Leases, Land and Local Leaders

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Leases Land and Local Leaders: An analysis of a squatter settlement upgrading programme in Karachi

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Leases, Land and Local Leaders

An analysis of a squatter settlement upgrading programme in Karachi

Yap Kioe-Sheng

VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT AMSTERDAM Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut

VLJ De Boelelaan 1105, Postbus 7161, 1007 Me Amsterdam The series BIJDRAGEN TOT DE SOCIALE GEOGRAFIE EN PLANOLOGIE (Contributions to Human Geography and Urban and Regional Planning) is published by the Institute for Geographical Studies and Urban and Regional Planning of the Free University of Amsterdam. The Institute cannot be held responsible for the contents and opinions expressed in the publications; this responsibility rests solely with the author(s) and/or the listed departmental section(s).

Editorial Committee: G.A.de Bruijne J.Buit A.O.Kouwenhoven J.van Weesep J.van Westrhenen

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Kioe-Sheng, Y ap

Leases, Land and Local Leaders: an analysis of a squatter settlement upgrading programme in Karachi/ Yap Kioe-Sheng; (uitg. van het) Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut; (foto's Evert Meijer).- Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit.- Ill., foto's.- (Bijdragen tot de Sociale Geografie en Planologie; nr. 4). Met bibliogr., index. ISBN 90-6631-060-X SISO 955 UDC 911.3 Trefw.: sociale geografie; Pakistan.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the copyright owners.

Printed in the Netherlands by photo offset. Krips Repro, Meppel, 1982. "It is hoped that DAM would give their fullest attention and time to the primary

objective of regularization and improvement of katchi abadis, for which KMC

would continue to give them all the assistance".

(from a letter by the Administrator of KMC to the teamleader of DAM. Karachi, July 18, 1978)

To N. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 7

PROLOGUE The case of Ittehad Town 11

A THE POLICY 11

1 Autonomous housing: panacea or pitfall 11 1.1 Introduction 11 1.2 The views of John Turner 14 1.3 Limitations to Turners' theory 17 1.4 Marxists' critique 19 1.5 Conclusion 24

2 An improvement policy for katchi abadis 27

2.1 Karachi 27 2.2 An "Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas" 30 2.3 An action programme 33 2.4 The Central Planning Team 35

3 Refinement and redefinition of the improvement policy 38 3.1 The end of the Lyari Project 38 3.2 Lessons from Lyari 41 3.3 Standards and lease rates 44 3.4 People's participation 45 3.5 A permanent housing stock for low-income groups 48

INTERLUDE The case of 52 Jhuggies 53

1 A request 53 2 Regularization or relocation ? 57 3 Land ownershi p 60 4 Conclusions 62 B THE KARACHI SLUM IMPROVEMENT PROJECT 63 4 Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme 63 4.1 Introduction 63 4.2 The historical perspective 65 4.3 A survey of the area 69 4.4 The project proposal 72 4.5 Proposed improvement of Baldia Township 73 4.6 The financial plan 76 4.7 Some initial comments 78

5 Planning of Baldia Township 80 5.1 Concept planning 80 5.2 Community organization 83 5.3 Public objections to the concept plan 85 5.4 Detailed planning 88 5.5 Issuing of leases 91

6 Financing Baldia's improvement 93

6.1 PC I Baldia (part 1) 93 6.2 The lease rate schedule 94 6.3 PC I Baldia (part 2) 98 6.4 PC I Baldia (part 3) 101

INTERLUDE The case of Bhutta Village 103

1 Introduction 103 2 Approval of the budget 104 3 Processing of the bill 107 4 The results of the survey 111 5 Summary and conclusion 114 C AN ANALYSIS 117

7 An assessment of the project 117 7.1 The end of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project 117 7.2 Extenuating circumstances 118 7.3 Irretrievable consequences 123 7.4 Conflicts of interests 126

8 Marxist critique reconsidered 132 8.1 Capital interests and housing policy 132 8.2 Regularized plots as commodity 133 8.3 Land ownership in Karachi 136 8.4 Katchi abadi upgrading and political pressure 140

9 Organizing katchi abadi communities 144 9.1 The need for public participation 144 9.2 Community assisting organization 148 9.3 The soak-pit project and beyond 152 9.4 Summary and conclusions 156

Notes 160

Bibliography 164 Appendix 1 Organizational chart of the Central 167 Planning Team of KMC 167 Appendix 2 List of abbreviations 169 List of Urdu words used 170 List of maps and figures 170

Index 172 PREFACE

At the conclusion of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project in June 1979, the weekly 'Pakistan Economist' published an article on achievements and setbacks during more than twelve years (1967 - 1979) of Amsterdam Free University involvement in squatter settlement upgrading in Karachi. The article had been written by Emiel Wegelin, one of the members of the Dutch advisory team for the project, and it was entitled 'Slum Improve ment in Karachi: Look Back in Despair'. At that moment some despair was understandable. The four Dutch advisers in the team had endeavoured for two years to implement the plans which had been prepared for the first squatter settlement to be upgraded and legalized under the project. But in June 1979 the Free University and the Government of the Netherlands withdrew the team because of lack of progress in implementation, obviously the result of unwillingness on the part of the Pakistani authorities to execute their policy of squatter settlement upgrading. The despair was mixed with astonishment, however, for at the start of the project all conditions seemed favourable for a smooth execution of the project. For approximately ten years the Amsterdam Free University (during the last five years in collaboration with the University of Karachi in the Joint Research Project IV) had studied the potential of squatter settlement upgrading in Karachi. Eventually it had formulated concrete policy recommendations for the Pakistani authorities, and these recommendations had been adopted by the Karachi r~etropolitan Corporation as basic principles for a policy of squatter settlement upgrading. Subsequently, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme had taken the place of the Free University. Together with the Metropolitan Corporation, UNDP experts formulated the 'Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas' and established a separate municipal department for squatter settlement upgrading called the 'Central Planning Team'. After the departure of the UNDP team it had been the assignment of the Dutch advisers (again from the Free University) to advise and assist the Central Planning Team in the execution of the policy. Despite

7 these intensive and long-lasting preparations a systematic execution of the policy proved to be impossible. Therefore, the title of the article in the 'Pakistan Economist' could also have been: 'Slum Improvement in karachi: Look Back in Bewilderment'. This book has been written out of bewilderment. It is an attempt to analyze the Karachi Slum Improvement Project and to suggest causes for the lack of achievements during the two years the project lasted. The book consists of three parts: Part A (The Policy) presents a theoretical discussion on the rationale of squatter settlement upgrading and the criticism of such a policy by (neo-)t1arxists. It also gives a description of the Improvement Policy for Sub standard Urban Areas of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. Part B (The Project) deals with the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme, the main assignment of the Central Planning Team and the Dutch Advisory Mission during the Karachi Slum Improvement Project. Part C (The Analysis) discusses the obstacles for a prompt execution of the Improvement Policy and an implementation of the Baldia Township Scheme. Suggestions are made to reinforce the role of squatter settlement residents in the planning and implementation of upgrading schemes. Between the three parts, two other assignments of the Central Planning Team and the Dutch advisers are described; namely '52 Jhuggies' and 'Bhutta Village'. These two cases are presented because they provide an illustration of the applicability of the Improvement Policy and the functioning of the Karachi r~etropolitan Corporation, respectively. This book confines itself to the period the Dutch Advisory Mission spent in Karachi, i.e., from June 1977 until June 1979. After the Dutch team had left, some new developments with regard to the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme occurred, but these have not been included in the book, mainly because their true impact and background cannot yet be completely grasped. Working in a team inevitably creates a situation which makes it

8 impossible after some time to discern who came with which idea and who put forward which argument. Although many of the ideas in the book came from the Dutch team and from the Pakistani counterpart staff, the contents of the book obviously remain the full responsibility of the author. This implies that I am indebted to the members of the Dutch Advisory Mission: Jan van der Linden, Ernst Lohman, Miel Wegelin and Henk Meijerink, and to the staff of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, in particular Zahid Hussain Bukhari and Mohammed Rafi Quereshi. Closely related to the Dutch Advisory t1ission was the Baldia Evaluation Survey Team (Madeleen Schuringa, Evert ~1eijer and Salahuddine Khan), which helped me to gain a better understanding of the origins and growth of Baldia Township. This book could not have been written without the support of the Development Sociology Section of the Amsterdam Free University, and in particular, prof.dr.J.W.Schoorl. Grants from the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation provided the funds necessary to write and publish the book. The views expressed in it are, however, those of the author and not necessarily those of any of the organizations involved in its publication. The maps and figures were drawn by J.ter Haar, J.Pickford, B.Reed, H.Meijerink and CPT/Kt1C, while E.Meijer contributed most of the photographs. The English text of the book was corrected by Victoria Vlek. I wish to express my thanks to all of them. Most of all I am indebted to the residents of Baldia Township, 52 Jhuggies, and Bhutta Village. This book has also been written out of commitment to their cause. We raised their expectations for a better living environment, but were unable to keep our promises. I only hope that they will not 'look back in disappointment and frustration' at the project, but will continue their struggle for security and better living conditions in their area.

Yap Kioe-Sheng Amsterdam, June 1981

9 PROLOGUE

The case of Ittehad Town

(Translation of a press release published in the Urdu daily 'AMN' of December 6, 1978). WORKERS OF THE PAKlSTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE ARE SELLING GOVERNMENT PROPERTY. r~ARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES SHOULD INVESTIGATE ItiJMEDIATELY, SAYS Mr.r~UJAHID KHAN BAL UCH; A leader of the Pakistan People's Party and president of the City Area I, West Karachi, Mr.Mujahid Khan Baluch, has called the attention of the Governor and Martial Law Administrator, Lt,Gen.Abassi, to the fact that some opportunists are selling government land under the name of Ittehad Town and are earning money by making fools of innocent people. This matter should be investigated by the Martial Law Authorities. He added that under the guidance of Mr.Qari Sher Afzal, Information Secretary for Sind of the Jamiat~·ul~Ulema-e-Islam (Mufti t1ahmud Group), and Mr.Rahim Shah, a group has prepared a scheme and is illegally selling land of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. The group charges from Rs.200 to RS,500 per plot for allotment, while a receipt for only Rs.1 is issued from the Ittehad Committee. When the Land Department of KMC took action against the group, Qari Sher Afzal used his political status and started blackmailing KMC. Since a person from a party represented in Government is involved in this malpractice, the situation is detrimental to the present Government's reputation. The Martial Law authorities should investigate this matter immediately, and the responsible persons should be punished. Mr.Baluch said that if these people are not prevented from selling Government land, they will earn hundreds of thousands of rupees. He said that this group had also sold land worth hundreds of thousands of rupees in Orangi. The Karachi Development Authority had initiated action against the group, but it could not achieve anything because of directives from a higher level.

10 A THE POLICY

1 Autonomous housing: panacea or pitfall

1.1 Introduction

For quite some time discussions about urbanization and housing in the Third World centered around the question: slum clearance, yes or no ? In those days demolition of squatter settlements in and around Third World cities seemed to be the only option for governments faced with a rapidly urbanizing society. In practice the only alternative for clearance was the complete neglect of squatter settlements by the authorities. If clearance was the policy, government actions only differed with regard to the fate of the residents from cleared slum areas: relocation in their (rural) region of origin, or relocation in flats and low-cost houses in the city itself. Since th€ mid-1960's urban sociologists and planners have tried to convince governments that slum clearance cannot be the answer to the housing crisis, and that slums and squatter settlements perform a function in rapidly growing cities. Van der Linden (1977, pp.287-291), quoting from a range of publications, mentions several positive features of squatter settlements, among them: the provision of shelter at low costs; the creation of job opportunities; their operation as reception area and shock absorber for newly arriving migrants; and the freedom they offer to residents to select their community, budget their resources and shape their environment. Van der Linden (Ibid.pp.291-292) concludes that with the removal of squatter settlements, most positive aspects also disappear; there is also an enormous disadvantage in destroying dwellings when there is a shortage of houses and financial means are scarce. To quote Charles Abrams (1970, p.127); 'Worse than sl ums is a sl um shortage that provides no shelter'. Van der Linden (1977, pp.299-300) therefore recommends that governments legalize and improve squatter settlements instead of destroying them.

11 The most prominent advocate of a policy which recognizes the positive aspects of squatter settlements for housing of low-income groups is John F.e.Turner. In several books and dozens of articles Turner has tried to show why a policy of constructing complete dwelling units by the public or private sector cannot solve the housing crisis, and why residents' control over planning, construction and management of houses (what Turner calls 'autonomous housing') is the only possible answer. Since the early 1970's Turner and his so-called self-help school seem to have convinced politicians and administrators of the validity of this view. Initially this change of policy became manifest in the attention given to site-and-services projects. In these projects, governments and international development agencies tried to initiate the development of autonomous settlements in a guided and planned manner. When site-and-services projects proved to be a too costly alternative for the 'real' squatter settlements, attention shifted to squatter settlement upgrading. In a number of cities (such as Jakarta, t1anilla, Calcutta and Karachi) this approach of the housing problem was introduced. Basic to the approach are two objectives: the provision of security of tenure by legalization of the settlement, and improvement of living conditions in the settlement by upgrading its infrastructure. Thenceforth, a new debate (Lea 1979a, p.1) has been taken place between what are now sometimes called 'convivialists' (Turner and the self-help school) and (neo-)t1arxists. The discussion now centres around the question whether squatter settlements and squatter settlement upgrading contribute to an improvement of the living conditions of the urban poor, or should be seen as a political action by the government to incorporate the settlements in the capitalist system to the detriment of the poor. This chapter deals with the debate between convivialists and Marxists, a debate which unfortunately remains rather abstract and does not lead to any practical alternative to squatter settlement upgrading. While describing this debate, we are faced with a number of difficulties. Obviously, Turner is the main representative of the convivialists; but who should represent the r~arxists ? Several critics could be considered, but they do not always hold a common view. Remarkably enough, the same is true for Turner himself: his first articles date from the mid-1960's; and since those days he has constantly

12 corrected, amended and developed his views, which are therefore not always consistent. Moreover, his ideas are scattered over dozens of articles and books, making it rather difficult to put together a comprehensive summary of these ideas. Another problem in summarizing Turner's views pertains to the deter mination of which elements are essential to his theory and which ones are not. Numerous critical questions can be raised, for instance, about the validity of his model of settlement development pattern and of geographical and socio-economic trajectories of migrants; but their omission does not seem to affect the essence of his ideas. A final problem we face while discussing Turner's theory is that his ideas - as well as those of most of his critics - are based on experiences in Latin America, while this book deals with Karachi, Pakistan.

This pavement dweller in the centre of Karachi has made his home out of cartons. It is necessary for him to live in the city centre to earn some money.

13 1.2 The views of John Turner

Two related concepts seem to be at the centre of Turner's theory: standards and dwellers' control (or autonomy). In this secti on of the chapter we shall present Turner's philosophy of housing (as Colin Ward calls it) in two stages. First, we shall discuss what Turner sees as the problem: standards. Second, we shall take a look at Turner's solution: dwellers' control.

