COPY NO. go Shi. 207A ii— ass MATO UNCLASSIFIED „ . ,. REGRADED ............ Pages 1 - 74. incl. Par Authority ....... REPORT BY THE STAMPING GROUPp, , .... Date.3..r.Z.-Sefti... to the MILITARY COMMI TTEE DEGRADED ____ ■ ■ ' Dr’r-| |'■; . • .. T""*"*"™ 0n *•" Per _ NATO EXERCISES - 1953. Bv.. n , /3. V 3.r> U"~^ IMTRODUCT ION 1. The purpose of this report is to acquaint the Mi lita ry Committee with the more important aspects of the lessons learned and dif ficulties enconntered in NATO exercises and maneuvers during 1952. For more detailed study there axe a t Enclosure a list of more impor­ tant exercises conducted by NATO Commands with Appendices giving pre­ liminary reports on nine (9) exercises conducted by SACEUR three (3) exercises conMucted by SACLANT, anM two (2) series a nM miscellaneous exercises conducteM by the Channel Command. ^ DISCUSSION 2. General. It wa s evident from exercises helM this year that all NATO Commands have maMe considerable progress in combat effectiveness 'a nM cooperative ability. The exercises, in particular MAINBRACE, Memon- strated the growing strength and nnity of purpose of the NATO nations, and that the present NATO Command structure * while needing some refine­ ments, is workable. ■ 3. Valuable experience and training were obtained. Liaison . r and cooperation between forces of di fferent nationalities and dif fer- N ent languages showed marked improvement. This was particularly true in the planning phases, and in the conduct of exercises in SACEUR's DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-130-96 EN LECTURE PUBLIQUECentral Command. 4. Communications. NATO The most outstanding genera l difficulty enconntered was in - 1 - DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION MEMO, £ . 0 A, o the communications and electronics f ield. The superimposing of NATO traffic on existing national and commercial networks was satisfactory, but the system is generally incapable of bear ing the strain of war. Speed of development of the basic NATO Connnnni cat ions plan is impera­ tive as it is not far enough advanced to deal properly with an emer­ gency. The short service system, with resultant inexperience of per­ sonnel, further added to the difficulties. 5* Cryptography. Though belonging to the commnnications field, this subject is mentioned separately because an urgent need for an improved crypto system was noted in all exercises. There are three interlocking prob­ lems : a.. There is a need for a NATO-wide crypto system. The present practice of NATO forces using their national crypto sys­ tem is not sa tisfactor y. b. Crypto personnel are inadequate and due to their short service are insufficiently trained. jg,. Control of traffic is essential, particularly the de­ termination of priority of operational traff ic, the number of ad­ dressees, and the volume and routing of administrative messages. These problems are being given continuous priority study by the Standing Group and major commanders, 6 . Logistics. A principal deficiency noted in all exercises was the lack or realist ic logistics support. Some of SACEUR's forces revealed an almost total absence of logistic capabilities to support combat oper­ at ions. SAC IAHT*s difficulties were mostly in support procedures such as nnderway support of a combined fleet, with some deficiencies in shore facilities. CHANCOM noted shortages in certain specialized equipment and facilities. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-130-96 EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 7. Armv Forces. I'feximum troop training has been achieved from two-sided - 2 - WTO i.G. 2O7/3 G Tnr.r-r s! J L Ü NATO UNCLASSIFIED NATO maneuvers with nnits no larger t han a corps. Due to financial and SSöfJff political factors exercise of higher echelons has been accomplished by command post exercises. The continuation of joint, combined, and amphibious maneuvers is an absolute requir ement and the implications of nnconventional weapons should be included. The inclusion of logis­ tic support units in future exercises is a definite requirement. 8. Air Forces, Air support of ground troops was practiced in every major exercise and the procedure and language problems are being resolved. Air defense of SACEUR's area is weak especially the defense of air­ fields. Due to lack of organization and meshing of gronnd observer networks, little or no warning of low flying aircraft is available. Obsolescent radar equipment hampers high altitude detection. Again lack of commnnications was a limiting factor in air/gronnd cooper­ ation. Airfields and facilities are nnsatisfactory for combat oper­ ations in SACEUR's area, on the channel coast, and in the Azores. 