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IBM Tivoli Monitoring: Active Directory Agent: User™S Guide ® Tivoli Monitoring: Active Directory Agent Version 6.2.0 User’s Guide SC32-9444-01 ® Tivoli Monitoring: Active Directory Agent Version 6.2.0 User’s Guide SC32-9444-01 Note Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on page 121. This edition applies to version 6.2 of IBM Tivoli Monitoring: Active Directory Agent (product number 5724-C71) and to all subsequent releases and modifications until otherwise indicated in new editions. © Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2005, 2007. All rights reserved. US Government Users Restricted Rights – Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. © Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2007. All rights reserved. US Government Users Restricted Rights – Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. Contents Tables . .v Chapter 5. Attributes reference . .21 About attributes . .21 Chapter 1. Overview of the Monitoring More information about attributes . .21 Attribute groups and attributes for the Monitoring Agent for Active Directory . .1 Agent for Active Directory . .21 IBM Tivoli Monitoring overview . .1 Address Book attributes . .22 Features of the Monitoring Agent for Active DHCP attributes . .23 Directory . .1 Directory Services attributes . .24 New in this release . .2 DNS_ADIntegrated attributes . .26 Monitoring Agent for Active Directory components .3 DNS attributes . .27 User interface options . .3 Domain Controller Availability attributes . .29 Domain Controller Performance attributes . .31 Chapter 2. Requirements for the Exchange Directory Services attributes . .32 monitoring agent . .5 File Replication Service attributes . .33 Running as a non-Administrator user . .7 Group Policy Object attributes . .34 Ping variables . .7 Kerberos Key Distribution Center attributes . .35 Caching configuration . .8 Knowledge Consistency Checker attributes . .36 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol attributes 37 Chapter 3. How to use a monitoring Local Security Authority attributes . .38 Lost and Found Objects attributes . .38 agent . .9 Name Service Provider attributes . .39 View real-time data that the agent collects . .9 Replication attributes . .40 Investigate an event . .10 Replication Partner attributes . .43 Recover the operation of a resource . .10 Replication Partner Latency attributes . .44 Customize your monitoring environment . .11 Security Accounts Manager attributes . .45 Monitor with custom situations that meet your Services attributes . .47 requirements . .12 Trust attributes . .48 Collect and view historical data . .13 Disk capacity planning for historical data . .49 Chapter 4. Workspaces reference . .15 Chapter 6. Situations reference . .51 About workspaces . .15 About situations . .51 More information about workspaces . .15 More information about situations . .52 Predefined workspaces . .15 Predefined situations . .52 Active Directory workspace . .16 DHCP workspace situations . .54 Address Book workspace . .16 Directory System Agent workspace situation . .56 DHCP workspace . .16 DNS workspace situations . .56 Directory System Agent workspace . .16 DNS ADIntegrated workspace situations . .57 DNS workspace . .17 Domain Controller Availability workspace DNS ADIntegrated workspace . .17 situations . .58 Domain Controller Availability workspace . .17 Domain Controller Performance workspace Domain Controller Performance workspace . .17 situations . .61 Exchange Directory Service workspace . .17 File Replication Service workspace situations . .62 File Replication workspace . .17 Group Policy Objects workspace situations . .63 Group Policy Object workspace . .18 Kerberos Key Distribution Center workspace Kerberos Key Distribution Center workspace . .18 situations . .64 Knowledge Consistency Checker workspace . .18 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol workspace Lightweight Directory Access Protocol workspace 18 situation . .64 Local Security Authority workspace . .18 Name Service Provider workspace situation . .64 Lost and Found Objects workspace . .18 Replication workspace situations . .64 Name Service Provider workspace . .18 Replication Partner workspace situations . .67 Replication workspaces . .19 Replication Partner Latency workspace situation 67 Replication Latency workspace . .19 Trust workspace situations . .68 Replication Partner workspace . .19 Security Accounts Manager workspace . .19 Trust workspace . .19 Chapter 7. Take Action commands reference . .69 © Copyright IBM Corp. 2007 iii About Take Action commands . .69 Examples of trace logging . .97 More information about Take Action commands . .69 Principal trace log files . .97 Predefined Take Action commands . .69 Setting RAS trace parameters . 