Standards. "Only in an impossible world of limitless resources and perfect justice -where people could have their cake and eat it too - could there be a coincidence of material and human value. For the present we must accept that as long as there are unsatisfied desires for material goods and services, people must choose between the cakes they can afford to eat. So long as this fact of life remains, and as long as people's priorities vary, the usefulness of things will vary independently of their material standard or monetary value" (Turner 1976, p.61). What Turner obviously means to say is that in an economy of scarcity people have to make choices, and since they have dHferent levels of income, they have different needs and priorities and consequently make different choices. What is 'best' varies and cannot be measured by absolute standards; 'best' is what satisfies the particular needs of individual people. This is also true for housing: a house of materially higher standards is not neces sarily 'better' for its occupants than a house of lower standards. What is important is that the house satisfies the needs and priorities of the people who occupy it. Most public and private housing projects fail because this principle is not taken into account. Planners fix a level of standards which usually coincides with the urban-industrial middle-~lass norms, and they assess the housing need by deducting the number of dwelling units at or above this standard from the total number of households. Subsequently, they try to reduce the apparent housing shortage by constructing dwelling units which meet the standards they have initially set. fn Turner's view this is an obvious misinterpretation of the housing crisis, and therefore an in adequate approach to its solution (Ibid. pp.60-61). Instead of quantifiable measures for housing needs, people's housing

14 needs should be stated in terms of priorities. Three universal basic housing needs can be distinguished: - location with access to people, institutions and amenities on which livelihood depends; - minimum shelter from hostile elements, whether climatic or social; - secure tenure which lasts long enough to make the move worthwhile. A house can be a home, if and only if it is minimally accessible, provides minimum shelter and gives minimum security of tenure. However, these limits are immensely variable, and they vary with the socio-economic conditions and expectations of the concerned household (Ibid.p.97 and Turner 1968,p.356). Particularly in developing countries people's needs - including their housing needs - are very sensitive to changes in socio-economic conditions. Turner distinguishes three types and levels of social situations (for migrants) in Third World cities according to income level: - the bridge-header (with a very low income), who seeks a toehold in the city and hopes to improve himself. He has a high priority for location of his residence, since this determines his job and income opportunities. Tenure and quality of his house have a low priority for him; - the consolidator (with a low income), who has gained a relatively firm foothold in the city, but is in danger of losing it unless he can con solidate his newly achieved socio-economic status. He gives a high priori ty to tenure, since urban home ownership provides at least a partial source of social and-economic security. He gives a medium priority to location ('no longer') and quality ('not yet') of his house; - the status-seeker (with a medium income), whose first priority is a house of good quality. Location and tenure are less important to him (Turner 1968, p.358). For that reason the central slum is a functional place of residence for the very-low-income group, the bridge-headers. The peripheral squatter settle ment fits the needs and priorities of the low-income group, the consolida tors. The middle-class residential areas suit t~e wishes of the middle income group, the status-seekers.

Dweller's control According to Turner, the only way governments can match housing to the particular needs and priorities of the various target groups is to involve these people directly in urban planning and low-income housing policies.

15 With this in mind he formulated three principles. 1. If what matters in housing is what it does for people (a home which suits their needs) rather than what it is (a house of certain standards), the consequence shou 1d be selj'-gover'nmenr in housing. On ly when hous i ng is determined by households and by local institutions and the enter- pri ses they contro 1, can the requ is ite vari ety in dwe 11 i ng env i ronmen t be achieved. Only then can supply and demand be properly matched and consequently be satisfied. Dwellers' control, for that matter, does not merely or necessarily mean autoconstruction, but relates to planning, construction and management. 2. In an economy of scarcity the mass of the common people, though poor, possesses the bulk of the nation's human and material resources for housing. Their collective entrepreneurial and managerial skills (and spare time) far surpass the financial and administrative capacity of even the most highly planned and centralized institutional system - whether dominated by the state or by private capitalist corporations. The conviction that the economy of housing is a matter of personal and local resourcefulness rather than centrally controlled industrial productivity leads to the principle of appropriate technology for housing. 3. If people in their own locality have the ultimate authority over housing, and if investment and care depend on resources that only they can use economically, the conclusion should be that planning is an essentially legislative, limit-setting p:t'ocess to maintain equitable access to resources and avoid exploitation. In other words, in order to make it possible for low-income groups to govern their housing process and utilize their own resourcefulness, the government's task in planning is mainly to guarantee a continued access for low-income groups to the essential housing resources, such as land, materials, credit and technology (Turner 1976, pp.102-105). These three principles point in the direction of what Turner calls an unfettered or informal sector housing system. The network of in dependent operators provides the requisite variety of the controlling system, so that locally and personally specific demands are more easily met. The consequently greater expectations of satisfaction stimulate the use of available human and material resources: personal responsibility - and therefore tolerance - are maximized (Ibid. pp.135-136).

16 Thus, Turner's major recommendation for a solution to the housing problems in Third World cities is the directed or assisted development of 'spontaneous' or 'autonomous' settlements based on the provision of elements of environmental security: appropriate technology, tenancy and investment opportunities (Turner & Goetze 1967 p.123). His recom mendations imply that new low-income families looking for shelter in the city should be given the opportunity to meet their housing needs autonomously by granting them access to the necessary resources, within limits set by the government. To low-income families which have already met their housing needs autonomously in spontaneous settlements, security of tenure should be provided as first priority, followed by access to other resources, so that they can improve their living conditions.

1.3 Limitations of Turner's theory

Before discussing the critique of Turner's ideas by the Marxists, it may be good to first draw attention to comments (some by 'fellow convivialists') on the general validity of the ideas. These comments introduce limitations to the theory, while leaving the basic principles intact. Dwyer (1975, p.201), who seems critical but not opposed to Turner's

ideas, refers, for ins tance I to the many spontaneous settl ements, "i n which the densities of population are far too high and the building patterns too chaotic to permit their easy rationalization". He quotes Zafar Ahmed Khan, who wrote that in Karachi along the Lyari River "every available foot of land has been built upon so that instead of streets and roads there are narrow and winding lanes which provide the only approach to the houses, and in some parts of the area the population dens ity exceeds 2400 persons to the hectare" (Ibi d. pp. 201-203) . What should be done about these settlements ?

17 Turner is likely to reply that these settlements probably suit the needs and priorities of the residents in view of their socio-economic position. To these people (probably late bridge-headers or early con solidators), location has the highest priority. The settlements along the Lyari River to which Ahmed Khan refers are located near the city centre and an industrial area, and therefore provide easy access to income and job opportunities. People living along the Lyari River risk once a year the demolition of their houses by the floods after heavy monsoon rains; but they are ready to accept that risk, since to them secure tenure and a good-quality dwelling have a lower priority than access to income opportunities. Still, one may raise the question of whether or not 'in the public interest' a city can afford to have residential areas, where high population density, an inadequate layout and lack of infrastructure create permanent dangers to public health.Turner does not seem to be worried by this situation and probably believes that Third World cities have to accept it. Moreover, his classification of three social situations of migrants (incidentally, why only migrants ?) - bridge header, consolidator, status-seeker - seems to indicate that he expects most, if not all bridge-headers ('the common bridge-header') to become consolidators one day. Once they have become consolidators, they will improve their living conditions by investing their savings in an improvement of their houses; or they will move out of the neighbourhood to settle in a consolidators area. They will be replaced initially by other bridge-headers, but it is Turner's expectation that eventually - with national economic growth - bridge-headers and the need for 'poor housing' will gradually disappear (Turner 1968, pp.358-360). Benninger (1970), however, observed in India that definitely not all bridge-headers achieve the consolidator status. Many come into what he calls a prolonged reception and intermediate stage. Likewise, Dwyer (1975, p.204) and Payne (1977, p.75) point out that some people are and remain too poor to become self-improving owner-occupiers in a spontaneous settlement. They remain in the central slum area, usually under very bad 1iving conditions; or become tenants in a spontaneous settlement, in which case they also miss the motivation to improve their housing conditions. Even if they find an opportunity to squat,

18 they will not be able to improve their house. Turner does not come with any suggestion on how to improve the housing conditions of these (prolonged) bridge-headers. He concentrates all his attention on the consolidators and thereby neglects the poorest of the poor. In the preface to Turner and Fichter's book, 'Freedom to Build', Fichter frankly admits that "the hopeless poor may well remain just as much a dilemma after this book as before it" (Turner & Fichter 1972, p. IX). How ever, for the urban authorities the dilemma cannot remain unsolved if the living conditions of these very-low-income groups create public health hazards, and if these people do not have the resources to improve their housing situation.

1.4 Marxist's critique

While discussing the housing crisis in Third World cities, Marxists often quote Friedrich Engels' 'The housing question'. Engels stated that the housing shortage suffered by the workers and petty bourgeoisie in the modern cities is one of the secondary miseries which result from the present capi talist mode of production. In Engels' view, it is definitely not a direct consequence of the exploitation of workers as workers by capitalism. Ex ploitation is the fundamental evil the social revolution wants to abolish by abolishing the capitalist mode of production (Engels 1962, p.214). In other words, the housing shortage is merely a symptom and one of the many inevitable consequences of the capitalist mode of production. The housing crisis cannot be solved unless and until the capitalist mode of production has been abolished.

Housing in the capitalist system Following Engels, Marxists reproach convivialists with an incorrext analysis of the causes of the housing crisis by isolating this crisis from the prevailing capitalist structures in society. Marxists try to show convivialists that autonomous housing cannot solve the housing crisis, and they accuse convivialists of reinforcing - intentionally or not - the status quo of inequality and capitalist dominance.

19 Burgess (1978, pp.1111-1112) in particular points out the shortcomings in Turner's analysis of the housing crisis. Turner advocates autonomous production of houses, because in his view they meet the needs and priori ties of the occupants, and they are much cheaper than houses heterono mously constructed by centrally administered systems. According to Burgess, expensiveness of heteronomous housing construction is not the result of a bureaucratically and technologically top-heavy, centralized system; but both are the consequence of the capitalist mode of production. The interests of industrial capital (through the monopoly of the building material sector), the interests of landed capital in high land costs, the system of subcontraction of labour and the profits involved - all of these constitute the principal elements in the cost of heteronomously produced houses. Now if the real causes of the housing crisis lie in the capitalist mode of production rather than in the heteronomy of the present housing delivery system, autonomizing the housing production will not solve the crisis unless it tackles the capitalist mode of production. But when Turner argues that the State should intervene to guarantee local access to raw materials, finances and land for low-income groups, Burgess wonders if it could be seriously expected that the interests of industrial, financial and landed capital are going to legislate against themselves (Ibid.p.1119). From here on, the views of the Marxists seem to diverge. Some, like Rivas and Janssen, positively appraise the early spontaneous settle ment process - in particular squatter invasions - as attacks on the capitalist system by low-income groups in an attempt to gain access to land, resources, etc. Rivas (1977, p.323) writes: "The action of the barriada as a collective project is dysfunctional to the system, whenever it involves confrontation with power groups. This is evident in the invasion stage, in which private property defined as one of the system's foundations is attacked". Janssen (1973, p.218) notes that urban social movements of barrio dwellers mainly concern the procurement, consolidation and defense of public services and a place to live. If they have an organized and more Or less permanent character, they con stitute the barrio dwellers' contribution to the class struggle for what Janssen calls the right to the city.

20 Rivas and Janssen both have to admit, however, that in most cases the in surgent and emancipatory character of the squatter movement is lost in the process of consolidation. The spontaneous settlement is incorporated in the capitalist system, where it has to accept a relationship of dominance. Other Marxists therefore consider the entire process of spontaneous settlement as functional to the capitalist system. As Burgess (1978, p.1112) states: "The squatter has not escaped capitalism;he is merely in another part of it". In this regard, Burgess also criticizes Turner's idea that an autonomously produced house mainly or only has a use value for its owner and not an exchange value. He points out that autoproduction and consumption of a house do not in themselves mean that we can understand these outside the process of commodity formation. Commercial products are consumed, such as raw materials, which have an exchange value derived from labour spent on their elaboration. Autoconstruction of houses also involves a considerable imput of (paid) labour, which gives a new value to the materials used, including recycled throw-aways and commercial materials (Ibid. p.1109). Self-built housing as a commodity only differs from other housing com modities insofar as it is constructed for the immediate use of the producer, rather than for exchange by agents other than the consumer. This is the distinction between housing as a real commodity and housing as a potential commodity. Yet, the house being a product of human labour and being in vested with a determined labour time is given a price by the capitalist market; this price can be realized if the producer turns the use value into exchange value by putting the house on the market for sale or rent (Ibid. p.1l09).

Functionality of the squatter settlement Burgess (Ibid. p.1113, n. 9) also attacks Turner's proposition about the functionality of the various settlement patterns for the needs and priorities of the different income groups. The priorities of people in different social situations (bridge-header, consolidator, status-seeker) depend directly on their level of income, which is determined by the capitalist structure of society. In this respect, settlements which fit the priorities of the various income groups are functional only for the capitalist mode of production.

21 Autonomy in housing systems may produce cheap and constructor/owner occupied houses. Insofar as housing is necessary for the maintenance and expanded reproduction of social labour, the dominant capitalist mode of production is satisfied to allow the self-production of such activities, particularly if the absence of rent and the association of such housing with various forms of subsistence activities that extend family budgets will mean less pressure for wage increases (Ibid. p.1115). Vernez and Valenzuela, quoted by Janssen, speak of 'self exploitation' by the popular sector, which in fact subsidizes the capitalist sector by reducing pressure on wages in view of lower housing costs (Janssen 1978, p.85). Moreover, once established and consolidated, the spontaneous settlements are usually penetrated by the capitalist system, as richer and more powerful groups in society take interests in the settlement with its houses and plots. The self-built dwellings change from potential commodity into real commodity and take on an exchange-value determined by the capitalist market. The original low-income residents are gradually replaced by middle-income families, who purchase the houses at prices many times the original investments. The low-income groups which started the settlement and constructed the houses usually do not benefit from these price increases; most profits go to middlemen and speculators. Janssen observed this process in the settlement of 'Santa Rosa' in Bogota, Colombia (Ibid, pp.133-139).

Government programmes for squatter settlements Following Turner's recommendations, governments of several Third World countries have started to legalize and upgrade spontaneously created settlements and to guide the development of new settlements. Depending on their opinion about the nature of the 'real' spontaneous settlements, Marxists diverge somewhat in their appraisal of these government programmes. Critics like Rivas and Janssen, who discern some positive insurgent and emancipatory elements in squatter movements, see government attention to spontaneous settlements mainly as an attempt to neutralize and depoliticize these movements. According to Janssen, the authorities initiate community development programmes in spontaneous

22 settlements in an effort to undermine the cautious and often spontaneous attempts by barrio dwellers to give the defense of their interest a militant character (Ibid. p.141). Sara Michl (1973, pp.155-178) takes an intermediate stand. In her opinion, successive governments in Peru permitted relative freedom for squatter settlement formation as a cheap and safe way to satisfy the housing needs of the urban poor, while they were channelling public funds into housing projects for middle and upper classes. They could do so because vacant government-owned desert land was abundantly available near Lima until the late 1960's. When by that time all conveniently located public land had been occupied, the possibility of continued squatter invasions posed a serious threat to private real estate. In view of the tightening land supply, the government outlawed squatter land invasions, designating instead specific areas where the city's poor may homestead, and established firm and formal control over new squatter settlement formation. Critics like Burgess, who emphasize the functionality of spontaneous settlements for the capitalist system per se, consider the government programmes merely as a new step by power groups to accelerate the penetration of the popular sector by the capitalist system. Burgess (1978, p.1120) writes: "If the State post-facto legalizes an invasion by granting tenure, it will merely facilitate the penetration of commodity relations in land, where hitherto they either did not exist or where they were underdeveloped (precisely because they were illegal). If it legalizes such lands before possession, it will merely allow for the market valuation of these lands, which otherwise would have been invaded or bought illegally (at lower prices}. In both instances the intervention of the state which Turner argues as the principal policy necessity has facilitated the penetration of the commodity form of land. There are many reasons why the State would do this, but the interest of the squatter would hardly be the deci s i ve one".

