SA NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ROYAL COMMISSION

MR KEVIN SCARCE, Presiding Commissioner MR CHAD JACOBI, Counsel Assisting

SPEAKERS:

MR KEITH THOMAS, South Australian Native Title Service (SANTS) MR ANDREW COLLETT AM, Counsel for Maralinga Tjarutja & Yalata Community Incorporated MR CHRISTOPHER LARKIN, Senior Public Service Administrator (retired) MR DENNIS BROWN, Maralinga Tjarutja Project Officer DR SCOTT CANE, Consulting Anthropologist MR RICHARD PREECE, Maralinga Tjarutja Council General Manager MR PATRICK DAVOREN, Senior Public Service Administrator

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

ADELAIDE

12.29 PM, MONDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 2015

DAY 22

PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY SPARK AND CANNON

.SA Nuclear 05.11.15 P-512 Spark and Cannon COMMISSIONER: Good afternoon. We return to topic 13, “Community Engagement and Nuclear Facilities” and I welcome Mr Keith Thomas. Counsel.

5 MR JACOBI: Mr Keith Thomas is the CEO of the South Australian Native Title Service, the Native Title Service provider for South Australia. Since its establishment in 2008, SANTS has focussed on delivering a range of services to secure sustainable social, cultural and economic outcomes for Aboriginal people, including the recognition of native title rights and interests. SANTS 10 aims to work towards such outcomes by working cooperatively with all stakeholders including through the negotiation indigenous land use agreements and consent determinations and the facilitation of projects and partnerships and the Commission calls Mr Keith Thomas.

15 COMMISSIONER: Thank you Mr Thomas for joining us this morning. Before I ask you to provide evidence, I need to state from the outset that I have read and considered the many submissions made to the Royal Commission by the prescribed bodies corporate representing Aboriginal communities which have been prepared with the assistance of SANTS. I have read in those 20 submissions the consistent themes of deep concern held by many of those communities about the activities being considered by the Commission. I invite Mr Thomas to give evidence today on a similar basis to other witnesses, addressing the topic of community engagement in nuclear activities. I am seeking to identify the most appropriate processes to negotiate with Aboriginal 25 communities on these complex issues.

I hope that we can learn from recent experience of successful negotiations with Aboriginal communities and as I said last week, my intention is to provide some applicable principles were a government or a proponent minded to 30 proceed in the future with some of these nuclear activities. And again, I thank you for joining us. I think we might sort of start, because what we are really interested here is the process. The process that works, and perhaps you could walk us through those successful negotiations in relation to native title and what remains to be achieved in to the future? 35 MR THOMAS: Yes. I think from my view, native title ushered in a new era of community communication. Prior to that it was largely programme based service delivery based and you just talked to the individual communities that ran services. Native title made it more of a state wide encompassing all 40 Aboriginal people who have links to land in South Australia. So we have people who of course have shifted interstate and that but they all become part of still having a say about what happens on their country. So in the process of achieving native title, we’ve brought native title groups together, we’ve brought the community for each of those individual groups together and it is 45 that community then who has selected a committee, what we call the

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1192 Spark and Cannon Native Title Briefing Committee initially which then morphs in to the PVC usually. So the briefing committee is established with guidelines from the community about their – how they operate and where they might need to come back to the community if there is something that means there is going to be a 5 loss of rights for – or interest in the land then they needed to come back and talk to the community about that. Community didn’t want committees making those decisions without consulting the wider community.

COMMISSIONER: Was there a process of making the selection of those 10 peoples sit on those initial committees?

MR THOMAS: It differed from community to community. Some communities wanted to make sure there was an even share of the different family groups, the ethical ancestors which we identified for that particular 15 claim. So some of them would pick an equal number, male, female maybe from each ethical ancestor. If there was six ethical ancestors there would be 12 people on that management committee and then they would select the officers as per any normal sort of corporation.

20 COMMISSIONER: Okay. All right. So these are the areas now that have negotiated a successful agreement?

MR THOMAS: They are. There is quite significant, even the far north east one that white space at the top far north, these – that will be coloured in 25 December the 16, there is a consent determination happening, up at Innamincka, so that will be coloured in and most of that Eyre Peninsula there is a determination there for the Bungala people that the Federal Court has given. They still haven’t finalised that though because of tenure issues. They are tidying those up and the boundary issues and then the – what’s that, the eastern 30 side of Eyre Peninsula well, mainly right up to the purple will also be decided.

COMMISSIONER: Okay. So the process is a representative group to consider it, that then morphs in to the prescribed body - - -

35 MR THOMAS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER: - - - and then the prescribed body is the negotiator with the state and the federal governments on these issues?

40 MR THOMAS: The prescribed body corporate is the one that is there to manage the Native Title Rights and interests and that includes negotiating with governments, mining companies, other interests that might want to use the land for some purpose.

45 COMMISSIONER: Okay. And the state of play for those negotiations that

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1193 Spark and Cannon are ongoing?

MR THOMAS: The state has played a significant role in the establishment of the Native Title Management Committees through the ILUA process - - - 5 COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR THOMAS: - - - and that and once they become the PBC, the state at the moment hasn’t had that much engagement, we’re in the process still of looking 10 at how the state might have some involvement in that process because we think having a body which represents the traditional owners makes it the ideal body to also be representing that area for heritage and maybe speak for other matters of the state as well in those regions.

15 COMMISSIONER: Does it have broad community support that one body to look after various interests?

MR THOMAS: When we say community support, I say within the community - - - 20 COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR THOMAS: - - - of that group.

25 COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR THOMAS: It does. For sure it is – it has probably been the most engaging process in terms of engaging community. In the past, people have gone say to – I don’t know say Oodnadatta for example, talk to the committee 30 and bang, whatever people decided would happen, without any consultation or input from any other people who might have different ideas about how things should happen. But in native title it is – there is the prescribed body corporate who will manage most of the day to day stuff but if there is – something comes up that affects the rights and interests of native title holders then they have to 35 get the authority of the native title holders which are separate to the members of the PBC because holders don’t necessarily have to become members if they don’t want to of the PBC.

COMMISSIONER: Yes. 40 MR THOMAS: But the holders still have a significant say on matters where it affects their native title rights and interests.

COMMISSIONER: Okay. I know we’ll come back to that in a bit more detail 45 - - -

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1194 Spark and Cannon

MR THOMAS: Sounds a bit complex but - - -

COMMISSIONER: No. We need to unpick some of that as we go through. 5 MR THOMAS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER: But could I just get a sense of those areas that are still to be negotiated? 10 MR THOMAS: Yes, the two blue areas on the west Eyre Peninsula - - -

COMMISSIONER: Yes.

15 MR THOMAS: - - - as I said that one next to it, the Bungala that has been determined. I envisage that will be completed maybe by the end of the year hopefully. Fingers crossed. The one up the far northeast is done. There is an overlap at Oodnadatta, there’s a small area and there’s a trial happening at the moment over Lake Torrens between three groups with competing interests. 20 Pardon me. The yellow area, the top yellow area in that little - - -

COMMISSIONER: Mm’hm.

MR THOMAS: - - - dotted area above it, they will be a consent determination 25 happening on the 8 December, so that has already been decided so that is cleared up. And then we have – we are getting in to the area where we have got a lot of work still to do in terms of doing native title reports and everything else, getting people’s stories. There is some overlap issues there which we are in mediation at the moment. There’s Ajmanat as part of that, the group 30 abutting the New South Wales side Wilyucali and the Njuderi in that sort of – what is it, a light green area.

COMMISSIONER: Green, yes.

35 MR THOMAS: But they all overlap each other there and there’s mediation taking place and a report has gone to state council in relation to the possible resolution of that area as well. But then once we come down there’s a whole lot of new claims still to come in, down the southeast; there’s nothing there at the moment, all the way up. There’s parts of the River Murray which are 40 determined up there but it’s probably just along the river, it’s not that clear on the map there.

COMMISSIONER: Mm’hm.

45 MR THOMAS: But there is a portion of the River Murray and across to the

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1195 Spark and Cannon top of the Adelaide hills and Mount Barker which still will be a new claim probably come in there as well. And then we will have virtually covered the whole state then.

5 COMMISSIONER: All right, thanks for that intro.

MR JACOBI: Can I perhaps – we are very interested in learning from the negotiation process that SANTS is engaged in and I am just interested to understand just to round out where we have gone, the scope of the issues or the 10 scope of the topics that have in fact been the subject of agreements by negotiation that have been conducted by SANTS?

MR THOMAS: Yes. There is a whole range – I suppose that are part of the ILUA process have been the foundation agreements I suppose that form part of 15 the consent determination and they would include ILUA or settlement ILUA of course over the whole claim. Parks, ILUA’s pastoral ILUAs with the individual pastoralists, local government or even like our back areas or whoever is involved there in a local government sense and waters or sea fishing and that type of thing as well. So that is probably the range of the 20 different ILUAs that were dealt with in different sectors. But there was also a number of agreements, negotiated with mining companies under part 9B of the Mining Act, with movie makers and that type of thing to access land, like around Coober Pedy where they made all the Mad Max movies and a couple of others there and that so – and some people each year have got access to Lake 25 Frome and that where they have a day out up there and that but they’re – so there’s all different levels of negotiations that take place, mainly about access. And then there is – with the mining companies and that if what they find initially is good, then it could develop in to negotiations about actual mining and what that means. 30 MR JACOBI: In the notes you provided to us, you have spoken of there being a change in the level of sophistication in the negotiations over the last – perhaps the last couple of decades. I am just hoping you might be able to expand on that for us? 35 MR THOMAS: I think there’s been a greater input from the Aboriginal side in terms of lifting their knowledge about what’s been negotiated. We’ve been able to get advisors and that who talk about the mining and what is involved in that and what – even come down to determining what might be an appropriate 40 sort of compensation deal to talk about with the mining company because previously I think there was just that – the offer from the mining company and people accepted cars or motorbikes or whatever else and a job here and there. And I think that sophistication has become a lot better now and it’s still improving but we’re looking at, you know business opportunities, economic 45 development to participate in the mining process itself. Not just the mining but

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1196 Spark and Cannon it’s the set up and maybe jobs in providing catering and cleaning and all of that type of thing within the mining sector. So it’s a lot more sophisticated in that sense, joint ventures as well, of actually – if we’re going to get in to the preparation for mining sites, or even some of the mining, joining with people 5 who have the experience in doing that type of work so that we’re providing a greater opportunity for Aboriginal people to participate and the economic opportunities that are available in their country especially.

MR JACOBI: I want to come back to the issue of structures at the end but I 10 just wanted also to pick up on the extent to which negotiation – there is a distinction that we have read about, drawn between rights, which I think we are discussing in this context, in interests and I am just interested in the extent to which you’ve also been able to address interests that aren’t necessarily the product of a legal entitlement? 15 MR THOMAS: It’s more so I think something that certainly encompasses Aboriginal people, there are certain people within the group who have rights for that country, can speak for the country and that where other people will have the interest in that country, they can still camp there and that but they 20 need to get permission from other people and that type of thing before they can go in to those types of areas. So especially in areas where that knowledge is still maintained and kept, it’s important that those protocols are kept within those groups and that type of thing, otherwise there are sort of things within the cultural sense and that type of thing where people can be – what would you call 25 it? Penalised for breaching those rules and that type of thing.

MR JACOBI: One of the things that we’ve read about the notes that we’re interested in exploring with you is they identify a preference for negotiated outcomes and I’m just perhaps interested, and identified the position in 30 South Australia is somewhat different than it is elsewhere in Australia and I’m perhaps interested in explaining – getting you to explain to us, how that particular position has developed and what the significance of that is in terms of development and activities that are carried out?

35 MR THOMAS: It’s probably very important on a couple of fronts, one that we all work with limited resources and you want to make the most of the resources that you have and we could have been tied up in courts all the time, spending money just in the legal sense within a court timeframe and not being able to do anything else. We decided to – along with the state, it was actually the state 40 who approached us initially to look at a negotiation process and we jumped at the opportunity because we could see the advantages that a negotiation process has because when you’re talking about the negotiation process and you might’ve seen in the documentation that you’ve had to date about the ILUA process and that, it talked about building relationships and getting to know the 45 people that you’re actually talking to about things and I think you’re working

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1197 Spark and Cannon from a much better position when you have that relationship rather than butting heads and a court process where it’s all adversarial and that type of thing. So there were lots of advantages in looking at a negotiation process which was the relationships, the better use of resources and of course we thought better 5 outcomes for Aboriginal people in South Australia.

