Shell to Sea Report for the People’s Permanent Tribunal Lima May 2008

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Report compiled by Eve Campbell and Niall Harnett Mark Garavan

Thanks to Pepe

Special thanks to volunteer translators: Rosario de Zayas Rueda, Italy. Nancy Serrano, (Gluaiseacht), Co Limerick. Martina Hemmersbach, Ennistymon, Co Clare. Martha Fabregat Carceller, Gort, Co Galway.

Photo credits Terry Dunne Jan Pesch Eve Campbell Franc Myles

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Table of contents RESUMEN DEL INFORME 4

IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN IMPACTS 6 ON PEOPLE'S AND HUMAN RIGHTS: Introduction 6 Overview of the Corrib Project 7 Pollution 8 • The refinery • Carrowmore Lake • Broadhaven Bay Health and Safery 10 • The Refinery • The Pipeline Livelihoods 10 Lack of Democracy in the Planning Process 11 • The Systematic Blocking of Public Participation 13 CASE STUDY: The TNCs and the Irish State Forestry Company in Corrib 15 CASE STUDY: The TNCs and the Irish State Forestry Company in Corrib IN 19 SPANISH INSTRUMENTS AND ACTORS THAT EXPLAIN 22 THE SYSTEMATIC DIMENSIONS OF THE CASE Introduction 22 Ownership and Control: Fiscal and Licensing Terms Governing Oil and Gas 22 Exploitation and Production Changing Laws for the Oil Companies 23 Jailing : The Rossport 5 25 Political Policing: Shell’s Cops 26 ACCUSATION 28 Environmental Impact Assessment 30 Seveso 2 Directive 30 The Water Quality Directive 30 Various Public Consultation Directives 30 The Habitats Directive 30 ACCUSATION IN SPANISH 32 RESISTANCE AND ALTERNATIVES AND HOW THE TRIBUNAL CAN CONTRIBUTE 38 TO THIS APPENDIX 40 Report of an International Fact Finding Delegation to Co. Mayo, Ireland 40 February 23-27, 2007 Executive Summary of the Centre for Public Enquiry Report 45 Key findings of the Accufacts report 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY 48

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RESUMEN DEL INFORME

El Campo Corrib es una reserva de gas natural situado a 80 kilometros de la costa oeste del condado de mayo, que contiene 11 trillones de pies cubicos (TCF) de gas natural. El Proyecto de Gas del Campo de Corrib, compuesto por un consorcio de empresas lideradas por Royal Dutch Shell, tiene la intención de traer el gas a tierra cerca de Rossport en la región de Erris en el noroeste de Mayo y bombear el gas sin refinar 9 kilometros tierra adentro a través de una tierra poblada a una refineria ubicada en una colina de turba, donde el gas seria limpiado y despresurizado para la venta y la exportación. El proyecto se ha encontrado con la oposición de la comunidad local desde que los detalles del proyecto salieron a la luz por primera vez en el aňo 2000. Activistas de la comunidad argumentan que si la refineria se contruye tendrá un efecto en detrimento del medio ambiente local y por tanto su comunidad, con la contaminación del agua y del aire actualmente limpios, con un efecto negativo sobre la salud, la economía familiar, la fauna y constituyendo un riesgo inaceptable para su seguridad. Activistas locales han seňalado la falta de democracia que ha rodeado el proyecto Corrib, el hecho de que nunca fueran consultados de una forma significativa y que el proyecto opera actualmente sin el consentimiento de la comunidad. La propiedad y el control del Gas de Corrib ha llegado a ser uno de los enfoques de la campaňa; la gente en Irlanda se beneficiará poco del Gas, que pertenece al Consorcio de Gas de Corrib que no pagará derechos al estado y poco o nada en impuestos sobre los beneficios.

El proceso por el cual las empresas petroleras consiguieron el permiso de obras para el Proyecto de Corrib subraya la manera en la que el gobierno hizo caso omiso al proceso de planificación como un mero detalle, y la forma fundamentalmente antidemocrática en la que el Proyecto de Corrib a sido impuesto. No hubo una consulta significativa con la comunidad local en la etapa de planificación del proyecto. El grado en el que el Proyecto ha sido dado por sentado es evidente en los comentarios hechos por el primer ministro Bertie Ahern en la celebración del vigésimoprimero aniversario del instituto nacional de gas a principios de octubre del aňo 2000. En la celebración, el seňor Ahern anunció que el instituto y el consorcio Enterprise financiarían y construirían un gaseoducto de connexión desde la refineria de Ballinaboy a la red nacional de gas en Galway. Esto fue incluso antes de que las compaňias petroleras solicitaran permiso de obras para la refineria.

Las actividades del Consorcio del Gas Corrib en Irlanda, la manera en la que han enfocado el Proyecto de Corrib y las relaciones con la comunidad en Erris estan enmarcadas por el estado irlandes. En este contexto el caso ilustra la subordinación del estado irlandes al poder corporativo, visible en la manera en la que el estado a facilitado a las compaňias petroliferas toda la coyuntura necesaria prioretizando sus demandas sobre las necesidades de las comunidades en Irlanda. Esta facilitación y prioridad de las comaňias petroleras es visible en varios aspectos del Proyecto Corrib, desde el regimen de impuestos y

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las licencias que gobiernan los hidrocarburos hasta la manera en la que las leyes se han ido cambiando especificamente para el Proyecto; el proceso por el cual las compaňias petroleras consiguieron el permiso de obra; y el papel que la policia ha jugado en asegurar que el trabajo continuase en el Proyecto a pesar de la masiva oposición de la comunidad, activistas locales y otros partidarios que han apoyado la campaňa.

El regimen de impuestos y las condiciones de las licencias relacionadas con Gas Corrib además de todo el resto del gas y petroleo que hay en los mares de Irlanda son muy favorables para las empresas petroleras. El campo del Gas Corrib, por ejemplo, pertenece enteramente al Consorcio Corrib que no pagará derechos y podrá deducir los costes de instalación de sus beneficios finales para efectos de hacienda. El estado Irlandes ha dado efectivamente el campo de gas al consorcio por poco o nada. Entre mediados de los ochenta y mediados de los noventa el regimen de impuestos y las condiciones de licencias fueron reducidos para permitir la apropiación de grandes areas de territorio submarino a las compaňias petroleras por periodos de tiempo largos con mínimos impuestos sobre los beneficios.

Las condiciones irlandedas identificadas como las mejores en el mundo por el director irlandes de Statoil Mike Cunningham deben ser vistas en el contexto de la presión ejercida por los jefes la industria petrolifera a los politicos irlandeses desde que el gas irlandes fuera por primera vez encontrado en los setenta en la costa oeste, pero mas recientemente en relación con el Proyecto de Corrib y la apertura del margen Atlántico como una area viable para la explotación del gas y petroleo.

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IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN IMPACTS ON PEOPLE'S AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

“Shell’s only reason for being in Erris is to make profit. They will maximize that profit by taking whatever shortcuts official Ireland will allow them” Erris Inshore Fisherman’s Association 1

“In the context of this community Shell E&P Ireland and its government protectors will be here for a short time only. In that time they will have destroyed the potential of the area for sustainability, for the continued survival of the community into the future.” Niall King, Aughoose 2

INTRODUCTION: The Corrib Gas Field is a reserve of natural gas situated 80 km off the west coast of County Mayo containing 11 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas. The Corrib Gas Project, directed by a consortium of companies led by Royal Dutch Shell, seeks to bring the gas ashore near Rossport in the Barony of Erris in North West Mayo and to pump the unrefined gas 9km inland through an inhabited area to a refinery located on a boggy hill where it would be cleaned and depressurized for sale and export. The project has been opposed locally since the details first came to light in 2000. Community campaigners argue that if built the refinery would have a detrimental effect on the local environment and their community which it sustains resulting in pollution of the currently clean air and water, negatively affecting health, livelihoods, wildlife and posing an unacceptable safety risk. Local campaigners have highlighted the lack of democracy surrounding the Corrib Project, the fact that they were never meaningfully consulted and that the project is currently without community consent. Ownership and control of the Corrib Gas has become one of the foci of the campaign; people in Ireland will benefit little from the Corrib Gas which is owned by the Corrib Gas consortium who will pay no royalties and little or no tax on profits .

Impacts of the TNC: • Health and safety • Pollution • Livelihoods • Democracy, lack of local consent • Ownership and control of natural resources

1http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%209a%20erris%20i nshore%20fishermen’s%20associa.pdf 2http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%209a%20erris%20i nshore%20fishermen’s%20associa.pdf 6

Overview of the Corrib Gas Project:

The Corrib Gas Field is a reserve of natural gas situated 80 km off the west coast of County Mayo containing 11 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas. The gas field was discovered in 1996 by Enterprise Oil, operating in a consortium with Saga Petroleum. Enterprise Oil drilled appraisal wells in 1998 and declared the field commercial in early 2001. The Enterprise consortium drew up plans to bring the gas ashore at near Rossport in the Barony of Erris Co. Mayo processing the gas at a refinery located 9km inland in the townland of Bellanaboy. In 1998 the Corrib Enterprise Oil consortium employed consultants to survey the Connacht coast to find a suitable place to bring the gas ashore. A site was identified in the Barony of Erris at Broadhaven Bay, a large bay and special area of conservation. The Enterprise Consortium also sought a site to build a gas terminal and in 2003 they purchased 400km 2 of state forestry land from Coillte the state forestry agency.3

The development concept which the Enterprise Oil Consortium had selected for the Corrib Gas was that of a land based refinery. Instead of processing the gas at sea the consortium had elected to pump high pressure raw gas to an inland refinery where it would be processed for sale and consumption. This is key to the conflict that has surrounded the project. The design concept of an inland refinery was drawn up to facilitate the further exploitation of Ireland’s offshore oil and gas reserves. 4 No other development models were meaningfully explored by the Corrib consortium, nor did the relevant government authorities ask the consortium to seriously examine other models. 5The main work on the ground began at the refinery site in spring 2005. Preparatory work began at the refinery in April 2005 and attempts were made to stake out the route of the pipeline in Rossport .6

In June five men from the area were jailed indefinitely for attempting to stop Shell engineers staking out the route of the pipeline in Erris. Work on the project was halted after the jailing as campaigners from the area began pickets on Shell’s worksites. In October 2006 the implementation of a large policing operation allowed Shell to recommence work on the refinery after more than 15 months of delay. Shell said they would reroute the pipeline and hired a company to undertake consultation on the route. Shell completed peat removal from the refinery site in 2007 and began construction of the refinery. Construction of the refinery is ongoing. Shell has still not identified a pipeline route.7

3 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 24 4 It is thought that Bellanaboy has been earmarked not just for one gas refinery but as a refining zone for the west coast of Ireland. A report produced for the Petroleum Affairs Division (PAD) and the Irish Shelf Petroleum Group (ISPGG) entitled ‘Cost Effective Development Options’ examines the “economic viability of various field development concepts” of hypothetical fields located in the Rockall, Porcupine and Slyne/Erris/ Donegal basin off Ireland’s west cost. Several of the model fields use the “existing Corrib terminal” while others use “adjacent facili[ies].” What is clear from the report is that Bellanaboy is intended for far more than just Corrib. What is also clear is that there is far more that just Corrib off the west coast of Ireland. 5 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 30-32 6 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 43 7 As of March 2008 7

Pollution:

“It is a basic human right that everyone should have clean air and clean water. This is how it has been around here since time began. ..Someday I would like to have children without having to worry that the air that I breathe and the water I drink could be harming them before they are even born .” Siobhán Mc Donnell, Bunowna.8

The Refinery: Campaigners have several concerns about the refinery stemming from fears of pollution of the air, drinking water and local marine waters as well as based on health and safety from the risk of accident or explosion on the site. Threats to local water are one of the major concerns surrounding the refinery and its location. The project poses a threat to both Carrowmore Lake, a Special Area of Conservation (SAC) and drinking water source for 10,000 people as well as Broadhaven Bay another SAC and basis of the local fishing industry.

Carrowmore Lake:

“If you site a petrochemical industry in the catchment area of a community drinking water [source] you are asking for trouble and it’s only a matter of time before damage is done 9 Anthony Irwin, Blacksod.

Construction of the gas refinery has necessitated the excavation of several hundred tons of bog, which were transported and dumped several km away at Srahmore peat facility. The disturbance of aluminium rich deposits under the bog during excavation combined with inadequate water management and treatment at the site has resulted in the pollution of the local drinking water source and Special Area of Conservation, Carrowmore Lake. Aluminium contaminated water was allowed to run off the site draining into the lake. Mayo County Council’s figures show that aluminium levels in the drinking water coming from the lake to contain levels of aluminium exceeding EU accepted safety levels. Further and more serious contamination of Carrowmore Lake is feared if the refinery is built and operational.