23 1.5 Conclusion John P.Lea (1979a, p.4) concludes that the debate between convivialists

and (neo- )~~arxists creates a di lemma: "(On the one hand) an intellectually persuasive interpretation of underdevelopment by ~1arxist critics, which has great explanatory strength, but is unable to accommodate most changes in housing policy of the in cremental kind for obvious ideological reasons. Set against this is what appears to be a politically naive but at the same time practical attempt to encourage the poor to better themselves despite the odds 1 ined up against them". At this stage we would like to make only two preliminary obser vations. The first one concerns Burgess' accusation that Turner's recommendations merely serve to maintain the capitalist system; the second one concerns Burgess' statement that the urban poor cannot benefit by legalization and upgrading of their spontaneously created settlements. If legalization and improvement of squatter settlements and programmes of guided autonomous housing are functional for the capitalist system and do not provide a real solution to the housing crisis, the question can still be raised whether or not they in any way delay the solution of the crisis by obstructing an early abolition of the capitalist system. There seems to be an inclination among some ~arxists to resort to a vulgar version of Marx' theory of pauperization ('Verelendung'); improve ment of living conditions of the urban poor reduces the revolutionary potential necessary to abolish the capitalist system; deterioration of their living conditions enhances this potential. The theory of pauperi zation has led to a long-lasting debate among Marxists concerning its validity. It seems that most r~arxist theorists now postulate that psycho logical deprivation arising from alienation in the production process, rather than physical misery of their living conditions, increases the class consciousness and revolutionary urges of the workers (\~right Mills 1962, pp.86-87 and p.110). Bad living conditions in Third World cities may sometimes have given rise to rebellious movements by the urban poor, but these movements rarely took on a revolutionary character. Odongo (1979, p.34) and Lea (1976b, p.52) quote evidence that feelings of frustration and discontent do exist among many slum dwellers in Third World cities, but that radical groups in those cities are generally those who have gained some material possessions and education. Lea (Ibid.p.38) even concludes

24 that on this basis ownership of a house in a site-and-services project (or a legalized settlement) may not be counter-revolutionary after all, but is more likely to radicalize the occupants than if they were left alone. If, in addition, the observations of Rivas and Janssen are correct, and squatter settlements initially do reveal some real emancipatory elements, it may become all the more important to find out if - and if so, how - these emancipatory elements may be preserved (and perhaps be reinforced) in programmes of legalization and improvement of spontaneous settlements. But even if legalization and upgrading of spontaneous settlements and guided autonomous housing do not negatively affect the revolutionary potential of the proletariat and subproletariat - and thereby the eventual abolition of the capitalist system - then Burgess' observation still stands: the urban poor do not benefit by these programmes, because of the penetration of commodity relations in legalized settlements. There is little evidence up to now of such negative consequences of squatter settlement upgrading projects. This is mainly because evalu ation studies of such projects rarely include a comparison of composition and income level of the settlement populations before and after legaliza tion. In fact, the entire debate between convivialists and Marxists remains rather theoretical and abstract because of a general lack of case material, not only with regard to penetration of commodity relations in legalized settlements, but also with regard to most aspects of squatter settlement upgrading. This book is an attempt to join in the debate by presenting a case study on a squatter settlement upgrading programme: the Karachi Slum Improvement Project (KSIP); For obvious reasons,not all aspects of the debate can be dealt with in this book. The main subject is the political context of the squatter settlement upgrading programme, i.e., the formulation and execution of an improvement policy for spontaneous settlements as political issues which became a prey in a power struggle between interest groups. In this book, first, an outline will be given of the legalization and upgrading policy for spontaneous settlements of the Karachi Metro politan Corporation. The outline will make clear how this policy has its roots in Turner's recommendations for informal housing delivery systems. Next, amendments to the policy, which became necessary after the break-

25 down of the first upgrading project in Karachi, will be discussed, Some of the amendments brought the policy more in line with Turner's ideas (e.g., regarding standards); other amendments refined and redefined the pol icy, so that it would better suit the pol itical and financi al real ities of the moment. In the second part of the book an account will be given of the execution of the policy during the two years the Karachi Slum Improvement Project lasted. Special attention will be paid to the legalization and improvement planning of one of Karachi's major spontaneous settlements, namely, Baldia Township. In three chapters the proceedings of the actual planning work will be described extensively, including the physical planning, the par ticipation of residents in planning, the preparation of the budget, etc. The third part will present an analysis of the policy, the project and the Baldia Township upgrading scheme. The obstacles to execution of the policy, the conflicting interests of people and institutions involved, and possible ways to overcome the obstacles will be portrayed. The analysis will show that Burgess is right when he emphasizes the political character of squatter settlement upgrading, which affects the interests of many powerful people and institutions. Turner seems to have neglected or underestimated this reality. On the other hand, it will become apparent how Turner's views may be politicized and brought in line with political realities for the benefit of the low-income population of spontaneous settlements in Karachi.

26 2 An improvement policy for katchi abadis

2.1 Karachi

Until the end of the 1940's Karachi was a small port and garrison town in the western part of British India. When the colony gained in dependence in 1947, it was divided on a communal basis into two sovereign states: a predominantly Hindu India and an Islamic Pakistan. Pakistan consisted of two parts: West Pakistan and East Pakistan, separated by 1000 miles of (hostile) Indian territory. As a centre of the Pakistan movement and in view of its harbour and airport, Karachi became the first capital of Pakistan (Chaudry 1973, p.198). The "Partition" of British India was characterized by massacres and communal riots between Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Out of fea'r of oppression and persecution, millions of people fled from India to Pakistan and vice versa. Karachi, as capital and as commercial and industrial centre abandoned by the Hindu population who had fled to India, attracted hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees (known as Muhajirs). Within five years (1947-1952) the population of Karachi grew from 350.000 to about 1,5 million (Ibid.p.269). The sudden arrival of so many people created enormous problems in the city. "The strain on the city's resources of housing, water supply, electricity and other services was great. A number of (housing) colonies like Lalukhet, Nazimabad, Landhi and others were constructed, but the supply always lagged behind the demand" (Ibid.p.269). Many refugees were forced to meet thei r hous i ng needs by occupyi ng vaca,nt 1and and bu il di ng their own shelter. In this way the first spontaneous settlements were created in Karachi. With independence rural-urban migration in Pakistan also gained momentum, in particular from the northern parts of the country: Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Karachi was the main pole of attraction. Although in 1959 the capital was shifted to Islamabad, a new town near Rawalpindi in the Punjab, Karachi as Pakistan's main port remained the commerci al, industrial (and pol iti cal) centre of the country.

27 NORTH KARACHI

1. Ka rachi

28 From that time rural-urban migration continued to be oriented towards this city. When in 1971 East Pakistan became the independent republic of Bangladesh, new waves of migrants from the former eastern part of the country settled in the city. With an ever increasing backlog in housing supply, more and more people in Karachi had to find shelter in spontaneous settlements. Their number is presently estimated at about 1,6 million. The oldest spontaneous settlement is Lyari, the origins of which go back to the 19th century. The area now borders on the city center and has about 600.000 inhabitants. Numerous plots are illegally occupied, but many parts of the settlement now resemble an inner city slum area rather than a squatter settlement. Most of the more recently created spontaneous settlements are situated at the periphery of the city. To the north, Karachi borders on the desert of Sind and the spontaneous growth of the city is mainly pointed in that direction. In addition, spontaneous settlements can be found along railway lines, in river beds and on vacant land in the city center. Since about 80% of the land in the Karachi Metropolitan Area is owned by national, provincial or local government (and given on lease to individuals and public or private institutions for periods of 99 years), most spontaneous settlements are located on public land. The Karachi Municipal (later r1etropolitan) Corporation (KMC) and the Karachi Improvement Trust, now Development Authority (KDA) , have tried in a number of ways to solve the city's housing crisis created by succes sive waves of migrants. Until recently, the basic principle of their approach was demolition of the illegal settlements and relocation of the inhabitants - on site or elsewhere. Karachi has had its low-cost housing projects (Korangi, North Karachi), its open-plot development programme (Baldia, Qasbah and Orangi Township), its site-and services project (Metroville) and its in-situ relocation in flats (Jacob Lines). None of these projects achieved its objective: relief of the housing crisis for the low-income groups. A change of policy occurred in the early 1970's as a result of several simultaneous and interrelated developments. Firstly, Turner's views gradually found acceptance in circles of international develop ment agencies, and the World Bank showed interest in financing a squatter settlement upgrading programme in Karachi. Secondly, since the late 1960's the Amsterdam Free University (AFU) and the University of Karachi had executed a joint research project (JRP IV) to study the

29 improvement potential of squatter settlements in Karachi. One of the major policy recommendations of the project was to legalize and improve these spontaneously created residential areas. Thirdly, the ruling Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Prime-Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was eager to legalize and improve the Lyari area, which was a predominantly PPP-oriented settlement and therefore a power base for the government. These circumstances led to the stationing of UNDP advisers in the KMC from 1975 unti 1977 to assist the Corporation with the following matters: preparation of legalization and improvement plans for Lyari, formulation of a general policy for squatter settlement upgrading ("Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas"), and creation of a separate municipal department - the Central Planning Team (CPT) - for the execution of the policy. The formulation of the policy and the creation of a separate department for squatter settlement upgrading were conditions set by the World Bank for the extension of a loan for improvement of Lyari and other areas in Karachi.

2.2 An "Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas" 1

In the chapter on Physical Planning and Housing of the draft Fifth Five-year Plan (1976-1981), the Government of Pakistan (KMC 1977b,p.8) wrote: " Katchi abadis and jhuggies (huts, YKS) exist, because they provide housing at rents that these people can afford and thus fulfil a need created by the tremendous shortages, and (.,) this housing gap will continue into the foreseeable future and thus new katchi abadis and jhuggies will continue to be created to meet the need of the numerically dominant lower-income groups. The fact is that these jhuggies as forms of unorganized self-help housing are inevitable and as such instead of clearance of these areas, a pro gramme of slum improvement should be undertaken, which should take into account the following factors: i. existing housing stock even in slums will have to be preserved wherever possible (through legalization of the settlements, YKS); ii. major rapid improvements in the living conditions of slum dwellers can be ach ieved through a we ll-organ i zed programme of envi ronmenta 1 improvement" (i.e. upgrading of infrastructure, YKS).

KMC elaborated this government statement in a policy document called "Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas". In this document KMC

30 says to have learned three vital lessons from recent experiences with kat(;h1: alHlcH (squatter settlement) upgrading (the earl ier attempts to legalize and improve Lyari) (Ibid. p.2).

"First. Standar'ds intended for vacant land should not be applied to densely populated areas as they lead to plans requiring massive relo cation, which generates public protest and rejection. KMC is now developing flexible standards for SUA's, suited to the circumstances and responding to the real needs of the residents. If standards are set too high, then they are not the best;they are worse because they prevent improvement instead of facilitating it. Second. No level of government has sufficient funds to build all essential urban improvement works. City-wide revenues must be applied to works benefitting the city as a whole. This means that the people in each area of the city must pay for improvement to their neighbourhood. Education and health facilities will be provided without direct charges. All concerned must recognize that there is no other way. Third. The residents of an area are directly affected by its conditions, so no SUA improvement project can succeed without the initiative and participation of its residents. Kr~C should carry planning to the people and with them should define their means and needs for improvement. Successful people's participation will be a boom to all concerned, as it will encourage collaboration instead of conflict". (my italics, YKS). These three lessons clearly link up with Turner's ideas of autonomous housing and follow his points of standards, resourcefulness and dweller's control. The K)l1C pol i cy document cont i nues : "It is clear from past experiences that initially not every facility can be provided at the same time at high standards (in all SUA's, YKS). Not enough money is available and even technical capabilities for project preparation and construction are in short supply. But that fact should not lead to the conclusion that nothing is to be done. Selection of a single area at a time for total development is one alternative, but it will result in the relative neglect of most SUA's for many years. Incremental improvement is the only acceptable alter native. This idea has multiple meanings, but all of them are relevant and can be applied in combination. Incremental improvement can mean: a. initial development of a cOmponent at a low standard with upgrading in the future; b. initially, one or a few components may be fully developed to a high standard with the other components being left for later; c. initially, certain components may be fully developed to a final standard, but only thinly spread throughout a SUA" (Ibid.p.24). However, even an incremental improvement of all SUA's in Karachi is a costly affair. "If a sound strategy is not adopted, the cost of the city-wide improvement could (still) be prohibitive. If the cost of improving Lyari 31 according to the present plans were taken as a guide, then the bill for bringing everyone up to the same standard would be in hundreds of crores of rupees (i.e., hundreds of millions of US dollars, YKO). Such enormous investment of currently available funds is just not feasible, so only a minor part of the problem could be solved this way. An approach must be devised which will permit sufficient improvement to all areas so that no one needs to live in squallor, without inves ting so much public funds that other national development priorities are slighted" (Ibid.pp.6-7). If KMC cannot finance the improvement of all SUA's in Karachi, the residents in the SUA's will have to contribute in the cost of the improvement projects. "Self-financing means quite simply that the residents must pay for what they get. Fortunately, recent research clearly shows that people are ready to pay for land and for improvement they consider important. Some improvements such as primary schools and health centers ( .. ) may be provided without direct charges. However, direct subsidies must be minimized as KMC and the government lack the means to provide heavy subsidies" (Ibid.p.14). By paying charges to KMC for receipt of a lease title to the plot they occupy illegally, residents of a SUA will make the improvement project of their area self-financing. A logical consequence of self-financing projects is the participation of the contributors in planning and imple mentation. "As the peop 1e of the a rea will have to pay for the improvement, the standards and pace of improvement should be decided by the people of the area, establishing their own priorities. KMC will only ensure the techni cal feasibility of the schedule for execution of the works and the re lative priority of the scheme as a whole, if advance of capital from a city-wide SUA improvement fund would be required" (Ibid.p.25). In summary, the policy stated that KMC will legalize spontaneous settlements by granting the residents a (99-year) lease title to their plot upon payment of (1 ease and improvement) charges. The proceeds of leasing are utilized to finance the provision and upgrading of infra structure in that settlement. The level of infrastructure provided is determined by the magnitude of the lease proceeds, and therefore by the paying capacity of the residents. In view of the relatively scanty amount of lease proceeds to be expected from a squatter settlement, only the most basic infrastructure will be provided, but it may be improved and extended over time. In accordance with Turner's view that people possess the human and

32 material resources to cater to their own housing needs and that the government should only provide a legal and physical framework for them to do so, improvement of single houses in legalized and improved settle ments is left to the residents. Since Kt1C (Ibid.p.l) defined "sub-standard urban area" as "a primarily residential area where environmental conditions clearly endanger the physical health of the residents", and the objective of the Improvement Policy is to remove these public health hazards, absolute standards in upgrading are nevertheless implicitly applied.

2.3 An action programme

Kr1C trans 1a ted the po 1icy pri nci p1 e into an acti on programme for regularization (legalization) and improvement of katchi abadis. The programme consisted of 17 steps. 1. Local leaders or residents from an area request KMC for improvement and, if necessary, regularization of their settlement. 2. The Central Planning Team (CPT) reviews the request and prepares a brief note about the area. 3. The note by CPT and supporting requests from the area are reviewed by the Joi nt Work i ng Party (JWP) compri sing selected Kt1C and KDA planning technicians. JWP recommends KMC either approval, rejection or no immediate action. 4. If the area is approved for regularization but the land is not controlled by KMC, sanction and subsequently transfer of land by the controlling authority is requested by KMC. If the request for regularization is rejected by JWP, alternative plots in a regular area are offered to the residents. 5. In the area approved for regularization a land survey and a survey of existing and planned public facilities is carried out. Simultaneous ly, an Area Self-Improvement Work i ng Party (AS IWP) is formed to represent the population of the area. 6. A socio-economic survey is carried out in the area and CPT opens its field office. 7. The data collected in the various surveys are analyzed and evaluated by CPT. 8. CPT prepares a concept plan for the area, with informal consultation of the residents and with due consideration for the Karachi Development

33 Plan. 9. The concept plan is reviewed by JWP and ASIWP, and the plan is revised until all agree that public objections should be invited. 10. Public objections to the concept plan are invited by KMC and the plan is finally revised in the light of these objections. 11. An improvement plan (including a detailed financial plan) is prepared by CPT and ASIWP jointly, while simultaneously residents of each mohallah (neighbourhood, YKS) prepare a detailed regularization plan for their area. 12. The detailed regularization plans are reviewed by CPT. 13. Public objections to the improvement plan and to the detailed regularization plan are invited by KMC. 14. An area improvement fund is established by KMC. This fund will hold in trust all funds received from improvement charge payments, from the city-wide SUA improvement fund and from private benefactors. At the same time, residents demolish those structures in their neighbour hood, which, according to the detailed regularization plan, fall within the new road alignment. 15. An advance from the city-wide SUA improvement fund for the area improvement fund is approved by the fund manager, and simultaneously KMC starts the collection of lease and improvement charges. 16. The construction work is started by contractors chosen by KMC or sometimes by direct self-help by the people. Leases are issued by KMC upon full payment of all charges by the residents. 17. The project is evaluated (Ibid,pp.31-36). The action programme clearly shows that KMC (or at least the authors of the policy document) had a programme in mind for which the residents set the initiative and pace of work, define the priorities and standards, provide the funds, and participate in planning and implementation. In line with Turner's recommendations KMC only supplies the technical project support. The policy document says; "KMC has evolved ( .. ) a programme to maximize utilization of the enormous potential for self-improvement available in the SUA's themselves. This potential will be tapped, if the roles of KMC and each SUA community are defined so that each does what it can do best. KMC will provide a suitable organizational framework, technical skills and legal and administrative capabilities. The people in each SUA will invest their resources of man power, capital and intimate knowledge of their own needs and possibilities" (Ibid.p.2).

