ODA

Innovation and collective action in farmer- managed irrigation schemes a first-rank resource to land and water scarcity Study case of the Burka Jalala irrigation scheme in East Hararghe, Ethiopia.

Thesis presented by :

Céline ALLAVERDIAN

Director : Pascale MAÏZI-MOITY (CNEARC)

Supervisor : Jean-Philippe FONTENELLE (GRET)

Jury : ENGUEHARD François (GRET) FONTENELLE Jean-Philippe (GRET) GUILLAUME Julie (GRET) LANAU Sylvain (CNEARC) MAÏZI-MOITY Pascale (CNEARC)

Montpellier, February, 15th 2007

“Bishaanif haati hamtu hinqabdu…”

“Water and one’s mother badness does not have…”

Oromo proverb

2 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First, I would like to thank all the people of Burka Jalala for their generosity: to all the women and children who greeted me and opened their hearts to me during my stay, to all the farmers which gave their time and shared their knowledge with me. I especially thank my dear sister Kimiya, my grandmother Fatumeh Sadico, my favorite shop keepers Abdulla and Jamal, my favorite wise man Umar Abdullai for his charisma and sense of humor, the “good crazy man” for his simple joy, the development agents Tesfaye and Ahmed “ tafki ” for their friendliness and help, my bodyguard and step-father Aliyi Ibroo, and many more… I give a huge “ galaatomi ” at Mohamed Gelmo from ODA to have untiringly helped us in all our difficulties. Thank you for your welcome, your friendship, your honesty, our discussions and many laughs. Thanks to Awad as all the ODA staff. Another big “ galootomi ” to Abdallah Ibroo, Umar and his sisters for their precious support during our stay in Jarso, as well as Abdu Karim from the Agricultural Bureau for his rightness and kindness, and his colleagues from OIDA for their support. Thanks to all the people of the French Alliance of Dire Dawa: especially Monsieur Joseph for his immense kindness, Sofian for his constant help, friendship, knowledge and khat chewing tips, Mustafa for our laughs and his books. I would also like to thank my “comrade” and friend Angèle Legall for her great friendship, sense of humor and cooperation throughout our stay. To my team mate Ashenafi for having helped me in my work, endured such hardship and learned to prepare the best “bloody sugo ” and shuro I tasted in Ethiopia. All my gratitude to Philippe Lempérière for his priceless advice and help throughout the stay in Ethiopia, to his wife Khalda for her great kindness. Finally, I would like to thank Jean-Philippe Fontenelle for his wise advice and his intellectual support throughout the stay and the thesis writing. Un grand merci to Pascale Maizi for having helped me with constructive tips and comments during the writing of my thesis. Another merci to François Enguehard for his internal encyclopedia on Ethiopia. Muchas gracias para los amigos Erwan LeCapitaine and Charlotte Servadio for having supported me during the writing of this thesis, with a cozy home, advice and kindness. Thanks to all my loved ones for having given me the strength to go on. Thanks to Catha Edulis for having stimulated and inspired me throughout my stay in Ethiopia. I will surely not forget you!

3 INDEX

INTRODUCTION...... 1 1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY...... 2 1.1 Basic data on Ethiopia...... 2 1.2 History of Ethiopia: strong contrasts between the North and the South ...... 4 1.3 The study area ...... 5 1.4 The irrigation Project of Burka jalala...... 9 1.5 The study’s hypothesis...... 15 2 THEORETICIAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY...... 16 2.1 Concepts and theoretical framework...... 16 2.2 Methodological steps and their tools...... 19 2.3 Challenging working conditions ...... 23 3 HISTORICAL ANALISIS : SETTLEMENT TO SATURATION...... 24 3.1 1800 – 1900 AD: settlement and first stages of agriculture...... 24 3.2 From the nineteeth century to 1975: the first steps of irrigation development ...... 27 3.3 Since the 1975 land reform: expansion of irrigated lands...... 33 3.4 Since the late 1980s: Heading towards severe land and water scarcity ...... 36 4 HOW FARMERS COLECTIVELY FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE LOCAL PROBLEMS… ...... 40 4.1 Water allocation among canals of the irrigation system… ...... 40 4.2 At the canal’s scale: Diversity of Water Authorities...... 43 4.3 Organizations involved in solving water conflicts...... 48 4.4 Institutional innovation and change in water allocation rules...... 52 4.5 New local arrangements for Social regulation ...... 56 5 INNOVATION IN FARMERS’ INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES...... 60 5.1 Typology of Farming Households...... 60 5.2 Strategies based on crops ...... 70 5.3 Strategies based on land and water...... 79 5.4 strategies based on non farming activities...... 82 5.5 Migration strategies...... 87 5.6 Summary of farming households’ strategies...... 88 5.7 strategies of farmers towards the irrigation project...... 89 6 INNOVATION AND FARMERS OF MELKA JEBDU ...... 93 6.1 The factors of Innovation...... 93 6.2 About endogenous and exogenous innovations… ...... 99 6.3 confronting The reactionary and progressive narratives: The study case of Burka jalala 100 6.4 What changes with the Burka Jalala project?...... 102 6.5 Accompanying innovation processes...... 103 6.6 About governance in innovation and irrigation...... 105 CONCLUSION...... 109 BIBLIOGRAPHIE :...... 110

4 ABSTRACT

This study was carried out for GRET and ODA during 5 months of fieldwork in East Hararghe, Ethiopia. The main objectives were to gather data on water management in a small farmer-managed irrigation scheme, before its future upgrading, to analyse the socio- economical status of the area’s farming households and to take into account farmers’ claims for the continuation of the irrigation project. A “Social Management of Water” diagnosis was undergone to study the modalities of water distribution in the irrigation scheme. It unravelled the great complexity and flexibility of an irrigation system, in which farmers are continuously confronted to new problems and opportunities. A socio-economic analysis, based on a systemic approach, enabled to evaluate the advantages of irrigated agriculture and to define a typology of farming households where water rights and the quantity of irrigated lands are key factors in providing food security to households. Finally, results of the actor-focused analysis about the irrigation project indicated that farmers have many different interests and worries. The modernization process will surely provoke important disruptions and modifications. In this adaptation process, collective action and innovation capabilities of farmers must not be underestimated and must give way to constructive ties of cooperation with irrigation agencies and NGOs…

KEY WORDS:

Irrigation, water management, social groups, smallholders, innovation, governance, food security, Catha edulis, Ethiopia,

5 GLOSSARY

Abba arrada : PA chairman Abba burka : spring owner Abba ganda : village leader Abba qalada : landlord Afaan oromo: Oromo language Afosha: traditional organization of neighbours for solidarity Badheysa: intermediate season (February to May) Birr: Ethiopian currency (10 birr = 0.87 Euros = 1,26 US$) Birra: intermediate season (October to December) Bona : dry season (December to February) Boqqolo: maize Burka Jalala: spring of love Burka: spring Caamsa: small dry season (May to June) Demina : Oromo clan leader Derg: socialist regime from 1974 to 1991 Faraka: exchange of labor or of water Fetha negest :the Justice of Kings (Menelik time) Gana: rainy season (July to September) Ganda: village Garada: minor clan leader Gosa : clan or lineage Gumbotal: small dry season (May-June) = caamsa Guza: collective work to help a person for important labors task, without guarantee of compensation Haro: artificial pond for harvesting and storing water Hebret hersha: State cooperative Hera: trial process of traditional court Hilmo barchuma: adoptive son Hirmana: free labor Holola : best portion of farm land which is kept by a father until his death

6 Ishada : time unit of 12 hours for water distribution Koulak: individuals farm Kure: very small pond to store water Kushe : yam Mana mari: house of representatives Mana murtu : House of Justice (administrative court) Mardufa : bunch of khat Maysia: April (rainy month) Meret le arrashu: “land to the tiller” land reform Mimalak: water master Mongudo: wise elder Naftanioch: hamhara landlord Nam torba: committee of seven persons to redistribute lands during land reform Qalada: large portion of land Qamadi: wheat Qoti: land measure of 1250 m 2 (1/8 ha) Sera murtu: judge of administrative court Shivata: land measure of varying size Siso : initial feudal system before 1938 Wokil: controller, working for a landlord Xisenia: tenant in the feudal system Zemech : main actors of the zemecha Zemecha: rural development campaign after the 1975 land reform

For more vocabulary: see annex 1.

7 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS: Agency-Managed Irrigation Scheme AV: Added value CSP: Country Strategic Paper DPPC: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission DPPB: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau EGS: Employment Generation Scheme HDI: Human Development Index FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization FMIS: Farmer-Managed Irrigation Scheme GDP: Gross Domestic Product GIS: Geographic Information System GRET: Groupe de Recherche et d’Echanges Technologiques MAE : Ministère des Affaires Etrangères MCNG : Mission de Coopération Non Gouvernementale MERET: Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition to more sustainable livelihoods NGO: Non Governmental Organization ODA: Oromia Development Association O&M: Operation and Maintenance OIDA: Oromia Irrigation Development Authority OWWE: Oromia Water Works Enterprise PA: Peasant Association SN: Safety Net UNDP: United Nations Development Program WFP: World Food Program WMS: Welfare Monitoring Survey WUA: Water User Association

8 INTRODUCTION

The region of Hararghe, located in the Eastern part of Ethiopia is one of the most drought prone and food insecure areas of Ethiopia. In the frame of its program which promotes food security, Oromia Development Association, with the support of GRET and the French Embassy, wish to develop irrigation by upgrading traditional farmer-managed small scale irrigation schemes. The first experience took place in Burka Alifif, where works were completed at the end of 2006. The second experience is about to start in 2007 with the small scale irrigation scheme of Burka Jalala… As it was useful to obtain an actor-focused analysis on water management and a thorough knowledge about farmers’ irrigation modalities and strategies before starting the modernization project, GRET and ODA decided to ask for a study of the Burka Jalala irrigation scheme. Responding to their demand, this thesis was the final step of the CNEARC 1’s Social Management of Water course, whose objective is to train rural development engineers specialized in an interdisciplinary approach of irrigation. This study aimed at fulfilling three important local necessities. The first objective was to produce data and knowledge about a farmer-managed small scale irrigation scheme to understand the reality of its dynamics. Actually, the irrigation scheme is a social and historical construction which is constantly crafted and re-crafted by farmers to respond to their new problems and opportunities. The second objective was to understand farmers’ different strategies around rainfed and irrigated lands and the water resource, in a context of severe land and water scarcity. The last objective was to try to build a reflection about the factors of innovation and collective action, and possible governance systems around irrigation schemes and innovation. These three necessities actually reveal the crucial need of taking into account farmers’ real capabilities and knowledge and improving government-farmers cooperation… The thesis is divided into six sections. The first section introduces the local context, the demand and the hypothesis of the study. The second section presents the theoretical framework and the methodology which have been used to undertake the study. The third section unravels the different steps of the population’s settlement, the construction of the irrigation scheme and the gradual apparition of land and water scarcity. The fourth section deals with the different authorities, institutional innovations and new local arrangements that farmers have built to respond to this scarcity. The fifth section analyses the different type of households from a socio-economical point of view and farmers’ individual strategies. The last section is a discussion about the factors of innovation and the changes which may occur after the modernization project of Burka Jalala. It finally brings up perspectives about how can the different actors of development accompany innovation processes and improve governance in irrigation schemes and extension programs...

1 Ecole Supérieure d’Agronomie Tropical du Centre National d’Etudes Agronomiques des Régions Chaudes (Superior School of Tropical Agriculture. National Center of Agricultural Studies in Warm Regions)

1

1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

1.1 BASIC DATA ON ETHIOPIA

1.1.1 Ethiopia, “the most populated mountain in the world”?

Landlocked in the horn of Africa since the independence of Eritrea (in 1993), Ethiopia is bordered by the former Italian colony at the North, by Djibouti and Somalia at the East, by Sudan at the West and by Kenya at the South. It is a vast territory of about 1,123,000 km 2, about twice the surface of France. The country is mainly composed of highlands of 2,000 to 4,000 m of altitude (58% of its territory), low lands and the Rift valley. As Ethiopia’s highlands are densely populated (the average density is of 150/km 2 but it can reach up to 1,000), some geographers have called the country “ the most populated mountain in the world ” (Gallais, 1989 in Gascon 1995). (see map of Ethiopia: annex 6) Map 1 : Ethiopia’s location within the horn of Africa

Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/et.html Ethiopia’s population has known a spectacular growth rate . In 1970, population was estimated of 25 millions (Eritrea included). In 1984, it reached 42 million people (Eritrea included) (Gascon, 1995). In 2006, estimates are around 75 million people, with an annual growth rate of 2.7% (UNDP, 2006). Ethiopia’s population now ranks as the second largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Composed of 83 ethnic groups, Ethiopia’s population is also highly multiethnic. The main groups are the Oromo (38% of population), the Amhara (26%), the Tigrean (10%), the Sidamo (7%), the Somali (6%) and the Afar (2%). Though the country’s history is strongly marked by Christianity, around 45% of the population is Muslim, 45% Christian and 10% have kept Animist cults. 1.1.2 An agrarian economy

The population of Ethiopia is mostly rural (about 84%) and mainly dependant on agriculture as the primary livelihood source (80%). (CSP, 2006) The agricultural sector is by far the main economic engine of the country : it contributes to about 42% of the national GDP and 85% of exports (FAO Aquastat, 2005). Within agriculture, the lion’s share is staple cereal production by smallholders and 90 to 95% of the annual harvest is produced during “Meher” season (main rainy season from July to September). The main cereals are wheat, barley, teff ( Eragrostis abyssinica ). Other important

2 sources of carbohydrates are enset ( Enset ventriculosum ), cassava, potato and sweet potato. Cash crops include oleaginous crops, spices, coffee, khat ( Catha edulis ) and eucalyptus (FAO,2002). Perennial crops such as coffee, enset (false banana) and khat are important livelihood sources in localized farming systems and account for 30% in value terms although they cover less than 5% of the total cultivated area (CSP, 2006). Coffee exports are Ethiopia’s main source of currency, providing for 40 to 60% of the country’s revenue (FAO, 2002). Other export products are leguminous and oleaginous crops, khat, and sugar etc... Ethiopia has Africa’s largest livestock population and their products account for about 30% of the agricultural GDP. Livestock is an integral part of mixed highlands systems and ensures the livelihood of the lowland pastoralists.

Diagram 1 : Ethiopia’s GDP highly depends on rainfall Irrigation contributes marginally to overall production. Only 2% of arable lands are Rainfall variation around the mean, & GDP growth irrigated. 97% of all crops are 80 25 20 60 heavily dependant on rainfall 15 quantity and distribution. As 40 10 agriculture is mostly rainfed, 20 5 0 percentage percentage 0 production strongly varies from year -5 1992 1998 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 1989 1982 1983 1985 -20 1984 to year. As more than 80% of 1994 -10 -15 Ethiopia’s households directly -40 year -60 -25 depend on agriculture, rainfall - variations have a strong incidence of -80 GDP growth -30 rainfall variation around the mean the country’s GDP. Production periodically suffers sharp declines Source: World Bank. SIMA & African Rainfall &Temperature Evaluation System data during drought year.

1.1.3 Food insecurity, a common problem of rural households

The latest Welfare Monitoring survey (World Bank, 2006) shows a global prevalence of 37% underweight. More than 4 million children suffer form hunger to a point that stunts their growth. Malnutrition factor are higher in rural areas than in urban areas. This reflects the difficulty of rural households to satisfy their food needs with their own production . According to WMS 2004, 40% of rural households report a production covering less than 6 month food needs. Only 2% of households report self sufficiency and only 3’% of households have enough production to feed themselves more than 10 months.

The question of national self sufficiency and grain availability is controversial. In 2001, food imports reached 193.7 millions dollars while exports ranged about 138.7 millions de dollars. Even during good years, 4 to 6 million people depend on international food aid in order to survive (FAO, 2002). But according to the estimates of CSP 2 (2006), only one out of the five last years was a clear deficit year in terms of cereal balance (production/consumption). If production ensures national self-sufficiency and availability is broadly guaranteed, the main food security issue is access to food, arising from income

2 Based on FAO estimates

3 poverty. Evidence of this is the mismatch between distribution and production areas. Even if climate and production have improved in densely populated food insecure areas, it has not had an impact on the population’s vulnerability (CSP, 2006).

1.2 HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA : STRONG CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

Ethiopia is the only African country that has not been colonized, besides the short Italian occupation period from 1936 to 1941. Nevertheless, it has known a stormy and troubled history…It remains one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks 170 out of 177 with the Human development Index (UNDP, 2006). • From Menelik to Hayle Selase: Conquest and domination of Southern territories. During the period preceding the Ethiopian revolution, more than monarchy itself, the fiscal and land tenure system was the keystone of the social and political edifice that fell in 1975 (Gascon, 1995b). Actually, there was a strong opposition between the Northern Semitic highlands and the Southern Cushitic Muslim and Pagan territories . In the Northern regions, access to land was guaranteed and land tenure was managed by communities themselves, without possibility of intervention by the King. However, in the Southern regions, there was no security of land tenure since the Southern peoples had been defeated. On the lands conquered by Menelik from 1889 to 1913, the “Justice of Kings” ( Fetha Negest ) was implemented. This legal code stipulated that the conquered lands became royal lands (Gascon, 1995b). As a consequence, the South was characterised by a landless peasantry (Woudineh, 1990). The power of Hayle Selase (who reigned from 1930 to 1974) relied on the distribution of these lands to remunerate his servants, especially starting from 1960. These servants became landlords ( naftanioch ). These massive transfers of land led to many evictions and rebellions (as in Balé from 1963 to 1966) (Gascon, 1995b). In 1975, as a result of famine and mutiny, Haylé Selase was overthrown… • The Derg period (1974-1991) and its radical land reforms In 1975, a military coup d’état established a socialist government. The provisional government (the Derg ) proclaimed a land reform whose effects were extremely different in the North and the South. Land was nationalized. Farmers had usufruct rights on 10 ha at most. Wage and sharecropping systems were prohibited. Peasant associations were created for every 800 ha. The zemech , the main actors of the reform (mainly students) were engaged in a rural development campaign ( zemecha ) by means of alphabetization, extension and information on the revolution and the land reforms. But these land reforms were far from uniting the country. On the contrary, it increased regional divisions: as decisions were hailed with enthusiasm in the South, they were strongly rejected in the North (Gascon, 1995b). In 1979, another step to socialize rural economy was executed (Woudineh, 1990). The green revolution, based on the soviet model of economic planning, was proclaimed. This mainly affected southern highland regions of coffee production (the country’s main source of currency). There, farmers were forced to adhere to production cooperatives ( hebret hersha ) and renounce to their private farms (Gascon, 1995a). Individual farms ( koulak ) were cut to 4

4 ha and farmers were continuously denounced by authorities for their selfishness. In 1984, as famine roared in arid areas, the government accused once more the koulaks and started its resettlement campaigns as a prelude to the complete collectivization of agriculture. More than 600,000 people were resettled in massive transfers of population to form huge State farms of several thousands of Ha (Brüne, 1990 In: Gascon, 1995a). Peasant associations were used by the government to their advantage and lost their autonomy with « the assimilation of peasant associations as local organs of state administration »3. Finally, through all these reforms in which government gradually gained control over agriculture and farmers, « the Ethiopian revolution can be understood as an expression of the town’s decision to restructure its access to the countryside »4. During the 1984-1985 droughts, the model showed its limits. State farms stood for 6% of the country’s cultivated area but mobilized 90% of credits while yields were only 30% higher than those of farmers with wooden ploughs (Dessalegn, 1984, in Gascon, 1995 p 383). The severe famines which then took place were not foreseen by the government. The State then heavily relied on the mass medias to call for international aid. • The Meles government 1991 to nowadays (2007): regionalization and liberalization In 1991, soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, its main ally and support, the Derg was overthrown by a coalition of different rebel groups. A new constitution was adopted in 1994. It established a federal State which is divided into nine ethnically based regions and two special administrative areas (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). Elections were organized in 1995. Regionalization was a major stake and many government structures, such as agricultural bureaus were submitted to this process. As consequence, the functioning of bureaus of regions, zones and districts are still very disordered (FAO, 2002). Some measures have also been adopted to liberalize Ethiopia’s economy. The Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA) was created in 1992 to promote private investment and an ambitious privatization program was launched (Machulka, 2002). However, State control remains extremely tight…

1.3 THE STUDY AREA

1.3.1 Oromia, the biggest region of Ethiopia

Oromia is one of the regional states of Ethiopia. Covering 353,632 km 2 from the east to the southwest of the country, its population was estimated in 2002 at 24 million, making it the largest state in both terms of population and land area . 89% of population lives in rural area and 92.2% are employed by the agricultural sector. Rainfed agriculture constitutes over 98% of the total production and is purely dominated by small-scale peasant farming characterized by small, scattered holdings and low technological input utilization. Almost half of the region’s surface area is considered to be drought-prone and large numbers of people remain food insecure.

3 Pausewang, 1990, p 46 In: Gascon, 1995a.

4 Taye M., 1990, p 35 in Gascon, 1995a).

5 The great majority of inhabitants of the region are Oromo. It is Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group. They have their own language “ afaan oromo ” which has many variants according to areas. One of the prides of Oromo identity is the traditional and democratic system of self-governance known as the Gada system (see annex 11). However, due to the Amhara invasion and cultural domination, the Gada system was eroded and replaced by the iron rule of the naftanioch landlords. In West Oromia, people have embraced Christianity and in East Oromia, they have chosen Islam. Only a small fringe of Oromos preserves animist cults. 1.3.2 East-Hararghe zone

Map 2 : Position of study area in Ethiopia

Eastern Hararghe is one of the 14 administrative zones of the Oromia regional state. It is located in the eastern part of the country about 600 km of the capital, Addis Ababa. It has an area of about 22,600 km. In 2000, population is estimated at 1,900,000, out of which 95% is rural and the average size of rural household size is of 4.7.

(see map of East Hararghe: annex 2)

Table 1 : Other facts about East Hararghe

Average farmland holding size 0.5 ha Average oxen holding size 0.9 Source: Jarso district data % of farmers without a farm ox 35%

1.3.3 Jarso district

Jarso is one of the 15 districts of East Hararghe. It is divided into 18 Peasant Associations and has an area of 487.7 km2. Ejersa Goro is its administrative center. Population is of 93,500 and crude population density is of 192 persons per km2. In this area, the Harar highlands descend towards the Awash plain. As a consequence, Jarso is characterized by a great variety of agroclimatic zones which range in altitude from 1050 to 3030: highlands (39%) mid-lands (33%) and lowlands (28%). As observed on the map, highlands and lowlands have strong differences in temperature and rainfall, thus crops and vegetation are also completely distinct. See annex 3: Map of Jarso and annex 4: data on Jarso district

6 1.3.4 Melka Jebdu Peasant Association 1.3.4.1 Basic data Located in the highlands, Melka Jebdu is one of the 18 Peasant Associations (PA) of Jarso. A PA is just an administrative unit. Geographically, the PA is divided into two main valleys: the Jalala valley and the Woldaya valley. In each valley, flows one perennial spring (burka ) of the same name which is used in one small-scale irrigation scheme. Downstream, at the limit of the PA, in the village called Melka Jebdu as its PA, the two waterways meet and form the Mite river (which descends until Burka Alifif). The Burka Woldaya irrigation scheme has been modernized in 2001 with canal lining and construction of multiple use structures at the spring. The Burka Jalala irrigation scheme is the object of my study. Table 2: Distribution of land types on the area of Melka Jebdu PA

Type of land Area (ha) % An important part (35.5%) of the PA area is Rainfed land 410 26,2% cultivated. There are also many forest lands which are Irrigated land 145 9,3% protected by government and cannot be cleared. Most Forest land 956 61,1% of these lands are uncultivable anyhow with strong Grazing land 15 1,0% slopes and very rocky soils. There are however used by Community land 5 0,3% the people for “unofficial” grazing and collection of Rocky land 25 1,6% Residential land 8 0,5% fire wood and more rarely they are illegally cleared for PA total area 1564 100,0% cultivation by farmers with too little land. Source: Development agents of Melka Jebdu Table 3 : Population of Melka Jebdu PA Melka Jebdu is densely populated Gothi 0 to 15 15 to 60 over 60 Total Biftu 391 334 40 765 with approximately 340 inhabitants per Guyyama 440 394 15 849 2 km . The PA is itself divided into 7 Horo 454 390 47 891 administrative sub-units called “goxi”. Dagabala 349 281 61 691 The study area is composed of 4 goxi: Ifa Nura 217 336 49 602 Biftu, Guyyama, Horo and Dagabala Waldaya 361 246 43 650 Burka Maya 390 464 11 865 (highlighted in grey). Melka Jebdu 2602 2445 266 5313 % 49% 46% 5% 100%

Source: Development agents of Melka Jebdu

See annex 5: map and data on Melka Jebdu

7 1.3.4.2 Climate

Diagram 2: Climatic comparison between lowlands and highlands.

Source: Angèle Legall

Harar (the site where hygrometric measures of the graph above have been done) and Burka Jalala are both located in the Hararghe highlands but there are some slight differences. I will describe more precisely the climate in the study area. In Burka Jalala, there is one very dry season ( bona ) from December to January. From February to May, rain becomes more frequent with a peak in April ( maysia ) when floods often occur) although this season ( badheysa ) is characterized by unreliable rainfall and unpredictable droughts. Indeed, annual variability is extremely high during this season. From mid May to June ( gumbotal ), a minor dry and warm period takes place. From July to September, it is the main rainy season ( gana ). Finally, another intermediary season ( birra ) from October to November is characterized by variable rains. Temperatures are relatively constant although May and June are warmer months. October, December and early January are colder months where frosts and hailstorms may occur.

8 1.4 THE IRRIGATION PROJECT OF BURKA JALALA

1.4.1 Data on the irrigation scheme

Burka Jalala is a traditional community-based irrigation scheme. Its total command area is said to be 50 to 80 Ha. However, GIS results demonstrate that it actually is of around 100 ha (seeTable 4).Water comes from the main spring of Burka Jalala. During dry season, the perennial spring has an average flow of 65 l/s but it strongly increases during rainy season. See annex 6: photos of Burka Jalala irrigation scheme Photo 1 : Spring of Burka Jalala Credit: GRET The spring of Burka Jalala is located at an altitude of 2550 meters and the altitude whole command area ranges from 2550 to 2250. This spring is used by four canals. All are earthen canals which are rebuilt annually at the end of rainy season. Two are these canals have intakes downstream along the river which are built with rocks. At some points, when canals must cross temporary waterways (gullies and the river), farmers also built stone bridges, according to their indigenous terracing techniques. These stones structures often have to be rebuilt 2 to 4 times during irrigation season when episodic flooding incidents cause damage. Two canals have their intake directly at the beginning of the spring: the Kolobo and Gora canals. Downstream, two others canals (Becheysa and Nia’a canals) have intakes in the river bed and divert water flowing from Burka Jalala as well as water from seven other minor springs which flow throughout the year, increasing the water flow for the two lower canals. As a consequence, all the canals do not have the same initial water supply. These four canals form Burka Jalala spring’s “official” irrigation system. It obeys to the water sharing rules which were decided decades ago by elders and local leaders although some rules have been modified since. Finally, a fifth canal which has its intake along the river diverts water only from the minor springs and never uses water from the spring of Burka Jalala. More than 300 households cultivate land in the irrigated area. Irrigation is used for khat, potatoes and maize and to a lesser extent for onions and garlic. The irrigation period can start as early as September and end at latest in mid-July. But the key irrigation period is from December to June. January, February and May are the peak months of irrigation.