During the 2007 oral hearing for the granting of an IPPC (integrated pollution prevention and control) licence Leo Corcoran of An Taisce lodged an objection to the granting of the licence on behalf the basis

8http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%2024%20sean%20 &%20siobhan%20mcdonnell.pdf 9http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%2032%20anthony %20irwin.pdf 8

that “ the Bellanaboy site does not comply with international codes of practice for siting gas processing terminals because it is located within the catchment of a major water supplier .” 10 As well as the lake’s primary importance as the source of drinking water for almost 10,000 people it is also of considerable ecological value, primarily for the extensive intact blanket bog surrounding the lake, which provides a range of good quality habitats for both plants and animals. The north-western part of the site supports a number of Greenland White-fronted Geese, while other important bird species which occur are Golden Plover, Merlin, Sandwich Tern and Arctic Tern.

Broadhaven Bay:

Waste water from the proposed refinery would be pumped into Broadhaven Bay at the mouth of the Sruthwaddacon Estuary. This untreated waste water would contain many lethal substances, including lead, nickel, magnesium, phosphorus, chromium, arsenic, mercury and the radioactive gas radon. Broadhaven Bay has circular tidal patterns The bay is a designated Special Area of Conservation and is of particular importance due to the range of habitats that it encompasses including large shallow bays, intertidal sand flats, reefs, marine caves and salt marshes. It is an important breeding and wintering ground for several species of waterfowl and other birds as well as providing a breeding and foraging ground for several marine mammals.

A study commissioned by Enterprise Energy in 2001 from the Coastal and Marine Resources Centre at UCC found the bay to be of special importance for cetaceans and other marine mammals. The study recorded over 220 sightings of two whale and five otter and dolphin species commenting that “ there are few if any comparable examples of a relatively small bay in Ireland containing all five Annex II marine mammals with such frequency (bottlenose dolphins, harbour porpoise, grey seal, common seal and European otter). ” It found that Broadhaven Bay was an important breading and rearing area for whales and dolphins specifically bottlenose dolphins. The area was also noted as containing “ important foraging habitats for numerous marine mammal species, plankton feeding basking sharks and seabirds.” Significantly the findings of the UCC report were omitted from the subsequent EIS, which stated that there was “ no evidence that the bay is of particular importance to whales and dolphins ”. 11 Air Pollution:

A key concern in relation to the proposed refinery at Bellanaboy is the issue of air pollution. Aerial emissions is what is now a pristine environment will include Oxides of Carbon, Oxides of Nitrogen, Sulphur Dioxide, Volatile organic compounds, methane and ozone. It is proposed to emit methane through a process of cold venting.12

10 Ref to Leo Corcorans submission to the EPA 11 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 27 12 http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/shell%20d/objection%20no.%207%20- %20treasa%20ni%20ghearraigh%20&%20others.pdf 9

Health and Safety:

“I don’t think any company will introduce expensive safety measures unless they have to .” Christy Loftus, Shell’s communication officer in Mayo 13

The Refinery: The refinery site is a Seveso site , that is large quantities of dangerous and flammable materials will be stored onsite. In his submission to the EPA oral hearing on the IPPC license Captain Dave Aldridge, a retired army engineer stated “ I believe that the proposal to store 3627 Tons for Methanol at Ballinaboy in close proximity to houses and release upwards of 1800 tons per year into the environment could lead to another Bhopal here in County Mayo .” 14

The Pipeline: One of the most problematic components of the Corrib Project has been the upstream pipeline. The upstream pipeline is that part of the pipe that would carry unprocessed gas from the landfall (where the gas pipeline hits land) to the proposed refinery at Bellanaboy. The pipeline was scheduled to travel from the landfall at Glengad on Broadhaven Bay, across the estuary, through the village of Rossport, to the refinery site at Bellanaboy. The planned pipeline route brought it under public roads and families' laneways, and within 70m of many homes in Rossport Village. The pipeline was designed to carry raw, unprocessed gas at a huge pressure of 345 bar. The nature of the gas in its raw form increased the danger of blockages from condensed materials present in the unprocessed gas.

In November 2005 the Centre for Public Enquiry (CPI) published a report on the Corrib Project entitiled the Great Corrib Gas Controversy. As part of the report the CPI commissioned an independent analysis of the pipeline which was done by Richard Kuprewicz of Accufacts Inc. The report found the initial “ route of the pipeline …[to be] unacceptable because of its proximity to people and dwellings,” and that “The pipeline’s uniquely large rupture impact zone with high fatalities raise[d] many questions about the appropriateness of the current proposals and QRA (qualitative risk assessment) approaches .” As yet Shell’s pipeline consultants have failed to identify a pipeline route. Concerns remain over pipeline pressure.

Livelihoods:

In his report recommending the refusal of planning permission for the refinery Kevin Moore concluded that the “ employment impact of the development on the local community would be insignificant in the medium to long term.” Further pointing out that most of the longterm jobs created would be reserved for “specialist skilled persons ”. 15 Many livelihoods in the Erris area are based on the clean sea, air and water. Small scale fishing, farming and tourism are some of the main industries employing people in the area. The Corrib Gas Project will jeopardise these livelihoods mainly through the resulting pollution.

13 http://www.youtube.com/watv=sfNGwlaNIg&NR (Those Who Dance –Part 2 of 5 timeline 07:54) 14 http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%2021%20dave%2 0aldridge%20for%20moran%20party.pdf

15 The Price of Our Souls, pg 43 10

Local fishermen have been some of the most vehement opponents of the project. Erris Inshore Fisherman’s Association passed a motion in support of Shell to Sea. The fishermen are demanding that the waste from the outflow pipe from the refinery with is due to discharged into the waters around Broadhaven Bay be pumped back into the well which Shell refuse to do. February 2007 the Erris Inshore Fisherman’s Association lodged an objection to the granting of the IPPC licence to Shell stating: “There are about 150 fishermen and their families who depend on 150 sustainable jobs in or around the waters of Broadhaven Bay for a major part of their income, if not all…Additionally the marine is one of our most important leisure facilities that has potential to, not only augment but to be the mainstay of our tourism industry. ..The loss of economic benefits in the tourism industry, together with the demise of our traditional fishing industry would far outweigh the benefits, if any, bestowed by Shell by virtue of their presence in Erris .” 16

Fritz Schultz, who runs a holiday hostel with his wife in Pollathomais, overlooking the Sruthwaddacon estuary and near the refinery site spoke out at the oral hearing over the negative effect the project would have on the growing tourist industry in Erris: “Holiday makers from all over the world, in particular from the European Continent and last, not least many Irish guests from other parts of this country …came and were enchanted by what they found. We often heard the word paradise. Until now! Until the news of a massive gas project by the multinational company Shell broke. Potential holidaymakers also have an immediate scenario before them when they hear about an area like Erris being targeted for a development like this: all the recreational facilities that were so readily available to them like water sports, walking, nature watching, freedom and safety of movement in the countryside, intact environments, cultural experiences, would be destroyed and with their reason to come here.17

Lack of Democracy in the Planning Process:

“People before profit is an alien concept to Shell. Shell has been blind to the impact that this project will have on the receiving communities, and deaf to the consistent message from these same communities that that have not given their consent.” 18

The process by which the oil companies gained planning permission for the Corrib Project underlines the extent to which the government disregarded the planning process as a technicality and the fundamentally undemocratic manner in which the Corrib Project has been pushed through. No meaningful consultation was conducted with the receiving community at the planning stage of the project. The extent to which the project was viewed as a fait accompli is evident in comments made by Taoiseach Bertie Ahern at a 21 st anniversary celebration of Bord Gáis in early October 2000. At the celebration Mr. Ahern, announced that Bord Gáis and the Enterprise consortium would fund and build a connector pipeline from the Ballinaboy site to the national loop at Galway, this was before the oil companies had even applied for planning permission for the site 19

16 http://www.epa.ie/downloard/shell/shell%20d/objection%20no.%205%20- %20erris%20inshore%20fisherman’s%20association.pdf 17 http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%204b%20fritz%20 schult%20for%20treasa%20mcgarry.pdf 18 http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%209a%20erris%2 0inshore%20fishermen’s%20associa.pdf 19 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 29 11

In November 2000 Enterprise Oil applied for planning permission to Mayo County Council and submitted an Environmental Impact Statement .20 Mayo County Council initially granted planning permission for the project on 3 August 2001. Rossport residents appealed the decision to the planning board. In the meantime the Government moved to provide the land for the pipeline by giving powers to the Minister to make CAOs for the benefit of a private consortium. 21 In December 2001 Enterprise representatives began knocking on doors and sending letters to landowners asking them to grant permission for the pipeline in exchange for compensation. As well as individual farms the pipeline route also passed through an area of commonage, commonly held land.

In February 2002 the Planning Board’s senior inspector Kevin Moore opened the oral hearing to hear appeals against the planning permission. In April 2003 the planning board announced its decision to refuse planning permission. 22 In his report senior planning office Kevin Moore was heavily critical of the project underlining that the site chosen for the refinery, on a boggy hill surrounded by peoples’ homes was the wrong site:

The proposed development of a large gas processing terminal at this rural, scenic and unserviced area on a boghill some 8km inland from the Mayo coastland landfall location, with all its site development work difficulties, public safety concerns, adverse visual, ecological and traffic impacts defies any rational of the term sustainability 23

In my opinion, the current proposed site is unequivocally the wrong choice. 24

Mr Moore recommended refusal of planning permission for the project on three grounds, threat to the sensitive and scenic location; the instability of the bog; and the risk of a major accident.25 After a meeting of An Bord Pleanála on 28 th and 29 th of April 200,3 the Board refused planning permission but overturned two of Mr Moore’s grounds. Minister of State for Labour Affairs Frank Fahey announced that the project had been delayed on a “technicality”. 26

Meetings Between Government and Big Oil: On 6 th August 2003 the CEO of Shell E&P, Mr Walter van de Vijver, wrote to the Taoiseach requesting a meeting about the project which was agreed to. 27 On 19 th of September 2003 Taoiseach Bertie Ahern met with Tom Botts, CEO of Shell E&P Europe, Andy Pyle of Shell E&P Ireland and Rosemary Steen of Enterprise Energy Ireland along with the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Dermot Ahern, and other department officials.28 The assembled ministers assured Shell that that An Bord Pleanála and Mayo County Council would treat the application with priority. On the 23 rd September 2003 a meeting was held between An Bord Plenála’s top officials and Corrib developers under the banner of the Irish Offshore Operators Association.29

20 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 29 21 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 31 22 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 34 23 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 34 24 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 37 25 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 38 26 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 38 27 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 39 28 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 40 29 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 41 12

Planning Permission Granted: On the 17 th December 2003 Shell resubmitted its planning application to Mayo County Council . Rossport residents made a new submission to the Council opposing the project. Permission, however was granted on the 30 th April 2004. Residents appealed to the Planning Appeals Board but on the 23 rd October 2004 permission was finally granted.30

The lack of meaningful consultation with the receiving community is compounded by the attitude of Shell towards people in the community:

“For many generations now, [Erris fishermen] have sustained a living from Broadhaven Bay and its surrounding waters…With the advent of Shell, things have changed drastically. They have intruded into our lives, not on any invitation from us but by permission from our administrative authority to exploit and develop the natural resource off our shores for their own benefit, and it seems for their own advantage. They came to us with a very doubtful environmental reputation on a global scale, but we were willing to accept them. We did not mind their intrusion provided it was done gently with dignity and consideration for our needs. Unfortunately, their claims of wanting to be ‘good neighbours’ sounds very hollow in view of their methods and practices since their arrival. We have asked questions of them and got answers that were contemptuous of our intelligence. We have responded to their calls for dialogue only to find out that ‘Dialogue Shell Style’ is that we sit down with them, make out points, accept their explanations and understand they were right all along!! ” 31

The systematic blocking of public participation.

The negation of public participation goes back as far as the original planning application for the refinery which was made by the TNC's in November 2000. Several hundred people signed various objections to the planning application. A circular from the Department of the Environment in 1996 states 'that all County Councils make correspondence on planning matters available for photocopying, except plans and drawings which may be copurighted'. This applies whether a planning project is pre or post decision.

Mayo County Council, the local planning authority, refused to allow members of the public to make photocopies of any submission or objections on file, even though the files may be photographed, dictated or read down a phone. This is in direct breach of the departmental circular, even though the order was brought to the attention of the Council staff by the office of the local radio station, Midwest News. Entreprise Energy Ireland, Shell's fore-runner, were given photocopies of the files by Mayo County Council and everyone else was refused. Also, the written submissions from the 'notifiable bodies' were not placed on the file until the planning application was granted. The public and the media were refused access to examine these submissions before planning permission was granted.

A senior official with the Department of the Marine, Michael Daly, said he saw no reason why the public was denied access to the submission made by the Department of the Marine. But only a few hours later, after he received a phone call from Mayo County Council, Mr. Daly changed his mind and said that the

30 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 42 31 http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%2023%20niall%20 king.pdf 13

Council could treat the submission as an internal document. Several people complained to the local radio station that the contents of the planning file changed constantly as time went by.

The planning office of the local authority, Mayo County Council, as just a physical location served as a good symbol for the typical interaction the public administrative body that is making the decision and the people it is meant to serve. And the planning office is 50 miles away from the locality affected by the decision, so anybody wanting to go there had to make a round trip of a hundred miles minimum only to be refused the very information they sought.