MR JACOBI: Has that been significant in ensuring that interests have been taken in to account in ILUA, that is things that are – that might otherwise strictly fall outside the concept of rights? 10 MR THOMAS: I think we’ve been able to capture everything that certainly our Aboriginal clients have been looking to within the agreements. Some of the agreements probably don’t go far enough but you’ve got to meet a middle ground when you’re negotiating, so for example on a pastoral ILUA, the 15 pastoralists will have certain conditions that they want to see met and Aboriginal people still want to be able to access certain areas to either camp or hunt, or whatever else. But there was a greater recognition between the groups when they got together and talked about each others’ interests, about the running of the pastoral station and about how Aboriginal people wanted to 20 access certain areas. And I think there was a greater knowledge, I suppose, placed on each others’ importance for that country and that type of thing and pastoralists were now able to say, look don’t go over there because we’re calving over that area, you know we need things to be quiet but you’re quite welcome to go over the rest of the station there and that type of thing. So 25 created much better working relationships as well as, you know agreements at the end of the day.

MR JACOBI: The Commission is in particular interested in learning what are the key elements or the lessons from successful negotiations? And you’ve 30 prepared some notes with respect to this and identified a range of topics and one of them is – and it’s a consistent thing that we’ve heard in the evidence is the issue of providing for sufficient time to allow Aboriginal communities to make decisions and I am just interested in perhaps you can explain to us, bearing in mind the sorts of negotiations you’ve been involved in, what the 35 importance of time has been?

MR THOMAS: Time is very important because in terms of the process, you’ve got to have time to be able to inform people properly in terms of what it is that they’re agreeing to and that type of thing and what are the matters that 40 they’re negotiating so we did that at probably a couple of levels. There’s a community level and then there’s the more intense specific level with the Native Title Management Committees that looked after – that actually did the negotiating as well with the different parties and that type of thing. So it’s very important to allow time for people to take in the information, to understand the 45 information and then be making decisions based on having the – a level of

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1198 Spark and Cannon understanding about what they’re actually making decisions about and that type of thing. So it’s a bit of capacity development I suppose in terms of bringing people’s knowledge and understanding up, about why we’re doing these things in terms of procedural matters within the Act and that type of 5 thing. But also about what were the areas, identifying areas where they might be able to say okay we can maybe do less of this if we get more of that, or whatever else.

So you need time to talk about those things and a lot of the times – and it 10 depends on the different groupings because what we have in native title that’s - to some extent, it’s an unlevel playing field because we’ve got groups from all different areas of the states and some groups we’ve got people with English as a second language, so you need a lot more time because you actually have to have an interpreter and take the time to actually understand that people 15 understand what you’re saying and that. So it’s a bit of a feedback process in there as well, asking questions back and so it does take more time because it is about how you communicate, if you go on – say you do a couple of paragraphs and you say to everybody, you okay with that, everyone will say yes. What are they saying yes to, you know. Because there might’ve been a whole range of 20 things you actually asked in there, so you’ve got to be more specific and succinct in what you’re talking about and making sure that people are understanding the things that they’re going to be talking about. So in doing that, that all takes time.

25 MR JACOBI: And in that context, and no doubt you’ve had to do it, you would have had proponents or developers approach with particular commercial or political imperatives to do something within a particular timeframe and I am just interested in how is that managed in the context of what – in the context of what we’re talking about? 30 MR THOMAS: Yes. Usually when we get to something that comes along like that you’ve got a certain time frame in which to respond. So usually then we would get on our bike, so to speak, and make sure things happen within that time frame and that means if you had to call a community meeting, if you had 35 to call a management committee meeting, that you’d plan for all of that within the time frame that is provided for that particular matter. It might be maybe a mining development or something and of course that is going to affect people a lot more than just an access on property matter and that type of thing, so there’s a lot more information, a lot more talk and probably a lot more interest because 40 it’s likely to involve compensation at the end of the day for the loss of native title rights and interest and that type of thing. That probably will cause a lot more debate in the whole process as well.

MR JACOBI: I’m interested in the extent to which you have been able to 45 successfully negotiate the time frames themselves and that is say, look, I

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1199 Spark and Cannon understand what your time frame is but we need a bit more time. Has that been successful?

MR THOMAS: It has, it has. We’ve had to do that with the state, with the 5 federal court in different matters. We do have a bit of tyranny of distance, so to speak, we’re the only service provider in this state so we have to service groups all over the state and that in itself just takes time and getting people together. We could make every effort, get everybody together and then somebody might pass away on a community, it might be an important person. 10 All of that goes out the window. Generally we’ve got to go back to the court or the state and say look, we’ve got to change that date, we need to extend the time frame because we just can’t bring people together again like that sort of thing. So it can be time consuming and frustrating at times as well.

15 MR JACOBI: I think also against that context of timing I am interested in the extent to which engagement at the start of the process is thought to be significant and what the consequences of light engagement are.

MR THOMAS: Are you talking about engagement with other parties? 20 MR JACOBI: No, sorry, this is engagement by developments with Aboriginal communities, whether it matters to do it early and what’s the consequence if you do it late?

25 MR THOMAS: Look, I think that engagement has to be early. People have to be up front about what they want to do. You have the opportunity to build that relationship, get to know the people over the time of your negotiations and that type of thing and I think it makes a better platform for actually negotiating. If people come in. We have had some instances in the state where mining 30 companies have taken upon themselves saying that they didn’t have to come in and talk to the group, they have gone on country and drilled holes and that type of thing and we have ended up in court processes because of that. So we always encourage groups to – developers, miners, whoever to come in first and talk to the group and so that everyone’s minds are at ease, everybody knows 35 what everybody is trying to achieve in the process and it makes for better relationships in the whole process.

MR JACOBI: You spoke previously about there being differences in communities in terms of not only language but in terms of economic 40 opportunity and I’m interested to the extent to which differences in Aboriginal communities need to be respected and the extent. Perhaps if you can point to examples by reference to negotiations you have conducted?

MR THOMAS: There’s a range of diversity and that within Aboriginal 45 groups and when we’re getting further north and there’s still the strong cultural

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1200 Spark and Cannon practices and that type of thing, we have to have regard to the people who can actually speak for country and that type of thing. Understand that at the end of the day it’s probably a men’s group that is going to – the senior men that will have the final say on what happens, but we have put in place processes 5 especially in those areas where we can factor that in, so that the senior men themselves are not the PBC but we have the PBC and then there’s the senior men who there’s a discourse between those groups and that type of thing. So the PBC actually won’t make a decision on country matters without the senior men given the okay for that to happen. So they will get to a point and then 10 they’ll say we’ll have to consult with the waddies, the senior men over this matter. Usually there’s a senior person on the PBC as well and they’ll say we need to take this to the waddies and do that.

MR JACOBI: I was going to pick up from that actually in terms of structure 15 and the structures with whom communities negotiate and I’m just interested in terms of from the perspective of a proponent or developer does the Aboriginal community have a view that it’s most appropriate to engage with the PBC only or is it also necessary to engage with Aboriginal communities, bearing in mind? 20 MR THOMAS: Yes, and it depends where it is, as I think the first part of your question was leading to. It is an un-level playing field in lots of respects for a lot of different reasons and diversity is a part of that and – sorry what was that – I just lost track of that last question? 25 MR JACOBI: I’m interested from a developer’s perspective if one is motivated in speech with indigenous community, is it most appropriate to engage directly with the PBC or is it also necessary to engage with the community separately and what’s the Aboriginal community’s view of such an 30 interaction?

MR THOMAS: Look, I think the PBC is always the starting point because the PBC are the ones who have the rights and interests in country and will also have the rights to talk about heritage interests and that in the country and that 35 type of thing, whereas a community might have a different management structure. Probably – or may not have, but may not have an Aboriginal person in charge of that community as well and most of the members of the community are probably members of a PBC if it’s not the specific one that covers their community. But having said that I think it’s still important to talk 40 to communities as well because if a mining company for example, you’ve got around Coober Pedy and that, there’s great involvement from the mining companies in the community as well that have been able to do things which have benefited the whole community, not just Aboriginal people in the community like Coober Pedy has got the football oval and everything else 45 which has come about because of those mining interests which started off as

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1201 Spark and Cannon negotiations with Aboriginal groups and that type of thing, with the PBC and that type of thing. So there are benefits to be had for communities I think and benefits to be had for the PBC, the native title group. A lot of those mining companies engage in social justice sort of programs and that type of thing 5 which does provide benefits to the communities as well.

MR JACOBI: Could I just pick up the concept of leadership within the Aboriginal community. It speaks to the idea of leadership needing to be self- defined. I was wondering whether you could perhaps explain that and explain 10 how that fits with the concept of the PBC which has an elected - - -

MR THOMAS: Yes, well certainly PBCs have come out of necessity because of the Native Title Act and the process that that happens. That provides a certain structure and a certain level of leadership, probably one that I’m not 15 entirely happy about but that’s the way it’s eventuated but it seems that it was thought that those people would have the leadership skills and the skills to run a PBC once they became a PBC and it doesn’t happen that way. So there’s been a lot of support and capacity development and that type of thing happening with PBCs to try to bring people up to scope to show leadership 20 within their group and that type of thing and to provide good governance and financial management skills and all of that type of thing on behalf of their native title holders and members of the PBC. But outside of that there is also other levels – structures within the Aboriginal community, particularly if we’re looking at who can talk for country and that type of thing. So you’ve got to 25 also have an understanding of who are the senior people for those areas and that type of thing and the groups will willingly tell you, we can’t speak for that but these are the people you need to talk to and that type of thing. So there are those structures. There are other contemporary structures I suppose in terms of if a heritage committee had been set up separately and that type of thing so 30 there are people if they haven’t amalgamated with the PBC as yet, there still may be other people to talk about heritage interests and that type of thing and other interests in the area if there are Aboriginal corporations and that established and that type of thing you may have people for example at Maree. Reg Dodd runs a tourism thing around the place as well, so there are other 35 people who have interests that should be talked to about how things might affect their interests in the country and that type of thing.

MR JACOBI: I’m interested in the design of a negotiating process. I wonder if you’ve got any observations about where negotiations have been successful 40 how the process was designed and whether there were key elements to the way that process was thought about at the outset.

MR THOMAS: Look, our negotiation process largely is in line with the Human Rights Commission sort of process, for engagement with indigenous 45 groups and that type of thing, so it’s important to create that relationship,

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1202 Spark and Cannon provide the information upfront, so that people can have that, what they call now “free prior” or give free prior informed consent to matters when they’re negotiating, and that type of thing.

5 We mentioned earlier about time and how we do that, and I don’t know if there’s a perfect answer to that, because sometimes as you mentioned before, you do have a very short time frame, and you wonder whether you’ve been able to give people enough information for them to be able to make informed decisions and that type of thing, because sometimes people are only - 10 especially if we’ve called a community meeting - people are only getting that information at the meeting, or if there was the mail out, but then they’re only getting an understanding of what that means at the meeting itself, before they make a decision.

15 MR JACOBI: In terms of the processes themselves, do you have a view about the extent to which they themselves need to be negotiated with communities, that is, are the communities comfortable with the process and the format that’s going to be used?

20 MR THOMAS: Indeed. We talk to all the groups and that type of thing, about especially saying that we’re only the support agency in terms of SANTS, so it’s up to the groups to be up there. We’ll advise them and provide the information and that, but we’re saying, “It’s your country, you need to speak for your country,” and talk about then looking at who they want to be a part of 25 that negotiating committee and that type of thing.

So they’ll go through a selection process who they think should do that, and that in itself can take a long time sometimes as well, as people try to get together a group I suppose, which they think will represent their interests as 30 best they can.

MR JACOBI: Have you been involved in negotiating processes which have needed - where the initial process that was adopted or the tools that were used as a negotiating process needed to change subsequently? I’m just interested, 35 do you have any reflections on the need for flexibility?

MR THOMAS: Not so much change so much, but sometimes something can come out of left field, where people will say, “We need to break, we need to talk about this, we didn’t talk about this before,” so a mining company or the 40 state or whoever will be asked to leave while there’s some discussion take place around that matter, because they haven’t had the opportunity to talk about it previously.

So sometimes those things happen within a meeting process. But in the main, 45 once that structure’s in place, there are usually not significant changes that take

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1203 Spark and Cannon place.

MR JACOBI: Do you have a view about the kinds of methods that are available to negotiate with Aboriginal communities, the sorts of tools that you 5 might use in order to engage them and the variety of techniques that might be available?

