US Strategies for Regional Security: Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia
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US Strategies for Regional Security: Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference Edited by Michael Kraig and James Henderson Convened at Airlie Conference Center,Warrenton, Virginia October 25-27, 2001 Preface trategy for Peace, the Stanley Foundation’s US foreign policy conference, annually assembles a panel of experts from the public and private sectors to assess specific policy Sissues and to recommend future direction. The eighty-seven participants who met at Airlie Center were drawn together in four concurrent round-table discussions to examine the current state of relations and recommend elements of a strategy for peace. All sessions were informal and off the record. In preparing this document following the confer- ence, the rapporteurs tried to convey the areas of consensus and disagreement and the conclu- sions of the discussion. It contains her or his interpretation of the proceeding and is not merely a descriptive, chronological account. The participants neither reviewed nor approved the reports. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions. Production: Amy Bakke, Loren Keller, Margo Schneider, and Eileen Schurk Introduction and Summary By Michael Kraig and James Henderson Program Officers, The Stanley Foundation US Strategies for Regional Security For the 2001 Strategy for Peace Conference, the Stanley Foundation invited US officials and policy experts to consider US foreign policy and defense strategies for achieving regional secu- rity in four major areas of the world: Europe; the Middle East and Persian Gulf; South Asia; and within Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula. Participants were asked to view the strategic, economic, and political dynamics of individual regions in their entirety. For each separate work- ing group, two to three participants were asked prior to the conference to author “thought- pieces” or short policy briefs on US foreign policy options. These pieces served as a primer for discussion and are reprinted in their entirety within this report. The chair of each working group was then asked to write their own short reports synthesizing, analyzing, and summarizing both the working group discussions and the commissioned briefs. Working group discussions at Airlie House were informal and off the record. Therefore, the primary policy recommendations listed at the beginning of each chair’s report in the follow- ing sections of this publication should be viewed as the chair’s own interpretations of the substance of discussions. Why a Focus on Regions? It may seem that the new realities of transnational terrorism and the global “war on terror” require a purely global focus in conceptualizing US foreign and security policies over the long term. Alternately, many experts might point to the necessity of shoring up US bilateral relations with key potential allies, especially European allies and individual developing countries from these four regions. Both the global and the bilateral points of view are necessary in any compre- hensive assessment of US policy options. However, one only has to consider the international events of the first post-Cold War decade to find compelling reasons not to abandon a broad regional outlook as a necessary component of national security strategy: • Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophes were initially not treat- ed as strategic interests for the United States. However, the potential for instability spreading to regional neighbors threatened the values, political principles, and military credibility of the North American Trade Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). • Regional differences have repeatedly challenged the norms and goals of global nonprolifera- tion regimes. The threat environments of the Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean penin- sula have required supplementary strategies for preventing the spread of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). • The Persian Gulf region—particularly Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors—and the dis- pute between Israel and Palestine constitute the two primary unresolved regional problems that are fueling the Al Qaeda-related transnational terrorist cells in more than 60 countries around the wo r l d . Successful resolution of these diverse national security challenges will require that the United States deal with the regional issues involved, align regional initiatives with global concerns and regimes, and use US bilateral relations to leverage solutions. In this regard, sound regional secu- rity frameworks can provide essential economic, political, and military foundations for making global security initiatives workable. The primary substantive focus of each separate working group, and the associated findings and policy recommendations, are briefly outlined below. A more complete and detailed set of rec- ommendations can be seen at the beginning of each chair’s report. European Security The attacks of September 11 have renewed the centrality of the Euro-Atlantic partnership between the United States and Europe and made clear that threats to European security will increasingly come from unstable states and regions bordering Europe. Special attention was focused on the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Near East. Key findings and recommendations were: • The Euro-Atlantic partnership and transatlantic community are still central components of US and regional security after September 11. • Europe and the United States should work to further integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic system, a goal now made easier by President Putin’s recent policies. • The primary powers and responsibilities of the EU and NATO should not be confused with each other, and membership should not be viewed as automatic. Neither the EU nor NATO is a full-service institution. • In the Balkans, the United States and its European allies have little choice but to carry on with their present policies. Continued involvement by both the United States and the EU is critical to future progress and stability in the region. • Turkey remains simultaneously one of the principal bulwarks and one of the major policy conundrums of European security. The problems of Turkey’s concerns about NATO-EU arrangements for the EU Rapid Reaction Force and Cyprus’s membership in the EU need to be resolved. • The Caucasus will be increasingly important for European security. European countries should pay greater attention to the region, including problems such as those faced by the government of Georgia in Abkhasia. • Economic and demographic pressures in the Mediterranean and Near East may increasingly present European countries with security challenges at their borders and internally. The EU is the proper institution for fashioning “soft security” measures to prevent the worst possible out- comes from materializing. Korean Peninsula Security and Northeast Asia Special attention was given to the problems of the Korean peninsula within Northeast Asia because it represents one of the few Cold War territorial and ideological divisions still operat- ing. As such, it is a de facto obstacle to further progress toward a wider multilateral security framework in East and Southeast Asia. Key findings and recommendations were: • New forms of US engagement are needed to reduce the massive uncertainty about long- term North Korean goals and intentions. A consistent US policy strategy for both Ko r e a and for Northeast Asia is hampered by lack of US understanding about North Ko r e a n intentions and goals. • Coordination with South Korea remains critical. To reduce confusion, there should be an explicit agreement confirming the division of labor on WMD issues, missile proliferation, and conventional arms control talks. • The United States should acknowledge the positive role that China and Russia, as interested regional powers, could play in reducing tension on the Korean peninsula. Middle East Security Central concerns revolved around the future of the Israeli nuclear, chemical, and biological pro- grams; US efforts to keep Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states committed to the war on ter- ror; missile and WMD development trends for Syria, Iran, and Iraq; and US bilateral policies toward both Iran and Iraq. Key findings and recommendations were: • Avoid unilateral actions against Iraq unless firm evidence of connections to Al Qaeda emerges. For now, leverage the new post-September 11 relationship with Russia to gain approval for smart sanctions toward Iraq. • Improve public relations in the Arab world and the Persian Gulf. Make every effort to better understand Arab and Persian culture and society. • Craft a consistent policy in the Middle East in regard to human rights and democracy. • In the near term, avoid regional arms control and disarmament initiatives meant to alter the status quo of Israeli nuclear opacity. In the long term, how eve r, the quest for reg i o n- al stability will require the United States to work with Israel in changing the nuclear status quo. South Asia Security For this region, the primary policy conundrum was on how to balance three competing US security mandates: the need to win quickly and decisively the post-September 11 war in Afghanistan; the need to ensure the security of South Asian nuclear stockpiles against terrorist theft or diversion; and the broader, longer-term requirement of preventing operational nuclear deployments and the further improvement of both countries’