From the outset, the political and discursive opportunities facing protesters were not promising. Political representatives were generally sympathetic to the project, were largely united and, even should their views change, could in any case exercise no direct role in the decisions to be made. All the major political parties supported the full exploitation of natural resources. Because there was no substantive division among political elites, the gas terminal conflict did not become a contentious issue at the formal, political level. Accordingly, the conflict was to be conducted within an administrative process rather than within a ‘political’ setting. This had a decisive impact both on the claims protesters were to make and on the forms of their protest. This is because, in order to make a protest that could be processed by administrative decision-makers, objectors were obliged to conform to the rules of relevance operated by such bodies. This meant that what were often inchoate grievances, or grievances that centred on questions of broader principle, had to be translated and reduced into valid submissions appropriate to the targeted interlocutor. The implication of this administrative context for decision making was important as it meant that no elected body, either at local or national level, had any role to play in making the immediate decisions on the matter.

The political opportunity structure facing objectors was such that key democratic bodies were ‘closed’ to them – no elected body was to decide on the matter, either elected county councillors or the Dáil (national parliament) and, besides, there were no serious public divisions among politicians on the issue. Decisions were to be made entirely by various administrative bodies. The planning process served as a ‘channelling mechanism’ by which objectors could be shunted onto narrow discursive ground, thus structurally limiting the discursive opportunities available to them.

The refusal to dialogue, and the capacity to proceed in the absence of dialogue, indicates the existence, and exercise, of power. The consequence of non-dialogue was to impair the community’s capability to resist the terminal and pipeline proposal by effectively reducing them to a state of silence. By being silenced in the decision-making process, the only voices remaining that could be ‘heard’ were those of the state and corporation. The gas project was to be determined through a series of ‘objective’ tests and could proceed accordingly if judged appropriate by these tests, irrespective of community consent. In this way, through the application of a series of procedural mechanisms, dissent and resistance to the project were overcome and rendered, in appearance at least, unreasonable.

The capacity to establish the conventions under which communication between citizens and decision- making bodies can occur is a key contemporary form of power. It is conventions (often legislatively set) that determine the test of relevancy adopted by decision-making or policy-making bodies. In the Corrib Gas conflict, questions of health, for example, were strictly speaking irrelevant for all the administrative bodies involved, and could not become relevant for any of them even though it was of central concern to the local community. Therefore, by determining that certain topics and concerns are irrelevant (i.e. outside the scope of consideration), the actors raising them are rendered silent. In this way, the 14

empirical plurality of views on development projects, and dissenting views particularly, can, through the application of a pre-determined method , be excluded from consideration.

TNC’s (Trans-national Corporations) are legal persons, with all the rights of persons, but they are not socialized into any community and are a-cultural. They do not inculturate themselves or embed themselves appropriately into any community that they encounter. Instead, they impose themselves on communities and are a form of ‘cultural invasion.’ That is a key reason for global-wide community resistances to them, often pejoratively and inaccurately designated as ‘nimby’ (not in my back yard) style disputes.

Disgracefully, as we have witnessed in the case of Corrib, Shell and the TNC's are allowed to operate outside of full democratic control.

Shell’s activities in North Mayo exemplify all of the dysfunctional consequences of these global, immortal legal persons.

How 500 acres of publicly owned State forestry/land was made available and became the property of Shell and the TNC’s (trans-national corporations)

Shell are building the Corrib Gas refinery on a 500 acre site. This site was bought from a publicly owned State Forestry company called ‘ Coillte’, (Coillte is the Irish word for Forests).

Coillte’s main purpose, as outlined in ‘the objects of the company’ outined in legislation, is ‘to carry on the business of forestry‘. Coillte also (claim to) operate within environmental guidelines established by the international ’FSC’ (Forestry Stewardship Council) and according to the principles of ’SFM’ (Sustainable Forestry Management) , and have an ‘FSC eco-label’ attached to their name which belies the truth, which is this:

Coillte are engaged in two main pursuits.

1) The growing of Sitka Spruce plantations for quick (and poor) commercial turnover. Sitka Spruce is a non-native conifer species, and the plantations are a sterile monoculture with no biodiversity. They require chemical insecticides and fertilisers which then run into water courses from drains that they dig to remove excess water, causing environmental pollution, and, as in the case of Corrib:

2) The selling off of land to private interests: Shell, wind farms, developers etc.

Feasibility studies to develop the Corrib Gas Field were conducted in the late 1990’s and onshore development and pipeline options were being proposed and considered in the North-West of County Mayo. It was only when Government minister Mr Frank Fahey offered Coillte Forestry lands as a possible site for a gas refinery that the project started to become a reality.

In March 2001 Coillte approved the sale of 250 acres of land at Bellanaboy, Co Mayo for the Corrib Gas Project. In December of 2004 the final area of 160 hectares was sold by Coillte to Shell for €2.75 million, to build a Gas Refinery Terminal. Subsequently Coillte granted Shell ’wayleave’ permission to build a 15

high pressure raw gas pipeline through 3km of adjacent Coillte land at Aughoose, Co Mayo.

At no stage did Coillte consult with the local community with regard to the sale and use of this public land . Despite the efforts of the local community to organise meetings and to establish a consultation process, Coillte refused to meet them.

Coillte state that their policy on consultation is to: “consult at national, regional and local level to establish and maintain dialogue with relevant statutory and non-governmental organisations, special interest groups and general public.”

But. Coillte never held any public consultation or information meetings in the local area in regard to the sale of land, which is in clear breach of their obligations. In fact, Coillte only announced the sale 5 months after the planning application for a gas terminal had been lodged in November 2000.”

Coillte’s claims to Sustainable and Consultative Principles of Management.

Coillte claims to have ‘committed itself publicly to comply with Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) Principles and Criteria. The specific commitment given by Coillte is as follows:

We have adopted Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) as the guiding principle by which we manage our forests now and in the future.

Among the principles:

• Countries have the right to use forests for their social and economic development needs. Such use should be based on national policies consistent with sustainable development.

• Forests should be managed to meet the social, economic, ecological, cultural and spiritual needs of present and future generations.

• The planning and implementation of national forest policies should involve a wide variety of people, including women, forest dwellers, indigenous people, industries, workers and non-government organizations.

• Indigenous peoples rights : The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands, territories, and resources shall be recognized and respected

• Coillte policy on consultation with local/indigenous people.

Coillte has committed itself publicly to comply with FSC Principles and Criteria and is an active participant in the Irish Forestry Certification Initiative which aims to develop FSC national standards for Ireland. Coillte remains fully committed to putting Sustainable Forest Management Principles into practise in the way we manage our business every day.”

No Consultation.

16

In October of 2005, the chief executive of Coillte, Mr Martin Lowery admitted that:

“Coillte did not consult the local community prior to the sale of the land at Bellanaboy. Coillte has no statutory obligation to consult prior to offering land for sale.”

Observation: Here we can see the real commitment of Coillte to the SFM & FSC principles which, in effect, is no commitment at all. Martin Lowery, CE of Coillte is aspiring only to his ‘statutory duty’, not to any other duty or any duty outlined in his own Coillte Policy documents or public commitments.

And in the same month, Government minister Mary Coughlan said this:

“Under Section 14 of the Forestry Act 1988 and the Code of Practice for the Governance of State Bodies, Coillte has certain responsibilities and duties in the matter of sale of land. I am satisfied that all obligations and duties under these measures were properly discharged by Coillte in this matter. Notwithstanding the fact that Coillte is a private commercial company, I have made enquiries and I understand that there was no consultation with the local community by Coillte prior to the sale of this land.”

Minister Mary Coughlan refers in her reply, to ‘statutory obligations’ but omits to mention Coillte’s own obligations to the State, to the public and to the very principles designed to give the public a say as to how that land is managed. The Minister’s reference here to Coillte as a ‘private commercial company’ is not a true representation of Coillte’s company status and belies the fact that they are the stewards of public State land, entrusted to them for the purposes of Sustainable Forestry Management.

In 2003, Coillte accused the European Commission of “failing in its duties relating to cooperation in good faith, legal certainty and sound administration and breached the principle of legitimate expectations“. The European Court of Justice ruled against Coillte finding them to be a "public entity wholly owned and controlled by the State". while attempting to misrepresent themselves as a “private- law legal entity” in an attempt to draw down up to €50 million of European funding intended to compensate farmers for their loss of income incurred during the non-productive period of afforested agricultural land. These premium grants may be paid only to farmers or private law individuals, not to public undertakings.

Coillte claimed premium grants for loss of income from land the Company had only just purchased from farmers and used the funding stream to borrow funds to purchase more land from more farmers. The total illegitimate funding involved should have continued up to 2013, by which time the planting up to 2000 alone would have paid Coillte IR£37.3 million.

In this case, it was Coillte who were putting forward the arguments that they, while misrepresenting themselves, were expecting the European Commission to protect their position under the principles of ‘‘the protection of legitimate expectation’ and ‘the duty to cooperate on good faith’, when in fact it was Coillte themselves who were found to be in breach of these very principles.

A local resident put it this way:

“Since our first complaint in 2001 local people have given up and despaired of any ethical behaviour or 17

adherence by Coillte to FSC principles of consultation. Our local community group has started off enthusiastically in the spirit and belief of public participation and we have ended in regarding the FSC logo as a tool of salesmanship without any meaning. Nobody is interested anymore in wasting time with make-believe-complaint-procedures.“

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De cómo 500 acres de tierras/bosque propiedad del estado fueron recalificados y se convirtieron en propiedad de Shell y corporaciones transnacionales (TNC)

Shell está construyendo la refinería de gas Corrib sobre 500 acres de terreno. Este lugar fue comprado de manos de una compañía llamada "Coillte" (Coillte significa en irlandés "Bosque") de bosques estatales.

El principal objetivo de Coillte, tal y como se detalla en los "objetivos de la compañía" dentro de la legislación, es "continuar con el negocio de la ingeniería forestal". Coillte también (proclama) funcionar dentro de las directivas medioambientales establecidas por el " FSC ", del inglés " Forestry Stewardship Council " (Consejo de Manejo Forestal) y sigue los principios del " SFM ", del inglés " Sustainable Forestry Management " (Gestión forestal sostenible), y cuenta con una "eco-etiqueta FSC" junto a su nombre que oculta la verdad:

Coillte está dedicado a dos temas principales.

1) El crecimiento de las plantaciones de picea sitchensis para una renovación comercial rápida (y pobre). La Picea sitchensis es una especie conífera foránea y las plantaciones son un monocultivo estéril sin biodiversidad. Requieren de insecticidas químicos y fertilizantes que pasan al agua mediante sumideros que cavan para eliminar el exceso de agua, provocando polución ambiental,

Y, como en el caso de Corrib:

2) La venta de tierras a intereses privados: Shell, granjas eólicas, constructores, etc.

Los estudios de viabilidad para la construcción de la Central de gas de Corrib se llevaron a cabo a finales de los 90 y se propusieron y consideraron opciones de creación y construcción de conductos en el Noroeste del Condado de Mayo. Fue en el momento en que el Ministro del gobierno Sr. Frank Fahey ofreció los terrenos forestales de Coillte como posible ubicación para una refinería de gas cuando el proyecto comenzó a convertirse en una realidad.

En marzo de 2001, Coillte aprobó la venta de 250 acres de terreno a Bellanaboy, Condado de Mayo para el Proyecto de gas de Corrib. En diciembre de 2004, el área definitiva de 160 hectáreas fue vendida por Coillte a Shell por 2,75 millones de euros, para construir una Terminal de refinería de gas. Consiguientemente Coillte dio a Shell "carta blanca" para construir un conducto de gas bruto de alta presión atravesando 3 km. de terrenos adyacentes a Coillte en Aughoose, en el Condado de Mayo.

En ningún momento pidió Coillte la opinión de la comunidad local con respecto a la venta y el uso de terrenos públicos . A pesar de los esfuerzos de la comunidad local para organizar reuniones y establecer un proceso de consultas, Coillte rehusó encontrarse con ellos.

Coillte expone que su política de consultas es: “consultar a nivel local, regional y nacional para establecer y mantener el diálogo con las organizaciones no gubernamentales pertinentes y aquellas creadas por la ley, grupos de interés especial y el público en general.”

Pero. Coillte nunca mantuvo ninguna consulta pública ni organizó reuniones informativas en la zona con 19

respecto a la venta de terrenos; lo que parece ser una infracción de sus obligaciones. De hecho, Coillte anunció la venta sólo 5 meses después de haberse presentado la puesta en marcha del plan de la terminal de gas en noviembre de 2000."

Coillte proclama unos Principios de administración sostenibles y participativos.

Coillte reivindica haberse "comprometido públicamente para cumplir con los principios y criterios del Consejo de manejo forestal (FSC). El compromiso específico adquirido por Coillte es el siguiente:

Hemos adoptado la Gestión forestal sostenible (SFM) como principio rector, y siguiendo sus premisas administramos nuestros bosques en la actualidad y en el futuro.

