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Steve Baldwin and Pacific Justice Institute V. Kathleen Sebelius

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Steve Baldwin and Pacific Justice Institute V. Kathleen Sebelius Case 3:10-cv-01033-DMS -WMC Document 24 Filed 06/25/10 Page 1 of 63 1 TONY WEST 2 Assistant Attorney General IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN 3 Deputy Assistant Attorney General LAURA E. DUFFY 4 United States Attorney 5 JENNIFER R. RIVERA Director 6 SHEILA M. LIEBER Deputy Director 7 ETHAN DAVIS 8 JOEL McELVAIN JUSTIN M. SANDBERG 9 Attorneys U.S. Department of Justice 10 Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 11 20 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Room 7332 Washington, DC 20001 12 Telephone: (202) 514-2988 13 Fax: (202) 616-8202 Email: [email protected] 14 Attorneys for the Defendants 15 16 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 17 STEVE BALDWIN and PACIFIC ) 18 JUSTICE INSTITUTE, ) Case No. 3:10-cv-01033-DMS-WMC 19 ) Plaintiffs, ) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 20 ) Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for v. ) Preliminary Injunction and in Support of 21 ) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 22 KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official ) capacity as Secretary of the United States ) Date: July 16, 2010 23 Department of Health and Human Services, ) Time: 1:30 p.m. et al., ) Courtroom: 10 24 ) The Honorable Dana M. Sabraw 25 Defendants. ) 26 27 28 10cv1033 Case 3:10-cv-01033-DMS -WMC Document 24 Filed 06/25/10 Page 2 of 63 1 Table of Contents 2 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 3 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................5 4 A. Statutory Background..............................................................................................5 5 B. Current Proceedings.................................................................................................8 6 C. Applicable Standards ...............................................................................................8 7 ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................9 8 9 I. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Employer Responsibility Provision and the Minimum Coverage Provision Fail.......................................................................................................9 10 A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over These Claims. ............................................10 11 1. Plaintiffs Lack Standing Because Neither the Employer 12 Responsibility Provision nor the Minimum Coverage Provision 13 Takes Effect Until 2014. ............................................................................10 14 2. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Unripe. ...................................................................13 15 3. The Anti-Injunction Act Bars Plaintiffs’ Claims. .....................................13 16 B. The Comprehensive Regulatory Measures of the ACA Fall Within 17 Congress’s Article I Powers...................................................................................14 18 1. Congress’s Authority to Regulate Interstate Commerce Is Broad ..............14 19 2. The ACA Regulates the Interstate Markets in Health Insurance 20 and Health Care Services. ..........................................................................17 21 3. The Employer Responsibility and Minimum Coverage Provisions 22 Regulate Activity That Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce ..........19 23 4. The Provisions Are Integral Parts of the Larger Regulatory Scheme 24 and Are Necessary and Proper to Congress’s Regulation of Interstate Commerce ..................................................................................................22 25 5. The Provisions Are Valid Exercises of Congress’s Independent 26 Power under the General Welfare Clause. .................................................26 27 II. Mr. Baldwin’s Direct Tax and Origination Clause Claims Should Be Dismissed. ...........29 28 A. Mr. Baldwin Cannot Prevail on His Direct Tax Claim. ........................................30 i Case 3:10-cv-01033-DMS -WMC Document 24 Filed 06/25/10 Page 3 of 63 1 2 B. Mr. Baldwin Cannot Prevail on His Origination Clause Claim. ............................33 3 III. The Claims under the Due Process Clause, Federal Rule of Evidence 501, and California Rule of Evidence 992 Are Meritless..........................................................37 4 5 IV. Mr. Baldwin Cannot Prevail on His Claim that the ACA Violates Equal Protection. ......40 6 V. The Executive Order Is Not a Line Item Veto. ..................................................................43 7 VI. Plaintiffs’ Claims Regarding Section 1552 Are Baseless. .................................................45 8 VII. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction. ....................................................46 9 10 A. Plaintiffs Make No Showing That They Would Be Irreparably Harmed in the Absence of Emergency Relief. .......................................................46 11 B. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest Weigh Strongly 12 Against Granting Preliminary Relief. ....................................................................47 13 14 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................48 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ii Case 3:10-cv-01033-DMS -WMC Document 24 Filed 06/25/10 Page 4 of 63 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 3 Cases: 4 5 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 6 387 U.S. 136 (1967) .................................................................................................................13 7 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) .................................................................................................................42 8 9 Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dept. of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................47 10 American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 11 559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................................4, 9, 47 12 Armstrong v. United States, 13 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................35 14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 15 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) ...............................................................................................................9 16 Barr v. United States, 17 736 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................14 18 Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................14 19 20 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) .................................................................................................................46 21 Boating Indus. Assns. v. Marshall, 22 601 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) .................................................................................................42 23 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 24 416 U.S. 725 (1974) ...........................................................................................................14, 28 25 Boday v. United States, 26 759 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................35 27 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) .................................................................................................................41 28 iii Case 3:10-cv-01033-DMS -WMC Document 24 Filed 06/25/10 Page 5 of 63 1 Buckley v. Valeo, 2 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .....................................................................................................................29 3 Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................47 4 5 Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................45 6 Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 7 301 U.S. 548 (1937) .................................................................................................................26 8 Citizens United v. FEC, 9 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) .................................................................................................................11 10 Clinton v. New York, 11 524 U.S. 417 (1998) .................................................................................................................45 12 Daniel v. Paul, 13 395 U.S. 298 (1969) .................................................................................................................22 14 Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................44 15 16 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) ...........................................................................................................32, 33 17 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 529 U.S. 120 (2000) .................................................................................................................29 19 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 20 220 U.S. 107 (1911) .................................................................................................................34 21 Get Outdoors II, LLC v. City of San Diego, 22 506 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................12
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