DOCSLIB.ORG

Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? Author(S): Laurence Bonjour Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? Author(S): Laurence Bonjour Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol North American Philosophical Publications Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? Author(s): Laurence Bonjour Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1978), pp. 1-13 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009690 . Accessed: 10/01/2015 18:24 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.118.139.129 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 18:24:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 15, Number 1, January 1978 I. CAN EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE HAVE A FOUNDATION? LAURENCE BONJOUR HPHE idea that empirical knowledge has, and decisive argument which seems to rule out all non * must a common have, afoundation has been tenet skeptical alternatives to foundationism, thereby of most major epistemologists, both past and showing that some version of foundationism must There have as we shall see present. been, further be true (on the assumption that skepticism is false). below, many importantly different variants of this In a recent statement by Quinton, this argument idea. But the common denominator among them, runs as follows: the central thesis of epistemological foundationism If beliefs are to be at . must as I shall understand it here, is the claim that any justified all, there be some terminal beliefs that do not owe their . certain empirical beliefs possess a degree of credibility to others. For a belief to be justified it is not epistemic justification or warrant which does not enough for it to be accepted, let alone merely enter? depend, inferentially or otherwise, on the justifi? tained: there must also be good reason for accepting cation of other beliefs, but is instead an empirical it. Furthermore, for inferential belief to be justified somehow immediate or intrinsic. It is these non the beliefs that support itmust be justified themselves. inferentially justified beliefs, the unmoved (or self There must, therefore, be a kind of belief that does movers as not owe moved) of the epistemic realm Chisholm its justification to the support provided by has called them,1 that constitute the foundation others. Unless this were so no belief would be justified at for to belief would the ante? upon which the rest of empirical knowledge is all, justify any require cedent of an infinite series of beliefs. The alleged to rest. justification terminal . beliefs that are needed to the In recent years, the most familiar foundationist bring of to a need not be views have been to severe and continuous regress justification stop strictly subjected self-evident in the sense that somehow attack. But this attack has been aimed they justify rarely themselves. All that is is that should not at the central foundationist thesis required they directly itself, owe their justification to any other beliefs.2 and new versions of foundationism have been quick to emerge, often propounded by the erst? I shall call this argument the epistemic regress argu? while critics themselves. Thus foundationism has ment, and the problem which generates it, the a to come become philosophical hydra, difficult to epistemic regress problem. Since it is this argument grips with and seemingly impossible to kill. The which provides the primary rationale and argu? to a purposes of this paper are, first, distinguish and mentative support for foundationism, careful clarify the main dialectical variants of foundation? examination of itwill also constitute an exploration as ism, by viewing them responses to one funda? of the foundationist position itself. The main dia? mental problem which is both the main motivation lectical variants of foundationism can best be and the primary obstacle for foundationism; and understood as differing attempts to solve the regress second, as a result of this discussion to offer problem, and the most basic objection to the schematic reasons for doubting whether any version foundationist approach is that it is doubtful that of foundationism is finally acceptable. any of these attempts can succeed. (In this paper, reason The main for the impressive durability of I shall be concerned with the epistemic regress is not foundationism any overwhelming plaus? argument and the epistemic regress problem only ibility attaching to the main foundationist thesis in as they apply to empirical knowledge. It is obvious one itself, but rather the existence of apparently that an analogous problem arises also for a priori 1 Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., p. 30. * 1966), The an Anthony Quinton, Nature of Things (London, 1973), p. 119. This is extremely venerable argument, which has played a central role in epistemological discussion at least since Aristotle's statement of it in the Posterior Analytics, Book I, ch. 2-3. have found an (Some anticipation of the argument in the Theaetetus at 209E-210B, but Plato's worry in that passage appears to be that the definition of to an proposed knowledge is circular, not that it leads infinite regress of justification.) I This content downloaded from 129.118.139.129 on Sat, 10 Jan 2015 18:24:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY knowledge, but there it seems likely that the argu? solely because it is now seen to be inferentially ment would take a different course. In particular, a justifiable. Second, less obviously, a person for foundationist approach might be inescapable in