DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE " ^ IMTRODUCT ION U"~^ For mor For T UNCLASSI ED „ . . , . learnedand the oflessons aspects important themore with Committee „ D IE IF S S A L C N U ATO M s s a — i i xrie cnutdb ALN,aM w (2) series twoanM by SACLANT, conMucted exercises Commands hav Commands 207A Shi. and that thepres that and di n oprto ewe ocs ofd forces between cooperation and isworkable.ments, The ability.cooperative xrie cnutMb h hne omn. ^ stre thegrowing strated Command.the Channel by conducteM exercises (3) three (9)bySACEUR conducted exercises on ninereports liminary tan Central Command. Central ent languages showed marked improvement. This was particularly true particularly Thiswas improvement.marked showed languagesent nte lnig hss n nte cothein phases,and planningthe in incl. 74.Pages 1- f ficulti t exercises conducted by NATO Commands with Appendices giving pre­ giving Appendices with NATO Commands by conducted exercises 1. The purpose of this report is to acquaint th toacquaint is reportthis of purpose The 1. . General. 2. . Communications. 4. . aubeeprec n training wer andexperience Valuable 3. e detail The most outstanding gener outstanding most The It w e RGAE ...... REGRADED . enconnt s e maMe considerable progress in combateff in progress considerable maMe a s evident from ex from evidents . e _ d study there axethere study d e NATO EXERCISES - 1953. - EXERCISES NATO nt NATO Command structur Command NATO nt e ■ ' ■ ■ EOTB H TMIGGOP,, GROUPp, BYSTAMPING THE REPORT red in NATO inex NATO red n MILITARY COMM MILITARY gth and nnity of purpos of gthand nnity e ecss i atclr MAINBRACE,M inparticular xercises, DISCUSSION e tothe csshl thisy rciseshelM n *•" Per 0n - a 1 e t Enclosure a list of more impor­ ofmore list a t Enclosure i a rcis ffer DCMN ETU T O E O £.0 . £ DOCUMENT- DESTRUCTION MEMO, ifclyecntrdws in enconntered was l difficulty n I . TT duct of exercises in in exercisesSACEUR'sofduct E e e ■ DEGRADED E s and maneuv ands nt nationalities and di and nationalities nt e *ne while e band Liaison obtained. Bv.. e n , 3.r> /3. V of the NATO the ofnations,NATO OYN. go NO. COPY P a r A u t h o r i t y Dr ’ r - | | ' ■ ; e a a nMmiscellaneous r that all NATOall that e e e M ding some refine­ someding rs during 1952.rsduring e ____ ctiveness ' i . • .. T""*"*"™ • lit .... a ry Date e mon- f .3..r.Z.-Sef . i t a e- N fer- nM ...... NATO .. r . DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE a su to capabilities oflogistic totalabsence almost shore facilities. CHANCOM noted shortages in certain specialized certain in shortages noted CHANCOM facilities.shore in somedeficiencies with fleet, combined aof support asnnderway crypto improved an for need an urgent because separately mentioned equipment and facilities.andequipment lems : or realis system was noted in all exercises. There are three interlocking prob­ interlocking three are There exercises.in all noted system was shor The gency. ConnnnnithebasicNATO of ofdevelopment Speed cat impera­ is plan ions bea of incapable generally is system the but sonnel, further added to thetodifficulties. added further sonnel, tive as it is not far enough advanced to deal pro to deal advanced enough far itnotis tive as rfi neitn ainladcmeca ewrsws satisfactory, networkswas commercial and national existingon traffic the communications and electronics and communications the i.G. 2O7/3 t ions. SAC IAHT*s difficulties were mostly in support procedures such such SACprocedures support in mostly were IAHT*s difficulties ions. Standing Group and major com major andGroup Standing thebystudy priority continuous given being areproblems These 6 messages. ofadministrative routing and thevolume and dressees, termination of priority of operational traf operational of priority of termination trained. insufficiently areservice 7. Armv Forces Armv 7. s is nottem sys­ crypto theirnational using forces of NATO practice present 5* Logistics. . rnia eiinyntd naleecssws h lack the exerciseswas inall noted deficiency principal A thede­ particularly essential,is trafficof Control jg,. Though belongin Though Cryptography. . Teei edfraNT-ie rposse. The system. crypto aNATO-wide for a need is There a.. b. Crypto personnel are inadequate and due to theirshort to dueand inadequate arepersonnel Crypto b. t I'feximumtwo-sided from achieved been hastraining troop c oitc support. logisticsic t a service system, with resultant inexperience of per­ of inexperience resultant system,with service tisfacto s! Ü L J . g t h cmniain fed ti subjectis this field, commnnicationsthe to r y. - S m 2 - anders, ome of SACEUR's forces revealed an an revealed forces ofomeSACEUR's f ield. The superi The ield. r ing the strain of strain the war. ing f ic, the number ofad­ thenumber ic, p Tnr.r-r G erly with an emer­ an erly with O T W p port combat oper­ combat port m posing of NATO ofposingNATO , A o DE CLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE -3 M M I M ■ maneuvers with nnits no larger no nnits with maneuvers i ees o AERs ra swa seily h ees ofair­ the defense especially isweak area of SACEUR's defense Air mhbosmnues s naslt requi absolute an ismaneuvers amphibious co by accomplished been hasechelons of higher exercise factors political exercise and the procedure and language problems are being resolved. beingare problems language and procedurethe and exercise ewrs ltl o owrig flwfyn icati available.is aircraft flying oflow or no warning little networks, observer gronnd of meshing and organization of tolack Due fields. oflogis­ inclusion The included.be should weapons of nnconventional were limited, though peacetime safety me safety peacetime though limited, were the inAzores. andcoast, channel the on area, in SACEUR's ations oper­ combat for nnsatisfactory are facilities and Airfields ation. cooper­ air/gronnd in factor limiting a wascommnnications of lack requirement. definite a is exercises future in supportticunits most important factor. Carrier operations off Norway and Denmark andDenmark offNorway operations Carrier factor. important most boecn aa qimn apr hg liuedtcin Again detection. altitude high hampersequipment radar Obsolescent more severely than would be common practice in war. The alarming, The in practicewar. common bethan severely would more a was logistics,weather and commnnications from Aside operations. u nw, at htmnsepn of h uc os i ol possible is only Coast the offDutch minesweeping that fact known,but o naeaeo wledy prmnh ee nsme,ws clearly summer,wasin even permonth, daystwelveof average an for northern flank. northern can forces thatnaval showed exercises the alloted periodsshort thevery and encountered thedifficulties ofspite In illustrated. vers comparable in scale to those held in in those toheld scale in comparable vers carry out their assigned tasks, including the support ofSACEUR's support the including tasks, theirassigned outcarry headqua 1953 should envisage conducting land, air, naval and amphibious maneu­ amphibiousand naval air,land, conducting envisageshould 0 I h lgt ofrepo lightthe In 10. m 8 . aa ocs ' NavalForces. 9. ad po mand . Air Forces, Air . r ters should be exercised to the to exercised be shouldters i upr of support Air aa xrie ee odce oeigalpae ofnaval phases all covering conducted were exercises Naval s xrie. h cniuto f on, obnd and combined, joint,of continuation The texercises. g round troops was practiced in everymajor in practiced troopswasround FI D IE IF S S A L C N U O T A N CONCLU r ts on NATO exercises onts NATO t a crs De ofnnilad SSöfJff and financial to Due corps. ahan S IONS a m r sure restricted operations restricted sure aximum extent feasible throu feasible extent aximum mn n te implications theand ement 1952 In higher addition . f r15, ln for 1952, plansor NATO NATO g h DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE th shouldb (incl e med u 11. It is recommended that the abovethe that is Itrecommended 11. ding cryptography) cryptography) ding i um of comm of um e emphasis a e n d. d post a nd the implications of unconventional weapons ofunconventional implications the nd PEC QMIENDAT IONS e ecss Lgsi spot communicatio$s support, Logistic xercises. I n Œ î Ç f Ç Â ‘I LnU y l l s L j c onclusions beonclusionsnoted. kJ iJr`L1 DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE mobile operations in the early stages ofstages war,in theearly operations mobile th inFre in Germnny.tion Forces Chief Allied Air Forces Central Europe. Central Chief Forces Air Allied Occupation ontheOccupationRhine. iemnues nldn tak dfne exploitation, includingdefense,attack,size maneuvers S maneuve iousand modern exercise Northern Flank of Europe. Northern Flank incoop inexercisesHOLDFAST hpigaantte umrn het , submarinethreat.theshipping against f hpigaantte het f umrn n surfaceaction.raider submarine ofand threat the shippingofagainst ACEUR ACEUR e wrig fSaf n signalcommnnica and ofStaffs working . CXOe— o td h stage, manage studythe To — One CPX ä.« 2 GADALAC T ieraitc etn o testing settingfor giverealistic To — 1 GRAND ALLIANCE 32* d. EQUINOXE — A "two-sided A — EQUINOXE tined.at maneuver "two-sided" A level.corps — ROSEBUSH £. £ . . ANCIENT WALL — A series of seven regimental or sevendivision ofseriesregimental A — ANCIENT WALL £.. of bythe British Army "two-sided"mnneuver A — HOLDFAST e.. i BU LINE— nar xrie supportinggroundforces exercise air An — BLUEALLIANCE £i. g,. . GHS — aa xrie ntecnrlad p inandcontrol the exercise Naval A — GÄHNST a.. ofSACIANT andSACSUR the exerciseforces To MATNPjRACE — i,. . Mft.INDllft.CEb. to Designed — £ .• IMMIGRANT — A Naval exercise in the control and protection incontrol andthe exercise Naval A — IMMIGRANT £.• JUNE P JUNE a e IT (FC LIST EXERCISES ainwt h ees ofthedefense ration with nd SACIANT with particularref with SACIANTnd (Brief atareAppendix Preliminary Reports (BriefPr R I M ER — An air exe air An — ER e li a nd nd EQUIN m inary reports are at Appendix atareinary reports Appendix O NDUCTED BY NATO MAJOR COMMANDERS MAJOR NATO BY NDUCTED ENCLOSURE SACIANT C SACBUR KE. r s. " mane r t e cis he Northern Northern Flanks.he ecs ocs (Primarily of Navy) forcesxercise e e ec ote s theto rence conducted byCommand conducted u ver by the French Occupa­ the by verFrench t ions. me nt and conduct oftheconductand nt u " " pr ofthepport A" ) B" ) s mall amphib­ mall r otection ofotection s e r-in- r-in- r r m DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE exercises. support of convoys by air defense.airby convoysof support ç. CAST DIETS — A Major Co Major A CAST — DIETS ç. a p_, . BANDFAU SERIES — These were a series of minesweeping seriesofminesweeping a Thesewere — SERIES BANDFAU . A NNA IS SERIES — A s A NNA — ISSERIES (Bri e f Preliminary Report Preliminary f CHANNEL COMMAND CHANNEL e is o ries m vex/Flex vex/Flex Exercise. s are atAppendi are f exercises .with reference x "C") SSSSET t oth e

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE HP/225 8Nvme 19 8November SHAPE/1212/52 TO: Standing Group Standing TO: 1952- Exercises NATO on Report SUBJECT: I AG requested that brief reports on NATO Exercises which have been have which NATO Exercises on reportsbrief that requested uc ros nEecs ODAT Gon ocshv ae consider­ made haveforces Ground HOLDFAST. in troops Exercise Dutch principle was followed throughout all gronnd maneuvers this year.this maneuvers gronnd all throughout followed was principle attached are conducted, exercises the principal from learnedlessons and aspects important themost covering briefs,These Committee.the Military briefing of the purpose commandsfor major Consequently, field army and higher headqu andhigherarmy field Consequently, particularly noteworthy between French and American headquarters in headquarters and American between French noteworthy particularly particularly within exercised, fully nationalities was different paragraphs I have set out ths main conclusions reached.conclusions main ths setout I have paragraphs in progress considerable made serviceshave three all that year aevr. ' superiority.air enemy nnder operations conceal towithdrawal ability in progress able maneuvers. co infuture thisproblem given be Continuedemphasis will levelandhigher. army fieldat AirandHeadquarters Army towork cases, the Inwillingness all Command. theCentral of forces echelonsthe higher exerciseto impracticable itmake maneuvers hi saesol o e agr hncrsvru crs This corps.corpsversus than larger be scaleshouldnot their by submittedbe Meeting Committee lastMilitary the since conducted scale outlined leads to increased battle efficien battle increased to leads outlinedscale all commands. This was particularly noticable in the Belgian and the Belgian in noticable particularly Thiswas commands.all andEQUINOXE. ROSEBUSH Exercises conductof and planningthe exercises.command post by except scalelarge ofvery implications political and financial the present regularby out carried be must This require.they training thefull obtefciees n coeaieaiiy Infollowing the ability. cooperative and effectivenesscombat together was demonstrated to a high degree. This relationship wasrelationship This degree. atohigh demonstrated togetherwas m While periods.future during exercises commandpost 7 O 2. It was evident from the maneuvers and exercises held thisheld exercises and maneuversthe Itfrom evident was 2. 3. Armv Forces Armv 3. you 421,by STAND asmodified cable392 InSTAND your 1. 2 OT • SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE POWERSALLIED HEADQUARTERS SUPREME • ahntn . C. D. Washington, . CombatEffectiveness b. . Headquarters a. c. Equipment for Umpire Organization Umpire for Equipment c. Except for British, Canadian and United States troops,States United and Canadian British,for Except in noted was combateffectiveness in increase Marked (2) Liaison and cooperation between headquarters of headquarters between cooperation (2)and Liaison (1)maximu achieve To 3 Teei otnigne o xriig jointly exercising forneedcontinuing (3)ais There APPEN PARIS,FRANCE D IX IX "A(S m troop training from maneuvers,from training troop NATO ‘ a rters have not received not have rters m mand exercises andexercises mand c y at lowerechelons,aty hereto. a neuvers on the on neuvers 5 2 DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE ee teddb obndtas fSAEadNtoa bevr, andobservers, National and ofteams SHAPE combined by attended were have been and are being.conducted in many NATO conntri NATO many in being.conducted are and been have w serious amost highlights rbe a nyb ipoe ycretn qimn eiinis and deficiencies, equipment correcting by improved detection be altitudecanonly high The problem in efficiency. increase amarked show does in tested be Thiswill Commander. Air supporting thein vested been hasauthority coordinating control nnits, Anti-Aircraft and Air the between coordination effective for themachinery developing atregular continued beingis training This improvement. marked show utilization their for procedures andconducted been have forces resolved. being are Theproblems language and procedures nnits.Force Air or Air Naval by either maneuver major every National by studied being are Teams Observer the by made dations display cooperation and interest the and exercisesthese of results and Luxembourg France, inDenmark, Belgium, held been far so have rmaeut u t apwr hraeadoslt qimn, but equipment,obsolete and shortage manpower to due adequate from maneuvers. future forc time. in attacked ext involving exercises Several sources.outside upon dependent recommen­ many The gratifying. very been has authorities National by that visited team SHAPE a theNetherlands, for held was exercise plann are and Norway, National additional in resulting Units, Service Military by equipment andsupplies issueof and storage will transport,effectively this do provision, To require exercised.be mustconditions field of operational supplying The maneuvers. in future extent Command Europe, namely the absenc the namely Europe, Command Low altitude attacks by enemy aircraft were seldom reported or reported seldom wereaircraft enemy by attacks altitudeLow intervals*. General Staffs. no While exercises. asSHAPE conducted cases,were ail nearly in strengthen to donecan be much responsibility, anational is support This follow-through. support and logisticplay lackofrealistic the onr n odce uvyo h oiiainsse. The system. mobilization the of survey a conducted andconntry possible themaximum to play logistic introducing by thisdeficiency c obtoeain. Notw combatoperations. osts and mobilization of certain National logistic nnits.logistic National certain of mobilization and osts e 4. Air Forces Air 4. i h il n h ainldfne forces.defense National theand field the ins . (4) The control and reporting system is still very far stillvery is system reporting and (4) control The . . AirDefense b. Support Air a. Logistics Army d. Mobilization .e A principal deficiency noted in the 1952 maneuvers w 1952 maneuvers the in noted deficiency principal A At SHAPE'S suggestion. Army mobilization exercises mobilization Army suggestion. At SHAPE'S (3) Because of the need for close cooperation between between cooperation closefor needthe (3)of Because in assisted areas in rear exercises (2) Air Defense largely isforces front-line of support(2) Bomber in practiced troopswas gronnd of(1) Support Air (1) Air Defense of airfields is literally non-existent. literally isairfields of(1) AirDefense e d for Greece, Italy and Portugal. All exercises All Portugal. Italyand Greece, ford i thstan e akness, d n h rnil ta logistic that principle theing e of logistic capabilities to suppo to capabilities logistic of a pplicabl e throughout Allied throughout a rmies nnderrmies e . Exercises s. e rnal e a d r s t DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Southern commands, and have contributed greatly toward improvingtoward greatly contributed have andcommands, Southern Action ha Action used in support of maneuvers. While there isstill there While ofmaneuvers.support in used Ai Naval and Army or thoseandimprovement showed Theprocedures cooperation. Army/Air h lw lev lowthe will continue duringcontinue will 1952maneuver thein demonstrated repeatedly was defense nyfrhr empha furtheronly in use did not inhibit operations either between Army andForce, Air Army between either operations inhibit notdidin use developing th developing Atomic play. SHAPE has this problem nnder study with a view toa studyview with nnder thisproblem has SHAPE play.Atomic Maneuvers. Central thein demonstrated particularly itcommandswas all MAINBRACE. To meet this problem SHAPE and subordinate commands subordinate and thisSHAPE problem Tomeet MAINBRACE. atomic we concerning procedures operational establishing inheld tomaneuvers applicable thiswas While toattack.airalert andparticipatin practiced,equipment was and tions support to maintain tosupportmaintain support of Army forces ofArmy support effective prohibit not thisdid ofprocedures, standardization ehiu soe mrvmn. ocamn fhaqatr, installa­ ofheadquarters, Concealment improvement. showed technique effectiveness of forces nnder my command. my nnder forcesof effectiveness doctrine,,commonoperating implications in connection with maneuvers was emphasized in Exercise emphasized wasmaneuvers with connection in implications aino oitclfre i aevr a indicated. inwasmaneuvers forces logistical of pation Group. the toStanding hs hc ol e osdrdpltclydneos Thisprocess dangerous. politically considered couldbe thosewhich maneuvers.majorin future inclusion their significantly. improved has nationalities ofdifferent forces between and services conditions,'and condition the improving to greatly contributed screened all 1952 exercises subsequent to MAINBRACE todetermine to MAINBRACE subsequent 1952exercises allscreened . PassiveAirDefense 6. 9 8 Atomic Warfare 7. 5. Naval Naval Forces 5. Pltcl mlctos in Maneuvers Implications Political . . Conclusions s be An increased awareness to the problem of passive airpassive of thetoproblem awareness increased An Major Naval exercises were conducted in Northern and inNorthern conducted exerciseswere Naval Major c. Armv/Air Coo Armv/Air c. ycnlsos are:conclusions My The importance of appreciating of importanceThe b. The ability to cooperate effectively between differentbetween effectively cooperateto ability The b. existing lightof the in considered 1952maneuvers, The a. It is my belief that maneuvers did not include sufficient include notdid that maneuvers belief It ismy c. The clear need for logistical exercises and and partici­ exercises logistical for clearneed The c. e ld e e limited existing observer corpsorganization. observer existing limited n started to achieve thi achievetostarted n e (1) Lack of commnnications was a limiting factor in limitingfactora was(1)commnnications Lackof (2) Joint Army/Air Operation (2) JointArmy/Air fen s s ized the requirement for requirement theized r e problem c eproblem s peed ofopera peed . Breakdowns orfailure Breakdowns . 1953 . and suggested proc suggested and n a eration nd effective integration of Naval forces.ofNaval integration effectivend a n b n t e ions. p a s expansion. rtially rtially p ossible political political ossible s Centers were regularly regularly Centerswere a e dequate backup ofbackup dequate s dures have been submitted been havedures in commnnications in m et by expandingetby g forceswere s ome lack of lack ome a s os andpons Comou . s and ignal f lage m NATO NATO DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE tnig Group Standing DISTRIBUTION: Ex, Paris SGLO, Incls:9 NMR NMR NMR NMR NMR NMR NMR NMR NMR M Turkey NMR NMR NMR United States United NMR NMR exercised in 1953 through the medium of c of themedium through 1953 in exercised command. my nnder forces of *Note: French Translation French *Note: emphasized in all exercises. all bein will emphasized aspects support logistical possible extent maximum the Xin.ll headquarters higher ïnaddition, intensively be 1952.in maneuvers. in weapons atomic of odcig ad nvlad i aevr cmaal i cl t those to scale in comparable maneuvers air and naval land, conducting absolute requirement to further improve the status of combat readiness combat of status the improve further to requirement absolute S.G. 4 - Exercise EQUINOX - Exercise 4 3 - Exercise ROSEBUSH [Annex "C"][Annex -ROSEBUSH Exercise 3 I[Anne GRANDALLIANCE -Exercise 2 9 - Exercise MAIN BRACE "I"][AnnexBRACE MAIN -9 Exercise 8 1 7 -7 6 5 "F"][Annex WALL ANCIENT -Exercise NM - - - Denmark Exercise HOIDFAST [Annex HOIDFAST Exercise Exercise BLUE ALLIANCE [Annex "H"][Annex ALLIANCE BLUE Exercise France CPX One [Annex "A"][AnnexOneCPX Belgium Canada Norway Netherlands ntd Kingdom United Greece Luxembourg Portugal Italy 10. Maneuver Plans f Plans Maneuver 10. 207/3 R E (SHAPE) xercise JUNE PRIMER [Annex"G"]PRIMER JUNE xercise e. . h cniuto f on n obndmnues s an is maneuvers combined and joint of continuation The d. nte ih fte oeon, ypasfr 93 envision 1953 for plans my foregoing, theof light Inthe

T here is a need to include the implications and effect and implications the include to need a is here Eng. E 3 3 3 2 [Annex "D"][Annex 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 1 5 1 1 1 1 l 5 5 o will 195^ r r * Fr. DCLA 4 - - 5 - » - - - " - E"] follow.