Entre los principios se encuentra:

• Los países tienen el derecho a utilizar los bosques para sus necesidades de desarrollo económico y social. Dicho uso debería basarse en las directivas nacionales acordes con un desarrollo sostenible.

• Los bosques deberían gestionarse de modo que cumplan con las necesidades sociales, económicas, ecológicas, culturales y espirituales de las generaciones actuales y las venideras.

• La planificación e implementación de directivas forestales nacionales debería involucrar a la diversidad de la población, incluyendo mujeres, moradores, habitantes autóctonos del lugar, industrias, trabajadores y organizaciones no gubernamentales.

• Derechos de la población autóctona : Los derechos legales y consuetudinarios de la población autóctona a la propiedad, uso y administración de sus tierras, territorios y recursos debe ser reconocida y respetada

• Directiva de Coillte de consultas a la población local/autóctona

Coillte se ha comprometido públicamente a acatar los Principios y criterios de la FSC y es un participante activo de la Iniciativa irlandesa de certificación forestal, que reivindica el desarrollo de estándares FSC nacionales para Irlanda. Coillte sigue estando plenamente comprometida a poner en práctica los Principios de gestión forestal sostenible, tal y como hacemos cada día en nuestra labor."

No han habido consultas.

En octubre de 2005, el director ejecutivo de Coillte, el Sr. Martin Lowery admitió que:

"Coillte no consultó a la comunidad local antes de vender las tierras en Bellanaboy. Coillte no tiene obligación legal de consultar antes de poner en venta las tierras."

Observación: Aquí podemos observar cuál es el compromiso real de Coillte con los principios del SFM y el FSC, ninguno en absoluto. Martin Lowery, director ejecutivo de Coillte aspira únicamente a cumplir con sus "obligaciones legales", con ninguna otra obligación de las señaladas en los documentos

20

estatutarios de Coillte, ni tampoco con ningún compromiso público.

Y en ese mismo mes, la ministro del gobierno Mary Coughlan comentaba lo siguiente:

"En la Sección 14 de la Ley forestal de 1988 y el Código de prácticas para la gobernación de los cuerpos del estado, Coillte tiene ciertas responsabilidades y obligaciones en el tema de venta de tierras. Estoy satisfecha al saber que todas esas obligaciones y deberes han sido cumplidas correctamente por Coillte durante todo este asunto. Sin embargo, el hecho de que Coillte sea una empresa comercial privada me llevó a realizar mis propias indagaciones y comprendí que Coillte no habían realizado consultas a la comunidad local antes de la venta de estas tierras."

La ministra Mary Coughlan se refiere en su respuesta a "obligaciones legales" pero omite mencionar las obligaciones de Coillte para con el estado, con el público y con los principios mismos sobre los que se rige públicamente para gestionar el terreno. Esta referencia de la ministra a Coillte como una "empresa comercial privada" no es una representación real del estatus de la compañía Coillte y oculta el hecho de que son los encargados de salvaguardar los terrenos estatales, confiados a ellos con el fin de contar con una Gestión forestal sostenible.

En 2003, Coillte acusó a la Comisión Europea de “no cumplir sus obligaciones relacionadas con la cooperación de buena fe, veracidad legal y administración sensata y por incumplir el principio de expectativas legítimas“. El Tribunal de justicia europeo falló contra Coillte, al considerar que se trataba de una "entidad completamente pública y controlada por el Estado", al mismo tiempo que se presentaban a sí mismos como una "entidad legal privada" en un intento de hacerse con hasta 50 millones de euros de fondo europeo destinados a compensar a los agricultores por las pérdidas de ingresos provocadas por el período no productivo en terrenos agrícolas reforestados. Estas ayudas sólo podían pagarse a agricultores o entidades legales privadas, no a empresas públicas.

Coillte reivindicó cuantiosas ayudas por la pérdida de ingresos ocasionados por tierras que la Compañía acaba de adquirir de manos de agricultores, y utilizó estos fondos a modo de préstamos para comprar más tierras a más agricultores. La financiación completamente ilegítima debería haber continuado hasta 2013. Para entonces Coillte ya habría obtenido en el año 2000 una suma de 37,3 millones de libras irlandesas gracia a la planta.

En este caso, fue Coillte quien, continuando con los argumentos, al tiempo que se malinterpretaban a ellos mismos, esperaba obtener de la Comisión Europea protección para su posición bajo los principios de "la protección de expectativas legítimas" y "el deber de cooperación de buena fe", cuando, de hecho, era Coillte quien estaba faltando a estos mismo principios.

Un residente local lo expresa del siguiente modo:

"Desde nuestra primera queja en 2001, los habitantes de la localidad ya se dieron por vencidos y no esperaban ningún comportamiento ético ni ninguna adhesión a los principios de la FSC de consultar. Nuestro grupo local se ha movilizado de forma entusiasta en el espíritu y la creencia de la participación pública y hemos terminado por pensar que el logotipo de FSC sólo sirve como herramienta de ventas sin ningún significado. Nadie está interesado ya en malgastar su tiempo con procedimientos de reclamación que no sirven para nada." 21

INSTRUMENTS AND ACTORS THAT EXPLAIN THE SYSTEMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE CASE:

“It’s a terrible reflection on our public representatives that we have voted them into positions of authority and we believed and trusted them to take care of our interests. They have now sold us down the road - they have sold our future and your future Mr Chairman and the future of your children too .” Sean Mc Donnell, Bunowna, at the EPA oral hearing on the IPPC licence.32

The activities of the Corrib Gas consortium in Ireland, the manner in which they have approached the Corrib Project and their interactions with the community in Erris are framed by the Irish State. In this context the case is illustrative of the subordination of the Irish State to corporate power, visible in the way in which the State has facilitated the oil companies every juncture prioritizing their demands over the needs of communities in Ireland. This facilitation and prioritization of the oil companies is visible in various aspects of the Corrib Project from the fiscal and licensing terms governing hydrocarbons to the manner in which laws were changed specifically for the project; the process by which the oil companies acquired planning permission; and the role which the police have played in ensuring work continues on the project despite robust opposition from community organizers in the area and their supporters.

The Aspects and Examples of State Facilitation of the Oil Companies in the Corrib Gas Project Which Will be Examined in This Case Are:

• Giving the gas away: Fiscal and licensing terms governing oil and gas exploration and production (infrastructure for plundering) • Changing the law for Shell: the introduction of CAOs for private companies and the juggling of ministerial powers for Corrib • Shell’s cops: Corrib Gas Project and the Irish Police • Jailings: The Rossport 5

Ownership and Control: Fiscal and Licensing Terms Governing Oil and Gas Exploration and Production in Ireland:

“The Irish terms are the best in the world.” Mike Cunningham former director of Statoil E&P Ireland 33

Fiscal and licensing terms relating to Corrib Gas along and all other gas and oil off the Irish coast are stacked heavily in favor of the oil companies. The Corrib Gas Field, for example, is wholly owned by the Corrib consortium who will pay no royalties and can write off all tax on profits against costs. The consortium has effectively been given the gas field by the Irish State in exchange for little or nothing. Between the mid eighties and the mid nineties earlier fiscal and licensing terms were pared away to allow for the alienation of large tracts of Irelands offshore territory to the oil companies for long

32 Seán Mc Donnell resident of Bunowna at the EPA oral hearing on the IPPC license in 2007. http://www.epa.ie/downloads/shell/thirdpartysubmissions/oral%20hearing%20subm.%20no.%2024%20sean%20 &%20siobhan%20mcdonnell.pdf

33 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 65 22

durations of time with minimum taxation on profits. The Irish terms dubbed “the best in the world” by ex-Irish Statoil director Mike Cunningham must be viewed in relation to the robust lobbying of politicians by oil industry bosses that has taken place since Irish Gas was first hit off the south coast in the seventies but more recently in relation to the Corrib Project and the opening of the Atlantic margin as a viable area for oil and gas exploitation.

Hydrocarbons in Ireland: Hydrocarbons were first found off the Irish shore at Kinsale off the coast of Cork in the early seventies. The Kinsale field was discovered by Marathon Oil, an American company which signed a once off agreement with Bord Gáis to supply 125 tcf (trillion cubic feet) of gas per day for 20 years. In the wake of the once off deal with Marathon Oil, which had been criticized as too generous, there was an attempt by certain government ministers to formulate terms governing oil and gas exploration and production that would ensure more benefits to the Irish State.

Keating’s Terms: In 1975 Justin Keating , the then Labour Minister for Industry, introduced the Ireland Executive Offshore Licensing Terms for Oil and Gas Exploration. The 1975 terms included: • 50% maximum state participation in any commercial find • Production royalties of between 8% and 16% • Production bonuses on significant finds • 50% corporation tax

The terms also sought to commit companies to a program of drilling wells at as early a date as possible and obliged the licensee to drill at least one exploratory well within three years surrender 50% of the original licensed area after four years. Licensees failing to carry out the required exploration program were liable for costs.

Changing the Terms in Favor of Big Oil: The first move to erode the terms came in 1985 when Dick Spring as Minister for Energy, introduced changes for marginally profitable fields of less than 75 million barrels. Spring announced a sliding scale of State participation and reduced State royalties for these marginal fields and in 1986 further announced the abolition of participation rights. Keating’s fiscal and licensing regime came under more serious threat with the appointment of Ray Burke - a man who has since been prosecuted for corruption - as Minister for Energy. 34

In 1987 Burke announced new fiscal terms. 35 He removed royalties and introduced a 100% tax write-off against profits on capital expenditure for exploration, development and production extending back 25 years. In April 1992, Bertie Ahern as Minister for Finance introduced the 1992 Finance Act incorporating and extending Mr. Burke's 1987 fiscal terms. Ahern slashed the corporation tax to 25%. In addition to Burke’s fiscal terms new licensing terms were also introduced by the then Minister for Energy, Bobby Molloy.36 The new licensing terms provided for the alienation of large tracts of prospective territory to the oil companies for lengthy periods of time. Under the 1992 terms there are three types of licences: standard, deepwater and frontier. Standard licences are granted for six years, deepwater for twelve and

34 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 58 35 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 59 36 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 61-2 23

frontier are granted for not less than fifteen years. Under a frontier licence a company can hold onto a large tract of its licence territory for more than fifteen years in return for drilling one well. If a company makes a discovery and seeks a petroleum lease the terms do not require production to begin until eight years following notification or six years after expiration of the exploration license. 37 The 1975 terms gave the Minister control, during emergencies, of supplies of petroleum; the regulation of production during emergencies, and the curtailing of excessive production that is not in the national interest. These powers were revoked in the 1992 terms. The 1992 terms state that oil or gas can be delivered at “market prices” unlike the previous agreement with Marathon where Bord Gáis could buy gas at bulk discount. 38

The Corrib Gas Field is only one of a number of fields along the west coast to which the favourable terms apply and the government in advertising. Ireland’s Atlantic margin is marketed as “an exciting petroleum province” by the Department of Marine and Natural Resources to oil companies. The brochure for their “Exploring Atlantic Ireland” conference, held in November 2006, boasts studies indicating “yet to find resource potential …in excess of 10 billion barrels of oil.” The Dunquin Prospect off the coast of Cork is a particularly rich area. Pre-drill estimates have suggested Dunquin North and South together could contain 25 trillion cubic feet of gas and 4 billion barrels of oil. If proven, that would put it among the 20 biggest fields in the world. In the words of Tony O'Reilly Jnr. Providence boss, "Even if we're half-right, the numbers are mind-blowing... This is opening up a new hydrocarbon frontier,"

In 2007 newly appointed Minister for Natural Resources, Eamon Ryan, Green Party announced a rise in corporation tax from 25% to 40%.

Lobbying and Deals with the Oil Companies: The generous fiscal and licensing terms governing petrochemical extraction and production as well and the policy of preventing the development of an Irish State oil and gas sector in favor of encouraging the private sector is best viewed in the context of the cosy relationship between politicians and business people and lobbyists in the oil industry. During the mid seventies when Justin Keating was formulating his terms to safe guard Irish oil and gas the oil industry were also organizing. The Irish Offshore Operators Group, later the Irish Offshore Operators Association (IOOA) was formed in the mid seventies as a lobbying force for industry interests. 39

The oil companies donated money to the political parties in power. In 1998 Enterprise Energy bought a table in the Fianna Fáil tent at the Galway Races. The tent at the Galway Races is a fundraiser for the party and an opportunity for developers and business people to gain access to politicians.40 In 1997 Marathon Oil, a partner in the Corrib consortium contributed £10,000 to Fianna Fáil . 41 The involvement of Ray Burke in changing the terms is of particular significance. Subsequent to his appointment as Minister for Energy in 1987 Burke began negotiating with the oil companies, occasionally meeting directly with executives in the absence of his department officials. 42 Mr Burke was later found by the

37 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 64 38 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 61 39 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 52 40 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 68 41 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 68 42 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 58 24

Flood Tribunal to have received a number of corrupt payments during the late 1980s and in 2004 he pleaded guilty to charges of making false tax returns.43

Changing Laws for the Oil Companies: The processing model selected by the Corrib consortium (that of an inland refinery, fed by a 9km on land upstream pipeline) created significant legislative problems for the government. Existing legislation did not cover an on-land upstream pipeline network and there was no legislation in place to allow the Minister to provide compulsory acquisition orders (CAOs) for private companies. 44 The government attempted to solve the problem by placing the project under the supervision of the Department of the Marine and Natural Resources and proceeded to bundle the various powers needed to grant permission to the Corrib Project within the Department. 45 This bundling of powers was undertaken specifically to facilitate the Corrib consortium. Perhaps more significantly, the government also moved to bring in new laws relating to Compulsory Acquisition Orders to facilitate the project placing the powers within the Department.