an whom a belief is inferentially justified need not account of a priori knowledge.) have explicitly rehearsed the justificatory argu? ment in question to others or even to himself. It is enough that the inference be available to him if the I belief is called into question by others or by himself out The epistemic regress problem arises directly (where such availability may itself be less than as of the traditional conception of knowledge fully explicit) and that the availability of the infer? adequately justified true beliefz?whether this be taken ence be, in the final analysis, his reason for holding as a fully adequate definition of knowledge or, in the belief.6 It seems clear that many beliefs which light of the apparent counter-examples discovered are quite sufficiently justified to satisfy the justifi? as a by Gettier,4 merely necessary but not sufficient cation criterion for knowledge depend for their condition. (I shall assume throughout that the justification on inferences which have not been are elements of the traditional conception at least explicitly formulated and indeed which could not necessary for knowledge.) Now the most natural be explicitly formulated without considerable re? a a way to justify belief is by producing justificatory flective effort (e.g., my current belief that this is the some argument: beliefs is justified by citing other same piece of paper upon which I was typing (perhaps conjunctive) belief B> from which A is yesterday).7 inferable in some acceptable way and which is thus Suppose then that belief A is (putatively) justified offered as a reason for accepting A.5 Call this via inference, thus raising the question of how the inferential justification. It is clear, as Quinton points justifying premise-belief B is justified. Here again out in the passage quoted above, that for A to be the answer may be in inferential terms: B may be a genuinely justified by virtue of such justificatory (putatively) justified in virtue of being inferable argument, B must itself be justified in some from some further belief C. But then the same fashion; merely being inferable from an unsup? question arises about the justification of C, and so or would confer no an ported guess hunch, e.g., on, threatening infinite and apparently genuine justification upon A. vicious regress of epistemic justification. Each belief an Two further points about inferential justification, is justified only if epistemically prior be? as understood here, must be briefly noted. First, lief is justified, and that epistemically prior belief is the belief in question need not have been arrived at justified only if a still prior belief is justified, etc., as the result of an inference in order to be infer with the apparent result that justification can a never no entially justified. This is obvious, since belief get started?and hence that there is justi? some as a no arrived at in other way (e.g., result of fication and knowledge. The foundationist claim wishful thinking) may later come to be maintained is that only through the adoption of some version 3 to as "Adequately justified" because a belief could be justified to some degree without being sufficiently justified qualify knowledge (if true). But it is far from clear just how much justification is needed for adequacy. Virtually all recent epistemo logists agree that certainty is not required. But the lottery paradox shows that adequacy cannot be understood merely in terms a see of some specified level of probability. (For useful account of the lottery paradox, Robert Ackermann, Knowledge and Belief that what is (Garden City, N.Y., 1972), pp. 39-50.) Armstrong, in Belief, Truth and Knowledge (London, 1973), argues required is that one's reasons for the belief be "conclusive," but the precise meaning of this is less than clear.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • STILL STUCK on the BACKWARD CLOCK: a REJOINDER to ADAMS, BARKER and CLARKE John N
    STILL STUCK ON THE BACKWARD CLOCK: A REJOINDER TO ADAMS, BARKER AND CLARKE John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. In their latest defence of the truth-tracking theories, “Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock,” Fred Adams, John A. Barker and Murray Clarke try again to defend Nozick’s and Fred Dretske’s early analysis of propositional knowledge against Backward Clock. They allege failure of truth-adherence, mistakes on my part about methods, and appeal to charity, ‘equivocation,’ reliable methods and unfair internalism. I argue that these objections all fail. They are still stuck with the fact that the tracking theories fall to Backward Clock, an even more useful test case for other analyses of knowledge than might have first appeared. KEYWORDS: sensitive belief, extra-sensitive belief, sensitive methods, truth- adherence, reliable methods, Backward Clock In a seminal paper, “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories,” Fred Adams and Murray Clarke argued persuasively and ingeniously that a number of well-known examples that appear clearly fatal to Robert Nozick and Fred Dretske’s truth- tracking analyses of knowledge are not really counterexamples at all.1 These include Ray Martin’s Racetrack, George Pappas and Marshall Swain’s Generator, and Laurence Bonjour’s Clairvoyant,2 as well as Saul Kripke’s Red Barn, his Deceased Dictator, and his Sloppy Scientist.3 So taken was I with this defence that I assumed that the truth-tracking analyses were impregnable. Until that is, Neil 1 Fred Adams and Murray Clarke, “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, 2 (2005): 207-221.