10 - D/SACEUR SACEUR SHAPE: DCPO PCS1 SPACOS Deputy Air Secretary Naval Deputy Naval CS O&T ACOS, CS In ACOS, he, i. 0. Sig. Chief, Chief of Staff of Chief CS Log ACOS, PP&O ACOS, Chief, General, United Stat United General, /s/ AG Central FilesCentral AG "B" ] o M. R B. mn-oteecss To exercises. mmand-post PID t Appen e1, IDGWAY d ix

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DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ANN5ÜC APPE TO "A" INCLOSURE 3. INCLOSURE C P X ONE X N DIX "A"DIX U l U U H d H U U l U £ far? ï o T ß DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Divisionsl level and Senior Staff Officers of all forces assigned assigned forces all of Officers Staff Senior leveland Divisionsl rerakdfr sinet toSACEUR. assignment for earmarked or rbe ht ofot s nErp n.wt htbcgon, to background, that and.with in Europe us confronts that problem Fleets. Mediterranean Bomber RAF Command, Air Strategic U.S. associated with but not forming part of SACEUR's Command such assuch Command SACEUR's of part forming not but with associated early stages of a war".ofstages early the in operations mobile of conduct and mnnagement stagethe study commanders eue h eeyar capability. air enemy the reduce priority of tasks will be: taskswill of priority ere r confirmed: learnedor of command must exist to enable this plan to b to plan this enable to exist must command of machines the and landforces, the of support in used beto power air of fota ti time. thisat effort of percentages of allocations exact maketo or priorities strict 2 1. Brief Description of CPX CPX of Description Brief 1. . Ma.jortheExercise. from learned Lessons a . Those attending were attending Those : .a CPX The following major tactical and training pointswere training and tactical major following The Th b. a. Use of Air Power Airof Use a. . ONE was a study study we a ONE was (3) Commanders or representatives of certain forces certain of representatives or Commanders (3) to down Commanders Commanders-in-Chief, (1) (2) 1 Tasks (1) (2) e National Chiefs of Staff or their representatives. their or Staff of Chiefs National purpose of the Exercise was "To take the military themilitary take "To was Exercise theof purpose i Pwr nSpoto te LandBattle. the of in Support Power Air A plan must be worked out to enable the full the weight enable to out beworked must A plan a Tepiayamo u i ocs s to is Forces Air our of aim primary The (a) b I rnil, hrfr, h initial the therefore, Inprinciple, (b) How support. Close 3.. . Interdi 2. 1. Connter air operations. air Connter 1. RESUME OF CPX ONE CPX OF RESUME e ver, it would be wrong to lay down lay to be wrong it would ver, e k held in in k held 12 O NE - c tion. . C ommand, British and French and French British ommand, PARIS e quickly implement quickly for certain senior certain for Appendix ,!AAppendix Ann e A to"A" x " e d . O T A N 4 ^/ DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE p rapid reduction of the enemy air forc airenemy the of reduction rapid on o te supp the forfonnd ba quick thevery ensureto found be the Itbest be will plan. theAir best or Army thebest be outsid many handle to able benot thisat Also examination. cumbersome.tooand slow too is forces air outside in bringing decr ntedpomn fntoa ocs N solu No forces. ofnational thedeployment on severe limitations impose and would flexibility lacks ization today.exist NWR pni a. o ev rfi, BHVEi h only theis LB traffic,HAVRE heavy For in open war. ANTWERP of the Atom Bomb ag Bomb theAtom of extremely complicated. In Central Europe, the logistic org thelogistic InEurope,Central complicated. extremely theExercis forc trained reserve further and requires importance firstrate of is own airfields targets wh stocks aggravates all our present logistic difficulties.logistic present ourall stocks aggravates o ssibl e as e e com a e sal t ipre r ca or to disperse able Is as he e (4) Procedure for Mounti for Procedure (4) hi nta Mac s check isaMvance Initial their n e p ), the logistic situation is very nnsatisfactory and nnsatisfactory very is situation ), logistic the romise. t ime, air commanders oth commanders airime, (b) Army/Air Planning - The final plan will not will plan final The- Planning Army/Air (b) for the machinery theofExercise), timethe(At d GeneralLogis (d) theseto meet shoulMreaMy be situa Plans (c) f Pr fATEP-W cann - of We ANTWERP Port (f) ad of lack The ~ of Lack Resources (e) (c) Availability of Reserve Forces - Means must- Means of Forces Reserve Availability (c) ( Late (b) a I h al aso a tekyt theto the key of Inearly days war the (a) a ) Air Defense - Th - Defense Air ) o rt of Northern Eu Northern of rt a e inst his airfields. The opportunity may opportunity may The airfields.inst his , ohln n i. Suc air.and land s, both r ,forc land the enemy t e fre t h sm time. same theat forces i n c Situati t e r gMa.ior Operations.Air ucsfldfneo ourof defense successful e tle availability of properly tleavailability ope. e than CINCAIRCBITTERr would a elb in be s may well p tur e o d. e (tte ie of time (Atthe - n M airfields.M o e t t on keeping plan h ion has yet been been yetion has s reserves do notdo reserves m yofr good offeray e quate t he use he a n­ t ions. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE .. 2O7/3 S.G. Forces. dire includ eue rbe, h scesu ucm o tebtl o thefor the battle of outcome successful the problem, refugee exercis Center will be gravely prejudiced. gravely be will Center the for agreedplan an is there nnless and begins, fighting fore at governmental level. governmental at c tions. e close cooperation at all levels between Ar between levels all at cooperation close e efcet commanddemands: efficient Cg) Command Organiz Command Cg) (h) Dependents and Refugees Dependents (h) JL , Unless the dependents are moved outbe­ are moved thedependents Unless JL, 1. A sound command structure, which must structure,which command sound A 1. There are shortcomings today in in today bo shortcomings areThere 2, 2. The refugee problem can only he resolved canonly heresolved problem refugee The 2. fiin commnnications. Efficient - 14 - 14- a tion - The ability to ability The- tion Appendix "A" Appendix "A"'Annex .to m y andAir y t h these h DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE EXE ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "A" TO APPENDIX "B" ANNEX R CISE B C r&AW LOSURE 2LOSURE ALAC I ALLIANCE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE For security reasons, the alert measure differed differed the alertmeasure security reasons, For AAFCE and FOCE, during the period 16-lS July 1952. July 16-lS the period during and AAFCE FOCE, ad ersn temltr omns ftesae ofstate of.the commands themilitary represent mands during alert movements, and to accustom them to working in a new new ain themto toaccustom working and alertmovements, during Strategi at Fontainebleau. oain ^ location. test.ato provide similarity sufficient of they butwere plan actual testing settingfor agiverealistic to itnecessary as insofar was Command Subordin naet • analert. the working of the Staffs and Signals.and Staffs the ofthe working hours on the second day of the exercise. The theoretical tactical theoretical The exercise. theof second day on the hours the Iron Curtain. The situation was develo situation was The Iron Curtain.the of situated East GREENLAND, stateof strong the by threatenedis LAED July July 15/16of thenight during General Alert a declared nntilBLUELAPD tor tfs falHseggdI h exercise.theIn engaged ofall HQs Staffs O33O at attacked forces GREENLAND situation.theto develop tinued con­ Director the asExercise locations exerciseto HQs variousthe iuto a eeoe uig eodadtidas toful thiiddays secondand during developed situation was . re ecito f theofExercise Description Brief 1. 1952 a a dSbriaeCmad i h oeet f their during ofHQ the in movement Commands Subordinate nd tes' Staffs in the maintenance of the continuity o continuity the of thein maintenance Staffs tes' Teeecs pnda O atopened exercise The . . h ucsso h exercise thewere:of Thenurcoses b. w ALLIANCE ©AID Exercise a. The Main HQ of the Exercise was at METZ with R at with METZ theExercise was of HQ TheMain a. . h ocn f h exercise the ofwas:concent The c. (2 (1) To check the execution of the alertthemeasures.of execution thecheck To (1) (1) The Central Surope Command and Subordinate Com­ Subordinate and Command Surope The Central (1) theandStaffs theEurope Central Toexercise (3) (2) The first day of the Exercise was spent in spentmoving the of was Exercise day first The (2) RESUME OF EXERCISE GRAN OFEXERCISE RESUME To ) eecs te tfso theCentralEurope of Staffs the exercise c ad atclpolm ee tde only studied were problems tactical and a s Joint CPX conducted by ALFCE, sCPX Joint 6 OO hours on l OO hours D ALLIANCE ALLIANCE p ed by theExer by ed f rom those in the in those rom 6 I July 1952.July ^ E ICELAND. BLUE c l f iseDirec­ y test thetest y com e ar HQ m and -

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE development of valuabl of development m for the Central Europe Commands. theEurope Central for signal testing personnelj headquarters higher training of purposes arate room for briefing purposes. briefing for room arate a situation operational thefor a shouldroom include This clear. toambiguity. liable and complicated tooto be proved communications and improving working methods. improving andworking communications a Euro he eta uo^Cmad okn oehr nte samebuilding,the in together Commandsworking Europ^ threeCentral esp equipment, ■Srerci... titious character of the exercise does not lend itself vfelllend not does theexercise of character thetotitious to move their command post locations until the enemy's intention intention was enemy's untilthe locations post command their to move should be obtained in a different type exercise.type adifferent in obtained shouldbe opera in n active part in the logistics portion of this exercise. The fic­ The exercise. thisof portion logisticsthe in partactive n a ehf siteproved, keshift benorm than would difficult more a p n exerci n 4. AAFCE Report on Ma.ior Report AAFCE theExercis from learned Lessons 4. . Ma,i 3. e Command was not used. The development arid development The operat used.not Command ewas . icsino the Probl of Discussion 2. t ions. ä« A Joint Photographic Information Centre is necessary necessary is Information Centre Photographic Joint A ä« . lr esrs-Tepeet sy present The- Measures Alert a. * Iti s* b. The Headquarters ofA TheHeadquarters b. . ti ihvpoial tohav Itprofitable ishiehlv a. b. Similar exercises are necessary in th in necessary are exercises Similar b. Itis, suchas ALFÇ.E aHQ for difficult toparticipate *a . o esn fscrt, thep security, of reasons For b. . Nationa c. c. A definite problem problem definite A c. se o r Lessons Learned from Jhe E from Learned Lessons Jhe r o thi of e cially signalequipment. cially s essential that a Joint a War that essential s scope and at the same time maintain routine time samemaintain the at and scope e l logistical proble logistical and territorial organization territorial and e w ms Encoraÿegcd in Executing the in Executing Encoraÿegcd ms as created by the shortage of shortage the by created as I F F C M/AAF CE/F 0 attemptshould not CM m x s. Logistical training Logistical s. ercise. la e the staffs of the staffsof the s nned War HQ of Central of HQ nned War tem of alertmeasures oftem R oom be established. beoom e s s ftr o theforfuture hould not hould a o i l. n f aof n d ad s . t ep­ e . a ke DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE boards at this level should be established established should be level this at boards combined headquarters and also that th that alsoand headquarters combined that the "Crypto" staffs became rapidly swamped with work and remained swamped work with staffsrapidly became the"Crypto"that committee to have representatives from the main directorates of all all of directorates the main from torepresentatives have committee This exercises.produce and toprepare formed should be committee so throughout the exercise.the throughoutso strategic he services.three . omnctos-Casfe rfi a o such of volume was traffic - Classified Communications d. a e« Exercise Planning Planning Exercise e« Air Reconn c. ir reconnaissance formation should be av shouldbe formation irreconnaissance ------a sac I eae bin that obvions It became- issance - - Ç - For future exer future For e necessary reconnaissance reconnaissance necessary a nd exercised.nd c a ises a combinedisesa lbe o the to ilable a small ^^TQ NATO

ANNEX 11C" TO APPENDIX "A"

EXERCISE ROSEBUSH DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Director Headquarters.Director Y Corps and French II Corps, and their defense in successivedelaying in theirIIdefense and Corps, and Corps French Y 4 edures US 2dAm Divisi Armd 2nd U.S.Headquarters, V Corps and French II Corps, part of Seventh Army, was to delay theto delay II SeventhArmy,was of partCorps, and Corps French V position WIMSBA 2nd Armd Division (-1CC)H-Hour attacks ArmdDivision 2nd tween the Corps thereby requiring maximum coordination between the between coordination maximum thereby requiring theCorpstween abreast in zone, along the axes FRITZLAR - MARBURG - GIïlSSMM- - MARBURG axesthe FRITZLAR in along zone,abreast - (-1the andCC) 1stArmd theDivision (Reinf) of composed French ision twoCorps. in zone." h. 207/3 Shi. u - September 1 D . Brief Description o Description Brief . MM'and the MAE:’over seizecrossings RHIMM to(MODLMMZ) riv s . The main effort of this attack was along the bonndary be­ thebonndary along attack thisof was effort Themain . Exercis a. Eyienaiy forcos con forcos Eyienaiy a. . h cneto the conceptiras;ofmaneuver The d. . Aggressor b. c* The purposes of the exercise the were;of Thepurposes c* $2 by 1$$2 (2) French IICorps. French (2) Corps U.S.V (1) 1 US 2dAm iiin (-) Division 2nd Armd U.S. (1) 2) (2 U.S.theagainst by Aggressor Forces attack An (1) force exercise Tomajor (1) 3 T (3) (2) To perfect coordination between Allied Forcos. coordination between Toperfect (2) Division 1stArmd French (2) J\SSIrlL l r I S S \ ,J e h iso f h grso a: "2nd thewas:ofaggressor The mission RSDS a a"two-sided" man was R0S2DUSH b lt rd Cavalry Regiment l4th Armd (b) a Fec r Infantry Division 3rd French (a) Infantry Divisio U.S. 4th (a) RE the h e mission of e Frie mission S UME OF MXMRCISM OFMXMRCISM ROSM3USH UME f U.S. U.S. orces were nnd.erorces were ofcontrol operational the mi s m s io im f theExercise. S eventh eventh - 20 - 20 - s i o M. 3 MO. n ana were composed of: composed anan were s . -f, tedof; ? Arzty n l ocs composedU.S.of dly Forces .

6 September 1952, divisions September which ftuicfcl which s in emergency inroles. f - »''WS -»''WS •• Appendix "A" ' Appendix ne C to "C" Annex e vr conducted from uver n o ned asned A rmdDiv­ e hi'; r ro M DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE hicles and conti and hicles in Sector for a period of 72 hours.of aperiod Sectorfor in who speak French permanently stationed with CCFFA and with the French theand French with CCFFA stationed with permanently speak French who 6 O atattack saying theForces of Aggressor General Commanding excep opp h Officers Staff Army Seventh The advance. exercisew Exercise. orManeuver.. Allied High.Commissioners. Allied conntries theof interests thebest in but was thedesired realism from in accordance with Later-Allied claims procedures as set forth by theby setforth as claimsprocedures Later-Allied accordance with in the to a sending message by exercisethe started then andeuver theman­ before issued ordersof stageby means the set hadquarters "fre a being This AirTwelfth Force. tivated or unharvested tivated the advances of Aggressor Forces East of general defense line BAMDOO BAMDOO line defense general of East of Forces Aggressor theadvances t course.its ving American and French forces. The Seventh Seventh Array The officersU.S. has forces.and French American ving invol­ exercises in previous used samepattern the followed Planning thema infollowing itmet was exercise In this alities. nation­ different ofunits between barrier language the ercise was we maneuvers from claimsresulting Civilian concerned. troops were not permitted to maneuver in town and cities and in cul­ in andcities intownand to maneuver permitted not troops were theFre pl eral ttoe ihteSvnhUS Am. Them U.S.Army.Seventh thestationed with S.G. h organizations theseof Mach II Corps. September. From then From September. o si . Disc 2. t 207/3 that being exercised "by umpire decisions. The Director Head­ The Director "byexercised thatbeing decisions. umpire t e members in the French II Corps, the U.S. V Corps, and the and Corps, V the U.S.II Corps, the in French e members n a n was prepared i prepared n was hOfcr atcptn. fe prvlo te conc theof approval After participating.Officers ch i a. In order to forestall nndue property damage property nndue to Inforestall order a. b. One of the problems enconntered in planning this ex­ this in planning enconntered the ofproblems One b. th no special maneuver staff or committee being formed in formed being committee staffor specialmaneuver th no ïâ U U iü ylil ylil iü U U ïâ (4) This exercise was planned as a usual training ausual as planned was exercise This (4) n uereconn u ssion f o ields, but were required to dismount from ve­ from todismount required ields, but were n , h ietrHaqatr e aue take nature let Headquarters the Director n, IIQ with (director headquarters) Army Seventh 3 f o a issance orissance the Probl the - 21 - -21 e e p " maneuver, there was no c no there was " maneuver, msEnco toso ot Ti detracted This on foot.atrols as officers who speak English speak English officers who a h sitneo theirofassistance thed a neuver concept and gen­ and concept neuver u ne C to "C"Annex Appendix Appendix trdI xctn theIn Executing ntered r " e processed A" n ner. a d claims,nd 6 e OO, pt and pt o n t rol DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE was constantly demonstrated. Constant stress should be laid on ag­on shouldstresslaid be Constant constantly demonstrated. was vide front. Demolitions programme should be intensified and expanded.and shouldintensifiedbe programme Demolitions front.vide on aactionsdelaying friendly duringadvance enemy on effect decided difficulties. sotoavoidlanguage as followed vas preclude another maneuver on tfti.on anothermaneuver preclude Further, one.last thoscaleof to soasbe conceivablyhigh forcesmay to participating maneuvers theofmaneuver. aspect "international" thisofpurely costthe defray orconfirmed; Thisprocedure Officers.by umpiredAmerican troopsand American gressiveness by delaying forces. This attitude is highly import is attitudehighly This forces.delaying by gressiveness n cnb eemnn atri h sceso adlyn action. a successofdelayingthe in canfactora be and determining portati inter-allied costs will bemore, costs inter-allied will apportion.to difficult attendtoiau3t early Mato. an atforthcoming be e self-isofNATO thenations between memberofnnits exchangethe interna should be laid on future improvement.on shouldfuturelaid be f Officers by umpiredFrench and combinedmaneuve all chova mo.rl:ed stress Continuing theyear.past improvementduring Offi Stall general plan, an "Action Officer Coi,a~J.'l "Action an generalplan, . . ~.Q vident. To permit the arrangement of aMecj.uaofthe arrangement To permit vident. a iiis ec, ti meaie that;imperativeis it etc., cilities, 2O7/3 3 M . o t ihntemnue ra scrt laacs briefingclearances, security thearea, ithin maneuver n ional guest observers and press arrangements. The value of Thevalue arrangements.pressobservers and guest ional . Operational b. M. When the contrac the When M. The following major tactical and training points were learned training points andwere tactical major Thefollowing a. Demolitions and other barrier operations can have acan have operations barrierotherand Demolitions a. . h au fagesvns nte ’Dthe on ofaggressiveness value The c. . n f h ao rbesecntrdwsicdn toincident enconnteredwas theproblems ofmajor One c. c a ers, prepared the detailed plans. In this exercise, as i Inas exercise,this the plans.detailed ers, prepared jor. lessons .Le (2) The early allocation of international fnnds tofnnds international of earlyallocation The (2) th of designation firm A (1) r s,troops wer French ,y a rned from ths_from rned Exercise,. l iaison betwe iaison 5 American troops were opposed byopposed troops were American t - ual 2 - 22 a gree : tee", which included French tee",included French which e m n Fren e o ents are signed, cost of the signed,of cost entsare p o international spectators international posed by French troops by posed French t cooain, trans­ eaccomodations, c h andU. h Appendix "A" Appendix "C" Annex a to theofd rt S .has Forces t o O T A N e a fender h h nt m ^ n MATO