9 Table 4 : Command areas of different canals using the springs of Burka Jalal area.

POTENTIAL COMMAND ESTIMATION OF NON -IRRIGATED ESTIMATED EFFECTIVE CANAL AREA (HA ) LANDS IN THIS AREA COMMAND AREA (HA )

Kolobo 11,44 20% 9

Gora 34,94 15% 30

Nia'a 47,89 30% 33,5

Becheysa 25,4 10% 23

Estimated total Burka Jalala’s command area: 95.5 ha Total area of former rainfed lands irrigated with motor pumps: 14 ha From the Kolobo area: 10,5 ha. From the Gora area: 3,5 ha Area irrigated by minor springs only: Usmael canal’s command area: 2.5 ha

Data: Results from geographic information system mapping

10 Map 3: Burka Jalala irrigation scheme

Source: GIS surveys See annex 7: Spatial organization of Burka Jalala landscape

11 1.4.2 The modernization project of the irrigation scheme

The modernization project of the irrigation scheme of Burka Jalala would mainly be to build new lined of canals and lining parts of the original earthen canals. This would reduce seepage losses, thus increasing the water supply for irrigation. The lining would also diminish canal rugosity and thus increase the speed of water. This would facilitate distribution of water, allowing more flexibility to operate water exchanges between individual users and between different sectors. The project may also increase surface of the total command area though for topographic constraints, this increase would be slight. The project may also include construction of water control and division structures (intakes, outlets, gates…) as the current ones are rudimentary and have to be re-built several times by farmers every year. The construction of all these structures would consistently reduce maintenance work of water users. The project is planed to benefit 150 to 300 households (depending on the final project design). Unfortunately, it has not been possible to collect more information about the project design. The data collection for the feasibility study has been undergone in May and June 2006. But due to organizational and labor shortage problems in OIDA, the feasibility study and the project design have not been completed. 1.4.2.1 Partners and institutional organization of the project • ODA: Oromia Development Association, general manager of the project Oromia Development Association (ODA) is an indigenous non-profit organization and one of Ethiopia’s largest membership associations. Although it is registered as an NGO, ODA closely works with government structures such as ministries, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) and Oromia DPP Bureau, district administrations and bureaus of agriculture etc… The membership organization of ODA stretches down to remote village level to promote voluntary grass root involvement. In order to achieve its objectives, in the past 10 years, ODA has secured more than 130 million birr to implement more than 300 various projects in the region. ODA’s main activities focus on promoting food security, improving reproductive health and family planning services. In East Hararghe, activities comprise modernization projects of irrigation schemes, attribution of loans for poor households to invest in small livestock, support to family planning services etc… Future activities are planned for community capacity building (in growing vegetables and irrigation maintenance) and support for better commercialization of vegetables. Hence, under these programs, rehabilitation of irrigation schemes is one of the major objectives undertaken in the district of Jarso, East Hararghe. The first project took place in Burka Alifif. Water works have been completed in September 2006. One district project coordinator is placed at Jarso to directly implement project activities • Institutional organization of the project Cooperation between GRET ( Groupe de Recherche et d’Echanges Technologiques ) and ODA started in 2005 with the modernization project of the Burka Alifif irrigation scheme. Looking for funds, ODA called upon the French Embassy who then called upon GRET. Actions were financed by the French Embassy’s counterfunds of former food aid and the Non-Governmental Mission of Cooperation (MCNG) of the French ministry of foreign affairs

12 (MAE). Cooperation was pursued with the modernization project of the Burka Jalala irrigation scheme. To summarize the complex organization of the project, ODA is the project manager and has in charge finances and legal issues. Oromia Irrigation Development Authority, OIDA, (a public structure of the Oromia region 5) is in charge of controlling the construction of the structures. It has in charge the feasibility study and the project design. The Oromia Water Work Enterprise (also a public structure of the Oromia region) is the contractor for the structure work with the participation of the community. (See annex 8: feasibility study demand)

However, ODA understands its part in a broader way which includes discussions with local community for planning: design of the canals and schedule of the work with the Peasant Association and its members, self-organization for community water management, maintenance, impact on the agricultural production, introduction of new crops upon request of the farmers and marketing etc…

1.4.2.2 Compromising between GRET’s and ODA’s demands As ODA had little experience in the field of irrigation projects and minor presence on the field, it was not completely aware of the complexity of irrigation issues and of possible problems that could arise from the project. As a consequence, GRET decided to support ODA by sending two master students in Social management of Water. One student, Angèle Legall was sent to Burka Alifif, where works had started in 2005 and were to be completed in September 2006. The other student (myself) was sent to Burka Jalala where the project had not yet begun. The scope of the study in Burka Jalala focused on the following points: • Water management organization: Description of the present irrigation system before revitalization. Characterization of scheme management (decision making, financing and control of operation and maintenance etc...). • Agricultural practices: characterization of traditional irrigated and non-irrigated cropping systems. Interview on household profile (importance of irrigated agriculture, agricultural/non agricultural activities) and strategy after scheme revitalization. • Collection of farmers’ perspectives regarding the possible evolution of scheme management after project implementation. Collection of their demand regarding the project design and implementation. • Possible impacts of the project implementation: analysis of emergence of conflicts during works. Obviously, the interests of ODA and GRET for the study were a bit different. This tension is typical of partnership relations and it was very enlightening understanding it and finding a compromise. Choosing this compromise was very important because it determined the thesis’ content.

5 In Ethiopia, each administrative region has its own irrigation development authority.

13 GRET was more research-oriented. Their priority is not necessarily to give answers and recommendations but rather to ask the “good questions”. They expected a thorough study of water management, its rules, its social structures as well as the history of the construction of the irrigation system. On the other hand, ODA had a more “pragmatic” demand. They mainly expected a socio-economic study of water users to estimate to what extent irrigated crops and lands could ensure more income and food security to households. They also wanted a baseline study of households as a reference in order to study the impact of the project afterwards. Finally, it hoped to receive recommendations about the project’s design and demand-driven orientations for their future projects. A good intermediary was JP Lempérière who worked at the International Water Management Institute. With his important working experience with irrigation institutions and the Development world in Ethiopia, he indicated me what could be very useful for Ethiopian institutions also and helped combine both approaches. Finally, I decided to take into account most of the demands but as time was limited, I restricted some aspects. I also chose according to what seemed for me most useful for the local population, and as a secondary criterion, according to what fitted best my skills and motivations. The thorough study of water management in a traditional small scale irrigation system was very useful for all parties as little literature existed on these types of system in Ethiopia and the issue often neglected during technically focused feasibility studies. As a consequence, I spent an important amount of time on this aspect. The socio-economical study was also very important to understand the importance of irrigation in the area. This was the second main point of my study. But as I ran short of time, I limited the number of surveys. Data was however enough to understand local dynamics and strategies of each different type of farmers. For GRET’s demand on a thorough monographic study of the irrigation system’s expansion, time was again limited and research conditions difficult. I decided to study this historical expansion of irrigated lands on one canal’s command area only.

14 1.5 THE STUDY ’S HYPOTHESIS

These hypotheses are the outcome of all the questions and hopes of both parties. They are also linked to the first data collected on the field. Hypothesis 1: Cultivating land in irrigated systems is an asset for more food security for the households of all water users. Hypothesis 2: An irrigated system is managed by a complex set of rules that individuals must constantly adapt to their needs in variable ways. As information, technical skills, and power relations about the scheme are asymmetrical, water management in an irrigated scheme is arduous and changes are slow processes. Hypothesis 3: Despite asymmetries and inequalities between people around the resource (here, water and irrigated land), farmer have aptitudes to adapt themselves to the physical, economical and political changes of their environment, to innovate and find solutions to new problems by building new rules and institutions, through dialogue and eventual presence of trouble- shooters. Hypothesis 4: Dialogue, collective building of rules and adaptation to changes of the scheme’s organization/ aménagement and management does not eliminate inequalities between actors of the irrigated system around access to the resource, distribution, control and expected benefits from its utilization... In order to answer my study’s hypotheses, I have used the theoretical framework, the methods and the tools that are presented in the following chapter…

15

2 THEORETICIAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.1 Systemic approach

As agriculture is an ever-changing and complex object, the systemic approach seems to be most adapted to this study. Indeed: “Analyzing and understanding a complex and animated object in terms of a system means considering its functioning as a combination of interdependent and complementary functions which ensure internal circulation and exchanges of matter, energy and economical value with the outside world. (Mazoyer, 1999) 6. Box 1 : Main principles of the system approach • Explain rather than describe: to understand the causes • Carry out a dynamic study: to understand historical changes • Analyze the diversity of farmers: to understand their different interests and strategies • Analyze cause-effect relations: to understand the logics of farmers • Identify and characterize rather than quantify: to understand how the elements of the system work and their interactions • Build successive hypothesis • Analyze at different scales In: Apollin, 2000 • The cropping system : it is the defined combination in time and space of crops and fallow. It is a homogenous mode of cultivation and of utilization of the environment 7. (Jouve, 1992) • The production system: It is a structured set of productions means (labor, land, capital, water) whose combination ensures vegetal and animal production in order to satisfy objectives and needs of the farm holder and his family 8. (Jouve, 1992) • The agrarian system : This concept includes utilization and reproduction modes of ecosystems, social relations around production and exchanges that contribute to the existence and development of the agrarian system, as well as general economical and social conditions. This concept also helps

6 Original text in French: : « Analyser et concevoir un objet complexe et animé en termes de système, c’est aussi considérer son fonctionnement comme une combinaison de fonctions interdépendantes et complémentaires, qui assurent la circulation interne et les échanges avec l’extérieur de matière, d’énergie et, s’agissant d’un objet économique, de valeur .» 7 Original text in French : « Un système de culture correspond à une combinaison donnée dans l’espace et dans le temps de cultures et de jachère. Il représente un mode d’exploitation et de mise en culture homogène d’un milieu ».

8 Original text in French : « Un système de production est un ensemble structuré de moyens de production combinés entre eux pour assurer une production végétale et animale en vue de satisfaire les objectifs et besoins de l’exploitant et de sa famille. »

16 understand the functioning and the conditions of reproduction of a society’s agricultural sector 9. (Cochet, 2000). The systemic approach is also relevant to study irrigation. Just like for agriculture, the approach consists of putting men at the center of the system, while acknowledging the importance of interactions with economical, social, cultural, technical, agricultural and ecological dimensions. This is why I will speak in terms of an “ irrigated system ”. This concept includes its knowledge, its physical structures, its users, the organizations in charge of its management and the rules which are used by users and other stakeholders to manage the system (Lavigne Delville, 1997). Diagram 3 : Systemic approach of an irrigation system

Local Social relations Historical heritage society

Geography of scheme Management and infrastructures of the irrigated scheme

Water rights and system of rules

Farming systems and Organization of users farmers’ strategies and its functioning

Source: Apollin, 2000 This approach requires great multidisciplinarity: the researcher must constantly juggle with different disciplines: agriculture, economics, anthropology, hydraulics etc…

2.1.2 Social management of water

An irrigated agricultural system distinguishes itself from non-irrigated ones by the existence of strong constraints linked to the network and shared among users. (Molle, Ruf 1994). That is why the word « social » has all its importance in water management. Indeed, “water management is before anything else, a social and historically produced construction which is never completely frozen because it generates contingency. It thus carries changes, according of unpredicted events 10 ”. (Sabatier, Ruf, 1992). Furthermore, water rights are

9 Original text in French : « Un système agraire peut être défini comme permettant de comprendre l’état, à un moment donné de son histoire, le fonctionnement et les conditions de reproduction du secteur agricole d’une société. Le concept de système agraire englobe à la fois le mode d’exploitation et de reproduction d’un ou plusieurs écosystèmes, les rapports sociaux de production et d’échange qui ont contribué à sa mise en place et son développement, ainsi que les conditions économiques et sociales d’ensemble ».

10 Original text in French: « La gestion de l’eau est avant tout un construit social, historiquement produit, mais jamais totalement figé car générateur de contingences et donc porteur d’évolution en fonction de tous les imprévus. »

17 considered as social relations: « Rights are hence, subject to changes, there are the object of struggles between individuals and social groups .” (Gerbrandy in Apollin, Eberhart, 2000). Social management of water is based on agricultural and hydraulic knowledge, labour allocation among water users and the social actors in charge of bringing the water, and a socially recognized water authority which register rights, organizes maintenance, surveillance as well as the sharing of labour and financial costs. 2.1.3 Collective action

The main question of collective question is “how to solve collective action problems in common pool resources such as water?”. For an irrigation system, the heart of the problem lies in the definition of its functioning rules, as well as in the structure of the organization in charge of implementing these rules (Ostrom, 1992).

The quality of rules is a necessary condition for the efficient management of irrigation systems. Indeed well-designed rules increase the advantages for fair-playing the game, decrease loss of earnings and increase fines of infractions (Lavigne-Delville, 1998). But there are other necessary conditions as well…

Box 2 : Eight major principles which are necessary conditions for successful self-governing institutions (Ostrom, 1992)

1. Both the boundaries of the service area, and the individuals or households with rights to use water from an irrigation system are clearly defined. 2. Rules specifying the amount of water that an irrigator is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labor, materials and/or money. 3. Most individuals affected by operational rules are included in the group who can modify these rules. 4. Monitors, who actively audit physical conditions and irrigator behavior are accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. 5. Users who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or both. 6. Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts between users or between users and officials. 7. The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. 8. Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

2.1.4 Innovation

Agriculture practices and social institutions are ever-changing elements in rural society. To study the innovation processes and the agricultural dynamics in Burka Jalala, I have followed the strategic and actor-focused approach which is recommended by Chauveau (1999). The first methodological requirement is to put back these processes in their historical depth and trajectories. The second one is to focus on the qualitative analysis of change processes. Third, deterministic and finalistic principles must be questioned to privilege the “constructivist” approach

18 My analysis is strongly marked by the different theories which I have been analyzed in the frame of my study: Malthus, Boserup, Darré, Chauveau, Ostrom, Lam etc…. At the last section of this thesis study, I have tried to confront these “schools” with the observed local realities. This final debate opens the door to the analysis of possible perspectives of approaches and projects for future actions. My positioning about these “schools” has not been determined by a choice a priori, before the study. It was rather built progressively, each observation and findings bringing a new “stone” to the construction. That is why I have chosen not to present an ad hoc inventory of these theoretical schools about innovation and development. I have preferred to privilege the confrontation of point of views and theoretical frames to Ethiopian realities as a reflexive framework.

2.2 METHODOLOGICAL STEPS AND THEIR TOOLS

2.2.1 Observation of the physical environment

The objective of this first step was to understand how the agricultural landscape was built and why was it built in this way. Also, reading the irrigation network’s physical structures helped me draw some keys to understand the irrigation system. It helped me formulate the first hypothesis about local history. • Landscape analysis First, it was necessary to get in touch with the field by walking and looking around. This observation was necessary to determine the main blocks that composed the landscape, looking at topography, geology, soils, wild and cultivated vegetation as well as all human constructions: houses, roads, important sites of social life etc… A practical way of doing this at first was by making transect walks and observing from peaks (as they are excellent view points), drawing, noting observations and taking pictures. During the first weeks, as I was alone and with very poor knowledge of the Oromo language, this was anyway the only thing I could do. It was also an excellent way to get in touch with the population, to introduce each other and learn more Oromo. Though the first weeks were completely dedicated to these tasks (and also the study of the physical structures of the irrigation network), I always continued to observe the environment: first because crops continuously changed with the seasons, and second because I constantly built new hypothesis on each area which needed to be verified. • Physical structures of the irrigation network Studying waterways brings us to all forms of mobilization of water on the study area and structures. According to Aubriot (2000), reading the physical structures goes through the study of the four following elements: the limits of the network, the structure of access to the resource, geography of distribution canals, access to water on plots. I used a GPS to follow all the main canals and the important secondary canals. I also picked up references of all the gates. I then was able to make maps of the network with Map Info.

19 2.2.2 Historical research on local agriculture and use of irrigation

Studying the history of agriculture in the area was extremely important to look at the area’s dynamics. Furthermore, the historical approach was also necessary in order to study agricultural techniques: “ Understanding techniques without knowing their history is about just as impossible as understanding the Earth’s relief without using geology ”11 . Unraveling the main steps of the agricultural history helped understand change in agricultural and technical systems, production and cropping systems and their impacts on local society. An irrigation system is the product of history. As a consequence, the study of its history is essential. Aubriot affirms “ The current functioning of an irrigation system is the result of an historical process, of an accumulation of situations which each responded to constraints and have been the object of choice, compromise and power relationships ” 12 (2000). It is important to collect information on the history of the construction of irrigation infrastructures, changes in rules of right transmission, as well as changes of community structures of water management. Furthermore, historical change of social around sharing and distribution of water rules in farming communities is a key element to grasp the future of these systems. According to Sabatier (in Apollin, Eberhart, 2000), « Water rights are the results of conflicts, struggles and agreements between the different groups which compose local society. In this sense, the current legislation is often the expression of past social relations ”. To carry out this historical study, I was first accompanied by a very skilled translator during one week. Thanks to him, I was able to get very precise information on agriculture change and the construction of the irrigation system. I operated through open interviews mainly with about fifteen mongudo (wise elders). With their impressive knowledge of history, these men are recognized to be the guardians of collective memory. With the help of an Ethiopian student, I pursued the historical study whenever old people were present and available during the following months. I used open interviews, or closed interviews if I had a clear aim of the information I wanted, or just let people speak in informal discussions about their past. Historical study is however quite difficult. History often legitimates current rules. As a consequence, this could sometimes create fears and distortions in people’s discourses. For example, as I was trying to discover the different steps of the construction of the irrigation scheme, elders from each sector tended to say that their sector was the first to have built a canal and I ended up with many different versions. Only time, critical sense and triangulation can then give a clearer picture of the “truth”.

11 Sigaut, F., 1975, La technologie de l’agriculture ; terrain de rencontre entre agronomes et ethnologues, Études rurales, n°59, pp 103-111

12 Original text in French: “ Le fonctionnement actuel d’un système d’irrigation est le résultat d’un processus historique, d’une accumulation de situations qui ont chacune répondu à des contraintes et ont été l’objet de choix, de compromis et de rapports de force.” (Aubriot, 2000).

20 2.2.3 Study of water management in the irrigation system

Once I became aware of the local history, I followed on studying the management of the irrigation system with new questions and hypothesis. First, I interviewed twelve block leaders of canals (over sixteen) using a checklist of issues: distribution of rights among the canal’s blocks, distribution among the users of the same block, description of water rights and their transmission rules, maintenance rules and labor costs, …), operations and goals of the block leader etc... After, I did semi-structured interviews with more than forty users using a similar checklist of issues. Then, I analyzed differences between effective practices and formal rules. According to Aubriot (1997), this comparison enables to decode changes of the irrigation system which are not always explicit in discourses.

Bailey 13 makes a difference between normative rules and pragmatic rules: • Normative rules are the official rules which govern theoretical behaviors by defining what is good or bad, fair or unfair. These rules are publicly used by local actors either in relationships with their environment or in internal conflicts. • Pragmatic rules do not define what is fair or not but what is recognized as efficient. With these informal rules, actors allow some individual behaviors, even if they are forbidden by the official rules. These pragmatic rules are not to be considered as exceptions or simple structural dysfunctions but on the contrary, they must be analyzed in order to understand the difficulties that the system has to cope with. (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977, quoted by Vogel, 2006) In addition, it is important to identify the actors around the water and land resources, their positions and their power relations by closely listening to water users and authorities (Jolly, 2001). I also tried participatory irrigation system mapping with their block leaders and farmers from the four main canals. I would ask them to indicate the areas of the canal which had problems (water logging, destruction by cattle etc…), the different types of soils in the command area, how did rotation and distribution take place, the areas of important maintenance as well as areas of multiple use (livestock drinking, washing cloths etc…), the areas with poor access to irrigation etc… Despite my initial doubts, I finally found this tool extremely instructive. An important task that I had planned was to follow the daily course of water and take note of different operations of water distribution. But my field stay was from June to October, precisely at the rainiest period of the year (especially from July to September) where irrigation is almost inexistent. In fact, this was the main motive of the prorogation of my stay until after the rainy season. But unfortunately, as October was exceptionally rainy this year, farmers did not start irrigation and I was unable to perform this work.

13 Bailey FG., 1971. Les règles du jeu politique , PUF ,Paris. Quoted by Lavigne Delville, 1998.

21 2.2.4 Technical and agro-economical study of farming households

First, I gathered information about farming practices and irrigation techniques for all the crops. This was based on observation, many discussions with more than 60 farmers, present on their fields, through the interviews related with water management or through semi structures interviews of variable content and length, according to the farmer’s own enthusiasm and availability. Only once I had already a good idea of local agriculture, did I start the economical approach of farming systems of households. For these household surveys, I prepared a questionnaire (see annex 9) which brought up many issues: family structure, livestock size, area of owned or rent lands (both rainfed and irrigated), employed labor activities, crop patterns and rotations and yields, prices, use of crops and the amount of food they need to buy. This questionnaire was done entirely for 21 households, and partially for 15 households. Finally, I discussed with women. These discussions were completely informal and generally without presence of men or translator. I discovered a lot of family issues regarding parentality, food consumption, and female activities. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to have the two sides of information in the same households so I was unable to combine both for data processing. 2.2.5 Foreseeing farmers’ hopes and fears in agriculture and the irrigation project

One of the last steps was to foresee hopes and fears of farmers about irrigation project and about their future agriculture projects. Unfortunately, this activity was limited because the implementation of the irrigation project was delayed. As a consequence, I did not see the beginning of waterworks and the conflicts that could possibly rise from it, nor did I even see the final project design which could have provoked stronger reactions from farmers which were still poorly informed about the project. One first part of the task was done with more than 20 individual open interviews with different types of farmers from all irrigation sectors. Finally, I made meetings with water users for each of the four canals concerned by the project. The first question to be answered during meetings was to point out the main constraints of local agriculture. The second question was to depict the strengths and weaknesses of the irrigation scheme. The third one was to indicate what elements of the irrigation system should be modified. Finally, as I exposed various design proposals, farmers had to express their main fears about the project’s impact. 2.2.6 Final presentation

At the end of the field work, one important duty was to make an oral presentation of the results and findings of my research work to give back to farmers what they had given to me. The presentation is not only a important way of thanking farmers for their help, but also an excellent way to validate findings and reformulate questions according to their comments and reactions which can give way to a debate…

22 2.3 CHALLENGING WORKING CONDITIONS

Working conditions were far from being easy. I had decided to live in the area during field work for better integration and understanding of society by participating observation. I lived in the same PA but not in the area of Burka Jalala. Living and transport conditions were extremely rudimentary. Working relations with the Ethiopian bachelor student which operated as a translator were very challenging and instructive for both of us but at the same time, extremely difficult as he did not except such hardship in rural areas. All these difficulties absorbed an important amount of time and energy during field work. Fortunately, on the other hand, people were very open and it was relatively easy to establish contact and dialogue with them.

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3 HISTORICAL ANALISIS : SETTLEMENT TO SATURATION

3.1 1800 – 1900 AD: SETTLEMENT AND FIRST STAGES OF AGRICULTURE

3.1.1.1 Advent of the Oromo in Hararghe during the XVI th century Ethnographic literature affirms that the Oromo arrived in the region of Hararghe around 1530-1540 when the Barentu, one of the Oromo clans migrated from south central to eastern Ethiopia and drove out the inhabitants of the Hararghe highlands towards the coast (Ezekiel Gebissa, 2004). The Oromos settlers, mainly pastoralists, rejected political precepts of Qur’an and preexisting authorities and established their own political institution: the Gada system of government which survived down to the late nineteenth century until it was dismantled by the Egyptians who occupied the region from 1875 to 1885. (Information about the Gada system: see annex 11) 3.1.1.2 Settlement of Oromos in Jarso during the XVIII th century

Karayu Jarso is the founding ancestor of the Jarso clan ( gosa 14 Jarso ), one of the countless clans of the large Oromo ethnic group. Jarso elders say that Karayu Jarso had twelve sons, six of which remained on the father’s territory while the six other sons were sent 15 to colonize further regions in order to expand the clan’s territory. Each son formed a sub-clan, also called “ gosa ”.

Diagram 4: the Jarso clan and its sub-clans

The six sub-clans of the Jarso clan

Karayu Jarso

Walabo Doworo Oromo DankaSayo Oga

First settlers and current main First settlers and current main clans of the Western Jarso clans of Eastern Jarso

14 Gosa means clan in Oromic language. However, the same word can designate a clan, a sub-clan and even a lineages to a certain extent.(information from local farmers)

15 The myth of settlement of Jarso Oromos recalls that, to decide which direction the sons had to go, their father ordered each of them to cross the house’s doorstep, one by one. If they stepped first with their left or right foot, they were sent to the Western part of Jarso ( wara bita ) or to the Eastern part ( Wara mirga) respectively. (information from local farmers)

24 3.1.1.3 Settlement in Melka Jebdu

Farmers of Melka Jebdu say that Walabo (son of Karayu Jarso) and his three sons Balad, Imar and Usman were the first Oromos to settle in the area, more than 200 years ago. These initial settlers were cattle breeders. Springs were used for human consumption and for their large quantity of cattle.

Map 4: Territories of the first settlers of Burka Jalala

Source: personal data based on surveys and GPS.

25

Nowadays, nearly the entire population of the Peasant Association (PA) of Melka Jebdu descends from the lineages of Usman, Baalad and Imar. However, in the study area of Burka Jalala, the main lineages are Baalad and Imar. As land inheritance is patrilineal, one territory is specific to one lineage. As a consequence, areas are often named according to the first Oromo that settled and declared his territory there. As it can be observed, the upper area of Jalala valley and its surrounding mountains are inhabited by lineages of the Imar clan. On the other hand, the Gora valley and the lower part of the Jalala valley are inhabited by lineages of the Baalad clan.

(See annex 10: historical myths of Burka Jalala) 3.1.2 From pastoralism to agro-pastoralism 3.1.2.1 Origins of agriculture One hundred and fifty years ago, nearly half of the Oromo population on the Hararghe highlands was of pastoralists. Ezekiel Gebissa (2004) indicates that the Hareri, who possessed a strong agricultural economy long before the settlement of the Oromo in the Hararghe highlands may have taught them how to farm and given them specific crops. However, R. Caulk 16 points out that Oromo practiced cattle breeding and barley cultivation in their country of origin, long before they settled in the Hararghe highlands. As Harar grew and its export trade flourished, many Oromos took up agriculture and were gradually incorporated in the city’s economy. According to Ezekiel Gebissa (2001): “ By the mid-nineteenth century, the Oromo from as far as some 30 miles northeast of the town were fully involved in market exchanges with town dwellers, supplying them with much of their basic food requirements and with products that Hareri traders exported .” In Melka Jebdu, Oromos started to combine agriculture with pastoralism more than 150 years ago, about three generations after the first settlements. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to have more details about how agriculture appeared locally from discussions with farmers of Burka Jalala. As a consequence, many questions such as: “Who brought agricultural knowledge and the first tools?”, “Did this change come from the people themselves?”, “Why did these pastoralists start to cultivate crops?”, “Was the change triggered by the growth of Harar?” remain unanswered… 3.1.2.2 Staple crops for home consumption As Melka Jabdu was quite isolated and access to the Harar market difficult, it is not assured that local farmers had enough commercial exchanges with Harar to modify their agricultural strategies based on production of staple crops for home consumption. The main crops were sorghum and maize. People would only cultivate the best soils, generally located in the bottom of valleys and along river banks. Maize was cultivated from April to October and sorghum from April to December. Farmers also cultivated barley and an ancient variety of wheat called qamadi gurrati (black wheat) from June to September.

