. It should be said that the Jews are descendants of the orthodox minority, which for centuries practically never married outside their communities. Science confirms this. In her article “Stvolovye kletki ne mogut skryt svoyu natsionalnost” (The Stem Cells Cannot Conceal Their Nationality), A. Timosh- enko wrote: “There is a genetic passport of sorts created by nature itself which proves that members of different nations demonstrate different resistance to disease and which is responsible for different appearances and biochemical specifics. This is how genome works. For example, the very white skin typical of people of Northern Europe or the ability to digest lactose are the result of genetic selection which has been going on for hundreds of generations.”34 In his book Know Your Genes, American academic Aubrey Milunsky writes about diseases typ- ical of certain nations: “The chances that a child of yours will suffer or carry a hereditary disease” to a great, if not determining, degree depends on your ethnic origin. A high frequency of some diseases (Tay-Sachs disease and familial dysautonomia) is found among Jews. “Blacks in the United States carrying the sickle cell gene brought it with them from Africa. Now some 1 in 10 black Americans are carriers of this disorder, and a child with sickle cell anemia occurs in about 1 in 400 black births. Cystic fibrosis is the most common genetic killer of white children. About 1 in every 2,500 is born with it, and 1 in every 25 whites is a carrier, Cystic fibrosis in blacks or Orientals is positively rare. When it does occur, it is almost invariably related to white admixture somewhere in family history.”35 The American Journal of Human Genetics (3 June, 2010 issue) carried an article “Abraham’s Children in the Genome Era: Major Jewish Diaspora Populations Comprise Distinct Genetic Clusters with Shared Middle Eastern Ancestry;” the project excluded the Ethiopians known as falasha since they have nothing in common with the Jews as a nation. They can be accepted as a marginal sect which preaches a mixture of early Christianity and pre-Talmud Judaism. Ethnically, they belong to the Chad-Kushic group of the Negroid race. To dot all the “i”s, let me say that Dr. Gil Atzmon, Assistant Professor of Medicine and Genetics at Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva University, Prof. Edward Burns, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, NY; Prof. Harry Ostrer, New York University School of Medicine, New York, NY, and Eitan Friedman, Tel-Aviv University, carried out a full-scale survey of the three larg-

33 A. Koestler, op. cit., p. 20. 34 A. Timoshenko, “Stvolovye kletki ne mogut skryt svoyu natsionalnost,” available at [www.newsland.ru]. 35 A. Milunsky, Know Your Genes, Houghtom Mifflin, 1977, p. 71. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 175 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION est Jewish populations: the Ashkenazi (the Jews of Eastern and Central Europe), Sephardic (the Jews of Italy, Greece, and Turkey), and Mizrahi (the Jews of Iran, Iraq, and Syria). The genetic material was obtained from 237 persons living in New York, Seattle, Athens, Rome, and Israel, each of whom was a descendant of one of the groups. To better understand the relatedness of current Jewish groups, Dr. Ostrer and his colleagues performed a genome wide analysis of 418 representatives of non-Jewish groups. The researchers identified distinct Jewish population clusters each exhibiting a shared Middle Eastern ancestry which set them apart from the non-Jewish population (these distinctions date back to hoary antiquity). Ge- netic analysis demonstrated that the two major groups, Middle Eastern Jews and European Jews, were timed to have diverged from each other approximately 2,500 years ago. Dr. Ostrer noted, “The study supports the idea of a Jewish people linked by a shared genetic history.”36 Blue eyes and blond hair among the Ashkenazi are the result of a recessive gene which frequent- ly betrays itself in isolated populations such as the Nuristanis of Afghanistan (160 thousand of them live high up in the mountains) and people living in mountain auls in Daghestan. The above-mentioned authors have given dates for when the main Jewish populations began to form as independent commu- nities. The Iranian and Iraqi Jews formed independent communities in Babylon and the Persian Empire in the 6th and 4th centuries B.C., respectively. The Jewish populations in the Balkans, Italy, North Africa, and Syria appeared in Antiquity; later they mixed with Sephardic Jews who, after being evict- ed from Spain and Portugal in the late 15th century, came to the Balkans. The Ashkenazi Jews were genetically incredibly homogenous, which means that they all descended from an extremely small group. The scholars concluded that, although divided into several population groups, the Jews of the world have common origins.37 The Mountain Jews belong to the Jewish population of the world; “having studied the Jews who moved to the Caucasus from Hither Asia,” anthropologist L. Oshanin concluded that “all of them exhibited obvious specifics of the Hither Asian type.”38 Gregory Cochran, Jason Hardy, and Henry Harpending have demonstrated that “the Ashkenazi Jews have the highest average IQ of any ethnic group,” which they explained by “disease clusters, groups of biochemically related mutations … that have physiological effects that could increase intelligence … and are not common in adjacent populations.”39 This reliably disproves the Khazarian theory of the origin of the Ashkenazi Jews as another unfounded hypothesis.