100 Problems and workarounds . 102 Chapter 8. Policies reference . .71 Installation and configuration problem determination . 102 About policies . .71 Agent problem determination . 107 More information about policies . .71 Problem determination for remote deployment 109 Predefined policies . .71 Workspace problem determination . .110 Situation problem determination . 111 Appendix A. Upgrading for warehouse Support for problem solving . .114 summarization . .73 Using IBM Support Assistant . .114 Tables in the warehouse . .73 Obtaining fixes . .114 Effects on summarized attributes . .73 Contacting IBM Software Support . .115 Upgrading your warehouse with limited user permissions . .74 Appendix E. Documentation library 117 Monitoring Agent for Active Directory library . .117 Appendix B. IBM Tivoli Enterprise Prerequisite publications . .117 Console event mapping . .77 Related publications . .118 Other sources of documentation . .118 Appendix C. Monitoring Agent for Active Directory data collection . .93 Appendix F. Accessibility . .119 Navigating the interface using the keyboard . .119 Magnifying what is displayed on the screen . .119 Appendix D. Problem determination . .95 Gathering product information for IBM Software Support . .95 Notices . 121 Built-in problem determination features . .95 Trademarks . 123 Problem classification . .96 Trace logging . .96 Index . 125 Overview of log file management . .96 iv IBM Tivoli Monitoring: Active Directory Agent: User’s Guide Tables 1. System requirements for the Monitoring Agent 13. Mechanisms used to gather attributes . .93 for Active Directory . .5 14. Information to gather before contacting IBM 2. Ping variables descriptions and default values 7 Software Support . .95 3. View real-time data . .9 15. Trace log files for troubleshooting agents 98 4. Investigating an event . .10 16. Problems and solutions for installation and 5. Recover the operation of a resource . .11 configuration . 103 6. Customizing your monitoring environment 11 17. General problems and solutions for 7. Monitor with custom situations . .13 uninstallation . 105 8. Collect and view historical data . .13 18. Agent problems and solutions . 108 9. Capacity planning for historical data logged by 19. Remote deployment problems and solutions 110 component ado . .50 20. Workspace problems and solutions . .110 10. Time periods and suffixes for summary tables 21. Specific situation problems and solutions 111 and views . .73 22. Problems with configuring situations that you 11. Additional columns to report summarization solve in the Situation Editor . .112 information . .74 23. Problems with configuration of situations that 12. Overview of attribute groups to event classes you solve in the Workspace area . .113 and slots . .78 © Copyright IBM Corp. 2007 v vi IBM Tivoli Monitoring: Active Directory Agent: User’s Guide Chapter 1. Overview of the Monitoring Agent for Active Directory The Monitoring Agent for Active Directory provides you with the capability to monitor Windows servers with Active Directory Support. This chapter provides a description of the features, components, and interface options for the Monitoring Agent for Active Directory. IBM Tivoli Monitoring overview IBM Tivoli Monitoring is the base software for the Monitoring Agent for Active Directory. IBM Tivoli Monitoring provides a way to monitor the availability and performance of all the systems in your enterprise from one or several designated workstations. It also provides useful historical data that you can use to track trends and to troubleshoot system problems. You can use IBM Tivoli Monitoring to do the following: v Monitor for alerts on the systems that you are managing by using predefined situations or custom situations. v Establish your own performance thresholds. v Trace the causes leading to an alert. v Gather comprehensive data about system conditions. v Use policies to perform actions, schedule work, and automate manual tasks. The Tivoli Enterprise Portal is the interface for IBM Tivoli Monitoring products. By providing a consolidated view of your environment, the Tivoli Enterprise Portal permits you to monitor and resolve performance issues throughout the enterprise. See the IBM Tivoli Monitoring publications listed in Appendix E, “Documentation library,” on page 117 for complete information about IBM Tivoli Monitoring and the Tivoli Enterprise Portal. Features of the Monitoring Agent for Active Directory The Monitoring Agent for Active Directory offers a central point of management ® for your Microsoft Active Directory service. It provides a comprehensive means for gathering exactly the information you need to detect problems early and to prevent them. You can monitor many servers from a single workstation, and information is standardized
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