    [Show full text]
  • Bonjour's Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge
    The Structure of Empirical Knowledge LAURENCE BONJOUR University Press CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, AND LONDON, ENGLAND Externalist Versions of Foundationalism crucial cases will not) have any cognitive grasp of this reason, or of the relation that is the basis of it, in order for his belief to be justified; all of this may be entirely external to his subjective conception of the situ­ ation. Thus the justification of a basic belief need not involve any further beliefs or other cognitive states, so that no further regress of justification is generated and the fundamental foundationalist problem is neatly solved.’ The recent epistemological literature contains a number of exter­ nalist and quasi-externalist views. Some of these, however, are not clearly relevant to my present concerns, either because they are aimed primarily Externalist Versions at the problem, so that their implications for a foundationalist solution of the regress problem are not made clear; or because they seem, of Foundationalism on the surface at least, to involve a repudiation of the very conception of epistemic justification or reasonableness as a requirement for knowl­ edge. Views of the latter sort seem to me very difficult to take seriously; but they would in any case have the consequence that the regress problem in the form with which we are concerned would simply not arise, so that there would be no need for any solution, foundationalist or otherwise. My concern here is with the versions of externalism that attempt to solve the regress problem by claiming that the acceptance of beliefs satisfying the externalist conditions is epistemically justified or rational or war­ 3.1 The basic idea of externalism ranted.
    [Show full text]
  • A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism December 13, 2013
    Reason & Explanation: A defense of explanatory coherentism Ted L. Poston University of South Alabama December 13, 2013 ii Contents Preface vii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 A brief history of coherentism . 2 1.2 Two traditional objections to coherentism . 7 1.2.1 The Input Objection . 7 1.2.2 Alternative Systems Objection . 9 1.3 Overview . 11 2 Epistemic Conservatism 17 2.1 The anti-conservative probability argument . 19 2.2 Conservative Justification & Warranted Assertion . 26 2.3 Conservatism & Autobiographical Epistemology . 28 2.4 The `Extra Boost' and Conversion objections . 32 2.4.1 The \Extra Boost" Objection . 32 2.4.2 Conversion objections . 33 2.5 Conservatism & the perspectival character of justification . 35 2.5.1 The argument from perspective . 36 2.5.2 Two challenges . 38 2.6 Conclusion . 40 3 Reasons without first philosophy 41 3.1 The Basic Reasons Dilemma . 42 3.1.1 The First Horn . 42 3.1.2 The Second Horn . 44 3.2 The argument against first philosophy . 45 3.2.1 The nature of basic reasons . 45 3.2.2 No First Philosophy . 48 3.3 Framework Reasons . 51 iii iv CONTENTS 3.4 Weak foundationalism & framework reasons . 56 3.5 Bergmann on foundationalism and epistemic circularity . 58 3.6 Conclusion . 62 4 Explanation & Justification 63 4.1 Explanation & its virtues . 64 4.1.1 Three arguments for primitiveness . 67 4.1.2 The virtues of explanation . 73 4.2 An explanationist theory of justification . 78 4.2.1 The goal . 78 4.2.2 The Ex-J account . 79 4.2.3 Ex-J & Mentalism .
    [Show full text]
  • Agrippa's Trilemma: Scepticism and Contemporary Epistemology
    This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non- commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the copyright holder/s. Agrippa's trilemma: scepticism and contemporary epistemology Aaran Steven Burns PhD Philosophy March 2020 Keele University Word Count: 74970 1 Acknowledgements I must at least try (and fail) to express the deserved amount of gratitude by giving thanks to those who have aided me over the last four years – and perhaps even the last 7. My mother and grandmother have given constant support, particularly over the last year, allowing me to stay with them while finishing things up. My partner, Kathryn Hayward has offered more support than I likely deserved and shown more patience than I could reasonably expect, not to mention the more direct efforts she made in reading drafts of my work. In the early stages of my research I had a number of email exchanges with both Richard Fumerton and Laurence BonJour, who were both immeasurably helpful in helping me to understand these issues more clearly. BonJour in particular has left an almost embarrassingly large mark on my work. Although our email exchange was short, the amount which I gained was vast, and only multiplied from the subsequent reading of his work.
    [Show full text]
  • Morgan Andrew.Pdf (186.3Kb)
    Spectrum Epistemology: The BonJour – Goldman Debate by Andrew Wade Anthony Morgan A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2009 © Andrew Wade Anthony Morgan 2009 AUTHOR'S DECLARATION I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. ii Abstract Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality.
