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The Fractured Subject: Deleuze’s Response to Kant

Abstract: I offer an interpretation of ’s claim that the subject is fundamentally fractured, drawing on his response to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Paralogisms. I will argue that Deleuze accepts Kant’s claims that (1) our judgments are the result of the spontaneous exercise of the understanding, and that (2) , as a sensible form of objects, cannot be derived from the form of . This makes Deleuze out to be more Kantian in his account of judgment and of temporal objects than has heretofore been appreciated. My primary task in what follows, however, is to reconstruct Deleuze’s argument in favor of the claim that the subject is, most fundamentally, fractured by the form of time. My thesis is that Deleuze’s argument is persuasive.

Keywords: Deleuze; Kant; time; subject; spontaneity; passivity

A fractured, or split, subject is one whose self-understanding contains two aspects such that the subject is indissociably both but cannot grasp how the two aspects are both characteristics of one and the same . The fracture in the subject that we will be interested is between the subject insofar as it thinks (the ‘thinking I’) and the subject insofar as it exists (the

‘existing Me’). We can get this fracture in view with an example: when I say ‘I’, I mean to refer to myself as a particular being; but what I express is something that is common to every self- conscious subject, or to every thinking I. I, then, have indissociably two aspects: I am this particular being, and I am an I. If the only resource I had available to me for grasping their unity were whatever content is contained in ‘I’, then I could not grasp how those two aspects characterized one and the same being: all I could grasp was what is common to every thinking being; I could not reach all the way to the particular being that I (also) am, and grasp how that being is an I.1 In my understanding of myself, I would not be able to grasp my unity; I would be fractured.

1 This example is one of Hegel’s favorites (cf., e.g., Hegel 1977: ¶101-2). It is worth noting that Hegel, at least, thought that the resources contained in ‘I’ did suffice to grasp the unity of this particular being and self- (what is expressed by ‘I’) (cf. Hegel 2010: 12.16ff.). But if ‘I’ refers only to the self-consciousness common to every thinking being, it is difficult to see how it could also be the source of whatever specifies one individual thinking being. 2

Of course, it is reasonable to think that we have many more resources than just those contained in ‘I’ for understanding my unity. And I will not rest any weight on this brief example; it is merely illustrative of our topic.

That topic, the fractured subject, was especially significant in 20th Century . Many different philosophers in that tradition worked out views on which the subject was fractured. They offered very different views on what fractured the subject, and on what implications we should draw from the fracture. But the that the subject was, most fundamentally, fractured, was fairly common. In this essay, my focus will be on Gilles Deleuze’s understanding of the fractured subject.

The topic of the fractured subject was introduced into philosophy before the 20th Century.

The most important, and perhaps the first, discussion of the topic prior to the last century occurred in Kant. Kant discussed the fracture in terms of a paradox of inner sense. According to

Kant, we are conscious of ourselves as the active or spontaneous source of the combination of our representations in judgment. But that consciousness of ourselves is not consciousness of ourselves as an ; it is a purely formal consciousness, a consciousness that accompanies or at least can accompany our consciousness of any object whatever. Nevertheless, Kant recognized that we are also conscious of ourselves as an object. He thought that meant that we are conscious of ourselves insofar as we appear to ourselves through a form of intuition, in this case inner sense. As he puts it, ‘through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by our selves, i.e., as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our own subject only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself’ (B156).2 The most important part of this for our purposes is that we cannot grasp how the active, thinking I is the same as the passive,

2 Citations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason will use the standard A/B pagination, and follow the Cambridge translations. 3

existing Me that appears as an object. They must be the same, but we cannot grasp how the two characteristics are characteristics of the same being. Hence, Kant’s subject is fractured.

Deleuze credits Kant with having discovered the fracture in the subject, and in particular praises Kant’s idea that the ‘pure and empty form of time’ is responsible for that fracture (cf.

1994: 116-23/85-91).3 Surprisingly, not much critical commentary has been written about

Deleuze’s account of the fractured subject, or of the way in which his account draws on Kant.4

There is, to be sure, a lively debate, within scholarship on Deleuze, between those who think his work is heavily indebted to Kant and those who do not. In this essay, I will not try to wade into this more general debate, focusing instead exclusively on the relation between Deleuze and Kant on the topic of the fractured subject. On this topic, at least, it is obvious that Deleuze is very heavily indebted to Kant.

The bulk of commentary on Deleuze’s idea of the fractured subject relates it to his doctrine of the three passive syntheses of time, because his discussion of the fractured subject occurs in a discussion of the third passive synthesis. My argument in what follows will instead focus on his claims about the fractured subject in their own right, as I believe he has an argument in favor of the fractured subject which can be separated from the much more difficult account of

3 For references to Deleuze: translations are my own, though I have consulted the extant English translations. The year refers to the year of publication of the English edition cited in the bibliography; page references are to the French edition followed by the English edition as cited in the bibliography. Wherever a reference contains a year and no author name, the author is Deleuze. 4 The critical guides to and Repetition all discuss the topic, though most do no more than provide some background on Kant (and Descartes, , Shakespeare, etc.) that Deleuze is more or less taking for granted in his argument. One extensive treatment that I will not be able to discuss in this essay is that put forward by James Williams – Williams takes it that the subject fractured is not the thinking subject, but rather anything that can in any way said to be active or passive in relation to any process (cf. Williams 2011: 5, 27-9, 90). So, a rock eroding over time is a fractured subject on his reading. The relevant passages about the fractured subject strongly suggest a focus on the thinking subject, as Williams admits, but he finds reasons to doubt that appearance in his overall interpretation of Deleuze’s project and space does not permit me to respond to those reasons; so, I set Williams’s view aside. 4

the three passive syntheses. Further, most of the critical commentary is simply trying to get a handle on what Deleuze is claiming. This is reasonable, as Deleuze’s texts are hard to pin down due to his constantly shifting vocabulary and his seemingly endless allusions to thinkers.5

My project in what follows will not primarily consist in trying to make plain what Deleuze thought. Building off of some excellent work that others (especially Joe Hughes and Henry

Somers-Hall) have done to clarify what Deleuze means, in this essay my primary task will be to offer an argument in favor of Deleuze’s claim.

