The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict Between Rival Antagonists
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Cyber Hype versus Cyber Reality: Restraint and Norms in Cyber Conflict Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness Chapter 4 The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists Introduction In 2011, the United States government declared a cyber attack similar to an act of war, punishable with conventional military means. Cyber engagements directed by one state against another are now considered part of the normal relations range of combat and conflict. Cyber is thought to be just another piece in the arsenal. This chapter examines these processes and determines which rival states have been using cyber tactics and where these actions are directed. We also examine the level and seriousness of cyber interactions to discern the level of impact of the incident or dispute. The goal here is to understand what we can learn by examining the cyber relations of rivals. In particular, we question the reality of this threat. Is it actual or inflated, myth or fact based? Only by examining the data produced by an examination of cyber operations in the recent past can we really answer this question. Otherwise, investigations are selective and targeted to make political points. Here we move beyond the bluff and bluster to examine the relationship between cyber conflict and international interactions, the interchange between hype and reality. The Future of Military Conflict? Cyber security is clearly an important and pressing question for national security actors and policy makers. Akin to the shift in strategic operations after 2001 due to terrorism, the rising fear of cyber combat and threats has brought about a reorientation of military affairs (Nye 2011: 19). The Department of Defense notes “small scale technologies can have an impact disproportionate to their size; potential adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons systems to pose a significant threat to U.S. national security.”1 This dialogue only suggests that combat is changing and our institutions must rise to meet the challenge. The discourse is that asymmetric combat is real and likely to be realized through cyber conflict. To counter this threat, actors across the globe are promoting a variety of new military organizations and institutions to deal with it in much the same way the focus on terrorism has changed the security discourse. While it is clear that terrorism is an important concern in terms of scale of operations, locations, and impact, it is less clear on whether cyber combat has and will exhibit the same trends. The danger lies in focusing too much on fear of the attack rather than concentrating efforts against actual and demonstrated threats. Preliminary qualitative analysis suggests that while there is evidence for a plethora of cyber disputes among post-Soviet states, they rarely take the form of serious disruptions to the state of national security (Valeriano and Maness 2012). In addition, there is little evidence for cyber conflict among actual rivals. In reality, it seems that cyber conflict mimics the dynamics of espionage or economic combat and is not a form of war at 68 all since zero deaths result from the actions (Rid 2011). Most operations are taken by private citizens to achieve economic gain or for political expression rather than military gain. Operations taken for military gain rarely pay off in the form of the “significant damage” the U.S. government warns and strategizes against. In this chapter we quantify the number of cyber disputes and incidents experienced by international states in the realm of foreign policy, particularly historical antagonists. We examine the scope, length, and damage inflicted by cyber disputes among rival states (Klein et. al 2006) from 2001 to 2011 because cyber operations have been added to the arsenal of rival interactions. Our data demonstrate that 20 rival dyads out of 126 engaged in cyber conflict during this time period. About one-half of these rivals experienced only one dispute during this time period. The average number of cyber incidents among rivals who participate in such behavior is three incidents. The U.S.-Chinese dyad experiences by far the most amount of cyber conflict with 23 observed cyber incidents within five overall cyber disputes. As will be demonstrated (in Chapter 7), even though there are 111 observed cyber incidents within 45 cyber disputes among 20 rivals, the intensity, duration, and level of attack remain low compared to the dire warnings one receives from the media. We hope that this research can return the debate on cyber conflict to a more nuanced examination of the threat. Others should be able to use our data to come to their own conclusions. While there is a real danger of cyber combat and cyber disputes, one must remain prudent in relation to the actual threat, not the inflated threat presented by the imagination. Protection of the state against external threats is of the utmost importance, but when does the promotion of the threat impede the policy process? Next we will review our theory of cyber restraint and regionalism as we then move to the empirical study of cyber conflict. Cyber Conflict: Rivalry, Restraint and Regionalism It would be useful to summarize our theory of rivalry interactions in cyberspace before we proceed with our analysis. In terms of conflict operations, the attractiveness of the target in relation to the capability used is a critical equation rarely examined. What good would a cyber conflict between rivals be if it does little physical and psychological damage to a rival state? Much is made about the secret nature of cyber operations, yet we know very little about the impact of basic operations on foreign policy dynamics. The value of the tactic seems minimal when one thinks of the potential devastation can arise from direct attack between states. On the extreme end, a large scale operation that might wipe out the United States’ Eastern Seaboard power grid would be catastrophic, but it would likely be punished with immense retaliation and thus not a realistic option short of total war. We are then left with minor incidents that are basically speculative attacks with few operations resulting in considerable damage. Restraint exists in the realm of cyber conflict and we have covered this issue in Chapter 3. To review in the context of this chapter, we go over the argument briefly. Rid (2011, 2013) argues that cyberwar in the extreme sense that death will result has not yet occurred, and is unlikely to occur. Likewise, Gartzke (2013) develops the logic for cyberwar being utilized by states as a low level form of conflict. Maness and Valeriano (2013) in an examination of Russian foreign policy, conclude that cyber conflict is literally the least, easiest option Russia could use to attack Estonia during their dust up in 2007. We also contend that cyber interactions will take a regional tone in that rivals typically are constricted to regional interactions. 69 Little is known about the actual impact of cyber tactics. Much speculation has been made with little connection to the realities on the ground. In short, the risk to the initiator in relation to the impact of cyber tactics does not make the use of cyber strategies a very useful option in the international system. This is especially true in the context of the rivalry where the competition is often known and the attribution issue in cyber conflict is minimized because the enemies are obvious. The benefits of examining the rivalry population rather than interactions between all states are clear and logical. Why focus on all possible dyads when we have exhaustive data on those states most likely to engage in crises, escalated conflicts, and wars (Diehl and Goertz 2000)? By examining only the rivalry population, we should be able to focus on the antagonists experiencing the most and obvious forms of cyber conflict. The concept of rivalry brings history and the past pattern of interactions back into the study of political science. To understand why wars or crises develop, one must look at the history of interactions at the military, diplomatic, social, and cultural level. Rivalry is defined as long-standing conflict with a persistent enemy (Diehl and Goertz 2000). It would therefore make sense that cyber conflict would be added to the arsenal of rival interactions and should be investigated under this context. An important consideration for rivalry is relative gains or losses. The issue positions of the states engaged in a rivalry are made in relation to the attitude of the other side (Vasquez 1993). The phrase to cut the nose to spite the face comes to mind in rivalry. Rivals are in some ways addicted to perpetual conflict because of their singular outlook targeting the enemy. This spiraling competitive relationship can be a dangerous situation in international affairs due to the buildup of hatreds and tensions over time. As most rivalry scholars note, there must be some degree of competitiveness, connection between issues, perception of the other as an enemy, and long-standing animosity for a pair of states to be called rival (Diehl and Goertz 2000, Thompson 2001). Cyber operations are a tactic used to gain an advantage either diplomatically or militarily against a target. During a rivalry, one would think all options should be on the table; war and cyber conflict then become viable foreign policy options. It is in this context that the attribution problem in cybersecurity is minimized because rivals are obvious targets for cyber activity. The normal relations range for a rivalry interactions tend to take the form of espionage, war games, brinksmanship, and economic warfare. It is in this context that rivals should display a certain degree of hesitance to use cyber tactics against their rivals due to the fear of retaliation.