MR THOMAS: As I said, yes, given the diversity, there’s a whole range of different things, but we find that visual use is very important; people can 10 actually see and can understand from having visual aids and that type of thing. As I said, we use interpreters as well, and that can be interesting in itself. You probably need someone there who can you that you’re starting on the right thing as well, because sometimes individuals can have their own perception about things, and sometimes the way we say something is not perceived in the 15 way we think it is being done and that.

That’s where I said it’s important sometimes to gain an understanding about what people are saying yes to. I suppose while it’s on my mind, when I talk about that, it’s also important not to make promises, especially if they can’t be 20 kept because people generally don’t forget what’s been promised at a meeting. So we always say, “Never promise anything, wait until the final agreement is in place about what are the elements that come into that agreement.”

And there’s a word they use, say, up on the APY lands, which means “generoo 25 -maybe, we’ll have a look,” that it might be or might not be, essentially.

MR JACOBI: In terms of making promises, do you have in mind promises that are sometimes talked about with respect to the economic benefits that might flow from an activity? 30 MR THOMAS: There’s a whole range of things I think, we’ve even had people who at election times who want to get elected they go up and say, “Yeah, we’ll give you cattle,” so people are waiting for the cattle to turn up and they never come sort of thing, and then the next time that person comes, they 35 haven’t forgotten. They say to that person, “Where’s our cows,” you know? There’s that whole range of different things, so it’s important to know what are the things that you are going to say yes to, at the end of the day.

Changing things half way through a negotiation can have disastrous effects on 40 that because people say, “Well, you said, you told us, you told us this,” you know?

MR JACOBI: I’m interested in picking up something I think that’s going to be a theme at the session later this afternoon in terms of the provision of 45 independent scientific or technical advice to communities, and in terms of the

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1204 Spark and Cannon experience that you’ve had with that with native title negotiations and the extent to which that’s been important to achieving a successful outcome.

MR THOMAS: It’s become very important. As I said earlier, it’s about 5 having that better understanding about what you’re actually dealing with, and you actually get a better idea of what the actual benefits might be for a mining company in that process. Generally a mining company might not be forthcoming in terms of that level of information to a mining group, but if you’ve got an understanding about the approximate size and the length of the 10 period of the mine, then experts are able to work out what they think you might get out of that sort of mining process.

So you’re in a much better informed process in terms about negotiating outcomes and that type of thing. I think I said before that it’s a lot more 15 sophisticated in terms of having that higher level and technical understanding about what are the benefits achieved through mining for the mining companies, so that you’re then better able to negotiate a compensation package for yourself.

20 MR JACOBI: Moving aside from the economic benefits, I’m also interested in scientific and technical information, including impacts on environmental outcomes and so on, or something like the impact on fisheries.

MR THOMAS: There’s all that, and there are different processes that happen. 25 We’ve been involved in projects which we partner with the groups which go out and go trappings and that type of thing, to identify the fauna, and even identify the plants that are in certain areas to have some measure of what the impact of that development or the mining might have in that region.

30 But it also affords the opportunity for groups that we’ve been involved with so far to go through and do seed gathering and all of that type of stuff, so that they’re better placed at the end, when the mining’s finished. It might only be a 25 year mining cycle or something, but they’re better placed once the mine has been reinstated, to plant those seeds which they gathered from that area. 35 MR JACOBI: The Commission’s keen to understand about how long term benefits or outcomes can be achieved, and I’m just interested as to whether you have a perspective on it. I think this might pick up from where we’ve already talked about the level of sophistication of negotiations - - - 40 MR THOMAS: Yes.

MR JACOBI: - - - about the sorts of long term benefits and long term thinking that might now be involved in (indistinct) and other sorts of 45 arrangements.

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1205 Spark and Cannon

MR THOMAS: In some respects, I think it’s one of the more unfortunate things about native title, in that it does create an uneven playing field in terms of the resources you might have. If you’ve got a mine on your native title 5 claim area, then you’re pretty well set up in terms of having an income stream for a while, which supports the PBC, which enables them to get into other economic development opportunities, or to participate with the mining company.

10 Far west coast for example has bought mining machinery and leases it back to the mining company, so they’ve been able to do that, it’s paid for the machinery and they’re now investing monies in funds management and that type of thing, so they’re going to be well set up for the future. A lot of groups are not as fortunate, they don’t have mining, so some of them have very little, 15 and some of the funds that they have to, they might put into charitable trusts and the like, to enable members to access funding for, it might be funeral, it might be education support, it could be for housing goods.

So there’s a range of different things. So that’s one of the things I’m looking 20 at, at the moment is to how to better even that playing field, to create opportunities for more economic development for groups that don’t have that access. It’s something that we’re still working on, but we’re working closely with other agencies, the state and IBA and the ILC in terms of trying to look at how we might achieve something which is going to be of benefit to all 25 Aboriginal people in South Australia.

Part of that was we’d set up the Aboriginal Foundation of South Australia, which was setting up that like a trust, from which if there were for example, all the coastal groups, if we were able to negotiate a fishing licence from the state, 30 I don’t envisage that each group would get a fishing licence, but if we were able to get one then the Foundation would hold that and operate on behalf of all of those groups, and they’d all share the income stream that would be created by having a fishing licence.

35 You can see that happening in different areas within the state for different purposes, and you know, there is great opportunity out there, but it’s trying to make the best of that opportunity. The problem is, it doesn’t happen overnight and it’s not a simple thing. I’m quite hopeful that coming into the near future, that we’ll be able to look at a couple of projects which are going to be 40 beneficial to all Aboriginal people in South Australia.

MR JACOBI: I’m interested in picking up the reference you made to charitable trusts, and I wanted to come to this issue of structures. Do you have a view about the sort of flexibility you might need in structures to deliver those 45 sorts of long term outcomes? Do trusts offer sufficient flexibility for that

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1206 Spark and Cannon outcome?

MR THOMAS: I think what trusts offer is a modicum of financial management that’s not available within the community. I think if there’s one 5 area where the Aboriginal community really falls down is in the management of funds. There’s just not that understanding, even if they’ve got somebody who manages their funds, there’s not that understanding of even reading a basic balance sheet and your income/expense sort of sheets.

10 So it’s very important to have people in there who are trustworthy people that can provide that level of security to groups about their funds, and how they’re used. In that sense, yes, but I think it’s also important to look at lifting the level of financial knowledge and management within the Aboriginal community as well. 15 MR JACOBI: The issue I had in mind was, there are sometimes limits on the purposes for which charities and trust funds - - -

MR THOMAS: Indeed. 20 MR JACOBI: - - - can be used, and I’m just wondering about whether you have a view about whether there might be more flexible vehicles that you could use to achieve the sorts of long term benefits you’re talking about.

25 MR THOMAS: Yes, there may be. We’ve been looking at, and groups are using things like the ANZ Trust and other bank trusts. IBA has its property trust and are now also setting up a money trust called the Prosperity Fund, which is looking to get groups to put their funds into those. There’s a higher level of interest return; the property trust I think was 12 per cent last year, but 30 if you’ve got monies in the bank you’re only getting what, 3, 3.25 or something.

So there is a greater level to start building wealth, but I think we’ve also got to lift the understanding of people that you are putting these funds away for long 35 term, for a better purpose, for setting up your organisation for the future, for your grandchildren and that type of thing.

COMMISSIONER: That might be a good time to come to think about the sorts of activities that we’re envisaging in the nuclear cycle, and to get your 40 views about what might be appropriate when we think about the sorts of long term decisions that might be necessary.

MR THOMAS: Are you talking about what happens prior to the process or during the process? 45

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1207 Spark and Cannon COMMISSIONER: Perhaps we could just walk through - - -

MR THOMAS: All right.

5 COMMISSIONER: - - - in a step process. If the government were minded to take this activity, and they certainly aren’t at this stage, what would be the process, based upon your experience, of how you’ve walked through what is a many-generational decision?

10 MR THOMAS: There’s probably an interesting example with the Federal Government with their nuclear dump proposal at the moment, which you know, they’ve put a big carrot out there with $10 million on the offer to a group, so groups are going to have to think seriously about that type of thing, so they need to sit down and talk. I know there is an ideology strongly 15 opposed to the dump and uranium and that, because of past experiences that happened from Emu and the like, and what happened to people on the APY lands and that type of thing, so there’s that strong history about those things not being repeated, and the damage that it does to country and not being able to access country. 20 You know, Aboriginal history has largely been by word of mouth, and that’s carried through from generation to generation about the effects of radiation on people, and things that happen to people that were never in your mainstream papers, and that type of stuff. 25 So it’s not a good experience, but I think people still have to sit down and talk, and come to the party if the state want to, because at the end of the day the state can say, “Well, we need this thing, we’re going to do it,” and then really I suppose you’re going to be just talking about compensation as such. But from 30 our point of view, if there is a starting point, then people get the information, people get together, have the time to talk about that, and I think we talked about it in terms of the process in leading up to the Royal Commission.

COMMISSIONER: Yes. 35 MR THOMAS: There’s been a lot of time, technology has changed a lot over time, let’s sit down and have a look and see what is happening at the moment, and what is the history. So I think the opportunity is there to sit down and talk to people about how this thing might happen and how it might be progressed, 40 but people are going to be strongly concerned about what happens to themselves, what happens to the land, what happens to the resources on the land? If you’re putting stuff directly into land, what happens if it gets into the water system in a fragile environment and that type of thing.

45 COMMISSIONER: Can I just pick away at that a little bit? You’ve talked

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1208 Spark and Cannon about communities, or larger communities. In this process, because there is an enormous amount of complexity and risk, is it important to have that broad initial dialogue with all of the Aboriginal community, or do you think it’s more specific once locations are identified? 5 MR THOMAS: If locations are known, then I think it’s got to be more specific, because people will just say, “Hey, you can’t speak for our country, go away.”

10 COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR THOMAS: So once you know, if you have a location, and there’s a specific group, native title group or whoever involved in that, then they’re the ones, you need to talk to the people who can speak for the country, essentially. 15 So that’s the PBC, and it starts from there. Because something like that is quite complex and quite divisive in the community in some respects - - -

COMMISSIONER: Yes, it is.

20 MR THOMAS: When I think about it, it’s going to be even more so, when you see a carrot of $10 million, because really, something like $10 million can really set up a community for the future and that type of thing, especially if you can invest properly. $10 million, you know, if every group had 10 million I think they’d be set, virtually. 25 So it’s going to be important for those groups to look at that, and not just dismiss it offhand I think. I think from my point of view, we’d be encouraging groups to have a look and talk about it. At the end of the day, some people might just say, “No, we don’t want anything to do with it.” 30 COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR THOMAS: But we’ve seen in the lead up process that there’s been a couple of Aboriginal groups which have said, “We’ve mined the stuff, we’d be 35 prepared to take it back, but we’d want to talk about what’s involved in that.”

COMMISSIONER: Just exploring this concept of the foundation, that’s some sort of benefit to the whole of the South Australian community. Is that something that can be negotiated with a single group, or is that more likely to 40 be achievable with a number of PBCs? Is there a - - -

MR THOMAS: What we’ve tried to look at in the past is, the group is still able to negotiate with the mining company or the developer, and still get their interest. But we’ve been looking at a similar system as what they’ve set up 45 with the Aboriginal Lands Trust, in that the state government gets the 3 per

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1209 Spark and Cannon cent mining royalty, why can’t they stream some of that money into the Foundation for the benefit of all of South Australia, not just that group who has negotiated their own package? But there is an income stream into the Foundation which then can be used for the betterment of all Aboriginal people 5 in South Australia.

So it’s not taking anything away from the group themselves, and it might dilute the state’s income a little bit, but we see - well, naturally enough, for the betterment of the state and for Aboriginal people in South Australia. So it’s 10 not taking anything away from the group itself and it might dilute the state’s income a little bit but we say naturally enough for the betterment of the state and for Aboriginal people in Australia.

MR JACOBI: Thanks. I wanted to pick up this issue of flexibility and given 15 the sorts of activities the Commission is required to contemplate and considering activities that might have very, very long periods of operation, I was interested in the need to build flexibility into the arrangements so that there can be adjustments or changes made with communities along the way and your views about that. 20 MR THOMAS: I don’t think it’s unheard of in terms of in agreements that you have sort of milestones and you might sit down and talk about the next stage or whatever else and that type of thing. So I think generally there is flexibility in that. I think that happened a bit with the BHP negotiations with 25 all of the groups involved there, there are different stages and different set ups, about how that happens and who benefits and that type of thing.

MR JACOBI: Does that provide for the opportunity for review later on, so if Aboriginal communities for example are not happy with a particular outcome 30 they can come back and have a think about how they might have shared that result better in the future if the state of technical knowledge is moved on.