34 Kr~c realized that residents' participation in regularization and im provement planning and implementation requires some form of community organization in katchi abadis under planning. The formation of the Area Self-Improvement Working Party is in fact only the ultimate stage of a process of community development and organization. "To use this service (of KMC) efficiently, the community must speak with one voice. For this purpose, the leaders of the community must ensure that there is a community consensus before the key decisions are taken, as to nature, scope and costs of development to be undertaken. It is probable that many communities will not have, at the outset, the necessary level of organization to act. In such case, KMC may approach some third party to act as community organizer. KMC itself will not directly undertake that task, as doing so will handicap its future dia logue with the community. There is here a positive role for either political leadership or professional assistance, or both" (Ibid.p.19). Eventually, KMC stated that "KMC cannot provide improvement to them (the katchi abadi residents, YKS), but they can achieve improvement with Kt~C help. They, the people, and not KMC, are the improvers, the motive force for improvement. It cannot be otherwise because SUA improvement is a social problem with technical aspects. It requires a social solution with due attention to technical details" (Ibid.p.21).

2.4 The Central Planning Team

As part of the organizational setup of the city-wide programme of SUA improvement, KMC created a separate department for squatter settle ment upgrading: the Central Planning Team (CPT).

Origin and structure In fact, CPT was a continuation of the "Lyari Improvement Planning Team" (LIPT). This team of KMC planners and UNDP advisers had prepared the regularization and improvement plans for Lyari in the period 1975-1977. In order to implement these plans in Lyari even on a self-financing basis, KMC had needed a start capital of Rs.400 million (US$ 40 million). The International Development Association (IDA),affiliate of the Inter national Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("the World Bank") had declared that it was willing to lend this amount, provided ~~C would utilize it as a seed capital for a revolving Improvement Fund which would benefit all SUA's to be improved in Karachi. In 1976 the provincial

35 Government of Sind indeed proposed to promulgate legislation to establish a Slum Improvement Revolving Fund. This Fund would use the monies collected as land lease and improvement charges in Lyari for other upgrading projects in Karachi. The establishment of the Fund and the Lyari Project offered KMC and IDA a prospect of first improving conditions in Karachi's oldest and largest slum area (Lyari), and in that process developing the organization, resources and procedures needed for similar operations on a metropolitan wide scale. After the Lyari improvement would be completed, the Fund - operated and managed as set out in the legislation - was estimated to provide a continuing capacity to plan and execute works amounting to some Rs.90 million annually. The evolution of the Lyari Improvement Planning Team into the Central Planning Team was a logical step in the establishment of this new city-wideKMC programme for SUA regularization and improvement. CPT would be responsible for the preparation of plans, monitoring and evaluation of their implementation, and refinement of the Improvement Policy (KMC 1976, p.29). When CPT was established in 1977, it consisted of four sections: the Physical Planning Section (for preparation of concept plans and detailed regularization plans); the Engineering Section (for the physical improvement plans); the Economic Planning Section (for the preparation of financial plans); and the Community Relations Section (for people's participation in planning and implementation). CPT was headed by a Planning Coordinator, who was directly responsible to the Administrator KMC 2. This arrangement had been made because several KMC departments and new zones were involved in the various SUA's to be improved, and its work would inherently involve numerous complex and delicate issues of SUA priority, such as cost recovery policy and related matters, which are not the concern of anyone KMC department or zone specifically (Ibid. p.30). Dutch involvement. The UNDP advisers remained in Karachi for about two years, mainly to assist KMC in the planning for Lyari, the formulation of the SUA Improve ment Policy and the establishment of CPT, which were the conditions for the World Bank to grant a loan to the Slum Improvement Revolving Fund. After the two-year period they were replaced by a team of four advisers fro~ A~sterdam Free University (AFU), sponsored by the Dutch government under its technical assistance programme to Pakistan. The choice of AFU

36 as counterpart organization to Kt~C was a logical one in view of the ten years experience of the University with katchi abadi research in the Joint Research Project IV (JRP IV). The Dutch team, working under the name "Dutch Advisory Mission" (DAt~), consisted of a Planning Coordination Adviser, who was team leader and counterpart to the Planning Coordinator CPT, as well as a Physical Planning Adviser, an Economic Planning Adviser and a Community Relations Adviser. There was no Engineering Adviser in the Dutch team, as KMC thought to have enough capable engineers in the Metropolitan Corporation. A Dutch project coordinator was stationed at the Free University in Amsterdam to coach and backstop the Dutch team and monitor and evaluate its work and progress (Ibid.p.9). The tasks of the Dutch team were to advise and assist CPT in the following: a. the completion of the preparation of improvement plans for Lyari and second-cycle SUA's; b. the research and analysis of standards, and the definition of technical alternatives for third-cycle planning; c. the refining of the Improvement Policy and the defining and testing of simple planning methods adapted to local capabilities; d. the city-wide inventory of SUA's; e. the start of improvement efforts in other areas with the refined approach; f. the training of local staff; g. the initiation of transfer of experience to other cities and agencies through training of staff, if applied for (Ibid.p.4). After completion of the planning work for Lyari, the next priority ("second-cycle") areas to be upgraded by CPT under the new policy were Baldia Township, Golimar/Gulbahar, and Bhutta Village. The initial project duration for the Dutch team was fixed at two years, but the project was expected to be extended to five years after the initial period. The first members of the Dutch team arrived in Karachi in June 1977.

37 3 Refinement and redefinition of the improvement policy

3.1 The end of the Lyari Project

Originally, the Dutch team had expected to start its work in Karachi at the end of 1976, However,its departure was repeatedly delayed, mainly as a result of the national elections in Pakistan in March 1977 and their tumultuous aftermath. These elections would profoundly influence the course of the project, as we shall see in the coming chapters. Under the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan the term of the National Assembly had been due to expire on August 14, 1977, unless sooner dis solved or extended under the emergency laws. The Government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had opted for a "surprise" dissolution of the National Assembly effective January 10, and had called for fresh national elections on March 7. Elections to the Provincial Assemblies had been fixed for March 10. In the elections the Pakistan People's Party of Bhutto had to face an united front of nine opposition parties brought together in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The political campaigns preceding the elections were hot and violent, and one of the issues was the regularization and improvement of (certain) katchi abadis. On February 9, the Chief Minister of Sind, Jatoi (PPP), said in a public meeting in Baldia Township that "the government has decided to regularize all unauthorized colonies immediately" and he assured that "the work in this regard will be completed without delay"l. The next day, the same minister spoke in Lyari. The Karachi daily "Dawn" gave the following account: "Mr.Ghulam t~ustafa Jatoi, Chief t1inister of Sind, yesterday told a public meeting at Kakri Ground that all residential-cum-commercial plots in Lyari would be regularized by June 30, this year. He told the cheering crowd that the rates would be fixed at Rs.4 for residential and Rs. 6 for commercial (plots) and he also warned the KMC officials that if the leases are not completed and handed over to the residents by June 30, they will be sacked. Mr.Jatoi ( .. ) also promised the residents to give electricity, gas, sewerage connections as so~n as possible; the charges would be rer.overed in instalments, he added" . If we compare the above rates (Rs.4 per square yard for residential

38 and Rs.6 per square yard for commercial plots) with the lease rates for the Lyari Project as proposed by the Karachi t~etropol itan Corporation in January 1977, we notice a marked difference. KMC had estimated the total cost of the Lyari Improvement Scheme at Rs.356 million. This included improvement works, a credit component for house improvement and new house construction and support services for Kt~C (KI~C 1977a). The physical improvement works consisted of an underground sewerage system (Rs.136 million), street improvements (Rs.21 million), a solid waste disposal system (Rs.33 million), community facilities (Rs. 20 million) and vehicle maintenance shops (Rs. 5 million). The new sewerage system clearly accounted for most of the cost of the Lyari Improvement Scheme. According to a JRP IV survey in Lyari (JRP IV 1975, p. 78), a sanitary sewage collection system had the highest priority of desired improvements. In view of the high water table in the area, the proposed solution was an underground sewer system with two pumping stations. The credit component was intended for households in improved areas which had received regularized land tenure. It would be handled by the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC). The support services for ~C were comprised of surveys and advisory servi.ces. Because of the IDA requirement of a self-financing scheme for the issue of a loan to ~C, the improvement costs had to be recovered from the beneficiaries, the residents of Lyari; and this condition had defined the level of the proposed rates. For leasing of residential plots in Lyari, KMC had proposed rates which would range from Rs. 5 per square meter for the first hundred square meters to RS.I05 for every square meter exceeding 400 square meters. For commercial plots, lease rates would range from Rs.35 per squal'e meter for the smallest plots to Rs.135 for every square meter exceeding 400 square meters (KMC 1977a, Annex III). In addition to these lease rates, Kt·1C had proposed to charge improvement costs to the Lyari residents. According to the proposal ,improvement rates would range from Rs.20 per square meter for the smallest residential plots to RS,405 for every square meter exceeding 400 square meters. For commercial plots, rates would vary from Rs.140 to Rs.540 per square meter (Ibid.Annex III). With these rates Kt1C hoped to collect about Rs. 38 mi 11 ion in 1ease charges and RS,300 million in improvement charges in Lyari, enough to finance most of the improvement work in the area. However, in January 1977, KMC and the Government of Sind were still negotiating the level of these

39 lease and improvement rates and had not yet reached an agreement. It was obvious that because of the central location of Lyari in the city, not only residents of Lyari would benefit by the improvement, but a~so other inhabitants of Karachi. Therefore, about 10% of the costs of improvement of Lyari would have to be paid by residents from other areas (Ibid. Annex III), but the bulk of the amount had to come from the popula tion of Lyari itself. On the basis of data concerning the paying capacity of Lyari residents, collected in the JRP IV survey, KMC had come to the conclusion that about 95% of the households in Lyari should be able to pay these lease and improvement charges. According to these calculations, households would have to pay about 15% of their income on land lease and improvement charges, property taxes, and conservancy charges. However, as was explicitly stated, residents would have to be motivated to do so, by 1. being convinced that they do have to pay for improvements, and 2. being given every facility to make payment as easy as possible (e.g. by allowing payment in instalments over a period of 16 years). Nevertheless, the lease and improvement rates proved to be politically unacceptable to the ruling PPP and the government, in particular in view of the approaching elections. Lyari is a very old settlement, consequently having a high security of tenure. This has resulted in many multi-storied buildings in parts of Lyari near the city centre and the port area. The PPP had urged KMC to regularize and improve Lyari because of its predominantly PPP orientation. But if the peop 1e in Lya ri woul d have to pay such high charges, the proj ect cou 1d become counter-productive to the party. Moreover, in the pas t some plots in Lyari had already been leased at Rs. 4 per square yard for all residential plots and Rs, 6 per square yard for all commercial plots, irrespective of size. The idea of additional improvement charges to recover improvement costs was implicitly dropped by Jatoi. By announcing lease rates of Rs.4 and Rs.6 only, Jatoi undermined the self-financing character of the Lyari improvement project, With these rates, 1ease proceeds from Lya ri woul d cover on ly a fracti on of the actual cost of the scheme. For IDA, the loss of the self-financing character of the project (and the political instability in Pakistan as a result of the elections) were reasons enough to abandon the idea of a US$ 40 million loan

40 to KMC and to withdraw from the project. The decision by IDA meant the end of the Lyari improvement project, even before the arrival of the Dutch team. For lack of funds to execute the scheme as planned, upgrading of infra structure in Lyari was again carried out on a piecemeal basis like before. Only regularization (at rates announced by Chief Minister Jatoi) continued in Lyari.

3.2 Lessons from Lyari

The failure of the Lyari project forced CPT and DAM to reconsider several points in the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas. The level of infrastructure. It was obvious to CPT and DAM that the idea of flexible standards had not been sufficiently taken into account by LIPT when it had prepared the Lyari improvement plans. An improvement project at a cost of Rs.593 per capita in Lyari, where the average monthly income amounts to Rs.620 according to the JRP IV, survey, cannot be said to suit the financial circumstances of the population. Besides, calculations showing that 95% of the households can afford to pay the charges, because their expenditures in this respect would amount to about 15% of their income,are also rather questionable. Survey data on income are usually not very reliable, in particular if many respondents are day-labourers and petty traders with an irregular income. But even if lease and improvement charges fall within the paying capacity of the residents, UPT should have anticipated that this level of lease and improvement charges would be politically unacceptable to PPP and the government. It seems that there would have been two ways to avoid these mistakes of the Lyari project. Following the purport of the Improvement Policy, the level of infrastructure to be provided in Lyari should have been curtailed and set in accordance with the paying capacity of the majority of the residents and the political reality of the moment. It is difficult to say, however, at what point exactly the level of infrastructure could have been reduced. Would it not have been more realistic to design a less expensive sewerage system for Lyari ? A KMC engineering report excluded the

41 introduction of low-cost sanitation systems, such as pit latrines and aqua privies in Lyari, because of high population densities, small plots, flat lowland and high ground water levels (KMC 1977a, Annex I, p.2). Besides, it should be understood that while political reality demanded low (lease and improvement) rates for Lyari, it simultaneously asked for upgrading of living conditions in the settlement to a politically attractive (i.e., rather high) service level. This would imply that a self-financing improvement project for Lyari is in fact not feasible, and this is even more plausible because (as already stated) Lyari no longer has the characteristics of a spontaneous settlement. It is an older area in the heart of town, with a high level of de facto security of tenure in most parts. Several roads in Lyari are actually thoroughfares for the entire city, and a number of sewer lines through the area drain away sewage from other parts of the city. So, there seems to be an argument to finance at least part of the improvement programme for Lyari out of general Metropolitan revenues and to abandon the idea of a completely self-financing scheme for this area. One could even say that Lyari, though obviously a sub-standard urban area, does not fit the criteria of the Improvement Policy and consequently should not be treated according to the principles of the policy. One could have considered a division of Lyari into a number of internally homogeneous areas, some of which would be regularized according to the Improvement Policy and others regularized and improved along other lines; but this would probably also have been politically unacceptable. In general, the areas selected for regularization and improvement are rather large and have huge populations. They may in fact be too large to be treated as one area, but unfortunately, political criteria rather than planning criteria are applied to select and define areas.

Regularization-cum-improvemen~ The high level of lease and improvement rates was not the only mistake in the Lyari project. The distinction between land lease and improvement charges (and consequently between cost of land and cost of improvement) also needed review, as it offered residents as well as politicians an opportunity to frustrate the integrated character of the programme: regularization-cum-improvement. According to the policy, residents have to pay both land lease and improvement charges, but they will only receive their lease title

42 once they have paid all improvement charges. In this way KMC hoped to exploit the eagerness of the residents for security of tenure in order to finance the improvement works in the area. However, by making a distinction between land lease and improvement charges, KMC had opened the way for Chief Minister Jatoi to drop the idea of improvement charges and to promise regularization at low lease rates followed by improvement. Such a programme would give the residents the possibility - after having regularized their occupancy - to claim improvement without payment of charges, since KMC provides and upgrades infrastructure in all other legal areas without special charges. As a consequence, the entire programme would become largely defaulting financially to KMC.

In most katchi abadis KMC supplies water through public taps. In Baldia, one tap serves an average of 50 households or 300 people.

43 3.3 Standards and lease rates

In the light of the experiences with the Lyari Project, CPT and DAM came to a number of conclusions with regard to the execution of the Improvement Policy. First of all, CPT and DAM noted that for a new and still untried policy, Lyari had been a much too complex and politically too sensitive area to start with. The Improvement Policy seems to be more suited to the conditions of a peripheral spontaneous settlement rather than to an old area near the city centre with multi-storied buildings and a high level of de facto security of tenure. If KMC ever wanted to prove the soundness and feasibility of the policy, the next area to be selected for regularization and improvement would have to be a peripheral squatter settlement. A second conclusion concerned the level of infrastructure to be provided under the improvement programme. It seemed that the complexity of the problems in Lyari had forced LIPT to first design the infra structure and to calculate the cost of improvement next. Then eventually the improvement rates were fixed in view of the cost of improvement and the size of the area to be leased out, but without taking into account the paying capacity of the residents. DAM emphasized that for the next area to be planned, primarily low-cost solutions in the field of appropriate technology should be taken into consideration. From the start of the planning work,the paying capacity of the residents has to be taken into account. Overhead and survey costs should not be charged to the project budget. Incremental improvement signifies that in the initial stage amenities are to be provided in an area up to a minimal level only, so that at least the dangers for the physical health of the residents are reduced. In practice this means water supply through public standposts instead of house connections, metalling of only the main roads, construction of open drains, introduction of a low~·cost human-waste disposal system, etc. Concerning the sewage system for katchi abadis, DAM stated that the system would have to meet the following conditi ons: it should be in-

44 expensive and easy to construct; it should require little and easy maintenance; it should be adapted to local physical and socio-cultural conditions; and incremental improvement should be possible (DAf'lIKt1C 1979, p.13) . It is obvious that these low-cost solutions of the appropriate technology type were likely to encounter opposition from KMC engineers, who considered it almost beneath their dignity to design these systems. To DAM, the experience of Lyari had shown what could be the outcome of an improvement project with a too-elevated level of infrastructure; but to some KMC engineers, the Lyari Project rather proved the im practicality of the Improvement Policy. A third conclusion concerned the lease and improvement charges. In order to avoid the problems Kr~C had encountered for Lyari, it was decided to do away with the distinction between land lease charges and improvement charges. Instead, there would only be lease chapges fop ceYJiced land, which would vary according to size and land use of the plot. The rates would be calculated on the basis of land and improvement costs and the area of land to be leased out, while taking into account the paying capacity of the residents. People would receive their lease title after payment of all lease charges for their plot; payment could be made in three yearly instalments3.