16 R. Caulk. 1977. Harar town and its neighbours in the Nineteeth Century . Journal of African History, 3, p 373. Cited in Eezkiel Gebissa (2001)

26 3.2 FROM THE NINETEETH CENTURY TO 1975: THE FIRST STEPS OF IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT

3.2.1 Political context and land tenure at dawn of irrigation development 3.2.1.1 Land tenure before Amhara colonization Before Amhara colonization, lands were occupied and owned by the descendants of the first Oromo settlers. In Oromo culture, lands are inherited from father to son. As a consequence, one area is generally specific to one lineage. It seems that all inhabitants had the right to their own lands. As demographic pressure was still extremely low, one could also simply clear forest land and cultivate it, with the control of the elders. 3.2.1.2 Local power in the hands of clan leaders: demina Each sub-clan had its own local leader, called demina . The main task of a demina was to organize military security and defence against possible invaders (especially Somalis warriors which were quite close). But he also had non military responsibilities such as deciding about political matters and solving conflicts between his people and the others. The demina had great power. Though the Gada system was abolished at the end of the XIX th century, many features of its organization have been preserved in Oromo rural society. The principle of democracy is one of these. The demina was elected by all male members of his clan for wisdom, honesty and capacity to lead people. At his death, one of his sons or his brother’s son could follow on as demina if clan members agreed. But if no satisfactory leader was found among his close family, they could choose a person from another family.

3.2.1.3 Amhara colonization and reign of Hayle Selase 3.2.1.3.1 Allocation of lands to Amhara military officials From 1889 to 1913, Menelik, the king of Abyssinia conquered the South of what became Ethiopia and colonized all Oromo territories. On the conquered lands, the Fetha Negest (“the Justice of Kings”) was put in effect. This Ethiopian Code stipulated that the lands confiscated from conquered peoples, rebels and defaulting taxpayers became lands of the King Menelik. To prize efforts and courage in battle, he then allocated many temporary land concessions to his soldiers and administrators (Gascon, 1995b). Amhara political control over all Ethiopia continued on during the reign of Emperor Hayle Selase from 1930 to 1974. His power was somewhat based on distribution of lands of the newly conquered regions of Ethiopia to his servants, including many Amhara military officials. (Gascon, 1995b). These new landlords were called naftanioch 17 or abba qalada 18 . Local farmers were forced to work on their fields in a feudal system.

17 In Amharic language, naftanioch means “man with a gun”.

18 In oromic language, abba qalada means “father of a plot of 40 hectares given by the government”, in other words, a landlord.

27 Several Amhara military men were prized with lands in Melka Jebdu. It seems that in this specific case, orders for land allocation were given by government officials but clan leaders were the ones to decide which lands were to be allocated 19 . In the study area, the whole Gora valley was allocated to Salale 20 and the small plateau of Horo to Tayle 21 . Farmers who formerly used these lands had to choose to submit to the land owner or to move away. 3.2.1.3.2 Changes in feudal systems Several systems of share cropping have existed. From the late nineteenth century to 1938, the feudal system was called siso . A farmer under siso authority ( xisenia ) worked on his master’s lands five days a week. During the two remaining days of the week, he worked on his own plot in order to harvest the necessary food for his family’s survival. Moreover, the farmer’s family had to grind all the grain harvested on the lands he tilled. All these tasks were compulsory and without any remuneration. As these military officials were absentee landlords, they generally hired controllers (wokil ) to manage their fields, crops and farmers. These employees, generally Amhara farmers were allotted their own lands that they cultivated by themselves. After Italian occupation (1938-1941), the feudal system changed. Farmers worked on their master’s land every day but received half of the harvest. They became sharecroppers. The compulsory task of grinding grains was abolished. These changes slightly improved living conditions of farmers but land tenure security remained extremely low: share croppers could be dismissed at any time by their master. 3.2.1.3.3 Land tenure during Haylé Selase Land tenure during the reign of Haylé Selase can be summarized in the following manner: There were different types of land. • Lands owned by small Oromo farmers. • Lands owned by Amhara “landlords” and cultivated by Oromo share croppers. • Lands owned by Amhara controllers, wokil . A landlord controlled the area he owned. On the other hand, a demina had political power over an area, without owning its lands. He leaded the area’s inhabitants, whom nearly all belonged to his lineage. It is said that demina s remained the main local deciders and had more effective power than the Amhara landlords.

19 It is said that the local demina was the one to select which land were to be allocated for these military officials. This increased his power as he could confiscate one’s land for these officials.

20 According the his former servants, he was rewarded for having resisted 12 spears during the battle with the Somali!

21 Another local Amhara landlord but with less power than Adeno

28 Map 5 : Political control over the area of Burka Jalala, before 1974

Source: personal surveys with farmers and GPS

29 The map shows the territories controlled by landlords and deminas in the area of Burka Jalala. Herer, Elemo and some parts of Horo (in green) were controlled by the demina of the Imar clan. Becheysa (in blue) was controlled by the demina of the Godana lineage while Nia’a (in pink) was controlled by the demina of the Nia’a lineage. The grey areas are lands of independent Oromos farmers that weren’t under control of control of a specific demina . The Gora valley (in orange) was owned and controlled by three generations of Amhara land lords: Salale, Magashem and finally Adeno. Horo (in purple) was owned and controlled by the landlord, Tayle. Finally, the area around Ganda Abbas (in yellow) was owned by several wokils , who worked under the orders of landlords. It clearly appears that most territories were controlled by deminas and only a small portion of the area was owned and controlled by Amhara land owners. This also explains why the deminas stayed the most powerful local leaders. 3.2.2 Beginning of irrigation: individual use of spring or river water

Irrigation started about 80 to 100 years ago with small land owners for individual use, mainly on maize crops. It was used to reduce risks of crop damage due to drought, especially during the drier months of May, June, September and October. Initially, farmers only irrigated by diverting water along the river 22 . Woday Khabe, an independent farmer was the first to build a small canal to irrigate his maize fields directly with the water of the spring of Burka Kolobo. Following his example, Mumed Umar Jilo, another independent farmer built a canal to irrigate his small khat farm. These constructions were approximately built in the 1940s.

Map 6 : Irrigation before the 1950s Source: personal surveys

22 Elders say that this was still possible two generations ago. Since then, the river has dug a valley by erosion and this irrigation technique is no longer feasible in most areas.

30 3.2.3 Construction of the first collective canals 3.2.3.1 The Adeno canal for the landlord’s khat farm The initial logic of individual construction of canals is transformed with the introduction of new production systems of khat cultivation.

Map 7 : Irrigation in Burka Jalala during the 1960s

Adeno Magashew, the amhara landlord who owned the lands of Goora valley started to trade khat with the Isaa clan (Somali) with whom he had close relations 23 . Observing the advantages of irrigation and possessing great interest in developing this cash crop, Adeno decided to lengthen Woday Khabe’s canal to irrigate his big khat farm (zone A). He called upon all his share croppers to construct the canal following his design although these farmers were forbidden to use irrigation and cultivate khat. However, Khabe Woday and his descendants (the initial user’s of a canal) who owned their own lands (zone B) could freely use the canal to supply their fields as they did before.

Source: surveys with farmers and GPS

23 He even become son of adoption of this clan. Besides possible affective links, it was clearly motivated by commercial relations.

31

3.2.3.2 Collective action to build other canals

Map 8 : Irrigation in Burka Jalala during the early 1970s

On the Godana side of the valley (Becheysa), Ambo Eebo, a wise man (hayu ) organized his people to build a canal. It seems that the structure was approximately built at the same time as the Adeno canal. It was lengthened a few years later until Ganda Santala by farmers and Demina Ali Mumed. A decade later, other farmers pursued efforts to build new canals. On the Nia’a side, Demina Ali Amadu strongly motivated his people to build the Ali Nia’a canal until his lands located in Dagabala (the lowest part of the valley). Descendants of Woday Khabe also built collectively the small Usmael canal. Finally, members of the Imar clan built together the Kolobo canal under the orders of their demina Yussuf Woday Shonkor.

Source: surveys with farmers and GPS

32

3.2.3.3 Construction of a water sharing system By the late 60’s, all the canals present today were built. Local leaders and elders gathered to define water rights for each canal using water from the spring of Burka Jalala. The Amhara landlord Adeno met with three Oromo clan leaders: Demina Ali Amadu for the Nia’a canal, Demina Mumed Ali for the Becheysa canal, and Demina Yussuf Woday Shonkor for Kolobo canal. The water sharing system was based on dividing the week’s time into 14 ishadas , one ishada equalling 12 hours (corresponding to 12 hours of night and 12 hours of day). Each of the four canals (Adeno, Nia’a Becheysa and Kolobo) was allocated three ishada per week. One extra weekly ishada was allocated to Lolo Gelmo, an Oromo small holder who owned the land where the spring emerged and who had claimed a special water right. As a privilege, one ishada was given to share (by shifting every other week) between the powerful Demina Ali Amadou and landlord Adeno. The system thus passed to a collective logic which was facilitated by the territorial divisions among clans. The collective building of canals and of organization revealed the power of local leaders. Its technical efficiency was very soon based on dialogue about the sharing of water. The established rules clearly reflect the local social standards. Indeed, they combine both territorial principles and the structure of power relations.

3.3 SINCE THE 1975 LAND REFORM : EXPANSION OF IRRIGATED LANDS

3.3.1 Proclamation of the land reform

In 1974, Hayle Selase was removed and the Derg regime established. In March 1975, the “Proclamation to provide for the Nationalization of Rural Land” (see annex 12) becomes effective. It abolished tenancy and revoked titles and privileges of landlords. The land reform “Meret le arrashu” - land to the tiller 24 - also provided the redistribution of confiscated lands among farmers. All former tenants were allocated the lands they had tilled prior to land reform without compensation to the landowner (Pausewang, 1983). In the study area of Melka Jebdu, the land reform was also rapidly effective. In the first step, it only had an impact of tenancy lands (in the Gora valley and the Horo plateau). Tenants kept the plots they had tilled for their landlord. Other modifications were brought by the land reform. The limits of administrative units were redefined and the Peasant Association became the main administrative unit at the local level and gathered several villages. In the Burka Jalala area, two peasant associations were formed: one for the area of the Imar clan, the other for the Baalad clan 25 . Moreover, a new law prohibited land and house ownership in two separate Peasant Associations. Owners had to choose one PA. Possessions from other PAs were transferred to the government until redistribution.

24 In Amharic language

25 This clan division of territory and resources created many conflicts, so the two PAs were later united into one and the new PA got its name “Burka Jalala” (the spring of love) after succeeding to re-established peace.

33 Finally, demina gradually lost their power, being replaced in their functions by the PA chairman and his cabinet. 3.3.2 Land redistribution with the “Nam Torba” comitee

Although the land reform abolished tenancy, there were still important inequalities between farmers. In the years following the land reform proclamation, the government pursued its efforts of land distribution: “ As far as conditions allow, land shall be equally distributed taking into consideration differences of soil fertility. "26 In each Peasant Association, a committee of seven persons (generally composed of PA leaders and elders) was trained and enforced to divide large lands and redistribute them equally. They also tried to allocate irrigated land for all farmers. As a consequence, farmers with more lands - wokils (Amhara controllers) but also some Oromos - were forced to share their lands with smaller farmers and landless people. In Melka Jebdu, several farmers from exclusively rain fed areas (especially from Kolobo) received irrigated lands in Becheysa or in Nia’a. This land redistribution had an impact on current water rights. In most cases, nowadays, when owners of reattributed plots do not belong to the sector’s village, they do not possess water rights. This redistribution of powers and land rights brought on a redistribution of water rights which itself led to the exclusion of some users (see 4.4.1.6). 3.3.3 Development of khat crops and irrigation

In sharecropping arrangements, farmers could not choose their crops and were required to cultivate grain only. Khat cultivation was strictly prohibited by the local leaders who protected their monopoly with the Somali market. Once farmers possessed their own land after land reform, they were empowered to make decisions regarding crop patterns on their plots. Land tenure became secure and farmers were more inclined to invest on their lands by planting perennial trees and building irrigation infrastructures. Khat had many assets for farmers: it was low demanding in labor costs, resistant to drought and pests, cultivable in all types of soil. It also generated monetary incomes when it was sold to Somali merchants. Finally, the plant was highly appreciated for its stimulating effects. As a consequence, ten years after land reform, nearly all farmers possessed at least one small plot with khat trees on their farm. Khat cultivation triggered development of irrigation. Before khat, irrigation was only used a few times a year to compensate rain deficits on maize. With khat, irrigation became a common practice for farmers. Though resistant to drought, it needs to be irrigated during the dry months (October to March) preceding its commercial harvest (January to March) to obtain good yields. 3.3.4 Ban of irrigation on khat and development of mixed cropping practices

Although this fact has never appeared in interviews on the field of Burka Jalala, several authors (Ezekiel Gebissa, 2001, Gascon A, 2006) point out that khat fields were ineligible for irrigation water. In other words, irrigating khat was contingent upon the production of food crops. In order to maintain eligibility for irrigation water, farmers had to cultivate khat in association with food crops. It was also a good way of compensating absence of khat

26 Pausewang S, 1983

34 production during the first five years following plantation. Until the late 1980s, the most common crops to be associated with khat were sweet potato, maize, sorghum and beans. 3.3.5 Farmers start to cultivate more water demanding crops

Until the late 1980s, irrigation water was practically used exclusively for khat crops during rainless months. Monthly irrigation is sufficient to obtain good yields and excessive water may even be harmful to khat. Irrigation was also used on grain crops to complete water needs in case of drought. It was used on maize crops during its final stage of maturity before harvest (in September and October, the months following rainy season). However, in the late 80s and the 90’s, with improvement of transport infrastructures, opening towards the Somali market and development of dynamic market points such as Kombolcha and Xinacsan, farmers began to grow potatoes. It was first introduced by merchants who encouraged farmers to grow potatoes to satisfy the demand of Somalis and of a starch factory built in the region. But soon after, noticing potato’s commercial assets, farmers brought seeds from Kombolcha by themselves and started its cultivation without previous knowledge on this particular crop. Until then, there had only been sweet potatoes and a large tubercle (called kushe ) which could be stored in the ground without being harvested, under wheat or barley crops. They were exclusively used for home consumption. Potato is well adapted to the local mountainous environment and gives good yields with low pest and disease incidence. As market prices are high, it is an excellent cash crop, better even than khat (see 5.1.3.3). At the same time, the product is edible and can be stored during several months, giving farmers more food security than khat when market accidents (such as drops of prices...) occur. Thus, potato cultivation considerably increased through the last 20 years in Melka Jebdu. However, potato has much greater water needs than maize and khat. To obtain satisfactory yields, crops must be irrigated every 8 to 15 days during the dry season. Crop change towards potato has intensified use of irrigation. As a result, it brought important modifications in the water sharing system. (see: 4.4).

35 3.4 SINCE THE LATE 1980 S: HEADING TOWARDS SEVERE LAND AND WATER SCARCITY

3.4.1 Changes in population density

Ezekiel Gebissa (2001) notes that Hararghe’s rural population greatly increased ninety to a hundred years before the 1940s, corresponding to the change of the Hararghe Oromo from livestock herding to sedentary agriculture. An Italian study published in 1942 puts population density of the Hararghe highlands from 60 to 100 people per square kilometer 27 . Later, in 1956, Hararghe’s average rural population density was estimated of 150 per square mile 28 , which corresponds to 58 per square kilometer. Unfortunately, a further study of demographic change is impossible to carry out as historical data has been difficult to find. Archives, especially from the Derg period in Jarso and East Hararghe administrations are out of access, lost or destroyed.

In 2000, a report 29 published by the Bureau of planning and economic development of the Council of the Regional State of Oromia estimates the rural population density of East Hararghe at 83 inhabitants per square kilometer and Jarso’s rural population density of 192. According to calculations based on data collected by development agents of Melka Jebdu, population density of this PA is estimated of 322.

Table 5 : Some data about rural population density in Hararghe

PLACE AREA (KM 2) POPULATION POPULATION DENSITY

Melka Jebd (P.A.) 15.65 5,038 322 Jarso (District) 487.7 93,509 192 East Hararghe (Zone) 22,623 1,900,000 84

Source: data given by Melka Jebdu’s development agents and the report: Physical and socioeconomic profiles of 180 districts of Oromiya Region. March 2000. Finfinne. Bureau of planning and economic development. Council of the Regional State of Oromiya.

3.4.2 Impact of population increase in Melka Jebdu

However, in the study area of Melka Jebdu, according to information given by elders, population was very low until the 1970s. Independent farmers had large lands to cultivate sorghum and maize on the fertile lands of valley bottoms. Households were food secure and production was abundant enough to store grain in underground pits in case of climatic

27 Scarin, Hararino, p 95, cited by Ezekiel Gebissa, 2001, p 63

28 Mesfin Wolde-Mariam, “An estimate of the population of Ethiopia”, Ethiopia Observer (1961) , p. 138 cited by Ezekiel Gebissa, 2001, p 63

29 Physical and socioeconomic profiles of 180 districts of Oromiya Region. March 2000. Finfinne

36 accidents for the following years. They also possessed large livestock, and grazing areas were abundant. But the first signs of land scarcity gradually appeared in the 1970s. As bottoms of valleys started to be fully occupied by fields, farmers cleared forestlands and built new terraces on valley slopes to expand cultivated lands though soils were rocky, thus more difficult for agriculture. Quality of cultivated soils dropped as periods of fallowing and the ratio “quantity of animal dung incorporated/cultivated area” decreased. Grazing areas were removed from lower areas of valleys and replaced by crops. Cattle were sent to graze in upper areas where forest was cleared as well. Possession of livestock started to be limited by forage availability. Now, for example, when they already own more than three cattle (ox or cow), farmers are obliged to sell their calves. See annex 13: geneology of users of Gora, to observe the rapid population increase

3.4.3 Expansion of irrigated lands

See Diagram 5 : Steps of irrigation expansion since the 1975 land reform, p 39. As seen before, area of irrigated lands considerably increased after the 1975 reform: farmers understood benefits of irrigation with khat cultivation. For 1975 to the late 1980s, development of khat is the motor of irrigation expansion. During this period, more and more farmers wishing to cultivate khat for cash, became irrigation users by asking right to their mimalak . As water was still not scarce, rights were easily attributed. The canals of Gora, Kolobo and Becheysa were lengthened through collective work to reach new lands and new users. The works were organized by the concerned group of neighbors, once they obtained authorization of the mimalak and the group of water users. Often, as all the people of the same canal were all relatives, water users could not refuse rights to the new comers. In the 1990s, the Gora canal and the Becheysa canal were lengthened once again by groups of new users located in its tail ends. However, since the 1990s, the motor of irrigation development switched to potato crops which bring even more cash than khat to farmers. Since then, considering topographic constraints and land occupation 30 , it now impossible to lengthen canals any further.

3.4.4 An inheritance system which breaks up land

As stated before, the Oromo system of inheritance is patrilineal and property passes from father to son. This son can be a biological son and seldom, an adoptive son ( hilmo barchuma ). If there are no male heirs, daughters may inherit land. In most cases, lands are divided and transmitted to each of the sons, at their marriage. But when the father is still alive, he will keep one part of land for himself (called holola ) which is generally the most fertile plot in his possession. He will work on it until he is too aged and then, transmit the holola to the son who has best taken care of him.

30 Further downstream, lands are occupied by crops which are irrigated by Burka Woldaya, a spring located in the neighbouring valley, West of Burka Jalala.

37 If the father dies before any son has been married, lands are equally divided among all sons. In some cases - and this seems to be a recent phenomenon - fathers will not transmit lands until all his sons are married. He will then distribute them among the sons. This seems to be explained by the fact that many young men migrate for an undetermined period on time. It is a way for the father to prevent conflicts if his sons who have migrated fail and have no other solution than to come back in their village to become farmers. In the region of Hararghe, bloody conflicts occur in many villages between brothers, when one who has migrated comes back and asks for his portion of land. (See annex 15: changes in local agriculture (cropping calendars and terrace building) In all cases, this inheritance system tends to break up lands, especially since fertility rate is high, emigration quite low and access to forest lands (that could be cleared for agriculture) unavailable. All these transformations have brought the local system to face serious land and water shortage. With these scarcity conditions, food security appears to be an increasingly difficult goal to reach for more and more households. However, local farmers continuously find collective solutions to adapt to these new problems, to survive and live in a relatively peaceful community…

38 Diagram 5 : Steps of irrigation expansion since the 1975 land reform

39 4 HOW FARMERS COLECTIVELY FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE LOCAL PROBLEMS…

This chapter will put into light how organization of water distribution and the system of water rights have evolved taking into account changes in cropping patterns and demography. We will put into light how pressure on land and water resources can trigger many types of innovation in the community.

4.1 WATER ALLOCATION AMONG CANALS OF THE IRRIGATION SYSTEM …

Though an official schedule exists to share water of the different existing springs among canals and groups of users, there is no specific central water authority that can decide for the whole irrigation system. 4.1.1 Allocation of water from the main spring Burka Jalala 4.1.1.1 Water for four canals and privileged entities As it was decided by local leaders and elders in the late 1960s, the water sharing system of Burka Jalala is based on dividing the week’s time into 14 ishada 31 . Since then, many aspects of the organization have not been modified, even with local variations of population growth and land tenure modifications etc…. Each of the four canals had the right to 36 weekly hours or 3 ishada . The Kolobo canal and the Becheysa canal have not modified their water right 32 since the creation of the system. On Sunday day, one extra weekly ishada was allocated to Lolo Gelmo, an Oromo small holder who owned the land where the spring emerged and who had claimed a special water right. As a privilege, one ishada was given to share on Monday night (by shifting every other week) between the powerful Demina Ali Amadou and landlord Adeno. (see Diagram 6 : Allocation of water of the spring of Burka Jalala among canals, before 1975, p. 42)

4.1.1.2 Minor changes since the 1975 land reform However, Gora and Nia’a, the two longest canals, modified their allocation of water during the Derg period. Water flow in canals had reduced 33 and couldn’t reach the furthest areas. Users came together with the elders ( mongudo ) and the Peasant Association leaders. They decided that the two canals would shift for water every other week. As a consequence, one week, the Nia’a canal uses six ishada and the other week, the Gora canal does the same. (see Diagram 7 : Allocation of water of the spring of Burka Jalala among canals, in 2006 p. 42)

31 one ishada is equal to 12 hours

32 Except the transfer of Kolobo’s Monday day ishada to the school in exchange of Monday night

33 It may be explained by erosion and deforestation but it may actually be the number of users that increased.

40 4.1.1.2.1 Conservation of privileges for spring owners and descendants of Lolo Gelmo At the time of construction of the canals and the ishada system, Lolo Gelmo was a small oromo land owner. He owned a qalada of around 1.5 shivata 34 . As the spring of Jalala came out on his lands, he claimed a special right for water. He obtained 1 ishada per week on Sunday day, just for his personal use. (see yellow section of Diagram 6). Lolo Gelmo had two wives. After his death, all his sons shared this special water right among themselves. But in the 60’s, after conflicts between the two sides of Lolo Gelmo’s descendants, the elders ( mongudo ) decided to allocate one ishada for each side of the family every other week. Now, in 2006, the living descendants of Lolo Gelmo are eight. One week, the ishada is shared among six of them, who descend all from the same mother. The other week, the 12 hours of water are shared among the two grand sons 35 descending from the other wife of Lolo Gelmo (see yellow sections of Diagram 7) 4.1.1.2.2 Privileges of local leaders are abolished and transferred to the public school Before the 1975 land reform, one extra ishada on Monday day was allocated to the two strongest local leaders as a privilege. One week, landlord Adeno used this water on his lands in Gora valley, the other week, Demina Ali Amadu used it for his lands in Dagabala. After the land reform, traditional Oromo leaders like demina and garada lost power and Amhara landlords were removed. But the special water right remained: water of this extra ishada (during the day of Monday) was allocated to the same geographic sectors. One week, the extra ishada was allocated to users of Dagabala (the furthest sector of Nia’a canal command area). The other week, it was allocated to Gora. During the Derg government, the school of Kolobo was built on lands that were confiscated from big land owners in Horo. To generate income, the school had its own farm (3/8 Ha) with free labour ( hirmana ) provided by the population. In 2003, it was decided that the extra ishada of Monday day would be allocated to the school’s farm to generate more income. To facilitate irrigation on the farm and avoid water theft, the water right was transferred from Monday night to Monday day. Now, the school farm is just of 3/8 Ha and does not need its whole weekly ishada . Normally, out of the twelve hours, the school just uses 2 hours. It delegates for free the remaining hours to users of Dagabala one week and of Gora the other week. But it may also sell water to users from other areas.

Selling of water is still a taboo and restricted practice 36 . However, it exists and has generated conflicts, especially with people of Dagabala who face the greatest problems of

34 Term introduced by Egyptians during their occupation to designate plots of land of varying sizes. It is equivalent to 4.3 hectares.(Ezekile Gebissa)

35 Mohamed Ali Lolo, Mume Adem Lolo

36 Indeed, in Islam, water is always a gift from God and should be free.

41 water shortage. They have tried to claim their water rights upon PA leaders. But this issue has even been presented to the Jarso district administration, without any results… 4.1.2 Allocation of water from minor springs

Between the spring of Burka Jalala, and the downstream intakes of Nia’a and Becheysa canals, seven other smaller springs emerge along the river. The water resource doesn’t have an official sharing system which has been established for decades like Burka Jalala. However, since the last years, with increasing water scarcity, these springs do have a defined sharing system. Also, it is not totally independent from Burka Jalala’s sharing system: users must follow time rules, especially during water allocation to the downstream canals. First, the downstream canals of Nia’a and Becheysa (which also belong the Burka Jalala’s sharing system) use during their whole water right, the water from the springs of Burka Jalala and of the seven other minor ones. When the water of Burka Jalala is allocated to the upstream Gora canal, the minor springs are used by the Usmael canal which is located in the Gora valley. During Kolobo canal’s water right, the water of Burka Jalala is used to irrigate allocated Kolobo’s command area. Meanwhile, the water of the minor springs is used by people from Kolobo who cultivate irrigated lands in Nia’a’s or Becheysa’s command area. (see Diagram 8) 4.1.3 Water allocation calendars of the different springs

Diagram 6 : Allocation of water of the spring of Burka Jalala among canals, before 1975

Saturday Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Burka Jalala Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day

Week 1 Kolobo Lolo D/bala Gora Nia’a Becheysa

Week 2 Kolobo Lolo Adeno Gora Nia’a Becheysa

Source: personal survey data

Diagram 7 : Allocation of water of the spring of Burka Jalala among canals, in 2006

Saturday Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Burka Jalala Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day

Week 1 Kolobo Lolo 1 Gora School Gora Becheysa

Week 2 Kolobo Lolo 2 Nia’a School Nia’a Becheysa

Source: personal survey data

Diagram 8 : Allocation of water from the minor springs in 2006

Minor Saturday Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday springs Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day Night Day

Week 1 Excluded Kolobo people Usmael Nia’a Usmael Becheysa

Week 2 Excluded Kolobo people Nia’a Becheysa

Source: personal survey data

42 4.2 AT THE CANAL ’S SCALE : DIVERSITY OF WATER AUTHORITIES

The absence of a central authority for the whole system may explain the diversity of structures of water authorities and of their set of rules among canals. Though social and administrative organizations may interfere if serious disagreements arise, there is no central water authority enforced to establish, for example, a uniform set of rules for water authorities of all the canals and reject local rules considered unfair… Also, the fact that each canal and sector has its water authority without a “controlling” central authority may give more flexibility to users to change rules according to their specific conditions. Although canals and groups of users of the irrigation scheme must all obey to the same water distribution schedule, each canal has an independent structure of authority. However, there is some coordination between sectors and canals which is facilitated by the presence of mimalaks … 4.2.1 The mimalak : the main water authority

The main authority of water distribution is the mimalak . Command areas of all canals are divided into sectors which are each managed by a mimalak. He decides of the daily schedule of water allocation among the users. His observation of irrigated crops and their level of water shortage is a key task when he decides of the irrigation schedule. Though users have official water rights, the mimalak may decide to skip a user’s turn for someone else whose crops may be more affected by water shortage. During his sector’s water turn, day and night, he is constantly called upon by users to solve disagreements and adjust water rights according to specific needs. In exchange of his services, users offer him handfuls of khat so that he may not feel tired. The mimalak is a decision maker and not an operator. He will just allow a specified duration of irrigation to each user but he does not physically operate water distribution. This task is left to the users. He is also the one which will decide when maintenance must be done. Several times during irrigation season (generally from October to May), he calls upon users to dig the canals, remove fallen rocks, silt and plants, and built the intakes and the bridges. The mimalak can be called a “water user peace keeper” as he is always the first one to be called upon by users to solve water conflicts. When users of an irrigation sector are not satisfied with their mimalak , they can decide to replace him at any time. When this occurs, another mimalak is elected soon after by its users during meetings by hand rising. The mimalak is also the one who controls fields when farmers complain of water theft and maintenance works to see if some users are absent. If he observes rule-breaking practices, he has the power to call upon traditional court ( hera ) and sanction the free-riders with fines. (see 4.3.1) Within the same canal or between canals, there may be exchange ( faraka ) of water rights. This is done between canals whose command areas have different cropping calendars and therefore different water needs. These exchanges are done after agreement of mimalak in charge of the concerned sectors. In case of serious drought; an area which has less water shortage problems may transfer water to a more affected area. (see 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) But there are many differences between the canals: depending of the mimalaks’ experience, the canal’s and area’s history, physical features etc…The water sharing system’s organization will now be described specifically for each canal.