MR THOMAS: There is the ability – I know that within some agreements there is a review process locked into some agreements that they will revisit 35 after a certain period of time. There might be requirements for the group to actually go and do a report or something to provide to the group which then leads into the next stage or something like that, you know. We’ve had different agreements where they’ve had to do like a native title report so to speak about what are the rights and interests and what’s impacted in that and there might be 40 for example onto Rose Hill with the pastoralists in that there was a whole map done pointing out the watering points and that, and so it’s not all sites but certainly the sites that were mentioned within the trial process for Rose Hill. So pastoralists in there now have a good idea about where things are and they have actually allowed – that relationship’s built there and they’ve actually 45 fenced off some of those places now so that the cattle can’t sort of destroy sites

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1210 Spark and Cannon and that type of thing. That’s a really good example about how negotiations and agreement making has made for better relationships and something that’s probably never happened before in South Australia in terms of protecting Aboriginal sites on a pastoral station. 5 MR JACOBI: I just want to pick up something else. The question asked by the Commissioner in terms of negotiating with the community more broadly or just in particular groups. I was interested in the extent to which there would be an expectation for example people that might be indirectly affected by such a 10 facility might also need to be negotiated with. That is for example if there was a transport corridor that was related to the ultimate operation of the facility with it, whether that would be something else that would need to be addressed.

MR THOMAS: Yes, and I think I touched on that earlier where I said 15 anybody who has interests in that country should probably be looked at and spoken to and depending on some of those might be Aboriginal interests, I think I mentioned Rag Dodd for example, he’s a part of the native title group as well, so he’d probably want to talk to the native title group about how – what their negotiating is affecting his rights but the communication, I mean a road 20 corridor and that type of thing is a different matter altogether and it may have already been negotiated if a developer or someone had to build a road through their country then they would have already had to negotiate the outcomes of that.

25 MR JACOBI: I had in mind the idea of even the use of the existing road.

MR THOMAS: That’s probably been dealt with in terms of native title already because they would have – most groups that have been affected say by the main highway going north, Stuart Highway, have negotiated compensation. 30 There’s still a couple of groups outstanding but most groups have done a settlement (indistinct) which looks at – and really the road and the railroad, some of those areas it’s just all pastoral stations so there’s not a lot of extinguishment and the road and the road and the railroad is it essentially.

35 COMMISSIONER: Can I just pick behind the answer that you gave and you will tell me if you’re not comfortable giving the answer. But if the government were minded to go ahead with this activity and therefore recommended it, it might take a number of years to come to a location. Does it make sense to have that broad engagement with the Aboriginal community about the sorts of 40 activities that are being considered before we actually come to a discussion about location?

MR THOMAS: It probably makes it difficult because you’re probably setting people up with an expectation and then if it doesn’t eventuate in their area - - - 45

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1211 Spark and Cannon COMMISSIONER: You run into the problems you mentioned.

MR THOMAS: Indeed, that’s right. So I think it’s important to proceed once you know – once you have more certainty about where you’re actually going to 5 put it. I mean things in general I think its fine to put out there but not to start talking about the nitty gritty sort of parts of or how it might affect your country or whatever.

COMMISSIONER: I was thinking about an education program but again that 10 raises the level of expectation.

MR THOMAS: Yes, but just in general terms I think to put information out there and that, it’s important from my point of view I think communication is the key to any successful organisation or any successful project and it’s how 15 you communicate that that’s which is going to lead to the success of that particular activity. So I think it’s important to get information out but it’s also important in that information to say this is just general information.

COMMISSIONER: Not to raise expectations. 20 MR THOMAS: Indeed, indeed.

COMMISSIONER: Mr Thomas, that is very clear evidence, thank you very much for your submission which we found very useful and for the evidence 25 you have provided this afternoon, we are very grateful for that.

MR THOMAS: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER: We will adjourn now until 14.15 when we will talk with 30 the Allerton Rail Link community.

ADJOURNED [1.26 pm]

RESUMED [2.14 pm] 35 COMMISSIONER: Good afternoon. I welcome you back for a continuation of topic 13, Community Engagement and Nuclear Facilities. Counsel assisting.

MR JACOBI: The witness, Mr Christopher Larkin is a Kokotha man with 40 over 40 years of experience working in government departments and agencies delivering programs and services for community, housing, health and land management in South Australia; particularly those focused on Aboriginal interests and issues. He has worked closely with Maralinga Tjarutja and Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) communities over many years 45 and he's in the shop on the immediate left. To his right is Mr Dennis Brown.

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1212 Spark and Cannon

Mr Brown is the traditional owner of the Maralinga lands and has worked as a project officer for the Maralinga Tjarutja since 1988. He worked closely with Dr Archie Barton AM, the Aboriginal leader of the Maralinga Tjarutja 5 community during negotiations with the Commonwealth and state governments relating to the contamination and rehabilitation of land from the British nuclear tests.

Along side him is Dr Scott Cane, a consulting anthropologist. Mr Cane has 10 over 35 years of experience working in the field with Aboriginal people around Australia. During the 1980s, Dr Cane performed anthropological work with the communities affected by the British nuclear tests at Maralinga. He assisted Maralinga Tjarutja during negotiations with the Commonwealth and state governments regarding the clean-up, compensation and establishment of the 15 trust fund to administer the compensation.

Mr Patrick Davoren has, since the 1970s, held a number of positions in the Commonwealth government departments advising on nuclear-related issues and strategies. Mr Davoren was the secretary of the Technical Assessment 20 Group (TAG) established in 1986 to advise the Commonwealth government on rehabilitation options for the lands contaminated by the British nuclear tests. He also served as the secretary of the government body established to plan and implement the clean-up at Maralinga and Emu. In these roles he worked closely with Maralinga Tjarutja throughout their negotiations with the 25 government.

Along side him is Mr Richard Preece, the Maralinga Tjarutja Council general manager. Mr Preece has worked closely with Aboriginal communities in a number of roles within state and Commonwealth government departments and 30 agencies over 40 years. During the 1990s, Mr Preece was involved in the Commonwealth and state working group which conducted negotiations with Maralinga Tjarutja regarding compensation for contamination resulting from the British nuclear tests. He served as the general manager of the APY Council in 2013 and is currently serving as the general manager for the Maralinga 35 Tjarutja Council.

Finally, Mr Andrew Collett AM, barrister, is the counsel for the Maralinga Tjarutja and Yalata Community Incorporated. The Maralinga Tjarutja is a corporation representing the traditional owners in relation to the management, 40 use and control of the Maralinga Tjarutja lands in the far western region of South Australia. Yalata Community Incorporated is an association aimed at promoting the development of the Yalata community and their lands. Both bodies represent the people belonging to the same Western Desert cultural group. Mr Andrew Collett AM is an independent barrister in Adelaide who has 45 provided legal advice for the Maralinga people since 1984. This has included

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1213 Spark and Cannon advising and acting for the Maralinga traditional owners in relation to the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia in 1984 and all matters which arise from it, including compensation, negotiating with the British and Australian governments over the clean-up of contaminated lands, 5 the establishment of a compensation trust fund and the hand back of the rehabilitated lands to the traditional owners.

The Commission calls Mr Chris Larkin, Mr Dennis Brown, Dr Scott Cane, Mr Richard Preece, Mr Patrick Davoren and Mr Andrew Collett. 10 COMMISSIONER: Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us. In my work prior to the Commission I had the privilege of visiting the Maralinga lands on a number of occasions and we did so again when the Commission started earlier this year. I note from first-hand accounts that Maralinga Tjarutja 15 Aboriginal people were deeply unhappy about being displaced from their lands, about the health impacts upon them of nuclear activities, and unhappy in terms of the initial efforts to clean up the testing and the trial sites. Whilst these are not matters that will be directly addressed by the Commission, there are many lessons to be learnt from this experience. 20 I acknowledge the express statement of the MT people that is neither opposed nor supportive of the activities being considered by the Commission. Today I hope that we can learn from the experience of the Maralinga Tjarutja people. Today's public session brings together a number of the key figures in the 25 negotiations to relate a series of themes about the essential elements of building confidence and negotiating with remote Aboriginal communities on issues as complex and difficult as the Maralinga clean-up.

The public session today draws upon their submissions which address the 30 negotiation process of the clean-up of the Maralinga lands conducted by the Commonwealth, the state and Maralinga Tjarutja. I am grateful for the willingness of the MT people who have provided this relevant information to the Commission so that we can draw upon the key elements of those negotiations. 35 If I could start with the questions so that we have some context and perhaps I could address this to Mr Collett. Can you give us a brief outline of the issues that you've needed to address since and during those negotiations of the lands of the clean-up? 40 MR COLLETT: These issues faced the Maralinga Tjarutja just about from the day it started. In fact the Royal Commission in the British Nuclear Tests was called in August of 1984 and the Land Rights Act was passed later in that year. At that stage the Maralinga people knew nothing about the nuclear tests or the 45 contamination. So the first issue through the Royal Commission was to find

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1214 Spark and Cannon out as much as they could about the history of the tests, how they affected Aboriginal people and, as emerged in the Royal Commission, the state of the land.

5 At the start of the Royal Commission, Maralinga Tjarutja had one of about 50 reports that were available of the Commonwealth. At the end of the Royal Commission that had increased to about 500 reports once the British doors had opened and MT got that information over the first year. So the first issue was to work out what the problem was and then how to deal with it. Over the next 10 six years, until the Technical Assessment Group report in 1990 which made recommendations for the clean-up, the community had to work out what was the extent of the contamination and the nature of the contamination and how it could be fixed, bearing in mind that it was a traditional community. So that was the first issue. 15 Once a clean-up was decided upon, there was then the issue of negotiating compensation for about 30 Aboriginal people who had been injured or seriously inconvenienced during the test period: people had been dislocated; people who suffered injury. Then there were the negotiations about what form 20 of clean-up there would be and what compensation there would be for the lands that couldn't be cleaned up. There was a big issue in that because a total clean-up would have cost $500 million, a partial clean-up obviously less. The community had to consider what they did and they ultimately opted for a partial clean-up on the basis that a total clean-up would have added another 25 environmental disaster to deal with the first one.

The compensation had to be negotiated in a way which set up a trust fund. The Maralinga Piling Trust was successfully set up in 1995 and still exists with all its capital and interest to this day. Maralinga Tjarutja then had to cooperate 30 with the South Australian and Commonwealth government in the clean-up and the clean-up took three or four years. It had one or two ups and downs and there was a lot of negotiation involved in that.

Then, as you will know, Commissioner, ultimately that led to the hand back of 35 section 400 after some very extensive negotiations giving indemnities by the Commonwealth to the state government of South Australia and to the Maralinga people. The last negotiation we had was in a sense righting an historical record and having the Woomera prohibited area removed from section 400. That took place about two years ago. So it's taken about 27 years 40 to get through all of those issues.

COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MR JACOBI: I just wanted to pick up, perhaps with you, Dr Cane, the nature 45 of the negotiating challenge that was really confronted at the outset of the

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1215 Spark and Cannon negotiations with respect to the clean-up activities. I'm just wondering perhaps whether you can give some context about standing at that point and looking outwards to what needed to be done, what the scale of the negotiating task was and what the issues that you envisaged then that you were likely to confront. 5 DR CANE: I wonder if I actually can. I wasn't involved so much. I mean I was there as a - this is a terrible saying about my myself but I always thought the anthropologist is a bit like a camp dog; you can always hang around the community but not necessarily central to the activity. A lot of that earlier 10 clean-up stuff you were more directly involved in that I. I mean I participated later on, when the clean-up had been completed and the negotiations to get the - - -

MR COLLETT: Just the clean-up or right from the start with the - - - 15 MR JACOBI: No, what I'm seeking to get at is that at the time of the decision, before the decision was made as to whether you'd do a full clean-up or a partial clean-up, just what the scale of the negotiating challenge was that was perceived to exist at that time and then how one was going to begin to tackle 20 the extent of that challenge.

MR COLLETT: Bit by bit was the answer. It was really a matter of finding out what the problem was first and then only then did the scale become apparent. As an example of that, a really important part of negotiations for the 25 part that Pat was involved in when the Technical Assessment Group made suggestions as to clean-up options, that helped us to understand what all of the options were; some we hadn't thought about. Once we had those roughly six options, we then sat down and got independent overseas advice and we could flesh out what the options were. So I think we were lucky that we were never 30 too ambitious. We set targets. What's the problem? How do we fix it? How do we go about getting advice? How do we deal with the TAG report? So we just took it in stages.