3.4 People's participation

Compared to the intentions expressed in the KMC policy document - "the people and not KMC are the improvers. the motive force for im provement" - CPT and DAM dras ti ca lly modifi ed and reduced the role of katchi abadi residents in the planning of katchi abadis. Lyari had been a predominantly PPP-oriented area with an extensive and well-established local organization close to the government, namely, the PPP itself. With a shift to new katchi abadis, where local organization might be absent, the role of the residents had to be adjusted. CPT and DAM differed somewhat in opinion about the exact role of

45 people's participation in planning. Most requests for regularization of certain areas addressed to KMC and CPT came from influential poli ticians and were passed on to KMC and CPT with the personal recommen dations of important government officials. These requests were in fact orders from government officials to CPT to regularize and improve this or that katchi abadi, rather than requests by katchi abadi residents for CPT assistance in self-help improvement activities. Under these circum stances, CPT preferred to undertake the planning and implementation work on its own - without much involvement by residents - instead of asking a "third party" to organize and motivate the community for self-help improvement. Once CPT had decided to undertake all work itself, it considered people's participation in planning rather as a form of meddlesomeness by residents, and it tried to reduce such participation as much as possible.

People often encroach upon the road by ralslng wooden fences, which, if not removed by KMC, are subsequently replaced by walls made of cement blocks.

46 DAM agreed that since new areas under planning probably would not have an adequate community structure to undertake the necessary activities, and self-help improvement would therefore be rather infeasible, CPT would have to carry out most of the planning work itself. However, even though the original ideas of self-help activities by residents with technical assistance by CPT had to be abandoned, DAM stressed the importance of at least some form of people's participation; and it had a number of practical arguments besides the more principled ones stated in the policy document.

Participation in planning. Squatter settlements are by nature dynamic and juridically complex areas. They have been created without proper planning and coordination. and they continue to develop rapidly in a spontaneous way. Ownership of plots - if one may speak of ownership in a squatter settlement - is defined by verbal and informal agreements, patronage relationship and traditional norms difficult to translate into modern legal terms. Without proper residents' assistance, surveyors and physical planners have an arduous, almost impossible job to record the existing situation (especially the boundaries of each plot) on their maps, and to prepare a detailed regularization plan for legal purposes, Moreover, dimensions, land use and ownership of plots and houses continuously change, even in the period between the preparation of the detailed regularization plan and the issuing of leases in that area. Open plots are occupied; houses are turned into shops and shops into houses; plots and houses are rented or sold; and people extend their plots by encroaching on roads and open land. Once the location of major infrastructural works and the width of roads and streets have been fixed, and detailed regularization plans have been prepared and approved, these new encroachments may create serious problems when it comes to implementation of the plans. The plans have to be modified or cannot be implemented at all; or the new structures have to be demolished, resulting in a financial loss for the residents and a waste of money and materials. It is impossible for a physical planner to check an area under planning continuously after he has prepared the detailed plans. It is also inadvisable to assign this task to the local chowkidars (watchmen) of KMC in view of their easy corruptibility. Only residents in the

47 neighbourhood in whose interest the improvements are carried out can see to it that changes in the layout of the settlement do not jeopardize its regularization and improvement. They will do so, provided they know the plans for their neighbourhood and agree to them. The best way to achieve this is to involve the residents in the planning work.

Participation in implementation People's participation in implementation was believed to be limited - but at the same time crucial - for a successful execution of the policy.

~~C and its contractors would carry out all or most of the improvement work, but the residents would have to bear the cost of regularization and improve ment through payment of lease charges. If many residents would not apply for a lease or would not pay lease charges for their plot, improvement would become impossible. In the years before the adoption of the Improvement Policy, threats of demolition and false promises of improvement on the one hand, and illegal occupations and encroachments on the other hand, created great mistrust between residents and government bodies about each others' intentions. A better relationship between KMC and the katchi abadi residents was therefore believed to be essential for a successful execution of the policy. Only if residents believe that ~~C will utilize the lease proceeds for the improvement of their area, will they be ready to pay lease charges; and only if Kt~C is convinced that residents wi 11 pay lease charges, will it start any improvement work. Residents' participation in planning was thought to be an instrument to bridge the credibility gap between residents and ~1C, and a stimulus for residents to pay their lease charges.

3.5 A permanent housing stock for low-income groups

In the Improvement Policy it is stated that: "regularization of squatter settlements can encourage further squatting, if preventive measures are not given sufficient attention. It must be clearly understood r~etropolitan policy that no future unsanctioned squatting will.be recognized or regularized; instead they will be cleared. Otherwise, some 'professional squatters' may even realize substantial

48 profits, just by getting successive allocations of land. Furthermore, the parallel efforts of the Metroville programme (a site and-service project of KDA, YKS) will be curtailed, if the squatter knows that he can settle in any way he wants, and in time obtain a title of ownership for his plot" (KMC 1977b, p.22) "The Metroville should be strongly supported as an essential companion and long range solution to the squatter problem, if it is adapted to the needs of squatters. If financial constraints require, preventive planning of 'pre-metrovilles' should be stressed to facilitate future provision of facilities. Even if this was not the original intention, the planned part of Baldia (a plot-township with a very low service level, YKS) provides a good illustration of this. Provision of public utilities and community facilities in that area will be greatly facilitated by the foresight that ensured regular layout of the area" (Ibid.pp.22-23).

These policy recommendations by Kt~C were clearly in line with Turner's theory on autonomous housing by low-income groups. Existing spontaneous settlements should be regularized and upgraded, but in doing so KMC is in fact always one step behind. Further squatting should and could be prevented, if KMC guides the autonomous building process of low-income groups by guaranteeing them access to land, materials and credit. This was also the idea behind Metroville and Baldia Township. Unfortunately, neither Metroville nor Baldia Township are successful projects. In both cases, funds allocated for these programmes were in sufficient to make the areas liveable by providing at least a minimum level of infrastructure, in particular an adequate water supply system. Moreover, both projects became prey to speculators, and this was reflected in a rapid increase in land values in these areas. Finally, the size of the projects is totally insufficient to contribute to a relief of the housing crisis of the urban poor in Karachi. Consequently, low-income groups in Karachi, whether migrants or not, cannot be properly housed unless they are already living in a spontaneous settlement which will be regularized an improved, or unless they buy a house or squat in an area where the chances of regularization are good.

Dislodgement of residents from ~egularized settlements Besides the urban poor, (lower-) middle-income groups are also looking for shelter in Karachi, and given the general housing shortage, they also have a hard time finding a suitable house, Therefore, one of the possible outcomes of regularization and improvement of spontaneous settlements is an increased interest of middle-income groups in buying houses and plots in regularized areas, thereby replacing the original

49 Metroville I, the site-and-seryices project of the Karach i Development Authority. After five years mos t plots still contain nothing more than the utility wall with water, sewerage, gas and electricity connections. low-income groups. In view of the relatively low lease rates (because land is provided free of cost or for a nominal price) and the consequent (often) relatively low prices of houses and plots at sale, the replacement of low-income groups by higher-income groups could mean subsidizing the latter, while the former have to go and squat elsewhere in Karachi. In this way the squatter problem and the housing crisis of low-income groups would never be solved. The attractiveness of regularized katchi abadis to middle-income groups is even enhanced by the planning principle that improvement of katchi abadi should be incremental rather than immediate. Planning a katchi abadis for incremental improvement means that in the future the regularized settlement can and will be upgraded to a higher infrastructural level. The underlying idea for incremental improvement planning, derived from Turner's theory, is that low-income groups in squatter settlements will gradually better themselves economically, and consequently bring about living conditions in the settlement in accordance with their new needs and priorities. On the basis of this expectation, it is logical that the katchi abadi is planned in such a manner that in the ultimate stage the incrementally

50 improved settlement can meet the normal (i .e., middle-class) standards. No timetable is set for further upgrading of the settlement above the basic service level provided in the first improvement phase. The only criteria are the wishes and the paying capacity of the residents, who in theory have to pay for further improvement. As we have seen before, however, the expectation that (in the fore seeable future) lower-income groups will better themselves economically is rather disputable. It is more likely that before the low-income groups have ever improved themselves, middle-income groups will have bought them out of the area and turned the settlement into a middle-class residential area by urging on provision of additional infrastructure. This process is facilitated by incremental improvement planning, because room for up grading up to middle-class standards is in principle already available; once it has started, it will be hard to slacken the process for the sake of low-income groups.

Obstacles to dislodgement. CPT and DAM felt that there were probably two ways to prevent - or at least retard - this process. First of all. KMC could make the lease titles of plots in regularized katchi abadis non-transferable or re-transferable only to KMC. This has the disadvantage that it would probably result in unofficial sale of plots or sale prior to regularization, and that the lease title could not be used as collateral for a loan, for instance for house improvement. Secondly, the settlement could be planned and improved in such a manner that the chances of raiding by middle-income groups are reduced to a minimum. This means that either the principle of incremental improvement beyond the basic service level is abandoned completely, or further (incremental) im provement is limited to what are expected to be needs and priorities of low-income groups in the foreseeable future. CPT and DAM therefore proposed not to widen streets, unless very necessary, so that they remain inaccessible to motorized traffic; to install public water standposts and prohibit private house water connections; to leave house access lanes unmetalled, etc. As was to be expected, these ideas provoked a strong reaction by KMC planners and engineers. In their view such planning meant creating "perpetual slums". If streets are kept narrow and plots on both sides are regularized, it will be impossible to widen the streets within the

51 next 99 years without tiresome and expensive expropriation procedures. The crucial question, of course, is whether or not it will become necessary and desirable during the next 99 years to further upgrade the regularized settlement beyond the basic service level provided under the present improvement programme. In other words, is it likely that in the next 99 years the need for residential areas with only basic infrastructure will disappear because there will be no more poor in Karachi who can afford to live in such areas only? It is obviously impossible to make projections for such a long period, but the above seems rather unlikely4. Even if a large number of low-income families presently living in spontaneous settlements would better themselves economically, many new low-income families would probably be looking for inexpensive shelter in Karachi simultaneously. We may assume that most houses to be constructed in Karachi in the coming years will be intended for middle-income groups rather than for low-income families. Consequently, it will probably be easier for a middle-income family which has outgrown the regularized katchi abadi to find suitable shelter than for a low-income family which has newly arrived on the housing market. Therefore, there seem to be good arguments to try to keep property values in regularized settle ments within the financial reach of low-income groups by maintaining a low but adequate service level. DAM consequently formulated the following summary of the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas: "Action to improve living conditions in katchi abadis should be a two pronged approach: - provision of security of tenure to the residents through legalization of their occupancy (= regularization); - upgrading of overall conditions in the settlement through provision of basic urban infrastructure (= improvement). It is expected that while security of tenure will be a stimulus to residents to invest more of their savings in their house and its direct surroundings - thereby improving their individual conditions - the provision of basis infrastructure will improve the environmental conditions of the settlement as a whole. So, a policy for regularization and improvement of katchi abadis aims at creation of legal and environmental conditions in squatter settlements by which residents are encouraged to improve their own house and its direct surroundings so that a permanent housing stock for low-income groups be comes available" (DAM/KMC 1979,p.13)

52 INTERLUDE

The case of 52 Jhuggies

1 A request

On June 17, 1977, while CPT was preparing the last detailed regulari zation plans of Lyari, the Administrator KMC received a file from the Minister of Local Bodies (Government of Sind) containing the following letter. Honourable Finance Minister, & Honourable Minister for LOCAL BODIES, Government of Sind, Ka rach i sub: MEMORANDUr1 Your Gracious Honour, With due respect and humble submission I, ... , son of' ..... , resident of '52 JHUGGIES' situated at ..... Road, Garden West, Karachi, ~long with other residents of this plot of land since the birth of Pakistan, i.e. 30 years, most heartly welcome you over here and beg to submit this MEMORANDUM in the wake of your most honoured promises you made before the last General Election and beg to submit as under: - That I, the undersigned is the CASHIER of the PPP office of ..... , Garden West, Karachi, and have been serving the party with all other residents of this area '52 Jhuggies' a plot of land belongs to some Hindu who has since left for India at the time of Partition. - That we the JHUGGI nashien of the above address have been living over here by erecting our Jhuggies with our own money and we are the owner/ occupier of this shelter. - That since ever this piece of land is not claimed by any of the claimant and we are very peacefully living here and serving the PPP with all our heart and soul and there among us there never happened any difference of opinion in and toward the party manifesto and we always backed the MANSHOOR of the PPP from our area. - That since our beloved Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has repeatedly announced and your honour too promised to get our occupied areas leased in the name of the occupier after you win the election - which by the grace of Almighty God you have duly won. In the wake of the above few grounds, we today take this opportunity to remind your honour to stand for our rescue in getting this place leased in the individual name of the legitimate owners and occupiers so that we achieve the mental piece in and towards our residential problems. We hope that your honour and the honourable Minister for Local Bodies shall oblige the faithful and sincere workers of the PPP of the Area

53 in granting our prayers in granting the required lease and for which we shall ever remain grateful and shall get the encouragement to be more zealous towards PPP. Thanking you and assuring our best services at all time. Karachi, dated the 17th June, 1977. Your most obediently, (with 29 signatures and thumb prints)

The Administrator KMC forwarded the file to the Planning Coordinator of the Central Planning Team with the request to examine the feasibility of regularization of the area and to report within two weeks. After consultation with the Senior Physical Planner CPT the Coordinator replied that: "the 52 Jh uggi es are situated in Garden Wes t on an approxi mate ly 500 square yards. The plot is triangular in shape lying between the boundary wall of a school and ...... Road. It is an evacuee property land with a high land value. The community is of small size as well as the plots. The existing lay-out of the area with 3-feet lanes has no planning vestige and there is hardly any scope for planning and reserving minimum space for roads and services. In view of the above reasons, it would be technically difficult to regularize this area". The Administrator KMC was not satisfied with this reply and requested the views of the Community Relations Section of CPT. The section officers visited the area several times and discussed the request with the local leader of the community and first signer of the memorandum. As an experi ment the man was asked to organize on his own a socio-economic survey in the area, so that the officers could assess the various options for the settlement. Data to be collected related to the name of the head of each household, his occupation, his place or work, the length of his stay in the area, the size of his household, his mother tongue, his place of birth and the size of his plot. About a week later the local leader presented a list of households with the required data to the Community Relations Offi cers.

Some basic data There appeared to be 38 plots in the area, which showed that the name '52 Jhuggies' was somewhat exaggerated. Out of the 38 plots, 31 had a residential or mixed land use and 7 had a commercial or industrial land use. The owners of the structures on commercial and industrial plots had

54 been included in the list of heads of household, although they were living outside the area. The total population actually living in the area amounted to 214 persons. If we include the households which were not present in the area but claimed to belong to the area, there were 36 households; 33 of these originally came from India, 2 came from North West Frontier Province and 1 from Baluchistan. It was remarkable that all heads of household claimed a length of stay in the area of 30 years, i.e., since 1947, the year of Partition. In this way they tried to prove their right to the land: in 1947 the original (Hindu) owner had fled to India and the present residents (in majority Muslim refugees from India) had occupied the land. The total area of the settlement was about 1300 square yards, almost completely in use for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. The average plot size was 34 square yards; the smallest plot had an area of 9 square yards and the largest one 110 square yards. Out of 31 heads of household living in the area, 13 people worked as dhabi (washerman) in the nearby Dhobi Ghat, a place along the Lyari river specially created for washermen. Most of them had their customers in the Garden Area. Another six heads of household found employment in or near 52 Jhuggies. There was some small-scale industry in the settlement: a wood factory, a lamp factory, a plastic toys factory, and a carton factory. There were also two small restaurants, two paanshops and a garage. KMC had constructed one public tap in the area, which supplied water two times a day: between 5.00 - 9.00 A.M. and between 2.00 - 5.00 P.M. According to the residents, the construction of 2 more taps had been approved or promised. Eight houses had an illegal connection to a sewer line on the main road. Since some of the residents worked as electricians for the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, six houses had electricity, but many more houses had illegal connections. The people did not pay any taxes to KMC or to any other government body. According to the residents, KMC had in the past demolished all en croachments in the neighbourhood and had widened the streets; but 52 Jhuggies had not been affected, because, as they said, the land of 52 Jhuggies belonged to the Evacuee Property Trust and not to KMC. Several complaints and requests for demolition of the settlement had reached KMC from the adjacent school, because residents of 52 Jhuggies frequently made holes in the boundary wall and used the vacant land between wall

55 and school as a defecation place.