Conclusion

History is a living science which changes as time goes on and produces more and more knowledge. New facts compel us to reassess what looked to be unassailable truths. Today we know that historical chronicles and legends require a critical approach because, even in the distant past, ideology warped historical truths, negative information was suppressed, and facts and figures were distorted. Most rulers shared a very understandable human failing: they wanted to look great in the eyes of the posterity and bought the services of chroniclers and court poets. Each of them hoped to go down

36 N. Lebedev, “Genetiki dokazali edinstvo evreev,” available at [www.jewish.ru] (see also: [http:// www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/06/100603123707.htm]). 37 See: N. Lebedev, op. cit. 38 Quoted from: R. Kasimova, Antrologicheskie issledovania sovremennogo naseleniya Azerbaidzhanskoy SSR, Baku, 1975, p. 45. 39 G. Cochran, J. Hardy, H. Harpending, “Natural History of Ashkenazi Intelligence,” Department of Anthropolo- gy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA, available at [http://harpending.humanevo.utah.edu/Documents/ ashkiq.webpub.pdf]. 176 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in history as a wise and fair “father of all the tribes and peoples” who had the prosperity of his subjects close at heart. This is what happened to our recent past, which is being successfully revised; the same should be done with the history of the distant past—much in it should be assessed in line with current knowl- edge and technology. We should always bear in mind that the migration processes that occurred in antiquity and the Middle Ages differed little from what we see today. At that time, they were accom- panied both by conquests of territories and peoples, as well as by the peaceful settlement of nomad cattle breeders, merchants, and artisans in new places. In fact, assimilation at that time and today was very similar: either the newcomers completely assimilated or they remained isolated and rejected. Aliens were feared and avoided; sometimes they were elevated to high posts to serve the new country. Contrary to religious bans, biological assimilation went on, albeit on a small scale. This has nothing to do with Judaism, which was never inclined to proselytism (with the excep- tion of one case when under Maccabees Judaism was imposed on a small tribe of Edomites closely related to the Jews). The Jews avoided proselytism at all times and regardless of where they lived. This means that the small Judaic community of Khazaria could hardly have imposed its religion on the subjects of the Khazarian khakan. Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 177 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Index THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Vol. 5, 2011

Author Article No. Pp.

GEOPOLITICS

Jannatkhan CENTRAL EURASIA THROUGH EYVAZOV THE PRISM OF SECURITY: A REGIONAL SYSTEM OR A SUBSYSTEM? 1-2 6

Arbakhan MAGOMEDOV, Ruslan THE SOUTH STREAM VS. NABUCCO: NIKEROV THE “PIPELINE WAR” GAINS MOMENTUM 1-2 15

Zurab THE PHENOMENON OF MARSHANIA POST-BIPOLAR REGIONALISM IN EUROPE 1-2 23

Beka GEORGIAN NATIONALISM TODAY: CHEDIA FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1-2 34

Farhad GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AND HUSEYNOV INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 3-4 6

Rovshan TURKISH-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AND IBRAHIMOV TURKEY’S POLICY IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS 3-4 14 178 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Author Article No. Pp.