Deleuze credits Kant with the discovery of the fractured subject, but he nevertheless thinks that Kant betrayed his own discovery. On his reading, Kant makes the fracture in the subject logically posterior to unity of the subject. The thinking I is, for Kant, unified, and that unity is logically prior to, and indeed a condition on the intelligibility of, any appearances of the subject through inner sense. Moreover, time (which fractures the subject) is unified through being determined by the thinking I. As a result, the fracture in the subject can only be made sense of by appealing to a prior unity in the thinking subject. Thus, though Kant’s subject is fractured, it has a prior unity in the of the thinking I. Deleuze argues that this is inconsistent with

Kant’s thought that the form of inner sense cannot have its source in the nature of the thinking I, because (as Kant puts it) ‘the I that I think… differ[s] from the I that intuits itself (for I can represent other kinds of intuition as at least possible)’ (B155). So, Deleuze argues that the fracture in the subject is logically prior to the unity in the thinking I, and he does so on what he takes to be Kantian grounds.

5 Daniela Voss’s account of the third synthesis is a good example of a commentary that provides helpful background for Deleuze’s account and interprets Deleuze’s claim that the subject is fractured entirely in light of his of the third synthesis of time: cf. Voss 2013. 5

In what follows, I will explore Deleuze’s account of the fractured subject, especially focusing on his relation to Kant. I will argue that Deleuze accepts Kant’s claims that (1) our judgments are the result of the spontaneous exercise of the understanding (the thinking I), and that (2) the form in which objects appear, time, cannot be deduced from the thinking I. This makes Deleuze out to be more Kantian in his account of judgment and of temporal objects than is typical.6 My primary task in what follows, however, is to reconstruct Deleuze’s argument in favor of the claim that the subject is, most fundamentally, fractured by the form of time. My thesis is that Deleuze’s argument is persuasive.

§1 The Fractured Subject – A Preliminary Account

Before diving into an intricate discussion of the relation between Kant and Deleuze, it might help to introduce a preliminary account of what is meant by ‘fractured subject’ and some of the philosophical significance of the idea. This account will need to be made more precise, and the picture it presents will need to be justified in what follows. It is also important to keep in that, according to Deleuze, Kant accepts that the subject is fractured, though for him the of a fractured subject is logically posterior to the concept of a unified subject. So, what I say in this section will be accepted by both Kant and Deleuze (according to Deleuze); I will explain where they differ in §6

The fracture that both find within the subject is between the I insofar as it thinks and the I insofar as it exists. I will refer to the former as the thinking I; in the discussions of this by such authors as Sartre and Deleuze, this is often referred to simply as the ‘Je’. I will refer to the latter

6 For instance, contrast my claim with what has been said by Manuel Delanda, in his 2002. He reads Kant in a way that is thoroughly shaped by contemporary philosophy of science, and his account of Deleuze on temporal objects lays little to no stress on the importance of the active thinking I. 6

as the existing Me; often simply ‘Moi’. To get a preliminary handle on this distinction, it is helpful to refer to Sartre’s distinction between non-positional self-consciousness (the thinking I) and positional self-consciousness (the existing Me). I am non-positionally conscious of myself when I sense the table in front of me, as also when I judge that the table is brown. I am positionally conscious of myself when I reflect on my sensation as mine, or as had by Me, or when I reflect on the fact that the judgment is made by Me. In the latter cases, my self figures as the content or object of my consciousness; in the former, it does not.7

We can also put the point about the relation between the thinking I and the existing Me in terms of the relation between the science that studies the thinking I and the science that studies the existing Me. As classically understood, logic is an account of the nature of thinking, and so an account of the nature of the thinking I. Psychology, on the other hand, is an account of the nature of the , or the subject as an existing Me. The claim that the subject is fractured is the claim that the science of logic and the science of psychology must be irreducibly different from one another.

This claim may sound either uninteresting or obvious: after all, a hallmark of twentieth century philosophy was purifying logic from psychology, thereby separating the two sciences.

This was a preoccupation of at least one important phase of Husserl’s work.8 And it was central to Frege’s new conception of logic.9 To get at what’s interesting in the theme of the fractured subject, it will help to contrast it with a version of the claim that logic and psychology are different where that claim does not entail any fracture in the subject. I will focus on Frege’s, as it is the simplest.

7 Cf. Sartre 1956: 9-17. Actually, Sartre’s terminology is more complicated, given his distinction between positional and thetic consciousness, but the added complexity is of no significance for our purposes. 8 Cf. Husserl 1975 and Derrida 2003. 9 Indeed, it is one of his three fundamental in The Foundations of Arithmetic: cf. Frege 1980: x. 7

As Frege understood it, logic is the most general science, the science of thinking truly about what is in general. So described, he claims, logic is a set of rules that ought to govern us when we judge, no what we judge about.10 But these rules do not determine the nature of our thinking – they set norms for how we should think, but do not define a standard that is internal to or definitive of our thinking. Precisely not, Frege thinks: to say that logic governs how we do think, that it determines the nature of our thinking activity as such, would be to turn logic into psychology and thereby vitiate its purity as an a priori science of the laws of .11

In contrast, the claim that logic and psychology are irreducible to one another that emerges from an account of the fractured subject accepts the traditional characterization of logic as determining the nature of our activity of thinking. This follows from Kant’s claim (examined in §2) that any combination of representations in a judgment (or judgments) has its source in the activity of the I think. So, for instance, the rules for combining judgments to form inferences flow from the nature of the activity of thinking. Those rules are not mere norms on how we should think if we wish to reach the truth – they define the activity of thinking itself, determine it in its nature.12