A stagnating settlement. Being a mini-slum (Van der Linden 1977, p.37), 52 Jhuggies is not mentioned in the list of katchi abadis in Van der Linden's study "The Bastis of Karachi", but the settlement obviously belongs to the category of "stagnating post-partition settlements", i.e., settlements created after 1947 which stagnate in the physical development normal to most katchi abadis (Ibid.pp.215-252). Bastis in this category are often typified by a problematic layout (as in the case of 52 Jhuggies). They are real encroachments, as they have grown up on existing roads and streets and they have often also en croached in themselves. About the circumstances under which these stagnating bastis with a problematic layout came into existence, Van der Linden writes that "these bastis came about during the period immediately following Partition and they are inhabited by t1uhajirs almost exclusively" (Ibid.p.226). When looking into the causes of stagnation, lack of security seems to be the basic cause and also the cause behind the problematic layout; low security of tenure is a reason for the inhabitants not to care much about the layout. According to Van der Linden (Ibid.pp.234-235), the fact that some bastis stagnate in their development does not mean that they have no potential for development. If bastis themselves do not improve, their inhabitants may do so. People may move out of their basti after some time; they may in a sense outgrow their settlement. This does not seem to be the case in 52 Jhuggies. Sometimes people remain in their basti as long as there is some hope; they stay just patiently waiting or fighting for their chances. Besides the good location of the basti regarding job opportunities, the presence of friends and relatives, proximity of schools and other facilities, and other similar reasons may prolong the stay of these people in a stagnating basti. Some of the inhabitants of stagnating bastis reside there because they think this is the only possibility open to them to obtain a properly leased plot within their economic means (Ibid.p.251).

56 2 Regularization or relocation?

In theory there were two options open to CPT: - to regularize and improve 52 Jhuggies according to the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas; to reject regularization of 52 Jhuggies on grounds mentioned in the Policy. According to the criteria and conditions for regularization of katchi abadis, 52 Jhuggies could not be regularized for a number of reasons. The existing layout was hardly suitable or improvable. The area was over crowded:685 persons per acre. And an additional difficulty was that the land apparently belonged to the Evacuee Property Trust and had to be trans ferred to KMC incase of regu 1arizati on (KMC 1977b, pp. 10-11) . The Improvement Policy states that if an area is rejected for regula rization, "this action should be considered final and should be followed immediately by an offer of plots in a regular area. No land-oriented services should be provided, neither utilities nor on-site schools, dispensaries, etc., although off-site or mobile services may be provided. At some convenient time, the occupants should be required to vacate" (Ibid.p.32). The Community Relations Section agreed with the Senior Physica1 Planner that the provision of infrastructure to the settlement would be difficult without considerable demolition, and it doubted that regularization of 38 plots with an average size of 34 square yards and a smallest plot of 9 square yards would be wise. But on the ot~er hand, the land use did not confl ict with any plan, and full cooperation of th.e residents in regularization and improvement of t~e settlement was assured. As soon as the socio-economic survey had been completed and the general characteristics of population and settlement had been analysed, the Community Relations Section started to look for alternative solutions.

Demolition of the settlement and relocation of the residents. The Department of Land & Estate of KMC is responsible for demolition of encroachments and relocation of squatters. According to this department, people who have encroached and are removed by KMC's demolition squad are

57 Children waiting for chapatis (bread) at the bakery shop.

offered a plot in Baldia Township or New Karachi. To obtain such a plot they have to pay Rs. 5 per square yard as lease rate and Rs.n5 per square yard as development charge; the latter amount can be paid in instalments. Only if structures on leased-out land have to be removed for the sake of realignment or other such reasons, do the owners receive a compensation. So, in the event of relocation, the residents of 52 Jhuggies would have to shift to Baldia Township or New Karachi, far from their present place of employment. They would have to pay Rs.70 per square yard for probably an 80-square-yard plot and would not be compensated for the loss in housing materials. One variant of relocation to Baldia or New Karachi is relocation in a nearby place, for instance Lyari. Lyari is situated not too far from 52 Jhuggies and the Lyari River. KMC is issuing leases in Lyari at Rs. 4 per square yard and does not charge improvement costs. However, hardly a plot is available in Lyari, and any available open plot in the area has to be allotted to families who are resettled from within the area, Another variant is relocation on site, but in view of the small size

58 of the area this would probably imply construction of a multi-storied building with all its usual problems, like different life styles and the impossibility of extension of the dwelling. The construction costs would be high, and consequently the price or rent would be prohibitive for the residents of 52 Jhuggies. Besides, it is doubtful that the people of 52 Jhuggies would like to live in a flat.

Partial relocation of residents. A compromise between relocation and regularization would be a partial relocation. Households which are not strictly tied to the Garden Area could be relocated in Baldia or New Karachi; the remaining households could redistribute the land, so that the density is reduced and infra structure can be provided. However, partial relocation can only succeed if a sufficient number of households can be resettled, if all agree to cooperate, and if there are enough funds available to resettle one group and improve the living conditions of tne other one. It was rather questionable that these conditions could be met.

Extension of the settlement. An alternative to partial or complete relocation would be the purchase of the vacant land beyond the school boundary wall by the residents of 52 Jhuggies. An extension of the area would reduce the population density and give the residents the opportunity to improve the layout of their settlement. However, according to the head of the school, the vacant land had been purchased several years ago to build a primary school. After the nationalization of all educational institutions in Pakistan, the project had been delayed or even dropped; but the school was still the owner of the land and did not want to cede it. The head of the school, rather, asked for demolition of 52 Jhuggies and relocation of the residents. Purchase of the land would also be difficult because of its price. According to the Coordinator CPT, the land of 52 Jhuggies had a high land value; so, one may expect that the land beyond the boundary wall is also valuable.

Cooperative housing society A last alternative taken into consideration was the organization of the population of 52 Jhuggies into a cooperative housing society, so that KMC could lease the land of 52 Jhuggies as a whole to this housing society.

59 It would then be left to the society, i.e., to the joint residents, as to how they would improve the settlement. A likely outcome would be that richer families buyout the poorer ones; the former would keep on living on the land, but on larger plots, and the latter have funds to resettle somewhere else. The question is whether this should be considered a posi tive or negative development.

3 Land ownership

A prerequisite for all on-site solutions was the transfer of the 52 Jhuggies land to KMC, the lease-issuing authority. According to the residents, the land had belonged to a Hindu, who had left Pakistan after Partition, and it had been taken under control by the Evacuee Property Trust. This Trust had been established after independence to administer all property left behind in Pakistan by Hindus and Sikhs when they fled to India. In his note to the Administrator KMC, the Coordinator CPT had confirmed that the land was evacuee-property. When the Community Relations Section of CPT received the assignment to examine the feasibility of regularization of 52 Jhuggies, it did not immediately approach the Trust. It feared that this would call the attention of the Trust and others to this highly valuable land and could lead to a request to KMC by the Trust for demolition of the settlement. Instead, the Community Relations Section requested the KMC Department of Land & Estate for the plot number, plot size and ownership of the land occupied by 52 Jhuggies. It took the Department six weeks to reply, and the answer was quite surprising. All information regarding land ownership collected before proved to be wrong. According to the maps of the Land & Estate Department, the land on which 52 Jhuggies had been erected originally had been public space: part of the road which runs along the settlement. In 1940 a realignment of this road had been carried out in accordance with the Garden Quarters Town Planning Scheme, and for that purpose Kt·1C had acquired 420 square yards of the land nelonging to the school. To compen sate the school ,725 square yards of public space which fell outside the

60 new road alignment were granted to the school. The school had never taken possession of this strip of land, probably because it did not know it had become its owner. The 52 Jhuggies had been constructed mainly on this strip of land and partly on public space. This information made regularization of 52 Jhuggies completely im possible, as the school would never agree to cede this strip of land. There even was a fair chance that the school would demand demolition of the settlement as soon as it would find out it owned the land. This apprehension brought the Section Officers to the last alternative for regularization or relocation: to ignore the request by the residents for regularization, so that no decision would have to be taken and attention would not be drawn to the settlement. Then, the residents of 52 Jhuggies could, at least for the time being, keep on living on their plots. This also seemed to be the best solution in view of the changed political situation in the country. The request for regularization had been written on June 17, 1977. In the morning of July 5, 1977 the Government of Z.A.Bhutto and his PPP was overthrown by the armed forces and Martial Law was declared throughout the country. Prime-Minister Bhutto and many PPP politicians were taken into protective custody and all political activities were banned. The people of 52 Jhuggies could no longer make an appeal to their PPP ministers in the Government of Sind and pressurize KMC to regularize the settlement. A couple of months later,the new military ruler of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, announced the regularization and improvement of all katchi abadis created before January 1, 1978. The residents of 52 Jhuggies under stood this as a sign that they now had gained complete security of tenure, though without a formal lease title to the plot. They had achieved their goal. When the Community Relations Section passed the 52 Jhuggies some months later, green flags with nine stars of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) were flying over the settlement. The PNA was the federation of opposition parties which had fought for the removal of Bhutto and the PPP and had welcomed the military coup d'etat.

61 4 Conclusions

Apart from 52 Jhuggies' particular problem of private land ownership, which made it impossible to arrange a transfer of land to KMC for leasing, the more general problem of what to do for this type of small katchi abadi with a problematic layout and a high population density also remained unsolved. KMC's Improvement Policy proved to be inadequate to cope with this type of settlement, of which numerous examples can be found in the centre of Karachi. On the one hand, it seems reasonable enough to provide security of tenure to the residents of 52 Jhuggies, who have been living on that strip of land for many years and are not disturbing anybody or obstructing the implementation of any plan. They deserve at least the protection of the authorities against speculators or anybody else who wants to remove them and demolish their houses. On the other hand, it would probably be unwise to regularize a settlement like 52 Jhuggies with its problematic layout and high population density and to grant lease titles for a 99-year period to the residents. Regularization would provide security of tenure, but what would be the physical future of the settlement? Neither the houses nor the infrastructure can be really upgraded. From a planning point of view, it may be more feasible to grant short term lease titles (e.g., for a period of 10 - 25 years) to residents of such settlements, so that the people have security of tenure, but know they cannot stay forever. But since in Karachi lease titles are normally granted for a 99-year period, there is a good chance that on political grounds titles for a shorter period would be unacceptable, or that on the same grounds the titles would be automatically extended to 99 years after the first period had expired. Thus, after the Lyari Project, the 52 Jhuggies case showed again the rather limited scope of KMC's Improvement Policy for Sub~·standard Urban Areas. The policy seems to have been formulated basically for regularization and improvement of peripheral squatter settlements with a rather spacious layout, where (re-)planning is possible and upgrading can be inexpensive. Baldia Townsh1P seemed to be such a settlement.

62 B THE KARACHI SLUM IMPROVEMENT PROJECT 4 Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme

4.1 Introduction

On March 7, 1977, general elections for the National Assembly were held in Pakistan. Two parties opposed each other in these elections: the Pakis tan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The results of the polls, which were planned to be followed by elections for the Provincial Assemblies on March 10, astonished everybody, including the PPP. Not so much the victory as such was surprising, but its magnitude: a landslide victory for the PPP. Bhutto's party secured 155 out of 200 seats in the National Assembly, while the PNA won only 36 seats (Burney 1977, p.16). Immediately after the results had been announced, the opposition accused the PPP and the government of rigging the polls. The impression that fraud had been committed was not only based on the results, but also on the unlikely high polling percentage. Although the PPP had uncontested ly won 19 seats in Sind and Baluchistan, more than 63% of the national electorate had cast its vote. In a predominantly rural constituency in Sukkur (Province of Sind), for instance, 85% of the electorate had voted (Ibid. p.13). Following the announcement of the election results, the PNA called for a boycott of the provincial elections on March 10, and it withdrew its candidates. Consequently, the PPP won all seats in the provincial assemblies. But simultaneously, unrest spread throughout the country, and there were political processions and riots in a large number of cities and towns of Pakistan. A curfew had to be imposed on numerous occasions in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, and the army had to be called in to restore law and order. The political unrest lasted from March until early June 1977. Finally, the riots forced Bhutto to start negotiations with the PNA to find a way to settle the crisis. The negotiations began on June 5, 1977,

63 (the day the first members of DAM arrived in Karachi), and centred around the demand of the PNA for new national and provincial elections. Although it sometimes seemed that progress was being made, the negotiations in fact dragged on for weeks without tangible results. To many politicians and political observers it became clear that eventually Bhutto would have no alternative but to call for new national and provincial elections. And even though the negotiations were still going on, politicians started to make their preparations for a new election campaign. One of these politicians was Haji Qasim I'\bbas Patel, who had been the PPP provincial assembly candidate for a constituency which also included Baldia Township. On March 10, Patel had easily won his assembly seat because the PNA candidate had withdrawn from the polls. Subsequently, he had become Minister of Health and Social Welfare of the Provincial Govern ment of Sind. Patel feared for his seat, if the government would call for new elections, because the majority of the electorate in his constituency seemed to favour the PNA. During the national elections on March 7, the PNA candidate Sardar Sher Baz Khan Mazari, leader of the National Demo cratic Party, had defeated the PPP candidate Malik Mir Hazar in almost the same constituency. Patel assumed that in a direct confrontation he would also be defeated. On June 26, 1977, Haji Qasim Abbas Patel, as Minister of Health and Social Welfare, visited Baldia Township in the company of the Minister of Ho~sing, Town Planning, Local Government and Rural Development. The next day the two ministers wrote a letter to the Administrator KMC requesting him to expedite the regularization and improvement of this katchi abadi, so that they would gain in popularity in Baldia Township. Baldia Township already was on the priority list of katchi abadis to be regularized and improved (together with Golimar/Gulbahar, and Bhutta Village). Now that the Lyari Project had collapsed, CPT/KMC complied with Patel's request and took up Baldia Township for planning on a priority basis.