GEO-ECONOMICS

Marina ON THE INSTITUTIONAL ACHELASHVILI INFRASTRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE POST-COMMUNIST CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 1-2 42

Amil MAGERRAMOV, Hajiaga ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL FOR RUSTAMBEKOV REALIZING NATIONAL INTERESTS 1-2 54

Rovshan ENERGY RESOURCE TRANSPORTATION IBRAHIMOV BY COUNTRIES WITH NO ACCESS TO THE OPEN SEA (AN AZERBAIJAN CASE STUDY) 1-2 63

Ramaz SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ABESADZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1-2 70

Vladimer ON THE FIRST-GENERATION PAPAVA POST-COMMUNIST REFORMS OF GEORGIA’S ECONOMY (A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS) 3-4 20

Kamran FACTORS DETERMINING EYYUBOV THE DIFFERENCES IN FDI INFLOWS INTO AZERBAIJAN’S AND RUSSIA’S OIL SECTORS AFTER INDEPENDENCE 3-4 30

Alexander TVALCHRELIDZE, Avtandil GEORGIA’S FRESH MINERAL SILAGADZE WATER FOR EUROPE 3-4 43

Solomon THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS AND PAVLIASHVILI GEORGIA 3-4 54

Elene CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION CHIKOVANI, IN GEORGIA: Mariam CHANGES, OUTCOMES, AVALIANI AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 3-4 62

Elguja TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMY: MEKVABISHVILI THE PROSPECTS FOR FORMING AND DEVELOPING AN INNOVATIVE ECONOMY IN GEORGIA 3-4 71 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 179 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Author Article No. Pp.

GEOCULTURE

Rauf BELIEFS, CUSTOMS, AND RITES OF HUSEIN-ZADE 7TH-12TH CENTURY TURKS (According to Syrian Sources) 1-2 87

Rauf THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT FROM GARAGOZOV, THE POSTMODERNIST PERSPECTIVE: Rena CULTURAL GROUNDS FOR KADYROVA BIASED INTERPRETATIONS 1-2 102

Roland THE ETHNIC SITUATION TOPCHISHVILI IN THE CAUCASUS: PAST AND PRESENT 1-2 111

Rauf MEMORY, EMOTIONS, GARAGOZOV, AND BEHAVIOR OF THE MASSES Rena IN AN ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT: KADYROVA NAGORNO-KARABAKH 3-4 77

Sudaba THE FORMATION OF WEST SLAVIC ZEYNALOVA ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN THE CAUCASUS (19TH-BEGINNING OF 20TH CENTURIES) 3-4 89

GEOHISTORY

Jamil HOW THE CAUCASIAN BUREAU OF HASANLI THE C.C. R.C.P. (B.) DISCUSSED THE KARABAKH ISSUE IN 1920-1923 1-2 119

David SOME ASPECTS OF GEORGIAN HISTORY MUSKHELISHVILI IN THE LIGHT OF ARMENIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 1-2 148

Vasif TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AZERBAIJAN GAFAROV AT THE TURKISH-RUSSIAN TALKS OF 1921 (The Moscow and Kars Conferences) 1-2 157

Aydin THE CAUCASUS IN THE 15TH CENTURY ASLANOV (600th Anniversary of the Azeri Kara Koyunlu State) 1-2 168

Jamil NAGORNO-KARABAKH: OLD DELUSIONS AND HASANLI NEW INTERPRETATIONS 3-4 102

Zurab THE BYZANTINE COMMONWEALTH AND PAPASKIRI THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE GEORGIAN POLITICAL UNITS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 10TH CENTURY 3-4 126 180 Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Author Article No. Pp.

Parvin THE GEOHISTORICAL PRINCIPLES AND DARABADI SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN THE MUSLIM EAST AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST 3-4 144

Irina WESTERN ADIGHES AND BABICH COSSACKS: TOGETHER AND SEPARATELY IN EUROPEAN EMIGRATION (1919-THE 1930S) 3-4 150

Moshe BEKKER JEWS IN KHAZARIA 3-4 167