DR CANE: I can add a bit there, unless you wanted to - I mean I was around 35 the fringes of some of those meetings and the strategy on the ground - I mean always these negotiations are contextual and so the generational circumstances change. But at that time Maralinga - and it's different now - had obviously very strong leadership and the durable leadership of Archie Barton. He was an Aboriginal man who got the politics and got the strategies and if he gave his 40 word, he delivered right up until the end, really, and so you knew for sure.

You also had a situation where you had the first generation people from the bush who had been moved onto the coast and they were moving back. So they had a really active interest in the landscape and their country. So it naturally 45 filtered in the contamination discussion. So they listened; they were really

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1216 Spark and Cannon receptive. There was no politics about that. It was, "What's happening? What's happened out there? How do we get back out to our country? What do we have to deal with to do that, where we can and can't go?" So there were very actively interested rather than having a political interest particularly. 5 On the tribal front, you had people like - there was a man now dead called Huey (indistinct) His great-grandfather, King Billy, was the boss of Noongar and was actually probably a boyfriend of Daisy Bates and he was very bright man and he got the politics and he could translate it to the community. So 10 someone like me would be there to talk to him, like Brownie and I would talk. Brownie and others play that role a bit now. So you get a sort of filtered - you've sort of got the expertise filtered through you guys to people like Huey and Archie, filtered back into the community, but in the context of really active reclamation of rights and land. In other words, there was kind of an organic 15 component and a real sense of - I can remember one meeting at the end there where it had been cleaned up and there was this I think a year and a half discussion about what sort of signs to put up and Huey was getting in saying, "We're not stupid. I don't care what you put up there, we're not going there."

20 It was like there was this sort of element of commonsense with a certain synergy of interest. It's slightly different now than you'll confront because the community is now - at Yalata there's been a generational change and the people who grew up in Ceduna now are a little bit kind of like over being in the bush and all alone, and you'll see the young people hanging around the public phone 25 box hoping someone rings. But equally there's been a generational shift there and the last 10 years a problem of people drinking in Ceduna, but also now they're starting to go back again. So it's a matter of configuring whatever negotiations were there in the context of those experiences and you have to understand a little bit about them - or whoever - what comes post your inquiry, 30 I guess, now to tailor those negotiations so they have some resonance. Sorry, I got off the track there. I'm not sure - - -

MR JACOBI: I just wonder, Mr Davoren, whether you've got any observation in terms of thinking about the nature of the issues that stood to be negotiated 35 and discussed from the outset in terms of the sorts of challenges that you envisaged that you were going to confront at that point in time and looking forward.

MR DAVOREN: I can honestly say we didn't have a clue about how our 40 negotiations with the Aborigines would go on the preferred clean-up option. In September 1990, we got a Technical Assessment Group report which came up with a range of costed options essentially going from do nothing to the skimming of tens of square kilometres of sandhills, which was right at the edge of practicability. In the middle was some options around a hundred million 45 which dealt with the worst of the contamination and released areas of land but

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1217 Spark and Cannon with the capacity for part-time access, casual access, for hunting and things like that. That was a question that we had to get the views of Maralinga Tjarutja on, whether that land was of use for hunting. But the main thing was before we went to the British government, we had to know – had to agree with 5 South Australia and Maralinga Tjarutja what the Australian position was and that presented challenges for people in Canberra who are used to – used to think they could get an instant response from an indigenous community. And of course it’s well known that if you were dealing with an indigenous community early in the year, you have things like traditional ceremonies which 10 can be a massive thing out at Oak Valley to deal with and there’s no way you’ll get a decision out of people during that time. So when you consider that from September of 1990 we had a report by about August of 1991 we had a considered view of both the South Australian government and Maralinga Tjarutja and agreement on a preferred rehabilitation option that the 15 Commonwealth government was able to consider in around August of 1991 and in November of that year we were in negotiations with the British government, so that went pretty well.

But I think the most important thing in getting to that point was having 20 independent scientific advice for Maralinga Tjarutja and I think that’s something that might play out more broadly in to the Commission’s deliberations. I think that’s a valid idea, whether they’re indigenous people or normal sort of landholders. I mean you couldn’t reasonably argue that the people of ANSTO or the Australian Radiation Laboratory were going to give 25 you some skewed advice but I think there was much more community confidence once Maralinga Tjarutja were funded by the Commonwealth to go off and get their own advice. And it was interesting that when they did that, the Commonwealth’s advisors said gee, they’re good people, you know they picked very sensible and well established technical advisors. 30 MR COLLETT: The main one, the leading advisor was a radiation biologist from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in San Francisco - - -

MR DAVOREN: Henry - - - 35 MR COLLETT: Henry Kohn who had been the head of the Bikini Atoll rehabilitation committee which is why we sought him out but he was a man who already had terrific practical experience elsewhere in the world on this issue. And we expected that the government would recognise his credibility. 40 MR DAVOREN: We were also well served by the structure that was put in place by the senior people in the Department of Resources and Energy after the Royal Commission as part of the government’s response. They set up two bodies, they set up the technical assessment group which was purely technical 45 and they set up the Maralinga Consultative Group and that involved officials

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1218 Spark and Cannon from the South Australian government, the Commonwealth government, obviously Maralinga Tjarutja and at that stage representatives of the British government and also the West Australian government because of the Montebello Islands’ tests. And so we just had a pattern of consultation where 5 everyone was kept in the picture, technical assessment group would have a meeting somewhere and then a month or so after we’d have a meeting of the consultative group and they’d be briefed by our chief scientist Des Davey and I think Des also played an important role because he had a particularly good relationship which developed over many years with senior people in 10 Maralinga Tjarutja.

MR JACOBI: I was hoping to come to the structures that were involved in the negotiations and I’m just interested – and perhaps if we can deal with – with the Commonwealth first and that is, do you have a view about the significance 15 of those particular structures to the success of the overall process? And I’ll come to MT in a minute? Do you have a view about the importance of establishing a structure at the outset and whether that structure – did that structure need to change?

20 MR DAVOREN: It didn’t need to change. Well obviously the players changed as the circumstances changed. I mean some people left and some people were added but it remained essentially the same all the way through and in fact it was such a successful structure, it was applied to on the projects. I mean it sounds sensible now but it was a bit unusual at the time and I think it 25 helped enormously in getting the agreement of the South Australia and Maralinga Tjarutja to a preferred option.

MR JACOBI: I mentioned picking up on the structural separation between the technical advice and the consultative group. Could you explain how that 30 interaction worked?

MR DAVOREN: Well, Des Davey it was through – mainly through Des Davey who was the chair of the technical assessment group and he was later the chair of a similar group for implementation of the clean up and he 35 made a formal report to all of the consultative group meetings. There were – there’s the representative of South Australian Health Commission, the radiological protection branch, Dr Jill Fitch, she had the opportunity to give a technical representation to South Australia and that’s pretty much the way it worked. 40 MR PREECE: Can I add to that? I think there was a lot of fortunate things happened in this instance and it was early days in negotiating with Aboriginal people around the country and I remember the Northern Territory Land Rights Act, only happened 10 years prior. But there was a lot of fortune (indistinct) I 45 was an observer on the Department of Aboriginal Affairs so Maralinga Tjarutja

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1219 Spark and Cannon was well served both by Dr Archie Barton who was a very strong leader and it had some really good advisors like Andrew Darcey O’Shea, Scott and so on plus its own people and there’s a lot of sort of self-evident stuff. I mean there’s no magic really. It’s self-evident that if you go in to a negotiation trying to get 5 the outcome that you think the minister wants, or an outcome that some private interest wants and you know they’re only Aborigines and they’re poor so they’re not – they don’t know much, it’s all going to fail. But if you go into – to think that because people are poor, financially poor, they’re dumb is a huge mistake. You know Aboriginal people are as smart as anybody and smarter 10 about a lot of stuff because they’ve had a lot more negotiations about this sort of thing than most middle class Australians.

So it’s self-evident that if you go in to a negotiation in good faith, you are really wanting to find out what the Aboriginal community is expecting and that 15 you’re not looking for an answer, it might – you might know of a convenient one but if you go – you’re not going to manipulate the response, then you will develop the relationship and get an answer and usually a very pragmatic sensible response. If you go in saying I’ve got a business interest this, or the minister wants that, forget it. You are going to hit brick walls. And this group, 20 some of whom here today, some who aren’t, on the Commonwealth side, there was a really good bunch of professional people, they were scientists, not beholden to some minister, there was good advisors on the Maralinga Tjarutja side and the state government like it usually does, just followed along in the negotiations between the two and I think this was a very fortunate sort of 25 formula that developed around this issue. I’ve seen similar issues in other locations that have just turned in to disasters because people manipulated the outcome or thought they were and it all – it all goes to mush later on as a result.

DR CANE: Can I lock in then and sort of take it down the chain (indistinct) 30 expertise in the community. Again, my experience being there is a shadow really, was that information fed in to the community, Archie Barton was a general leader and he kept himself quite separate from the community. In fact, when he came to the community it was a bit like the Commissioner walking in to the room, it’s like (indistinct) He had that sort of personal charisma but he 35 had offsiders and Brand was one, right and you could (indistinct) guy who has just died, (indistinct) close brother really and he had a community which was mobile at that point. Oak Valley didn’t exist and you probably don’t know the terrain there but you’ve got the Nullarbor Plain and the line and this vast inhospitable desert. 40 The people live near the line and got food from the trains that came through but Dickie and Brownie would take food up all the time, so there was a constant conduit of communication and there’s probably a bit of a cliché but nothing better, Aboriginal people in my experience like nothing better than talking 45 about other Aboriginal people and they’re big on politics and inter-family

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1220 Spark and Cannon disputes and what’s happening and there’s lots of scammy and talking which goes under the radar when you just have a public meeting. But with that dialogue at that time and an astute (indistinct) really to Archie, the information pervaded and then these guys would come for the more serious meetings and 5 people would be across it, in the context of the tribal leadership with obvious (indistinct) and Baker who were just – were like the equivalent of the Commissioners. I mean they ruled according to traditional law and custom, they were powerful, they were strong, they hadn’t been – become receptive or impoverished in any sense in their own ideology they were the senior law men. 10 So decisions were made quite pragmatically and quite clearly with complete conversation where that might be different now but another – that was the situation. So you went in to a sort of – a group which had its own structures essentially strong and in place, so the decision-making was clear and reliable and effective. So you had sort of basically a nice balance of expertise on the 15 west in the context of informed senior responsible men in the traditional context. I don’t know if that’s a reasonable summary.

COMMISSIONER: Can I just develop that a little bit? In terms of these two consultative groups, how as the Aboriginal community engaged? The 20 community itself as opposed to the leadership within those groups? Was that led by Dr Barton?

MR DAVOREN: It had to be because to do the clean up, you had to work out decontamination contours on the ground. Those contamination contours were 25 developed from estimates of dose to Aboriginal people, leading what was called a semi-traditional lifestyle so that naturally involved the engagement of project scientists and anthropologists with the Oak Valley community. So that they had to be involved, they saw scientists around them all the time and there was quite a deal of interaction there. 30 COMMISSIONER: So the information in terms of individual negotiations conducted – what I am also interested in was how the leadership engaged with the community? Is it in a traditional sense?

35 DR CANE: Yes, that’s a good question because Archie wasn’t an initiated man, so he was always subservient and – to those senior men but he was recognised as the boss when we had interface with the white people and in my introduction to that was in exactly that role. I was this kind of servant, I was the butler for those men and I would do (indistinct) I was told and they’d tell 40 me what to do and they didn’t know how to put that across in my little area, not so much in that – and that was the structure which they established. But it’s also – and it’s a trick probably to somehow get in the Commissioner’s head, it’s not so much that there are these definable structures and I know the western process thinks like that but what happens is everyone talks all the time. And I 45 don’t want to sort of patronise things but Aboriginal people miss nothing, right.

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1221 Spark and Cannon They’ll sit in the meeting and go (indistinct) and you think they’ve got it and they’re not interested or it’s a hard thing to read but I would always, as an example, go to those meetings and sit next to Brownie, purposefully because I knew he’d position himself politically and strategically. So if I was with him, I 5 wasn’t going to offend anybody and I’d tap him for my information and Archie would tap him and Dickie would. And that’s kind of how it plays.

Everyone sort of almost kind of (indistinct) about this because he’s kind of a cunning sort of dude but the – Aboriginal people are always playing politics 10 amongst themselves and so there’s not necessarily a structure which you can define and tap in to but all the time, if you’re providing information in a regular seemly way, seem is not the right word but accurately, consolidated way, it will get through to the community. The trick is to get that information to the community and now what tends to happen is everyone’s busy and everyone’s 15 coming from all over the place, they fly out, have a meeting and go. Everyone goes what was that about? I don’t know. That’s the organic nature of the relationship.