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE or reduced to an absolute minimum. absolute an to reduced or . The d. (3) Maneuvers are free. are Maneuvers (3) (5) Sufficient umpires are provided. are umpires Sufficient (5) entirely eliminated is forces fictional of Play (4) Man (2) 1 Mnuesae two-sid are Maneuvers (1) m axi e m vr r short. are uvers um v um a lue from maneuv from lue e d. e rs can be gained only if: only gained be can rs

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ANNEX "D" TO APPENDIX TO "A"APPENDIX ANNEX "D" EXERCISE EQUINOXE EXERCISE INCLOSURE INCLOSURE 4 DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LE CTURE PUBLIQUE French Forces in Germany during the period 17-19 September 1952.17-19September period the during in Germany Forces French two ArmdRegiments)two Corps level was to st tolevel was Corps With the help ofhelpthe With areas. andLEOPOLDSHAFEN NEUBURG in the 1st priority with bridgeheads, continue the attack toward BIENWALD.toward attack thecontinue . Brief Descriptio 1. Exercis * leFre osse of consisted Forces Blue a* b. Green Forces consisted of:consisted Green Forces b. d. The c The d. c„ The purpose of the exercise which was carried outatcarried was exercisewhich of the purpose The c„ (1) Snd Army / Army Snd (1) (2) French 1st C.A.T.A. French (2) (1) 9th Army 9th / Army (1) 2 US 1t i oc (Elements) 12thForce Air U.S. (2) (3) Elimination of abridgehead,of Elimination (3) oftheRHINE. Crossing (2) action. Delaying (1) (1) Green forces attack toward the RHINE to establish to RHINE towardthe attack forces Green (1) e EUNX a a "tw was EQUINOXE a / Represented by an element of the Directors Staff,ofDirectorsthe element an by Represented / (a) French ICorps French (a) /R (a) U.S. VII Corps VII U.S. (a) o n airborne group in the vicinity ofLAUTHERBOURG, inthe vicinity group airborne n iijpanjiKi i K i j n a p j i ii m n m RESUME OF EXERCISE EQUINOXE OF EXERCISE RESUME ncept ofth ncept e u dy successively: dy presented by an element of the U.S. VII Corps.oftheU.S. VII elementan by presented French 2nd Infantry Infantry Division 2nd French Division U.S. 43rd U.S. 28th Infantry Infantry Division 28th U.S. ibreRT (French)RCT Airborne (Reinforcedby Division Infantry French 4th n NLSR O 4 INCLOSURE NO. i m ofth mu u im e maneuver was: maneuver i le u . »« » « » , ir o n» -m 'W ■< 'W -m n» o ir , » « » »« . u le e Exercise. o -sid C. : (French1stDivision) Air e d" maneuver conduct d" maneuver e d by the d DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE RASTADT as long as possible. Naval forces in two groups to assist in assist to groups intwo forces Naval possible.as long as RASTADT Frontier and theand Frontier Maneuver. preventing a crossing of the ofRHIN crossing a preventing Exercise ROSEBUSH). Exercise counterattack. by beeliminated to theRHINE across amonnt of realism obtained in the maneuver,thein obtained ofrealism amonnt ( culties.: was very succes very was division, holding an extended front, to prevent the enemy forming enemy the prevent to front,extended an holding division, that could defeat any attempt to establish a bridgehead,a establish to attempt any defeat could that nnits. artillery long-range and Engineer additional and demolitions ofextensive aid the only with possible is This later. come to battle principal the for Infantry, particularly forces,saving airborne and bridgehead operations. This requirement for speedmakes for requirement This operations. bridgehead and airborne para­ that again showed and support air powerful for necessity the up pointed It area» defended aheavily in place ittaken not had ally additi one least at cise, exer­ Inthis theRHINE.as such obstacle an behind even bridgeheads, confirmed:or anhimdaecntrtak, eveilconnterattacks, immediate against launch smallformations, by danger.a arereal guerrillas and chutists 2. Discussion of Discussion 2. . Ma.lortheExercise from Learned Lessons 3. The following major tacti major following The diffi­ language to due problems operational and Planning a. c. Consideration given to private property limited thelimited property private to given Consideration c. . ugtpolm; Seprgah2 o nlsr -3 of Enclosure 2c (Seeparagraph problems; Budget b. a. The delaying action must be carried out with the idea of idea the out with becarried must action delaying The a. . twscnimdta t s fteums iprac to importance utmost the of is it that confirmed It was d. operation airborne the view,of point technical a From c. one for impossible isit that again once confirmed Itwas b. S ee paragraph 2b of Inclosure 3 - Exercise ROSEBUSH). - Exercise 3 Inclosure of 2b paragraph ee (2) Blue forces Blue (2) s ful. It could have aided the RHINE crossings materi theRHINE aided couldhave It ful. R HINE and toand maint HINE t he Problem he o nal division was needed to needed was division nal E c s . Any Green bridgehead est bridgehead Green Any . Enconntered in Executing the in Executing Enconntered a al andal in bridgeheads at KARLSRUHE and at KARLSRUHE bridgeheads in t raining points were learned learned were points raining t o fight delaying a delaying ofight . f orm a defense aorm defense a blished c tion between the between tion ­ DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE For al liaison between U.S. and French Forces nnd between Land and LandAir between nnd Forces French and U.S.between liaison al abs it c es. o ... lutely necessary to have a goodSignal n ato have lutelynecessary . otne stres Continued e. . —— — -.. - s must be laid on improvement of operation­ ofimprovement on laidbe must e twork. 0 % DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ANNEX "E" TO APPENDIX "A"APPENDIX TO "E" ANNEX EXERCISE HOLDFAST EXERCISE INCLOSURE 5 INCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 52 etme 92 yHaqatr BAOR. by Headquarters 1952 September 15-22 Armd Division Armd Itrepre­ was each. Divisions of three Corps fourof group fictional staff. control of threeCorps sented by the control staff. control the by sented 1. Brief Description of BriefDescription 1. Exercise HOLDFAST was a two-sided maneuver conducted from from conducted maneuver two-sided a was HOLDFAST Exercise a. Friendly forces consisted of: consisted forces Friendly a. . poigfre eerpeetdb: edures (GB) 7 Headquarters by: represented were forces Opposing b. (1) (2) HQ Southern Group. This was a fictional group ofgroup fictional a was This Group. Southern HQ (2) (3) GHQ Reserve (Territorial Forces). This was a was This Forces). (Territorial GHQ Reserve (3) 2 3 e n d , BdeInf Ter 31 (2) Bde 7Armd (1) t hree hree H a H I (GB) I Corps HQ (a) b H I (NL) I Corps HQ (b) c H (B)I Corps HQ (c) RESUME OF EXERCISE HOLDFAST OFEXERCISE RESUME Q Northern Group Northern Q D vsosec. Itrepr was each.ivisions ‘27 BdeGroups Cdn Corps Troops Corps 6 Corps Troops Corps Troops Corps (NL)3 4 (B) Infantry Divisions (B)Divisions Infantry 4 (Cadre) (NL)Divisions Infantry 2 11 (GB) Armd Divisions (GB)Divisions Armd 11 16 (B) Armd Divisions (B) ArmdDivisions 16 one (lessRCT) (B)Division Infantry 1 (G3)Divisions Armd E I xercise HOLDFAST. xercise nfantry Divisions Divisions nfantry e sented by a flank byflank a sented DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE was predominantly armored, and when ordered to withdraw, it withdrew itwithdrew toordered withdraw, and armored,when predominantly was region of the RUHR and the crossings over the Rhine between Düsseldorf between Düsseldorf the over Rhine crossingsthe and ofthe RUHR region roles. prot Force aArmy/Airas Joint BLUE ALLIANCE of Exercise portion ATAF .. 207/3 S.G. order In lineTIGER.general the on localities defensive from fight were designed to act as both breakwaters and pivots of maneuver. andpivots breakwaters both as act to designed were ofCOL the indirection (factional) push jointoperation^.in 2ndATAF Exercise. position was occupied on the general line LION. The covering forcecovering The lineLION. on thegeneral occupied was position acovering betoprepared, positions defensive theseallow main to and EBBEGEBIRGE.and a south wasthe on attack the and covering Supporting Emmerich.and elements. national theirrespective between liaison topractice Essentially they were a series of strongly defended "bastions" which which "bastions" defended strongly seriesof a they were Essentially xrie orManeuver. Exercise fensive positions on this line were designed to lure thè enemy into aintoenemy thèlureto designed linewere this on positions fensive connter thelannchi for favorable that TIGERof were the torear toareas iuto nwihtelte ashmefoe o severepunishment,to open himself lays thelatter in situation which r ce ees ne odtos far inferiority.air of conditions nnder defense acted 2. Discussion of the Problems En the Problems of Discussion 2. a ttacks against penetrations of ihel-T.IGER penetrations against ttacks -Theline. d. The purposes of the exercisewere:ofthe purposes The d. e. The concept of the maneuver was:the ofmaneuver concept The e. c. This exercise was conducted in conjnnction with th inconjnnction with conducted was exercise This c. 2 TeFinl ocsdfnepa a osad andstandto was plan defense Forces Friendly The (2) (1) An attack by the "enemy" to seize the industrial theseize to by"enemy"the attack An (1) (4) To exercise 2nd ATAF in the tactical and airdefense and in tactical the ATAF exercise2nd To (4) in Group ofNorthern corps three the exercise To (3) and machinery and AirCommand the Army exercise To (2) and Group Northern between cooperation practice To (1) (If)SAS. Det 3 Oe B C ^ (B)RCT One (3) - 30 - O GNE to cross the ROTHARGEBIRGE theROTHARGEBIRGE crossto GNE c onntered in Executing thein Executing onntered Appendix "A" Appendix Annex "E" to to o "E" Annex m ain de­ ain e 2nd n gof ssssjtf DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE TOS ROSEBUSH civilian population, the Ge the population, civilian oto, l control, 2c of Inclosure 3, Inclosure"Resume of 2c h lnigfr hseecs nteerysae ofpl stagesearly in the exercise this forplanning the national fnnds to defray expense defray to fnnds national lmntdpolm sc s outas such problems eliminated Army/Air Army/Air guest observer arrangements - particularly in the securing of inter­ of securing in the -particularly arrangements observer guest days delay and substantial losses on a numerically superior enemy andenemy superior a onnumerically losses substantial and delay days eoe serious.become olwn odtosd o xs, h ea moe yte armoredbythe imposed delay theexist, not do conditions following several impose can plan,demolition comprehensivea with conjunction ananda nefciefgtn salsmn inpeacetime. establishment fighting effectiveat an maintained divisions will be negligibl be will divisions the If seriouslosses. incurring themselves without extricated be joint as consideredbe mustoperations All stage.every at interwoven orconfir deployment and the preparation of their demolition plans before they they beforeplans demolition oftheir preparation andthe deployment r attacked.are S.G . 207/3 . Ma.iorExercis the from learned Lessons 3. " reference Contractual Agreements. Contractual reference h olwn ao atcladtann onswr learned werepoints and training tactical major following The a. In order to forestall nndue problems with respect to t to respect with problems nndue forestall orderto In a. m . e prgah2 o nlsr , Rsm ofExercise "Resume 3, ofInclosure 2d paragraph See c. "international to incident ofproblems adiscussion For b. a. The Joint Lant/Air War Lant/Air Joint The a. b. Delaying Tactics Delaying b. o a d . ed: perations and planning carried outaccordingly. carried planning and perations d tasot et transport,nd, h ln n h arwrms e osdrda oe and oneas considered bemust air theandwar land The I (1) Divisions so employed must be highly trained andtrained behighly must so employed Divisions (1) (2) They mu They (2) (3) They must be provided with air reconnaissance.air with provided be must They (3) a sonta eltandamrddvsos in divisions,armored thatwell-trained shown twas s e ie ufcettm t opee theircomplete to timesufficient given bet r o e a ii uhrte eebogt into brought were Authorities Civil man fE c . ., b x - 31 - ercise ROSEBUSH".ercise o s of such observerssuch of f bonnds or restricted orrestricted bonnds f e for e they had an opportnnity toopportnnity an had they e . - .annex Appendix "A" Appendix see paragraph seeparagraph a a es traffic reas, nn. This nning. to ^ to -hi' hi "

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE hs aki oata ohbekaesadpvt of maneuver, andpivots breakwaters both asact isto task whose division can covereffectiv can division pnnishment. The conception of two or more strongly defended areas,defended strongly ormoreof two conception The pnnishment. severetoopen layshimself latter in the which situation ainto enemy the Army must stand firm and halt the enemy. This phage of the battle ofthe phage This enemy.the and halt standfirm must theArmy iswhen stagereached the action delaying theon Following defense. outdepth.in carried bemust demolitions and ofdemolitions use tive capable to lannchconnterattacks. to capable capableself-aontained; completely be must the "bastions"essential be more than than bemore be exposed are considered to befollows: asto considered arebe exposed and attack; ready airnnd infantry artillery, massed ofwithstanding practicable. and be itselftorealistic showed should be designed to condition the enemy for a connter-stroke.a forenemy the condition to bedesigned should them. betak must advantage battlefull and the ofdefensive course minded.fortressbecome bombardment,airand lery in battalion, brigade or divisional strength will occur during theduringoccur strength will ordivisional brigade battalion, in d. Organization of the Defensive Position ofthe Defensive Organization d. . Protra c. e..Connterattack The The main defensive positions were designed to lure thelureto designed were positions defensive main The The second part of the exercise dealt with protracted dealtwith exercise ofthe part second The 10 (5) Delaying positions must be conducive to the effec­ theto conducive bemust positions Delaying (5) (2) The main dangers to which these areas are liable to liableare areas these which to dangers main The (2) is it layout, defensive type ofthis design the In (1) (1) Opportnnities for profitable local connterattacks local profitable for Opportnnities (1) (2) Large scale connterattacks must be nndertaken only benndertaken must scaleconnterattacks Large (2) to a Dsrcino etaiainb asv artil­ by massive orneutralization Destruction (a) (c) A tendency on the part of the garrison togarrison theof partthe on tendency A (c) atinfantry night.of aby flood Penetration (b) c 15 ted Defense miles. e ly. It is considered that this should notshould this that considered is It ly. e n of n DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE et o uulfr support. fire mutual for ments arerequired anddispositions strengths enemy of Information detailed formations is essential. It is invaluable for this liaison to bemade to liaison this for invaluable is It isessential. formations witlj commensurate be will divident thethat such are conditions when otiewih hl tkn it con ifrne in national differences acconnt into taking while which, doctrine arrange­ be should inthis Included operations. of fluid stress the before and initially, least at concerned, commanders by the personally ensure against misunderstanding is essential.is misunderstanding against ensure conclusion, itslogical to through carried be and time opportune theat can hit attack theso that characteristics and organizations, has sufficient common gronnd to gronnd common sufficient has organizations, and characteristics and superiority air Local involved. losses and risks effort,the . Liaison f. g„ Interpretation of Ordersof Interpretation g„ The correct interpretation of orders based on a tactical onatactical based ordersof interpretation correct The bet contact and Liaison w een n een e ighbo r ing commanders and commanders ing „NATO DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ANNEX "F" TO APPENDIX "A"APPENDIX TO ANNEX "F" EXERCISE ANCIENT WALL ANCIENT EXERCISE INCLOSURE INCLOSURE 6 DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE was conducted by the "LEGNANO" Division during the period 7-1O Sep­ 7-1Operiod the during "LEGNANO"Division the by conducted was mental or division sized exercises conducted in the UDINE area duringareaUDINE the in conducted exercises sized ordivision mental was conducted by the "FOLGORE" Division during the period 10-13 Sep­ 10-13theperiod during Division "FOLGORE"the by conducted was ploitation, a small amphibious exercise and monntain operations. and exercise monntain smallamphibious aploitation, against an enemy in prepared defensive positions.defensive prepared enemy in an against terrain, in monntainous attack,thein division lightofa ling thehand­ topractice exercise thiswas of purpose The 1952.tember p 13-15 gronnd forces in all phases of land combat.of land phases allin gronndforces ex­ defense,attack, included They 1952.September 17-20 periodthe logistics. invery mount BrigadeAlpine an of the handling "TRIDENTINA1'theby conducted theperiod during (Alpine) Brigade, .. 2 S.G. enemy deployed on a wide front in semi-prepared defensive positions.defensive semi-prepared in fronta on wide deployed enemy an theagainst attack in division lightaof handling thecountry, tember 1952 September13-17 period theduring "MANTOVA"Division the by conducted and development of a defensive position on a wide front.on a position wide defensive aof development and conducted by the "JULIA" (Alpine) Brigade during the periodthe during (Alpine) Brigade "JULIA"theby conducted a rticular reference to axes, grouping of forces, time factors and time factors forces, of grouping toaxes, reference rticular Teproeo hs xriews opatc h organization the topractice exercisethis was of Thepurpose . Spebr15. h proeo hs xriews topractice exercisethis wasof purpose The 1952.September • re ecito f theExercise. of Description Brief 1• 0 1952 7/3 ' Appendix "A"` Appendix '7/3 b. The individual exer individual The b. Italian train to exercisewas theof purpose The a. sevenregi­ ofseries ofa consisted WALL ANCIENT Exercise . The purpose of this exercise was to practice, in hilly in hilly topractice, exercise this of was purpose The . (2) Exercise PENNA BLANCA, a two-sided exercise,was two-sided a BLANCA,PENNA Exercise (2) 1 Eecs CA Exercise (1) ( (b) Exercise VALLO V VALLO Exercise (b) (5) Exercise CAPPELLO ALPINO. a two-sided exercisewas two-sided a CAPPELLOALPINO. Exercise (5) 3 Exercise ) RESU M E OF EXERCISE ANCIENT WALL OFANCIENT EXERCISE E INCLOSURE 6INCLOSURE S TRADA MAESTRA. a two-sided exercise,two-sided a TRADA MAESTRA. R ROCIO LOMBARDO„ a two-sided exercise,two-sided a LOMBARDO„ ROCIO c ises were: a inous conntry conntry with inous E NETOt a two-sided exercise,was two-sided a NETOt 16-19 DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE was conducted by the by conducted was ee nonee nte xcto fte ml aevr sne each since smallthe maneuvers of execution thein enconntered were was of very short duration and was carried out in the general area of area generalthe inout carried was and shortduration ofvery was Exercise adigo n lieBiaei h takaanta semi-prepare a against theattack in AlpineBrigade of an handling 82 etme 92 Teproe fti eecs a topractice exercisewas this of purpose The 1952.September 18-20 topractice exercisewas thisof purpose The 1952.September 15-18 Battalion. Alpine reinforced aLy held themonntains in position defensive realistic deployment of many troops at a time. Only minor problems Onlyminor time.ata troops ofmany deployment realistic instances, in most prohibits, damage agricultural Resulting Italy, phase. exploitation thein brigade ofarmored an thehandling raid. ampibious ofan execution the the nnit's normal location. normal thennit's long periods of time. Logistic play was continuous and realistic. and continuous play was Logistic time. of periods long with nnexpected or nnusual situations or to make decisions based upon based decisions toormake situations nnusual or nnexpected with noted. gene A for themselves tosupport and distances long tomove required been conducted by th by conducted Sept aevrit ee iiinadbiaeeecss Ti a over­ Thiswas exercises.brigade and sevendivision into maneuver so surely relative late date in change of concept of the maneuver from a largefroma theofmaneuver concept of change in datelate relative training in planning and execution for the lower echelons. thelower for execution and planning in training come in most instances with remarkable success and afforded excellent afforded and success remarkable instances with income most em . icsino tePolm nonee nEeuig the in Executing Enconntered the Problems of Discussion 2. e 92 Te ups fti eecs a t rcie the practice to exercise this was of purpose The 1952.ber r al shortage of many categories of material and equipmentwas and ofcategoriesmaterial ofmany shortage al . m a. There are no suitable large training areas in Northern in Northern areas training large suitable no are There a. b. No serio No b. ao oitc polm ol aeeitdhd thennits had existed have problems would logistics e major . o iteoprniywsafre omnes o cop to commanders afforded opportnnity was little Too d. . h otiprat btcews osdrdt e thetobe considered obstacle was important Themost c. e (7) Exercise FLAMMA PREM FLAMMA Exercise (7) ( Adriatic Maritim Adriatic 6 ) Exercise LEONE VENETO. a two-sided exercise; two-sided a VENETO. LEONE Exercise ) " REE (roe) rgd,drn h periodthe during Brigade, (Armored) ARIETE" u s logistics problems were enconnter were problems slogistics e Military Command during the period during Command Military I SE. a two-sided exercise, two-sided aSE. e , butd, d ^ ^ § § < e