10 ‘In one sense a law asserts what is; in the other it prescribes what ought to be. Only in the latter sense can the laws of logic be called 'laws of thought': so far as they stipulate the way in which one ought to think. … [The laws of logic] have a special title to the name "laws of thought" only if we mean to assert that they are the most general laws, which prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think at all’ (Frege 1964: 12). 11 ‘But the expression “laws of thought” seduces us into supposing that these laws govern thinking in the same way as laws of nature govern events in the external world. In that case they can be nothing but laws of psychology: for thinking is a mental process. … [T]he laws of truth are not psychological laws: they are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never displace. It is because of this that they have authority for our thought if it were to attain to truth. They do not bear the relation to thought that the laws of grammar bear to language; they do not make explicit the nature of our human thinking and change as it changes’ (Frege 1964: 12-13). As the last sentence makes evident, Frege sees no room for a conception of logic on which it makes explicit the nature of our human thinking (and so is internally related to psychology) and retains its status as articulating the laws of truth. 12 For helpful, contrasting accounts of Kant on which how we actually think is determined by the laws of logic, cf. Tolley 2006 and Newton 2018. 8

And yet, according to the claim that the subject is fractured, logic is not identical with psychology. To say that logic is not identical with psychology, in this context, is to say that an account of the activity of thinking is not an account of the nature of my soul (insofar as I can have of my soul). It thus threatens the unity of the human: there is a gap between our rationality and our nature as an existing being. This, then, is the philosophical significance of the fractured subject: in our nature, we are determined by the laws of logic and by the laws of psychology, but the two sets of laws are irreducibly different from one another. How can we make sense of the unity of the subject if it is governed by irreducibly different laws?

§2 Kant and Deleuze on the Spontaneity of Judgment

According to Kant and Deleuze, the subject cannot understand how the thinking I can be the very same being as the existing Me. To substantiate this claim, and make it more precise, we need to give an account of the two aspects of the subject. In this section, I will outline how Kant and Deleuze understand the thinking I. The most important feature is that the thinking I is active or spontaneous, and more specifically the source of the synthesis of representations in judgment.

Kant’s focus is on the cognitive subject, in particular the faculties that we possess in virtue of which we can have knowledge of the world. For our purposes, the faculty to focus on in the first instance is Kant’s conception of the understanding, the paradigmatic exercise of which is in judgment (cf. A69/B94). The judgments on which Kant is focused in the Critique of Pure

Reason are theoretical, which means that we determine objects through these judgments without thereby causing the objects to exist – the objects we form theoretical judgments about are there anyway, whatever we judge about them (cf. Bix-x). So, for example, the tree is there whether I know it or not, and my theoretical knowledge does not cause any trees to exist. It follows that 9

there is an aspect of receptivity in theoretical knowledge: what we know must be given to us or at least must be able to be given to us in order for us to know it (cf. A19/B33).

The involvement of the understanding, however, also has a spontaneous aspect.

According to Kant, all theoretical judgment is a result of the activity of the understanding.

Consider, for instance, my judgment that the fall is over three hundred feet. I judge that the fall is over three hundred feet because I take it that it is. My judging is not there anyway, irrespective of what I take to be true; it is dependent upon my taking it to be true. If you convinced me that I did not have good reasons for the judgment, then I would cease judging it, and the judgment would cease to be. Consequently, though the object judged about is not made actual by the understanding, the judgment itself is. This means that the judgment is not given to the understanding; rather, it is the result of the activity of the understanding. Hence, all theoretical judgment involves the spontaneity of the understanding.

Kant argues that the understanding must be spontaneous in judgment at the beginning of the B-Deduction: ‘all combination… is an action of the understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis in order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves’ (B130; cf. A103). In the literature on Kant, there has been a great deal of debate about the significance of this claim.

The debate concerns how best to interpret the relationship between the Transcendental

Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction. It is uncontroversial that Kant thinks that the synthesis of representations in judgment is the result of the spontaneity of the thinking I. But it seems like Kant is arguing that the manner in which any manifold of representations hangs together, even in an intuition, is the result of the spontaneity of the thinking I. Some argue that, 10

according to Kant, time considered as a form of intuition is not unified by the thinking I; rather, only something derivative upon that (as, for instance, the representation of time as a formal object) owes its unity to the thinking I.13 Others argue that, according to Kant, time even as a form of intuition owes its synthetic unity (the fact that, despite the manifold of different , they are all related to one another within one order of time) to the thinking I.14 I suspect the exegetical dispute has gotten sufficiently sophisticated and technical that we cannot easily place

Deleuze on one side or the other.15 My focus (with one exception that I will note shortly) will be on the relation between the thinking I and judging. In that context, this debate about how best to interpret Kant does not matter, as both sides grant that judgmental synthesis stems from the spontaneity of the understanding.

It is quite plain from Deleuze’s commentaries on Kant and Hume that he was aware of

Kant’s argument for the claim that the synthesis of representations in judgment is the result of the spontaneity of the thinking I. In his discussion of Hume, for instance, he notes that Hume has no explanation for how the associations that govern my representations can yield representations of objects. This is not a problem for Kant, Deleuze sees, because the rules that govern the active syntheses of representations in judgment are the very rules that determine what it is to be an object (cf. 1991: 125/111 and 1984: 21-2/12-3). So, Deleuze was clearly aware of Kant’s argument that the thinking I is spontaneous in synthesizing its representations.16 But does he endorse it?

13 cf., e.g., Allison 2004 and Allais 2015. 14 cf. Longuenesse 1998 and Land 2015. 15 The most relevant passage I can find is Deleuze 1984: 43-4/ix. I believe it suggests the latter interpretation. 16 Here I oppose Christian Kerslake’s claim that Deleuze, in his reading of Kant, thinks of the understanding (the thinking I) as having a unity on which no synthesis depends (cf. Kerslake 2009: 220-1). The passage I reference in the paragraph and the one I go on to quote about Sartre show that Kerslake must be wrong. Kerslake supports his reading by appealing to Deleuze’s claim in his book on Kant that imagination alone is responsible for the synthesis, while the understanding is responsible for the objective purport of the synthesis (cf. 1984: 24-5/14-5). Deleuze’s 11

We can see that he does in a criticism of Sartre that Deleuze makes in .