64 4.2 The historical perspective

The settlement which carries the name Baldia Township is popularly known as Muhajir Camp, i.e., Refugee Camp. It is situated on the north western fringe of Karachi (see map 1), along the Hub River Road, just north of an important industrial zone, Sind Industrial Trading Estate (SITE). This industrial area had already been planned and created before Pakistan's independence, and since the 1950's it has attracted labourers who wanted to live in its vicinity. In 1953 the Karachi Municipal Corporation resettled some potters on land just north of SITE, because their activities were considered ob noxious to the densely populated area of Lyari, their dwelling place till that time. The potters, who had already been relocated twice within Lyari, created a new settlement called New Kumbharwara. As Salahuddine Khan recounts: "In the early years when people had just started settling in this area, it had such a small and sparse population that people to whom plots were allotted did not dare to stay overnight. They would come early in the morning, erect huts, make pots and would go to their relatives in Karachi before it got dark"(Schuringa et al.1979, p.19). Next to Kumbharwara but still along the main road leading to Hub River, new settlements developed in the 1950's and early 1960's: Delhi Colony, Mecca Colony and New Anjam Colony. Some of the new settlers had requested the Municipal Corporation for a plot or a house, because they could no longer live in the overcrowded city centre. Others were forcefully evicted from illegal settlements in the centre of Karachi. As the settlements in the area grew and the industrial zone developed, squatters also started to occupy vacant land. Because it was a municipal resettlement area, it became known as Baldia (Municipal) Colony (Ibid.p.20). In 1965 administrative control over the land was transferred from the Board of Revenue (Government of Sind) to the Karachi Development Authori ty (KDA) for development as a predominantly residential area according to a new approach. Since 1958 the authorities in Karachi had tried to reduce the housing shortage by developing two low-cost housing projects (North

6S Karachi and Korangi) at some distance from the city; but when these projects proved to be too expensive for resettlement of squatters, they were stopped. Now KDA decided to try to develop three plot-townships: Qasbah, Orangi and Baldia Township (Segaar 1975, pp.44-45). The total project area of Baldia Township covered 7200 acres, divided into 21 sectors. The various sectors had different land uses and would be developed in stages over a number of years. The Sectors 1 to 5, nearest to SITE and proposed to be developed immediately, were intended for low income families. Further north, industrial and commercial lones, residen tial areas for middle-income groups, large graveyards and a site for a police training centre would be developed, However, when KDA wanted to implement its plans, it 'discovered' that Sectors 1 and 2 and part of Sector 5 - all adjacent to SITE - had already been almost completely occupied by squatters. KDA could therefore allot plots (of 80 and 120 square yards) only in Sector 3 and part of Sector 5, These plots were mainly allotted to families who had been shifted from the center of Karachi, in particular the area near the Mausoleum of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and from a spontaneous settlement on the land of the Pakistan Air Force Base adjacent to Baldia Colony, on the other side of Hub River Road. The plots in Baldia Township were supposed to be given on lease to the new residents, but KDA could not decide on a price for land and develop ment. It therefore asked the people to pay 25% of the price of their plot at a provisional rate of Rs.5 per square yard. After payment of these charges they received an 'allotment slip' in their name. In this way approximately 6000 plots were provisionally allotted in Sectors 3 and 5, but as KDA did not immediately provide the area with the necessary infra structure, such as water supply, many people did not occupy their property. Only since the early 1970's is some infrastructure being provided to Baldia, and since then the population has grown rapidly. In the early 1970's the situation was such that the southern part of Baldia Township had been completely occupied by squatters; two sectors had been provisionally allotted and occupied by resettled families, while the remaining land north of Sectors 3 and 5 was still vacant (see map 2). In 1972 the population of Baldia Township was estimated at 80.000 in habitants (Population census 1977, p.25).

66 ORANGt HILLS

67 In 1972 KDA submitted a project proposal (PC I) to the Government of Sind for upgrading of Baldia Township. The total cost of the project amounted to Rs.400 million, to be recovered entirely from the residents. KDA withdrew its proposal when it appeared that the project lacked political support for lease rates higher than Rs.5 per square yard. In 1973 it submitted a revised PC I, which mentioned a total improvement cost of RS,155 million and a deficit of about Rs.80 million; KDA had strictly kept to a lease rate of Rs.5 per square yard. This proposal was of course unacceptable to the Government of Sind, and consequently the project was not implemented. On Juli I, 1974, administrative control over Baldia Township was trans ferred from KDA to KMC. The decision to transfer Baldia Township to the Municipal Corporation was taken at a meeting in the KDA office, presided over by the Minister of Housing, Town Planning, Local Government & Rural Development (HTPLG & RD). Present at this meeting were: the Administrator and Chief Engineer of KMC, officers of ~~C and KDA, officers of the HTPLG & RD Department, and several members of the National and Provincial Assembly. According to the minutes of the meeting, the Administrator K~~C raised objections, but could not prevent the transfer of Baldia Township to KMC, as "the decision was taken at quite a high level". With the transfer of the land control over Baldia Township, also the assignment to regularize and upgrade the settlement was transferred to ~C. Most probably the trans fer of Baldia Township from KDA to KMC had been arranged by some PPP politicians, because KMC could be manipulated more easily for the~r politi cal objectives, namely legalization and upgrading at very low charges for the residents. At a meeting on October 30,1976, at the HTPLG & RD Department, a working paper on allotment of plots in Baldia was discussed. Present at this meeting were the Secretary HTPLG & RD, the Administrator and Land Manager of KMC, and Mr.Haji Qasim Abbas Patel, Member of the Provincial Assembly. At this meeting Mr.Patel stated that lease rates for plots in Baldia Township could not be increased above the level of Rs. 5 per square yard, as promises had been made by Prime-Minister Bhutto at a public meeting in Baldia Town ship in January 1973. No decision was taken at this meeting. On February 19, 1977, during the campaign for the March elections, Chief Minister of Sind Jatoi visited Baldia Township together with the PPP candidates for this constituency, Malik Mir Hazar and Haji Qasim Abbas Patel. The Chief Minister disclosed that 600 new drinking water taps

68 were being installed in Baldia Township, and a KMC lease cell would be opened in the following week. He also promised a college, a high school for boys and gas supply to the areal. But despite these promises the PPP candidate for the National Assembly was defeated by the PNA candidate, and Haji Qasim Abbas Patel was only elected because his PNA opponent had withdrawn from the contest. Out of fear that he would also be defeated, if new provincial elections would be held, Patel urged KMC on June 27, 1977, to start the planning work for the regularization and improvement of Baldia Township immediately, so that his popularity in the area would be enhanced. The Administrator KMC passed the request on to CPT, which began making the necessary preparations without delay. And it continued the planning work, when seven days later, on July 5, the PPP government of Bhutto was overthrown by the armed forces because it could not solve the political crisis. Also, Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Haji Qasim Abbas Patel, and other provincial ministers were removed from office.

4.3 A survey of the area

Before planning of the regularization and improvement of a katchi abadi starts, a physical survey, a reconnaissance survey and a socio-economic survey are conducted in the area. As Baldia had already been placed on the list of katchi abadis to be regularized and improved on a priority basis, a physical survey had already been carried out before the Ad ministrator KMC instructed CPT to start the planning of the Township on June 27. Consequently, a map of the area on a scale of 1:2500 and 58 sheets on a scale of 1:500 were already available for physical planning purposes. The Community Relations Section of CPT paid some reconnaissance visits to Baldia Township during the first week of July, but it had to inter rupt its work for some weeks when the army seized power and declared Martial Law. The reconnaissance survey was completed at the end of July and a report was prepared for CPT (CR Section 1977).

69 Following a tendering procedure which had been started in 1976, KMC had already signed a contract with the Joint Research Project IV (JRP IV) of Karachi University for a socio-economic survey in Baldia Township. JRP IV also had to interrupt its fieldwork for the survey because of the coup d'etat, and as a result, survey work in Baldia spread over a period of 6 months - from July through December 1977. The main work of data collection was carried out during the months of October through December. The report of the survey became available in 1978 (JRP IV 1978, pp.8-9). The survey showed that in 1977 Baldia Township had a population of about 150.000 people, occupying approximately 23.000 dwelling units (or plots) on 1000 acres. The gross population density amounted to 150 persons per acre, a rather low density rate compared to, for instance, the gross population density in Lyari: 375 persons per acre (Ibid.p.10). More than 40% of the heads of household in Baldia Township were born in India, in particular in Gujrat and Katch. More than 20% of the heads of household came from North West Frontier Province, and 17% were born in the Punjab (Ibid. p.72). The origin of the population is reflected in the names of the mohallahs (neighbourhoods, mainly on socio-ethnic basis) which constitue Baldia Township; Delhi Colony, Guj'rat Colony, Katchi Colony, Sarhad (Frontier) Colony, Baluch Colony, Swat Colony, Junagarh Mohallah, etc. (Ibid. p.1l7). To a question about the length of their stay in Baldia Township, almost 55% of the heads of household replied that they had been living in Baldia for more than ten years; about 82% said they had been living in Karachi for more than ten years (Ibid. pp.76-77). The information collected by JRP IV showed that more than 26% of the heads of household were employed as skilled labourers or craftsmen, and that 29% worked as unski lled labourers. A 1 ittle over 13% were salesworkers, including shopowners and hawkers, and about 6% were engaged in "white-collar" jobs of administrative or clerical nature. Of all heads of household 10% declared not to have a job for one reason or another (Ibid.p.88). Data on household earnings showed that 42% of the households earned Rs.500 or less per month, 34% earned between Rs.500 and Rs.900 per month, while 14% were reported to earn between Rs.900 and Rs.1300 per month. The average monthly income per household amounted to Rs. 656 (Ibid. p.103). The survey also revealed that 23% of the heads of household

70 had found employment in Baldia Township itself, while 26% were employed in the nearby industrial areas like SITE and Shershah (Ibid. p.90). The findings of the survey indicated that the overwhelming majority (87%) of the households lived in a "semi-pacca" house, i.e., a house constructed partly with pacca (durable) materials like bricks, stones and concrete, and partly with katcha (temporary) materials like mud. About 7% of the households had a completely pacca house and about 6% lived in a katcha house or jhuggie (hut)(Ibid.p.1l2). About 84% of the households in Baldia were reported to be living in their own house, while about 15% had rented their house (Ibid. p.1l2). With regard to the plot area it was found that about 41% of the plots were smaller than 90 square yards, and 33% had an area between 90 and 130 square yards. The average plot area in Baldia was 117 square yards. It should be remembered that in the planned part of Baldia only plots of either 80 or 120 square yards can be found (Schuringa et al. 1979, p.56). The market value of (vacant) residential plots in Baldia Township varied with their location and the availability of infrastructure. A small survey conducted in 1978 revealed that plots of 80 square yards in Sector 3 were being sold at a price of Rs,55 per square yard, while in the less developed Sector 5, plots of 120 square yards were sold at Rs.45 per square yard. In the unauthorized part of Baldia Township prices ranged from Rs.60 per square yard in Delhi Colony near the Hub River Road, to Rs.10 per square yard in Rashidabad, where water supply is largely in sufficient (Imam, n.d.). Drinking water in Baldia Township is supplied through 550 public taps. Most of these taps provide water on alternate days for only two hours in the afternoon. In summer, however, when there is a general shortage of water in Karachi, supply to Baldia is considerably reduced. Moreover, since Baldia has a gentle slope up to the east, pressure on the water supply network in the most southeastern part of the settlement is too low to supply water through taps; in this part of the area water provision is undertaken by water trucks. Depending on the season and the location of the tap, the available quantity of water per head per day in Baldia Township varies from 1,5 to 4 gallons (Schuringa et al. 1979, p.59). A survey conducted in Baldia in 1979 showed that for human waste disposal three types of latrines are in use. Almost 35% of the households have a bucket latrine: an open bucket - usually an empty battery box -

71 placed under the toilet. More than 60% of the houses have a soakpit: a hole in the ground connected to the toilet by a pipe. About 3% of the households have a septic tank: a concrete chamber under the ground, where the liquid is filtered and the solid materials stay behind (Ibid. pp.57-58) . The JRP IV survey of 1977 also indicated that the construction of an adequate water supply system emerged as the most felt need for improve ment in Baldia Township, followed by the construction of a sewerage and drainage system (JRP IV 1978, p.85).

4.4 The project proposal

As outlined in the 17-steps programme for regularization and improve ment of katchi abadis (Chapter II.3), CPT prepared a concept plan for the area under planning once the data collected in the various surveys had been analysed and evaluated. Although the final results of the socio economic survey were not yet available in July 1977, the Physical Planning Section of CPT started the preparation of a concept plan for Baldia Town ship on the basis of the physical survey maps and a preliminary survey report by JRP IV. Simultaneously, the Engineering Section made an analysis of the existing infrastructure in the area and the physical improvements necessary to upgrade the overall living conditions in Baldia Township to an acceptable level. A comprehensive concept plan of the Physical Planning Section and an improvement plan of the Engineering Section constituted the two basic components of the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme prepared by CPT in November 1977 and submitted by KMC to the Government of Sind for approval in December 1977. According to the project proposal, the Baldia Scheme comprised the following three main elements: a. Land regularization: the provision of land leases to the residents. b. Area improvement: the development of the area within the given budget constraints (i.e., cost has to be tailored to recovery). The develop-

72 ment of the area includes the provision of roads, water supply, an open sewerage system, solid waste management and community services. Improvement and development of the area are essentially incremental. c. Sub-standard Urban Area Improvement Fund. The project is to be financed from the SUA Improvement Fund. Rules for implementation of the Fund are under consideration. All foreign and local resources for slum improve ment will be channeled into the Fund. It will include any foreign assistance, lease proceeds and proceeds from auctioning of open plots in the area (CPT 1977, pp.3-5).

Although chronologically the preparation of the comprehensive concept plan and the physical development plan preceded the preparation of the official project proposal of the Baldia Township Regularization and Im provement Scheme (commonly known as the PC I Baldia), we shall discuss the project proposal in this chapter and review the concept plan together with the detailed planning in the next chapter.

4.5 Proposed improvement of Baldia Township

In the PC I Baldia the following proposals were made for upgrading of Baldia Township: a. Water supply, sewerage and storm-water drainage.

These three basic utilities could not be dealt with in isolation since they are interlinked and every decision on one would influence the other. The physical constraints of the area itself, the overall lack of water in the northern part of Karachi for many years to come, and the limited financial resources determined the characteristics of the utilities to be provided to Baldia Township (DAM 1977, p.13). As shortage of water is one of the most important problems for the Baldia residents, the project proposed continued water supply by stand posts, with an option for house connections restricted to certain areas. The total number of standposts in Baldia was proposed to be raised to 1000 (an increase of 450 taps), on the assumption that one standpost could serve 20 plots and each plot should not be more than 100 yards away

73 from the nearest standpost. House connections for the entire population were rejected at this stage (CPT 1977, p.10).

Since water is supplied for a couple of hours on alternate days, people line up their tin cans at the tap long before the water arrives. In summer, when Karachi suffers from a serious water shortage, there is often not enough water to fill all cans.

For human waste disposal a modern, closed waterborne system can only function if a sufficient quantity of water is available throughout the year. Bearing in mind that the present water supply would be insuf ficient to ensure this, it was concluded that a closed sewer system could not be considered. Besides, an underground system would require digging trenches in the rocky subsoil at considerable costs. The limited water supply in Baldia rather suggested an open sewerage system, which could be maintained more easily provided the drains are properly constructed (DAM 1977, pp.13-14). The nallahs, or natural drains, can easily absorb storm water from the entire township; even during the heavy rains of July 1977 Baldia Township had not been seriously affected. The course of the five major nallahs runs more or less parallel from the hills to the Hub River Road,

74 from where a main sewer and a storm-water drain leads to the Lyari River. So, if the nallahs could be channelled and encroachments in their beds be removed, they could serve as the main network for a combined storm water and sewerage/drainage system, to which all roads and plots could ultimately be connected (Ibid. p.14). b. Solid waste disposal.

Garbage in Baldia Township is presently collected by one sanitation van owned by a private contractor. Collection takes place monthly and mohallah-wise, and the garbage is dumped and incinerated in the adjacent hills. Moreover, KMC employs 12 sweepers to clean the streets. There are 33 concrete dustbins in Baldia and an equal number made out of other materials. The PC I Baldia proposed the purchase of two new sanitation vans for the collection of garbage and the construction of 100 additional dustbins (Ibid. p.14). c. Roads.

The main road network for Baldia Township would consist of two primary distributors, one along the western side of the settlement (the present Hub River Road), and the other along the eastern side of the settlement (a loop road to be constructed through the Orangi hills). Two district distributors would intersect the area, one linking the Hub River Road with the eastern part of the settlement and one linking SITE (to the south) with the still undeveloped area north of Baldia. Both district distributors would follow the existing road pattern, but widening of the roads probably would require some demolition (Ibid. p.12). Local dis tributors would give access to colonies and mohallahs. They would have a minimum width of 24 feet, so as to meet the KMC requirement of a maximum distance of 100 yards between a residential plot and a 24-foot-wide road. House access lanes, with a reserve of 8 to 12 feet in width, would be dealt with at the detailed planning stage (Ibid. p.12). d. Electricity.

Electricity is available throughout the area, but house connections

75 are frequently of bad quality and are rather dangerous because they are illegally installed. Street lighting is availabe; but the PC I proposed the extension of the network, so that in a later phase each electricity pole could be provided with a street light (Ibid. p.14).

e. Community services.

The proposed area improvement plan included a basic health center with a maternity home and playgrounds. Along the main roads, road-side plan tations were proposed (CPT 1977, p.11).