    [Show full text]
  • In Defense of Radical Empiricism
    In Defense of Radical Empiricism A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Ryan D. Ross May 2015 © 2015 Ryan D. Ross. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled In Defense of Radical Empiricism by RYAN D. ROSS has been approved for the Department of Philosophy and the College of Arts and Sciences by John W. Bender Professor of Philosophy Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 Abstract ROSS, RYAN D., M. A., May 2015, Philosophy In Defense of Radical Empiricism Director of Thesis: John W. Bender Laurence BonJour defends a moderate version of rationalism against rivaling empiricist epistemologies. His moderate rationalism maintains that some beliefs are justified a priori in a way that does not reduce to mere analyticity, but he tempers this strong claim by saying that such justification is both fallible and empirically defeasible. With the aim of ruling out radical empiricism (the form of empiricism that repudiates the a priori), BonJour puts forth what he calls the “master argument.” According to this argument, the resources available to radical empiricists are too slender to allow for justified empirical beliefs that go beyond what is immediately available to sense- perception, e.g., what we see, hear, and taste. If so, then radical empiricists are committed to a severe form of skepticism, one in which it is impossible to have justified beliefs about the distant past, the future, unobserved aspects of the present, etc. Worse, radical empiricists, who pride themselves on their scientific worldview, would be unable to account for justified beliefs about the abstract, theoretical claims of science itself! Clearly, the master argument is intended to hit the radical empiricist where it hurts.
    [Show full text]
  • Internalism Vs Externalism in the Epistemology of Memory
    Internalism v.s. Externalism in the Epistemology of Memory B.J.C. Madison (Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, eds. Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelin) Draft Version – Do Not Cite Without Approval Introduction: We have countless beliefs, and many of them are justified. Most of our beliefs, at any given time, are not occurent, but are stored in memory. In addition, many of our beliefs remain justified while stored in memory. How is this all possible? An epistemology of memory will in part explain the nature of memorial justification, and how it is possible. Epistemic internalists and externalists disagree deeply about the fundamental nature of epistemic properties like epistemic justification. That is, is justification wholly determined by what goes on inside and from the first-person perspective, or does how beliefs are caused, formed, and what relations subjects bear to their environment prove relevant to whether or not justification obtains? This chapter will first survey general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief. 1 I. The Internalism / Externalism Distinction: Intuitive Motivations: The internalism / externalism distinction in epistemology concerns the question of what kind of factors can contribute to the positive epistemic status of a belief. While one can endorse versions of internalism or externalism for a variety of epistemic statuses, such as epistemic rationality, warrant, entitlement, etc., the focus of this chapter will specifically be on epistemic justification.
    [Show full text]
  • IN SEARCH of DIRECT REALISM Laurence Bonjour University of Washington
    IN SEARCH OF DIRECT REALISM Laurence BonJour University of Washington It is fairly standard in accounts of the epistemology of perceptual knowledge to distinguish three main alternative positions: representationalism (also called representative realism or indirect realism), phenomenalism, and a third view that is called either naïve realism (usually by its opponents) or direct realism (usually by those who are more sympathetic to it). I have always found the last of these views puzzling and elusive. My aim in this paper is to try to figure out what direct realism amounts to, mainly with an eye to seeing whether it offers a genuine epistemological alternative to the other two views and to representationalism in particular. My thesis will be that it does not—that what is right about direct realism turns out to have little bearing on the main epistemological issue concerning perceptual knowledge. Both for reasons of space and to allow a focus on the issues that I regard as the most important, my discussion will be restricted in the following ways: First, I will give no consideration at all to phenomenalism. The numerous and to my mind entirely decisive objections to the phenomenalist view are by now very well known. Second, I will also give no attention to the standard externalist views of justification, of which reliabilism is the most familiar. Though it is very easy within a reliabilist framework to defend something that might perhaps be characterized as “direct realism,” the point of such a characterization and of the alternatives that it implicitly suggests is largely lost in that context.
    [Show full text]
  • A Priori Justification and Experience Jamie Carlin Watson
    Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2009 A Priori Justification and Experience Jamie Carlin Watson Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION AND EXPERIENCE By JAMIE CARLIN WATSON A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester 2009 1 The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Jamie Carlin Watson defended on August 7, 2009. _______________________________________ Michael A Bishop Professor Directing Dissertation _______________________________________ Philip Bowers Outside Committee Member _______________________________________ Russell Dancy Committee Member Approved: ________________________________________ Piers Rawling, Chair, Department of Philosophy The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members. ii I dedicate this to my wife, Darlena, whose support and encouragement made this project possible and my parents, Boyce and Janice Watson, whose support has been unconditional, even when they did not understand my love of philosophy. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I extend deepest gratitude to my dissertation director, Mike Bishop, who, though his sympathies run contrary to my thesis, tirelessly and graciously read numerous muddled drafts to help me express these ideas more clearly. Thanks also to my colleagues and friends, Robert Arp, Stephen Kearns, Philip Bowers, John Bowers, Joseph Long, Aron Vadakin, and Clifford Sosis, who were always available to entertain questions and quick with encouragement. And finally, thanks to the organizers and participants of the conferences where pieces of this project were presented.