43 4.2.2 Diversity of water management authorities of Burka Jalala

Each of the four canals of the Burka Jalala sharing system has different water management authorities, with different structures and different rules. 4.2.2.1 Gora: one highly respected central water authority Despite the important length of the Goora canal and its high number of users, there is only one main mimalak to manage irrigation water distribution . This man, Mohamedi Adem has been mimalak for the past 30 years. He participated in the construction of the canal at the time of the last amhara landlord, Adeno Magashew. He is recognized by all users to be an excellent mimalak , with great experience and commitment. As he was becoming older, it became difficult for him to manage the whole canal by himself. In 2005, users of the canal elected a young farmer to take care of the sector of the command area (Ganda Gola). However, the main mimalak remains the central authority. The second one is learning with him to take his succession, one day… Diagram 9 : Structure of Water Authority of the Gora canal Source: author

4.2.2.2 Nia’a: a recent organization of water authority

Before 2002, water distribution was managed by a single mimalak . As all users complained of his poor management and unfair distribution of water, users came together to reform the canal’s water authority 37 . For the new system, three mimalak (one per each of the three sectors) were chosen to each manage 24 hours allocated to official 24 users. The three mimalak have the same level of power. When a decision must be taken at the canal’s level, they must meet and decide together.

Diagram 10 : Structure of Water Authority of the Nia’a canal Source: author

37 Poor distribution of water was tolerable before because irrigation water was not so scarce until then. Pressure on the water ressource triggered the conflict and the reform of the water authoriry and its sharing system..

44 4.2.2.3 Example of Becheysa: a changing water authority The case of Becheysa is quite interesting. During months of research in Burka Jalala, whenever I asked questions about water authority in Becheysa, I never received the same information, even for a question which seemed very simple to me at first: “How many mimalak are there for this canal?” During meetings, farmers could discuss about this question during half an hour until they came to their final conclusion. Actually, far from losing patience, these long debates made me realize that for farmers, the system of authority is far from being very clear and “official” in all aspects. I will demonstrate this with the following example based on speech analysis. 4.2.2.3.1 Study of speech: “How many mimalak are there?” • “There is one mimalak ”. This is the first answer I got from Mohamed Amin, one of the mimalak which is also the village leader (abbaganda ). It was also the initial answer I would get from farmers in his presence. • “There are two mimalak ”. This is what the same man (Mohamed Amin) told me when I drew the map of the canal and asked him how water was distributed: “Actually, there are two mimalak. I take care of the sector of Ganda Ambo and Ganda Sharo. Muktar Musa, the other mimalak takes care of Ganda Santala .” Muktar Musa gave me the same information when I interviewed him later on, about water distribution. • “There are three mimalak”. This answer was first given to me by farmers who live in Ganda Boru, the lowest sector of the irrigated area of Becheysa. “Mohamed Amin takes care of Ganda Ambo and Ganda Sharo. Muktar Musa takes care of Ganda Santala and Aliyi Mohamed of Ganda Boru”. I also got the same answer from many farmers during a meeting in the house of the village leader. • “There are four mimalak”. This answer was given to me by some farmers of Ganda Santala. “There are four mimalak , and they have the same level of power.” After discussing, even Mohamed Amin (who is both village leader and main mimalak ) told me “ There are four mimalak. But there are two main mimalak. They can delegate someone to help manage distribution of water. These secondary mimalak can decide of water allocation among farmers without consulting the main one if they agree. If not, the main mimalak must be consulted.” 4.2.2.3.2 Conclusions First, the variation of the number of mimalak is surely linked to the existence of two recognized authorities which are established since a certain amount of time and of two “apprentices” or “helpers” whose authority and skills are still not recognized by all (as in Gora for example). Second, though the irrigation system works according to specific rules, farmers are sometimes incapable of explaining them. The same words may have different meanings for

45 different farmers. For example, the word “ mimalak ” has different definitions in farmers’ mind. Farmers may or may not call a person a mimalak considering his assigned tasks, his level of power and personal relations. The word “ power ” is also to be handled carefully. When farmers may say that two persons have the same level of power, they are actually considering their own experience and relations or thinking about one specific aspect of power. Also, authority is always moving and rules ever changing. Change may occur after crisis and a provoked official reform. But most of the time, it occurs gradually. Rules are changed by sudden jolts, according to the variations of water demand. Little by little, new rules are established, until they finally become official when accepted and known by all. But before this actually happens, a rule’s definition may seem very blurry. Some new “rules” are clear only to the leaders which have defined them. Actually, they are future rules. For example, when Mohamed Amin (the main mimalak and village leader) states during a meeting that: “ The secondary mimalak can decide of water allocation among farmers without consulting the main one if farmers agree. If not, the main mimalak must be consulted ”, he is actually starting to build a new rule which had never been official before - and thus affirming his authority if this new rule is admitted … Diagram 11 : Structure of Water Authority of the Becheysa canal (according to the “main” mimalak) Source: author

4.2.2.4 Kolobo canal: an organization based on family links

This is the shortest of the four canals using water from Burka Jalala. It also has the smallest command area and number of users. For water distribution, the command area is divided into three areas, corresponding to three hamlets. As the number of users is small, each sector is managed by an elder from the group of users whose turn it is to irrigate. One man, Adem Ahmed Gelmo is in charge of watching the spring against water theft. When conflicts are not solved by the elders, he has the power to bring people to administrative court. Although he calls himself “mimalak ”, other users do not attribute a specific name to his function. His authority is not so recognized and this fact has to be considered with respect to the size of the managed area.

Diagram 12 : Structure of water authority in the Kolobo canal Source: author

46 4.2.3 Water authorities of the minor springs 4.2.3.1 Usmael canal: one main user, one leader This canal does not belong to the official Jalala irrigation sharing system because it does not use water from Burka Jalala but from the minor springs. The command area is small. Thirteen farmers are using this special canal to irrigate their lands, six of which also receive water from the Goora canal for other lands. The seven others users do not belong to the Goora canal sharing system. Practically all these lands are cultivated with potato in the dry season and wheat in the rainy season. A mimalak , Usmael Ahmed, is in charge of water allocation among users. However, there is no quantified water right for users. As the quantity of water is high compared to the canal’s command area, there is no competition. During his turn, each farmer uses the amount of water he needs. The mimalak decides of the order of water use, so that each farmer may know after whom he can start irrigating. For this canal, the mimalak is also the main user. He pumps water from this canal to his own artificial pond. He shares this water to irrigate khat on former rain fed lands, with four other persons and rents his motor pump to them. (See 5.3.1.1 and 0). It is clear that with expansion of the use of motor pumps, the rules of water distribution have also changed… 4.2.3.2 The “excluded” Kolobo group This group of 15 users exclusively uses water from the minor spring during Kolobo canal’s and the spring owners’ turn to use the Burka Jalala spring. This “excluded” Kolobo group did not officially exist until the resolution of a severe conflict which established a new rule for water transfers from Kolobo to Becheysa and for the sharing of water of the minor springs between the different user groups of Kolobo. (see Box 5 : Example of conflict resolution by the PA cabinet about water transfers by Kolobo farmers.). Since then, an official mimalak has been chosen from this group. He is in charge of managing water distribution among users of his group and to authorize water transfers through negotiation to the other Kolobo user groups when they wish to transfer water to Becheysa. The success of this group in obtaining water rights, despite their minority position can partially be explained by their level of organization. Indeed, the leader of this group is a recognized elder ( mongudo ) belonging to the Imar clan. His people also call him demina (clan leader). He actively participates in solving clan conflicts at the whole scale of Hararghe. Also, the village leader ( abbaganda ) belongs to this group. 4.2.3.3 The small Birbirsa spring The small Birbirsa spring is a very small spring which appears near the river and the spring of Burka Jalala. It was discovered in 2002 when one farmer (Karu Ibroo) noticed abnormal water flow in the river’s bed. This man lived in Horo but leased rain fed lands in Kolobo to cultivate khat. His strategy was to ask a small amount of irrigation time from a relative possessing an official water right in Kolobo. However, even though his relative agreed to give him water, he was prevented by the other users from having access to the canal’s water as they feared the “gift” may soon be claimed as a right. This strongly stimulated Karu Ibroo to find another source of water.

47 He asked guza 38 to dig in the river’s bed. Several farmers responded to help him to dig up the spring. Since then, six of them use this water to irrigate rain-fed lands (mainly khat) during dry season. Water is pumped directly from the spring to irrigate fields or is stored in an artificial pond for future irrigation. The group of users has control over the spring. Apparently, others farmers who claim to have helped in the digging of the pond and the spring, plan to be included in the sharing system. They have already modified their cropping systems on rain fed lands and planted khat. This group of users does not have a mimalak , though we can say that ones owning a motor pump are the leaders.

4.3 ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN SOLVING WATER CONFLICTS

4.3.1 Hera : traditional court for minor offences

The traditional procedure of justice decision ( hera ) can take place for each specific sector, at the most local scale. Generally, it is the first step to solve conflicts caused by minor offences. In case of water theft, non assistance to community maintenance duties and other minor faults, the accused person will be judged by this court. When trial takes place, farmers living in the hamlet will meet to hear the accused person and the complainants. They will negotiate together of an adequate sanction, according to financial possibilities. The sanction is generally a small amount of money which is spent to buy cigarettes or khat that will be equally shared among the present farmers. Box 3 : Example of conflict resolution with Hera

Quarrel between farmers Ahmed quarreled with his brother, Dino. Taking revenge, he destroyed some of Dino’s potato crops at night. The next day, farmers were informed by Dino about the incident and Ahmed was immediately suspected. The hamlet leader decided that Hera would take place this morning. Ahmed, Dino and farmers from the hamlet were called to meet. About twenty farmers went to fetch khat in their fields and came back to sit down together. They started chewing khat. Ahmed and Dino both testified. Then, a long period of discussions took place during more than one hour. Though elders and the hamlet leader actively participated in the debate, many other farmers intervened to express their personal idea about the conflict and propose punishment. Finally, an elder decided that the punishment would be of 100 birr. Farmers agreed. Ahmed declared that he didn’t have this sum of money and could only pay 10 birr. Farmers agreed. He threw a bill and walked off. A youngster was ordered to buy cigarettes in the nearest shop with all the money. He came back with several packs of cigarettes and handed them to an elder which equally distributed the cigarettes among farmers. Hera was over; farmers stood up and headed to work.

Source: based on observation of the Hera meeting

38 guza: it is a collective form of free work. One man in need may call for guza. Neighbours, friends and family members can come to help. Guza is generally used for important works such as building terrasses and houses.

48 4.3.2 Administrative court: Mana murtu

If no agreement is found between accused and complainants during Hera , the case is taken by the administrative court: mana murtu 39 . This administrative court (mana murtu ) is enforced by the Ethiopian government. As in all Peasant Associations, this court is represented by three judges ( sera Murtu ) who are elected by the House of Representatives 40 ( mana mari ). Sanctions are generally more severe and negotiation of punishment is more difficult than with traditional court. The money from paid fines is then included in the Peasant Association’s budget to finance public works. Every Monday and Thursday morning, the small shack where mana murtu takes place is opened. The judges are present and people wait in line for their cases. The most common cases are water theft and khat theft.

Box 4 : Example of conflict resolution by administrative court Example : Water theft

During his irrigation turn at night, Mohamed noticed that water flow is very low. He followed the canal upstream to check if there is a breach but didn’t find any. The next day, however, he noticed that Muktar’s land was abnormally humid. “ He stole my water last night and now, my potatoes will be destroyed!” He explained his case to the mimalak who called for Hera . Farmers met with Muktar and Mohamed. But no agreement was found: Muktar declared that he was innocent. The case was then taken to Mana Murtu . The following Monday morning, Muktar and Mohamed met there with their witnesses and the judges. They each testified. Finally, judgment was pronounced: Muktar was declared guilty. He was ordered to pay a fine of 70 birr, plus compensate 200 birr to Mohamed for crop losses linked to the water theft. Muktar paid the fine within the following month. He never indemnified Mohamed but no judiciary measure was taken since.

Source: interview with Mohamed

4.3.3 Mongudo: elders to solve serious conflicts

The Mongudo is an important Oromo traditional institution. They are elders which are chosen by the people for their wisdom and patience. Each important lineage has one or several mongudo. They are called upon for many different issues to make peace. Their decisions are highly respected though mongudos have lost power since administrative court was created. Mongudos are always the ones to manage important family issues. They are called upon to take care of marriage arrangements and to solve marital conflicts by promoting dialogue or

39 Literally means “house of decision” in Afaan Oromo

40 Each PA has its house of representative which is an assembly of 100 people elected every five years by male inhabitants of the PA.

49 proposing temporary separations. In case of important crimes, such as violent fights and murders, the mongudos negotiate solutions or punishment with the opposing parties. Mongudos also interfere in agricultural issues such as land conflicts, when border stones of plots are said to have been moved. In this case, these elders always have the final word because they are recognized to possess the memory of plot borders. 4.3.4 Peasant Association cabinet: to legitimate reforms

All Peasant Associations have an administrative cabinet composed of 7 to 9 persons. It is the most local government institution. The cabinet is in charge of managing all public affairs at the local level. It is the final intermediary between government and villagers. The government food/cash for work programs, organizing public works, the school, the administrative court betc… The chairman (abba arrada ) and the vice chairman are officially elected by the people of the PA during official meetings by hand rising. However, they are sometimes appointed by the district administration of Jarso. They serve for an undefined period of time. The other members of the cabinet are always appointed by the district administration of Jarso: one person in charge of development and employment (the local Development Agent), one person in charge of education (generally, the school director), one person in charge of cooperation among the people and one person in charge of health (but in Melka Jebdu, there is not any). When serious conflicts arise about water allocation and mimalaks are unable to solve them, PA leaders may be called upon to decide of new rules. This always takes place with participation of water users but PA leaders are recognized to have insight and to legitimate new reforms. This example shows that the cabinet intervenes to solve conflicts which oppose different groups of users and is not used to arbitrate minor conflicts between individuals. This organization is called upon to solve collective conflicts which do not deal with specifics events (theft, canal damage…) but with rules and rights. For this reason, it is considered as an institution which regulates the system at different scales of user groups. The cabinet does not only have an arbitration role of but also a decision and legitimating role as it establishes new rules.

50 Box 5 : Example of conflict resolution by the PA cabinet about water transfers by Kolobo farmers.

This conflict opposed di fferent groups of interest:

- Group A: Its gathers the official users of the Kolobo canal and the Burka Jalala spring owners (abbaburka ). They have lands in the Kolobo command area and thus water rights from there. They use this water to irrigate lands in Kolobo or transfer it to their cultivated lands in Becheysa.

- Group B: They are Kolobo inhabitants, who do not have irrigated lands in Kolobo but cultivate la nds in Becheysa’s irrigated area. They do not possess water rights from neither canal 1. They claim water rights from Kolobo or from Becheysa to irrigate the lands that they own or lease in Becheysa canal’s command area.

- Group C: The group of users of the Becheysa canal which are inhabitants of Becheysa : they claim that Kolobo already has more than enough water compared to Becheysa. They declare that Group A should share their water rights with group B.

51 The conflict was solved by the PA chairman and water users after strong and violent conflicts, especially between the different groups of interest of Kolobo (official users o f group A, farmers from group B and springs owners). After many long meetings, i t was decided that only the Kolobo people who cultivate lands in Becheysa without possessing water rights in Kolobo (group B ) had the right to use the water from the minor springs to irrigate their lands in Becheysa, during Kolobo’s turn while group A irrigates Kolobo’s command area with the water from the spring of Burka Jalala . Since then, a mimalak has been designated to organize water allocation among the group B (which includes 15 users). All of its users are inhabitants of Kolobo who have not irrigated lands in Kolobo. Kolobo farmers with Kolobo water rights (group A) , wishing to transfer water to lands in Becheysa during their turn must now consult the mimalak of group B or negotiate with one relative belonging to this group of users.

4.3.5 District administration

When no solutions are found to problems at lower levels, users may complain at the Jarso district’s level. This is extremely rare because generally, problems are solved by locals groups, within the four local institutions and authorities which have been described before. For example, in the neighboring downstream irrigation scheme of Burka Hadeysa (which is currently being modernized under a French Development Agency financed project), the village leader and the main mimalak were abusing their power by controlling the water resource to serve their personal interests. As no action was possible at the level of the corrupted PA, users went up to the district’s capital to complain about this breach. The problem was solved by replacing the village leader and the mimalak with new elections.

4.4 INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND CHANGE IN WATER ALLOCATION RULES

In this section, I shall show how the system of water rights has gradually changed, with increasing water scarcity and competition. 4.4.1.1 Controlled use of water When a group of irrigators was formed, a mimalak or an elder took charge of water allocation among users to establish a controlled use of water. At first, they were just responsible of defining the order of turns among users, without limiting duration of allocation. 4.4.1.2 Allocation of water: rights defined by number of hours At the late 1980s and early 1990s, with development of vegetable crops, water rights started to be allocated in number of hours in most canals. Water rights are timed only during drought periods when water is scarce.

This first canal to define water rights in terms of hours was Gora, upon the idea of the mimalak . At first, each user was allocated four hours every 15 days.

52 4.4.1.3 Decreasing number of hours per user As the number of users increased, duration of water rights was cut so that all users may have access to water, every 15 days at most. These decisions were generally taken, following the mimalak’s proposals but with the agreement of the concerned groups of users. For example, in Gora, in the late 1980’s, each user had a right for four hours every other week. This was cut down to three hours every other week in the 1990s. In 2000, water rights per user were cut down to two hours every other week.. In Nia’a, water rights were gradually reduced and since 2002, it has been limited to one hour per user out of two.

It is interesting to observe that in Burka Jalala, users have more or less equal water rights. Besides the spring owners and some local leaders which may use a bit more water, there are not great disparities like in some neighboring irrigation schemes where some users are extremely privileged 41 . 4.4.1.4 Gradual exclusion of people and lands Number of users increased as well as crop demand and frequency of irrigation. Competition for water became severe and water authorities defined new rules to exclude some people which had used irrigation until then. Here are a few examples • People who received lands from bigger farmers during the “Nam Torba” land redistribution reform (see 3.3.2). They were not entitled to their own rights if they belonged to another clan or lived in another village. This was not a problem when competition for water was low. These people were given water from the former owners of the redistributed land, who willingly shared their water rights. However, when water became scarce, the former owners decided that their water rights were already insufficient for themselves. Since then, they decide to exclude these people from their water rights. This has been the case in Becheysa, where many Kolobo people, from the Imar clan were given plots of irrigated land during the Nam Torba reform. Since the 1990s, they have been excluded from the Becheysa water sharing system. It was also the case in the Abbas sector of Nia’a. In 2002, the mimalak decided that farmers who were not residing in the Abbas sector and possessed this type of land were excluded for the water sharing system. • People who bought lands informally during Derg During Derg, land transactions were strictly forbidden and land was officially nationalized. However, as lands were transmitted from father to son, the sense of ownership remained. Some farmers sold their lands informally to other farmers. However, users now say that these lands were sold without water rights and as a consequence, their owners are not entitled to water rights if they reside in another sector. Exclusion decisions are often criticized. For example, the mimalak of the Abbas sector of Nia’a is often pointed out to be a selfish man by other mimalaks but they have never

41 For example, in Burka Woldaya, one man has a weekly 24 hour water right just for himself!

53 activated a conflict, nor a negotiation process with him, as each sector has its own decisional independence. The excluded minorities do react to defend their past rights by calling upon the different institutions described in 4.3. But sometimes, due to their minority position, limited power and organization, the conflict-solving organizations cannot satisfy their demands and these excluded people do get their rights back… 4.4.1.5 Water becomes linked to the land. Before 2000, with marriage, new households were not only given lands by the groom’s father, but also a new water right by the community. If all users possessed a two hour water right, so did the new household. However, since the last years, new wedded couples are not given their own water right but a portion of the groom’s father water right only. Water has become linked to the land. Water rights are now inherited in the same way as land. This water-land link is in the process of becoming a recognized and generalized rule but it is still not an official rule for local government institutions (such as the PA cabinet, the administrative court…). In command areas with less water competition (Usmael and some sectors of the Becheysa command area), this rule is still not systematically in use and new households may be entitled to their own water rights…

4.4.1.6 Reduction of spatial reach of water rights Other new rules have also appeared since 2000. For example, until then, it was possible for one farmer to possess several water rights if he had plots in several sectors of a command area. The mimalak of each sector would allocate him a water right. In Nia’a and Gora, this is now prohibited. Mimalaks consult each other to make sure the farmer receive a water right from one sector only. However, this is still not the case in Becheysa. The spatial reach of water rights is thus gradually being reduced so that finally only resident users will be entitled to water rights from their sector. This incites farmers to bring together plots (by informal land purchase, sharecropping or exchange transactions) into the sector where they have their water rights. Farmers can also decide to modify their production system: by cultivating the most water-demanding crops on the plots of the sector where he has rights, and by cultivating the lesser water-demanding crops (maize, sweet potato, or dry season fallow) on the plots of the other sectors.... 4.4.2 Current organization of water distribution and technical modalities of irrigation 4.4.2.1 Water distribution at the canal’s and its sectors’ level As said before in 4.2, each canal has its own authority, and its own set of rules. As a consequence, each canal has different modalities to allocate water to its sectors and users. Demographic, topographic and soil conditions of sectors vary and have an impact of water allocation and maintenance rules. However, as this may seem excessively monographic to readers and moves us away from the core of our analysis, I have preferred to place it in annex 14.

54 4.4.2.2 Technical modalities of irrigation It is important to note that in each of canals, users irrigate their fields with their water right, one after the other. It makes it relatively easy to control for water theft, as this noticeably reduces the water flow. Irrigation is operated sector per sector. Inside the sector, irrigation is most generally operated for each secondary and tertiary canal one by one to save time and water. To irrigate plots, farmers use two main techniques according to the type of crops: the boy and the katari techniques. For wheat, barley and maize crops, the flooding technique (boy ) is used. Outlets made of stones and mud, are opened during the farmer’s water right, which has been defined by the mimalak. Water flows in the plot until it floods and flows to the next plot. The farmer controls the irrigation while the next user watches for theft along the canal. When the farmer has used all his water right time, he closes his plot’s outlet. The next user is ready to irrigate. Diagram 13 : Katari technique irrigation The katari technique is used for khat, potato and onion plots. It uses less water than the flooding technique, ensures better drainage and prevents excessive irrigation which may provoke underground rotting of potato and onion. Also, khat does not tolerate excessive water either. The plots are organized in row of boxes (shatashata). Each row is successively irrigated by its and each box is irrigated one by one. Photo 2 : Preparing the katari…

Before planting his potatoes in August, this farmer is preparing the katari and the boxes for future irrigation two months later…

55

Diagram 14 : Variants of the katari technique The katari technique has variants that enable farmers to save water and time during irrigation. When khat and vegetables are mixed on the same plot, this katari technique is used in the same way exactly, if both crops need water. However when farmers wish to irrigate the vegetable crops only, they build small walls along the rows of khat to prevent water from reaching the trees.

This is the general estimation made by most farmers about the irrigation needs of their main crops during dry season: Potato : Every two weeks Khat : Every month Maize : every two months

4.5 NEW LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOCIAL REGULATION

I have put into light how water authorities and other types of organizations have produced institutional innovation in the Burka Jalala irrigation scheme. Rules have changed, and structures of authority have been modified through collective action processes. This has ensured the stability of the irrigation system, even with the deep demographic, social and agricultural changes which have affected the area during this last century. However, new arrangements have also strongly participated in ensuring this stability. To solve agricultural problems, farmers have sometimes invented new practices and new ways of collaborating together, at the micro-local level, between individuals. 4.5.1 Water exchanges between close relatives

In Burka Jalala, different types of water exchanges are authorized to solve local and punctual problems of water scarcity. This generally takes place between close relatives such as brothers. During dry season, frequency of irrigation on one plot of potato can extend up to one month. But as potato crops need to be watered at least every 15 days, especially during the critical period of flowering (which determines final yield), brothers may exchange water rights to make sure they irrigate frequently enough. 4.5.2 Water exchanges between sectors and canals

Some water exchanges are decided and done by the mimalaks of different sectors. When one sector is noticeably better off than another one, its mimalaks can give on demand several hours of water to the most drought affected sector. This frequently happens during dry season between sectors of the same canal. But it also occurs between different canals which have different water needs, crops and climatic conditions.

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Diagram 15 : Water exchanges between frost-prone areas and frost-safe areas

Source: author

In the study area, frosts may periodically occur during the months of October, November and December. As a consequence, most farmers must wait until the end of December or January to plant potatoes and water needs are concentrated during three following months. From December to mid February, drought is extremely high and water users very numerous. But in Becheysa and specific plots of Nia’a and Gora, no frosts occur. As a consequence, farmers can plant potatoes earlier than in other areas. From September to January, Becheysa farmers are practically the only ones to irrigate potato. During this period, rain is more frequent and water is available because other farmers just need to irrigate khat and maize which are much less “water greedy” crops. There are exchanges of water rights between frost prone areas like Kolobo, Gora and Nia’a and non frost prone areas like Becheysa. But as water availability is much higher in Birra season than in Bona season and the frost prone area much wider than the non-prone one, Becheysa can receive much more water from September to December than the other areas can from January to March. But nevertheless, this system of water exchange between areas with different needs is a collective innovation that has helped farmers during periods of water shortage. 4.5.3 Water, land and seed exchanges

Farmers have also invented a way to respond to local water or land disparities. In Kolobo, for example, the command area is very small. Farmers use the Jalala spring during 36 weekly hours (plus 12 others from the spring owners). Farmers can easily irrigate all their lands, once a week or once every other week. On the other hand, Becheysa has a large command area though they use 36 weekly hours of water from Burka Jalala and the minor springs. During the dry season, the amount of water rights can only enable irrigation of one qoti 42 in average. But as farmers possess in average 2 to 4 qoti of irrigate lands (0.25 to 0.5 ha), they cannot water the totality of their irrigated lands.

42 One qoti or qindi is a local measure. It correspond to 1/8 Ha.

57 Kolobo water users wish to expand their irrigated land while Becheysa farmers wish to have more water rights. As a consequence, farmers from Kolobo and from Becheysa have established new types of exchanges: Kolobo users can simply lease irrigable plots in share cropping arrangements during dry season from Becheysa farmers who cannot irrigate the whole of their lands. They will cultivate potatoes and give half of their harvest to the owners who will generally sell them or use them as seeds for the following potato season. Also, Becheysa farmers can just lend a plot during dry season to Kolobo water users and in return, Kolobo water users can transfer water rights to them during Kolobo’s turn. There may not be official arrangements, with quantified amounts of water in exchange of quantified amounts of lands. These exchanges are often established in an informal way, which may be facilitated by marital inter-family links. These links exists as both Imar (Kolobo people) and the Balad clans (from Becheysa, Gora, Nia’a ) are exogamous and marriage between these two clans is culturally recognized to be successful. However, the Usman clan is endogamous, so it is more difficult for them to establish spatial links.