In the ‘The Transcendence of the Ego’, Sartre claims that the unity of different representations stems from the unity of what they represent such that there is no longer any need for ‘a transcendental I’ to unify ‘all my and all my ’ (Sartre 2004: 3-4). On the basis of noting that consciousness needs no synthetic power, Sartre concludes that the I or the

Ego is explained in terms of the nature of consciousness, and not the reverse.17

In the Logic of Sense, Deleuze objects to this by noting that ‘A consciousness is nothing without synthesis of unification, but there is no synthesis of unification of consciousness without the form of the I…’ (1990: 124/102; cf. also 1990: 139-42/114-7, 128/105 and 2001: 4/25-6).18

That is, the unity of consciousness, as it is present in different perceptions and thoughts, cannot be provided for by the object that transcends consciousness – it must be provided for by a synthetic activity of the I. As Deleuze’s language makes plain, he means to agree with Kant that any conscious representation of an object is dependent upon the thinking I’s power to combine different representations of that same object with one another, thereby giving unity in one stroke to both itself and its object. This entails that there is no consciousness, and so no object present to consciousness, without the activity of the thinking I. It follows that he thinks that the synthesis of representations in judgment is the result of the spontaneity of the thinking I.19

point is that there can be syntheses, produced by the imagination, which are not unified by the understanding, but rather unified by other faculties (like reason and desire) or itself the source of its own unity. About syntheses with objective purport, Deleuze thinks they depend of the unity in virtue of which they have objective purport, and so thinks they are dependent on the understanding. 17 cf. Sartre 2004: 4-5, 9.

18 The quoted passage is targeted explicitly at Sartre, but Deleuze means for this criticism to extend to phenomenology in general, and especially also Husserl (cf., e.g., 1990: 138/113). For a helpful treatment of how this criticism works when applied to Husserl, cf. Beistegui 2010: 82-7. 19 Somers-Hall is the only commentator with whom I am familiar to give Deleuze’s response to Sartre the significance it deserves in assessing Deleuze’s attempt to explain our capacity to represent objects: cf. Somers-Hall 2012: 29ff. 12

So, I have shown that Deleuze agrees with Kant. But why think either of them are right?

What is the merit of the view they both share? I will conclude this section by examining Kant’s argument for the view that the thinking I is the source of the synthesis of representations in a judgment, an argument that Deleuze accepts.

To understand the argument for their shared view, we have to make two preliminary points. First, we have to distinguish between the synthesis of representations effected by the thinking I and what is represented: my representation of the fall and my representation of its height are synthesized in my judgment, but that synthesis is not identical to the fall’s being over three hundred feet. For the fall is over three hundred feet whether I represent it to be so or not.

Second, the synthesis of representations is a representation of the component representations as combined in the object: that is, in my judgment, I represent the fall and I represent a height, and the judgment is a synthesis of those representations such that it represents the fall as having that height.

Having made these points, we can now ask whether the synthesis of representations can be something given, a feature of some representation or some object that is existentially independent of my representation of it. Perhaps, for instance, my representation of the fall and of the height can have the of being combined, such that that property obtains whether or not I represent it. Call this proposal ‘Associationism’. According to it, my representation of the fall is associated with my representation of a certain height, such that when I have the first representation I also have the second. On reflection, I can then represent this association, and thereby represent a synthesis of my representations. But the synthesis is given to me, not the result of the activity of the thinking I. What is wrong with Associationism? 13

According to Associationism, what I represent is a synthesis of my representations: I represent that my representation of the fall is associated with my representation of a certain height. But I do not represent that association as having anything to do with the object I am supposed to be judging about. That is, my representation of the combination is a representation of something about me and my associative dispositions. We might formulate it as: I am so disposed as to represent a certain height when I represent that fall. This is not a representation of the fall as having a certain height. As a result, Associationism cannot explain how we represent the fall as having the height; the synthesis of my representations that is responsible for that cannot be given.

Associationism, as I have defined it, is a claim about the synthesis of representations as they are taken up in judgment. But the synthesis itself occurs prior to judgment; it is a synthesis of what Kant would have regarded as intuitive representations, or a perceptual synthesis: the synthesis that relates my of the top, middle, and bottom of the fall, for instance. One might wonder whether Deleuze thinks that this kind of synthesis is independent of the activity of the thinking I.

The response to Sartre quoted above indicates that he cannot.20 To repeat the most important bit, ‘there is no synthesis of unification of consciousness without the form of the I’.

The idea here is plain. Consciousness involves a manifold of representations with objective purport. The unity of those representations, such that they can together refer to one object, can only come about, Deleuze claims, through the I.

20 Joe Hughes, in his very helpful commentary on the relation between Husserl and Deleuze, makes this point persuasively by considering in some detail what Deleuze says about passive synthesis across his works: cf. Hughes 2008: 11-2 and 78-9. 14

Sartre himself, however, is no Associationist. Sartre’s idea, at least as Deleuze understands it, is that the objects of which we are conscious serve as unifiers of the manifold representations we have of them. So, Sartre thinks the synthesis can be given to us in the object: that is, I represent the fall as having a certain height in virtue of receiving not only those representations but also their relation to one another. This proposal cannot work either, as

Deleuze saw. The representation of the synthesis is a representation of both the fall and the height. So, it is a synthesis of my representations, and not just a representation of a synthesis in the object. On Sartre’s proposal, the synthesis would just be another representation, one that represented features of the object but did not contain the synthesis of my representations of the fall and the height.

Associationism rightly grants that the synthesis is a synthesis of my representations, but was unable to make sense of that synthesis as a representation of the object. Sartre’s proposal can make sense of the synthesis as a representation of the object, but cannot make sense of it as a synthesis of my representations. The object may well be the source of the unity of properties, we might say, but it cannot be the source of the unity of the representations of those properties.

Consciousness must unify its representations; the object cannot do it for consciousness – as

Deleuze notes in his response to Sartre.21

So, the synthesis of representations must have its source in or flow from the activity of representing it. It cannot be given, but must rather be the result of the spontaneity of the thinking

I.

§3 Is My Deleuze Too Juridical?