On 10 th July 2000 the Government introduced the first stages of a complex series of legislative acts designed to place the gas pipeline outside of the domain of planning through the Gas (Amendment) Act of 2000 which made provision for “a person other than the Board [Bord Gáis]” to construct or operate a pipeline.46 In September 2000 Bertie Ahern introduced Statutory Instrument (SI) 110 of 2000 transferring regulatory power over “any upstream pipeline network” from the Minister for Public Enterprise (who had responsibility for An Bord Gáis - the gas board) to the Minister for Marine and Natural Resources. In July 2001 Bertie Ahern introduced SI 289 of 2001 transferring powers from the Minister for Public Enterprise to the Minister for Marine and Natural Resources covering all legislation relating to upstream pipeline networks. 47

The government moved to provide land for the pipeline by giving powers to the Minister to make Compulsory Acquisition Orders for the benefit of a private consortium. This significant change in legislation means that for the first time in Ireland private projects can be granted compulsory acquisition orders for land for private projects. Previously only state projects undertaken in the “public interest” could be granted the orders. Instead of changing existing legislation on CAOs the government moved part of the CAO legislation into the power of the Department of Marine and Natural Resources without the caveats relating to the public interest.48 On the 15 th November Frank Fahey introduced SI 517 of 2001 giving the Minister for the Marine and Natural Resources powers to grant CAOs for upstream pipelines.

Jailings - The Rossport 5: On 11 th January 2005 Shell engineers, backed by police, attempted to enter land in Rossport to ‘peg out’ the route of the pipeline. The landowners demanded to see the compulsory acquisition orders (CAOs) and certificates of health and safety. The Shell engineers withdrew but on 19 th January 2005 Shell’s solicitors asked landowners to ‘cease and desist’ from preventing Shell in their work. On 18 th March

43 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 60 44 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy pg 28 45 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 28 46 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 28 47 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 31 48 The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, pg 31 25

Shell applied to the High Court for an order restraining the six landowners from interfering with their work on the pipeline. On April 4 th Mr Joseph Finnegan issued an interlocutory injunction against the six. On 15 th June 2005 Shell engineers returned to Rossport, accompanied by police and again attempted to enter lands along the pipeline route. When landowners. accompanied by their friends and neighbours, refused to allow the engineers ‘peg out’ the pipe several names were taken by the police. On 29 th of June five men, three farmers and two retired teachers, were summoned to the High Court charged with breaking the court’s injunction. They were Willie Corduff, Brendan Philban, Philip and Vincent Mc Grath and Micheál Ó Seighin. Because the men refused to promise not to prevent Shell working on the pipeline in the future they were jailed indefinitely for contempt of court. The men remained in jail for 94 days during which time the Erris community began picketing all Shell’s worksites and a campaign of support grew across the country culminating in several rallies in Dublin. The men were released from jail on the 30 th of September 2005.

Political Policing - Shell’s Cops:

One of the most contentious issue surrounding the Corrib Gas controversy is the manner in which the protests have been policed and the numbers of police that have been provided by the State to ensure the smooth running of Shell’s project. From the perspective of community organizers and their supporters the Gardaí have functioned as effective private security for Shell with the tax payer picking up the bill. In October 2007 it was revealed by Justice Minister Brian Lenihan that in the previous year the state has spent €8.1 million on providing policing for the Corrib project. 49

The large scale police operation that has accompanied the project began in October 2006 to allow Shell restart work after having been stopped for over a year by Shell to Sea. In the words of Superintendent Joseph Gannon of Belmullet Station 50 “The entrance to the site was blocked for a year and a half. Local people had a veto on who went in and out of the site: it was out of this situation that the current operation was born”. 51 On the 26 th of September 2006 a convoy of Shell workers, plant equipment and materials was prevented from entering the site by Shell to Sea campaigners, who stood in front of the

49 Áine Ryan ‘Corrib protesters meet Minister tomorrow as Garda costs escalate’ Mayo News 16 October 2007 50 Belmullet Garda Station is the nearest station to Bellanaboy. 51 http://www.indymedia.ie/article/80229 26

site gates praying the rosary. Early in the morning of the 3 rd of October 2006 approximately 170 police descended on the area erecting roadblocks and crowd control barriers around the refinery site gates.52 Protesters again attempted to prevent Shell workers and materials entering the site by holding a sit down protest in front of the gates. Protesters were forcibly removed by Gardaí and penned behind barriers.

In the weeks after 3 rd October 2006 protesters gathered each working morning between 6:30am and 7am engaging in sit down blocks, slow walks, and marches in front of Shell’s convoy of materials and workers, maintaining presence outside the proposed refinery site gates until 6pm. Protests took place in the context of heavy police presence. Numerous injuries were sustained by Shell to Sea campaigners and complaints relating to injuries as well as verbal abuse were lodged in the local Garda station. The days and weeks succeeding Shell’s recommencement of work at Bellanaboy witnessed a series of solidarity actions, which took place across the country, by the Shell to Sea network. Shell’s offices in Dublin were occupied by Dublin Shell to Sea and petrol stations from Derry to Cork have been picketed by campaigners. On October 20 th a national day of action was held at Bellanaboy. Over two hundred campaigners and supporters from around the country travelled to Mayo to participate in a blockade of the site.

On the 10 th of November 2006 a large protest was planned to commemorate Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni eight who were hanged by the Nigerian Government in 1995 for their protest against Shell’s activities in the Niger Delta. Protesters aimed to shut the refinery construction site for the day using a series of sit-down blockades. During the protest police baton charged a group of protesters off the road to allow Shell trucks to gain access to the refinery site. The incident sparked widespread condemnation of the manner in which the protests were being policed.

From the beginning of the large scale policing operation that accompanied Shell’s recommencement of work in autumn 2006 the police implemented a no-arrest policy. The policy was outlined in an article entitled ‘Bellanaboy: Reclaiming the Streets’ published in Garda Review the magazine of the Garda Representative Association. In the article sergeant Joseph Gannon outline the manner in which the Shell to Sea picket was broken on the 3 rd of October further stating “There were no arrests [that day]. That was part of our strategy: we did not want to facilitate anyone down there with a route to martyrdom. That has been the policy ever since.” Instead of arresting protesters police have used violence in an attempt to deter further protest affecting Shell’s work in the area.

In addition to the no-arrest policy police have singled out prominent organizers serving them with spurious charges such as assault. One activist, John Monaghan, was arrested for assault at the polling station during government election. The no-arrest policy is one that is clearly politically motivated. It is a decision that is intended to prohibit campaigners from expressing their dissent to the project by engaging in civil disobedience and using the court system to highlight their opposition to the project. The no arrest policy has served to further silence campaigners and to make their protest invisible.

52 http://www.indymedia.ie/article/78788 27

ACCUSATION

The Irish State is accused of failing to comply with the Aarhus Convention and various EU Environmental Directives in the Case of the Corrib Gas project, and from failing to ensure that Shell complies with the various directions set out there in. Shell and the Corrib Gas consortium has operated with impunity from the Irish state in relation to lack of consultation and violation of various codes of best practice and environmental regulations set out below.

1) The Aarhus Convention: access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters.

2) European Union (EU) Environmental Directives The Aarhus Convention is an agreement between member states of the European Union established in Aarhus, Denmark in 1998, the objective of which is ‘contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being. Each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention‘. Article 1.

‘Aarhus’ is an extension of the principle of consultation agreed to at the Rio World Conference on Environment & Development in 1992. It includes the ‘Local Agenda 21’ principle of local government which was coined in Rio and re-endorsed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa in 2002.

As we understand it ‘Local Agenda 21’ is a term that simply means that local people should set the agenda for the 21 st century, facilitated by local government, for the purposes of achieving sustainable development with specific regard to social & cultural, environmental and economic concerns.

We see the Aarhus agreement and Local Agenda 21 as two sides of the same coin that apply to member States of the EU (European Union). There is also EU legislation in that regard, that come to us in the form of numerous environmental ‘directives’ from the EU. Although Ireland signed up as a party to the Aarhus Convention in 1998, the Convention is still not fully ratified into Irish domestic law or enacted into national legislation. However, Aarhus is legally binding in Ireland for a number of reasons which are as follows:

Ireland’s failure to ratify Aarhus within a time specified by EU directive, means that citizens may invoke its provisions ‘by default’ of the Irish Government.

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Local Agenda 21 has been a principle of local government in Ireland for over 10 years, since ‘The Local Agenda 21 Sustainable Development Strategy for Ireland’ was devised, published and adopted by local authorities in 1997.

Aarhus and Agenda 21 are not 'new laws' that have to be 'adjusted to'. Far from it, they stem from a fundamental principle of ancient law - the right to be heard. Aarhus & Agenda 21 are just a modern revisiting of that fundamental principle of law within the modern context of sustainable development.

Further more these same principles are enshrined in the fundamental law of our nation, the Constitution of Ireland, Article 28A which says that ‘The State recognises the role of local government in providing a forum for the democratic representation of local communities, in exercising and performing at local level powers and functions conferred by law and in promoting by its initiatives the interests of such communities.’

It is the experience of Shell to Sea activists and members of the local community that the TNC’s, Shell, the government and the agencies of the State have conspired at all times to avoid proper consultation with the local community.

“People in this country are living under an illusion that they reside in a democracy”, Maura Harrington, local activist, June 2005.

The areas of concerns, outlined in this report, have not been addressed to the satisfaction of members of the local community and no public authority has taken responsibility to specifically address or resolve these concerns. Furthermore the issues raised by the Corrib Gas Project have never been fully debated or investigated and it is our contention that the Shell and the Irish State have no legitimate argument to counter the Shell to Sea position. And in that regard they simply resorted to the use of the police force of An Garda Siochana to quell local dissent with violence.

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Environmental Impact Assessment Directives. They have been breached because the Corrib Gas project has been characterised by ‘project-splitting’. Various elements of the project have been divided and subject to distinct regulatory processes. No process exists, which allows for public participation, into the project as an integral totality. As a consequence, the cumulative impact of the project on the population directly affected by it has never been examined by a body which permits public consultation and participation. Thus, the refinery is subject to planning processes; the operation of the refinery to approval by the EPA Irish Environmental Protection Agency; the laying of the production pipeline to approval by An Bord Pleanala and the Department of the Marine. Only the Department of the Marine has examined the project in its totality but without clear guidelines on the criteria used regarding EU law and without adequate public participation.

The Seveso 2 Directive. The competent authority in Ireland charged with implementing Seveso 2, the Health and Safety Authority, adopted a very narrow interpretation of the key concept of ‘establishment’ in determining the compliance of the proposed refinery to the Directive. This interpretation is a clear divergence from the explicit terms of the Directive. They judged that the ‘establishment’ did not extend to the boundaries of the refinery site but referred to a narrower work area within the site.

The Water Quality Directive. The proposed refinery is to be sited within three kilometers from Carrowmore Lake which is the drinking water source for almost 8,000 local people. This breaches the Code of Practice governing the development of gas refineries and breaches the Directive. The refinery clearly should not be located so close to a large drinking water source.

Various Public Consultation Directives. The proposed project constitutes a significant threat to the health and safety of the population living in proximity to it. The project involves a refinery and high- pressure production pipeline being located within a populated area. The area is rural and lacks any support infrastructure for a project of this kind. No health impact studies have been conducted and no pre-planning consultation occurred with the local population. The level of community consultation and participation involving the project has been far short of what is envisaged by the Directives and the Aarhus Convention.

The Habitats Directive. An Advisory Opinion from the Commission has already found the project to be in breach of the Habitats Directive because no adequate studies were undertaken of the nearby Broadhaven Bay, a known breeding ground for cetaceans. It is proposed that discharges from the refinery will be made into this Bay. The project is in proximity to three SACs – Broadhaven Bay, Glenamoy Bog and Carrowmore Lake.

The decision in November 2007 by the Irish Environmental Protection Agency to grant an operating licence to Shell to operate its proposed gas refinery in North Mayo further shows how all institutions of the State are complicit in facilitating Shell and ignoring their responsibilities to protect an environment where the following apply:

1. The refinery is sited within a water catchment area in direct breach of the relevant engineering Codes of Practice and contrary to environmental protection best practice throughout Europe.

2. The licence has been granted even though no application has yet been made by the developer regarding a pipeline to service the inland refinery. Three issues arise here:

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2.1 No adequate or comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment can be logically conducted given that the full and final features of the integrated project are as yet unknown. The pipeline may be placed in a marine environment or in a peat environment. Environmental impacts will clearly vary in accordance with this. Consequently the cumulative impacts of the project are not known and therefore cannot be assessed. Despite this, components of the project are proceeding which is a clear violation of the spirit and letter of the EU Environmental Assessment Directive.