4.5.4 Diversity of share cropping arrangements

Though renting is not practiced, many types of sharecropping arrangements also exist. • Official share cropping arrangements: They are generally made by owners who have migrated to Edjersa Goro and another site in the region. They establish a year round contract for one to five years. Payment is done at harvest: half of the production is given to the owner. • Dry season sharecropping arrangements: In dry season, many farmers cannot irrigate their lands in the command area because of insufficient water. At this time, they can lease it to Kolobo water users (who possess sufficient water rights) and receive half of the production (generally potato) in exchange. But during rainy season, the owners cultivate these plots as water is not a limiting factor. • Sharecropping arrangements with mixed crops: This has been observed in Becheysa. Local farmers have plots of khat which they irrigate from October to January. They can establish sharecropping arrangements on the aisles, between the rows of khat trees. Kolobo farmers can cultivate potato and transfer Kolobo water rights to irrigate. Local farmers can also cultivate sweet potato without watering. In exchange, farmers may give half of their production to the land owner. But many other informal types of exchanges exist through khat, labor work, loan of oxen or donkeys, punctual gifts of water, potato seeds etc… These examples of mutual cooperation can be considered as factors which promote new dynamics, which create “solidarity” links and promote social peace. All these possible arrangements enable the system and all its groups of users to adapt to new constraints (water and land scarcity…) and opportunities (potato and khat markets…). They bring great flexibility to the local system of water management and guarantee its stability through its permanent capability of change and cooperation which appear at different scales and around different objects and stakes…

58 The diversity of institutions and authorities, as a resource and recourse for each type of conflict and problem, increases the community’s capabilities to cooperate and to negotiate. This may explain why individual monopolizing and merchandizing of land and water resources are still very limited practices. This whole section emphasizes the importance of diverse forms of local governance around the management of an irrigation scheme with strong lineage and territorial identities…

59 5 INNOVATION IN FARMERS’ INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES

5.1 TYPOLOGY OF FARMING HOUSEHOLDS

5.1.1 Survey data

Results are based on surveys which have been done during my stay. Data has been collected from 22 detailed household surveys, 15 shorter surveys and a dozen of open interviews. For this work, I have also taken into consideration data of 24 household surveys made in my presence by a sociologist from OIDA, during the feasibility study of the rehabilitation project. See annexes 28 and 29 for survey data. 5.1.2 Discussion on criteria for establishing a typology

Although farming households are relatively homogenous, many differences exist in agricultural practices, investment capacity and individual strategies. As an indicator of household heterogeneity in Burka Jalala, surface of farmland owned by households varies from 1 qoti (1250m 2) to 11 qoti (1,37 Ha). But the average farm has an area of 3 qoti (3750 m2). For irrigated land, owned surfaces per household vary from 0,5 qoti to 5 qoti (675 to 6750 m 2). Even though differences have a ratio of 1/10, all farms of Burka Jalala are small farming systems which depend on their own family labor and punctual labor exchanges (faraka ) with relatives and neighbors. There is no employment of workers by farms, in this area. To establish a farmer typology, criteria based on agricultural tools and techniques are not relevant in this case. The same manual tools are used by all farmers and operations during cycles are basically the same for crops (see annex 16 on tools). They all plough their lands with oxen, when terraces are large enough. Some farmers do not own an ox and must burrow one from a relative or a neighbor but this factor does not seem to be discriminating enough. Criteria based on livestock ownership are often used in agro-economical studies. It is true that the quantity of animals owned by a household generally shows its level of capital. It gives a good idea about the household’s investment capacity and resilience to unexpected events such as death, sickness, climatic and market accidents etc... But as said before, forage availability is low in Burka Jalala and this limits the quantity of animals which can be owned by a family. As observed in survey results, some families may have large quantities of goats: it cannot only be explained by the household’s high level of capital but also by its proximity to pastures. In more isolated areas such as Ganda Gola and Horo, households tend to have more livestock when they have the financial capacity, because they have more community grazing lands. See annex 18 : livestock and land ownership in Burka Jalala

The family structure is not always relevant to define a typology. In average, households have about 4.5 children. But the average number of children bared during a married couple’s lifetime is of around 5 to 6 children.

60 Box 6 : Family planning in Burka Jalala and Jarso

In Burka Jalala, family planning is still a very minor practice although there has been health extension about the issue in t he area. Birth control medication is distributed for free in the district’s capital health center but religious beliefs and social pressure still seem to be a barrier in women’s decision. During interviews, no women have claimed by themselves to use birth control. Young women do not seem to be very interested by it. It may however be possible that some women secretly use it without informing their husband after having bared several children. Only farmers with political activities and thus more relations wit h the outside world seem to be well aware about family planning and use it for their own household. Unfortunately, I haven’t been able to obtain data about planning planning from Edjersa Goro’s health center.

Photo 3 : Poster of the reproductive health extension campaign in Jarso

Two criteria are here important to establish a typology: land ownership, especially of irrigated land and also the level of access to irrigation water. Indeed, irrigation strongly increases the part of cash crops in household incomes. This extra income has an important impact on living conditions. Th ey can produce more food for their family and even attain food self sufficiency.

However, during my research work, I have noticed that better-off farmers were generally the ones with most lands. This situation is often explained by the fact that they were the only sons to be born or that their brothers migrated to other regions. As a consequence, there is no division of lands and the owned surface per household is thus greater than average. The following table shows how households without irrigated lands have less livestock, thus less capital, and thus less investment capacity. Table 6 : Percentage of households without irrigated lands in total number of households without livestock HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS WITHOUT OX WITHOUT COW WITHOUT GOAT /SHEEP

Percentage of these 88.89% 87.50% 66.67% households who do not own irrigated lands Data: surveys with farmers in Burka Jalala

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5.1.3 Quantity of irrigated lands per household: a discriminating factor

The quantity of irrigated land is a discriminating factor for households because it has a strong link with the capacity to grow cash crops such as khat and potato which bring considerable monetary income to households. Growing khat and potato is indeed much more profitable than producing grain. For more information of these cash crops, see 5.2.1.1. 5.1.3.1 Limited value of grain Grain, such as maize, wheat and sorghum has low value. Indeed, added value per qoti (1/8 ha) cultivated with grain varies from 300 to 700 birr (according to seasons). Comparing with the added value/qoti of cash crops (see annex 17), we can observe that it is much lower. That is why households will try, according to their level of access to land and water, to cultivate an important part of cash crops and prefer to buy grain with this cash. Self sufficiency is not a necessary goal of most households… 5.1.3.2 High value of irrigated khat Commercialization in market points of irrigated khat produced in this area only takes place at harvest during dry season. As prices are high, farmers are willing to walk 12 hours to the nearest khat market point of Xinacsan to sell their production. During the second harvest in June, prices are low and production is sold or exchanged in the village. Variation of khat productivity mainly depends on the age and structure of trees. Table 7 : Economic data of khat harvest and commercialization Source: personal surveys with farmers of Burka Jalala

Harvest Bunch/qoti Average prod. Price/bunch Average price Added Value/qoti Average AV/qoti 1) January 30 to 80 45 bunches/qoti 10 to 25 20 300 to 1600 birrs 797 2) June 40 to 90 50 bunches/qoti 2 to 8 4 100 to 300 birrs 200 total/year 997 plus farmer consumption 5.1.3.3 Very high value of potatoes As observed in tables, potato cultivation is about two times more profitable than khat if there is no water shortage. Table 8 : Economic data on potato production and commercialization Harvest Bags/qoti Average Price/bag Average Added Value/qoti Average AV/qoti Mar-May 8 to 24 14 150 to 175 162 1400 to 4200 birrs 2268 Sept-Oct 8 to 24 16 100 to 125 112 1250 to 2500 1792 Jan-Feb 20 18 125 to 150 137 2250 to 2750 2466

Source: personal surveys with farmers of Burka Jalala Variations in potato yields can be explained by physical factors such as soil fertility. Yield can also be linked to the initial density of potato seeds at plantation. Indeed, some households may not have enough potatoes: they have been sold, consumed or have been damaged by blight. During dry season, the main factor which affects potato yields is water scarcity, especially at the crop’s flowering period. During rainy season, the main factor

62 affecting yield is potato blight. This disease caused by the fungus Phytophtora infestans affects leaves, stems and tubers of potato crops. It develops itself easily when there are heavy regular rains and warm temperatures. The price of potato is fixed by merchants per “quintal” but I have translated it into bags because the merchants’ definition of “quintal” actually corresponds to two large bags weighing more than 100 kg each, and increasing in size every year! The highest potato prices are at the end of dry season and the lowest ones at the end of rainy season. 5.1.4 Goal and limits of the household typology

The goal of this typology is not to be the most precise and detailed one. First I will introduce a very basic typology of farmers. Three main types of households will be described with a simple socio-economic analysis done with the data of surveys. Finally, I will show the different type of strategies used by farmers and how these strategies help them “transfer from one type of household to another”. The goal of the typology is setting up a picture of the local rural society with its main socio-economic groups of farming households, and trying to see which households are in serious food shortage, which are on the border line and which are not endangered at all and are able to have savings? The point is also to show that households are always in dynamics that make them move between food shortage and prosperity according to the strategies they abandon and the new ones they adopt… In the following section, the economic analysis is not the one that is usually done in compared agricultures studies. Economic data is based on agricultural and livestock activities as well as on eventual food aid and salaries. Because of time limitation, I have unfortunately not studied the possible additional income made by women of households. Indeed, some of them go weekly to the market of Ejersa Goro to sell eggs, fire wood, wild aromatic herbs, baskets and exceptionally a goat or a sheep. But this extra income has not been taken into consideration. Also, although information has been collected about labor costs and operations for each crop, it has not been presented here as labor is not a limiting factor, even during peak periods and does not determine farmers’ strategies. (see annex 30: labor indications for main crops)

63 5.1.5 Household typology

Basically, three groups of households can be distinguished:
Small farm with no or very little irrigated land: Household type n°1
Small farm with irrigated land but limited water rights: Household type n°2
Farm with more irrigated land and excellent access to water: Household type n°3 Diagram 16 : Cropping calendar of model of household type n°1

Birra Bona Badheysa Caamsa Gana Total : 3437 m 2 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug

Irrigated 625 m 2 Khat Maize

1875 m 2 Wheat Wheat

Rainfed 625 m 2 Maize+ Sorghum Maize+ Sorghum

312 m 2 Potato Maize Potato

Diagram 17 : Cropping pattern of model of household type n°2

Birra Bona Badheysa Caamsa Gana Total : 3750 m 2 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug

625 m 2 Khat Maize Irrigated 1250 m 2 Wheat Potato Wheat

1250 m 2 Potato Maize Potato Rainfed 625 m 2 Wheat Wheat

Diagram 18 : Cropping calendar of the model of household type n°3

Birra Bona Badheysa Caamsa Gana Total : 6875 m 2 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug

2500 m 2 Khat Maize Irrigated 2500 m 2 Wheat Potato Wheat

625 m 2 Potato Maize Potato

Rainfed 625 m 2 Maize Maize

625 m 2 Wheat Wheat

64 Small farm with no or very little irrigated land: Household type n°1

Table 9 : Socio-economic data about Household type n°1

Average number of children 5

Irrigated lands 0 to 0.5 qoti. (0 to 625m 2) Occupied with khat+maize.

Rainfed lands 2 to 3 qoti. (2500 to 3750 m 2)

Crops Mainly staple crops. No use of chemical fertilizer. Cow, ox, donkey 0 to 1 cow, no ox, no donkey Goats, sheep, poultry 0 to 5 (goat+sheep), 0 to 5 hens Type of house Small traditional hut Data source: surveys with farmers of Burka Jalala

The model of household type n°1 has 2.75 qoti of land (about 3440 m 2), out is which 0.5 (625 m 2) is irrigated land and 2.25 (2815 m 2) is rainfed.

Diagram 19 : Crops cultivated by the model of Household type n°1 during rainy season

potato 0.25 qoti khat+maize This type of households focuses on staple 0.5 qoti crops. Indeed, the diagram shows that they sorgh+maize occupy generally 75% of lands. In some cases, 0.5 qoti this part of lands with staple crops can even reach 100%.

w heat Data: household surveys in Burka Jalala 1.5 qoti

If this type of households own irrigated lands, they cultivate khat on it. If they don’t own such lands, they nevertheless have a few rows of khat which are often intercropped with maize from February to July. During rainy season, wheat will occupy more lands than other crops. But farmers also cultivate a plot of mixed crops of maize and sorghum from April to December. Since a few years only, some of these households may also cultivate potato on a small plot during rainy season (from July to November) if they can access to seeds through relatives and produce some during dry season on a very small irrigated plot which may be attributed to them by relatives just for seed production.

65

Table 10 : Income and amount of grain produced by crops of model of Household type n°1 per year

CROPS INCOME OR AMOUNT OF GRAIN USE

Khat 500 birr Cash crop and farmer consumption

Potato 900 birr Cash crop

Wheat 240 kg of grain Family consumption

Sorghum/Maize 30 kg of grain + cane + grilled maize… Family consumption + forage

Total crop production per year: 1395 birr and 270 kg of grain + 2 young goats sold /year in the market for 100 birr each.

Source: personal survey data See Diagram 16 : Cropping calendar of model of household type n°1 But a household with 2 adults and 5 children consume in average 650 kg of grain per year. This means that within a year, they will need to buy 380 extra kg of grain to ensure the household’s food security . They will spend about 1520 birr to buy this quantity of wheat and use practically all the cash gained from the sale of khat and potato. With the remaining 75 birr, they must ensure all other costs (gasoline for light, oil, salt, clothes, school material…) for the whole family during one year. Obviously, it is practically impossible. This is why these households have strategies to obtain more cash (see 5.4.2). But, even so, these families have no saving capacity and cannot invest in fertilizers. During drought years, they must sell the totality of their livestock to survive and tend to spiral debts. (see annex 19: model household n°1).

66 5.1.5.1 Small farm with irrigated lands and limited water rights: household type n°2 This category of household is the most common in Burka Jalala. They own a maximum of 3.5 qotis (4375 m 2) of land out of which 1 to 2 qoti (1250 to 2500 m 2) are irrigated and the rest rainfed.

Table 11 : Socio-economic data about household type n°2

Average number of children 4.5 Irrigated lands 1 to 3.5 qoti (1250 to 4375 m 2) Rainfed lands 0 to 2 qoti (0 to 2500 m2) In total: rainfed + irrigated land: 3 qoti (3750m2) Crops Equal area of staple crops and cash crops Cow, ox, donkey 1 cow, one ox, 0 to 1 donkey Goats, sheep, poultry 2 to 8 (sheep+goats), 0 to 12 hens Type of house Traditional hut or metal sheet house

This type of households is more market oriented than household type n°1. Indeed, year round, more than half of their lands are dedicated to cultivate cash crops: khat and as well as potatoes.

The model of the household type n°2 is considered to own 3 qotis (3750m 2) of land, out of which 1.5 (1875 m2) is irrigated and 1.5 (1875m2) is rainfed.

Table 12 : Income and grain produced by model of household type n°2 in one year

CROPS USE INCOME OR AMOUNT OF GRAIN

Khat Cash crop and farmer consumption 500 birr

Potato Cash crop 4536 birr

Wheat Family consumption 240 kg

Maize/sorghum Family consumption and forage 75 kg

Total crop production per year: 5035 birr + 315 kg of grain + 4 young goats sold in the market 100 birr each

Source: personal survey data

67 See Diagram 17 : Cropping pattern of model of household type n°2 These households do not produce enough grain to feed the family members (650 kg/household/year) throughout the year. The model of household type n°2 must get from the outside around 340 kg of wheat and spend more than 1340 birr in grain to ensure food security. After these purchases, they remain with about 4000 birr for all the other needs of the household during one year. They may save money during good years to survive during drought years. These households also adopt new strategies to improve their situation. See annex 20: model household n°2

5.1.5.2 Farms with more irrigated lands and excellent access to water: household type n°3 First, it is important to note that generally, even if one household owns more than two qoti of irrigated land, it cannot irrigate the whole land with its allocated water right. Generally, in dry season, from one household’s water right, only 1 to 2 qoti (1250-2500m 2) of crops such as khat or potato can be actually irrigated. The best lands (actually the lands with the best access to water) are chosen to grow cash crops. On the remaining lands, farmers may plant low water-demanding crops such as maize or sorghum. Others may sharecrop out these lands to relatives who have water rights from Kolobo. Water is for most water users the limiting factor . However, households of type n°3 have access to more water than average and thus are able to correctly irrigate their cash crops on more than 2 qoti (2500m 2). For example, spring owners have longer and more frequent water rights than other users. This enables these households to irrigate more than four qoti (5000m 2) of land. This is also the case of farmers who have water rights from two sources or two canals . For example, in Gora, a few farmers have water rights from the Gora canal as well as from the Usmael canal. In Kolobo, several farmers have water rights from the spring of Burka Jalala and also use the Birbirsa spring. This can also concern farmers from non-frost prone areas of Becheysa , who cultivate potato during the frost period when few farmers use irrigation, when water is not scarce.

Table 13: Socio-economic data about Household type n°3

Average number of children 3 to 5

Irrigated lands 3 to 6 qoti. (3750 to 7500 m 2)

Rainfed lands 0 to 5 qoti. (O to 6250 m 2)

Crops More cash crops than staple crops Cow, ox, donkey 1 to 2 cow, 1 ox, 1 to 2 donkey Goats, sheep, poultry 5 to 10 (goat+sheep), 2 to 10 hens Type of house Metal sheet house + hut for kitchen

Source: personal survey data

68 Cash crops take an important part on irrigated land. Half of the irrigated land is dedicated to khat and the other half to potato during the dry season. On rainfed and irrigated land, staple crops become significant in rainy season with cultivation of maize and wheat. But even though, some rainfed plots are cultivated with potato during rainy season.

The model of household type n° 3 has in total 5,5 qoti (6875m 2) of land, out of which 4 qoti (5000m 2) are irrigated and 1.5 qoti (1875 m 2) are rainfed.

Table 14: Income and grain produced by model of household type n°3 in one year

CROPS USE INCOME OR AMOUNT OF GRAIN

Khat Cash crop and farmer consumption 1995 birr.

Potato Cash crop 5670 birr

Wheat Family consumption 400 kg

Maize Family consumption and forage 213 kg of grain

Total production per year: 7665 birr and 613 kg of grain + 1000 birr from livestock reproduction

Source: personal survey data Household type n°3 is the only category of farmers that is self sufficient in grain. The model even obtains extra grain (here 13 kg) to sell. They have 8665 birr to spend for the other household needs. They can easily save money to built metal sheet houses for themselves and their sons to be wed invest in agriculture (fertilizers, pond, motor pump…), for their children’s education and invest in new businesses. See annex 21: model household n°3

69 5.1.5.3 Summary on distribution of household types

Diagram 20 : Distribution of household types in surveys In surveys, the great majority of H. type 3 H. type 1 10% households correspond to type n°2. However, 17% it must be specified that surveys have mostly been done in and around the irrigated area. As a consequence, most interviewed households were water users.

H. type 2 73%

Diagram 21 : Estimated distribution of household types in the entire Burka Jalala valley But if we take into H. type 3 2% account the whole valley of Burka Jalala, only 47% of H. type 2 households own irrigated lands. 37% This means that in reality, household type n°1 is much more widespread and household H. type 1 type n°3 much less common 61% than it appears in survey results.

5.2 STRATEGIES BASED ON CROPS

5.2.1 Change in crop patterns 5.2.1.1 Staple and cash crops Since the last 30 years, the strategic goal of farmers has remained the same: they wish to combine production of staple crops such as wheat, sorghum and maize with cash crops like potatoes and khat. Farmers wish to ensure monetary resources to buy important products such as clothes, gasoline, sugar… At the same time, they want food security and capacity of resilience in case of market accidents. 5.2.1.1.1 Staple crops As a consequence, all farmers cultivate grain for home consumption. Wheat is practically only cultivated during rainy season from early July to early November because of high water demand. Barley is a more marginal crop, chosen instead of wheat to diversify grain production. Maize is cultivated almost throughout the whole year. Two main cropping periods are distinguished by farmers: one from February to July-August (short cycle variety), and another from April to November (longer cycle). Farmers use traditional varieties ( boqqolo dimma : red maize). Some farmers have tried to plant improved varieties (boqqolo adi as white maize) but as they are little drought resistant, they have remained marginal.

70 Sorghum is rarely cultivated on irrigated lands. However, on rainfed lands, sorghum and long cycle varieties of maize are still cultivated by farmers. Often, they are sowed together in April. At first, density of plantation is high. Farmers gradually cut stalks of sorghum and maize before they reach maturity for animal forage. Sorghum is also cut before maturing in October for human consumption, just like sugar cane. Maize grain is harvested in November and sorghum in December. 5.2.1.1.2 Khat

Most farmers cultivate at least one plot of khat ranging from 0.5 to 2 qoti 43 . 95% of farmers owning irrigated lands have a plot of irrigated khat. This type of khat has two main harvests: one in January and another in June. Also, throughout the year, farmers snip tips of branches for their daily consumption, before heading for work. The khat production harvested in January (during dry season) may be sold to merchants who come. They buy khat at the plot level. Price is decided before harvest by the merchant at the view of the plot. When merchants don’t come (when market khat demand is lesser), farmers harvest their khat and process it themselves. They remove away old, thick or damaged leaves to obtain branches with soft and young leaves only. They are then packed into small bouquets (mardufa ) and bring the processed khat with donkeys to the market of Xinacsan at the Somali border at 12 hours walking distance. The production harvested in June is generally not sold. At this period, khat prices are very low and khat is mostly consumed locally. Farmers do not go to sell their production at Xinacsan. However, some women choose to bring khat in to the district’s capital, Edjersa Goro at two hours walking distance to gain a few dozens of birr on the market. Rainfed khat also has two main harvests but different periods of the year: one harvest in April-May and another in September-October. At these periods, khat prices are low so farmers consume it or sell it locally. It is often sold or exchanged to farmers who do not have khat at this period of the year. Women also sell it in Ederjsa Goro. 5.2.1.1.3 Vegetables All farmers owning irrigated lands also have vegetable crops like potatoes, onion and garlic. Potato is the most common vegetable crop: it is cultivated by 100% of farmers owning irrigated lands and by 70% of those who exclusively own rain fed lands (during the rainy season). Potato is preferred by farmers to other vegetables because of better conservation assets and market demand. Garlic is grown in the higher areas of Kolobo while onion is cultivated by the most innovating farmers. Though onion is more drought resistant than potato and can generate more income (considering yield * price), it is much more risky for farmers: if no merchants come in to buy, production is wasted within one month because it cannot be stored for long. 5.2.1.1.4 Coffee Coffee is only cultivated on irrigated lands, especially in Becheysa and Nia’a. But less than 5% of farmers with irrigated lands cultivate coffee. Even when they do so, it is on a plot of 1000 square meters at most. Coffee trees are associated with potato during the dry season and wheat during the rainy season. It has been reported to have been the most common cash crop during the reign of Haylé Selase. But it has been replaced by khat.

43 Corresponding to 625 to 2500 square meters

71 I will not speak about coffee cultivation any further because it is not a relevant practice in Burka Jalala. It may be related to climatic factors which gives more advantage to khat than to coffee. Lower in the Mite valley, along irrigation schemes such as Burka Hadeysa and Burka Alifif, where the climate gets warmer, coffee becomes an important cash crop.

5.2.1.2 Shorter cycles on irrigated lands Farmers have adapted themselves to land shortage by intensifying production. From one crop per year, they cultivate two crops per year on irrigated lands since more than thirty years. Generally, on these lands, in one year, farmers now cultivate one cash crop (mostly potato) and then, one staple crop (mostly wheat, maize and more rarely barley). As a consequence, crops with long cycles have been slowly abandoned by farmers. With eight to nine months cycles, sorghum and long cycle varieties of maize are practically never cultivated on irrigated lands.

5.2.1.3 Crop rotation on irrigated lands The diagram below shows the most common crop rotations done on irrigated lands. The main differentiating factor is frost risk. Crop rotations are presented on a period of two years to show variation of crop from year to year. Generally, farmers follow biennial rotations. Diagram 22 : Main crop rotation practices on irrigated lands of Burka Jalala

Source: data from farmers of Burka Jalala

In frost prone areas, potato will be cultivated during the driest season ( bona ) and badheysa . Wheat, a highly water demanding crop, is then cultivated during rainy season (gana ). Some farmers prefer to change crop rotation from year to year: instead of wheat, they cultivate maize during badheysa and gana. In non frost-prone areas, potato is cultivated during birra , when water is available: others farmers do not use irrigation (fallow period) and rains may occur several days a month. Also, at harvest in January, potato prices are very high. After potato harvest, many farmers chose to cultivate maize until July – August. They leave the land in fallow for one month at least before planting potato again in September October.

Other farmers change crop rotations from year to year. This may be linked to beliefs relating to soil fertility. But it may also be linked to varying needs in forage and grain and type and yields of crops cultivated in rain fed areas.

72 5.2.1.4 Two crops per year on rainfed lands Some farmers choose to cultivate two crops per year on rainfed lands. This is only done on higher lands (located in Horo and Kolobo) where evapotranspiration is lower and plants resist longer to water shortage. It is a common strategy for households of type n°1, which start facing food shortage problems early in the year, starting from February and who have little or no irrigated lands. Stocks of grain harvested in October - November have already been completely consumed in February. This means that they will need to buy grain during more than eight months! During this period, grain prices gradually rise on local markets and reach a peak at the end of rainy season in September. Cultivating an extra crop during Badheysa, prior to the main crop in rainy season is risky: rain is very irregular and variable for year to year. But for these households, it is worth the extra work and input of seed. Even if crops are destroyed by water shortage, they can be used as fodder for animals. And, if rain has been sufficient, grain can be harvested and households can lengthen the period of self-sufficiency. This extra harvest will prevent them to spiral debts buying grain for the family’s survival until the main harvest in October- November. The more market oriented farmers will cultivate a first cycle of vegetables instead of cereals. The will sell the production and collect money to buy grain to feed the household members. Diagram 23 : Possible crop rotations on rainfed lands

Source: Data from farmers of Burka Jalala

73 Box 7 : Impact of the strategy of double crops on rainfed land with household type n°1 With this strategy, farms are able to produce 100 to 200 kg of grain (wheat and maize) if rain during Badheysa has been sufficient. For example, the model of household type n°1 produces 150 kg more grain by this strategy and thus saves 600 birr.

Diagram 24 : Cropping calendar of model of household n°1 after adopting the strategy of two crops per year on rainfed lands

Birra Bona Badheysa Caamsa Gana Total : 3437 m 2 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug

Irrigated 625 m 2 Khat Maize

1875 m 2 Wheat Wheat or Barley Wheat

Rainfed 625 m 2 Maize+ Sorghum Maize+ Sorghum

312 m 2 Potato Maize Potato

See annex 22: model of household type n°1, with the impact of this strategy

5.2.2 Natural and chemical fertilization

Practically all farmers use natural fertilizers. Animals stay overnight in one part of peasants’ houses or huts. In the morning, animals are sent to graze and the female head of the household collects the dung which is put in a pile with all other domestic scraps, at the border of their vegetable garden mainly composed of squash and more rarely tomatoes and chili peppers. Compost is accumulated in the same area. During the dry season, when compost is not humid and very light, farmers will bring it in bags with donkeys on their fields. However, it is not the composting technique which is promoted by the development agents. They recommend composting in large pits. This innovation technique has not been adopted by farmers. First, the pits need two square meters of space, which is a lot considering land scarcity. Second, additional work is needed to dig the pit. Farmers who do not have animals cannot make compost. They will take care of other people’s livestock and make the animals “graze” crops residues on their lands after harvest and before sowing. Chemical fertilization is still a limited but growing practice. It can be considered as a technical innovation which promotes intensification. The first farmers started using it in the 1990s on potato crops. Now, about 50% of farmers use chemical fertilizers: urea and DAP. They are used on potatoes and wheat, and more rarely on khat, during rainy season only. According to farmers, at another time of the year, fertilizers increase growth and water demand of crops and can cause total failure of crops which become more vulnerable to drought. Until 2005, farmers bought chemical fertilizers by themselves, in the market of Edjersa Goro. However, since 2005, the recognized Womens’ cooperative of Woldaya supports purchase of fertilizers with microcredits. However, this incentive seems to benefit to better-

74 off farmers only. The poorest category of farmers does not use chemical fertilizer and claim that they fear spiraling debts by purchasing such inputs. In survey results, no relevant difference has been observed between yields of crops produced with or without fertilizers.