21 For a more worked out account of Kant’s argument in §15 along these lines, cf. Kitcher 2011. 15

In the previous section, I argued that Deleuze accepts Kant’s claim that the thinking I is the source of the synthesis of representations in judgment, and I explored Kant’s argument for that claim. But one might object to my reading of Deleuze that it makes Deleuze’s project too

‘juridical,’ or that it implies that he has a concern with the possibility of explaining the validity of our judgments. That the thinking I is the source of the synthesis of representations is Kant’s opening move in the Transcendental Deduction, a Deduction which has the task of securing our right to use the categories in judgments about spatiotemporal objects. Deleuze is explicitly hostile to any ‘philosophy of the categories,’ and he is also explicitly hostile to a philosophy which takes as its principal task explaining judgment insofar as it aims at truth (cf., e.g., 1994:

48-50/32-3, 170-3/130-2). And when Deleuze praises Kant for introducing the fractured subject, he precisely praises him for opening up the possibility of a different task for philosophy, though he also notes that Kant failed to realize that possibility (cf. 1994: 177-9/135-7). So, it seems like

I am starting off badly, with my focus on the spontaneity of the thinking I, by enlisting Deleuze in a philosophical project he explicitly and repeatedly rejected.22

In fact, I do not mean to enlist Deleuze in the ‘juridical’ project of explaining the the validity of our judgments. To be sure, on my view, Deleuze, like Kant, is concerned with the conditions under which judgment is valid.23 And, like Kant, he understands this concern to be simultaneously and indissociably a concern with the possibility of the objects that we and with the possibility of judging about those objects. But, unlike Kant, he is not concerned to explain the legitimacy of our judgments about those objects.

22 My thanks to two anonymous reviewers for pressing this objection. 23 Hughes puts this point quite well: ‘The attempt to establish a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uses of representation seems to be the ultimate aim of Difference and Repetition, and perhaps of Deleuze’s philosophy in this middle period as a whole’ (Hughes 2008: 119). 16

We can see these three commitments, for instance, from the project of The Logic of

Sense. That work seeks to describe the logic of sense, where sense is understood as ‘inseparably the expressible or the expressed of the , and the attribute of the state of affairs

(choses). It turns one side to the things (choses) and one side to the . … It is precisely the border between propositions and things’ (1990: 34/22.). Sense is a condition on the possibility of our representations and of the objects that we represent. But Deleuze does not think that sense should be defined in terms of what it makes possible (cf. 1990: 28/18). That is, he does not think that sense should be defined in terms of its contribution to the validity of our judgments. Rather, sense has its own nature, as a ‘border’, a nature that is to be sure responsible for the possibility that we can judge truly about objects, but which is not defined in terms of that.

And Deleuze is interested in exploring the nature of that border in its own right.

In other places, Deleuze talks about the logic of sense in more Kantian terminology as

‘the transcendental’ or as ‘the transcendental field’.24 And one of his favorite criticisms of Kant, or at least one of his most frequent criticisms of Kant, is that Kant explained the transcendental by reference to the empirical which it conditions or makes possible. As Deleuze puts it briefly, in a late essay, when one defines the transcendental in terms of its relation to a subject or an object,

‘the transcendental is entirely denatured, for it then simply redoubles the empirical (as with

Kant)’ (2001: 5/27; for a few other instances of this criticism, cf. 1990: 29-30/18-9, 118-20/97-9;

1994: 177-9/135-7, 209-10/161). As this criticism makes plain, Deleuze is interested in the domain of the transcendental, which is what makes representations of objects and objects themselves possible. But exclusively focusing on that fact about the transcendental (he claims) distorts our understanding of it.

24 For the link between sense and the transcendental, cf. 1990: 129-30/105. 17

In the previous section, I argued that Deleuze accepts Kant’s point that the thinking I is spontaneous. Kant makes that point in order to explain how we might legitimately employ the categories. The transcendental, for Kant, is thereby defined as that which secures the possibility of the legitimate use of the categories. Deleuze makes the same point in order to explain, typically against Sartre and other phenomenologists, that we can only really explore the transcendental if we leave behind judgment, as a kind of thinking that requires the synthetic activity of the thinking I. I have not yet offered any reason to think Deleuze’s understanding of the transcendental is a profitable one; but his idea of it is indebted to his Kantian understanding that the thinking I is spontaneous.

§4 The Existing Me

Having outlined the character of the thinking I, we should turn to the existing Me.

According to both Kant and Deleuze, the existing Me is determined by a form, time, that does not have its source in the thinking I.

Kant arrives at this conclusion about the existing Me by noting a limitation on the activity of the thinking I. The thinking I does not originally contain any contentful representations of objects. As Kant puts it, ‘through the I, as a simple representation, nothing manifold is given; it can only be given in the intuition, which is distinct from it…’ (B135). I can only judge objects insofar as those objects are or can be given to me, and that applies not only to objects of outer sense but also to the object of inner sense, myself. But the representation of the I is not a representation of anything that can be given, and so not a representation of an object that I can judge about. 18

Kant thinks that the fact that we can only know the existing Me through being given a manifold in inner sense entails that we can only know the existing Me as it appears, and not as it is in itself. This is part of his transcendental . He arrives at this conclusion by arguing that any manifold that is given to the thinking I must have a form, and that that form cannot have its source in the thinking I. The form of inner sense, for us, is time. One way of putting Kant’s point is that one cannot know, just from reflecting on the thinking I, that the form of inner sense is time; for all that one knows in reflecting on the thinking I, the form of inner sense might be different (cf., for example, B150-2). As a result, Kant thinks, what we know through inner sense is what appears to us, ones with time as their form of inner sense; we cannot know that what appears to us in inner sense is, in itself, as it appears to us to be. So, Kant thinks, I can only know the existing Me insofar as it appears.