    [Show full text]
  • Ucin1028837654.Pdf (108.79
    UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI _____________ , 20 _____ I,______________________________________________, hereby submit this as part of the requirements for the degree of: ________________________________________________ in: ________________________________________________ It is entitled: ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ Approved by: ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ BONJOUR’S RECONSIDERATION OF FOUNDATIONALISM A thesis submitted to the Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Philosophy Department of the College of Arts and Sciences 2002 by Fred J. Harrington B.A., The Ohio State University, 1995 Committee: Robert C. Richardson, Ph.D. (Chair) Robert A. Skipper, Ph.D. Thomas W. Polger, Ph.D. BonJour’s Reconsideration of Foundationalism Fred Harrington ABSRTACT: In BonJour’s recent essay, “The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism,” he argues for a reconsideration of foundationalism. BonJour makes three assumptions: (i) that the realist conception of truth as correspondence with the appropriate region of mind-independent reality is correct; (ii) that foundationalism is offering an account of “the fundamental structure of the epistemic justification of contingent or empirical
    [Show full text]
  • Internalism and Irrationality
    INTERNALISM AND IRRATIONALITY Philosophy Paper or Poster Session Dr. Charles Wallis California State University, Long Beach 1250 Bellflower Boulevard McIntosh Humanities Building (MHB) 917 Long Beach, CA 90840-2408 [email protected] 562.985.4331 562.985.7135 (fax) ABSTRACT FOR INTERNALISM AND IRRATIONALITY A common counterexample to externalism and reliabilism asserts that it does not capture the sufficient conditions for justification since reliable processes can yield beliefs the that from the believer’s own standpoint seem irrational. In this paper I argue that the internalist argument is based upon the false assumption that one’s subjective perspective and one’s psychological processes are easily and intuitively separable. I focus primarily upon the work of Lawrence BonJour. In his "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge" as well as his The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, BonJour offers a series of counterexamples to reliabilist theories of knowledge. BonJour claims that these counterexamples illustrate a conclusive objection to reliabilist theories of knowledge. BonJour objects to reliabilism on the grounds that a person could have a belief counting as knowledge according to reliabilism, but which seems (epistemically) irrational in light of the person's own understanding of the evidence. BonJour's article and book have proven very influential. His counterexamples are arguable the most thorough treatment of this criticism in the philosophical literature and are often treated in the philosophical world as the final nails in the reliabilist's casket. In this paper, I discuss BonJour's examples at length, arguing that the apparent strength of BonJour's objection is chimerical. I claim that the intuitive pull of BonJour's examples (and these examples generally) results, not from a weakness in reliabilism, but from rhetorical elements, vagaries, and false psychological presuppositions in BonJour's descriptions.
    [Show full text]
  • Knowledge, Innate Concepts, and the Justification for the Belief in God
    Kom, 2016, vol. V (1) : 21–36 UDC: 141.4 Мула Садра Ширази 165.19:28-184.3 DOI: 10.5937/kom1601021H Original scientific paper Knowledge, Innate Concepts, and the Justification for the Belief in God Abdolmajid Hakimelahi Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, I. R. Iran The epistemological approach of evidentialism maintains that a belief must have sufficient evidence in order to be rationally justified. The belief in God is no exception and, hence, it too must pass the litmus test of evi- dence as a measure of its rational justification. But what counts as evidence? Responding to this question and identifying the nature of the evidence that can be used to justify belief has become a point of contention between phi- losophers. While some evidentialists have denied the possibility of evidence for the belief in God, others have attacked the very basis of the evidentialist claim by promoting belief in God without evidence. The following paper briefly describes these two currents and culminates by discussing the no- tion of innate concepts and presential knowledge as proposed by Mulla Sadra. According to the authors, this type of presential knowledge can be included as “evidence” even from the evidentialist point of view which does not limit evidence to conceptual knowledge. Keywords: Belief in God, sufficient knowledge, justification, evidentialism, pre- sential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-huḍūrī), innate concepts, Mulla Sadra. Introduction The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of believing in God and the unmediated knowledge of Him, which in the Arabic philosophical termi- nology is known as al-ʿilm al-huḍūrī (presential knowledge, knowledge by presence, or unmediated knowledge).
    [Show full text]