MR LARKIN: Aboriginal societies (indistinct) are very complex about the 20 relationship and those sorts of things and what we are trying to do here is simplify for you how the relationship between people who all – your people you have to listen to from father-in-laws to mother-in-laws, you can’t listen to, or acknowledge and so there are defined relationships. And people who are father to brother’s children, the paternal uncle, he’s the father. So as part of 25 that whole business about how you relate and listen for information of looking after your family in meetings, what you’re saying now is how you gather how that person might react to that because it’s also related to that bit of country or those sorts of things. Who are the person who’s important for there, we’d better listen to them. But it’s – I guess we just assume, we don’t – we know 30 who to talk to and who to listen to and then what we come up with, we don’t sit down and dissect it like this, I don’t think. And so to be able to now think yes, how do we go about that? But what your – yes, what you’re focussing on is the one thing that Maralinga Tjarutja and all the experts and advisors were involved in which was huge. But at the time it also had lots of other people 35 around who were saying, yes it’s time this should happen, so the political fight the land rights, the – all those sort of things.

DR CANE: And it’s also, a consequence of that, jumping in, too much of the longevity of the players, we’re all getting old and we were all young when we 40 were there and also through good advice or good luck, or good management, never really stuffed anything up. So you do get a bit of a bank of credibility which you can draw on and it’s possible to go out and say look this will be fine, trust them, let’s do it and it can be as easy as that.

45 MR LARKIN: A lot of it is luck – like you said, that all these people stayed

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1222 Spark and Cannon together, that this man was there - - -

DR CANE: (indistinct)

5 MR LARKIN: You’ll be at the finish now and Archie and all Mr Day and all those fellows were part of it but you can’t keep picking the intelligencia of any one group without investing in the next level.

DR CANE: Yes, exactly. I was going to add something there. 10 MR LARKIN: And the bit that – I’m not talking about this process, I’m talking about generally, our community, we invest hours but generally community, who invest in the next leadership, all those sorts of things. We have done that in Aboriginal affairs for a very long time. And so when you – 15 somewhere recently where the premier said only Aboriginal people can fix this because we’ve tried and we don’t get it right because the community chose who was going to lead their negotiation, not the government anointing people. So they’ll choose me if I have credibility to come and talk, or yourself, or yourself. So now you can say it in a way that I’m not able to and that’s an 20 important part of it.

DR CANE: And because – I mean everyone’s kind of political on the ground and no one will stick their head up and get – well, go back a step. Because family is the core structure in Aboriginal communities, so you can talk to the 25 community but it’s kind of an invention of history or Oak Valley’s there, so there’s a community but it’s actually made up of families who have gotten weirdly complex and large alignments and not necessarily across the community. So the first part of the negotiation has to be at that family level. And in terms of a negotiating strategy which is kind of – to the extent you 30 could have a rule of thumb, there needs to be a fairly clear understanding of what the issue is that’s being discussed. There needs to be a preparatory time where conversations, and you might be the person for the agency that’s doing it. That spends time actually talks to – if ever I go to meetings which are complicated meetings and it doesn’t happen so much in Maralinga now 35 because we all trust each other but in other places, I spend a couple of days up there talking to every family. Because some people are like really pissed off and that’s going to come out at a meeting and fragment everything but if you can talk first, they get it off their chest and everyone finds out what the true situation. They go to the meeting informed. 40 So that’s like the second step is actually on the ground, face to face and it doesn’t happen so much now because what happens is, it’s more convenient for NRMs a case in point, to fly board members to somewhere which is convenient, Port Augusta or wherever and they attend the meeting a bit like 45 we’re sitting down, they get given some papers which no one’s read, they listen

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1223 Spark and Cannon to the meeting, they go yes, yes, yes. They go away with their TA and head home and that’s actually the consultation process. So it has to be an on ground in the dirt discussion with people with an active interest. Then you go to the meeting, right, and the experts come and give a broad picture and everyone is 5 already across it and they’ve already have their arguments and abused you a couple of times and – but it’s – that’s done but then – so that’s the sort of third step I think, I can’t be on five but the last thing is then to follow up and that’s all that you need, you make a commitment, you follow up. Whatever it is, we’re going to put a road sign in, we’re going to put a notice up on the board, 10 we’re going to come back up and go out and actually visit the site in three weeks time. It happens, which is (indistinct) how often it doesn’t happen.

MR LARKIN: Are you talking about all steps of unawareness to awareness.

15 COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR LARKIN: Comprehension comes commitment. And from commitment comes action. We demand unawareness to awareness; we demand the commitment and wonder why the bloody hell there’s no action. 20 DR CANE: I sat down once with your commitment thing with Jeffrey (indistinct) who was a leader, he’s dead now but just because I was really (indistinct) in the community, he was about to fly off to a land management meeting and I sat down with him and he had this big pile of papers and I was 25 going through them with him and (indistinct) didn’t make sense to me and I think – we’re just chatting like you and I might, and his partner Hilda just said, “You know Scottie”, they call me Waddie (indistinct) along there, “that’s the first time anyone’s ever gone through those notes with him.” He’d been going to these meetings for years, years. So I mean it’s that level, it’s kind of 30 actually pretty basic but there’s an (indistinct) getting Aboriginal approval, going through the ethics committee and doing all the right stuff in terms of policy but on the ground, which is actually quite a pain in the arse sometimes because people are away, people are dead and there are ceremonies and you’re about to go and (indistinct) but you just keep doing it. And it works. 35 COMMISSIONER: Can I ask a general question? In terms of the complexity of the cleanup how much did Aboriginal people understand what was happening to their community? I appreciate at the leadership levels there would’ve been good understanding, did that percolate down in to the 40 community as well? Or was it more an issue of trust of the leadership?

MR LARKIN: I don’t know. (indistinct) understood what was going on. I don’t think they do at the time of the cleanup.

45 MR BROWN: I don’t think – no.

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1224 Spark and Cannon

MR DAVOREN: Community was involved in some parts of the cleanup.

MR BROWN: I don’t reckon they knew what was going on. 5 DR CANE: Do you mean like literally the sort of the – I mean because I don’t really understand either what they actually did out there. In terms of the general level of understanding there was a contaminated area, that had been (indistinct) I would’ve thought they understood (indistinct) 10 COMMISSIONER: What I’m hearing is an effective leadership?

DR CANE: Yes, absolutely right. But also an effective line of communication which may be was implied. 15 COMMISSIONER: It was implied and I guess because of the complexity of what was being done, certainly the leadership understood that and the community followed based upon the faith of the leadership as opposed to the technical knowledge of what was actually being done. 20 DR CANE: For sure.

MR COLLETT: I think there was a level of understanding that related to the way that we could communicate. So I think Brownie’s right, I mean if we – if 25 the community was asked, well what’s the risk in terms of rads or redans or millisieverts, nobody does but everybody knew that there was poison there because those were the words that were used and everybody knows, Brownie tell me if you disagree, that you still don’t go to section 400. Even though the sign says you can go there some time, but not full time, the community’s 30 formed a view based on the fact that it’s better not to.

DR CANE: And I think everybody was very aware that there was a conflict going on and negotiation and strategic approach to (indistinct) to get money out of them which would tidy it up and that the Poms should pay and that the 35 community then will also get some compensation from it but that was all pretty well understood.

COMMISSIONER: Can I just follow the line of the compensation Mr Brown? Do you think the community had a sense that there was benefit as 40 opposed to the extent of the benefit? Or was that again led from leadership?

MR BROWN: (indistinct)

COMMISSIONER: The understanding? 45

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1225 Spark and Cannon MR BROWN: (indistinct)

DR CANE: This is a team effort; this is exactly how it works in the bush. He knows but (indistinct) on TV and he doesn’t want to speak up and his family 5 going to see it in Coober Pedy, so I’ll say it and then everyone will say I’m an arsehole. Right. That’s how it kind of works. It’s a team effort. So in terms of the compensation, everybody thought – and you have to correct me if I’m wrong, everybody thought that some people, you didn’t go (indistinct) did you?

10 MR BROWN: No.

DR CANE: Were going to go and get 45 million out of the Poms and it was going to be given to the community but I think that went in to the (indistinct) so there’s some miscommunication and there always is over money, it’s just 15 one of those things. Which is probably worth exploring at some point. So everyone knew that. We negotiated and got – and you were central to that, 13 and a half million dollars. Now people didn’t really – again, I slightly lost the point of your question. People didn’t really know what the 13 and a half million dollars was. 20 COMMISSIONER: Yes.

DR CANE: And had to be split between two communities and so – and that was a fairly heated discussion, so they got it to that extent, was a lot of passion 25 about who should get what and how it should be split and I mentioned we put our (indistinct) and Henry Robinson, dead now, was the guy that stood up and said, look Tjunajarra side should get this many and this many and everyone went oh yes, that’s about right. And that was - and then it just simply was that. So there’s levels of comprehension which – and again, I mean everyone here is 30 intelligent and knows their stuff, but it would be the same in any sort of community where there’s access to the knowledge and particularly when English is limited and so forth. So people understood at the level they need to operate at for sure.

35 COMMISSIONER: Nice one, that was clear.

MR JACOBI: Can I pick up the concept, we are talking quite a bit about communication and I am interested in how perhaps the – from the government side, first you approached providing the community with tools to explain some 40 of the technical and scientific concepts that you were dealing with? The concept of half-life, concepts of a dose, the concept of radiation itself? And what sort of tools you thought about developing for that purpose?

MR DAVOREN: Well, that was largely in the hands of our expert radiation 45 scientists and over the years the community developed a fairly good

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1226 Spark and Cannon relationship with people like Dr Peter Johnson who was from ARPANSA, previously ARL and he became the community advisor on radiation. And he was one of the three independent sources of scientific advice and also Des Davey who was the general manager, scientific at ANSTO, spent a lot of 5 time at the community explaining those concepts and also he gave demonstrations of what was involved using sort of a simulated earth moving equipment toys to show how the pits would be dug, and how they’d be filled in and he went in to quite a deal of detail on that. Some of those concepts are extraordinarily difficult to explain and I would agree with Brownie, and say 10 that the level of comprehension in the community was probably pretty low but it was just a question of whether poison was there or whether it was dealt with. And I think there was a lot of – lot of it depended on trust. I mean if they had someone like Des Davey going out there for – he was with the project from the mid-eighties to 2000 when the final sign off was given. He was at the hand 15 back and he’d had previous experience dealing with indigenous communities in the Northern Territory, so whatever methods he used, he was probably one of the more experienced people in the Commonwealth and would communicate as well as anyone could. But difficult concepts.

20 MR COLLETT: Can I just add - - -

MR DAVOREN: You go, yes.

MR COLLETT: Can I just add from an advisor’s point of view, negotiations 25 like this which are difficult; you develop your own language by trial and error. Now poison was one that we started with and people understood it and it was a lot better than the community has no numerical system, dealing with 10 millisieverts or whatever and so we started with poison and people understood and that remains one of the major words. Along the way, and this 30 is an illustration of what Scott was saying about how people talk, along the way eventually I could just say to the community, well this is where the problem is and I would put up three fingers and after a lot of discussion people understood that these were the three contamination plumes from Taranaki. We had been over that so often and they knew that’s where the plutonium went and 35 it went out towards the community. So this became a symbol for the wind borne plutonium contamination. It was just something that developed.

Later on when we had the trust fund, Chris Gill who was the corporate advisor, was trying to explain the difference between principle and interest in the 40 investment of the trust fund, so he – he drew a diagram which had something like a mincing machine and you turn the handle and out came some mince at the bottom and he said well this is your money making machine and that became the word that was picked up, people then understood that this meant the interest. And it came from the money making machine. Very sort of basic, 45 lot of fun in it but it became part of the developed lexicon if you like of

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1227 Spark and Cannon language in terms that (indistinct)

DR CANE: In terms it was going to pick up, just to sort of balance the sort of – in terms of language, in terms, and it really helps if people are going to go 5 out there and they get some fundamentals right. So every – most liked people – anamul is the Aboriginal word for people, and most western people go out there when they talk of have meetings and they call them anangu and you can almost the meeting switch off when they hear that, so there’s comprehensive technical terms but there’s a lot of Aboriginal terms which it really helps white 10 people go out and have those names and actually use them properly. You have learnt to say anamul? Good yes, not anangu.

MR DAVOREN: You can say Maralinga Tjarutja which is a task that’s proved too (indistinct) for many ministers. 15 DR CANE: Tjarutja means about ground, just attached to the country, attached to Maralinga is a word we know. Don’t know where Maralinga came from, it’s not a Ptinjarra word.