Deleuze introduces the form in which the existing Me is determined with a reference to these from Kant: ‘The determination ‘I think’ evidently implies something undetermined

(‘I am’), but nothing yet says how this undetermined thing is determinable by the I think. …

Kant thus adds a third logical : the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination)’ (1994: 116/85-6). The existing Me is an object; as such, the thinking I can form judgments about it, and therein determine it. But the thinking I does not contain the form of the existing Me, or of any other object: the thinking I does not and cannot know the manner in which the existing Me will appear to it, just from a reflection on spontaneity or the forms of judgment of which it is capable – it ‘says nothing’ about the form in which the existing Me appears to it, and so can be determined by it. The form in which the existing Me appears to the thinking I, which in our case at least is time, must come from elsewhere. 19

Deleuze goes on to describe Kant’s discovery of time as the form in which the existing

Me appears to the thinking I as the discovery of the transcendental. Earlier, we saw that Deleuze thinks of the transcendental as that which is a condition on the possibility of objects and our representation of objects; specifically, he thinks of it as a border between the two. We see the same thought echoed in this passage: the discovery of the form of the determinable is ‘the discovery of Difference, no longer as the empirical difference between two determinations, but as transcendental Difference between THE determination and what it determines – no longer as external difference which separates, but as internal difference which connects a priori being and thinking, the one to the other’ (1994: 116/85-6). As we will see in the next section, it is the form of the determinable that fractures the subject. And it is precisely this aspect of Kant which

Deleuze praises.

But again, we might ask why we should accept the point that both Kant and Deleuze accept, that the form in which we are given objects, and in particular the existing Me, is not derivable from the thinking I? Kant, we have seen, grounds the claim in his , but that doctrine is hardly very popular, and it is one that Deleuze seems to reject

(preferring to describe his position as ‘transcendental empiricism’). What argument, if any, can

Deleuze rest his appeal to Kant upon?

The argument, I suggest, is one that Kant makes in the Paralogisms, in the course of arguing that we cannot have knowledge of the thinking I as it is in itself. The thinking I does not determine an object, for Kant; rather, it is the form of any possible object. As he puts it, the I is

‘simple and in content for itself wholly empty’ such that it is not even ‘a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept’ (A345-6/B404). The fact that the thinking I does 20

not determine an object entails, we will see, that the form in which objects are given to it cannot be derived from the thinking I.25

To have knowledge of some subject matter generally requires that we determine it, or that we ascribe predicates to it. So, for instance, we might inquire about whether the I is simple or complex – in this inquiry, we are seeking to justify judgments with the I serving as the subject concept and simple or complex serving as the predicate concept. To have knowledge of the I would be, for instance, to know that the I is simple. What does Kant think is wrong with the idea of such knowledge?

As we have seen, for Kant, the thinking I is the form of any concept: that is, any concept, just in being a concept, has in common with every other concept that it is thinkable, or that the I think can be appended to it. That means (Kant claims) that just in representing the predicate of any judgment, we already represent the I. So, just in representing the predicate simple we represent the I (and likewise in representing the predicate complex). But that means that we cannot truly form the judgment: The I is simple. That judgment is ill-formed in that the proper unity of the I and simplicity is already contained in the predicate simple, such that we cannot separate out our consciousness of the I from our consciousness of simplicity so as to predicate the latter of the former. Or, as Kant puts it,

Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept; because of which we therefore turn in a constant circle, since we must always already avail ourselves of the representation of it at all times in order to judge anything about it (A346/B404).

25 I note that Hegel (and perhaps other post-Kantian idealists) would have rejected the premise that the thinking I does not determine an object (cf. note 1). I will not try to justify this premise here; I am not sure if it can be justified, but it is certainly absolutely fundamental to Kant’s conception of the activity of the thinking I, and so a reasonable point of departure for Deleuze (who has a rather different argument against Hegel’s project, at 1994: 61-82/42-58). 21

To see the force of this argument, it is helpful to distinguish the case of ‘The I is simple’ from two other well-formed judgments that are apparently similar to it.

Consider first the judgment that some figures are triangles. If we analyze the predicate of this judgment, we see that it too contains the subject of the judgment – i.e., it is analytic that a triangle is a certain sort of figure. We can analyze this predicate and find a concept that does not already contain the subject concept, e.g. three-sided or three touching line-segments, and then predicate that of the subject concept. However, there is no such analogous operation with the judgment that the I is simple: there is no way of taking apart the concept simple such that we arrive at a component concept that does not already contain the I. And the same point holds for every concept – we are constantly returning again and again to a concept that already contains the I.

Next consider the judgment that some chairs have backs. In this case, as in our case (the I is simple), we can think the subject without thinking the predicate. Thus, in this case as in our case, there is a sense in which the predicate further determines the subject. But in this case, as against ours, the representation of the subject distinguishes a particular object: that is, we pick out something determinate (some kind of object) when we represent something as a chair, but we pick out nothing determinate when we represent something as thinkable. For everything is thinkable. Consequently, the further determination in our case is not a way of having knowledge of something, the I, which is like a chair in that it distinguishes a particular kind of object. And so we can have no knowledge of the I as it is in itself. To be sure, we can indeed have knowledge of objects, and in having that knowledge we further determine the I. But those further determinations are not further determinations of the I as an object, and so they do not yield the kind of knowledge that we were inquiring about. 22

Deleuze was familiar with this kind of argument, though he does not explicitly connect it to Kant but rather to ’s thought that being cannot be a genus.26 A genus requires that there be something which can be added to it: whatever is added cannot already contain the genus.

But anything which can be added to it must already be, and so must already contain the concept being. Further, a genus must determine an object. But being does not determine any object; it is rather said of all objects. Hence, Deleuze notes, Aristotle must resist the conclusion that being is a genus. Though Deleuze does not make this explicit, it is for exactly the same reasons that Kant must resist the conclusion that the thinking I determines an object.

So, the thinking I does not provide a representation of the existing Me, but rather is a consciousness common to the concept of any object whatever. That means that it does not determine the form of the existing Me. There must be some form in which the thinking I can determine itself as an object. That form must bind the thinking I to the existing Me, and it must do so a priori, as there can be no thinking I without an existing Me (and vice versa of course – more on this in the next section). Hence, we must add a form of the determinable to the determination (the thinking I) and the undetermined object (the existing Me). There is in Kant, then, an argument for the non-derivability of the form of time from the thinking I which does not rest on his transcendental idealism. And though the evidence is not decisive, it appears to me that it is this argument which Deleuze adverts to in his praise of Kant’s discovery of the transcendental.