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ubr o esne a o be vial sne h dpino theof theadoption since available been nothad of personnel numbers Italian thefrom different very and was Forces Italian the by adopted involved.are nations and services various budge annual two-sid the in and practiced not were maneuvers proved d proved new p new proc Ground of forces thereof when execution as aswell exercises of planning ir configu liar ofdarkness. hours during landing was and conditions of weather because exercise ious net. Proper and additional training will tend to decrease the defic­ the decrease totend training will additional and Proper net. adequate to retrain time Sufficient replaced.it 7000 which Circular been recently only had Operation" Air/Gronnd for Directive Training thefollowing: by evidenced as cooperation in Air/Ground training thein funds ofnecessary theallocation and Government theNational plann be nNrhr tl u ovsblt hogot h eid thepecu­ period, the throughout tovisibility Italydue Northern in ofcase war.in and exercises future in JOC theof operation an exercises Also, exercises. and ofmaneuvers cost fragmentary information information fragmentary iencies caused by weather and terrain. and by caused weather iencies controlled. strictly sides were r theExercises. from Learned Lessons Manor 3* ocedure. o e ogeog navne oalwtm o teapoa of theapproval for time toallow in advance enough long d ctrine requires additional training to ensure the efficient the ensure to training additional requires ctrine a. There is a need for a fuller realiza fuller fora need isa There a. b. More attention should be given to joint and combined jointand to given beshould attention More b. c. Increased and continuing emphasis must be placed on placed be must emphasis continuing and Increased c. e r ue. hswsprl u otefc ht h "U.S. the that thefact to due partly This was dures. t ation of the terrain an terrain theof ation . (4) Target identification was extremely difficult extremely was identification Target (4) (1) Personnel were not thoroughly f thoroughly not were Personnel (1) (3) No air power was brought Into play in the amphib­ thein play Into brought powerwas air No (3) 2 AJCws nfl prto. T operation.full in JOC was A (2) a s would be encountered in actual combat.in actual encountered bes would d .of the lack e xrie, both exercises, d m U r rssai pa ?3 a r—v h a r n independent radar independent n miliar with Air/ with miliar d e recently ap­ erecently theofactual ion mnues should maneuvers i r j & DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Army and they were enthusiastic, alert anM business-like. The pilots The business-like. anM alert enthusiastic, they were and Army anM U.S. QM Aerial Resupply Detachment on loan fr loan on Detachment Resupply QM U.S.Aerial anM must learn to fly more compact delivery flight formations. The para­ The formations. flight delivery compact to more fly learn must vineyarMs in lanM to parachutist every practically causeM this anM h and trees more distance from the drop zone. The dropping was inac­ dropping Thewas zone.thedrop from distance trees more and Mrop zone although ther zonealthough Mrop flew haM to be useM in some instances. Since no fixed bridges in Northern Northern in bridges nofixed Since someinstances.in be touseM haM capabiliti anM receiveM well were Memonstrations These t ahrpo set. h roswr tebs se nte Italian the in seen thebest troops The were pooraspects. rather at all times. Extensive rains throughout the time of the exercises theof time the throughout rains Extensive times. all at develop be will This matter scale. moMest aon out att resupply was Air troops. gronnd of jectiv ob­ thefirst that ensure to orMer in lanMing following organization r also must chutists pilots taughtanM be techniquesmust Mropping accurate More curate. interf not were supportaircraft Close play. training in bridging operations. There are many rivers in Northern Northern in rivers many are There operations. bridging in training briMges fixeM and nnfordable become to streams anM rivers many causeM available readily itto have themand with equipment bridging ganic The Services. Italian the in capability resupply aerial an establish Italian Army and Air Force should be fostered.be should Force Air and Italian Army sidereM an important lesson learned. Troops must receive adMitional adMitional receive Troopsmust learned. lesson important an sidereM Italy and in case of war extensive bridging operations may certainly may operations bridging extensive of case inwar Italy and con- this was oftime war, in survive to upon MepenMeM becould Italy e e avy equipment Mrops were conducted by a combined nnit from the USAFthe from nnit combined by a conducted Mrops were equipment avy rrain in Italy is such that this is consiaereM t consiaereM isthis that such isItaly in rrain a e texc s are seizeM as rapiMly as possible a possible as rapiMly as seizeM sare M. IncreaseM emphasis must be placed on aerial resupply on aerial placed be must emphasis IncreaseM M. f. One parachute drop had some had drop parachute One f. e. Demonstrations of troop transport, aerial resupply and resupply aerial transport,troop of Demonstrations e. g. There is a need for gronnd troops to carry theiror­ carry to troops gronnd for need ais There g. e sv seMi os omto vr h etro theof center theover formation loose a in speeM ssive 5 Mr mhssms epae nar supremacy on air placeM be must emphasis More (5) e ev ute tann nte techniqu the in training ceivefurther e was about a 20 mile an hour wind blowing hour wind an 20 mile a about was e mpted and actually carrieM actually and mpted pa f rticularly good and some goodand rticularly e terlanMing. rred with or intercepteM.or rred with o m Central Europe.Central m o be inMispensable.be e d in order toorder in d e s in thes in e s of re­ ofs DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE and equipment show excellent maintenance and were properly utilized. properly and were excellent maintenance show equipment and become necessary.become in good physical condition condition and good physical in exerciseone shifted from equipment was some Ininstances comings. Themaneuv to re-e exercisethe but shortages,theseofzant cogni­ Leen have We troops.gronnd and air both for cationequipment a nother. The commnnications play was good and well handled. andgood well play was commnnications The nother. . There was h. . h top eemc mrvdoe atya. They are year.overlast improved troopsmuch The were i. e rs appeared to be well conducted.tobe rswell appeared a notable shortage of all types of commnni oftypes of shortage all notable p ossess excellent morale. Material Material excellent morale.ossess ASSII C IFIE S S LA C N U m hszdte short­the phasized DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE h. 207/3 Shi. A N NEX "G" TO APPENDIX "A" APPENDIX TO "G" NEX EXERCISE JUNE PRIMER JUNE EXERCISE INCLOSURE 7 INCLOSURE - 40 - - 40 Annex "G Annex Ahnen d ix "A ix " to " y ^ V- r : c t'Jfi Tr\ t'Jfi /V', r-- DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE the period 23-26 Jnne 1952 nnder the command and control of theof control and command the nnder 1952 Jnne 23-26 period the flage and dispersal of small scale military gronnd observer o observer gronnd scalemilitary small of dispersal and flage raids. C low flying raider forces by empl by forces raider flying low against airfields ofdefending means effective themost todetermine bomber formations. bomber tion. lands and Belgian Air Forces, 2nd TAF, 12th Air Force and lere DIVAR DIVAR lere and Force Air 12th TAF, 2nd Forces, Air Belgian and lands upr fdpoe squadrons. ofdeployed support DIVAR and 12th Air Force totalling 2OOaircraft. totalling Force Air 12th and DIVAR aircraft. 425 totalling support. 12th Air Force and Belgian Air Force totalling 28aircraft. totalling Force Air Belgian and Force 12th Air posts manned by personnel of the RAF Regiment.theofRAF personnel by manned posts .. 2O7/3 S.G. temporary basis for the exercise, consisting of wireless observer of wireless consisting exercise, the for basis temporary o mne-nCif AAFCE. mmander-in-Chief, . Brief 1. . h proe o h exercise the-wer of purposes The a. during conducted exercise air an PRIMER was JUNE Exercise b. Forces participating wer participating Forces b. ipirirn ■iir (2) To practice day and night attacks on airfields and on airfields attacks night and day practice To (2) Forc Defense Air practice To (1) 4 T rciete c the practice To (4) light of defense onand attacks Topractice (3) (5) To practice the procedure for calling for close for calling for procedure the practice To (5) (1) Blue Air Forces, comprising nnits of theN of nnits comprising Forces, Air Blue (1) 2 R (2) 3 GenArFre, opiigtasotnis of nnits transport comprising Forces, Green Air (3) (5) A military observer organization, set up ona set up organization, observer military A (5) lights.search and artillery (4-) Anti-aircraft De RESUME OF EXERCISE JUNE PREffiRJUNE EXERCISE OF RESUME scription of Exercise. of scription i u c e i ocs opiignis f2dTF lereTAF, of 2nd nnits comprising Forces dAir INCLOSURE INCLOSURE - 41 - 41 - o igdfnigfgtr,A, camou­ AA, fighters, defending ying 7

r oss servicing and logistics and servicing oss e : e e : smassed against Appendix "A" Appendix to "G" Annex r ganiza­ e ther­ OT"* i u ' ' m f*; DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE aoe n h dmrainln ewe eln (East) Blueland and Redland between line the demarcation and Hanover ne eurmnso aa qimn, h C theorganizati andR equipment, radarof requirements ance tothe Due inclusive.195223-26June theperiod during phases night eln, hsws h iiigfco nfxn hs times.phasein fixing thefactor limiting This was Redland, both raidsacrossout carried and Redland and Blueland ofboth -theParisofline emphasisNorth the main the inwith area AAFCE operate onlyoperate countries. 330 totallingaircraft. Sea, theof aircraft carrierbased andU.K. ment especially in Belgium and Holland isa necessity. andBelgium in Holland especially ment (West) roughly along Ems and Rhine.andEms (West) along roughly provid against high level high speed raids owing mainly to thetoinadequate owing speed raids mainly levelhigh high against equip­ radar New insufficient.altitudes was low andof high coverage shortage of trained control and reporting personnel and themainten­ and personnel reporting control and trained shortageof adequate warning and strong anti-aircraft defenses ofandairfields defenses strong anti-aircraft and adequate warning givetoin depth corpsorganized observer An ineffective. raids was pre­ at fighters interceptor equipmentand the radar of performance vital points are required to assist the defending fighters againstfighters thedefending toassist required arepoints vital tosentAAFCE.available this form ofattack.form this . Ma.iortheExercise. from Learned Lessons 2. e close support targets for opposing air forces.opposing air targetsfor support close a. C & R - Coverage of medium altitudes was sufficient? Coverageof altitudes was - medium C& R a. . h cnet fte exercisethe of conceptwas: The c. b. High Levai Raids - The air defense were ineffective -Thedefenseair were Raids Levai High b. c. Low Level Raids - The air defense against low levellow againstdefense- The air Raids Level Low c. 8 hours per day in Blueland and 12 hours per day in perday 12 hours inand Blueland perday hours 2 Phases (2) 1 S (1) (7) White Air Forces, comprising nnits based in thein based comprisingnnits Air Forces, White (7) ( 6 1 1 1I f e a t s ' ) Small landforce formations in trainingin landforceformations Small ) The exercise was conducted in 2 day and 2 day/22day in conducted and Theexercise was (b) The White Air Forces were the common enemy common the Forces Airwere The White (b) (a) The exercise took place on on a took place exercise The (a) e tti n g - 42 - 42 6 th Fleet in the inMediterranean th Fleet Appendix "A" Appendix ne’G t Annex’"G" E ast-West axis ast-West a o reas toreas o n could n

SÊftïjfiÇ' DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE need for the iinplenentatiotheforneed for eachexer for e are u. h iiigfcosae A are:factors Thelimiting carriedout.be augmented considerably be equipment staffs must and crypto available, considerably the flexibility of the air forces. There is an urgent Thereisan theforces.ofair the flexibility considerably sparesbacking.of adequate breakdowns which were beyond the control of the military caused somecaused the of controlmilitary the beyond were breakdowns which h, 207/3 Shi, andequipmentof ground or adaptation standardization oftechnicians, the traffic congestion problem. Until on-line crypto devices arecryptoon-line devices Until problem.congestion trafficthe thein provement whole ofai passive field creasing the scale of landline teletype facilities alone will not solvenot alone will teletypefacilities scaleoflandline the creasing In­ common.also congestion traffic Cryptowas congestion.traffic ofa butnumber exercises, previous than during higher considerably im­ forroom Thereismuch deception. camouflage and dispersal,by to the inadequacy of the steps taken to obtain the protection toobtain stepstaken the of inadequacy theto Logistics .f . C e. Defens Air Passive d. c ise. (2) The various aircraft fuels at present inlimituse present atfuels aircraft Thevarious (2) ( 1 o ramunications - The serviceability oflandlineswas serviceability The ramunications- ) At present only very limited cross servicing can servicingcross only limited very present At ) n of plans for standardization of standardizationfuels. forplansof 3 - - 43 e - A number of factors contributed -offactors number A r defense. l ack ofexperienced ack Anx“" to ■Annex“G" Appe n d!” "*"' d!” a fforie DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ANNEX "H ANNEX SXERCIS3 BLUEALLIANCE SXERCIS3 INCLOSURE " TO APPENDIX "A” TOAPPENDIX 8 O T W DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 4 and 5).and 4 tion with gronnd force exercises HOLDFAST and EQUIN and HOLDFAST exercises gronndforce tionwith 8 forc air aggressoran i o ae at in exercise.this part take not did raider forces flew 246 sor flew 246 forces raider September in the 2nd 2nd inthe September conducted exercisewas The north. area of area based U.K. engaged. were aircraft1170of total AAFCE A equal, ne\'J' HOLDFAST inthe forces area. Upon the cessation of cessation the Upon area. nte eea ra of areas general thein operating from its own b own its from operating follows follows : exist. in organization or control channels, but tactical operations nncove operations tactical but channels, control or organization in cept aircraft making low level penetrations and attacks.andlevelpenetrations low makingaircraft cept limitations. technological serious to subject still are lemon, RCAF. The opposing tactical air forces were approximately approximately were tactical airforces opposing The lemon, RCAF. 6207/3 problems and re-emphasized others that were previously known to known previously that were others re-emphasized and problems 1. Brief Description of Description Brief 1. 2, Major Lessons learned from theExercise. from learned Lessons Major 2, HQ Exerci a . Setting b. a. Night reconnaissance and night gronnd attack operations attack gronnd night and reconnaissance Night a. as were or again demonstrated learnedlessons tactical Major b. Air defense operations are unable to detect and inter­ andto unable detect areoperations defense Air b. . -S ,.cone AAFCE, while the gronnd force exercises were localized with­ localized were exercises force gronnd the while AAFCE, Realism was injected into the maneuver play by creatingbyplay intomaneuvertheinjected was Realism h i pha air The s RESUME OFBLU RESUME EXERCISE e BLUE ALLIANCE was eALLIANCE BLUE ATAF ATAF e (Green) nnder the command of Air Vice Marshal ofMarshal (Green) Vice Air command thennder T a KARLSRUHE rea. There were no major problems enconntered problems major no were There rea. a e, a sd t used ses, was area, and 17-19 September in the 4th 4th the in September 17-19 and area, I t s N o hseecs cvrdte operational the covered exercise this of e ies agains mainly CLOSURE NO. CLOSURE EQUINOXE EQUINOXE E xerc - 45 - - 45 in the south and PADERBORN inthe PADERBORN and south thein as i n i a an se. lne uigte periods the during planned on 19 September, 12th Force, 12th Air 19 on September, E ALLIANCE o rifreBu n Green and Blue reinforce r exercise held in in conjnnc-. exercise rheld t Blueland. French DAT French Blueland. C E (See Inclosnres XE A Annex ':HAnnex p pendix "A"pendix Ü :1 to' ATAF ATAF 16-22

oronrj

r NATO ed

T DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE more aircra more en to targets reduced xreathermarginal conMitions. forming attacks against defended defended against attacks forming formed only a only formed theatre which will adequately meet the light bomber requir bomber light the meet adequately will which theatre adequate to`adequate results. Mesired accomplish nnMer operateM be may that of aircraft thenumber reMuce nnacceptably ofresponsibility. area in AAFCE point toany power striking tactical ineff to contributeM has Group Area, in view of expected results, expectedof inview ul fet Its ouslyaffects their ability to conceal xtfithdrawalconceal to theirability in result will operations,which alti inthehigh yo h lr IA n of and DIVAR lere ofthecy omnal efficiency, commenMable standard system system standard . i. The grounM forces have made consiMerable progress in progress consiMerable made have forces grounM The i. . d. There is no aircraft presently available in this in available presently aircraft isno There d. . boecne o Obsolescence f. h. The limiteM capacity of approach control systems may systems control of approach capacity limiteM The h. e. The limiteM range of the Vampire MARK V aircraft seri­ aircraft V MARK oftheVampire range limiteM The e. . The g. k. A satisfactory improvement in the operational efficien operational the in improvement satisfactory A k. c. The attrition rat attrition The c. j. Camouflage anM concealment of AAFCE aircraft was not was ofaircraft AAFCE concealment anM Camouflage j. 1. Military services nnder NATO command should use ashoulduse command NATO nnder services Military 1. f t to be employed in the counter air role.air counter the in employedbe tot f ew Mays before the exercise starteM, operated with operated with starteM, theexercise before ew Mays t o ude intercept role. intercept ude f hourly time designation. time - fhourly o r p ange of the F.84 aircraft allows flexibility of flexibility allows aircraft oftheF.84 ange e rati e yar prtosaMwl, hrb, permit thereby, anM will, operations air my o nal flexibility. nal y 69 f radar equipment, particularly In particularly equipment, radar Gopwr oe. ihytre Group, Eighty-three noteM. were Group e of fighter-bomber aircraft per­ aircraft offighter-bomber e nemy airfields would b would airfields nemy e ctiveness of the Meteor aircraft the ofMeteor ctiveness \ T e poiiie . prohibitive e ment. 69 Qtr ^ATf) _ ^ v_ DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ANNEX "I" TO APPENDIX "A" APPENDIX TO ANNEX "I" XRIE MAIN BRACE EXERCISE INCLOSURE 9 INCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE with the defense of the Northern flank. oftheNorthern defense the with coasts of Norway and Denmark,and of Norway coasts Subordinate Commander Subordinate r cnand nhsrpr. hsrpr ees nyt hs oper­ those only to refers report This report. in his contained are ations or portions of operations c operations of orportions ations port for the portfor and Denm and in the submarines and on th on eeddhro. . Norw harbor. defended be available for manning onmobilization. manning for beavailable unlikely to be satisfactory for some time to come.to some time satisfactoryfor beto unlikely is organization overallairdefense the by coveredbe they thatwill ed o h i situation.air onthe pends and operators. There is a requirement for additional U.K.“Nor\tfayadditional for isarequirement There operators.and equipment of crypto shortage is athere system and crypto capacity lines. . d. The ability to operate ships in the South Baltic de­ Baltic South intheships operate to ability The d. . e . OBJECTIVE: 2. 3. MAJOR IESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EXERCISE: LEARNED FROM IESSONS MAJOR 3. GENERAL: 1. e inCatlCnosi silottnigadte rsn idea present the and stilloutstanding is Convoys gian Coastal Norw a rk r rk a. Type : Large scale naval exercise scalenaval Large Type : a. To exercise the forces of SACEUR and SACIANT in cooperation cooperation in SACIANT and ofSACEUR theforces exercise To The lessons learned by the forces nnder SACLANT's Command SACLANT's nnder theforces by learned lessons The c. Locale: East Atlantic, North Sea and Sou Seaand North Atlantic, Locale:East c. Dates : 13-25 S b* . h ann n okn fJCsadACs in Norway and JOC'sofACC's and working manning The a. . igt umrnsaedfiutt epot ofevena out keep to difficult submarinesare Midget b. c. The problem of how to give fighter protection to protection fighter togive of how problem The c. e. In signals there is a need for a secure, rapid high­ secure, rapid afor is a need theresignals In e. e gian Coast and Skag and Coast gian l e and battle, harbor defense at BERGEN, coastal convoys coastal BERGEN, at defense harbor battle, and quires further practice and a p a and practice further quires RESUME OF EXERCISE MAIN BRÜ.CEMAIN OFEXERCISE RESUME s S ie, h eevn fcrirbrear sup­ airborne ofcarrier , receiving the i.e., outhBaltic. 96?’: NISR O 9 NO. INCIOSURB — 48 - — 48 e tme 1952 ptember e a n h oea o f lightforcesof ion opera the and vak o nducted by CINCNORTH and his and CINCNORTH by nducted e rmanent skeleton staff skeleton rmanent Appendix Annex Annex . . 11 . p 1” to --- :» i m t WATfl h Baltic;h J DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE working together. The weather, of course, was not much worse than much worse not course, of was The weather, together. working mand er-in-Chie Wi 3. made in due course. in due made deficienci and difficulties Certain 4. eaigt ht comm thatto relating review of the aim, setting, concept and forces participatins im e im participatins andforces concept setting, theaim,of review isnecessary. report mitte R deficiencies in commnnications and by general lack of experience an of experience lack general and by commnnications in deficiencies Commander, Europe, will report will Europe, Commander, exercise has been includ been hasexercise to Inprovid order 2. available.notareyet analyses only,asdetailed reports preliminary rvn fetv spotb ares Wt eadt spot f the of supportto b land regard With carriers. supportby effective prevent force. c aver my within eliminated cannotbe those cerning which con­ andrecommendations consideration careful given beingare These exercise. ute eot onth reports further studi be ofcourse, Thedetails will, [Annex"A"] GANN3T. Exercise on Report Brief (1) Enel: fetv. oe rvs htdiy Det te riiilte and artificialities theto Due thatdaily* proves Norea cansupportbemost such effective.that but question isno There arerequired. gis h crir akfre c taskforce carrier the against 5. The difficulties in MAIN inBRACE wer MAIN difficulties The 5. exercises conducted within ay command during 1952. It is based on It isbased 1952.during command ay conducted within exercises enclosed, threeparts the into divided been has which report, This 1. O S TO: exercise limitations, no evalu nolimitations, exercise rmnosdfnie aaiiyadmblt fti tp f taskof type thisof andmobility capability defensive tremendous such air­ and to pilots risks nndue avoifor necessity thepeacetime ulns th outlines sc SUBJ: A Report to A Report SUBJ: r e f. ti osdrdta ete i h are the in that It isweather considered aft. a (a)STA f : le and type of enemy attack must be taken into account in planning-in account into taken be enemy attack must oftype and le a a efr the ar gefor e and ÏATO Conncil nnl Conncil andÏATO n operation. On the other hand, we should never minimize the shouldnever minimize otherhand,we Onthe operation.n a t eadt APBAE i s xetdta thethat expected is it toBRACE, NAIP h regard ttle by carrier aircraft, more standardisation and more drill drill and more standardisation more aircraft, carrierttle by during 1952. during Exe 3 BifRpr nEecs MGAT [Annex”C" ] EMIGRANT. on Exercise Report Brief (3) (2) Brief Repo Brief (2) e e most important aspects of and lessons learn lessonsandof aspects important most cretary, Standing Group. Standing cretary, r f cisesCon TUPSüPRPNIH AL , Allied Forces, Northern Europe and internalmatt and Europe , Northern Allied Forces, NORTH ATL NORTH I D 392, DTG DTG 392, D e a ? but its effect on operations was accentu operations on was ? effect its buta NORFOLK 11, NORFOLK VIRGINIA a e nd. This report covers all other aspects of theof aspectsother coversall Thisreport nd. e se exerciseswil t a suitable backgronnd suitable a he military Committe military he d e ucted within the Allied Command Atlantic Atlantic theCommand Allied uctedwithin d. r A nEecs ANBAE [Annex "B"] BRACE.tMAIN on Exercise NTIC ESATY O ESATY NTIC e H 3ADQUAR T3RS ss my detailed studiesrev ss detailed my APPENDIX "B" APPENDIX 29231 L a L3DCOI-I1-IAID3R ATLANTIC 0:1 ino te feto otl action of thehostile effect tionof a emd. nwr the Inprobable war, made. ben operations conducted by theCom­ by conducted operations OF Z Sep.OZ e e d at my headquarters but nobut headquarters atdmy l cue yavrewahr by adverseweather? causedby b ae o th to bemade e R , U.S.A. aual ae to light.came s naturally GANIZATION e and NATO Conncil on NATO Conncil NATOand f or this report, a brief a thisor report, a would h would c 6 O . v t t t/* - 0 O' ommand be will ;IÎ? e N Military Com­ Military