20 MR JACOBI: Mr Preece, I wanted to pick something up in the notes that you provided and you spoke of the person that does the communication needing real skills in communication and in particular you emphasised that that person not seek to lead the community’s decision making process, or undermine it. And I am just wondering perhaps whether you might expand on that and relate 25 that to some of your experiences?

MR PREECE: It goes to a bit what I was saying before about presenting. You know, one of the principles in decision making in community development is people have to make informed decisions, so really the job of the communicator 30 is, in this sort of environment, to give people the information and give it to them in a way which is well understood and preferably deeply into the community, not just at a leadership level. If you go in there with a preset view about what decision you want out of it, you're going to get that decision. People find out - - - 35 DR CANE: But it doesn’t stick. You find out three weeks later nobody is taking notice at all and you've totally missed the yacht. No-one is going to follow you at all.

40 MR PREECE: Really, the communication, it's got to be neutral in terms of just giving the facts so people really do understand the decision they're being asked to make. If you go in there as a mining company and you want to pick up this area of land and you're going to try and talk people into it, you won't get an answer. 45

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1228 Spark and Cannon DR CANE: Or you have a bad subsequent, because there will be no durability to (indistinct)

MR PREECE: If you go into court, you think about what you're going to say 5 in advance. It's amazing how few people do think about why they're there, what they're there for and what sort of information they need to provide. You need to be on top of your subject

MR LARKIN: They're just like you. When people want to talk to you about 10 something, they tell you what is in it for you. I know my family, what's in it for me.

DR CANE: Absolutely. It will be family centric - - -

15 MR LARKIN: And how does it affect us and what is the flow-on if I say yes to this.

DR CANE: And you need some expertise sometimes there to know what the consequences are. If Brown says something here, what is going to happen to 20 him back out in the community, so there is a contextual onus to that sort of family centric decision making process. The decision maker, I was going to add, Richard, to what you were saying, unless it's kind of obvious enough. Publicly, in my experience, Aboriginal people at meetings don't want to embarrass anybody, so they will say yes. It's just the nature of their congenial 25 and social - - -

MR LARKIN: Good manners.

DR CANE: Yes, that's the rule, "I never embarrass," but not necessarily 30 meaning it all, so you kind of have to (indistinct) on which actually does allow them, and it might take another night of meetings the next day, or to all go away and talk and come visit you and chat and have a re-think about it all to get a decision, but to encourage them to actually come back with a decision having provided the information (indistinct) I would never make a call in the 35 bush about that stuff. "Where are we going to go? This way or that way?" and I'll sit and say, "No, no, your country."

These is obvious, they're obvious things. It's so easy for white people just to run over it and get the meeting finished, and, yes, we all agree, and that's good, 40 "Thanks, that was a wonderful meeting. Now, let's have a barbecue," and they're gone. What was that about?

MR LARKIN: A really important point you're not making enough of is the fact that you did get resource to have the capacity to respond in a way that 45 allowed (indistinct) families to make informed decisions, or at least know when

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1229 Spark and Cannon to say, "I want to know more about that." That's an important - - -

DR CANE: Yes, that's right. There's a little bit of extra space in - - -

5 MR LARKIN: You've got the resource (indistinct) lawyers.

DR CANE: Yes.

MR LARKIN: All those people who you could ask the question to if you 10 wanted, or not.

MR JACOBI: To pick up the resourcing now, perhaps we could go to you, Mr Davoren. Can you explain how the Commonwealth resourced the community assist it to make the decisions it was making from a technical point 15 of view, and what the arrangement was and what the thinking was when that was established?

MR DAVOREN: I think when it was established we probably didn't have any idea that we would be funding independent scientific advice, and that was just 20 put to us and we quickly agreed that we weren't going to proceed unless that was done, Andrew, I think, made that very clear, and the Commonwealth responded. There was funding for the consultative group and the activities surrounding that, but there were a few one-off things that we funded, and we hopped on a few issues like that. 25 The Commonwealth helped the Marlinga Tjarutja in raising its claims separately with the British government, and you probably saw the publicity from a few missions to London where you would have people White Hall, traditional people made the Brits very uncomfortable and I helped to no end in 30 getting them to reach an accommodation with Australia. There were a whole lot of one-off things like that, that the Commonwealth did. There was no amount of funding set aside at the beginning for it, but it was a very high priority for the government to resolve the issues from the Royal Commission.

35 By having a Commonwealth Royal Commission like that, our job was quite simple, we just work through the government's response.

MR JACOBI: Dr Cane, I think in your notes you indicate the outcome could not have been successful without there being that independent advice, and I 40 was interested in why that was your view.

DR CANE: I think for the simple reason you want to give the community balanced information so they can make a decision. I hate saying this, particularly as (indistinct) but Aboriginal groups can be easily factionalised and 45 picked up by particular interest groups and convinced of all sorts of alternative

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1230 Spark and Cannon scenarios, and it's quite difficult probably just to give bare facts and actually trust them to make the call on it. To that extent, that's what I was referring to in terms of the independence of the advice.

5 To the extent that it lacks independence is probably that you do that with the interests of the community at heart and not your particular agenda on environment impacts or activity.

MR PREECE: It's the same reason why you would have a Royal Commission 10 into Nuclear - - -

DR CANE: Yes, exactly.

MR PREECE: What are the facts? You know, get away from the emotions. 15 DR CANE: They're vulnerable communities for lots of reasons, and some people tap into them and there's lots of misunderstandings. I did all the clearances and heritage surveys for the Woomera stuff years ago, and I think a lot of the clearances were on, as an example (indistinct) Is it? The geological 20 formation. Everyone thought they were going to put the waste sites on (indistinct) Station, and that sorts of drama with people in Coober Pedy, and it would be quite hard to get that out of everyone's head. I don't think we ever quite succeeded, but it's just clear information at the most basic levels. That's what I meant. 25 MR JACOBI: Mr Collett, do you have a view as to the significance of the resource in the community in the overall success of the negotiations that were conducted?

30 MR COLLETT: It's absolutely critical. I'll just give you two illustrations. One of the areas where we got advice was from (indistinct) botanists, and I remember perfectly Dr Barton and I went to see two South Australian area botanists. We only had two questions, and the first one was, "If the 150 kilometres north of Taranaki was completely scraped," so, in other words, 35 every blade of grass, every tree went, every piece of plutonium went, the first question was, "Could it be re-vegetated?" These botanists said, "Yes, we could re-vegetate that," so we thought, "Well, that's good."

The second question was, "How long would it be before the trees got up to the 40 same height they are now?" and these botanists sort of thought and said, "A hundred years," and that was it, as far as the community was concerned. That's why I said before the community were not putting one environmental disaster to deal with the other one. We knew straight away then the community would say, "No, we're not going to leave in that state for a hundred years," so that was 45 a really telling illustration of two questions that really helped to form a view

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1231 Spark and Cannon for the community.

In terms of how important it was to get the resources, I've negotiated for Maralinga Tjarutja against mining companies where we've said the same thing, 5 "We want funding for independent advice for your mining proposal, your exploration proposal," and in one case an exploration company said rather stupidly, "Why should we buy you a watch so we could tell the time?" and they completely missed the point that it wasn't them who was telling the time it was us who was telling the time, and those negotiations failed right there and then 10 because they just couldn't see that they needed to put the community in a position where it had some information and independent advice. That's a good illustration of the difference and how important that approach is.

MR JACOBI: Was there any discussion about reaching a consensus as to who 15 the individuals were that were appointed to provide that independent advice so that all of the parties had confidence in them?

MR COLLETT: In terms of the independent advice for the technical assessment group, we cast around, and we didn't discuss it with the 20 Commonwealth because we wanted it to be independent, but we did have a mind to choosing credible advice, so the two main scientific advisers (indistinct) who was an eminent world radiation biologist, and the other was a man called Herwig Paretzke, who was an applied physicist from Munich, and they were very highly regarded, I think, so we had regard to getting credible 25 advice.

MR JACOBI: Was that significant to you, Mr Davoren, from your point of view, that the people that had been engaged to provide the independent advice would be able to provide advice that you would have confidence in? 30 MR DAVOREN: Absolutely. Who knows what would have happened if they had got advice from scientists who might have been experts but not right in the discipline who came up with strange recommendations or prescriptions, but our scientists, I mean we had a guy from the United States who was provided by 35 the US Department of Energy, and he said, "Yes, Henry (indistinct) no problem. Paretzke, very good." They're people they would have gone to.

DR CANE: That would flow down the track, and I wouldn't know even what they're talking about, but independent advice, I would feel comfortable with 40 that, then I would be bush with you guys and we would be doing a trip for 10 days around a camp fire every night and we would be talking about it, and so then that would go into the community that there's independent advice that says this is an okay way to go.

45 MR COLLETT: Just to follow-up on that, because I know this is a person you

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1232 Spark and Cannon might speak to, our next adviser carrying on in Australia for advice after that, who we chose was Peter Johnson, who is now Prof Peter Johnson and was the deputy director of (indistinct) and we chose him because he, by that time, 1990, had about 10 years working out at Maralinga as a very highly regarded scientist 5 with the Australian Radiation Laboratory, who had a track record of 10 years working, analysing the plutonium samples. Again, we chose him for his expertise but also his credibility. We knew that the Commonwealth wouldn't question his credibility.

10 MR JACOBI: I want to come to you, Mr Larkin, and ask about whether you have views about the significance of developing a relationship of trust in the course of negotiations. I'm interested, in particular, on the significance of continuity for personnel to being able to achieve that sort of outcome.

15 MR LARKIN: I guess you start from always building the trust by coming and talking very clearly to each other about who you are and what you're there for, and when you say you're going to do something you do it and you all agree on how you're going to do it. What we've just spent an hour talking about is how Maralinga people got the resource to be able to participate in a discussion 20 where they could agree, because they had independent advice to do that. It's really important for you to hear the history of what happened and how it happened for Maralinga.

Continuity in terms of engaging with the Aboriginal community is really 25 important. I think the people are important, but what is more important is the way in which we trust each other to engage. Before you came I talked about an Aboriginal person, "I don't believe you're going to listen to me." I start from that premise, and I believe what you're dealing with is the belief Aboriginal people have built up over years, or all the things people have said they will do 30 but didn't. People with disability have a great saying, "Don't do anything about us without us," and that applies to all of us, so that's how you develop a trust.

When you're talking about continuity, you just have a look at how Aboriginal communities survive, the history of what was there from different governments 35 in terms of employment opportunities, training at CDEP, community development employment program, we then have the government say, "That's terrible, people are giving sit down money, so what we'll do is we’ll take it away and we'll send them to Centrelink." This is important, and bear with me about continuity, right. Centrelink, they haven't got the capacity to actually 40 chase up these folks.

If you're in (indistinct) to report into Centrelink, you have to go on myGov, and when you login they text you a five digit number. There's no mobile phone there, so 40 people were breached the other day when I was wandering past. 45 How are those people going to eat now? How are their kids going to eat? The

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1233 Spark and Cannon continuity, somebody in Canberra thought, "This sounds like a great idea. Why don't we do this to people?" Nobody knows that the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone, the whatever, you have a knock on effect.

5 When you change CDEP, I'm not talking about continuity with people here, it's all the programs that sustain all those people if you don't have it. Something that Aboriginal families to rely on when they know when they're planning for their kids to go to school or send them off here or whatever, they know that the world that the live in, their income maintenance, the health service, the 10 diabetes educator are going to be there, because that's how we live in the city. We know if we ring a cop he's going to be there in 10 minutes or whatever, that would happen.

In (indistinct) there's only one telephone and one computer for you to log on to 15 myGov, so continuity is really important, but more importantly, I think, is you have to know whether people have the capacity to carry out what has been agreed to as well otherwise you just keep on doing things to people and further making people think (indistinct) I used to go out to pick up people flying in off the plane and (indistinct) which means, "More of the same." 20 DR CANE: Yes, and then people turn off - - -

MR LARKIN: Yes, they're finished.

25 DR CANE: - - - and then you kind of lose them.

MR LARKIN: "I've got something important to say?" "Yeah, yeah." It's hard not to be cynical for us.

30 DR DAVOREN: Maralinga is lucky because (indistinct) we like it, we like each other, we sort of hang out and talk on the phone, and that's a rare thing, but I think in other Aboriginal political environments the lawyers change, there's no tie, it's like you never one know year to the next who you're talking to. 35 MR LARKIN: Continuity? I hear you guys got bad news last week. You're now living to 84 and you don't have enough super to live on.