§5 The Fracture in the Subject

We have, now, an account of the nature of the thinking I as spontaneous, and so the source of the synthesis of its representations in judgment. We also have an account of the

26 Cf. 1994: 45-52/30-5. Again, Somers-Hall’s account of this is invaluable: cf. Somers-Hall 2012: 43-51. 23

existing Me: unlike the thinking I, the existing Me is an object; further, the form in which the existing Me is determined (time) does not have its source in the thinking I. I now turn to show how this picture yields a fracture in the subject.

The first point to note is that we cannot separate the thinking I from the existing Me, such that we can account for each independently of the other. For there is no way to account for the activity of thinking without at least implicitly making room for the fact that we are accounting for the activity of some being. Otherwise, we would be moving in the direction of Frege’s third realm, leaving it entirely opaque how the account of thinking could get a grip on the activity of real thinking . Moreover, we cannot account for the nature of the existing Me without making reference to the activity of thinking: the determinations of the existing Me, or at least the ones we are interested in, presuppose that there is an activity of thought which is the existing

Me’s.

Deleuze puts this quite nicely when he notes that the form of the determinable cannot rightly be said to be added either to the thinking I or to the existing Me: ‘to the determination,’ the I think, ‘and to the undermined,’ the I am, ‘it is necessary to add the form of the determinable, which is to say time. And again “add” is a false word, since it rather concerns making the difference and interiorizing it in being and thinking. From one end to the other the I

[le JE] is as though crossed by a fracture: it is fractured by the pure and empty form of time’

(1994: 117/86). So, the thinking I and the existing Me are only intelligible in relation to one another, as the former determines the latter.

If we combine this first point with the fact that the form in which the determination takes place does not have its source either in the thinking I or the existing Me, then we get the fracture.

For the need to appeal to a determination that does not have its source in the thinking I or the 24

existing Me prevents us from ever identifying the thinking I with the existing Me. And so the subject is fractured by this form which makes it impossible either to separate or to identify the two aspects of the subject.

Why think that the need for a form of the determinable in which the subject can exist as an object implies that there is a fracture between the thinking I and the existing Me? Why not think, instead, that time is simply a condition on the possibility of knowing the thinking I as an object? Perhaps the relation between the thinking I and the existing Me is one of further determination: to note that the thinking being is temporal might merely further specify it, not fracture it.

Normally when we talk about further specifications we assume that the initial unspecified characterization still serves as a determination of the object. So, for instance, the concept triangle already determines a kind of object. When we then further determine it as a right-angled triangle, we do not fracture that original object because we can recognize the same object (a triangle) in the more determinate characterization. But in the present case there is no initially determined object to be further determined. For the thinking I does not determine a particular kind of being, as we have seen: it is inseparable from all of our , and not a determinate concept of something in particular. And so we a reference to the undetermined object (which would be the thinking I as object) which remains the same as it is specified. So, we cannot understand the thinking I to be any kind of object, and thus cannot understand it to be merely a less specified account of the very same thing as the existing Me.

Hence, the subject is fractured by the pure and empty form of time.

§6 The Fracture is Fundamental 25

We now have an account of the fracture. We do not yet have an account of what it means for that fracture to be conceptually fundamental, prior to the idea of a coherent subject. Providing that account is the task of this section. In doing so, I will articulate the point at which Deleuze diverges from Kant.

According to Kant and Deleuze, the subject is fractured in this sense: the thinking I, as a capacity to know that is dependent upon being given what it knows from elsewhere, is unable to determine its nature as a particular kind of being. To do so, it requires the intervention of a form

(time) that does not have its source in the thinking I. This enables the thinking I to determine the existing Me, but in such a fashion that we cannot identify the thinking I and the existing Me: we cannot know these to be the same being. The science of logic, as the science of the nature of thinking, is fractured from the science of psychology, as the science of the nature of the thinking being. We cannot identify these two sciences; and we also saw in the last section that we cannot separate them either.

This yields a difficulty: the thinking I and the existing Me are not identical, and yet they are inseparable. Deleuze departs from Kant in his response to this difficulty. For Kant (according to Deleuze) resolves the difficulty by affirming the priority of the thinking I over the existing

Me, thereby making the concept of the coherent subject fundamental. Deleuze, on the other hand, argues that the fracture must be fundamental.

This comes out most clearly in Deleuze’s description of the form of time as ‘pure and empty’. The ‘pure and empty form of time’ is time understood as that wherein objects exist.

Because it is the form of such objects, which is to say that it determines their possibility, it is logically prior to any such objects. As such, it is not determined by the objects that are ‘in’ it, and it would remain the same even if there were no objects at all. Moreover, Kant himself notes this, 26

writing that ‘In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time’ (A31/B46). That is, Kant himself would have insisted on the purity (not grounded empirically) and emptiness (remains even without any appearances) of time.27

As the form of time has whatever characteristics it has regardless of what objects are in it, the form cannot have its source in the objects that it informs. As we have also seen, Kant thinks and Deleuze accepts that the form of time cannot have its source in the nature of the thinking I either. So, the characteristics of time are prior to and not defined in terms of time’s role in making objects possible or in terms of its role in making representations of objects possible.

Time, then, is at least one guise of the transcendental that we discussed in §4.

The form of time has its source neither in the existing Me, as a temporal object, nor in the thinking I. Moreover, the form of time is that which connects the thinking I to the existing Me: it is that which is responsible for one subject being both a thinker and an existing individual.

Further, there can be no thinking I unless there is an existing Me, and vice versa. It follows that the form of time is logically prior to both the thinking I and the existing Me. Finally, we saw in the previous section that the form of time connects the thinking I and the existing Me in such a fashion that they are fractured from one another. It follows that the fracture is logically fundamental, or that the subject is fundamentally a fractured subject.