e O V 1952 V S lta sucha thatal H upreme Allied upreme

e d from NATO from d a mper but notbut mper a tedby Town Town e a rs ch sm is m DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE we do not lose sight of the many courses of action that we shall be shall that we action of courses themany of sight lose not do we wide MAIM BIIACM1,MAIM demonstr further raiders loose in the Atlantic, and the interception of troop convoys troopof interception the and Atlantic,the in loose raiders D 1 Team o te xrie eeahee. aube xeine and experience Valuable achieved. were exercises the of aims The 11. of naval phases important other the of some small way a in o attack minimize for importance great of tasks Other of"MAIH ones defensive primarily the than BRACE,other enemy the of thedefeat seafor at pursuing theof part one only is,however, This isfeasible. flank northern enc the anddifficulties allotted, iii BRACE,short periods MAIM thevery of spite 9. .. 207/3 S.G. PERRY B, Wm./s/ in particular exercises, The together. in working nations different ups o teMT ain, n ht h rsn AOcmad str command MATO thepresent that and nations, MATO the of purpose army engaged on land. At the same time, it was possible to introduce introduce to possible it time,was samethe At an to support - action of land.courseon engaged army important one covered BRACE MAH; 10. effort. ourof part large extremely an will absorb shipping of will task aprotection which be ocean-wide always the Moreover, theBaltic, in that essential is it and call, would war forwhich effort naval great valuable. most was logistics in is action drastic unless and of syst war, strain the commnnications ofbearing the incapable that fact the face must We 7. AUTKEI .T ICATED : 5 CIMCWEST -LAUT - 2 CIMCMQBTE s money well be It but will ofmoney, deal great a remedy To apossibility. is 6 Assistant Secretary Assistant CIM -2 COMSECFLT IMCA C IREASTLAM'T-2 2- CIMCEASTLAMT 10- GROUP STÀWlMG SECY ue istureworkable. develo be should cations training training w co of theprotection assuch tobases enemy on attack are: instance for forces, task carrier 8 of stages early the in breakdown disastrous a now,taken system, crypto improved an for need theurgent stress to eti ao ifclis antb overc be cannot difficulties certain major Lieutenant, USM USM Lieutenant, 5- SACEIB I regard it as a matter of vital i ofvital amatter asit I regard Wti h iie cp o tee xrie, h eprec gained experience the exercises, these of scope limited the Within . I Cmuiain ifclis r stress are difficulties Communications . STRIBUT C CHAMriL - 2 CHAMriL c oiamnnications syst I a ON: otie ysoehaqatr, hp and ships shore headquarters, by s obtained o nee, sh untered, n allied sea commnnications, the destruction of destruction the commnnications, sea allied e p m Is fully d fully Is m ed in my command with the maximum speed,çgfft'o themaximum command with in edmy n o a e tha wed voys in the approaches to Northern Europe. toNorthern approaches the in voys ted the growing strength' growing theted of unity and t i sta his mp ortance that effi that ortance t support by SACLAITT by support ofSACEUR's e t veloped. I particularly desir I particularly veloped. e of a ofe e o d in all three exercises.three all in d eutlte general the until me . D HcCCaiCM 1.D. f fairs ma fairs p ent. c 3 rcost very well ient commnni-^r^ commnni-^r^ ient e a m generally is generally m ircr a n emergency emergency n wa a rfare ft offt u c­ ' e

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE hc ilb vial ntal hudwr cu i h immediatethe in occur shouldwar initially be available will which fut immediatein the convoy maritime wartime Sub­ spheres. theirrespective in operations area directed Atlantic future. surfa toregard voy,with omitt were raiders forces. enemythe controlled Fleet, Atlantic U.S. Force,Submarine mander exposedis the Kingdom toUnited enroute convoy fast A CONCEPT. 4. craft participated. They were organized asfollows;organized were They participated.craft of forces at sea and in the operation of shore headquarters was shoreof headquarters operation inthe andsea at offorces that ofexcessin also but level, realistic aatmore coverwasair surfaceand aircraft minewarfare, shippingfrom to Threats exercise. were;GANNET ofExercise aspects important most The 7. aie oeaig nte area.the in operating marines sub­ threeto have estimated is and convoy the of reports position tuguese ships from the Azores and UK and US maritime and patrol air­ patrol and USandmaritime and UK theAzores ships from tuguese s largea had enemy who an aboutfor at beenwar with months five had nations NATO thatthe presumed Itwas 3. Approaches), (South West waters Station Home of Kingdom United limit tothe Azores) Septem­ period4-6 the during conducted wasexercise The SETTING, 2. of suitability thealso and range,andlong bothtactical mnnications, support group, were stronger than could be expected for theaverage for be expected could than stronger group, were support 6 Com­ operations.controlled Plymouth and atNorfolk headquarters area intheEastern in Chief Commanders The area. own his ationswithin oper~ directing to inaddition exercise, the conducting officerthe submarin ato 5. COMMAND and CONTROL. The Commander in Chief, Western Atlantic, w Atlantic, in Western Chief, TheCommander andCONTROL. COMMAND 5. e i h eea raetnigfo hue ak (northofthe Bank Chaucer from extending area generalthe in ber bonndaries.area hpig gis asbaie het I diint rvdn training toproviding addition In of protection and control inthe exercise anaval threat.was GANNET submarine a against shipping AIM. I» in anti-submarine warfare for the forces concerned, it was to test com- to ittest was concerned, forces the for warfare inanti-submarine . FORCES PARTIC FORCES . Convoy Screen - US Amphibious Group Screen plus 2 Portuguese 2 plus Screen Group Amphibious - US Screen Convoy ovySpotGop-U ntrKle ru ihecr carrier.escort with Group -Killer Hnnter US Group Support Convoy Group. -Amphibious US Convoy Shore-based Air - USN Neptnnes at Azoresat Neptnnes - USN Shore-basedAir Por­ MAINBRACE, toExercise enroute forces naval US Friendly. a* a. Threat. Only a limited submarine threat was available in this in available threatwas submarine limiteda Only Threat. a. . obndTann. aube u lmtdtann intactics training limited but Valuable Training. Combined c. forces. asenemy acted Submarines US Two Enemy. b. b. Scale of Protection. Assigned protectiv Assigned ofProtection. Scale b. e threat in the exercise area. The enemy has received received hasenemy The area.the exercise in threat I e PATING. d. destroyers. A hcltn atSt. Shackletons RAF Eval. c ASPECTS IMPORTANT sot ad h asgmn f aofconvoy assignment the andescorts e u u bmarine force.bmarine re. Maritime and patrol airpatrol and Maritime re. e fre o te con thefor forces ­ a s DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE W However,of consideredworthy are below listed items the learned. were maritime and patrol aircraft operations that will be required from this befrom required that will operations aircraft patrol and maritime l major no difficulty of performing a shipping exercise in exerciseshipping a of performing difficulty arose: points'important the following together, working ofnations NATO forces 2OO_miles used.they were extentto the satisfactory be to proved note: eurmn. . requirement. study.nnder of theIK.portion Southwestern andthe between Azores equidistant ubr o o-xriemrhn sis inarea. the ships merchant ofnon-exercise numbers craft from the Azores, CINCWESTLANT has suggested that the BASTLAM1- that suggested has CINCWESTLANT thefrom Azores,craft MANUAL,OFSHIPPING CONTROL NAVAL ALLIED ATP-2, and INSTRUCTIONS, prtn aiiisi h zrsfrteearrf s ais majoraircraft these forthe in Azores facilities operating scalelargethe support existto now not do facilities thatapparent itwasadequately, theirmissions performed PatrolForce theAzores betw between diff cooperation sea-air practicetoand tout experience limitedvery on basedIs Thisproposal studi be will Eval.from operateSt. to for full-time operation in the event of aof inwar.the event operation full-time for o e h saefrteeecs, n oofe, in offset,to and exercise,the stage for setthe to 8 base in the event of a war. Increased emphasis to establish adequateestablish toemphasis Increased aofwar. inevent thebase systems, NATO with personnel familiarize to exercise traihing simple have aircraftwould maritime atUK which distance the reduceIt would ties in the Azores is a priority requirement if Lages is to beto isready if Lages requirement apriority is the in Azores ties andUK. fir todate available information limitedtheof a review From 9. n ot ofEMIGRANT. outExerciseing impressions indicate that:indicateimpressions ie riigt h screeningnnits.the to binedtraining E . The limited scope of this exercise was such that no major lessons majorno thatsuch was thisexercise of scopelimited The . S T LANT-1BE e aas mainly devised exercise was this As Commnnications. t* â. Exercise Condition Exercise â. « prtos I diint h aubeeprec and by gained experience valuablethe to addition In Operations. a« c. Logistics. Although the small number of aircraft attached toattached ofaircraft small numberthe Although Logistics. c. c. The provision of ad of provision The c. between Norf are required facilities commnnication Better b. accomplished.wereexercise set thefor objectives The a. nNrokadU eeeprecd n orciemaue aremeasures corrective and experienced andwere UK Norfolk en 2 Bndre. s eut foeaigat-umrn air anti-submarine operating of a result As Bonndarles. (2) NAVAL MANEUVERING ALLIED ATP-1, Publications. Tactical (1) . This would place theplace would This e ssons were expected. Unacceptable delays in communicationsin delays Unacceptable expected.ssons were R LANT Bonndary junction be moved North East approximately East North bejunctionmoved Bonndary LANT LESSONS LEARNED LESSONS s e . Exefcise artificialities were establishedwere artificialities Exefcise . CONCLUSIONS quat e d in conjunction with a similar one aris­ onesimilara conjunction inwith d e mrtm n arlar basefacili air and patrol maritime E ASTLANT-WESTLAHT bonndary bonndary more ASTLANT-WESTLAHT p e rent nationalities, rent eacetime with l eacetimewith p r, thenatural art, a rge o lk s t ­ ­ DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE TO! with the forces at his disposal. Through SACEUR he r he Through SACEUR disposal. athis forces the with Fl hostile forces advancing south from Narvik and close air support for support air close and from Narvik south advancing forces hostile required the to provide CINCEASTLANI ordersagrees, SACLANT readiness. (Lyng Norway North in support aircarrier with particularly from SACLANT, support 4. CONCEPT. CINCNGRTH a CINCNGRTH CONCEPT. 4. Atlantic. our own, are supporting the land battles. Enemy medium h and medium Enemy battles. land the supporting areown, our U.K./Scandinavian an important andthe U.K. in is Force Amphibious An Force.Support Logistic a of support in acting totheU.K.,inNorthern operating Approaches is KillerForce CarrierHunter A port. within his command and to support the sea, land and air battl airand land sea,the supportto andcommand his within his forces deploy forceshis theof disruption immédiats requires thathestates CINCNORTH 5. the control of Striking operational CINCEASTLANT andpasses support, n arlarrf r prtn rmUK adNra. Itisthat estimated Norway. apd U.K.from operating are aircraft patrol and bombers are operating over the Norw theover operating arebombers intobreakout a attemptto is expected atNarvik cruiser enemy An notareexits theBaltic Although U.K.the aronnd attacks shipping on mininagconcentrating apparently area,the in are andaricraft been had butFinland neutral remained had SweMen tvasdays. D/30 the situation in Denmark is deteriorating and that adMitional support adMitional that and is deteriorating in Denmark situation the the Atlantic.the Gr Support aCarrier by covered convoy Line.Lyngen the flank 3. The NATO conntries were presumed to have been at war with a atwith been war tohave presumed conntrieswere NATO The 3. 13-24 Septemb the period during held wasexercise The SETTING. 2. th towithstand CINCNORTH was Europe. Northern rol in and SACEUR of SACLANT Navy) missions. SACLANT was to control the sea lines of commnnication linesof seathe control to was SACLANT missions. design was BRACE MAIN AIM. 1. closedn sea presumably at istroops, contain to believed KielCanal-Sider theat theat exercise: theassumed of were situations'commencement following The occupied. otnna uainPwri h ya 15» Th 1953» yearthein Power Surasion Continental Norway over operations air supporting with the Skaggerak, North Sea, the Lyngen Line (simulated in the Narvik area). A naval force, naval A area). (simulatedNarvik thein Line Lyngen the has enemy the In advanc Norway Jutland.and/or Zealand against assaults and Denmark and an amphibious landing area in in area Denmark. landing amphibious an and andDenmark the Baltic.from exits theseal and and Denmark intoNorway accordwartime with in broadly were missions Exercise tested.beto involved,theforces of training theadvanced to In addition ofEurope. oee h saae ot n atfo ctadt 8 ot, theto68° North, from Scotland eastand north area sea thecovered c 1952 o e mmand relationships, logistics, and commnnications facilities werefacilities commnnications and logistics, relationships, mmand et. e s, A fr sSCATsfre ee concern wereforces as SACLANT's far As . t* Sea. A Carrier Striking Force is replenishing in a in U.K. replenishing is Force Striking Carrier A Sea. t* c. Air. Enemy tactical air forces, which greatly outnumbergreatly forces,which airtactical Enemy Air. c. a. Land. In Denmark the enemy is b is enemy the In Denmark Land. a. e w d westward through Finmark although Allied forces are holdingare forces Allied although through Finmark dwestward e ith particular reference to the defense of the northern flank flank theofnorthern defensethe to reference ithparticular te umrnsnrsraevses canexitnndetected. vessels surface nor submarines ither e n Line), and by placing an amphibious force at immediateat force anamphibious placing by and Line), n 15 e to BRIEF REPORT OH EXERCISE MAIN BRACE BRACE MAIN OH EXERCISE REPORT BRIEF d between Narvik and Bodo. He further advises thatadvises further He Bodo.and Narvik between d 20 enemy submarines, supported by reconnaissance by supported submarines, enemy R iv p preciates that he cannot fulfil his mission mission his cannotfulfil thathe preciates e r Line and is exp is Lineand r INTRODUCTION c e ooperation in strategical and tactical and strategical in ooperation o ex tod e gian Sea* North Sea and Eastand Sea North gian Sea* o p sdet al Maritim sail.to is due up e cs tefre (primarily forces the rcise e e cted to lannch amphibious lannch tocted d the exercise area exercisethe d e e initial enemy thrusts enemy initial e ing held with difficulty difficulty helding with date of theofwar date e ndeavoring to out­ to ndeavoring e quests maximum questsmaximum e e avy ins O T W e

e r DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE 0 A hl te xriewre u spand Jin additional planned.asout exercise theworked a whole As 10. RAF and RN shore bases air acted as enemy strike'aircraft against theagainst strike'aircraft enemy as acted air basesshore and RN RAF aircraft. reconnaissance U.K.and Netherlands by French, supported were Amphibious Force - U.S. Amphibious Group with Marine Battalion Battalion Marine Groupwith - U.S. Amphibious Force Amphibious combine Groupand Killer - Hnnter U.S. KillerForce Hnnter Carrier are tiigFre-1t are gop (allU.S.) carrier group 1st- Force Striking Carrier f of SACLANT's Control commandarea. own his cov exercisethe of portion e a adddrn theDa during added was Sea aiie n arlArrf ..adUS tne ae atTrondheim,bases tender andU.S.- U.K. Aircraft Patrol and Maritime . nations. participating -All Groups Minesweeping nations. participating -All and Escorts Convoy are upr oc -US, .. n aainlgt ares and carrierslight Canadian and U.K. -U.S., Force Support Carrier r arlarrf yU n .. hywr raie s follows:as organized They were U.S.and UK by aircraft patrol aircraft. andpatrol maritime force assault Marine reconnaissanc and | operations A/S and Force: Support Logistic the and theFleet ofsupport in operations placed temporarily nnder the operational control of CINCSASTLANT.ofcontrol operational the nnder temporarily placed . andreturn: to Norway convoyfrom UK theof passage Fleets Striking raiders; mines were laid by ships, submarines and aircraft. Norwegian Norwegian aircraft.and submarines ships, laidby surface as mineswere acted raiders;minelayer afastcruiserand A sea.at forces Ö» COMMAND and CONTROL. By agreement betwe agreement By CONTROL. and COMMAND Ö» Joint Anti-Submarine S JointAnti-Submarine aircraftwere strike and aircraft a reconnaissance the submarines, in AOLANT I.e. forces Enemy responsibility. ofarea CINCNORTH's being Fleet theStriking with CINCAIRSASTLANT, and CINCEASTLANT by mariti reconnaissance and operations A/Sand raider incident involving a break out from th from out break a involving incident raider airthe during opposition air limited provided aircraft and Danish oitcSpotFre .. oitcSpotGopadUK oilers.and U.K.Group Logistic Support -U.S. Force Logistic Support the Commander in Chief, Northern Europe was designated offi designated was Europe Northern Chief,in theCommander tr the Killer Hnnter Carrier FleetstheStriking by operationssupport replenishment, action,anti-raider 6 7. When the situation in the North had been stabilized CINCNORTH CINCNORTH stabilized been had North inthe situation the When 7. con This Denmark. in Southern forces land hisfor support carrierair otoldb h lg fie umrns U) teDrco (RAF) (UK), the Director Officer Submarines theby Flag controlled crossedinto forces changeSACLANT's when controlnotdid Operational support actions.support Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, UK and U.S. and maritime and maritime and U.S.and UK Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, France, e . The first half of MAIN BRACE covered the sortie, transit north, transit sortie,thecovered BRACE MAINof half first The . quested aid in the form of theform in aidquested d ucting the exercise, in addition to controlling operations within within operations controlling to addition in exercise, the ucting . redy Nvlfre ee provid forceswere Naval Friendly. a. . nm. aih Netherla Danish, Enemy. b. a nsit fro nsit m .. etoe screen. destroyer U.S. screen. the UK unoppo and UK the Landing Team.Landing c hool and CINC3ASTLAIJTand hool ufc obrmn ru (combined).group bombardment Surface n are gop 2UK ad1US carriers, (21 andU.S. U.K. group carrier 2nd e n IMPORTANT ASPECTSIMPORTANT red the red ish supp ish a co mphibious troops landed in Jutland and Jutlandin landed troops mphibious m .. adbss t KlnlossTopeliffe, and at land-bases U.K. at -basesSullom tender and U.S.U.K. Norway. atStavanger,bases land U.K. bined screen)bined s a ed landing in Jutland of theofJutland in landinged nd support operations by the by operations support nd t o ast ot, elnsmn, and replenishment, south, ransit toeain. . operations.rt n s owga n .. submarines andU.K. ds,Norwegian Voe, Shetlands. Voe, Norway r o e e Baltic into theNorth into Baltic U.K. n SACEUR and SACLANT SACEUR n espectively. rces was exercised by exercised rceswas m e and patrol aircraft. d/ïlQ andpatrol e e yBlim Canada, by Belgium, d e by c er r d ea,