5.2.3 Mixed cropping

Mixed cropping are most commonly practiced with khat. This new form of agricultural intensification has gradually appeared with land scarcity problems, in order to valorize space between the rows of khat. Basically, there are two ways of planting khat: on ridged or flat fields. On ridged fields, khat shrubs are always located in the depression. Mixed cropping of khat and maize is the most common association and is practiced by all types of households. However, khat intercropping with potato or wheat is a recent and expanding practice which is mostly adopted by households of the type n°2 to face land scarcity. (see annex 24: model household n°2 with khat intercropping). 5.2.3.1 Intercropping on ridged khat plots As khat takes three years to five before giving any commercial production, intercropping enables to decrease khat plantation costs. The first years of khat plantation, sweet potato is very often planted. Farmers say that “ Sweet potato will make khat taste sweet ”. In other words, it’s a good association: leaves of sweet potato grow very fast and protect soils. It prevents erosion and facilitates growth of the young khat shrubs which have a much slower growth rate. Sweet potation is generally planted in August at the same time as the khat cuttings. Sweet potato is also very practical for families as it is highly drought resistant and can be gradually harvested at any time 6 to 12 months later. When sweet potatoes have all been harvested, a new crop will be planted with khat. Potato or onion can be planted during the rainy season, from July to September. Beans, maize and sorghum may also be sowed together at the end of the driest season in February and gradually harvested for forage until the rainy season. When the shrubs are too big (ten to twenty year of age without cutting), excessive shade prevents good development of vegetable crops. Farmers cultivate crops that grow taller, such as maize, sorghum from February to July or from April to November-December for human consumption or animal forage.

75 Photo 4 : Young khat shrubs and sweet potato, July 2006 Credit: author (July 2006)

Photo 5 : Ten year old khat shrubs with sorghum, maize and beans

Credit: author (July 2006)

Diagram 25 : Types of mixed cropping with khat on ridged plots

Sweet potato + khat Potato + khat or Onion + khat Maize + sorghum + bean + khat

0-2 years after plantation More than 2 years after plantation of khat

Source: author

The diagram shows that as the khat shrub’s size and level of shade increase, taller species are chosen to cultivate.

76 5.2.3.2 Mixed cropping on flat khat plots The first year or two, a great variety of plants are planted on the same plot: sorghum, maize, potato, sweet potato and beans, with the cuttings of khat. After, when khat shrubs are still small and produce little shade, farmers will plant wheat during rainy season from July to November, and potato from January–February to March-April. During this period, potato needs to be irrigated but khat can be negatively affected. Farmers build small “walls” along the field water ways to prevent water from irrigating khat trees. Potato can also be planted during rainy season or from August-September to November-December. Maize is cultivated in mixed cropping with khat when shrubs are tall and give much shade. Photo 6 : Mixed cropping khat + wheat in a khat field affected by hail Credit: author (august 2006)

Here, a hail incident has destroyed khat leafage. This has made it possible to grow wheat and to compensate khat losses . 5.2.4 Spreading water demand by crop diversification

Except most Kolobo official water users, farmers generally have more lands in the potentially irrigable area than they can irrigate. To try to irrigate all lands and intensify production, farmers (especially of household type n°2) will diversify crops and cropping calendar to spread water demand throughout the year. I will demonstrate this fact by presenting the study case of Jamal Musa/ It shows the important creative capacity of farmers, which is too often neglected by agricultural authorities and development agents. Box 8 : Study case of Jamal Musa

This farmer has 2500 square metres of irrigated land in the bottom of the Gora valle y. He also has the same surface of rain fed lands in Ganda Gadi (located at the Gora canal’s tail end), out of which 1000 square meters could be potentially irrigable by the canal during dry season if water flow was stronger.

Jamal Musa has concentrated hi s efforts on his best irrigable lands situated in the bottom of the valley. He divided this large plot of 2500 square meter into three plots with different cropping calendars (zone 1, 2, 3). All plots are flat and occupied with khat. But intercrops vary in type and planting period, in order to spread water demand over the year.

As it can be observed, on his plots, there is irrigated khat and as well as rain fed khat. Potatoes are cultivated at two different periods: once during bona and badheysa , once during birra . Maize is also cultivated during two periods, from February to July, and from April to October. Wheat is cultivated during rainy season.

The diagram below shows frequency of irrigation. With his complex cropping patterns, Jamal Musa has successfully tried to spread irrigation needs from September to June.

77

Diagram 26 : Cropping calendars on irrigated lands of Jamal Musa

Source: personal survey data 5.2.4.1 Summary of strategy of spreading water demand over the year Decision of farmers about their cropping calendars is quite complex. It is based on the combination of level of market prices of their two main cash crops, khat and potato, frost risks and water availability. Finally, farmers choose to separate irrigation periods of khat and potato but they do not leave any gap in between in order to sell their products at the highest price as possible. Potatoes are planted on plots early January. Khat is generally irrigated one day before harvest (in order to stay fresh longer) during the first half of January. The following day, plots with potato can be irrigated and crops start to grow soon after. Diagram 27 : Strategy of farmers to spread water demand

Source: interviews with farmers of Burka Jalala

78 5.3 STRATEGIES BASED ON LAND AND WATER

5.3.1 Expansion of motor pumps use and ownership 5.3.1.1 Use of motor pumps Farmers use motor pumps since 1999 to irrigate former rainfed lands. At the beginning, motor pumps were brought in by landless outsiders. They would rent their motor pumps out to local farmers, in exchange of money and plots of rain fed lands to farm during dry season. But soon enough, as renting costs were very high, some better-off farmers decided to invest in their own motor pumps. Since then, these outsiders no longer come in the area. The use of motor pumps is a developing practice as irrigated land is scarce. 5.3.1.1.1 Irrigating rainfed lands The use of motor pump is mostly used to irrigate rain fed lands by households of type n°2 and the better-off fringe of households of type n°1, in areas such as Kolobo, where irrigated land is especially scarce compared to water availability. Motor pumps are used by official water users, and by non official users who have been given a special water right from a relative who has official water rights in Kolobo. In the Herer sector, many farmers obtain water rights from the spring owners who have important water rights. Water may be given “for free” or rather in exchange of informal services to close relatives but it has been reported that it may also be sold at the price of one hour for 50 birr. Farmers dig a small pond ( kure ) to store water flowing from the Kolobo canal and pump water directly from it to the rain fed lands. Farmers whose lands are located 100 meters upper than the small pond must use two pumps in a row. Also, users from the minor Birbirsa spring can pump the water directly from the spring or from their specific storage pond. In Gora, a motor pump has been bought by the mimalak of the Usmael canal. When water is available, he pumps water to fill his storage pond several times a year. From there, his neighbours, who helped him build his storage pond can rent his motor pump to irrigate their rain-fed lands as well. 5.3.1.1.2 Crops on motor-pump irrigated land More than a twenty farmers of Kolobo and Gora use motor pumps to irrigate khat on rain fed lands. In Kolobo, many new khat plantations have been made since 2000. In early January, 1000 birr of khat can be harvested out of one qoti (1250 m 2) with the use of motor pumps. Farmers behave like rational entrepreneurs. One apparently “uneducated” farmer who planted khat trees five years ago said to me: “ It is still not worth for me to use motor pump. I would need to irrigate three times during more than three hours. It would cost me 600 birr and my khat trees are still too small to give important yields. I’ll use a motor pump in two years when they’ll be big enough. It will then be worth spending 600 birr for water ”.

79 5.3.1.1.3 Shortening trajectory of water Another use of motor pump is worth taking into account although it is not to irrigate rainfed lands. In Gora, some farmers (households of type n°2) use pumps during their water turn to gain time - and water - by shortening the trajectory of water. The following diagram shows how the use of a motor pump can allow shortening the former trajectory of water. With a shorter trajectory, there are less water losses and farmers can start irrigating faster.

Diagram 28 : How some farmers of Gora use motor pumps to shorten trajectory of irrigation water

Source: personal survey data 5.3.1.2 Owning a motor pump In the whole Burka Jalala area, four persons own a motor pump in 2006. These households belong to type n° 3 and the better-off fringe of household type n°2 Investing in a motor pump is profitable. Their cost (from 3000 to 5000 birr) is generally paid back within two years with two sources of cash: renting out the motor pump and cultivating cash crops. Owners rent out their motor pumps to farmers who cannot make such an investment Owners generally rent it out to an average number of ten persons at the cost of 25 to 30 birr/hour without gasoline or 40 to 45 birr with gasoline included. Most owners will accept being paid for the service (but not the gasoline) after selling of harvest products. Each user will need one to two hours, two to four times during dry season. This also means that farmers are able to harvest a cash crop when prices reach their peak. See annex 26 : example of household n°3 and motor pump use and ownership

80 Box 9 : Study case of a motor pump user and owner; History of Usmael Ahmed’s farm Usmael Ahmed is a farmer from the Gora area. In the early 80s, he inherited, as his only brother also, 5.5 qoti (6875m 2) out of which 2500 m 2 were irrigated by the Usmael canal and 4375 m 2 were rainfed lands in Ganda Gadi. On irrigated lands, he mostly cultivated maize in dry season followed by wheat crops during rainy season. On rainfed lands, Usmael cultivated khat year round, as well as maize and wheat during the rainy season. Unfortunately, rainfed khat could not be sold at good prices. That is the first reason why Usmael wished to irrigate his rainfed lands. In 1990, the Gora canal was lengthened by Usmael and other neighbors to reach lands of Ganda Gadi. But even though farmers of Ganda Gadi obtained a water right to irrigate these newly included lands in the canal’s command area, water flow was so weak in the canal’s tail end that irrigation was very poor and inefficient. In the 1990s, Usmael started to cultivate potato on rainfed lands during rainy season and on irrigated land during dry season instead of maize. In the late 1990s, in order to irrigate his rainfed plots of khat, he started to rent a motor pump to an outsider and then to the first local farmer to purchase a motor pump. He expanded his khat plots to an area of 2500 m 2. Competition for the water resource was low among users of the Usmael canal. As a consequence, it was easy for Usmael to pump water during the canal’s turn. With the sale of potato and irrigated khat, Usmael Ahmed considerably increased his income and was able to save money. Within several years, he was able to invest in the construction of a pond (built with the help of his neighbors) and a motor pump. He also became the mimalak of the Usmael canal 44 . During dry season, Usmael regularly pumps water up to Ganda Gadi from the Usmael canal when no other farmer uses it and stores it in his pond. He irrigates his khat fields and rents the pump out to his neighbors. It has been a good investment. As he gets important extra income from the sale of khat and the renting out of his pump, he has rapidly paid back his 4,000 birr expense. His neighbors are also very satisfied to have access to the water of his pond as they get good income from the sale of irrigated khat.

Diagram 29 : Historical change in Usmael Ahmed’s income

12000

10000 livestock 8000 pump

6000 grain

potato

income (birr) 4000 khat

2000

0 1980s 1990s 2000s

44 Actually, before he became mimalak, the canal was called magata gadi or the “canal down”. It gradually took his name as Usmael Ahmed gained control over it.

81 5.3.2 Cultivating more lands by sharecropping

As seen in 4.5.4, many farmers rent lands through different types of share cropping arrangements. Some farmers from Kolobo rent irrigated lands in Becheysa during dry season. However, there are also many farmers which rent rainfed lands in further areas. For example, some farmers hire rainfed lands in less population dense regions around Burka Jalala. Most times, their geographical location is linked to origins of one member of the family. Quite often, lands are hired in the native village of the farmer’s wife. There, they will plant wheat, barley (and more rarely potato) during rainy season. It seems that farmers prefer to cultivate staple crops on these hired lands. As they live far from the lands and surveillance tasks therefore limited, cash crops would face more theft problems. Farmers go to work there occasionally to plough, sow and weed. During the last days preceding harvest, farmers stay on the field night and day to watch for thieves and pest such as birds, rodents and monkeys. It is an additional support to food security in the context of land shortage. Farmers that sharecrop lands are generally from the type n°2. If they cultivate 1 to 2 qoti of rainfed lands with wheat or maize during rainy season, they become self sufficient in grain and need not buy some in the market. See annex 25: model household n°2 and sharecropping

5.4 STRATEGIES BASED ON NON FARMING ACTIVITIES

5.4.1 Taking up commercial activities: small shops and grain mills

Farmers with greater investment capacities have chosen to combine farming activities with different commercial activities. However, in Melka Jebdu, off-farm activities are quite limited. Most farmers are very poor and therefore, commerce is not so profitable. Even if it gives an extra source of income, commerce does not give much political power as it can be observed in bigger villages where merchants form strong local elites. The main non-farming activity in Melka Jebdu is the ownership of a small shop which sells basic products such as sugar, salt, oil, soap, cigarettes, grain and gasoline. Many of these products are contraband products brought in by donkeys from Somalia through the border market of Xinacsan. In the whole PA of Melka Jebdu, there are about 15 shops. This means that in average, there is one small shop for every 70 households. The second main activity is having a grain mill. The richest farmers have invested in grain mills to grind wheat, barley and sorghum. They charge the service per kilo of grain. The initial investment is very heavy but the activity is quite profitable. More than 95% of households use this service to grind their grain. Now, women only use their pestle and mortar for maize which can only be grinded manually. In the PA of Melka Jebdu, there are four grain mills, one for every 270 households.

82 Box 10 : History of Mohamed Aliyi’s farm and activites

At his marriage in 1988, Mohamed Aliyi received a part of his father’s land (0.56 Ha) and started to cultivate khat. With profits gained from the sale of khat, he saved enough money to buy an ox, a donkey and several goats. He started to bring goods from the district capital, Edjersa Goro (at two hours walking distance), for himself and on demand for his neighbors. This informal commerce gradually increased until he finally created his own shop in Burka Jalala. He exchanged goods against wheat during dry season (when the price of wheat is low: at 20 birr/10kg) with households without cash, and sold the wheat during rainy season (when grain reached 50 birr/10 kg) to the households facing food shortage. This was very profitable and soon enough, he created a bigger shop in the district’s capital where profits were easier to make. In 2005, he built a grain mill. He invested more than 29,000 birr to buy a mill and a motor. He charges 15 cents/kg of grinded grain. The mills open every afternoon. In g ana : he grinds 50 to 80 kg of grain per day and in bona : 100 to 250 kg/day. He pursues his farming activities with his sons on his 5000m2 of irrigated land and 625 m2 of rainfed lands by cultivating khat, potatoes, maize and wheat. He uses chemical fertilizers since 10 years, especially for potato. All his activities bring to his household an average sum of 14200 birr.

Diagram 30 : Distribution of Mohamed Aliyi’s income

shop; 4000 Potato; 5630

mill; 2748 khat; 997 livestock; 900

Source: survey data

See annex 27: example of household n°3 and non-farming activities

83 5.4.2 Selling labour force

This concerns the poorest category of farmers, the households of type n°1. They are characterized by the following aspects: • Little (less than 0,25 Ha) or no irrigated land at all. • In total, less than 0.4 Ha of land. • Insufficient food production for their family’s survival. • A limited amount of animals: no ox, and less than 5 sheep or goats. • Very little monetary incomes. As a consequence, they must sell their own labour force. There are basically two types of way of selling labour force. 5.4.2.1 Government programs First, people can work for government programs such as the Safety Net program, the Employment Generation System (EGS) or Meret.

Type of program Number beneficiaries in Melka Jebdu PA

EGS 60 families: 5.6% of households

Safety Net 200 families: 18.66% of households

MERET 400 people: 16.36% of working population

Source: data from Melka Jebdu’s development agents In EGS and Safety net, people were paid in cash (6 birr/day) until June 2006. Since then, food aid is distributed (3kg wheat/day) instead of cash. Actually, households must give 5 days of work per month per family member for the program. In a household of 6 members, 30 days of work must be given. These household will each then be entitled to:

-150 Kg of wheat/month/household - 2,5 Litre of oil/month - Pu lses and soya baby food may also be distributed.

5.4.2.1.1 EGS Ethiopia’s government Employment Generation Scheme aims to create employment by building sustainable productive assets (such as irrigation infrastructure and rural access roads to help market integration) and provide cash and food for work. However, this program is not constant. It is only put into action when there is food shortage during the period from July to October or due to climatic accidents. The poorest

84 families are chosen by the PA cabinet. They participate in public works in exchange of food aid. In 1998 of the Ethiopian calendar (2005-2006), 60 families have benefited of EGS. 5.4.2.1.2 Safety Net program In Ethiopia, the Safety Net program started in 2005 with five millions beneficiaries. In 2006, the program targets 8.3 millions persons (more than 10% of Ethiopia’s population) and has an annual budget of 275 million US$. The main donors are the European Union, the World Bank and the World Food Program (supported by the US, UK and Canada). In Jarso, the program has an effect on 21590 persons corresponding to 20% of the population. In this program, there is two types of support : direct support for the elder and the sick and support for publics works. In this case, members must work in exchange of food or financial aid. The selection of beneficiaries based on socio-economic criteria goes through a long administrative process: 4 dursagare (administrative hamlet leader) evaluate who has to participate in the program. The village leader ( abbaganda ) must then validate this selection. Finally, the PA’s food security committee must also agree. But there may be conflicts about this selection as the poorest may sometimes be put aside to privilege relatives of local elites. 5.4.2.1.3 Meret program The MERET (Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition to More Sustainable Livelihoods) program’s activity is pioneering food-for-assets, with over one million beneficiaries. Funded by the World Food Program, the MERET program focuses on managing environmental resources to increase food productivity in food-insecure communities. In Ethiopia, MERET currently assists an average of 1.3 million beneficiaries in 600 different communities each year. Its objective is making it possible for poor families to gain and preserve assets, and enabling households that depend on degraded natural resources for their food security to make a shift to more sustainable livelihoods (WFP, 2006). In the field, the program does not focus on poverty but on reforestation. As a consequence, volunteers are not chosen on socio-economic criteria but rather on working abilities. The PA’s committee of conservation of natural resource (formed by 7 members: the PA chairman, the PA’s development agents, leaders of the women’s cooperative and of rural youth, elders etc…) chooses the areas which must be reforested. Teams of 5 to 10 members and one team leader are formed to do the work: building terraces (soil and stone bands) and planting trees (90% cypress, which are grown in the PA’s nursery). Volunteers are paid with food aid (wheat) for each meter of terrace built. Table 15 : Meret remuneration

AMOUNT OF WORK REMUNERATION

1 km of soil band 450 kg of wheat

1 km of stone band 750 kg of wheat

Source: Development agents of Melka Jebdu

85 5.4.2.2 Employment in Nole Poor farmers may also sell their labor force in the neighboring district of Nole. Its capital, Kombolcha is a prosperous khat and vegetable market and an important point along the contraband road. Local merchants own several hectares of land (with khat, sorghum, vegetables as main crops) and hire labor. Surprisingly, it seems that the poorest farmers are not beneficiaries of government programs such as EGS, Safety Net and Meret. This can be explained by the fact that this category of farmers cannot afford to “wait” for food aid. Due to poor management and insufficient human resources, food aid delivery is constantly delayed of several months. As a consequence, the poorest farmers prefer to work in Nole where they will be paid day to day for their work. The poorest farmers are generally families with more than five children. They do not own irrigated land and have little or rocky rainfed lands. They own very little livestock and do not buy chemical fertilizers as they fear to spiral debts.

Box 11 : History of Abrahim Hassano’s household and impact of outside employment This man inherited very little lands as they were four brothers to share their father’s land. He has 625 m2 of irrigated land cultivated with khat. On his rainfed lands (3125m2), he cultivates two cycles of grain per year or maize only on the rocky soils. But nevertheless, grain production is not enough for satisfy the food needs of the family’s seven members. Cash obtained from the sale of khat is not even enough to buy all the extra grain needed. They do not have any livestock to sell. Outside labor is absolutely necessary for this family’s survival. The male head of the household goes to Nole to work in large farms. With 120 of labor days per year, the household is able to buy the extra grain needed for food and have 865 birr (about 100 US$) for all the other needs of the household during one year. This very limited sum demonstrates the extreme level of poverty of this type of families, their incapacity to finance their children’s studies and to invest in risky agricultural innovations…

See annex 23: model household n°1 and outside labor

86 5.5 MIGRATION STRATEGIES

Migration somehow contradicts the Boserup theory about population growth and innovation and rather joins the Malthusian narrative. Demographic pressure may be so high that innovation may not be sufficient to withstand it, and as a consequence, some farmers are constrained to leave. 5.5.1 To cities or other villages

Migration to other cities and villages is seldom the case now. After the land reform, many formers wokils and Amharas left Melka Jebdu to settle as merchants in Jarso’s capital: Edjersa Goro. Also, during research work, I have heard several farmers reporting their brothers’ migration to other rural areas with less population. There are also rare cases of families who have chosen to be resettled by the government of other regions of Ethiopia. Migration to cities is rare. Farmers are highly uneducated and Ethiopian cities do not generate much employment. It is extremely rare and only involves farmers which had the privilege to follow studies until high school or more. 5.5.2 The Saudi dream

Migration to Saudi is a more common phenomenon. Young unmarried farmers try to migrate to Saudi through Djibouti and Yemen. There, they are hired as cattle keepers or agricultural workers. Monthly salaries (100 to 200 US$ per month) are extremely high compared to what they may gain as a farmer in Melka Jebdu. These men will try to settle there and send money to their families in Ethiopia. But many times, they are caught by migration authorities and deported back to Ethiopia. They may try to migrate to Saudi again or come back to their native area. In some cases, they will have saved up several thousand birrs and get married. Unmarried women also migrate to Saudi and work there as house servants. They sent money to their families in Ethiopia. In the actual study area of Burka Jalala, about 10% of total number of households have had at least one child which has migrated permanently or temporarily to Saudi.

87 5.6 SUMMARY OF FARMING HOUSEHOLDS ’ STRATEGIES

The diagram below graphically summarizes the most common strategies of our previously-defined 3 types of households. The vertical axe represents food self-sufficiency and the horizontal one represents cash income. Basically, we can classify strategies in 3 types: one aiming at increasing grain production (thus food self-sufficiency), another aiming at earning more cash and another which aims both these goals at the same time. Diagram 31 : Summary of farmers’ individual strategies in Burka Jalala

Source: author The diagram shows that strategies of each type of households have different objectives (see slope of dotted arrows). For example, households of type n°1 aim first at food security and tend to prefer food self sufficiency. But as households also have to satisfy all their other needs (to ensure renewal), they need to increase their cash earnings as well. Households of type n°2 aim at the capacity to save money. Though some efforts go towards food sufficiency, most are oriented towards earning more cash in order to have a certain saving capacity for minor investments and resisting to bad harvest years. Finally, as households of type n°3 are already food self-sufficient, their objective is mainly to increase their cash income for larger investments (pump, shop, mill, collective transport vehicles) and start poly-activity… Indeed, there is a strong tendency of households n°3 to become service providers. NB: The renewal line has been calculated according to the households’ most bare and basic needs. See annex. The saving capacity line is a moving line and cannot be defined by an exact sum as households tend to spend more for their “basic” needs when they have more income. See annex 31: basic needs of households

88 5.7 STRATEGIES OF FARMERS TOWARDS THE IRRIGATION PROJECT

5.7.1 The farmers’ enthusiasm for the project

All farmers are enthusiastic about the project. Even if they have worries, they always show their willingness to cooperate when authorities are present. They often trust in the skills of engineers and do not dare to speak aloud their worries. For them, the project of canal lining will reduce water losses and make the water flow faster. It is difficult to present in detail the strategies of farmers towards the project. Farmers had very little information about it and different rumors circulated about the design. Unfortunately, the project was so delayed that it was impossible to present the final scheme’s design and observe worries, complaints and conflicts arising from it. However, I will try to present the farmers’ anticipations and suggest their possible future strategies… 5.7.2 The project: a source of employment

Though it is a short term perspective, I will evoke the point of view of many local men and women who hope that the project will generate employment through a government program such as Safety Net or EGS. 5.7.3 Claiming water rights for Kolobo people with rainfed lands

Some farmers of Kolobo with rainfed lands only are already anticipating the project to claim new water rights to pump water. Their main spokesman is the village leader (abbaganda ) of Guyyama 45 . He already takes water by “force” for himself from the Kolobo canal to irrigate vegetable plots on rainfed lands. It is interesting to observe that the village leader openly told me that he uses his political power to take water “by force” from the official users of the canal. He claims that all the people of Kolobo should have water rights if they wish to irrigate their own lands, even those who do not belong to the Imar clan.

45 Guyyama is the administrative name of the area of Kolobo.

89 5.7.4 Protecting rights on the minor springs

Map 9 : Hypothetical design of the new irrigation scheme One rumor about the project design has informed farmers that in the rehabilitation project, two canals only would be lined. On the right side of the valley, Kolobo would form one canal with Nia’a. On the left side, Gora and Becheysa would form one canal. This new design would strongly have an impact on the current head parts of the two dowstream canals of Nia’a and Becheysa. It also brings farmers to ask how the water from the minor springs would be used. Farmers worry that if water of the spring of Burka Jalala goes through the main canals (and not through the river bed as before), the minor springs may have insufficient flow to reach Becheysa or Nia’a. They claim that engineers have measured the flow of these small springs in May 2006 during a rainy period which did not correspond to the reality of dry season. Engineers have responded to farmers by saying that water from the minor spring could be stored in a small pond during the area’s right and then be allocated to users.

5.7.5 Keeping sovereignty of canals

Keeping sovereignty of canal is also the worry of users of the downstream canals. With the junction of their canals with an upstream canal, they fear to loose decisional power and face more water theft problems. For example, during the water right of the Becheysa canal, in order to prevent theft from other canals, one user watches the intakes of Kolobo and Gora canals at the spring of Burka Jalala, while another watches the intake of the Nia’a canal. But if the canals of Gora and Becheysa are connected, surveillance will become more complex and water theft from upstream more difficult to detect.

90 5.7.6 More water: what for?

The key question is: if canals are lined and more water flows into them, what will farmers do with it? There are different strategies: • Being able to irrigate the same surface of vegetable plots more frequently than before in order to boost yields. • Being able to expand their surface cultivated with vegetables during dry season: they will plant more vegetables and less maize. • Being included in the water sharing system and obtain water rights. Some reactions may seem irrational at first. For example, even if canals are elevated and new areas become potentially irrigable, most of these lands are grazing or forest lands which are extremely rocky and useless for agriculture anyhow. This project will barely increase the irrigation scheme’s command area. But the central point is allocation of water rights to new users: if one owns lands in a canal’s command area, he is generally entitled to a water right. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say how many new users would be included in the sharing system, without having being informed about the specific design. However, the PA leader has reported that this would only include 3 new users in total because most upper lands along the canal and Becheysa canals are already owned by official users. 5.7.7 Fear of change

There is a certain fear of change. Water users do not wish to change their sharing system. They continuously recall the system which has been built by their wise ancestors more than fifty years ago. They wish to keep the same water allocation calendar among the defined groups of users and the same rules. Change would provoke errors, conflicts and a long period of adjustments and adaptation that farmers are not prepared for. Even to manage new problems such as maintenance costs linked to cement, users count on the afosha system to collect money from users in case of maintenance operations.