In §2, we saw Kant argue that the thinking I is the source of the unity of its representations in its judgments, by synthesizing them. As a result, the thinking I is the source of synthetic unity. Moreover, there is no judgment without this synthetic unity (cf. B131). So, the

27 Here I oppose both Hughes (cf. 2009: 116) and Williams (cf. Williams 2011: 82-3): they both take it that the ‘pure and empty form of time’ already contains something with which Kant would disagree. To be sure, Deleuze draws implications from the pure and empty form of time which Kant would deny; but that time is a pure and empty form is a point Deleuze takes straight from Kant. 27

thinking I is the source of a logically fundamental unity: the synthetic unity of the representations that can figure in judgments is prior to any content which differentiates those representations from one another. (Kant, we might say, subordinates difference to .) We also saw that Deleuze accepts Kant’s point that the source of the synthetic unity of judgments is the thinking I and that without that there could be no synthesis of representations in a judgment – and so, presumably, no judgment. Hence, Deleuze accepts Kant’s point that the thinking I is the source of a logically fundamental unity. But, Deleuze argues, that priority only obtains among the representations that can figure in judgment (or, more broadly, in consciousness). It does not obtain, indeed it cannot obtain given Kant’s other commitments, in relation to the form of time.

(In this way, Deleuze finds in Kant the resources for his project to think a concept of difference that is not subordinated to identity.)

Kant, however, would disagree, as Deleuze sees. Kant tries to make the form of time logically posterior to the thinking I: in Kant, Deleuze notes, the fracture in the subject ‘is quickly filled in by a new form of identity, active synthetic identity, whereas the passive me is only defined by receptivity, not possessing by right [à ce titre] any power of synthesis’ (Deleuze

1994: 117/86). On Deleuze’s reading of Kant, time is itself held together or synthesized by the thinking I: while I do indeed appear to myself within time, and the form of time does not have its source in the thinking I, the unity of time has its origin in the synthetic activity of the I think.

Hence, the fracture is not fundamental for Kant since the thinking I is fundamental.28

28 A more complete account of where Deleuze locates the problem in Kant would have to bring in Deleuze’s response to Kant’s . On this aspect of Deleuze, cf. Smith 2012a and 2012b. Hughes has recently suggested that Deleuze is thinking primarily of Kant’s second critique, and the way in which the moral law makes unconditional demands of me (cf. Hughes 2012: 43-5). I find this suggestion very interesting, but cannot pursue it here. 28

Deleuze argues in response that Kant’s account of the priority of the thinking I cannot work given Kant’s own commitment to the fact that the form of time does not have its source in the thinking I (cf. 1994: 118/87). The synthetic unity of the I think comes too late to heal the fracture: even if the thinking I can unify time, that very act of determination is dependent upon the temporal manifold having a nature prior to its being determined by the thinking I. That is the inescapable result of Kant’s thought that the forms of intuition might have been different, for all we can know from the thinking I. Not only is this thought absolutely central to Kant’s transcendental idealism – it is also central to of his argument in the Paralogisms. As a result, the fracture must remain logically prior to the thinking I’s activity of making the subject coherent.

To understand the significance of Deleuze’s claim that the fracture is fundamental, it is important to note that it entails a kind of thinking which is logically quite different from the kind of thinking appropriate to objects in time, the kind of thinking that Kant discusses in the

Critiques. Insofar as we attempt to think about the form of time in the same way as we think about (or are conscious of) temporal objects, we are forced to misconceive it: we are forced to think of the manifold as given from elsewhere and forced to think of the synthesis as coming from the I think. It follows that to articulate the form of time, we have to articulate a different manner of thinking, one that is non-Kantian. Or, as Deleuze puts it, ‘it does not suffice to say, of the ground [fondement], that it is another story [histoire], it is also another geography, without being another world’ (Deleuze 1990: 120/99). The logical character (or geography) of the form of time is not like the logical character of an object, and the forms of thinking we use to articulate it must likewise be different.

It might help indicate what is distinctive of my interpretation of Deleuze’s claim that the subject is fractured if I contrast it with a different interpretation of Deleuze that also draws very 29

heavily on Kant. In Difference and Givenness, Levi Bryant offers what he calls a ‘hyper- rationalist’ interpretation of Deleuze. He notes, persuasively, that Deleuze’s account of time appeals to a kind of creative thinking (a kind of thinking in which there is no receptivity).29 But he also claims that this creativity characterizes all of our thinking. That is, he denies the difference in kind between thinking that is fit to articulate the form of time and thinking that is fit to judge about temporal objects.30 So, he writes, ‘Taking mathematics as a paradigm in which thought is able to produce its object in intuition like God, Deleuze instead argues that all intuition is productive and creative. … For Deleuze all intuition is productive, and we are led to believe it is passive insofar as most of the principles governing its production are unconscious’.31

Bryant’s evidence for this claim is his reading of what Deleuze takes from Maimon (and also

Leibniz), and also his interpretation of Deleuze on mathematics. Now is not the place to try to respond to that evidence. But I think it is worth noting that Bryant nowhere considers the possibility that we might have two kinds of thinking, one that is productive in the sense at stake in mathematics (on his reading) and one that is receptive, in Kant’s sense. This division of our thinking into two different kinds simply does not figure as an option for Bryant. I have tried to argue that it is the only way to do justice to what Deleuze takes from Kant.

The account I have offered is far from a complete account of the fractured subject. To offer such an account would require explaining Deleuze’s theory of time, which I have not attempted to do.

I hope only to have offered a plausible reconstruction of and persuasive argument for Deleuze’s claim that the subject is fractured. My reconstruction reveals that Deleuze accepts Kant’s account

29 cf. Bryant 2008: 88-9. 30 Hallward seems to take the same line in his very non-Kantian reading of Deleuze on knowledge: cf. Hallward 2006: 11-2. 31 Bryant 2008: 98; cf. also 178. 30

of the spontaneity of the thinking I. It suggests that Deleuze finds an interesting argument in favor of Kant’s view that the form of time cannot be derived from the thinking I. And it shows the merits of his claim in opposition to Kant that the synthetic unity of the thinking I is logically posterior to the fracture in the subject created by the form of time. This reveals a deeper allegiance to Kant than is typically seen, while also making precise a point on which they disagree. And it shows the merits of Deleuze’s account of the fractured subject.

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