m m

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE tiigFetws etd nte Are the in vested was Fleet Striking h hl atr sndr otnig study. continuing nnder is matter whole The This Fleet, Striking the of intentions future and actions position, ? SRKN LE OPERATIONS. FLEET STRIKING I?. schedule, exercise the in factor time the air to mainly shore-based Due arranging in difficulties and operations. concern caused naturally must control his fleet at sea and be free to carry out his mission with with mission his out carry to free be br and sea only at fleet his control must headquarters single a of establishment OINCEASTLANT/CIN the for to given be must priority as commanders, subordinate major their of several and SACEUR SACLANT, action to exercise any flexibility in the conduct of his operations. his of conduct the in of flexibility any freedom exercise little to with action himself fonnd Commander tineFleet Striking for vi different was most voluminous. It is apparent that much time and and time much that apparent is It voluminous. most was a Striking *’leet. The other point of view' is that the Fleet Commander Commander Fleet the view'of that is point *’leet. other The Striking a Co;;nmandersnaval all Area that control held ismust two opinion again the once side raised BRACE N STRUCT!JOTHE I FT.l^.T.OF M CONTROL 16. efficiency. maximum the with conducted be to are area that apparent is It contin­ exercise. the were throughout CINCATREASTLANT and locations emphasized separate uously the CINCEASTLANT of from resulting Headquarters the of disadvantages obvious the regard orders. and directives h raCmadrws fr osdrbepros naaeo the of nnaware by periods, where considerable situation for a was, produced Commander Area the difficulties, commnnicatlons including ord of volume the and saved been have major commanders had b had commanders major they were finally resolved in MAIN BRACE, worked very well. In this In well. very worked BRACE, MAIN in resolved finally were they 15 _ technical and orders exercise of sets parallel almost produced ^ _ _ be would a central planning team composed of representatives of the staffs staffs the of representatives of composed team planning central a whilst the latter might well have exaggerated the number of contacts contacts of number the exaggerated have well might latter the whilst annexes. In addition, orders produced by th by produced orders addition, In annexes. 14 weapons. and forces of OPERATIONS. on, oenraimhd ob acpe i atclr set, b aspects, particular in accepted be to had nnrealism some ronnd, omnes edd odpiae hs arayise yhge omt .directives and orders of set format- complete higher by a that issued result already the those with ions, duplicate to tended commanders given much planted information. To give the best experienc best the give To information. planted much given to attempt to draw far-reaching conclusions conclusions far-reaching draw to attempt to prod to possible was it of set or time given a in experienced be to likely incidents and and \jeapons training to the large nu large the to \jeapons and training 13 int with together defense, circumstances. In addition, enemy fo enemy addition, In circumstances. activities accompanying 12. The former requirement by itself might have given little tactical tactical little given have might itself by requirement former The 12.land. on and air the in sea, at forces the to training quarters. before drawing any conclusions. The setting was a compromise betw compromise a was setting The characte broad conclusions. the any recall to drawing before necessary is It 11. the following two requirements: two following the . COMMAND RELATIQNSHIPS. NATO command relationships involving involving relationships command NATO RELATIQNSHIPS. COMMAND . . Wti hs lmt aube xeinews and bt it but gained, was experience valuable limits these Within . EXERCISE PLANNING. It was fonnd that C that fonnd was It PLANNING. EXERCISE c _ b es and shore-based aircraft operating within their areas, including including areas, their within operating aircraft shore-based and es a. Carrier Air Su^no Air Carrier a. a. To exercise commands In their strategic roles, with all all with roles, strategic their In commands exercise To a. . o To provid To ad directives. In this exercise operational control of the of control operational exercise this In directives. ad wrong, as was previously stressed at the critique in Oslo, in critique the at stressed previously was as wrong, e s reg ws a e ^ ` ’ " " on the relative merits relative the on " " `’ ^ rding the control of the Striking Fleet, On one On Fleet, Striking the of control the rding C a seri a AIREASTLANT if operations within the EASTLANT EASTLANT the within operations if AIREASTLANT e en assembled to produce the basic exercise exercise basic the produce to assembled en u ce many events and much variety. much and events many ce o sac n cnetainfr tako peû&bs- or attack for concentration and search f e r e rplay and teamwork between various head-ocÇffÇj' various between teamwork and rplay t. LES s of tactical situations to give maximum maximum give to situations tactical of s S N L3ARÏÏ3DFONS a m Commander. Various deficiencies, deficiencies, Various Commander. e r ber of men and forc and men of ber s n drcie rdcd if reduced, directives and rs ces were skeleton and were were and skeleton were ces e I majority of" majority force N C NORTH and CINC and NORTH r istics of MAIN BRACE BRACE MAIN of istics m labor could could labor ÄQQlFSFhi e s involved, involved, s e , all E ASTLANT ASTLANT u of t e en en DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE detailed analysis is made, it is not possible to reach any conclusions conclusions any a reach and to received possible are not is it reports made, is complete as time analysis such detailed Until exercise. the minute. that last fact the theat by changed be to emphasized had was beach beforehand planning detailed for realistic situations were created, both by the exercise setting and and setting exercise the by both created, were situations realistic we lessons new on this phase of the exercise. the of phase this on sea. at forces all to presented were warfare submarine exercise not did which territory friendly in landing nnopposed an course. due in Standardization for Agency Military arranged be also probably could personnel the for training valuable ysrae cincop ad dugdsn ynvlgnie The gunfire. engaged naval by subsequently snnk were adjudged They and croups action Sea. surface North by the into Baltic the from and rvddsm eclettann. s h lnigws npoe, no nnopposed, was landing the As training. excellent some provided sup rcie btente are ocs rvdn te upr ad the and support the providing forces carrier the between practice, the major commanders concerned, in order that as much individual individual much as that order in concerned, commanders major the anti­ for opportnnities Excellent OPERAT ANTI-S IONS.UBMARINE 19» AÎIPIIILÏ IS. surfa enemy s from out breading raiders the tracked comments Appropriate Support necessary. isAir a Carrier draft Forces) Land Naval initial and the Governing of Amphibious of Revision Doctrine and (Principles national ATP-7 support. of using by air-gronnd concerned teaching nations schools several the Further amongst bilaterally support. such give to earmarked forces the with working of would difficulty the of portion a major that considered is It force. major lesson here would appear to be the disproportionate effort in effort disproportionate the be to appear would here lesson major training as possible could be provided during the short period of the of period short the during provided be could possible as training frequen given be could nuclei this that and a war, of of degree the operation an of type this o During training further and 34) concerned. para (see forces cryptography concern problems result of these difficulties which limited the effectiveness of air of effectiveness the limited sup which difficulties these of result rndfre. hs snt o cus, nacr ihte ex the with accord in course, of not, World is during This gained forces. gronnd Joint the and Fleet the between both arose difficulties outset the At h one Norwayj North off operating essential that JOC's and ACT's be fully aware of the capabilities of a of capabilities the of aware fully be ACT's and JOC's that essential be are i sup air carrier a As smoothly. more much proceeded Denmark over support air result, be eliminated if the trained nuclei of the Shore control sj^stem control could Shore the of nuclei trained the if eliminated be Constan commnnication. good on dependent very is rendered support major the that and satisfactory basically were doctrine tactical carriers. by ^iven be can and been, often has support ground Air the and aircraft C carrier the ( between Center and JOC), Operations w been shore elements exercising control, is mandatory. In addition, it is it addition, In mandatory. is control, exercising elements shore ht are ocs r to nlxbe to inflexible too are forces carrier that north, the in operations support air of day first the The completed off Dodo, and one full dav off Denmark. However, had t had However, Denmark. off dav full one and Dodo, off completed been during war, the necessa the war, during been carried out on both bad weather days off North Norway and Denmark. and Norway North off days weather bad both on out carried a omlyb epce i h ae foeain drn etme. ^ September. during operations of area the in expected be normally can hips and aircraft that is required to locate an locate to required is that aircraft and hips dsgetos nti tcia ulcto ilb owre o the to forwarded be will publication tactical this on suggestions nd o ntrol Teams (ACT). Some of these difficulties were resolved after after resolved were difficulties these of Some (ACT). Teams ntrol p p m orting arms in the roles they would play nnder war conditions, conditions, war nnder play would they roles the in arms orting ort operations, the land forces forces land the operations, ort aintained in areas likely to require support in the early stages early the in support require to likely areas in aintained S b. triking Fleet enconntered severe storms for 3 days whilst whilst days 3 for storms severe enconntered Fleet triking a ived and and ived (2) It is considered that the commnnications systom and systom commnnications the that considered is It (2) 1 Wahr c Weather (1) c e r e O S OPIOHATIOITUS r A e learned once the exercise had started. The necessity necessity The started. had exercise the once learned e a p ider nti-Raider Operations. Air reconnaissance fonnd and fonnd reconnaissance Air Operations. nti-Raider r oc as force ort a ir operations (somewhat curtailed) could have been been have could curtailed) (somewhat operations ir ’W r a . II and in Korea. Effective and exte and Effective Korea. in and II o S ndition . The amphibious operation, although it was was it although operation, amphibious The . r y peace time safety measures would have would measures safety time peace y c ompared to those of a land based air air based land a of those to ompared s encountered were at least as bado^fij bado^fij as least at were encountered a lf day of air operations was was operations air of day lf m ay h ay N arvik into the North Atlantic Atlantic North the into arvik a ve gained the impression impression the gained ve g v efcetspot to support efficient ive d destroy a single single a destroy t o a d a a as nd, M p any nn- nn- any portnnities n p sive eri e h nce nce f t f t is

he DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 'requirements of the overall situation. This procedure worked worked procedure This situation. overall the of 'requirements were nnder the direct direct the nnder were eeue t spotti eecs, ons u h ove the out points exercise, this support to used were w method of control. On the one hand, it is felt that AH' airc AH' that felt is it hand, one the On control. of method patrol and maritime involved it, followed which EMIGRANT EXERCEE CINCNORTH Norway. in bases from operated aircraft patrol .. 2O7/3 S.G. op direct the nnder be must st but Fleet, Striking AIRCR WARNING EARLY AIRBORNE 21* not should Headquarters, Naval solely the or command naval/air aircraft, and also to control the CAP an nn advanced picket for picket advanced nn an CAP the control to also and aircraft, a that recommended been has It produced. being are warfare icatoeaigndrte oto faohrnto. It nation. another of control the provid nnder operating aircraft development. encouragin most were aircraft cognizant are forces all systems. two provided the of operations, affect adversely commitments fulfil to available aircraft patrol and maritime of all of control operational retain to CINCAIREASTLANT permitted altho CINCNORTH, of control operational tac delegated who CINCAIRSASTLANT A MARITIME 20. Air Commander in order that all air operations from the shore shore the from operations air all that order in Commander Air aircraft these exercise the During Force. Striking Carrier attacking the locate to patrols barrier as raiders, track and for by SACLANT, but whatever the method of control, there is no doubt doubt no is there control, of method the whatever but SACLANT, by between differences the that appears Standardizati for Agency difficulty. Military the great of any medium the without Through interchanged be can forces these areas. all in aircraft advantages force. of subsequent the economy and with aircraft flexibility of patrol and maritime his of t support air maritime providing of problem the satisfactorily of command operational the nnder were aircraft patrol and all shore based aircraft, must be nnder the control of the Area Area the of control the nnder aircraft,be must based shore all em be may they that order in b aircraft that the success achieved by these aircraft warrants their further further their warrants aircraft these by achieved success the that the nnder placed were aircraft No COMAIRNORLANT. commander, hnig iutos Cnesl, h pno s advanc is opinion the Conversely, situations. changing patrol and maritime for control of system NATO standardized oto. .. ihrb h Mrtm edures ne joint nnder Headquarters Maritime the by either I.e. control. a epoel oodntd Ti rbe sndr considera nnder is problem This co-ordinated. properly be can anti-submarine of field the in publications tactical common ere passed to CINCAIREASTLANT, who who CINCAIREASTLANT, to passed ere b Sae fEfr. h at htvrulyalo the of all virtually that fact The Effort. of Scale b. . Supp *a c. Common Doctrines and and Doctrines Common c. e d an excellent opportnnity for co-operation and showed that that showed and co-operation for opportnnity excellent an d a e va dvlpd Pnig ute suyo hsmte it matter this of study further Pending developed. i al t lable o rt rt a N nd Is considered to be a practical solution to solution practical a be to considered Is nd D D o P f CINCNORTH. During MAIN BRACE all maritime maritime all BRACE MAIN During CINCNORTH. f TO I OPERATIONS. AIR ATROL o CIH r p o ong divergent views are held as to the best best the to as held are views divergent ong erational erational C AHIEASTLAIIT in the early stages of a war war a of stages early the in AHIEASTLAIIT e rational control of the Fleet Commander Commander p Fleet the of control rational g. loyed in the best manner to me to manner best the in loyed They were employed to sear to employed were They - 57 - 57 - A t FT. The results achieved by AEW AEW by achieved results The FT. c ical control to his sub-area sub-area his to control ical ontrol of the Commander Commander the of ontrol m M t tos Ti eecs, s did as exercise, This ethods. the with consistent them et e xsig w ehd of methods two existing he u hbt aiie and maritime both gh o CNNRH It CINCNORTH. Anx"" to "B" .Annex Appendix "B" Appendix r e all shortage shortage all d that that d 's e o c requ h for h t n r aft t ion ion BBWIC I BBWIC ocrnrT ocrnrT e O T A N sts DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE with an emergency. an with plan, which is by no means far enough advanced advanced enough far means no by is which plan, t shown was developed, being is it which 25 nature of various aspects was fully confirmed. fully was unsatisfactory aspects suspected thevarious of and start, nature shaky a after right put GENERAL. 24. shi. shi. This meteorol operations. those for planning hour to hour anM day to May analysis. detailed of exception the with M I N BRACE again showed the s to showed "need again BRACE N I M organization commnnications area -jeneral,ISast the in and Atlantic COMMUNICATIONS this of encrypting wartime that and clear, the in mete distributed available all that mind in in this area. Unfortnnately, no evidence is at hand to indicate indicate toreconna hand at is meteorological the evidence of no use appreciable Unfortnnately, any area. this in Norway over enconntered aircraft carrier the that opposition to provide information to the Striking Fleet. It should be kept kept be should It Fleet. Striking the to information provide to emphasises the necessity for the timely receipt of all pertinent pertinent all of receipt timely the for necessity the the influenced also emphasises but weather operations exercise the tactical the Throughout of conduct the only not METEOROLOGY. 23. f stated As particularly forces. defended nnintercepted, lightly or against nndetected either attack to able and medium from attacking aircraft general, In sea. at forces in particular, a gruelling test. Much went right, much was much right, went Much test. gruelling a particular, in and considering the artificialities already mentioned, it is it mentioned, already artificialities the considering and gunfire. AA and aircraft by attacked and tracked were level high Denmark, anM interception. communication deficiencies acturally experienced. and acturally cryptographic deficiencies the communication aggravate further will information force of information good proviMeM reconnaissance movem Air position. known known considered that no d no that considered effect to time in upon acteM be selMom can latter the since e on anM areas focal in success greatest rec their Reports achieveM they that war. during would they as rni aMdiysraig omk psto eot, oper reports, position make to surfacing daily anM transit It would appear that the low flying aircraft were in many cases many in were aircraft flying low the that appear Itwould reconnaissance, air to superior is intelligence advanced submarines xperience, that with the slow submergeM speeMs of existing existing of speeMs submergeM slow the with that xperience, . The basic NATO c NATO basic The . 207/3 e . Submarin a. . fesv i. pr rmtevr iie air limited very the from Apart Air. Offensive b. nts. Nevertheless, this served to emphasize the p the emphasize to served this Nevertheless, nts. y o v n o c o gical information by forces operating at sea, particularly particularly sea, at operating forces by information gical rue hr te ol prt swaos of weapons as operate coulM they where routes e nemy air was mainly confined to attack against against attack to confined mainly was air nemy M A I RC ae AOCmniain doctr Commnnications NATO gave BRACE N e adpo»umrn arrf. Submarin pro-»submarine aircraft. and s e o finite conclusions can be reached pending- reached be can conclusions finite mmnnications plan, and the lines along along lines the and plan, mmnnications e xercise artificialities requiring rapiM rapiM requiring artificialities xercise o rological inform rological - 58 - 58 p eed development of the of development eed e iv o b stsatrj but satisfactoryj be e d to Mate indicate indicate Mate to d o r ASW operations, operations, ASW r t o deal properly properly deal o a tion was tion i ssance flights ssance ne B to "B" Annex Appendix "E" Appendix a i ne st a e ted s, DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTU RE PUBLIQUE ihVF " now VHF. period, with change-over the during encountered be will which proposals and satisfactory not was command of echelons higher minor of number A satisfactory. proved designed, were they which very ex very 33. EQUIPMENT. MAIN BRACE took place before US forces had had forces US before place took BRACE MAIN EQUIPMENT. 33. little. too signalling visual and much 34. NATO CRYPTO SYSTEM. As expected, the existing NATO crypto crypto NATO existing the expected, As SYSTEM. CRYPTO NATO 34. the linking circuits NATO purely regarding situation The 31. b will and up shown were defects the in included now though which, facilities commnnication radio 30 28. öS commnnications personnel were working in an area where where area an in working were personnel commnnications öS 28. v inexperi the of complaints many were There PERSONNEL. 27. spir The 26. 32. Tactical commnnic Tactical commnnications. 32.level high satisfactory without effectively fnnction the by hampered was com Planning the result PLANNING. COMMUNICATIONS 29. system prov system others and IMF with equipped are forces some whilst beginning, th though o mrv teewl emd. uhpooas r bud to bound are proposals Such made. be will these Improve to for fnnctions same the perform to continued fact in system, NATO progresses. time as remied be should stan defect the in or ACPs either be personn commnnications experienced sufficient of avail­ forces c inadequate the operations With extent. serious a to available ma efforts infcnl tre ter hneoe rmVl oUF The VilFfrom UHF. to change-over their started significantly involve fresh expenditure, but the NATO co NATO the but expenditure, fresh involve t short the to due largely is This personnel. commnnications of nopeees f h AOgnrlcmniain ln A a As plan. commnnications general NATO the of incompleteness areas. ex nnfamiliar to opportnnity utmost every for take in need the difficulty points causes and BRACE This MAIN of stages early the accustomed. are they which to that contain many detailed Instructions which should more properly more should which Instructions detailed many contain service system which reduces the number of experienced personnel de to personnel able experienced of number the reduces which system service orlto f omnctos otie adas tene to need the also and doctrine, commnnications of correlation s h e a yncsayad kmig nti epc i afle economy. false a is respect this in skimping and necessary ry commnnic e ifcoiy wr eysgiiat etrs f h exercise. the of features significant very were tisfactorily, . RADIO COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS. In general those national national those general In CIRCUITS. COMMUNICATION RADIO . t ensive use of VKF in the exercise showed the difficulties difficulties the showed exercise the in VKF of use ensive e r d a e e e by all concerned to work the commnnications system system commnnications the work to concerned all by e l with the early stages of a war, flexibility of flexibility awar, of stages early the l with was a tendencj^ to use voi tendencj^ use a to was d far too slow. It was the major factor in communications in factor major the Itwas slow. too far d a a n only be assured by good commnnications. Provision Provision commnnications. good by assured be only n tions organiz tions i m t of co-operation within NATO, and th and NATO, within co-operation of t nnications orders had to be very extensive, and and extensive, very be to had orders nnications a tions systems proved generally satisfactory, satisfactory, generally proved systems tions a tion differs in many details from from details many in differs tion e d rcis ing orders of NATO Commanders. This This Commanders. NATO of orders ing e remedied. e commnnications personnel in in personnel commnnications c e and plain language language plain and e m mand system cannot cannot system mand e l is therefore therefore is l e intense intense e nce nce to ' o DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 37. DEVELOPMENT OF ACPs. Those ACPs which were available proved proved available were which ACPs Those ACPs. OF DEVELOPMENT 37. hampered seriously be to not are operations if priority, high intellig enemy efficient d 35« The "HATEX" system was tried out and proved quite nnworkable nnworkable quite proved and out tried was system "HATEX" The 35« imperilled. needlessly forces and an of face the in suicidal been have would which extent an 1 Te fet f hs is: this of effect The 41. BRACE MAIN TRAFFIC. COMMUNICATIONS OF REDUCTION 40. with on press Group Standing the that recommended is It 39« by bridged be to had series ACP the in gaps of number A 38. use. their with familiar more exercise the for exercises. supplied future were codes action grade low Although 36. as a main operational crypto channel^ it will however be suitable suitable be however will it channel^ for crypto operational main a as given be should system crypto improved an of implementation the al rdcino l Csnee o opee h series. the complete to needed ACPs all of production early measures. satisfactory, altogether not and extempore, though satisfactory, in this to paid be will Attention used. insufficiently were these Supreme Commanders. In particular there should be: should there particular In Commanders. Supreme present. at that î ‘. 2 4 esg t letter. to message h racs (o ships). (to Broadcast the ake uhmr effectiv more much tackled ships. of personnel crypto h. 207/3 Shi. e as adfre h tiigFett s panlnug to language plain use to Fleet Striking the forced and lays, The remedy lies in the education of originators, and can be can and originators, of education the in lies remedy The a standby syst standby d. There is a tendency to abuse degrees of precedence. of degrees abuse to tendency a is There d. d. To impose far far impose To d. long. too and drafted poorly are messages Many messages. b. many too are There a. b. To delay really vital operational traffic. operational vital really delay To particularly b. and system, commnnications whole the clog To a. c. Many messages are addressed to too many authorities. many too to addressed are messages Many c. a. A very great transfer of administrative business from from business administrative of transfer great very A a. weak case any in is which system, crypto the strain To c. e m. t here is a clear need for personnel to become become to personnel for need clear a is here e t nce organization. It is clear that that clear is It organization. nce omc oko h commnnica the on work much oo e ly by National authorities than by by than authorities National by ly - 60 - Appendix "B” Appendix Annex "3" io io "3" Annex s t howed again again howed ions and and ions NATO DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 45. PRESS. There was particular justification in MAIN BRACE for for BRACE MAIN in justification particular was There PRESS. 45. hand experience in the underway logistic support of a combined fleet fleet combined a of support logistic underway the in experience hand (Ship) the not but system communications the of use the justifies which S.G. S.G. involv problems logistical The 46. 44. It is recommended that good priority be given to the provision provision the NATO. to throughout given be system IFF priority good modern that a of fitting recommended and is It 44. were adequate and repairs were accomplished expeditiously. accomplished were repairs and adequate were de­ considered is coverage press extensive if However, obtained. be know. to need really who hretpsil time accomplishe be should possible area shortest difficult this in force a of LOGISTICS ee o nieystsatr o nowyrpeihetoig t owing provided replenishment oilers nndorway U.K. the for that satisfactory considered is Itentirely not vere range. awide over difficulty. thereto. attendant material, and administrative both problems, the and However resolved. well were Europe Northern of support in operations already severely stretched, and it is clear that they must be drasti­ be must they that clear is system it and commnnications stretched, a on severely strain already added an were facilities These ment in ships, equipment and methods employed, as well as transfer transfer as well as employed, methods and equipment ships, in ment Identific 43. o ssandlgsis Temr motn tm ee . were: items important more The logistics. sustained for n sbaie thre submarine and cally reduced in any future exercises if full operati full if exercises future any in reduced cally Press. the to granted be to facilities commnnications exceptional serious a is This non-existent. almost was identification electronic are those required for the repair of a catapult of U.S.S. ROOSEVELT ROOSEVELT U.S.S. of catapult a of repair the for required those are groups other and Fleet Striking the and planned well was Force Support test small a only was BRACE MAIN Exercise that remembered be must it Broadcasts. low pumping capacity and shortag and capacity pumping low impose a wearying state of alertness and anxiety on forces. on anxiety and alertness of state a wearying impose and the drydocking of U.S.S, COATES and Netherlands submarine 2EELH0UND) submarine Netherlands and COATES U.S.S, of drydocking the and cf amonnt the forthcoming, be must personnel of training and rates with sometimes but necessary, when replenished were requiring so provi be must traffic this accommodate to facilities ample sirable, commnnications the into fed being not Is traffic nnwarranted that sure state of affairs in these days of high speed and, nntil remied, will will remied, nntil and, speed high of days these in affairs of state tion tion system. nentoa euln odce ons ote ucs f hs type this of success the to points oper conducted refueling international feasible, is navies NATO different of ships between _ d. Agreement on a method of delivering non-operational traffic, traffic, non-operational delivering of method a on Agreement d. _ a 5 the rest had two incompatible types of IFF'. As a result rapid rapid result a As IFF'. of types incompatible two had rest the 207/3 b. It should be noted that the employment of the Logistic Logistic the of employment the that noted be should It b. first­ good of amonnt large a provided BRACE MAIN Exercise a. . tws rvdi hs xrieta tase ffe t sea at fuel of transfer that exercise this in proved Itwas d. c. Capabilities and limitations of the oilers provided varied varied provided oilers the of limitations and Capabilities c. en­ to centres communication principal at check of form Some e. e. The emergency repair facilities provided by the U.K. (Examples (Examples U.K. the by provided facilities repair emergency The e. ti c. Attention by originators to reduction of to reduction originators by Attention c. . infcn improvem significant A b. o n. a in Sm nt a omas feetoi identifica­ electronic of means no had units Some tion. a s exist. ts 5 this is especially true in wartime, when air when in wartime, true especially is this NATOUNCLASSIFIED - - e e nt in the concise concise the in nt of personnel. The replinishsi The personnel. of 61 e - d in the conduct of naval and air air and naval of conduct the in d Appendix "B" Appendix Annex "B” Annex to d rafting of messages. of rafting ’'•hile o a vlei to is value nal a d ddressees to those those to ddressees in the in improve­ o nt nt o