91 5.7.8 Summary of interest groups

The diagram below represents the interests of the different groups of water users of the irrigation scheme on an upstream-downstream transect. It shows that people who currently have more water rights than the others fear the project may confiscate their privileges. It also demonstrates that upper people from Kolobo who do not have water rights hope they may obtain new water pumping rights with the project. The diagram also shows possibilities of upstream/downstream conflicts and difficulties about the redefinition of the minor springs’ water allocation. It also puts into light that the groups of users who do not have a strong leader (such as the Nia’a water users) are less informed and involved in the project although users are interested by it. On the contrary, groups with powerful leaders are already starting to formulate their claims. The leaders may even influence their group of users according to their own personal interests (example: in Becheysa). Diagram 32 : The main interest groups around the modernization project of Burka Jalala’s irrigation scheme

Source: author

92 6 INNOVATION AND FARMERS OF MELKA JEBDU

As all development issues, the innovation issue is highly complex. Working on innovation in the development world requires a highly critical mind, a constant vigilance and also “mental” flexibility. It requires to become aware of our own dogmatic point of views, and to put them aside in order to understand processes of change in rural areas.

There are many theories and many contradictions and there is no “ready to think” formula about innovation that would be true for all cases. First, I will present different approaches of innovation. The final point is not to choose one of them. It is rather to keep them all in our minds in the goal of being perfectly aware when working and building new debates for better projects and policies.

I will expose different analysis on various innovation issues coming from a wide range of authors. But to go beyond theory and rhetorical effects, I will try to put them into light according to my working experience in Ethiopia.

6.1 THE FACTORS OF INNOVATION

In this section, I will expose some of the factors that encourage innovation. Bibliographic references will be accompanied of observations of all types of agricultural innovations that took place or are currently taking place in Burka Jalala. 6.1.1 Agricultural change and demographic pressure 6.1.1.1 Summary of the Malthusian narrative The reasoning of Malthus and his disciples starts from the initial hypothesis that the amount of food available is little extensible and as a consequence, this lack of resiliency is the main factor that defines the population growth rate. The neo-Malthusian theory has resuscitated the old idea that population growth must be considered as a variable that depends especially on agricultural production. Famine is here viewed as the main factor that regulates population growth rate. The neo-Malthusian narrative considers that demographic pressure almost mechanically intensifies environmental deterioration and soil erosion. However, many examples demonstrate the opposite phenomenon: in Kenya, Tiffen and al. (1994) show that there are cases where “ more people, less erosion ” because as Kandeh and Richards (1996) explain about Sierra Leone, “ more people equals more care ” (cited by Rossi, 1997)… 6.1.1.2 Challenging the neo-Malthusian narrative: example of Ethiopia’s environmental reclamation programs Since Ethiopia’s famine in 1985, the neo-Malthusian narrative has been used by government and donors to design the country’s environmental policy. An ambitious program of environmental reclamation was launched, backed by the largest food-for-work program in Africa, the second largest in the world. The narrative justified the rapid, massive and widespread use of standardized environmental packages without regard to regional or local agro-ecological conditions, and research on their environmental impact or economic costs and benefits. (Hoben, 1995 ).

93 According to Hoben: “ At the height of the program, 800,000 people were provided of 100,000 tons of food. By the early 1990’s, peasants had built more than one million km of bunds on farm land and had terraced almost half a million km of hillside. In addition, 80,000 ha of hillside had been enclosed and it was claimed that 300,000 ha had been planted to trees 46 . Hundreds of tree nurseries had been established with the capacity to produce an astounding 100 million seedlings per year ”. Nevertheless, according to the author, in retrospect, much of these costly efforts were wasted or counterproductive. According to several impact studies, they have not met people’s agricultural needs or halted degradation 47 . Hoben (1995) has summarized the narrative of population increase and environmental damage in what he calls the “narrative of Africa as a spoiled Eden”: “Long ago when there were fewer people in Ethiopia, indigenous farming systems and technology enabled them to make a living without seriously depleting their natural resources. Over the present century, human and animal populations have grown. Indigenous farming systems have been unable to keep up. Population has exceeded carrying capacity, causing ever-increasing and perhaps irreversible environmental damage. Only a massive investment in environmental reclamation can reverse this process. People are unable to make this investment without outside assistance because they do not know how and because they are too poor to forego for future income and to provide for their children.” (Hoben, 1995) The point of the discussion is certainly not to deny Ethiopia’s high population growth rate, its increasing poverty and the unfortunate existence of famine and soil degradation. But the main problem of the narrative and its implementation in Ethiopia is the absence of acknowledgment and mention of indigenous practices and techniques (of agroforestry, terracing, run-offs, irrigation etc…) which completely basks elites in their pejorative view of peasantry. Bringing the core of the problem to peasants’ ignorance and inability to adapt themselves to environmental changes contributes to the denial of possible side effects of the Derg’s land nationalizations and restrictions on trade and on farming strategies (such as labour migration and sharecropping) which have weakened rural households’ food security… Unfortunately, these visions have survived to the fall of the Derg and are still well alive in the new regime and its shaping of development and environmental policies. A valorization of peasantry’s knowledge and innovation capacities would be most constructive, together with an adequate policy on management of natural resources… 6.1.1.3 Boserup’s theory: Demographic pressure triggers agriculture change In her study on the effects of demographic change on agriculture (1965), Boserup takes the opposite position of Malthus and considers demographic pressure as the driving force of change. Population growth is therefore an incitation to adopt more productive techniques that can provide for needs of an increasing number of people. She demonstrates the influence of population density on relations between land, labor and capital. She first starts her discussion with the issue of land use and its relation with labor. The best yields per hour of labor are obtained with more extensive systems where land is more abundant than labor. As population increases and land-fallowing periods shorten, harvest

46 Stahl, 1990:5 cited in Hoben A. 1995

47 Herweg, 1992 cited in Hoben A. 1995

94 yields and soil fertility often decrease while erosion and weeds problems may appear. The people must then choose to invest more labor or more capital (new tools, irrigation, fertilizers etc…) on their farm, or otherwise migrate elsewhere to find other lands or work. With this first option, labor productivity decreases but on the other hand, crop production per person per year increases. Also, Boserup exposes the problem of “the vicious circle of scattered populations”. In these areas, transport prices are so high, that it makes crops’ farm gate prices lower and outside products more expensive 48 . With higher population densities, the opportunities to sell, to buy and to collect information increase. The adoption of more productive techniques means that farmers can buy and sell more and that non-farming economic activities expand. Finally, the last main point of Boserup’s discussion is the relation between demographic pressure and land tenure. As land becomes scarce, the notion of private property becomes stronger. According to Boserup, land tenure changes under the effects of population growth, following this process: from free access, to community-controlled access to private and alienable property. 6.1.2 The importance of government policies in agricultural development

If population growth is a necessary condition to agricultural development and farmer innovation, it is not a sufficient one. The process must also be supported by adequate governmental policies 49 (Tiffen, 1997). With the study case of the region of Machakos in Kenya, Tiffen demonstrates that farmers can adapt themselves, even when population growth is very high. According to the author, with the increase of population density, ideas circulated faster between farmers, people started working together in public works to improve roads and schools, local markets expanded and selling products became more profitable. According to Tiffen, farmers can find their own ways of investing if the overall political environment provides them support, especially in the three following aspects: • As all investments are built on the hope of future gains, policies must protect land tenure rights on the long term. • Providing information on new speculations and techniques can be useful but it is also important to develop general knowledge of people and their management aptitudes so that they can choose the best investments. • Trade must be facilitated so that agricultural income can increase. In the example of Burka Jalala, it is undeniable that with the 1975 “land to the tiller” reform which abolished landlord property rights and sharecropping arrangements, land tenure became secure and this strongly incited farmers to invest in khat plantations and construction of irrigation canals etc… This political change generated collective and individual dynamics that contributed to intensify agricultural production in order to match farmers’ individual demands.

48 Though population density is high in Burka jalala, transport conditions are so bad that this phenomenon is taking place there.

49 Sometimes, natural conditions may be so harsh that agricultural development is not even possible. However, in the case of Burka Jalala, pedological and climatic conditions are favorable to it.

95 6.1.3 Agricultural innovation and social structures

Darré JP (1996) focuses on farmers’ social structures and the link with their invention of agricultural practices in France. According to this sociologist, as thought is a social action, the choice made by an individual actually comes from the interactions between several individuals. Every social group produces norms that frame its members’ ways of acting and seeing things. A group never submits itself to an exterior norm without transforming it: the simple vertical diffusion of techniques cannot exist (Darré, 1996). This can also be observed in Burka Jalala. For example, water harvesting ponds are built under the incentive of the bureau of agriculture which distributes free plastic covers. But it is most interesting to notice that some of them are not built in this purpose but to store water which is ascended from canals or minor springs with motor-pumps. A new form of using ponds and thus a new norm is created for the use of these artificial ponds. We can also speak of an “innovation by using”. Norms and rules are ever-moving and have many variants according to situations and individual strategies. They constantly change under the pressure of some members of the group which may be, in unequal ways, co-producers of the system of norms. Although production of knowledge is a social matter which is not restricted to one specific category, it is produced with unequal social possibilities by the whole society. Individuals have possibilities of pulling through which vary, not only according to their own means, but also according to the possibilities of choice which are given to them by the local group. The possibilities of influence of members to modify the system of norms by introducing new variants are also unequal (Darré, 1996). In Burka Jalala, it is also the case. For example, concerning rights to pump water from the Kolobo canal, there is much pressure from Kolobo canal’s official users to limit the pumping of water by the others as they fear “exceptional” rights might be the foundations of future official water right for claiming pump users. However, the village leader of Guyama, though he is not an official user of the canal, has the power to impose his own rule. He unashamedly pumps water from Kolobo canal official users’ rights by using political force. The main hypothesis of Darré is that a relation can be found between the collective aptitudes of a group to react to changes and the morphology of the network of inter-influence which is specific of the local group. For him, a group’s heritage defines itself more by the group’s original manner of changing ways of conceiving and of doing things, than by what it knows to do. In the case of Burka Jalala, I believe that the community has an important social capital. Relations between neighbors and relatives are very strong. Villagers meet each other and discuss of important social issues every day. One reason can be linked to the area’s mountainous location. Indeed, in isolated areas, inhabitants have generally more willingness of autonomy and marginality and this enhances building of social capital. Khat consumption can also be a mean for reinforcing and expressing the sense of belonging of groups. That is why in this area, one cannot understand local society without considering khat. I think that khat consumption highly contributes to the building of the social capital. At the beginning, I considered khat chewing as a daily leisure activity that only helped farmers to make the day pass faster as plots were small and on-farm agricultural labor quite limited. I initially thought that chewing khat was a useless activity. It is only with time and

96 observation that I understood the power of khat: it encourages social gatherings, stimulates concentration and reduces verbal inhibition. It therefore strongly facilitates animated debates. My role is not to judge such a practice and the possible addiction to the drug but I can objectively appreciate its positive effects on social dynamics, especially on institutional innovations. I have assisted to meetings of different orders and I have often observed that people are able to imagine new solutions, change rules and practices even though there is strong attachment to decisions taken by elders in the past…One hypothesis is that khat contributes to soften rights of elders, authorizing youth to express themselves and to propose new ideas that can be validated by the group. Photo 7 : Khat, a factor of social capital. Meeting of irrigation authorities in Burka Alifif. Credit: Angèle Legall

Box 12 : Kava and its effects on local political and social life in the Pacific Islands. The important role of stimulant substances in social life is not specific to Hararghe. In the Pacific islands of Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, kava (the root of the perennial shrub Piper methysticum ) is also used as a stimulant substance in local political and religious life. According to Peterson, kava smoothens ranks and social, sexual and political hierarchy. Kava drinking is an important part of formal discussions and decision-making in villages. In Polynesia and Micronesia, when given as a present, kava also establishes new social links and restores degraded social relations. Ceremonies reestablish peace. Finally, the tranquilizing effects of the drug help creative and decision- making processes and serve as a model of good social relations Preparation of kava follows a precise and complex set of rules which reflects the complexity of power relations. This substance facilitates social and political life. Initially considered sacred and used exclusively in religious rituals for a small circle, kava has gradually lost its ritualistic dimension. As its consumption expanded, it is now also used informally for recreational purpose for all kinds of social groups. The lost of sense in the consumption of kava has been said to bring on negative effects such as drug abuse, addiction, laziness etc… It is very interesting to note that khat consumption has followed the same evolution.

97 6.1.4 Agricultural innovations in Burka Jalala

In section 0, I have exposed the agricultural history of the area of Burka Jalala. It demonstrates how Oromo pastoralist settlers gradually became farmers, intensified their agriculture and expanded irrigation to meet the food needs of the increasing population. These changes are summarized in the diagram below. Diagram 33 : Technical innovations in agriculture of Burka Jalala and link with population density

The introduction of cash crops is another key element of farmers’ innovation. This was facilitated by the regional development of transports and of market opportunities made possible by the initiative of local authorities but also by population growth. Selling profitable cash crops such as khat and potatoes largely contributed to food security of farming households. Households were able to buy grain easily and save money in order to survive during severe droughts. They were also able to buy outside products such as fertilizers and invest in new tools (motor pumps…) in the nearby cities of Harar and Haramaya. The last question would be on the effects of food aid (see interrogative arrow of Diagram 33). Indeed, during periods of severe drought, food production does not match the needs of local population. Food aid is provided by government “food for work” programs to a great number of families of Burka Jalala. If we take the problem from the other end, we can ask ourselves if the systematic and constant distribution of food aid, even during years of good harvest, can inhibit innovation and increase farmers’ dependency? Assistancialist strategies are not elements which encourage innovation but on the contrary, can inhibit it. These strategies can be based on government aid through employment programs and food distribution, or on money transfers from relatives who have migrated. With outside help, farmers may tend to stop investing in agricultural activities and thus agricultural change may be slowed. However, this is far from being always the case. For example, money which is sent by the diaspora can also give farmers the investment capacities they had lacked until then and push aside some constraints…Poverty alleviation is of course always a favorable condition for change and innovation…

98 6.1.5 Complexity of innovation

In the case of Burka Jalala as in most other cases, innovation and change are complex processes which cannot be explained by simple cause and effect relations. It is actually the result of a complex combination of interacting factors: population density, pressure on different natural resources (land, water, wood…), the political environment (than can ensure through different policies, security of land access and of resource use, agricultural support, rural development etc…), economical conditions (which can facilitate expansion of specific crops, access to inputs and to markets…), proximity of markets and of various types of services (education, credit, technical advice, market information etc…), roads and communications, and finally the internal functioning of the local society (its regulation capacities and possibilities of individual and collective initiatives etc…). Though innovation is the result of a complex set of factors and conditions, a boundary is often created between so-called endogenous and exogenous innovations.

6.2 ABOUT ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS INNOVATIONS…

6.2.1 A relative boundary

According to the analysis made by JP Chauveau (1999a), two contradictory presuppositions exist about innovation in the development world. One of them considers that farmers are doomed without technical innovation. It also overestimates the exogenous determinants of innovations. Most extension policies in the rural world of developing countries have been built on these old theories of modernization and Ethiopia is still one of them. In the other presupposition, endogenous capacities of invention, innovation and adaptation to the instable environment of farmers may also be overvalued. This can lead to the extreme point of view of “ideological populism” 50 that considers that only endogenous demand of innovation leads to a real innovation process. JP Chauveau (1999) points out the limits of these extreme approaches of innovation by affirming that empirical observation on innovations in the field refutes both theories. He also calls to be cautious when drawing the boundary line between exogenous and endogenous innovations as it may be very relative and clear. As consequence, he recommends not to compel a strict dichotomy of exogenous innovations (provoked by outside elements) and endogenous innovations (produced by the local environment). 6.2.2 Example of the introduction of potato cultivation in Burka Jalala

I will illustrate this last point with the example of the introduction of potato crops in my study area in Burka Jalala. Was it an exogenous or an endogenous innovation? Obviously, the first potatoes came from the outside. The introduction of the new crop was encouraged by the growing demand of the Somali market and the main objective of farmers was to cultivate potato as a cash crop for outside markets. In this sense, it can be considered as an exogenous innovation. But potato was brought in by local farmers themselves. These innovators had more information, more relations in market points and more investment capacities than other

50 Olivier de Sardan (1990) criticized Chambers and Richards on their ideological populism. Cited by Chauveau JP, 1999a.

99 farmers, but it was their own decision. No governmental policy or any NGO incentive supported the introduction of the new crop. Farmers developed their own know-hows about potato cultivation by communicating with other farmers and by trial and error method. In this sense, it can also be considered as an endogenous innovation… This example as many others, shows the obsolescence of the boundary that developers sometimes draw between exogenous and endogenous.

6.3 CONFRONTING THE REACTIONARY AND PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES: THE STUDY CASE OF BURKA JALALA

In their bibliographical analysis, Yung and Chauveau (1995) put into light the two main innovation narratives. I will expose them because the narratives have strong impact on the conception of development actions. First, I will objectively present the progressive and reactionary narratives. Second, it will define my personal position and use my arguments to think about the possible consequences of the rehabilitation project of Burka Jalala. 6.3.1 The Progressive and the Reactionary Innovation narratives 6.3.1.1 The progressive narrative

In the progressive narrative, Yung and Chauveau have distinguished two poles: the positivist and the basist pole.

The positivist pole : For the positivists, innovation comes from scientific advances. This also corresponds to the conception of a vertical “top-down” diffusionism of propositions of innovation which has long marked development organizations. This is the case of the agricultural development policy of the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture, despite much rhetoric for more demand- driven and participatory approaches to agricultural development.
The basist pole : The other pole of the progressive narrative was formed to respond to the failure of vertical diffusionism of innovation. The basists focus on organizational innovation. They consider that a better organization of farmers facilitates individual and collective initiatives and technical innovations. 6.3.1.2 The reactionary narrative: The rhetoric of criticizing change has been analyzed by Hirschman. From this author’s analysis of change, Yung and Chauveau (1993) have elucidated three main points of attack of innovation and change: the thesis of perverse effects, the thesis of inanity and the thesis of endangerment. The thesis of negative side-effects affirms that any development or modernization action that aims at improving the situation of farmers actually ends by aggravating it. The thesis of inanity can be summarized by the following motto: “The more things change, the more they stay the same”. Innovation is said to be only an illusion. The main arguments are based on recuperation and social parasitism. The thesis of endangerment is based on an idealization of traditional societies. Innovations are perceived as a danger to their equilibrium: they provoke social destruction, loss of traditional values and of cultural identities.

100 6.3.2 Personal positioning about innovation 6.3.2.1 The reactionary narrative: a sluggish vision of rural society? The reactionary narrative seems to be a dangerous justification of social and technical inertness. The systematic argument of negative side-effects is a defeatist point of view about change which can even lead to nihilism. In the field of creation of social organizations (for commercialization, water management etc…), the thesis of inanity can sometimes be observed through “recuperation” or “social parasitism” processes. For example, after rehabilitation projects of irrigation schemes, Water User Associations are officially created to manage the new scheme, in order to satisfy requirements of funding organizations. But in some cases, it can just be window dressing: management of water is operated by the same traditional organizations and following the same rules (recalling the “recuperation” argument). In other cases, Water User Associations can become truly effective but the leaders and privileges of the local elite remain the same (recalling the “social parasitism”). However, these phenomena do not always take place. In fact, social re-organization is a complex process. It is not because the leaders stay the same that the social organization and its rules remain the same. Also, it is not because local elites are stable that recuperation or social parasitism takes place. Stability of local leaders is not necessarily a sign of corruption. In fact, in many cases, it is rather a sign of solidity of social structures and unity. For example, in the irrigation scheme of Burka Alifif where the modernization project has been completed in September 2006, local elite and water management leaders have remained the same. But there are many discussions to reorganize water distribution and to reform water rights for the general interest of all water users. Finally, the thesis of endangerment is without foundation. This point of view constantly sticks to researchers as with long stays on the field and increasing sympathy for farmers, we sometimes tend to idealize traditional societies and wish they stay “pure”. But it is a total illusion. In fact, even before World War II, Malinowski 51 had already written that “ the fiction of non-contaminated indigenous must be put aside from field research and study. It is undeniable that non-contaminated indigenous do not exist anywhere ”. It is also an agrarian vision which considers that farmers have a systematic repulsion to risk and innovation and prefer to reproduce their traditional way of life. But, along this thesis, it has been demonstrated how on the contrary, farmers can have entrepreneurial logics and adopt new strategies and innovations… Indeed, it is not because change can provoke side effects that it must be refused as a whole. That is why, from my point of view, the reactionary narrative shows strong limits and is incompatible with development. Innovation helps solve problems but always brings new ones also. This should not make us go against change but should rather make us more active in finding solutions to cope with the new problems. 6.3.2.2 A balance between the two poles of the progressive narrative Between the two extreme basist and positivist poles, a progressive vision of innovation exists that can very well fit to the case of Burka Jala and many others. It is just as impossible to think about technical transfers without social modalities to appropriate, adapt and normalize them as to think about a social group which would be completely hermetic to

51 In Malinowski, 1970 : The dynamic of cultural change, an inquiry into race relations in Africa. Cited by Olivier de Sardan, 1995.

101 outside information that could help to solve some of their problems. Indeed, both technological contributions and new organizational modalities can be very useful and constructive in innovation processes. This is particularly true in irrigated agriculture where technical upgrading of irrigation structures must take place simultaneously with institutional innovations in water management. Even if the reactionary narrative has been put aside, it is important for all developers not to idealize change, to be cautious during innovation processes and to anticipate possible negative impacts. In the case of Burka Jalala and other irrigation schemes such as Burka Alifif, it would be irresponsible to idealize a rehabilitation project without asking “What could be the possible negative effects of the project and how can we cope with them?”

6.4 WHAT CHANGES WITH THE BURKA JALALA PROJECT ?

What elements can be taken from the discussion above to build another narrative which corresponds best to the local context? 6.4.1 What vision of innovation to adopt for the Burka Jalala project?

The progressive narrative subtends development with its dynamic point of view. It is somehow necessary to believe in when working in development as it justifies the presence and the actions of developers. Their motto is not to “make things better”? If vertical diffusion of innovations has proved to be inefficient when local society is not interested by its propositions, developers nevertheless tend to share the positivist idea that technical advance improves peoples’ lives. And how could we refuse this idea when noting the convenience of electricity, telecommunications, roads and other technical advances in rich countries? The rehabilitation project of the irrigation scheme of Burka Jalala is also based on this hypothesis: the lining of canals will participate in improving farmers’ lives and food security. The basist point of view is very constructive as it focuses on social organization. In their analysis of the progressive narrative, Yung and Chauveau conclude that the belief in an organic link between technical advance and social advance is essential . This brings us to the conclusion that the rehabilitation project of the irrigation scheme of Burka Jalala will only succeed and have positive effects on farming households if the social organizations that manage water distribution and resolve conflicts are strong enough to adapt to the changes provoked by the project and to continue insuring a relatively fair distribution of water . For example, the lining of canal can be accompanied of organizational support provided by ODA, development agents or workers from the Agricultural Bureau to adapt water allocation modalities among canals, groups of users and individual users to technical changes. 6.4.2 Anticipating possible new problems linked with the project

The mission report made by GRET in November 2006 points out possible side effects of rehabilitation projects: impact on irrigation scheme operation from the basin to household level, irrigation scheme maintenance, internal organization and institutional insertion. In Burka Jalala, one important point is the question of maintenance. Lining canals with cement provoke necessity of new technical know-hows which may not be available locally. Maintenance costs will not only be labor-based, but will also need monetary participation of farmers in order to finance purchase of cement for repairs and pay skilled labor. Farmers have

102 already thought about this problem and they foresee to collect monetary contributions of users by the social residential organization called “ afosha ”. This traditional organization already collect contributions but money is generally used for solidarity purposes among neighbors: support a family after death, wedding expenses, and maintenance of the mesquite… Another pertinent question is the institutional insertion of the irrigation scheme. Long N. (1989: 184) affirms that: “ In the context of modern irrigation development, even the so- called farmer-managed systems cannot be understood as stable and integrated parts of local society and farming systems … Irrigation development is thus part of the complex and dynamic processes of incorporation, social differentiation and State penetration so characteristic of present-day Third World societies.” With the rehabilitation project, the traditional 100% farmer-managed irrigation scheme becomes State-penetrated with the support of administrative organizations and the intervention of OIDA in the building of the scheme and its official engagement for major maintenance operations which are beyond farmers’ capacities. The limits between the responsibility of farmers and the responsibility of OIDA and the administration are blurry. In the case of Burka Jalala, GRET’s recommendation about providing support to define the roles of each party is highly relevant. Also, as shown on Map 9, trajectories of canals will be greatly modified with the rehabilitation project. The previously well-established calendar of water allocation among canals and groups of users may thus have to be adapted. For downstream areas (Becheysa and Nia’a), water rights of the spring of Burka Jalala and water rights of the minor springs will become separate at all times and will have to be defined. New rules will have to be decided to include new users, new lands, to modify water rights etc.... Finally, we should not force the formation of Water User Associations if the traditional organizations of water management are solid and efficient. As said before, one effect could be inanity but it could even tend to the collapse of all organizations that manage irrigation water. The idea is to allow traditional organizations to evolve at their rhythm into formal Water Users Associations so that they can be strengthened in the long run. Local actors must accompany the process of change in order to be protected from external demands that could weaken them (protection), to be allowed of progressively increasing their know-how of managing revitalized infrastructures (capacity building) and to be linked progressively into institutions, with other actors involved in irrigation (normalization).