2.2 The EPA's decision has been made without reference to the pipeline application and thus to the cumulative impacts of the project. This is an extreme example of 'project-splitting' and is again contrary to the spirit and letter of the relevant EU Directives.

2.3 The EPA's decision has been made without reference to the pipeline application and thus is predicated on the Commission agreeing to provide a derogation to Ireland regarding the Habitat's Directive. This will be necessary because all anticipated routes for the pipeline will adversely affect a designated SAC. No application has been made yet in this regard and obviously the Commission has come to no judgment. Once again, the phenomenon of 'project-splitting' has now been applied even to European processes.

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El Estado Irlandes es acusado de no cumplir con la convención Aarhus y varios directivos europeos en el caso de el Proyecto de Gas Corrib y de fracasar en asegurar que Shell cumpliera con las diferentes directrices impuestas. Shell y el Consorcio de Corrib han operado con inpunidad desde el estado de Irlanda en relación con la falta de consulta, la violación de varios códigos de práctica ética las regulaciones medioambientales.

Proyecto de Gas de Shell en Corrib e infracciones de:

1 El Convenio de Aarhus sobre el acceso a la información, participación pública en procesos toma de decisiones , y acceso a la justicia en asuntos del medioambiente.

2) Directivas medioambientales de la Unión Europea (UE)

La Convención de Aarhus es un acuerdo entre estados miembros de la Unión Europea establecida en Aarhus, Dinamarca en 1998. Se objetivo es “contribuir a la protección del derecho de cada persona del presente y de generaciones futuras de vivir en un medioambiente adecuado a su salud y bien estado. Cada partido debe garantizar el derecho al acceso a información, a la participación pública en procesos de decisiones, y el acceso a la justicia en asuntos de medioambiente en acuerdo con las provisiones de este convenio. “ Artículo 1

‘Aarhus’ es una extensión del principio de consultación acordado en la Conferencia Mundial en Río sobre Medioambiente y Desarrollo en 1992. Incluye el principio del gobierno local la ‘Agenda 21 Local’, que fue primero introducido en Río y endorsado de nuevo en la Conferencia Mundial de Desarrollo Sostenible en Sud África en 2002.

Como nosotros lo comprendemos, la Agenda 21 Local es un término que básicamente significa que la gente local debería decidir la agenda para el siglo 21, facilitado por el gobierno local, con el propósito de lograr un desarrollo sostenible específicamente con respeto a aspectos sociales y culturales, medioambientales y económicos.

Vemos el acuerdo de Aarhus y la Agenda 21 Local como dos lados de la misma moneda que se aplica a todos los estados miembros de la UE. También hay legislación de la UE que existe en la forma de directivas medioambientales de la UE. Aunque Irlanda firmó el Convenio de Aarhus en 1998 como una de las partes, el Convenio todavía no se ha ratificado completamente en la ley nacional irlandesa y no ha sido aprobada en la legislación nacional. Sin embargo, Aarhus es legalmente vinculante en Irlanda por las siguientes razones:

El fracaso de Irlanda de no ratificar Aarhus en el periodo específico determinado por la directiva de la UE, significa que los ciudadanos pueden apelar en base a los artículos del convenio, ‘por incomparencia’ del Gobierno Irlandés.

La Agenda 21 Local ha sido el principio del gobierno local en Irlanda por más de 10 años desde que se publicó ‘La estrategia para la Agenda 21 Local de Desarrollo Sostenible para Irlanda”, escrito, publicado y adoptado por las autoridades locales desde 1997.

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Aarhus y la Agenda 21 no son ‘nuevas leyes’ a las cuales nos tenemos que adaptar. Al revés, se originan de un principio fundamental de ley antigua – el derecho a ser escuchado. Aarhus y la Agenda 21 solamente son una manera moderna de aplicar este derecho fundamental en el contexto moderno del desarrollo sostenible.

Más aún, esto mismos principios que están consagrado en la ley fundamental e nuestro país, la Constitución Irlandesa, artículo 28ª, que dice ‘El Estado reconoce el rol del gobierno local en proporcionar un foro para una representación democrática de comunidades locales para ejercer y actuar al nivel local de poder y funciones otorgadas por la ley y en promover sus iniciativas por el bien de esas comunidades.

La experiencia de los activistas del grupo ‘Shell to Sea’ y de los miembros de la comunidad local es que las corporaciones transnacionales, Shell, el gobierno y las agencias del Estado han conspirado en todo momento para evitar consultar con la comunidad local.

“La gente en este país está viviendo bajo la ilusión que viven en una democracia”, Maura Harrington, una activista local, Junio 2005.

Las asuntos de preocupación, mencionados en este informe, no han sido tratados a satisfacción de los miembros de la comunidad local y ninguna autoridad pública ha tomado responsabilidad para específicamente tratar o resolverlos. Más aún, los temas planteados por el Proyecto de Gas de Corrib nunca se han debatido en totalidad o investigados y nosotros sostenemos que Shell y el Estado Irlandés no tienen un argumento legítimo contra la posición de Shell to Sea. Por eso simplemente han tenido que usar la fuerza policial de An Garda Siochána (la policia nacional irlandesa) para sofocar disensión local con violencia.

Directivas de Asesoramiento de Impacto Ambiental. Han sido incumplidos porque el proyecto de Gas de Corrib ha sido caracterizado como ‘división de proyecto’. Varios aspectos del proyecto se han dividido y se les ha aplicado diferentes procesos regulatorios. No existe un proceso que facilite la participación pública en el proyecto en su totalidad. Como consecuencia, el impacto cumulativo del proyecto sobre la población directamente afectada por el, nunca ha sido examinado por un organismo que permita consultar al público y su participación. De esta manera la refinería está sujeta a procesos de ordenación del territorio, la operación de la refinería, a la aprobación por la Agencia de Protección del Medioambiente (APM) Irlandesa, la instalación de la tubería a la aprobación de la Junta de la Ordenación del Territorio (An Bórd Pleannála). Y el Ministerio del Medio Marino. Solamente el Ministerio del Medio Marino ha examinado el proyecto en su totalidad pero sin directrices claras sobre los criterios con respecto a las normas europeas y sin participación pública adecuada.

La Directiva Seveso 2. La autoridad competente en Irlanda encargada de implementar Seveso 2, (la Autoridad de Salud y Seguridad), adoptó una interpretación muy limitada del concepto clave de ‘ubicación/establecimiento’ para determinar la conformidad de la refinería propuesta por Shell con las directivas. Esta interpretación claramente es una divergencia de los términos de la directiva. Interpretaron que el ‘establecimiento’ no se extendía a los límites del emplazamiento de la refinería, pero a un área más angosta adentro del emplazamiento.

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La Directiva de Calidad de Aguas. La refinería propuesta estará situada a menos de 3Km. Del Lago de Carrowmore del cual proviene el agua potable para casi 8,000 personas en la localidad. Esto incumple con el código de práctica en cual se basa el desarrollo de refinerías de gas y también incumple con esta Directiva. La refinería obviamente no se debería localizar tan cerca de esta fuente significativa de agua potable.

Varias directivas sobre Consultación Pública. El proyecto propuesto constituye una amenaza significativa a la salud y seguridad de la población viviendo en su proximidad. El proyecto incluye una refinería y una tubería de alta-presión de producción que también será localizada dentro de una zona habitada. La zona es rural y carece de la infraestructura de apoyo necesaria para un proyecto de este tipo. Ningún estudio se ha realizado sobre el impacto sobre la salud en la zona, ni ninguna consultación con los ciudadanos de la localidad previa a la planificación. El nivel de la consultación y participación con la comunidad sobre el proyecto ha sido mucho menos que los que indica en las Directivas y el Convenio de Aarhus.

La Directiva de Hábitats. Una Opinión Asesora de la Comisión Europea ya ha concluido que el proyecto está incumpliendo la Directiva de Hábitats porque no se hicieron estudios adecuados sobre la cercana bahía de Broadhaven, un sitio reconocido de cría de cetáceos. Se ha propuesto que los descargos de la refinería se harán a esta bahía. El proyecto está cerca de tres Areas Especiales de Conservación (Special Areas of Conservation, SACs) – la bahía de Broadhaven, la ciénaga de Glenamoy y el lago de Carrowmore.

La decisión en Noviembre 2007 por de APM Irlandesa de dar el permiso de licencia a Shell para operar su propuesta refinería de gas en el Norte de Mayo demuestra como todas las instituciones del Estado están involucradas en facilitarle a Shell e ignorar sus responsabilidades de proteger el medioambiente adónde lo siguiente es aplicable:

1. La refinería está situada cerca de una zona de captación de agua. Esto está directamente en violación a los relevantes códigos de práctica de ingeniería y contrario a la mejor práctica existente por todo Europa.

2. La licencia se ha concedido aunque todavía no se hecho ninguna aplicación por parte del promotor con respecto a la tubería que conectará la refinería al interior con el gas marino. Tres asuntos se presentan aquí:

2.1 No se puede hacer ningún Asesoramiento del Impacto Ambiental adecuado o extensivo porque todavía no se conoce todas las partes del proyecto. La tubería podía colocarse en un medio marino o en una ciénaga. Los impactos ambientales obviamente variarían dependiendo del medio. En consecuencia a esto, el impacto cumulativo del proyecto no se puede calcular. Sin embargo, ciertas partes de este proyecto ya están procediendo que es claramente una violación al espíritu de la Directiva de la UE sobre Asesoramiento Ambiental.

2.2 La decisión de la APM se ha hecho sin referencia a la solicitud de la tubería e igualmente sin conocer los impactos cumulativos del proyecto. Esto es un ejemplo extremo de división del proyecto.

2.3 La decisión de la APM se ha hecho sin referencia a la solicitud para permiso de colocación de la tubería y esto influiría sobre la Comisión en su decisión de darle a Irlanda su consentimiento pasando 34

por encima de la Directiva de Habitats. Esto será necesario porque todas las rutas anticipadas para la tubería afectarán negativamente a una Zona de Protección Especial (ZPE) designada. Ninguna solicitud se ha hecho sobre esto y obviamente la Comisión no ha hecho ninguna decisión. Otra vez vemos el fenómeno de división del proyecto.

El bloqueo sistemático de la participación pública

La negación a la participación pública empieza con la solicitud original para la construcción de la refinería que se hizo por las Corporaciones Transnacionales en noviembre del 2000. Cientos de personas firmaron varias objeciones a la solicitud de permiso para la colocación y construcción de la refinería. Una circular del Ministerio del Medioambiente en 1996 establece que ‘todos los municipios deben facilitar que toda correspondencia sea accesible para fotocopiar, excepto planos y gráficas que puedan tener derechos de autor’. Esto corresponde a proyectos antes y después que se haya tomado una decisión.

El Municipio de Mayo, la autoridad local de ordenación del territorio, se ha negado a permitir que miembros de público hagan fotocopias de ninguna de las observaciones presentadas al respecto u objeciones en archivo, aunque se pueden fotografiar, copiar a mano o dictar por teléfono. Esto es un incumplimiento de la circular del Ministerio de Medioambiente, aunque este incumplimiento se puso en conocimiento de los empleados del Municipio por medio de un programa de la estación de radio local, Midwest News. El Municipio de Mayo dio fotocopias de los documentos a Entreprise Energy Ireland, la compañía anterior a Shell, mientras que a todo el resto de gente se les negó. También, los documentos escritos presentados por organismos de declaración obligatoria no se adjuntaron al archivo hasta después que el permiso fuera otorgado.

Un funcionario superior del Ministerio del Medio Marino, Michael Daly, dijo que no veía ninguna razón por la cual se le había negado acceso al público a las observaciones presentadas por el Ministerio del Medio Marino ( 5 de Julio 2001). Sin embargo, unas horas después recibió una llamada del Municipio de Mayo y Mr. Daly cambió de opinión, diciendo que el Municipio podía considerar las observaciones presentadas como documentos internos. Varias personas se quejaron a la estación de radio local de que el contenido de los archivos de la solicitud para este proyecto cambiaban constantemente.

La oficina de ordenación del territorio del municipio del Condado de Mayo, como un sitio físico sirve, como un buen ejemplo para la interacción típica entre el órgano administrativo público que toma la decisión, y los ciudadanos a quienes les presta servicio. La oficina de ordenación de territorio está a 80km de la localidad afectada por la decisión, entonces cualquier persona que quería acercarse a la oficina tuvo que viajar 160km ida y vuelta mínimo y encima para que se les negara la información que buscaban.