d e d , DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE which are not far enough advanced to deal properly with an emergency. an with properly deal to advanced enough far not are which ments must be carefully evaluated. carefully be must ments aMdeM strain on a system already severely stretched anM fu anM stretched severely already system a on strain aMdeM areas. nnfamiliar in to working personnel commnnications all accustom re-emphasi re-emphasi zed. higher linking circuits NATO purely but satisfactory, proved NATO ing to opportnnity every seizing for and personnel commnnications ienced facilities, of provision and plan, the of development speed to need tactically. and technically both development, ee satisfactory. were rpi system. graphic inadequate. were command of echelons the showed exercise The satisfactory. appear developed, being is it times. it. counter to forces of effort ate ating techniques, carrier air support of SACEUR's northern flank flank northern SACEUR's of support air carrier techniques, ating urgent. still is CINCAIREASTLANT and nations, Treaty Atlantic shi. shi. system throughout NATO. throughout system all at available be must information meteorological date to up that satisfactory. proved CINCNORTH of foll The 47. per pr appears trol of the Striking Fleet for o for Fleet Striking the of trol th MemonstrateM further ya eta pann tea planning central a by . hr i nugn rqieet o nipoe AO crypto­ NATO improved an for requirement urgent an is There n. , ngnrl h ainlrdo omncto aiiis serv­ facilities commnnication exper­ radio of national proportion the greater general a In for need urgent an m, is There 1. which along lines the and plan, commnnications NATO basic The k. q. The commnnications facilities granted to the press were an an were press the to granted facilities commnnications The q. was IFF traffic modern a of commnnications of provision the volume given the be reduce shoulM to need The Priority p. o. support air patrol and maritime the for evolved procedure The h. 207/3 i. AEW aircraft proved most successful and warrant further further warrant and successful most proved aircraft AEW i. f. Subject to improvements in co in improvements to Subject f. CINCEASTLANT for headquarters combined a for requirement The M. 3 g. The r The g. . otnig td s eurda t tebs ehdo con­ of method best the to as required is study Continuing e. whole the on relationships and organizations commanM NATO c. prepared be shoulM magnituMe this of exercise an for Plans b. ai The a. . The effect of weather on operations in this area is such such is area this in operations on weather of effect The . a tcl , ctical. o wing wing a ider threat is still real and requires a disproportion­ a requires and real still is threat ider m of MAIN BRACE was attain was BRACE MAIN of p relimina e nnity anM strength of purpose of the North North the of purpose of strength anM nnity m . . r y conclusions have be have conclusions y CONCLUSIONS - - p erations of this type in this area. this in type this of erations 62 - m mnnications and combined oper­ combined and mnnications e d t d o a large degree and and degree large a App e Annex Annex n reached: n e nMix "£" nMix E to "E" t ure require­ ure U Ï A N c >./ ■; r U ' DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE were given a limited trial and proved satisfactory. proved and trial limited a given were both in the transfer of fuel at sea and repair facilities ashore, ashore, facilities repair and sea at fuel of transfer the in both mnnications, were satisfactory. There is an early requirement for the for requirement early an is There satisfactory. were mnnications, replenishment owing to low pumping capacity and shortage of personnel. of shortage and capacity pumping low to owing replenishment c o mpletion of the ACP series and a revision of ATP ATP of revision a and series ACP the of mpletion u. The UK oilers were not entirely satisfactory for nnderway nnderway for satisfactory entirely not were oilers UK The u. . C t. s. In general the logistical problems were well resolved. well were problems logistical the general In s. . ngnrleitn AOpbiain, ohtcia n com­ and tactical both publications, NATO existing general In r. r oss-servicing of logistics between different NATO nations, nations, NATO different between logistics of oss-servicing 7 . DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE was sent to protect the Southern Southern the protect to sent was . It th vias assumed 3. 4. CONCEPT. For this exercise friendly forces involved were; involved forces friendly exercise this For CONCEPT. 4. and force submarine range long large a possessing enemy an with year cond was exercise The SETTIMG. 2. vide A/S escort and reconnaissance. and escort A/S vide in the role of an Anti-raider Support Group and the A/S Support Group Group Support A/S the and Group convoy Support Northern the Anti-raider protect to an of ordered role the in was Group Striking Carrier The facilities c the In exercise naval a was EMIGRANT ADI. 1. in the"general area extending from outside the United Kingdom Home Home Kingdom United the outside from extending area the"general in cruisers capable of operating as surface raiders. surface as operating of capable cruisers sui the test shi of endvre o h southwest. the to diverted been Hatteras. Cape and Southern convoy two days prior to the commencement of the exercise and and exercise the the of attacked commencement severely the to had prior submarines days two enemy convoy that assumed Southern Itwas 5« Race Cape between and America North of Azores) the coast of east (north the to Bank Chaucer towestward thence southwestward waters Station nadto o h tann f h ocsivle, MGATws to was EMIGRANT involved, forces the of training the to addition In hti a endvre otwr. tws ute asmd that assumed adve further of It was cover northward. diverted been had it that surface raiders had managed to break-out into the North Atlantic nnder nnder Atlantic North the into break-out to managed had raiders surface p ping against a threat o threat a against ping a nd a portion of the naval control of shipping organization. shipping of control naval the of portion a nd t ability of area boundaries, and to exercise command post post command exercise to and boundaries, area of ability r d. An A/S support group enroute to the Ocean Sub-area. Ocean the to enroute group support A/S An d. Gibraltar from Norfolk enroute convoy fast A b. e. Shore based maritime and patrol aircraft. patrol and maritime based Shore e. . at f a of Part c. enro convoy fast A a. se flying weather and therefore the Northern convoy had had convoy Northern the therefore and weather flying se .Convoy), (Southern ( I ."or t ANNEX ANNEX a t o h t rn C rn onvoy ). he NATO nations had been at war for about a about for war at been had nations NATO he ‘ C " f I MT ast carrier striking group enroute US. enroute group striking carrier ast TO A TO f umrn ad ufc adr action. raider surface and submarine R ODUCTIO: C 64 - 64 onvoy, Shore based air was to pro­ to was air based Shore onvoy, P u PENDIX ''PENDIX 3 u cted during the period 2-1O October 2-1O period the during cted te New York from Londonderry Londonderry from York New te " o ntrol and protection protection and ntrol A to "B" Annex ppendix ppendix " B” DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM -130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE was officer conducting the exercise, in addition to directing directing to addition in exercise, the conducting officer was Atlantic Fleet, controlled the enemy forces. enemy the controlled Fleet, Atlantic ■ IMPORTANT ASPECTS IMPORTANT problem. this of part not was ■ part­ aircraft patrol and maritime US and UK Canadian, MAII: and BHACE U.S. Force, Submarine Commander operations. controlled operations Norfolk air and maritime directed Atlantic, Eastern Chief, in Commander in his area. Sub-area Headquarters at Plymouth, Halifax, New York New Halifax, Plymouth, at Headquarters Sub-area Air The area. his in participate. to unable was who Atlantic, Eastern Chief, in oper 6 cptd Te ee raie s olw: ■ follows: as organized were They icipated. PARTICIPATING. FORCES 7. face raiders"was"considered. Tho threat of mine warfare and aircraft aircraft and warfare mine of threat Tho raiders"was"considered. face U employed as surface raiders and. 12 US submarines acted as ènemy ènemy as acted and. submarines US raiders 12 surface as employed 8 - . COMMAND AID CONT AID COMMAND . . The most important aspects of Exercise EMIGRANT were; EMIGRANT Exercise of aspects important most The . Boats. Anti-Raider Support Group - Two U Two - Group Support Anti-Raider Toy escorted destroyer group logistic US of part - Convoy Northern a b. Enemy. A US battleship and a Canadian light cruiser were were cruiser light Canadian a and battleship US A Enemy. b. includi Group killer Hnnter US - Group Support Anti-Submarine Exercise from returning forces naval US and Canadian Friendly. a. Southern Convoy - part of US logistic group escorted My destroyer destroyer My escorted group logistic US of part - Convoy Southern hr ae i -RFSakeosa S. I3VAL ST.at Shackletons RAF - air based Shore . het t sipn. O shipping. to Threats a. tions within his own own his within tions R OL. The Com The OL. R vateers from Canada from vateers S i Kpue a zrs ' Bermuda at Mariners USM Azores at USii Keptunes USIT Meptunes and RCAF Lancasters from US. from Lancasters RCAF and USIT Meptunes sot adaCnda ih le carricr. fleet light Canadian a and escorts escorts. CAF Lancasters, RAF Shackletons and USiT and Pri­ Shackletons RAF Lancasters, CAF a rea. He was also acting for the CommêmaeH^ CommêmaeH^ the for acting also was He rea. m an escort carrier. escort n d ly the threat of submarines a submarines of threat the ly er in Chief, Western-Atlanti^jQ Western-Atlanti^jQ Chief, in er S carriers escorted by destroyers. by escorted carriers n n g sur­ d DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE eeue. ths ensgetdta eurmn xssfr a for exists arequirement that suggested been Ithas used. were relatively southern route, sometimes referred to as the Bermuda - Bermuda the as to referred sometimes route, southern relatively Allied shipping, the totally disproportionate effort, in terms of air of terms in effort, disproportionate totally the shipping, Allied investigated. be will this and publications national RAF aircraft \*ere deployed from the UK to Canada, USN aircraft from from aircraft USN Canada, to UK the from \*ere aircraft deployed RAF expected be only could air carrier by provided protection The wartime. ot n te ra crl ot rmLnodry Tersls of results The Londonderry. from route circle great the and route route UK - Azores operations. raider year of time this at area this demon­ in further Itprevailing was conditions weather shown. radar, again was out broken has that raider NATO publication for aircraft contact reports to replace existing existing replace to reports contact aircraft for publication NATO TO. Operations. From the operational point of view the following are following the view of point operational the From Operations. TO. within However, learned. being from lessons conclusive any precluded forces opposing nn- and assisted forces, sides, friendly both on on ordered placed exercise limitations movements the to realistic Unrealistic targets false offered forces. which shipping merchant random visaged should not have much effect upon the choice of routes in mid­ in routes of choice the upon effect much have not should en­ visaged be must routes convoy that realized fully is it action, raider fee yeeyrie atvte. pr rmpsil oss to s losses and search possible surface from and Apart activities. raider enemy by offered exercise limitations several important incidents occured and they are they and occured incidents important several limitations exercise GAI.1.ETEIIIŒIAMT of scope Exercise with limited case the the was As 9. ae no con h eurmn o fre t e rprdfr anti­ for prepared be to forces for requirement the acconnt into take nmkn cnat ' note; of worthy considered contact. making in convoys important most the for ocean. advan­ possible indicate limitations, its considering exercise, this must Planning operations. raider successful for scope search ample offer aircraft of performance high the of spite in that, strated GAMLET, ATF-1 and ^ATP-2 proved to be satisfactory to the extent they they extent the to satisfactory be to and ^ATP-2 proved ATF-1 GAMLET, paragraphs. following the in briefly covered wi encountered Were difficulties usual the but possible as istic aircra RCAF and U.S., the to Azores mobility. the aircraft of application the was aircraft anti-submarine submarine. The mine and aircraft threat to shipping as it is now en­ now is it as shipping to threat oraircraft and surface mine The either threat? any by-pass to submarine. attempt and surface of flexible threat tirely a is there if route southern the use_of the in tages as esting craft and surface escorts w escorts surface and craft b. Raider Threat. The exercise demonstrated the potential threat threat potential the demonstrated exercise The Threat. Raider b. a. Tactical Publications. As stated in the report on Exercise Exercise on report the in stated As Publications. Tactical a. c. Basic Routes for Convoys. One of the two convoys followed a followed convoys two the of One Convoys. for Routes Basic c. c. Exercise Conditions. The exercise was intended to be as real­ as be to intended was exercise The Conditions. Exercise c. p ect which enchanced the scale of protection by shore-based shore-based by protection of scale the enchanced which ect 5 the other convoy followed a route between this between route a followed convoy other the t rik LESSONS LEARI.ED LESSONS a e s more smore forces, required to locate and sink a sink and locate to required forces, , or transiting naval forces. An inter­ An forces. naval transiting or t han can be hoped for initially in initially for hoped be can han f t from Fewfonndland to the U.S. the to Fewfonndland from t t h ^ ^ h DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ete - induc - weather val vided must ensu must receipt of detailed reports. detailed of receipt nationa the with arranged ally have the requisite information. requisite the have operations. raider and area study, under is GAI'KET which and Exercise of out arose nm ocswr iie. naayi f thes of analysis An limited. were forces enemy submarin friendly of, operation and transit, of AO syste NATO 12* Logistics. This exercise brought forth the following items: following the forth brought exercise This Logistics. 12* consider were boundaries area nEeos GME, a gi eosrtd v demonstrated. again was GAMLET, Exeroiso in Occasions did arise when communications personn communications when arise did Occasions Group. Standing the with correspondence separate of subject the t traLfic trative CGhiKJNICATIONS. 11. area. anti-sub in engaged problem the with connected todetails work“ ity operational some out information on the composition and location of forces. NATO Command NATO forces. of location and composition the on information report. BRACE MAIN the in on of effectiveness control of national commanders in waters in w in in waters commanders national of control tutr o full" for warti scale structure nnsuitable present the from resulted BRACE, MAIN during enconntered siz the triment of operational traffic. This matter has been fully commented commented fully been has matter This traffic. operational of triment . Anti-submarin f. change suggested the of exception the With Boundaries. d. . Bas a. Ope Submarine Friendly e. h Crypt "hi § • Meteorology. The advers The Meteorology. §• c . Publications. ACP's 148 and 175 were used and proved adequate. proved and used were 175 and 148 ACP's Publications. .c adminis­ DRACd, MAH' exercise in As Traffic. Administrative .a e o^h eecs area" c exercise of^the Planning. Commnnications planning appeared adeq appeared planning Commnnications Planning. r u m e that National Commnnications Systems serving NATO forces forces NATO serving Systems Commnnications National that e a'hie^"expe'riencc to s. This problem has NATO-wide implications and has been been has and implications NATO-wide has problem This s. o graphy. - Delays and difficulti and Delays - graphy. e e clte nteAoe. Th Azores. the in . acilities F d delay i delay d e a ddt co h com o c the clog to nded t-adr prtos bt sac n srk. The strike. and search both operations, nti-raider m arine operations. Detailed procedures were mut were procedures Detailed operations. arine T ems iprat omnctos it commnnications important most he n e Warfare. Because of small scale opposition and opposition scale small of Because Warfare. nnderway replenishment also hampered anti­ hampered also replenishment nnderway e a r satisf d m l lcnendad oehtrdcd h û the reduced somewhat and concerned ll com ations. The exercise gave an opportnn- opportnn- an gave exercise The ations. e operations, as p as operations, e o ntacts and attacks by friendly and and friendly by attacks and ntacts e wahr odtos en conditions weather m anders for trial in the WSSTLAKT WSSTLAKT the in trial for anders a u ctory. ic tos ytmt te de­ the to system ni cations h e ich NATO commanders were were commanders NATO ich e s, similar to those those to similar s, lc faeut infra­ adequate of lack e e e operations must await await must operations s under the operational operational the under s l lacked essential essential lacked l r eviously indicated indicated eviously c u ntrd pro­ onntered, ate. e ms wer ms e ; u ■- e rs DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE handling of administrativ of handling particip for valuable*training 13. A review of the limited information available to date indicates indicates date to available information limited the of review A 13. tha npann. . planning. in t : d . The r The .d emphasised. again was Lages at deficiency infrastructure The b. b. . h ojcie stfr h exercis the for set objectives The a. c. Commnnications problems in the fields of cryptography and and cryptography of fields the in problems Commnnications c. R efueling at sea. This operation was conducted and provided provided and conducted was operation This sea. at efueling a ider threat is still real and must be taken into account account into taken be must and real still is threat ider e traffic require priority priority require traffic CONCLUSIONS a ting forces. ting e were accomplished. were c orrective action. orrective DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE MEMOR Reference From äiä — 0 — dääiUäS Enclosure Subject For which were carried out in in out carried were which a accordance with the reference. the with accordance odn S.W.l. London. Place, Chesham 34-46, n d Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel on NATO exercises exercises NATO on Channel Commander-in-Chief Air Maritime Allied A NDUM TeCanlCmite ■ Committee. Channel : The Report on Exercises. on Report O H HNE OMTE: - COMMITTEE: CHANNEL THE FOR 1952 IN COMMAND CHANNEL THE IN EXERCISES NATO Group. Standing The A combined report from Allied Comaander-in-Chief Channel Channel Comaander-in-Chief Allied from report combined A 392. STAND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGA TREATY ATLANTIC NORTH NAT( CHANNEL COMMITTEE CHANNEL t STANDING GROUP GROUP STANDING eCanlCmad n15 i fradd in forwarded is 1952 in Command Channel he APPENDIX "C" APPENDIX /s/ A. H. WALLIS WALLIS H. A. /s/ /s/ H. HSGOUEH-DEMEADX, HSGOUEH-DEMEADX, H. /s/ ati, R.ÏÏ. Captain, Captain, Captain, N ISATION ISATION t oebr 1952 November. 4th CC(52)16 F .N. .