9. Naval Forces. ' Naval exercises were conducted covering all phases of naval operations. Aside from commnnications and logistics, weather was a most important factor. Carrier operations off Norway and Denmark were limited, though peacetime safety mea sure restricted operations more severely than would be common practice in war. The alarming, but known, fact that minesweeping off the Dutch Coast is only possible for an average of twelve days per month, even in summer, was clearly illustrated. In spite of the difficulties encountered and the very short periods alloted the exercises showed that naval forces can carry out their assigned tasks, including the support of SACEUR's northern flank. CLASSIFIED-PUBLIC CLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-130-96 EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE E CONCLUSIONS D 10. In the light of repor ts on NATO exercises f or 1952, plans for 1953 should envisage conducting land, air, naval and amphibious maneu­ vers comparable in scale to those held in 1952. In addition higher headquar ters should be exercised to the maximum extent feasible through NATO ■ M I M M - 3 ‘I Â Ç Ç î Œ n f LnU yll s Lj kJ the medi um of comma nd post exercises. Logistic support, communicatio$siJr`L1 (including cryptography) a nd the implications of unconventional weapons should be emphasised. PEC QMIENDAT IONS 11. It is recommended that the above c onclusions be noted. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-130-96 EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ENCLOSURE sm r r LIST (F EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY NATO MAJOR COMMANDERS SACBUR (Brief Preliminary Reports are at Appendix " A" ) ä.« CPX One — To study the stage, management and conduct of the mobile operations in the early stages of war, 32* GRAND ALLIANCE 1 — To give realistic setting for testing the working of Staffs and signal commnnicat ions. £. ROSEBUSH — A "two-sided" maneuver at tine corps level. d. EQUINOXE — A "two-sided" maneuver by the French Occupa­ tion Forces in Germnny. e.. HOLDFAST — A "two-sided" mnneuver by the British Army of Occupation on the Rhine. £.. ANCIENT WALL — A series of seven regimental or division size maneuvers including attack, defense, exploitation, small amphib­ ious exercise and modern maneuver s. g,. JUNE PRIMER — An air exer cise conducted by Commander-in- Chief Allied Air Forces Central Europe. £i. BLUE ALLIANCE — An air exercise supporting ground forces in exercises HOLDFAST a nd EQUINCKE. i,. MATNPjRACE — To exercise the forces of SACSUR and SACIANT in cooperation with the defense of t he Northern Flanks. SACIANT (Brief Preliminary reports are at Appendix " B" ) a.. GÄHNST — A Naval exercise in the control and pr otection of shipping against the submarine threat. , b. Mft.INDllft.CE — Designed to exercise forces (Primarily Navy) of SACEUR a nd SACIANT with particular reference to the support of the Northern Flank of Europe. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-130-96 EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE £.• IMMIGRANT — A Naval exercise in the control and protection of shipping against the threat of submarine and surface raider action. CHANNEL COMMAND SSSSET (Brief Preliminary Reports are at Appendix "C") a . BANDFAU SERIES — These were a series of minesweeping exercises. p_, ANNA IS SERIES — A series of exercises .with reference t o the support of convoys by air defense. ç. CAST DIETS — A Major Comvex/Flex Exercise. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE DECLASSIFIE-MISE IMSM-130-96 EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE APPENDIX "A(S ‘ NATO • SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE PARIS, FRANCE SHAPE/1212/52 8 November 1952 AG I7O2 OT SUBJECT: Report on NATO Exercises - 1952 TO: Standing Group Washington, D. C. 1. In your cable STAND 392 as modified by STAND 421, you requested that brief reports on NATO Exercises which have been conducted since the last Military Committee Meeting be submitted by major commands for the purpose of briefing the Military Committee. These briefs, covering the most important aspects and lessons learned from the principal exercises conducted, are attached hereto. 2. It was evident from the maneuvers and exercises held this year that all three services have made considerable progress in combat effectiveness and cooperative ability. In the following paragraphs I have set out ths main conclusions reached. 3. Armv Forces a. Headquarters (1) To achieve maximum troop training from maneuvers, their scale should not be larger than corps versus corps. This principle was followed throughout all gronnd maneuvers this year. Consequently, field army and higher headqua rters have not received the full training they require. This must be carried out by regular command post exercises during future periods. While ma neuvers on the scale outlined leads to increased battle efficiency at lower echelons, the present financial and political implications of very large scale maneuvers make it impracticable to exercise the higher echelons except by command post exercises. (2) Liaison and cooperation between headquarters of different nationalities was fully exercised, particularly within forces of the Central Command. In all cases, the willingness to work together was demonstrated to a high degree. This relationship was particularly noteworthy between French and American headquarters in the planning and conduct of Exercises ROSEBUSH and EQUINOXE. (3) There is a continuing need for exercising jointly Army and Air Headquarters at field army level and higher.