Desde el principio, las oportunidades políticas y discursivas ofrecidas a los que se oponían no eran muy alentadoras. Los representantes políticos por lo general simpatizaban con el proyecto, estaban en gran parte unidos, y aunque pudiesen cambiar de opinión, no podían influir en la decisión que se iba a hacer. Todos los partidos políticos grandes apoyaban la explotación de los recursos naturales en su totalidad. Como no había una división significativa entre las élites políticas, el conflicto sobre el Terminal de gas no se convirtió en un tema contencioso a nivel político formal. Por consiguiente, el conflicto se iba a tratar dentro de un proceso administrativo en vez de un marco político. Esto tuvo un impacto decisivo sobre los que se oponían y sus formas de oposición. Esta es la razón por la cual para que la oposición pudiera 35

presentar una objeción que pudiera ser procesada por los tomadores de decisiones administrativas, los objetores tenían que conformarse a las reglas relevantes bajo las cuales operan estos órganos. Esto significaba que lo que eran quejas frecuentemente incoadas/incompletas, o quejas que se centraban en temas de principios más amplios, tenían que ser traducidas y reducidas para convertirlas en observaciones válidas adaptadas al interlocutor al que se dirigían. Las implicaciones de este contexto administrativo para tomar decisiones eran importantes porque significaba que ningún órgano elegido, a nivel local o nacional, tenía un papel a desempeñar en la toma de decisiones inmediatas sobre el caso.

La estructura de oportunidad política a la que los opositores se enfrentaban era tal, que los órganos democráticos claves estaban ‘cerrados’ a ellos – ningún órgano elegido iba a tomar una decisión sobre el asunto, fuesen concejales y diputados locales o en el Dáil (el Parlamento Nacional), y además, no había ninguna división pública significativa entre los políticos involucrados en el asunto. Las decisiones se iban a hacer completamente por varios órganos administrativos. El proceso de planificación del proyecto sirvió como ‘un mecanismo de canalización’ por medio del cual los objetores podían ser rechazados/redirigidos a terrenos discursivos más limitados, y por lo tanto limitando estructuralmente las oportunidades discursivas disponibles a ellos.

El rechazo a dialogar, y la capacidad de proceder en ausencia del diálogo, indica la existencia y el ejercicio del poder. La consecuencia de un no-diálogo perjudicó la capacidad de la comunidad a resistir frente a la propuesta del Terminal y la tubería reduciéndolos de manera efectiva a un estado de silencio. Habiendo sido silenciados en el proceso de toma de decisiones, las únicas ‘voces’ que permanecían y se podían ‘escuchar’ eran las del estado y la corporación. El proyecto de gas se iba a determinar por medio de una serie de pruebas ‘objetivas’ y podía avanzar como correspondiera, si se le juzgaba apropiado como resultado de estas pruebas, sin tener en cuenta el consenso de la comunidad. De esta manera, a través de la aplicación de una serie de mecanismos de procedimiento, disensión y resistencia frente al proyecto fueron superados y convertidos, en apariencia por lo menos, desproporcionados.

La capacidad de establecer las convenciones bajo cual la comunicación entre los ciudadanos y los órganos tomadores de decisiones pueden ocurrir, es una forma contemporánea clave del poder. Son estos convenios ( determinado a menudo por legislación) que determinan la prueba de relevancia adoptada por los órganos que toma la decisión o decide la política. En el conflicto del gas de Corrib, cuestiones de salud, por ejemplo , en sentido estricto, eran irrelevantes para todas los órganos administrativos involucrados, y entonces no podían convertirse en cuestiones relevantes para ninguno de ellos aunque fuese el tema de preocupación central de la comunidad local. Por lo tanto, al determinar que ciertos temas y preocupaciones eran irrelevantes, (i.e. fuera del alcance bajo consideración), los actores al plantearlos se veían silenciados. De esta manera, la pluralidad empírica de opiniones sobre proyectos de desarrollo, y las opiniones de disensión específicamente, con la aplicación de un métodos pre-determinado, pueden ser excluidos y no considerados.

Corporaciones transnacionales son personas legales, con todos los derechos de las personas/ciudadanos? Pero no están socializados dentro de ninguna comunidad y son a-culturales. A lo contrario, se imponen sobre las comunidades y son una forma de ‘invasión cultural’. Eso es una razón clave para la resistencia global de comunidades frente a ellas, a menudo menospreciadas e incorrectamente llamadas disputas de estílo ‘NIMBY’ (Not In My Back Yard; no en mi jardín)*.

Escandalosamente, como hemos dado fe al caso de Corrib, Shell y las corporaciones transnacionales se les ha permitido operar fuera de un control democrático total. 36

Las actividades de Shell en el norte de Mayo ejemplifican todas las consecuencias disfuncionales de estas personas globales e inmortales.

* Es una expresión negativa utilizada desde los años 80, para indicar la oposición de comunidades a ciertos desarrollos posiblemente perjudiciales en su localidad, aunque beneficios para unos, pero sin una percepción más global del asunto. Implica que los opositores tienen un punto de vista intolerante, egoísta, o miope.

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RESISTANCE AND ALTERNATIVES AND HOW THE TRIBUNAL CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THIS:

The Corrib Gas Project has been opposed on health and safety grounds since members of the community in Erris first became aware of what it entailed at the end of 2000. Initially residents fought the project through the planning process. When planning permission was initially granted in August 2001 groups of people from the area got together and worked on objections to the planning permission, calling for an oral hearing. Permission was overturned by Kevin Moore but, on appeal, finally granted to the Corrib consortium in October 2004.

2005 saw the campaign shift towards the use of non-violent direct action as Shell engineers attempted to stake out the route of the pipeline first in January and again in June, with landowners and their families and neighbours refusing Shell access to the land. The subsequent arrest and indefinite imprisonment of five men from the community marked a high point in resistance to the project. The five men refused to abide by a court order making them promise to allow Shell to stake out their pipe, against threats from the judge that they stood to lose their homes and farms.

In June 2005 after the ‘Rossport 5’ had been sent to jail for an unknown duration community activists from the area organized pickets on all Shell’s worksites in the area. The proposed refinery site at Bellanaboy was picketed in addition to Shell’s compound in Rossport; the base from which the pipeline was to be laid. The refinery construction site was shut down with a picket and peat workers walked off the job in solidarity with the community. The pickets were maintained at Shell’s sites forcing them to suspend work. A horse box trailer was parked outside the gates of the refinery site becoming ‘campaign HQ’ and every day people from the community would take turns to watch the site gates preventing materials entering the worksite. Community pickets succeeded in halting work and in August 2005 Shell announced their intention to temporarily suspend work “to facilitate a period of calm, informed discussion on this nationally significant project.” 53

In June 2005 a collective of environmental and social justice activists formed the Rossport Solidarity Camp project, moving to the area with the aim of supporting the community struggle. The camp acted as a contact point for supporters of the campaign,seeking to facilitate supporters visiting the area and worked to network the campaign with other groups.

After the jailing of the Rossport 5 people from around Ireland began to organize in solidarity. Shell-to- Sea groups were formed in Dublin, Cork, Galway, Kerry, Clare, Belfast and Dundalk. Groups picked Shell and Statoil garages, held information meetings, organized fundraisers and protests. Several demonstrations were held in Dublin culminating in a large rally on the 1 st October 2005. The Rossport 5 wrere released one day before the planned date of the rally on the 30 th September 2005.

After the five were released the community campaign continued to organise on the ground maintaining pickets on Shell sites. Decisions were made at a weekly meeting at the local community hall where

53 http://www.shell.com/home/content/ie- en/exploration_and_production/eeil/news/News_Archive_2005/sepil_20050805.html; http://www.shell.com/home/content/ie- en/exploration_and_production/eeil/news/News_Archive_2005/sepil_20050812.html 38

everyone was invited to contribute and make decisions. The campaign against the project combined direct action at the picket of the refinery site with media work, awareness raising and international networking. Links were made with other campaigns against Shell from Nigeria to South Africa.

With the collapse of mediation during the Summer of 2006 and the subsequent publication of the Cassells Report, Shell announced their intention to recommence work in September 2006.54 iOn October 3rd 2006 almost 2000 Gardaí (police) were drafted into the area to allow Shell to resume work after more than a year of delay. The police dragged off protesters who had engaged in a sit down blockade of the site gates and allowed Shell trucks into work for the first time since June 2005. Large numbers of police remained in the area to provide security for Shell. In the weeks after October 3 rd campaigners organised non-violent blockades of the site gates and material haulage route to the site. Many people from outside the area came to show their support for the campaign. Demonstrations continued at the site with daily early morning protest amid increasing police violence. Days of Action were orgainsed with campaigners from outside the area joining the community protests. Police agression was constant and went hand in hand with their no-arrest policy culminating on the baton charging of campaigners on the 3rd November 2006- Ken Saro Wiwa Day.

The campaign has continued to use a combination of tactics including direct action as in blockades, site invasions and occupations, pickets and protests as well as engaging in official channels such as making complaints and participating in a hearing on the granting of a pollution licence for the project, writing letters and visiting local council sessions. On a broader scale the national campaign has continued to support the community in Erris, participate and organize days of action and to raise awareness about the Corrib Project and the give-away of Irish natural resources.

In summer 2007 Willie Corduff one of the Rossport 5 was awarded the Goldman prize for grassroots environmentalism.

54 http://www.shell.com/home/content/ie- en/exploration_and_production/eeil/news/News_Archive_2006/sepil_20060803.html 39

APPENDIX

REPORT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING DELEGATION TO COUNTY MAYO, IRELAND FEBRUARY 23-27, 2007

SUMMARY An international delegation of human rights and environmental justice investigators visited County Mayo Ireland at the request of a number of local residents concerned with public safety, environmental impacts, free speech and human rights issues arising from a gas pipeline and on-shore refinery project being constructed by Royal Dutch Shell and its partners.

The delegation toured the area of the pipeline and refinery projects, held a public hearing with a court reporter in order to take testimony and spoke individually with members of the community, Gardai (police), and media about the issues of concern. The delegation requested meetings with the Gardai Superintendent in Belmullet and with the Mayo County Council, but these requests were rejected.

Over a period of 30 days after the visit, the delegation received many additional submissions of e-mails, letters, video footage and other evidence of activities mostly related to protests at the site of the construction of the on-shore refinery in Ballinboy.

This report does not take a position against or in favor of the gas pipeline and refinery project. Neither does it review the activities of the oil companies involved. The report is limited to the relations between the local community and the Gardai.

The delegation reviewed all the evidence submitted to us and reached the following conclusions:

1. A large number of local residents have engaged in peaceful protest activities against the gas pipeline and refinery project. Some of the activities involved actions of civil disobedience, such as road blockades. A few residents have indicated that they do not agree with the protest activities.

2. The behavior of many police on various occasions implies that either they were not trained in the necessary skills needed to manage peaceful demonstrations and civil disobedience actions, maintain order and protect the rights of free speech, or that they are not utilizing training if they have had it. Police undertaking their duties in terms of monitoring the protestors or protecting the site did not follow basic procedures such as displaying their identifications – badge and/or names and warning protesters before taking (physical) measures.

3. Protestors were followed and confronted by Gardai when they were about the community on their private matters. Gardai have appeared in plain clothes at public anti-pipeline events, resulting in other people present feeling intimidated.

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4. The community has been active in submitting complaints to the necessary authorities about the issues they have with the Gardai, but to our knowledge none of these cases have been taken forward. Thus people have lost faith in the system, and have stopped submitting complaints. 5. There is evidence of excessive physical force by Gardai against peaceful protestors who were prepared to be arrested, which resulted in serious injury.

6. Some protestors have been prepared to be arrested in order to make a political statement within their rights of free speech, but Gardai have publicly stated and practiced a policy of refusal to arrest peaceful protestors.

7. Several members of the general population, beyond the protestors, have indicated that they have lost respect for the Gardai as a consequence of the violence around the Shell facility protests.

8. There is evidence of the Gardai verbally threatening people without cause, which appeared to incite violence rather than diffuse it.

9. With a small population in rural Western Ireland the large Gardai presence of up to 200 people has caused an extremely sensitive atmosphere, which threatens the culture and values of the region.

10. There is evidence from videos of youth, women and the elderly being pushed and beaten by Gardai without provocation. Even high ranking officers were personally involved in beating up protestors.

11. Emergency response and medical treatment to injured protestors was denied and delayed by Gardai without justification.

OBSERVATIONS AND EVIDENCE The delegation has made the following observations based on the evidence we received. This evidence comprises oral testimony, written submissions, observation, video, photographs and interviews. This is not a scientific study – it is a report based on the evidence we collated. We have focused on the following key findings.

1. LACK OF APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT OF PROTEST SITUATIONS There was evidence that Gardai did not employ accepted police practices for managing peaceful demonstrations and civil disobedience actions. Such practices include arrest and removal of protestors without injury from protest scenes. If the Gardai were trained in these skills, they chose not to employ them. This resulted in peaceful protests being marred by injury and escalating violence. In addition, there was evidence that these violent actions were partly undertaken by high ranking members of the Gardai and not isolated or conducted by rogue elements of the force. There was evidence that people who decided to deliberately step out of the protest and go home were not allowed to go. Quite a few testimonies were made that that even in this case people were not allowed to go and were even violently held back and pushed. Members of the delegation witnessed such behaviour on the part of the Gardai.

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Police undertaking their duties in terms of monitoring the protestors or protecting the site did not always have their identifications – badge and/or names – clearly displayed, which violates official policy.