NAT o DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE were swept by mixed squadrons of British, French, Dutch and Belgian Belgian and Dutch French, British, of squadrons bymixed swept CommanM were Bomber British by laid were mines practice British mines.. BANDEAU II 3rd/7th March 1952 March 3rd/7th II BANDEAU as conducted and planned of types all with dealing in minesweepers NATO of w forces series, BANDEAU combined the as known exercises, of three three BANDEAU IV 19th/23rd May 1952 May 19th/23rd IV BANDEAU 1952 March 24th/29th III BANDEAU 1952 January 2lst/25th I BANDEAU classes. Inshore and Coastal Ocean, andthe of craft; sweepers Force Coastal and submarines minelayers, surface aircraft, exercis smaller of number a aMMition, In C always which shipping merchant peace-time of mass the by and hampered estuary, what Scheldt the as such great, are difficulties navigational exists in the narrow and coastal waters of the Channel Command. Channel the of waters coastal and narrow some­ the in be exists woulM exercises the of realism the that accepted be to haM it cl mand which is a serious handicap, but this has haM to be accepted accepted be to haM has this but handicap, serious ais which mand being is this and in needed, progress is Some practice more but made was concerneM. sweeping was sweeping night day as far as rate any at Re in Joint (Enclosure speci series w series owing to peace-time manning difficulties. manning peace-time to owing xrie Date Exercise o nclusions a ss fmnsepr eevr paet bt yte ieta the that time the by but apparent, very were minesweepers of sses NATO exercises In the Ch the In exercises NATO 19!>2) October 3Oth of Channel Commander-in-Chief, Air Maritime 2. In view of the importance of min of importance the of view In 2. . t s motn t xriemnsepn i ra hr the where areas in minesweeping exercise to important is It 4. 3. Four exercises in this series took place in 1952 and were were and 1952 in place took series this in exercises Four 3. (c) A Major CONVEX/FLEX CONVEX/FLEX Major A (c) Ex Defence Air Convoy (b) series) (BANDEAU Exercises Minesweeping (a) a 6. There is a lack of danlayers available for the Channel Com­ Channel the for available danlayers of lack a is There 6. . tfrt h dfiute o swe of difficulties the first At 5. m l on i iMfr usqet exercises. subsequent for minM in borne lly ain sections ain a s completed a most satisfactory standard haM been achieved, achieved, been haM standard satisfactory most a completed s EOT NNT XRIE ARE OT IN OUT CARRIED EXERCISES NATO ON REPORT H HNE OMN UIG 92 ^EÇRCT-- 1952 DURING COMMAND CHANNEL THE p ANNEX TO APPENDIX "C APPENDIX TO ANNEX ort by CommanMer-in-Chief, Channel and Allied Allied and Channel CommanMer-in-Chief, by ort f BANDEAU EXE BANDEAU ollowst- INTRODUCTION a nnel CommanM for 1952 were Mivided into into Mivided were 1952 for CommanM nnel e ecs (CASTINETS). xercise e css ANL series) (ANNALS rcises R CISES Conducting;Autho Admiral Nore. Admiral Admiral Benelux Admiral Northern Admiral Pre e Approaches. Approaches. s took place. took s e m e warfare a special series series special a warfare " ping together with different different with together ping I. ar a s designed to exercise exercise to sdesigned r t Place ity UK East Coast Coast East UK Firth of Forth of Firth Estuary of Estuary Off Cherbourg Off River Scheldt Scheldt River DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Exercise CHERPLY Exercise H Cherbourg-Le t than attention more receive will Hook to Ostend I Premar which 1952 Benelux March 12th Admiral II 1952 ANNALS February 12th I ANNALS at present available on the continent the Air Defence of land targets targets land of Defence Air the continent the on available present at aviation. Naval results, good with together well worked nations different the of Ships having been planned jointly by him and the British Seaward Defence Defence Seaward British the and him by jointly planned been having lcd ifed o h cnietrmis h ao subig lc in block stumbling major the remains continent active the on nnder is airfields subject placed whole The available. present at facilities Centres. ations authorities naval shore the to home brought however? exercises, two consideration, but the provision of adequate shore radar and suitably suitably and radar shore adequate of provision the of but lack the consideration, illustrate to helped exercises these and importance utmost Oper­ Sector defence air to appropriate the commnnications with link-up efficient and close a Officers ensure Liaison Naval for need the School. I Premar by conducted was 19th/2Otliand the defences on May the place against port the on attack exercise an and day, by nnits opee. hs ee sflos- , aircr maritime by provided was opposition Enemy sation. follows:- as were These completed. knowle a demonstration of British mobile equipment and types of small battle battle small of types and equipment mobile British of demonstration a attack in continental ports and this exercise played its part in under­ in part its played exercise this and ports continental in attack forces. Naval and convoys from protection satisfactory of provision the lining these requirements. The French authorities are now studying studying now are authorities French The requirements. these lining to and Cherbourg of were series the of two cross-channel the only and cancelled Unfortnnately be to had planned convoys. series cross-channel and coastal this. remedy to taken being are steps and generally staffs quarters aaT - 207/3 S.G. - aaaaST took CHERPLY part. took also Commando French a in which of night, by consisted It authorities. French the to technique defence seaward oe wes civn a achieving sweeps some seaward defence technique in more detail, with B with detail, more in technique defence seaward side had been satisfactory. There r There satisfactory. been had side xrie ae odcigAtoiy Place Authority Conducting Date Exercise 12. The protection of important convoys from air attack is of the of is attack air from convoys important of protection The 12. 13. This was an exercise to test the seaward defences of the Port Port the of defences seaward the test to exercise an was This 13. forces fighter limited the with that appreciated fully is It 11. from vessels naval by provided were Convoys 10. 14. There is a real need for adequate defences against nn against defences adequate for need real a is There 14. . h ojc o hs eecssws ots teArdfne of defence Air the test to was exercises these of object The 9. 8 seagoinhi^ft? the on shown improvement and gained experience The 7. e r e w d . On the whole, this proved a satisfactory series of exercises. exercises. of series satisfactory a proved this whole, the On . ge of minesweeping operations as a whole on the part of h of part the on a whole as operations ofminesweeping ge dfne b ihesfo h prpit eec organi­ defence appropriate the from fighters by defended . d emonstrate the latest developments in British British in developments latest the emonstrate MISCELLANEOUS EXERCISES MISCELLANEOUS 95 ANNALS EXERCISE ANNALS $ efficiency. $ 71 h - pedx"" a / P i h "C" Appendix - e protection of forces at sea. The The sea. at forces of protection e e mains, however, some lack of lack some however, mains, S r itish assistance. itish ne o /Phi to Annex ofHolland. a ll conntries conntries ll a , h exer the ft and British British and ft d e erwater erwater ad­ a c vre. ise /V/i / m DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE -M ISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE February February BLUEB of chain the along operations seaborne toprevent Zee Zuider bombardment from being entirely successful. The exercise was nnfor- nnfor- was exercise The successful. entirely being from bombardment mnnication circuits which have proved, on the whole, very satisfactory. very thewhole, on proved, have which circuits mnnication Exercises DOG ny _ ' _ ' only forces. land the of Netherlands support and in ofBritish bombardment exercised, direct Navies destroyers the in while Islands, employed were Terschelling F.P.E's Support". "Flank providing in waters weeks later Exercise CASTI1.ETG gave an an CASTI1.ETG gave Exercise later weeks Command Channel the within effort strong the in reflected was measures Exercises Kinewatchine be will and recognised, is forces sutiable more of shortage the to due Coa force for Tactics, Naval C Naval Tactics, for force failures communications but part, taking the F.P.B's to alth Benelux. Admiral by the from conducted area and coastal planned was Benelux June,the in 2nd/6th place took which exercise, The exercises are in fact, minor C.P.X's. DOG 8 took place on the 6th 6th the on place took 8 DOG C.P.X's. minor fact, in are exercises tnnately marred by the accident to H.M. M.L. 2582, which was snnk with snnk was which 2582, M.L. H.M. to accident the by marred tnnately successful been have to appears it major port was held at Portsmouth with MATO observers present. A A present. observers MATO with Portsmouth at held was port major into plans proper translate to 1952 during com­ L.T. and Radio U.K/Continental necessary the exercise also They plotting with familiar proced personnel commnnications M.H.Q's and keep they that is value cipal 1553* during possible, as far as corrected, the in part profitable a played craft these that said be can attack. an during it December Ï951, based on plans worked ou worked plans on based Ï951, December rie raie b h ega ayws tgd nte ced in Scheldt the on staged was Navy Belgian the by organised ercise August. 1952 exercises have served to establish a common doctrine and h and doctrine common a establish to served have exercises o aig shape. taking now wa exercise Dutch/Belgian combined a solutio atiye April in taken was step further A interest. great aroused which and orsle commo resolve to 20. No conclusions can be drawn from th from drawn be can conclusions No 20. 15 19 o tasks on them use to tendency The 13. 7 1 16. The analysis of this exercise h exercise this of analysis The 16. 1 Tevtliprac o ieaciga ato ie counter­ mine of part a as minewatching of importance vital The 21. s 22. Although minev Although 22. when an exercise to demonstrate the full scale organisation of a of organisation scale full the demonstrate to exercise an when . o Operations tal Force ugh hampered by weather on a numb a on weather by hampered ugh one survivor, when a Netherlands Thunder^et aircraft crashed on crashed aircraft Thunder^et Netherlands a when survivor, one CatlFre tool:I Forces Coastal . . Laval forces including F.P.B.'s were exercised in restricted restricted in exercised were F.P.B.'s including forces Laval . . Designed to exercise K.K.Q. plotting and communications, these these communications, and plotting K.K.Q. exercise to Designed . DadCSIES adwr epoe i ait frls It roles. of variety a in employed were and CASTIMETS, and RD a nd DOG DOG nd n of minewatching afloat, afloat, minewatching of n 9 problems, problems, will take place on the 19th/2Oth November. 19th/2Oth the on place take will a tching is a national responsibility these these responsibility national a is tching u e n ihte c the with and res . o ...... ntrol of Shipping and Enemy Reporting. Enemy and Shipping of ntrol p okn ieacigognstos are organisations minewatching Working exercise in art a nd imaginative. It was beneficial beneficial Itwas imaginative. nd e edi h Shlt nte 22nd the on Scheldt the in held o occ of r a t opportunity to try out a tent- tent- a out try to opportunity in conjnnctio in Further progress was made when when made was progress Further sno u e p u tside their war war their role time tside t ract eeecsswoe pri whose exercises se s BiDA ,BMBU II, BAi.DEAUI, BAMDBAU yet been received, but but received, been yet rrent rrent a sions. i Annex to Annex ce. An initial ex­ initial An ce. - - - -- p ublications In In ublications n with the Dutch Dutch the with p revented the revented a ve helped ve e xercises xercises n few few ­ DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Home and Channel, Channel, and Home forces in their wartime role, particularly that of trade protection, trade of that particularly role, wartime their in forces etApoce. t osse o isoe prtosivlig sub­ involving operations inshore of consisted It Approaches. West Exercise the of Framework Ma Commander-in-Chiei, Air and Channel air and surface Maritime Allied exercise to and commands, Air time hc nlddmrtm arrf, are spotgop ad sub­ and groups support carrier aircraft, maritime included which E and Home Channel, the of organisation ports ports nnder Brest and Cherbourg marines marines period, prove work-up This a minesweeping all m in convoys of operation minesweepers; and iü-boats, aircraft marines, Commander-in-Chiei, Air Maritime the and Ilome Channel, In-Chief, and Walcheren, Rosyth, Chatham, M.II.Q's My Plymouth, exercised was control wider command set-up is fully confirmed and that its working with ad­ with working its that and confirmed fully is set-up command wider June the Western Approaches and Scandinavian bonnd convoys in the North: the in convoys bonnd Scandinavian and Approaches Western the co-operation successful ee to were 26 Conclusions Benelux sub-commands where both ïlaval Coaunahiers reported most favour ïlaval most both Coaunahiers reported where sub-commands Benelux submarine transit offensive operations in the South West Approaches Approaches West South the in operations offensive transit submarine hs spriual aifcoyi h ia ra f h oe a More tho of area vital the in satisfactory particularly is This a and Inshore, and Ocean both convoys, ably on tho co-operation achieved between them. between achieved co-operation tho on ably coreiands jacent was soon apparent. Out of 172 mines laid, 77 were 77 were laid, mines 172 of Out apparent. soon was e an h.H.Q. air control showed a great improvement on last year and A/S air A/S and year last on improvement great a showed control air h.H.Q. of aim their achieved submarines The disrupting part. taking those to home old ones gained iron experience in in experience iron gained ones old p small number of escorts available the difficulty of operating again operating of difficulty the available escorts of number small actuated by merchant vessels. The alarming but known known but alarming The vessels. merchant by actuated forces. surface to apparent fully became waters inshore in submarines weigo h uc os s nypsil for possible only is coast Dutch the on sweeping iT of effect cumulative the and impossible often was sweeping h. 207/3 Shi. rhn sis okpr nte xrie Tewoe novd some involved whole The exercise. the in part took ships erchant a O ships, O trols vers well planned. well vers trols 23. This fl This 23. 4 Teeecs a conduc vas exercise The 24. 26. The exercise, which consisted of 8 days War between l8th/26th l8th/26th between War days 8 of consisted which exercise, The 26. wor arrangements exercise this of scale the to Owing 25. 27 8 Ipoeeti hpar co-operatio ship/air in Improvement 28. 29 30. Minesweeping. The weather conditions had a marked effect as effect amarked had conditions weather The Minesweeping. 30. n 1952 orgn etr o te exe the of feature couraging . This This . . A/S. Warfare . Mo outstanding new lessons were learnt. Many Many learnt. were lessons new outstanding Mo . A/S. Warfare . f or a weeks working up before the the before up working a weeks or i and and s , took place in the North Sea, English Channel, and the South South the and Channel, English Sea, North the in place , took m etn disappointing. extent ome 700 s ea-borne trade but with probable heavy losses. With the With losses. heavy probable with but trade ea-borne e s icatad some and aircraft ecs show xercise 52 Some operations. raider and ports of defence eaward e et exercise was designed to test the wartime command command wartime the test to designed was exercise et i an S f n SIHthi is w raiainae ohpatcbe n souhi. and practicable both are organisation own its d o i edures t Po at Headquarters his rom d A/S forces to collect together in United Kingdom Kingdom United in together collect to forces A/S d ol d l ocsi h sbeun exercise. subsequent the in forces all t ot n. otiue agl o the to largely and. worth contributed its t e he4overall commands of ühe Allied Commander- Commander- Allied ühe of commands he4overall d that the Channel Command Channel the that d t ed My the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief, Allied the My ed - 60 r 73 ie tog s though cise, W , 0 orld War II were once more brought brought more once II were War orld 0 s 0 a tern Atlantic. tern n men. stern Atlantic Naval and. Naval Mari­ Atlantic stern s umber of independently routed routed independently of umber tart of tho actual exercise. exercise. actual tho of tart n was most marked and was was and marked most was r tsmouth and Maritime Maritime and tsmouth h Appendi Annex to Annex par cœm'innications ip/air a n aver n s wept, three being being three wept, 's f role in the in role x act that mine- mine- that act a "C" "C" ge of 12 days 12 of ge i e inelaying inelaying made lor made fi-> n d s t ­ DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-130-96 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE w .. 207/3 S.G. ilb lost. be will ed i need use in pe in use cl -was Summer mid in even - month per f h xrie n the and exercise the of nn als ieweigPlc o teHm n hne omns for Commands Channel and Homo the for Policy Minesweeping a tablish for the Channel Command, have proved that the command orgainsation is orgainsation command the that proved have Command, Channel the for on a sonnd basis and that considerable progress has been made towards towards made been has progress considerable that and basis sonnd a on a satisfactory standard of co-operation and training. and co-operation of standard satisfactory a a rtime basis and V;( the whole worked reasonably well. The outstanding outstanding The well. reasonably worked and V;( whole thebasis rtime t 31. Commnnica ti ons.. Comrannications wore established on a full full a on Commnnica ti established Comrannications wore ons.. 31. 32. This year's exercises, which provided a very full programme programme full very a provided which exercises, year's This 32. il this is provided much v much provided is this il s lor axn established and and axn lor established a ce and war. and ce " ada" eisi a enpsil t es­ to possible been has it series Bandeau" GEMMRAL CQMCLUSIOMS GEMMRAL a luable training under realistic condition condition realistic under training luable e 7 - 74 - fcetMT rporpi sse, and system, Cryptographic MATO fficient e arly illustrated. As s^msult s^msult As illustrated. arly Appcndl:: "C Appcndl:: Annex t Annex o " o r m