MR DAVOREN: I'm hoping I live longer than 84. 40 MR LARKIN: Most the people we grew up with don't make it to get their superannuation.

COMMISSIONER: Can I just go to the broader question. You have said that 45 circumstances have changed now. If we were, and we are not, but if we were

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1234 Spark and Cannon to be thinking about a complex issue such as the things we are discussing now, would your advice about engagement be any different from what you've given us now?

5 DR CANE: A couple of things (indistinct) all those meetings about stuff on the land happens on the land, importantly, and that's more relevant now in a way because people live in (indistinct) as well as Oak Valley, and that actually forces them back in concentrated exercise. The change, the generational change (indistinct) some of them are alive today, but they're mostly gone. I 10 know if this is a reasonable thing to say, but the status is probably not as significant, but what you get instead is a raft of rather dominant, prominent men who are also quite educated and speak good English and are really savvy and get it, so they're an easier vehicle to inform, but they've also been slightly, I believe, corrupted by the superficial processes of bureaucratic engagement 15 and meetings, so they're not used to really taking responsibility for decisions on a face to face situation in the context of their community.

So they go to the meetings, as I said before, and they get their TAs and then they go home, and, you know, here's the thing, so it's still a matter in the sense 20 of grasping the community in country and letting everyone hear what is being said in the old fashioned way, but you have a slightly more informed audience now but perhaps without the clout of those older men socio-politically.

COMMISSIONER: Does that indicate the longer time, you think? 25 DR CANE: I actually don't think that time changes much. If I was going out to do what you might have to do, I would want someone out there who is good with people or working with the agency, obviously, who can talk to the people informally for a few days so people can get shit off their chest and inquire and 30 then have your meeting formally but with some peace and not with the usual sort of, "Let's have a barbecue," just a proper meeting, and then if it's possible you stay overnight and then you follow-up the next day. I mean, that's kind of my process, but it never happens. People who normally come to the afternoon meeting are gone, but that's kind of what we should do, I believe. 35 MR PREECE: We're talking about really significant long-term important issues. There are other issues, you can go to a meeting and make a decision and that, but it's important stuff where - - -

40 DR CANE: It has to be a bit organic.

MR LARKIN: We understate the importance of having Aboriginal people as part of (indistinct) people who know and have a background in doing these sorts of things here. Walk around, we have Asian people, white folks, all 45 different sorts of folks, but there's not many Aboriginal people here. In fact, if

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1235 Spark and Cannon you go and look through the public sector the representation of Aboriginal people are not there anymore in leadership roles.

DR CANE: It's an interesting comment. 5 MR LARKIN: The commonwealth (indistinct)

DR CANE: It's the same with Maralinga Tjarutja now (indistinct) not here and there's no-one to put in place of him with the skills. I mean, that's a 10 consequence of self-determination, once the missionaries stopped forcing people to be educated. The standard of reading and writing now, I think, has declined, and the capacity of individuals to kind of lead seems to me to be less (indistinct) so in the community now there's not an (indistinct) for whatever historic (indistinct) I can't remember his name - - - 15 MR LARKIN: No, I don't know what you're saying. We're just not investing in or demanding that Aboriginal people are part of the process or decisions that are made about them or that they participate in it. Where I grew up, he was a young man in (indistinct) growing up with me, he was the big boy's (indistinct) 20 MR COLLETT: The only advice I would change would be to do what Pat did with the (indistinct) people and take them to Spain to see (indistinct) does in Canada taking indigenous people right into the - say, it's a waste depository, to look at it and see it and ask questions and really understand it at that level. We 25 couldn't do that because (indistinct) but it strikes me that's really important.

MR JACOBI: I just wanted to come to the significance of selecting timeframes for the purposes of making decisions, and I'm just interested in thinking about the underlying issues that need to be taken into account in 30 giving time to allow a decision to be made. I'm just wondering if each of you want to comment on it, but perhaps starting with you, Dr Cane, in respect to the sorts of facts that need to be taken into account, particularly in the Aboriginal community, needed to make a decision.

35 DR CANE: It's kind of a mean question in a way because it's contextual, but that's not an excuse to get out of answering the question. Assuming that there's broad understanding of the significance of the issues so there's sort of a foundation and people are talking about it, generally speaking, and a meeting is coming up, and I'm thinking specifically about a meeting process which might 40 lead to a decision, I would always thinking of (indistinct) process. You tend not to get that, so that might be unreasonable.

From the point of which someone is going out there and talking and actually making sure people are across what the meeting is going to be about to the 45 meeting happening to a decision being made, it's certainly three days. Was that

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1236 Spark and Cannon the specificity of your question? In terms of the embedding of it, we could be talking for quite a few years.

MR PREECE: The bigger the issue, the bigger the - - - 5 DR CANE: Yes (indistinct) stuff will come up or - - -

MR LARKIN: It depends what it is.

10 DR DAVOREN: Yes, that's right, it's a hard question.

MR LARKIN: (indistinct) this morning to set up a trust fund, when I tell my countrymen that we're losing 25 grand every Friday night, they want to know about it and set it up very quickly, so that's one end of the scale. Depending on 15 what the thing is and how long and what are you talking about. If you're talking about the complexity of these things, Maralinga has been good for other communities too because everyone has learnt this. There has always been someone from Maralinga Tjarutja there and always been - I keep using Dr Barton, but he wasn't a lone ranger (indistinct) he had all those other fellows 20 with him too.

It's really important, I think, to know there were other people. He was the man who was leading it, but he also helped other people coming from east of there where I grew up, and so we had different sorts of engagement with defence and 25 those sorts of people and even had the radiation issues there, but we had the business of being frightened away every time some Pom in a Land Rover painted in checkers hunting us off the countryside.

MR JACOBI: I was actually picking up from the comment that you made, 30 Mr Larkin, that is, you spoke of them having to deal with unrealistic timeframes that were imposed that weren't realistic and then having to deal with the consequent disappointment of the fact that the deadline then wouldn't be met, and I'm just interested in trying to think about this issue of if you were minded to set a timeframe that took account of the community's needs how you 35 might go about approaching that.

MR LARKIN: Well, often there were occasions when I was running Housing where I would have had to just say, "Sorry, it isn't going to happen this year." It might suit me that contractors and all those people are running through and I 40 could have saved some money on that, but the community has not decided where I'm going to put the water power and sewage or the house, and I'll explain that to people, and they will go, "Yes, that's all right, we don't want you to make a silly decision and put it there, and some people will tell me off for listening to that group, but ultimately we all will take a bit of that, but I hope 45 90 per cent of the time I made the right decision for the right occasion. That's

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1237 Spark and Cannon the issue, I think, depending on what it is.

MR JACOBI: Picking up the idea of the fact that you were involved in making decisions for the very, very long-term, I'm just interested in whether or 5 not there were particular considerations that you thought were more important given that you were essentially addressing an exercise that would have an effect for many tens of thousands of years, and whether there was anything with the way that you went about doing the negotiation that took account of that. Perhaps Mr Collett. 10 MR COLLETT: Some aspects of the decision were more critical from that point of view than others. The two that I can think of were the nature of the remediation, and, interestingly, the other one was the way you set up a trust fund. In both cases, the advice we were giving was, "These have to be in place 15 for quarter of a million years," so in the case of the remediation we had to have a form of remediation that would last that long, and we got our advice on that, and we ultimately satisfied ourselves that engineered deep trench burial of plutonium could last quarter of a million years with appropriate maintenance and supervision, so we had advice on that, but that was an issue that worried 20 us. It might be that Pat wants to comment on those sort of long-term implications, because the government had to make recommendations about that demand as well.

MR DAVOREN: That's right. I mean, the commonwealth is ultimately 25 responsible for those plutonium (indistinct) out there. When we had the handback of the lands, it was partial handback. The commonwealth retained responsibility for a whole lot of things and in a way, the Commonwealth has to give a cooperative relationship with Maralinga Tjarutja in administering those sites, but I think a lot of those long-term things are covered in a document 30 called the Maralinga Lands Environment Management Plan, and that has a rolling program of maintenance, and at the moment, by the last decade, say, maintenance of the site has been a lot more intensive.

Things happen every few years, but I think we can see that things are settling 35 down, you know, pits are compacting, voids are collapsing, and we'll eventually get to the stage where management will be a lot less intensive, but we certainly took advice, TAG took advice and Martac took advice, on the stability of those structures. It's a vital consideration when you dealing with a contaminant like plutonium, which has got a half-life of 23,000 years, and 40 therefore ten half-lives, a quarter of a million years.

MR LARKIN: A bit hard to negotiate with the time frames when they're - -

MR ...... : That's right. 45

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1238 Spark and Cannon MR ...... : (indistinct)

MR DAVOREN: You know that you're going to be stuck with it forever and you just have to have a system. You can't look a hundred years hence. You've 5 just got to look to set up the institutions and try and keep them in place.

MR COLLETT: The other issue in relation to a trust fund, the community well understood that compensation was for the long term, and people like Huey Windlass, when talking to the community, would say, "This is for our 10 grandchildren, our grandchildren's our grandchildren." So that was understood, but then once it goes into a trust fund - and of course it's never enough and there are always demands - you have to build in protections to in fact make sure the trust fund lasts for that period, and we've, I think, been successful in doing that. 15 There's a trustee company who we call the corporate trustee and one of their jobs is to ensure that the capital is preserved, along with some interest, and to fiercely protect that fund. The interest can be paid out according to the terms, but the capital must be protected. And so the trustees, and Brownie's one of 20 them, sometimes laughingly describe the corporate trustee as the policeman, you know, who does protect that, but it's worked well. It's taken a lot of discussion and negotiation along the way, but that was one of the big issues relating to the long-term nature of the contamination issues.

25 MR JACOBI: You've got experience also with native title negotiations. We've heard different views with respect to the ability of trusts to be flexible to meet a community's changing needs. Do you have any views about the sorts of structures that could be available to communities to provide those long-term benefits that you're talking about? 30 MR COLLETT: Well, the first thing is not to reinvent the wheel, because there's a lot of royalty trusts and there have been particularly because of mining in the Pilbara, and a lot of those have been set up very carefully in negotiations between the big mining companies, Rio and BHP, and well-resources 35 Aboriginal beneficiaries. I've seen them. There are some really good models for trusts, and the two main models, one has one with the corporate trustee having a power of veto over anything that might destroy the trust; another is that the only trustee is a corporate trustee and Aboriginal people are simply an advisory committee, and both of those models are evident in the trust. 40 I think the critical thing - there is flexibility. You have to allow Aboriginal voices to be heard and heard regularly, and you have to have a trust management which responds to the community needs, and they will change. For example, in the Maralinga Piling Trust, early on the Western Australia side 45 said, "Well, look, we haven't got a lot of capital, but what's really important for

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1239 Spark and Cannon us is that we take a bit of the capital and we use it to build a roadhouse which is our art centre as well," and this happened at a place called Corker. And that was a very good use of capital, because it gave the community an outstation where they did their art, where they got food. 5 That roadhouse also services the Amberdell Highway, so they get income from tourists, and that has nurtured an art industry which is now of worldwide repute. So some capital was flexibly used, but for a very good long-term benefit. So you need imaginative and sensitive trustees, Aboriginal and 10 non-Aboriginal. It's not easy, but again, I think - I'd be interested in Brownie's comments, but I think eventually trustees work together well, you know, the trustee company and Aboriginal trustees, and they form working relationships.

MR DAVOREN: You can't overestimate the achievement of Maralinga 15 Tjarutja in having a trust account that's kept its capital over that period of time, and so the Maralinga Tjarutja got two lots of money from the Commonwealth. It got the 13.5 million for compensation for contamination and loss of access to land. There was a later amount of 6 million that was given sometime later for management of Maralinga infrastructure, so the management of that 20 infrastructure didn't become a drain on the community, and it was certainly helped, as far as the commonwealth was concerned, to know that that last lot of money had been managed responsibly. It's not all that common.

So that now maintains Maralinga village, the airstrip, all the infrastructure out 25 there, which is of enormous value to the community. It's now a tourist enterprise, but it's of great value to the scientific community and the commonwealth government in the monitoring and land management work.

COMMISSIONER: I think you're telling us that's enough, and I think we've 30 finished our questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add, intuitively conclude? Gentlemen, thank you very much for your submissions and for the evidence this afternoon. It gives us a lot to think about. There's a lot of wisdom here, and I'd like think that as we ponder what we might do, that if the opportunity arises we can call on that expertise again. Again, thank you very 35 much. We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning.

MATTER ADJOURNED AT 3.37 PM UNTIL TUESDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 2015

.SA Nuclear 16.11.15 P-1240 Spark and Cannon