2. REFUSAL BY GARDAI TO ARREST PEACEFUL PROTESTORS PREPARED TO BE ARRESTED TO MAKE A POLITICAL STATEMENT There was direct evidence that the Gardai had adopted an official policy to refuse the lawful right of protestors to be arrested, including a written statement by the officer in charge.

In an article published in the Gardai Review, November 2006, the following statement appeared by Mr. Joseph Gannon of the Gardai:

“There were no arrests. This was part of our strategy: we did not want to facilitate anyone down there with a route to martyrdom.”

One of the members of our delegation filed the following report after the visit:

“I tried to observe the protest from behind the trailer. It was very windy and rainy and near to impossible to take clear photos or film.

The atmosphere was a lot more grim and there were more police present, but at the beginning it seemed like a normal and quiet sort of protest.

Then Garda D 235 pushed Peter Lavelle, who had been in hospital all winter, because of a hip replacement. Mr. Lavelle fell backwards in the didge. People were shocked and started to argue with the police, asking to be arrested rather than pushed. Gannon, who had come out of his car, responded: ‘The court cannot deal with it when we arrest you all’.

Unfortunately I didn't witness this push personally, but Peter and his wife, both in their seventies, pointed the Garda out that had pushed Peter. Again they asked to be arrested rather than being pushed. The police responded: ‘You should take the consequences of your actions’.”

3. LOSS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AND FAITH IN GARDAI AND GOVERNMENT While a local landowner stated he would not take a position for or against the Corrib Gas project, he stated he “has lost respect for the Gardai after the violence around the Shell facility.” A large number of people testified that they have lost trust in the police and the government.

4. HARASSMENT OF SHELL PROJECT OPPONENTS IN PUBLIC PLACES AND HOMES BY GARDAI NOT DURING PROTESTS Evidence was submitted that Gardai were present in public places and the vicinity of homes and other locations not associated with the protest sites. People testified that they were not only confronted with police when they were protesting but also when they were about the community on their private matters. People were harassed 50 miles from their home. People feel that they were harassed by the police for having bumper stickers opposing the pipeline on their motor vehicles. One respondent submitted that the protestors had also been engaged in intimidation. The delegation requested further specific evidence or accusations, but none was submitted. 42

5. EXESSIVE FORCE BY GARDAI RESULTING IN SERIOUS INJURY Evidence was submitted that Gardai have responded violently to the peaceful protests. This evidence included video and photographs. Gardai attacks on peaceful protestors lacked proper warnings and use of acceptable practices to avoid serious injury. Evidence of serious injury was shocking in that impacted protestors carried no weapons or objects that would warrant the use of such violent action by Gardai. Examples included the use of large batons, heavy equipment and physical force that resulted in broken bones, loss of consciousness and heavy bleeding. At the hearing, people submitted that they had been thrown into ditches and down embankments. Although one respondent did imply that that the force employed by the Gardai was justified because of the protestors’ actions, we received no concrete evidence or accusations. The same respondent also mentioned that a female Garda was thrown into a ditch and injured by protestors, but again no further details were forthcoming.

6. VERBAL THREATS BY GARDAI INCITING VIOLENCE There was evidence of Gardai verbally threatening people, eg. ‘I have you, your time is up,’ ‘want to put a message across’ and ‘stand up and you will be beaten down’. These verbal threats incited escalating incidents that ultimately resulted in violence and injury. Such practices are not acceptable for peaceful protests and the maintaining of order.

7. LARGE GARDAI PRESENCE IN SMALL RURAL COMMUNITY CREATING SENSITIVE ATMOSPHERE AND THREATENING LOCAL CULTURE AND VALUES Gardai means 'The Guardians of the Peace of Ireland' and it is a showing of respect when you use the word Gardai. The local Gardai were highly respected before and did keep the peace, but there was evidence that many people do not have respect for them anymore.. Evidence was submitted that local people now lock their doors when they go out in their cars, “because there are so many police in the area”. People expressed fear to be out in public now with the actions of the Gardai.

8. FAILURE OF COMPLAINT SYSTEM AGAINST GARDAI REMOVES REMEDIES People in the community have submitted complaints to the necessary authorities with regard to the issues they have with the police in how they are dealing with people protesting and the public in general. To our knowledge none of these cases have been taken forward. Thus people have lost faith in the system, and have stopped submitting complaints. One of the complaints was sent to Dublin, yet after three and a half months there has been no response.

9. ELDERLY, WOMEN AND CHILDREN PHYSICALLY ABUSED BY GARDAI WITHOUT PROVOCATION Many of the protestors at the site have been youth and women who live in the area. The youth and women have been treated with violence by the police, with mothers and daughters being pushed. There is evidence of this on DVD. Other evidence of youth, women and the elderly being pushed was also submitted.

10. EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND TREATMENT DENIED OR DELAYED TO INJURED PROTESTORS During the violence that erupted in the protest, the emergency ambulance services did not come through for an hour. The delegation received many submissions that this was because the Gardai denied the emergency services access to the area. A local doctor, Doctor Jerry Cowell, was not allowed to get through to the injured people. The Gardai did not allow him through. There was a concern that the Red 43

Cross was ‘employed by Shell’. Complaints were made to the Dublin office on this. Failure to allow treatment of injured protestors by medical professionals violated human rights and appropriate practice by police.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS The situation in County Mayo arising from the Royal Dutch Shell pipeline and on-shore refinery has already resulted in serious injury,loss of trust in the rule of law and the Gardai and disruption to the culture and values of the area. No outside intervention by the European Union or World Human Rights protection entities has occurred to remedy the situation. This lack of action and appropriate response threatens to create an even more explosive situation.

We recommend the following: Global organizations specializing in human rights investigations, should further investigate this crisis. Appropriate legal action should be immediately taken by such entities with the resources to fully prosecute any violations of human rights and international agreements. The to-be-installed Ombudsman should take up the already filed complaints against Gardai behavior and swiftly and thoroughly deal with them in order to restore confidence among the local community. The local and national authorities of the Irish government must immediately recognize that the situation in County Mayo could result in further serious injury to protestors, the public and members of the Gardai. Action should be taken to restore order and peace to the region through the intervention of neutral third parties.

EVIDENCE USED IN THIS REPORT The delegation has made available as part of its enquiry the full transcript of a public hearing as documented by a licensed court reporter at http://gcmonitor.org/article.php?id=576 . In addition the submissions made to the enquiry have been catalogued and a summary is available at www.foe.co.uk/resource/evidence/ireland_submissions

DELEGATION Participants to the delegation were: Denny Larson, Global Community Monitor www.gcmonitor.org/ Hannah Griffiths, Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland www.foe.co.uk Hanna Jongepier, Milieudefensie, Friends of the Earth Netherlands www.milieudefensie.nl/ Bobby Peek, groundWork South Africa www.groundwork.org.za/ Paul de Clerck, Friends of the Earth International www.foei.org These groups have been involved in the campaign against the gas pipeline and refinery project, but this visit did not look at the pros, cons or impacts of the project itself.

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The Great Corrib Gas Controversy, Executive Summary

1. The Corrib Gas field, which is controlled by a consortium including Shell (45%), the Norwegian state company Statoil (36.5%) and Marathon (18.5%) is worth up to €8 billion according to sources in the oil and gas industry. Its discovery was announced in 1996. The Corrib gas and associated fields in the Slyne/Erris Basin of the north west coast of Ireland are estimated to be worth up to €50 billion. Through Statoil, the Norwegian tax payer benefits more directly from the gas find than the Irish public. Following the introduction of a new fiscal and licensing regime for the industry in 1987 and 1992, the Irish tax payer receives no royalties from the find while development costs can be written off against tax.

2. Changes to the 1975 fiscal and licensing terms are weighted heavily in favour of the oil and gas companies. While designed to encourage exploration and drilling the record shows that the new terms introduced by former minister, Ray Burke, in 1987 and then finance minister, Bertie Ahern, in 1992 had little effect in this regard and effectively ceded control of vast offshore reserves to the oil and gas companies.

3. In 1987, Mr Burke exempted the oil and gas companies from royalty payments and abolished all State participation in the commercial development of important natural resources. He introduced a 100% tax write off against profits on capital expenditure for exploration, development and production for up to 25 years.

4. In 1992, then Minister for Finance, Bertie Ahern, reduced Corporation Tax on oil and gas companies from 50% to 25%. The 1992 licensing terms allowed the oil and gas companies to secure licenses covering extensive offshore areas for long periods of time with minimal drilling requirements.

5. A proposal in the 1970s to establish an Irish State company to develop the country’s oil and gas resources and offers by the Norwegian government to assist in its creation were rejected by the Irish government at the time. When in 1979, a state company. The Irish National Petroleum Corporation was set up to guarantee oil supplies during an emergency it was explicitly prohibited from any involvement in exploration and drilling.

6. In 2002, the Irish government introduced statutory instruments into legislation which allow the Minister for Communication, Marine and Natural Resources to make Compulsory Acquisition Orders for the benefit of private companies which permit them to acquire land without the permission of property owners. Five men from County Mayo spent 94 days in jail during 2005 when they refused to permit Shell E&P Ireland to exercise these orders.

7. The Government also introduced legislation to allow the department to grant permission for an upstream pipeline, carrying untreated gas, without it being subject to normal planning procedures.

8. Following public hearings in 2002 a senior inspector of An Bord Pleanála (the Irish planning board) rejected the proposed location for a gas processing plant at Bellanaboy Bridge in County Mayo. Mr Kevin Moore stated that the proposed plant was in the wrong location and upheld the

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appeal by local residents against planning permission. In his decision he cited the threat to a sensitive and scenic location, the instability associated with the removal of hundreds of thousands of peat bog and the risk of major accident.

9. In 2003, senior executives of Shell E&P were granted a meeting with the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, the former Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Dermot Ahern and former Minister for Environment, Martin Cullen and senior government officials to express their concerns over planning delays.

10. Within a week representatives of the consortium seeking to develop the Corrib gas field were granted a meeting with the chairman of An Bord Pleanála, John O Connor, and members of the planning appeals board to discuss their concerns.

11. In 2004, the Shell led consortium was granted planning permission after altering their original proposal to dump hundreds of tones of peat near the intended gas processing plant and instead remove it to a site some 11km away at Bangor Erris.

12. The Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources failed to properly supervise work by Shell E&P which erected a section of the controversial pipeline without the necessary ministerial consents. They were subsequently forced to dismantle it.

13. The Department also commissioned a safety review of the proposed pipeline, which was originally routed through an area affected by landslides, from a company which was part owned by Shell and was forced to commission an alternative review after public pressure.

14. A safety review commissioned by the Center for Public Enquiry from a US Company Accufacts Inc. has found that the current proposed route of the pipeline is unacceptable and that claims that it meets “the highest international standards” are meaningless. The report raises serious questions concerning the credibility of the current proposal and also concludes that the benefits of locating the gas processing plant offshore have not been properly addressed.

15. In the latest round of licenses issued in August 2005, frontier licenses were allocated to a Shell led consortium and to Island Oil and Gas, and Irish based company. Providence Resources, controlled by Tony O’Reilly, the owner of Independent News and Media, is the largest Irish Company involved in offshore oil and gas activity and controls significant acreage off the west coast and in the Celtic Sea.

16. The Government has stated on several occasions that the benefit to Ireland from the Corrib gas field will be to increase the attractiveness of the northwest and an investment location; the creation of jobs in construction and operation of the connector pipeline and processing plant and to ensure ‘security of supply’ and reduce reliance on gas from ‘unstable’ regions of the world.

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The Proposed Corrib Onshore System An Independent Analysis By Richard Kuprewicz President, Accufacts Inc.

Key findings • The Corrib pipeline is not a ‘normal’ pipeline given its potential to operate under exotically high pressures and because of the unknown gas composition associated with gas field production. This can seriously increase the likelihood of failure. • The Quantified Risk Analysis (QRA) is inappropriate for this highly unique, first of its kind, pipeline as there is no data that can be used to evaluate this proposed system. • The route of the pipeline, as currently proposed, is unacceptable because of its close proximity to people and dwellings. • The thick-walled pipe is not invincible to leak or rupture from the expected high pressures and the destructive potential of reactive gases. • There are too many unknowns regarding the future operation of this pipeline – especially in the areas of gas pressure and gas composition that can lead to failure. • Maximum pipeline pressure, a condition that should be easily defined, has not been clearly demonstrated or documented- a grave deficiency. • This pipeline’s uniquely large rupture impact zone with high fatalities raises many questions about the appropriateness of the current proposal and QRA approaches. • Claims of meeting “highest international standards” are meaningless as no standard adequately addresses the numerous issues associated with this unique proposal. • Routing analyses for the onshore systems are seriously deficient while the difficulties with locating the gas processing plant offshore are overstated. • This report raises critical questions concerning the credibility of the current proposal, and should call into question the validity of evaluations concerning this project.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mc Caughen, M. 2008. The Price of our Souls; Gas, Shell and Ireland. Dublin; Afri.

Connolly, F. & Lynch, R. 2005. The Great Corrib Gas Contorversy. Dublin; The Centre for Public Inquiry.

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