6.5 ACCOMPANYING INNOVATION PROCESSES

6.5.1 Considering Innovation as a total social phenomenon

Some actors of development may tend to focus observation and activities on technical innovations. Agricultural development studies often start their analysis on the introduction of more efficient tools or products such as improved varieties, fertilizers, irrigation infrastructures etc… Of course, this also includes new knowledge, practices and techniques. The technical dimension of innovation is just one of its multiple dimensions; organizational, institutional, social, political, economical etc… Indeed, all types of innovation are embedded within one another. A technical innovation always comes with an institutional innovation and vice versa. According to Darré, innovation is therefore a social total phenomenon. One example of Burka Jalala is the introduction of potato cultivation. First, the introduction of new crops also meant the creation of new cultivation norms. Also, the development of this crop has had an impact on irrigation practices with more frequent, longer irrigations and new techniques. Irrigation norms have thus been modified. The increase of irrigation use triggered

103 a set of new rules of water distribution. Finally, water scarcity triggered by development of potato crops has facilitated reforms of water authorities, and the elaboration of new rules to share water deficits among users... Obviously, the modernization project of Burka Jalala is much more than just a technical innovation and will trigger a vast set of institutional innovations, farming norms, irrigation practices, water distribution rules, structure of water authorities etc… 6.5.2 The interface approach

In difficulties encountered during irrigation development, Long points out that the problem is not only that of organization and methods but is fundamentally conceptual. For him, each disciplinary group (from social scientists to irrigation engineers) clings to its own concepts and analytical frameworks. For Long, “ a way out of these problems lies in a serious appreciation of the dynamic and interactive aspects of irrigation development, a process which combines both social and technical properties and in which different social entities interact ”. He established the concept of “interface” as a basis for such an approach. According to Diemer (1988), basic elements of the design, such as the form and size of plots, the lay-out of canals and the water distribution system etc… are culturally determined constructs, reflecting a specific interpretation of what irrigated agriculture is supposed to be and how farming systems should be organized. All these social assumptions made in system design process should be related to the project’s present and local situation. This can only be done through participatory design procedures with discussion and negotiation which let the physical system reflect social processes at the interface. This participation (in labor but also in decision making) should continue during construction of the new structures to increase their efficiency. In the case of the Burka Alifif irrigation scheme studied by Legall A. (2007), the design of the irrigation scheme was done without consulting farmers. It contained several assumptions about the distribution of water coming from the irrigation system’s two separate springs and about social relations between villages. However, these assumptions were not verified on the field. As a consequence, on the right side, two newly-built secondary canals are actually useless if farmers do not drastically reorganize water allocation. On the left side, two separate canals have been joined into one, between two sectors which have historically never gotten along. To avoid conflicts with the head end sector, tail-end users have preferred to use their independent traditional canal, thus abandoning the newly built portion of the main canal. If irrigation officials had consulted farmers and informed themselves about their water allocation modalities, the efficiency of the new structures might have been much higher… Long also evokes the importance of the project manager, as an important support during the process of irrigation development. His tasks would mainly be to guide the interactional process. He must be able of translating and relating ideas and perceptions of different actors. Another of his responsibilities is to keep procedures, responsibilities and tasks clear. Finally, the manager should be willing and able to apply the perspective of the interactive nature of irrigation development. Finally, he points out an important limitation during irrigation development by State penetration when government agencies wish to control the process and tend to patronize farmers and their organization. For Long, “ a real recognition of the interactive nature of irrigation development would require the government to diminish its wish to control the

104 process and at the same time, it would provide the opportunity to request more responsibility from the other parties involved ”. This last point brings up the important question of governance…

6.6 ABOUT GOVERNANCE IN INNOVATION AND IRRIGATION

The question to be answered here is how different kinds of governance structure affect individuals’ incentives and capabilities to cope with collective-action problems? 6.6.1 About governance in irrigation schemes… 6.6.1.1 The effectiveness of farmer-managed irrigation schemes… In his study of small-scale irrigation schemes in Nepal, Lam’s analysis (1994) contrasts the value of the state’s role in providing complementary goods (canals, dams etc…) with the negative consequence of state involvement in irrigation operations at the local level. At this study, he compares performance of farmer-managed irrigation schemes (FMIS) to agency- managed ones (AMIS). While FMIS governance structures tend to emphasize problem- solving, reciprocity and active rule-crafting while AMIS tend to reinforce a dominance- dependence relationship in which neither irrigation officials nor farmers are given positive incentives to contribute their efforts. Evidence of 150 Nepalese irrigation schemes studied by Lam shows that governance structure is an important variable in irrigation performance. He affirms that farmer-managed systems are most effective than those in which the state becomes directly involved in the day to day delivery of water to fields. According to Lam, “enhancing farmers’ participation (through meetings etc…) is frequently interpreted as an exercise of tutelage by irrigation farmers just to tell farmers what to do and how to fit their effort in the O&M plan laid down by the officials”. However, he affirms that if officials would recognize farmers as intelligent human beings who are capable of reasoning, making choices and working collectively to solve problems, irrigation governance and management would be much easier to attain. Enhancing farmers’ participation should rather mean enhancing their capability of organizing themselves so as to realize their problem-solving potential. It should also mean providing them an institutional environment in which they are given positive incentives to craft effective rules and develop productive working relations, in operation and maintenance. To improve cooperation, reciprocity and accountability between farmers and irrigation officials, Lam evokes several possible measures. One of them is to provide incentives to irrigation officials to improve their services to farmers. The asymmetrical relation between officials-suppliers and farmers-receivers should be improved by giving farmers a voice concerning whether, what, and how officials are to provide. To do so, Lams recommends that farmers should collect and keep water fees by themselves for their collective O&M activities in order to acquire what he calls “purchasing power”. This may help officials substitute their vision of farmers as mere receivers of free goods and services to the one as transaction partners on a more equitable basis. 6.6.1.2 …does not mean getting rid of government agencies. Research findings from different authors such as Ostrom, Tang and Lam have indeed suggested that self governance can outperform government agencies in the management of irrigation systems However, the conclusion that self-governance can work has been

105 excessively used by policy-makers to justify the downsizing or elimination of government agencies in developing countries. Progressive State penetration is a historical observation that can be made in all societies and it is obviously not specific to less advanced countries. Even if this penetration has taken place more recently in these countries, it nevertheless contributes to their development as it did in developed countries. It would be simplistic to consider the State as a threat or a predator and to ignore the dynamic reality of societies. The State takes the form that the population gives to it and its nature is the higher resultant of organized social groups. It is true that in less advanced countries, State actions sometimes tend to be brutal, inconstant, and inappropriate. But this rather betrays the general weakness of the country’s institutions than its “predating” nature. In fact, local organization alone is not a panacea as it cannot ensure all capabilities and the handling of all resources by itself. Likewise, the survival and operation of self-governing local organizations are usually nested within, and conditioned by a broader institutional setting. (Ostrom, 1992. Tang, 1992. Lam, 1994). According to Lam (1996) in his analysis on Taiwan’s successful experience in water management and efficient irrigation agencies, “ it would be more useful to study how government agencies can be designed to perform effectively and complement citizens’ efforts in broader institutional settings, in conducting public affairs ”… The specificities of the Taiwanese case may help understand the reasons of the success of its irrigation agencies. First, the alignment of authority and responsibility is not only supported by bureaucratic rules but also by norms and social sanctions. Also, institutions are designed so that authority is checked and balanced. Finally, the institutional design of these agencies lets domains of autonomy to users so that they can exercise their problem-solving capabilities (Lam, 1996). It is sure than the design of government agencies and the construction of incentives to develop complementarity between farmers and officials would be most helpful to strengthen irrigation management and governance rather than getting rid of government institutions. Proposing the modalities of this institutional development is an extremely complex question which goes far beyond the objectives of my thesis. However, I think that crossing divides stands as a first-rank necessity … 6.6.2 Crossing divides and supporting coproduction

The role of government and citizen participation in innovation processes remains a key question. Ostrom (1996) introduces the concept of coproduction - the joint activity of citizens and government - to go beyond the “government/civil society” and “public/private” divides which she considers as conceptual traps arising from the rigid disciplinary walls surrounding the study of human institutions. She argues that in most cases where public services were effectively delivered, we are likely to find that they are co-produced with government and citizens acting jointly as producers. Ostrom (1996) affirms that if efforts at improving capacities and training of government officials or on the other side of the divide, at increasing citizen participation have been disappointing, efforts directed at increasing the potential complementarities between official and citizen production or problem-solving activities may require more time at the initial stage of a process but promise a much higher long-term return. Ostrom talks about the possible synergy between government and civil society. Putnam also argues for synergy, implying that

106 civic engagement strengthens state institutions and effective state institutions create an environment in which civic engagement is morel likely to thrive. When public officials and citizens work together in diverse sets of open and nested areas, productivity can be higher and forms of opportunistic behavior more likely to be exposed (Ostrom, 1996). It may also encourage citizens to develop horizontal relations and social capital (Putnam, 1993 52 ). 6.6.3 About governance in innovation and development…

When thinking about innovation, the point is not about reconsidering the theoretical relevance of technological development. It is more about questioning its orientations and motivations. The role of governance in the definition of these choices and objectives is a key element to understand innovation processes. Who and how are decided development actions? What is at stake is not directly about techniques and social groups but about “what does the social group do with these techniques, together with the other actors of the project?”. Indedd, the relation between state and population enables -or not- the expression of a technological potential which is socially, spatially and temporally adapted to the context, and the organized expression of social groups which interact between themselves and the State. Research and public policies to diffuse innovations can still be useful and relevant, as farmers are always asking for new solutions which are adapted to their problems. The important questions to be asked about extension are rather on the underlying political model which is used to diffuse these innovations, the choices which are put forward and the way they are proposed or even imposed to the local population. For example, in the Jarso district, the bureau of Agriculture has received an important amount of drop irrigation material: kilometers of plastic tubes and hundreds of small irrigation devices. Development agents have received technical booklets of drop irrigation. The official strategy is to develop drop irrigation among farmers of Jarso. But considering the high poverty level and the low investment capacities of most farmers, it seems to be a poorly- thought initiative or at least a very precocious one. The point is not to criticize officials of agricultural development but just to point out a strong contradiction between their discourse on farmer participation and their systematic top-down actions. But as we dig in the reasons of this gap, we can observe that one part of the causes are beyond the issues of the relation government-local population and also concerns the global context of Ethiopia with its partners. Indeed, when the ministry of agriculture tries to develop drip irrigation, its main goal is more to satisfy the objectives of funding foreign governments, international organizations and NGOs on which Ethiopia’s government heavily relies on, than to understand farmers’ real constraints, to work together with them and to define actions to alleviate their constraints. The same observation goes for the systematic orientations towards “food for work” and environmental reclamations programs. Indeed, as these strategies are the only points of agreement between Ethiopia and its partners, funds are concentrated in these domains of action… Where government officials cannot even decide for their own orientations, how can the place for farmers’ decision be considered? Here, both government officials and foreign funding organizations are responsible of the gap, despite much rhetoric on farmer

52 Putnam, R. 1993. The propserous community: social capital and public life. American prospect 13: 35-42. cited by Ostrom, 1996.

107 participation. In this context, it is easy to understand why the population seems to withdraw from extension policies, and how farmers have limited capacity to influence policies and to be actors of their own development. Yet, this is the basis of any possibility to valorize indigenous knowledge and local capacities…

108 CONCLUSION

This thesis is the study of Ethiopian traditional irrigation scheme in the region of Hararghe, at dawn of an important modernization process. Before the water works take place, the partners of the project have wished to understand the current functioning of this farmer- managed irrigation scheme (water authorities, rules, techniques…), its agricultural implications (crops, rotations, irrigation…), and the living conditions and strategies of water users’ households… Results of the study show that cultivating land in an irrigation system is a key asset for more food security for households of water users. Indeed, it has been observed that the most vulnerable households are the ones without or very little irrigated lands. This can be linked with the lesser capacity of rainfed lands to produce profitable cash crops (khat, potato). It has also been demonstrated that the system is organized by a complex set of rules which is the result of a long historical process. Since the last century, local population has drastically increased, bringing on land scarcity problems. With the 1975 land reform and the development of markets and transport means, the irrigation system has also gradually grown in surface and in number of users as well as in the water demand per user, due to the expansion of water-demanding cash-crops. All these transformations have raised new constraints and problems to which farmers find solutions through a diverse set of collective institutions, authorities and arrangements. However, there are inequalities in the access to land and water resources, and asymmetries in information and power relations. This leads to the adoption of different individual strategies according to the types of households, and therefore to complexities in water management and innovation processes, among different interest groups… The most vulnerable households tend to focus on food self-sufficiency; the average households try to optimize their water rights to increase cash-crop production, while the better-off households, which are the only ones to be food self-sufficient, tend to make important savings and become service-providers as well. The modernization project of Burka Jalala may increase water availability and ease management of irrigation but it will also bring up new problems that ODA, GRET, farmers, the agricultural bureau and the irrigation agencies must be ready to tackle. These actors should help the community find a new organization of water rights from the different springs, define maintenance responsibilities and duties, solve new downstream-upstream conflicts, adapt water management and irrigation practices to the new structures etc… Solutions will be easier to find if farmers are included in the design and construction process of the project as soon as possible… As the initial state of the irrigation system has been thoroughly explored, it would be very useful to evaluate the project’s impact within several years and learn from this experience. Also, as cash crops are here a key factor in improving farmers’ income and living conditions, it would be highly relevant to work with the community to find collective solutions to diminish merchants’ dominance with farmers and to improve the commercialization of their products…

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113 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION...... 1

1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY...... 2 1.1 Basic data on Ethiopia...... 2 1.1.1 Ethiopia, “the most populated mountain in the world”? ...... 2 1.1.2 An agrarian economy ...... 2 1.1.3 Food insecurity, a common problem of rural households...... 3 1.2 History of Ethiopia: strong contrasts between the North and the South ...... 4 1.3 The study area ...... 5 1.3.1 Oromia, the biggest region of Ethiopia...... 5 1.3.2 East-Hararghe zone ...... 6 1.3.3 Jarso district...... 6 1.3.4 Melka Jebdu Peasant Association ...... 7 1.3.4.1 Basic data ...... 7 1.3.4.2 Climate ...... 8 1.4 The irrigation Project of Burka jalala...... 9 1.4.1 Data on the irrigation scheme...... 9 1.4.2 The modernization project of the irrigation scheme ...... 12 1.4.2.1 Partners and institutional organization of the project...... 12 1.4.2.2 Compromising between GRET’s and ODA’s demands...... 13 1.5 The study’s hypothesis...... 15

2 THEORETICIAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY...... 16 2.1 Concepts and theoretical framework...... 16 2.1.1 Systemic approach...... 16 2.1.2 Social management of water ...... 17 2.1.3 Collective action...... 18 2.1.4 Innovation...... 18 2.2 Methodological steps and their tools...... 19 2.2.1 Observation of the physical environment...... 19 2.2.2 Historical research on local agriculture and use of irrigation ...... 20 2.2.3 Study of water management in the irrigation system...... 21 2.2.4 Technical and agro-economical study of farming households...... 22 2.2.5 Foreseeing farmers’ hopes and fears in agriculture and the irrigation project. 22 2.2.6 Final presentation...... 22 2.3 Challenging working conditions ...... 23

3 HISTORICAL ANALISIS : SETTLEMENT TO SATURATION...... 24 3.1 1800 – 1900 AD: settlement and first stages of agriculture...... 24 3.1.1.1 Advent of the Oromo in Hararghe during the XVI th century...... 24 3.1.1.2 Settlement of Oromos in Jarso during the XVIII th century...... 24 3.1.1.3 Settlement in Melka Jebdu ...... 25 3.1.2 From pastoralism to agro-pastoralism...... 26 3.1.2.1 Origins of agriculture ...... 26 3.1.2.2 Staple crops for home consumption...... 26 3.2 From the nineteeth century to 1975: the first steps of irrigation development ...... 27 3.2.1 Political context and land tenure at dawn of irrigation development...... 27 3.2.1.1 Land tenure before Amhara colonization...... 27

114 3.2.1.2 Local power in the hands of clan leaders: demina ...... 27 3.2.1.3 Amhara colonization and reign of Hayle Selase ...... 27 3.2.2 Beginning of irrigation: individual use of spring or river water ...... 30 3.2.3 Construction of the first collective canals...... 31 3.2.3.1 The Adeno canal for the landlord’s khat farm ...... 31 3.2.3.2 Collective action to build other canals ...... 32 3.2.3.3 Construction of a water sharing system ...... 33 3.3 Since the 1975 land reform: expansion of irrigated lands...... 33 3.3.1 Proclamation of the land reform...... 33 3.3.2 Land redistribution with the “Nam Torba” comitee...... 34 3.3.3 Development of khat crops and irrigation...... 34 3.3.4 Ban of irrigation on khat and development of mixed cropping practices ...... 34 3.3.5 Farmers start to cultivate more water demanding crops...... 35 3.4 Since the late 1980s: Heading towards severe land and water scarcity ...... 36 3.4.1 Changes in population density ...... 36 3.4.2 Impact of population increase in Melka Jebdu...... 36 3.4.3 Expansion of irrigated lands...... 37 3.4.4 An inheritance system which breaks up land...... 37

4 HOW FARMERS COLECTIVELY FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE LOCAL PROBLEMS… ...... 40 4.1 Water allocation among canals of the irrigation system… ...... 40 4.1.1 Allocation of water from the main spring Burka Jalala ...... 40 4.1.1.1 Water for four canals and privileged entities ...... 40 4.1.1.2 Minor changes since the 1975 land reform ...... 40 4.1.2 Allocation of water from minor springs...... 42 4.1.3 Water allocation calendars of the different springs...... 42 4.2 At the canal’s scale: Diversity of Water Authorities...... 43 4.2.1 The mimalak : the main water authority...... 43 4.2.2 Diversity of water management authorities of Burka Jalala ...... 44 4.2.2.1 Gora: one highly respected central water authority ...... 44 4.2.2.2 Nia’a: a recent organization of water authority...... 44 4.2.2.3 Example of Becheysa: a changing water authority ...... 45 4.2.2.4 Kolobo canal: an organization based on family links ...... 46 4.2.3 Water authorities of the minor springs...... 47 4.2.3.1 Usmael canal: one main user, one leader ...... 47 4.2.3.2 The “excluded” Kolobo group ...... 47 4.2.3.3 The small Birbirsa spring ...... 47 4.3 Organizations involved in solving water conflicts...... 48 4.3.1 Hera : traditional court for minor offences ...... 48 4.3.2 Administrative court: Mana murtu ...... 49 4.3.3 Mongudo: elders to solve serious conflicts...... 49 4.3.4 Peasant Association cabinet: to legitimate reforms...... 50 4.3.5 District administration...... 52 4.4 Institutional innovation and change in water allocation rules...... 52 4.4.1.1 Controlled use of water ...... 52 4.4.1.2 Allocation of water: rights defined by number of hours ...... 52 4.4.1.3 Decreasing number of hours per user...... 53 4.4.1.4 Gradual exclusion of people and lands ...... 53 4.4.1.5 Water becomes linked to the land...... 54

115 4.4.1.6 Reduction of spatial reach of water rights...... 54 4.4.2 Current organization of water distribution and technical modalities of irrigation 54 4.4.2.1 Water distribution at the canal’s and its sectors’ level...... 54 4.4.2.2 Technical modalities of irrigation ...... 55 4.5 New local arrangements for Social regulation ...... 56 4.5.1 Water exchanges between close relatives ...... 56 4.5.2 Water exchanges between sectors and canals ...... 56 4.5.3 Water, land and seed exchanges...... 57 4.5.4 Diversity of share cropping arrangements ...... 58

5 INNOVATION IN FARMERS’ INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES...... 60 5.1 Typology of Farming Households...... 60 5.1.1 Survey data...... 60 5.1.2 Discussion on criteria for establishing a typology ...... 60 5.1.3 Quantity of irrigated lands per household: a discriminating factor...... 62 5.1.3.1 Limited value of grain...... 62 5.1.3.2 High value of irrigated khat ...... 62 5.1.3.3 Very high value of potatoes ...... 62 5.1.4 Goal and limits of the household typology ...... 63 5.1.5 Household typology ...... 64 Small farm with no or very little irrigated land: Household type n°1...... 65 5.1.5.1 Small farm with irrigated lands and limited water rights: household type n°2 67 5.1.5.2 Farms with more irrigated lands and excellent access to water: household type n°3 68 5.1.5.3 Summary on distribution of household types...... 70 5.2 Strategies based on crops ...... 70 5.2.1 Change in crop patterns...... 70 5.2.1.1 Staple and cash crops ...... 70 5.2.1.2 Shorter cycles on irrigated lands ...... 72 5.2.1.3 Crop rotation on irrigated lands ...... 72 5.2.1.4 Two crops per year on rainfed lands ...... 73 5.2.2 Natural and chemical fertilization...... 74 5.2.3 Mixed cropping ...... 75 5.2.3.1 Intercropping on ridged khat plots ...... 75 5.2.3.2 Mixed cropping on flat khat plots ...... 77 5.2.4 Spreading water demand by crop diversification...... 77 5.2.4.1 Summary of strategy of spreading water demand over the year...... 78 5.3 Strategies based on land and water...... 79 5.3.1 Expansion of motor pumps use and ownership...... 79 5.3.1.1 Use of motor pumps ...... 79 5.3.1.2 Owning a motor pump...... 80 5.3.2 Cultivating more lands by sharecropping...... 82 5.4 strategies based on non farming activities...... 82 5.4.1 Taking up commercial activities: small shops and grain mills ...... 82 5.4.2 Selling labour force...... 84 5.4.2.1 Government programs...... 84 5.4.2.2 Employment in Nole ...... 86 5.5 Migration strategies...... 87

116 5.5.1 To cities or other villages...... 87 5.5.2 The Saudi dream...... 87 5.6 Summary of farming households’ strategies...... 88 5.7 strategies of farmers towards the irrigation project...... 89 5.7.1 The farmers’ enthusiasm for the project...... 89 5.7.2 The project: a source of employment...... 89 5.7.3 Claiming water rights for Kolobo people with rainfed lands...... 89 5.7.4 Protecting rights on the minor springs ...... 90 5.7.5 Keeping sovereignty of canals ...... 90 5.7.6 More water: what for?...... 91 5.7.7 Fear of change...... 91 5.7.8 Summary of interest groups ...... 92

6 INNOVATION AND FARMERS OF MELKA JEBDU ...... 93 6.1 The factors of Innovation...... 93 6.1.1 Agricultural change and demographic pressure...... 93 6.1.1.1 Summary of the Malthusian narrative...... 93 6.1.1.2 Challenging the neo-Malthusian narrative: example of Ethiopia’s environmental reclamation programs...... 93 6.1.1.3 Boserup’s theory: Demographic pressure triggers agriculture change ...... 94 6.1.2 The importance of government policies in agricultural development...... 95 6.1.3 Agricultural innovation and social structures...... 96 6.1.4 Agricultural innovations in Burka Jalala...... 98 6.1.5 Complexity of innovation...... 99 6.2 About endogenous and exogenous innovations… ...... 99 6.2.1 A relative boundary...... 99 6.2.2 Example of the introduction of potato cultivation in Burka Jalala ...... 99 6.3 confronting The reactionary and progressive narratives: The study case of Burka Jalala 100 6.3.1 The Progressive and the Reactionary Innovation narratives...... 100 6.3.1.1 The progressive narrative...... 100 6.3.1.2 The reactionary narrative: ...... 100 6.3.2 Personal positioning about innovation...... 101 6.3.2.1 The reactionary narrative: a sluggish vision of rural society?...... 101 6.3.2.2 A balance between the two poles of the progressive narrative ...... 101 6.4 What changes with the Burka Jalala project?...... 102 6.4.1 What vision of innovation to adopt for the Burka Jalala project?...... 102 6.4.2 Anticipating possible new problems linked with the project ...... 102 6.5 Accompanying innovation processes...... 103 6.5.1 Considering Innovation as a total social phenomenon...... 103 6.5.2 The interface approach...... 104 6.6 About governance in innovation and irrigation...... 105 6.6.1 About governance in irrigation schemes…...... 105 6.6.1.1 The effectiveness of farmer-managed irrigation schemes…...... 105 6.6.1.2 …does not mean getting rid of government agencies...... 105 6.6.2 Crossing divides and supporting coproduction...... 106 6.6.3 About governance in innovation and development…...... 107

CONCLUSION...... 109 BIBLIOGRAPHIE :...... 110

117 Diagrams Diagram 1 : Ethiopia’s GDP highly depends on rainfall ...... 3 Diagram 2: Climatic comparison between lowlands and highlands...... 8 Diagram 3 : Systemic approach of an irrigation system ...... 17 Diagram 4: the Jarso clan and its sub-clans ...... 24 Diagram 5 : Steps of irrigation expansion since the 1975 land reform...... 39 Diagram 6 : Allocation of water of the spring of Burka Jalala among canals, before 1975 .... 42 Diagram 7 : Allocation of water of the spring of Burka Jalala among canals, in 2006 ...... 42 Diagram 8 : Allocation of water from the minor springs in 2006...... 42 Diagram 9 : Structure of Water Authority of the Gora canal...... 44 Diagram 10 : Structure of Water Authority of the Nia’a canal...... 44 Diagram 11 : Structure of Water Authority of the Becheysa canal (according to the “main” mimalak)...... 46 Diagram 12 : Structure of water authority in the Kolobo canal ...... 46 Diagram 13 : Katari technique irrigation ...... 55 Diagram 14 : Variants of the katari technique ...... 56 Diagram 15 : Water exchanges between frost-prone areas and frost-safe areas...... 57 Diagram 16 : Cropping calendar of model of household type n°1...... 64 Diagram 18 : Cropping pattern of model of household type n°2...... 64 Diagram 19 : Cropping calendar of the model of household type n°3...... 64 Diagram 17 : Crops cultivated by the model of Household type n°1 during rainy season ...... 65 Diagram 20 : Distribution of household types in surveys...... 70 Diagram 21 : Estimated distribution of household types in the entire Burka Jalala valley ..... 70 Diagram 22 : Main crop rotation practices on irrigated lands of Burka Jalala ...... 72 Diagram 23 : Possible crop rotations on rainfed lands...... 73 Diagram 24 : Cropping calendar of model of household n°1 after adopting the strategy of two crops per year on rainfed lands ...... 74 Diagram 25 : Types of mixed cropping with khat on ridged plots ...... 76 Diagram 26 : Cropping calendars on irrigated lands of Jamal Musa...... 78 Diagram 27 : Strategy of farmers to spread water demand...... 78 Diagram 28 : How some farmers of Gora use motor pumps to shorten trajectory of irrigation water ...... 80 Diagram 29 : Historical change in Usmael Ahmed’s income...... 81 Diagram 30 : Distribution of Mohamed Aliyi’s income ...... 83 Diagram 31 : Summary of farmers’ individual strategies in Burka Jalala...... 88 Diagram 32 : The main interest groups around the modernization project of Burka Jalala’s irrigation scheme ...... 92 Diagram 33 : Technical innovations in agriculture of Burka Jalala and link with population density ...... 98

118 Tables Table 1 : Other facts about East Hararghe ...... 6 Table 2: Distribution of land types on the area of Melka Jebdu PA ...... 7 Table 3 : Population of Melka Jebdu PA ...... 7 Table 4 : Command areas of different canals using the springs of Burka Jalal area...... 10 Table 5 : Some data about rural population density in Hararghe...... 36 Table 6 : Percentage of households without irrigated lands in total number of households without livestock ...... 61 Table 7 : Economic data of khat harvest and commercialization...... 62 Table 8 : Economic data on potato production and commercialization...... 62 Table 9 : Socio-economic data about Household type n°1 ...... 65 Table 10 : Income and amount of grain produced by crops of model of Household type n°1 per year...... 66 Table 11 : Socio-economic data about household type n°2 ...... 67 Table 12 : Income and grain produced by model of household type n°2 in one year...... 67 Table 13: Socio-economic data about Household type n°3 ...... 68 Table 14: Income and grain produced by model of household type n°3 in one year...... 69 Table 15 : Meret remuneration...... 85

Boxes Box 1 : Main principles of the system approach...... 16 Box 2 : Eight major principles which are necessary conditions for successful self-governing institutions (Ostrom, 1992) ...... 18 Box 3 : Example of conflict resolution with Hera ...... 48 Box 4 : Example of conflict resolution by administrative court ...... 49 Box 5 : Example of conflict resolution by the PA cabinet about water transfers by Kolobo farmers...... 51 Box 6 : Family planning in Burka Jalala and Jarso...... 61 Box 7 : Impact of the strategy of double crops on rainfed land with household type n°1...... 74 Box 8 : Study case of Jamal Musa ...... 77 Box 9 : Study case of a motor pump user and owner; History of Usmael Ahmed’s farm...... 81 Box 10 : History of Mohamed Aliyi’s farm and activites...... 83 Box 11 : History of Abrahim Hassano’s household and impact of outside employment ...... 86 Box 12 : Kava and its effects on local political and social life in the Pacific Islands...... 97

Maps Map 1 : Ethiopia’s location within the horn of Africa ...... 2 Map 2 : Position of study area in Ethiopia ...... 6 Map 3: Burka Jalala irrigation scheme...... 11 Map 4: Territories of the first settlers of Burka Jalala ...... 25 Map 5 : Political control over the area of Burka Jalala, before 1974...... 29 Map 6 : Irrigation before the 1950s...... 30 Map 7 : Irrigation in Burka Jalala during the 1960s ...... 31 Map 8 : Irrigation in Burka Jalala during the early 1970s ...... 32 Map 9 : Hypothetical design of the new irrigation scheme...... 90

119 Photos Photo 1 : Spring of Burka Jalala...... 9 Photo 2 : Preparing the katari…...... 55 Photo 3 : Poster of the reproductive health extension campaign in Jarso ...... 61 Photo 4 : Young khat shrubs and sweet potato, July 2006...... 76 Photo 5 : Ten year old khat shrubs with sorghum, maize and beans ...... 76 Photo 6 : Mixed cropping khat + wheat in a khat field affected by hail ...... 77 Photo 7 : Khat, a factor of social capital. Meeting of irrigation authorities in Burka Alifif. ... 97

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