4.6 The financial plan

Once the upgrading programme for Baldia Township had been established, the Economic Planning Section and the Engineering Section of CPT prepared a cost estimate of the proposed improvements. The following budget was included in the PC I (Ibid. Annexure II): Item x Rs .1000 %

Land acquisition (land is already in Kr~c possession) Land development (including demolition, etc.) 1.500 4 Metalling of main roads 2.034 6 Metalling of house access lanes 7.000 20 Basic Health Center 600 1 Electrifi cation 2.000 6 Combined open sewers and storm-water drains 19.626 56 Water supply 2.031 6 Solid waste disposal 500 1 35.291 100 Contingencies (5% phys ical and 10% annual pri ce contingencies) 10.131 Departmental charges 497 Maintenance during construction 779 Transport vehicles 100 46.798

76 Planning and monitoring costs would not be paid from the project budget, but from the current CPT budget. The figure of approximately Rs.47 million as a total cost estimate for improvement of Baldia Township implied an average cost of Rs.313 per resident of the area against Rs.593 in Lyari. All costs of improvement had to be recovered from the beneficiaries, the population of Baldia Town ship, mainly through leasing of occupied plots and auctioning of vacant plots. After a careful study of the income level of the Baldia residents, in cluding their saving and expenditure pattern, the lease rate for the smallest residential plots was fixed at Rs.15 per square yard and for commercial plots at Rs.100 per square yard. (Ibid. p.14). So, if residents would be allowed to pay their lease charges in three yearly instalments after an initial down payment of 25%, an occupant of a plot of 117 square yards (average plot size) and a monthly income of RS,656 (average monthly household income) would spend only 5.5% of his yearly income on payment of lease charges for his plot (excluding interest}. The expected revenues from leasing of plots in Baldia Township were estimated on the basis of area and land use pattern rather than on the number and size of plots. This had been done, because the land use pattern was thought to be more reliable than the count and measurement of plots. According to the comprehensive concept plan, 527 acres of land had a proposed residential land use and 14 acres a proposed commercial land use. Leasing of this land alone at the above rates would yield about Rs.44 million in lease proceeds. Defaults in payment were expected to amount to 20% of the gross yiel~s (Ibid. p.14 and Annexure II). As explained in Chapter 11.4 Kt1C would nevertheless need a start capital deposited in the revolving SUA Improvement Fund to implement the project. From the Fund all improvement works would be financed, and all proceeds from leasing and auctioning would be channelled into the Fund. However, since the IDA had withdrawn from the Lyari Project, the SUA Improvement Fund was sti 11 empty; in fact it did not even exist, as the administrati ve Fund Rules had not yet been approved. At this stage the Dutch Advisory Mission approached the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation to inquire about the possibility of an allocation of funds from the annual Dutch financial assistance programme to Pakistan for this project, Informally,

77 the Dutch Ministry made it known to DAM that it would positively consider a request by the Pakistan Government during the annual bilateral nego tiations for a Dutch contribution of 70% of the total project costs, provided some basic conditions for a proper handling of the funds would be met. Thereupon, the financial plan of the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme could be completed. It was proposed in the PC I that KMC and the Government of Sind would contribute 15% of the project costs each, and the Government of the Netherlands, 70%. On December 7, 1977, KMC sent the PC I Baldia to the Department of Housing, Town Planning, Local Government & Rural Development for approval (Ibid.p.15).

4.7 Some initial comments

Although the entire project will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, the above presentation of the PC I for the Baldia project re quires some initial comments at this stage. The project proposal for Baldia was prepared by CPT and DAM in November 1977, only four months after the start of the planning work for Baldia and only five months after the start of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project. During the planning work not all socio-economic, physical and financial data about Baldia were already at the disposal of the planners. Moreover, the PC I was written first of all to obtain administrative approval for the financial plan of the scheme and the execution of the project. In the course of the two years the project lasted, the PC I Bal dia was revised several times to adapt it to newly available information, to objections from government departments and to newly gained insights of CPT and DAM. Therefore, the PC I as presented above is not consistent on all points with the refined Improvement Policy as described in Chapter I I I. About the proposed road network, for instance, it should be mentioned that the construction cost of the two primary distributors were not charged to the proj ect budget. Furthermore, the setting of a mi nimum wi dth for local distributors and house access lanes served a psychological rather than a legal or technical purpose. It reassured the technocrats who had

78 to examine the proposal that CPT was not preserving slum areas. During the detailed planning on mohallah level, the prevailing planning principle remained the preservation of existing structures wherever possible, even if it meant regularization of a 4-foot-wide street. The allocation for metalling of house access lanes and the construction of an open sewerage/drainage system amounted to 75% of the total project costs, obviously a very high percentage. A long discussion preceded the decision to allocate Rs.7 million for metalling of house access lanes. The alternative was to leave these roads unmetalled and to ask the residents to execute the work on a self-help basis. Eventually, the arguments that it is KMC's duty to metal all roads and that a request for self-help activities would probably provoke opposition from the residents - as well as the consideration that the decision could always be reversed - settled the matter. The proposal to construct an open sewerage system did not satisfy anybody in CPT and DAM, but it was adopted because the shortage of water in Baldia and the shortage of funds in the project budget excluded the construction of an underground waterborne sewerage system. The cost of construction of the open sewerage system amounted to about Rs.130 per capita in Baldia Township as opposed to Rs.230 per capita for the under ground sewerage system in Lyari, an important cost reduction. However, the question of whether or not despite Turner's arguments some standards should not be fixed to protect public health in katchi abadis, could be raised here again. Eventually the proposal for an open sewerage system was included in the PC I with the remark that the idea would be reviewed in a later stage to find out if no better alternative could be developed.

79 5 Planning of Baldia Township

5.1 Concept planning

In the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas, steps 8-10 of the 17-step programme for regularization and improvement of katchi abadis read:

8. CPT prepares a concept plan for the area, with informal consultation of the residents and due consideration for the Karachi Development Plan. 9. The concept plan is reviewed by the Joint Working Party and the Area Self-Improvement Working Party and the plan is revised until all agree that public objections should be invited. 10. Public objections to the concept plan are invited by KMC and the plan is finally reviewed in the light of these objections (KMC 1977b, pp.33-34).

In accordance with this programme the Physical Planning Section of CPT started the preparation of the comprehensive concept plan of Baldia Town ship. The objective of the concept planning was to place the settlement within the framework of the city master plan and to show general proposals regarding major road network, land use distribution and location of major infrastructural works (DAM/KMC 1979, p.10).

Existing plans.

In principle two plans had to be taken into account while preparing the concept plan of Baldia Township: the Karachi Development Plan ("Master Pl an") prepared by the Mas ter Pl an Department of KDA in 1974, and the development plan of Baldia Township (scheme 29) prepared by KDA in 1965. Although the significance of the Karachi Development Plan for the actual development of Karachi is very limited, due to the inadequacy of the authorities' instruments to direct the growth of the city, it is useful to go through the projections of the Karachi Development Plan for the Baldia area.

80 The Plan anticipated that one of the main thrusts of new growth for Karachi up to 1985 would be in the northwestern direction, i.e., the Baldia-Orangi area (MPD 1974, p.97). The population of this area was expected to grow from an estimated 300.000 in 1974 to approximately 650.000 in 1985. Baldia and Orangi were expected to be relatively low income residential areas for unskilled, semiskilled and, to a lesser. extent, skilled workers employed in SITE, the port of Karachi and the city centre (Ibid.pp.115-116). Because of its accessibility to unskilled and semiskilled job opportunities, Baldia was thought to continue to be a major entry point for immigrants to the Metropolitan Area (Ibid. p.1l6) . Since it is situated along the RCD Highway1 (Hub River Road), the main road leading from Karachi to the northwest and Baluchistan, some additional industrial development could take place in Baldia, in particular in the zone for light industry to be developed next to the existing settle ment. According to the Karachi Development Plan, water supply, sewerage, electricity and gas could also be easily provided (MPD 1974, p.119). In 1965, as mentioned before, KDA had prepared a plan for development of the area as a p1 ot- townsh i p (Scheme 29). Unti 1 1977 on ly two Sectors (3 and 5) had been occupied by squatters. With KMC's decision to regularize these squatters, the KDA plans for Sectors 1 and 2 were decisively shelved. The only issue to De settled i'n tfiis respect was the road connechon between SITE and the still undeveloped area north of the existing settlement. The new concept plan for Baldia proposed a loop road through the hills east of Baldia as the alternative for th.e 200~foot-wide road (proposed by KDA in Scheme 29) which would cut straight through the unauthorized part of Baldia Township; its construction would have required the demolition of about 1000 houses. A time schedule for construction of this road was not included in the concept plan, but neither was the cost of construction charged to the project budget. For the time being, an existing access road from SITE would absorb any increase in traffic.

Some elements of the concept plan. The guiding principle in land use planning for Baldia was regularization of existing land use patterns wherever possible, in order to preserve housing as well as employment opportunities in the area. Future commercial activities were expected to be largely concentrated in the existing

81 commercial zones. An exception was the zone on both sides of the proposed access road from SITE, which was declared commercial, although hardly any commercial activity was visible at the moment(DAM 1977, p.10). Industrial plots would be regularized irrespective of their location, provided they were not considered obnoxious according to KMC regulations. For such industries alternative plots would probably be offered in the future light-industry zone north of Baldia (Ibid. p.10). According to KMC regulations, cattle yards cannot be regularized if situated in residential areas. Pending a government decision about relocation of cattle yards, regularization as commercial plots in the name of the present owner was recommended. Workshops would be considered commercial to avoid uncontrolled conversion into obnoxious industry (Ibid.pp.10-11). Open plots in the unauthorized part of Baldia and plots abandoned by obnoxious industries and cattle yards would be used for relocation of households affected by regularization in that neighbourhood, or would be developed as a park, a playground, etc. Open plots in the planned area (Sectors 3 and 5) could possibly be acquired for use as a playground, if no other space would be available in the neighbourhood (Ibid.p.11). In the concept plan, space was reserved for construction of the following: additional primary schools and colleges, 6 government dispensa ries, a maternity home, and a hospital (Ibid.p.15). Financing and con struction of these amenities would be the responsibility of the concerned departments of KMC and the Government of Sind, not of CPT. Therefore, construction costs were not charged to the project budget, and the decision to construct would fall outside the scope of the Baldia Im provement Project. CPT estimated that the implementation of the concept plan would require the (partial or complete) demolition of about 300 houses (out of a total of 23.000 houses in the whole of Baldia, viz., 1,5%.Demolition would be necessary mainly along the Hub River Road (which had to be widened) and in the centre of Baldia Township (where the new alignment of the road from SITE had been planned).

82 5.2 Community organization

During the reconnaissance survey which had preceded the planning work, the Community Relations Officers of CPT had established contacts with a number of local leaders in Baldia Township. During the first visit to Baldia (before July 5, 1977) the Officers had met independent leaders as well as leaders belonging to PPP and PNA. However, after July 5 it was considerably more difficult to get in touch with PPP leaders, as some had been arrested and others had gone underground. The general elections of March 7 had shown that the PNA had a substantial following in Baldia Township. Without PPP representatives two PNA men emerged as the most important local leaders of the area. One was a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), originally from Gujrat in present-day India; in the past he had been president of the Baldia Town Committee, a sub municipal organization under the Basic Democracies system, which was practically abolished in 1969 (Segaar 1975, pp.64-65). The other man was a Hazarvi (from NWFP) , vice-president of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). These two persons and some other PNA and independent leaders were contacted again by the Community Relations Officers when the concept plan had almost reached completion. The Officers asked the man to form a community leaders' delegation from Baldia Township, which could represent the population of the area in the dialogue with KMC about the plan pro posals. A possible obstacle for the formation of this delegation was the ban the Martial Law authorities had imposed on political meetings and the pursuit of official functions by politicians after the coup d'~tat. Nevertheless, a couple of weeks later the two PNA leaders presented their community leaders' delegation of Baldia Township to the Community Relations Offi cers . The delegation, under the name "Anjuman-e-Ittehad Baldia Township", consisted of about 50 local leaders from almost all mohallahs. As far as could be concluded from the names, the delegation also represented a cross section of the ethnic groups in the area. It had an executive commi ttee of 7 persons: a pres i den t, two vi ce-pres i dents, two secretari es , a treasurer and a propaganda secretary. The JI man from Gujrat was president; the Hazarvi from JUI was vice-president. Besides the executive

83 committee, the delegation had an advisory committee of six persons. All people in the delegation were either PNA members or independent leaders; they were no members of the PPP. The Community Relations Section organized two meetings with the Anjuman e-Ittehad to discuss the concept plan and the financial plan for Baldia Township. The first meeting between CPT planners and members of the executive and advisory committees took place in the KMC site office in Baldia. The second meeting between CPT planners and the entire group of local leaders was organized in a local mosque. The purpose of these meetings was to explain the contents of the concept plan and the financial plan (mainly the lease rates of Rs. 15 and Rs. 100 per square yard for residential and commercial plots, respectively) and to inform the leaders about the procedure CPT would follow to obtain approval of the plans from KMC, the Government of Sind and the Baldia population. On these occasions copies of the concept plan were handed over to the executive committee,and the leaders were requested to pass all information they received on to the inhabitants of their respective mohallah. CPT also told them that it would gladly accept any invitation to give supplementary information at mohallah meetings. The Community Relations Section actually assisted at several mohallah meetings organized in Baldia Township. Simultaneously, the comprehensive concept plan, a summary of the financial plan and posters (in Urdu and English) explaining the main components of the plans, were displayed at the KMC office in Baldia Township. Moreover, a couple of thousand pamphlets in Urdu, explaining plans and procedures and listing the places where the plans could be seen, were distributed in the area by CPT. The general impression of DAM after the mohallah meetings and the display of plans at the KMC office was that the common residents were not very in terested in the concept plan as such, as they considered it too general and rather abstract. Most people who came to see the plans only tried to locate their own house and plot to find out if their house would be affected or even would have to be demolished for the regularization and improvement programme. However, the scale of the concept plan (1:2500) hardly allowed for any definite answer.

84 5.3 Public objections to the concept plan

On October 13, 1977, KMC officially invited public objections to the concept plan. Different from what had been stipulated in the Improvement Policy, a Joint Working Party of KMC and KDA planners did not review the plans prior to the public objections period. The relationship between KMC and KDA is such that cooperation between the two is minimal. If KDA had any objections, it could raise them simultaneously with the general public. For public objections the concept plan was being displayed at the KMC site office in Baldia, at the KMC Head Office and at the CPT office. Announcements in various Urdu and English newspapers listed the places where the plans could be seen and gave the address where objections had to be sent. A slide with a text urging the people to go to see the plans was shown in a cinema in Baldia Township. The public objections period had originally been planned to last for two weeks, but at the insistance of the local leaders CPT extended the period to four weeks. During these four weeks KMC received eight letters with 29 objections in total. They had been raised by the Anjuman~e-Ittehad Baldia Township, the Kh i dmat Comit tee of Jam Nagar t~oha 11 ah (386 signatures), 3 groups of 99, 101 and 104 residents, respectively. and by 3 individuals. At the end of the period CPT listed all objections and the concerned sections phrased their technical comments. Then, objections and comments were summarized in a document for the Public Objections Hearing Committee. This committee would have to examine the objections and decide whether adjustment? would have to be made in the plans before these are sent to the Government of Sind for final approval. Originally the idea had been to form a committee composed of equal numbers of KMC officers and representatives of the population. However, since by Martial Law order politicians were no longer allowed to fulfil official functions, it was impossible to have a representation from the public in the committee. When th.e meeting of the committee was finally held on January 11, 1978, the committee consisted of KMC officers only: Superintendent Engineer Circle II, Director Land & Estate, Deputy Director Land & Estate, Planning Coordinator Lyari, Land Use Controller Lyari,

85 Planning Coordinator CPT, and Senior Physical Planner CPT. The meeting was held in the CPT office. In six out of eight letters objections had been raised to the proposed lease rates, and in most letters a reduction of the rates to Rs. 5 or even Rs. 3 per square yard for residential plots was suggested. The technical comments of the Economic Planning Section on the objections to the lease rates are reproduced below: "This proposal (of Rs. 5 and Rs. 3 per square yard, YKS) wi 11 have the following repercussions:

1. The lease rates proposed by the people will reduce the recovery from Rs. 47 million ( .. ) to Rs. 9 million only. 2. The present project at the cost of Rs. 47 million provides for minimal standards of development including open drains and standpost for water supply. 3. In 1965 KDA had issued some leases of Rs. 5 per square yard for resi dential plots. During the past decade inflation and associated costs have risen more than three-fold. However, Rs. 3 per square yard is even lower than (the lease rate of) 1Q65. 4. If these lease rates are considered, it will set a precedent for other areas. 5. Prevailing lease rates in the adjoining areas Orangi and North Karachi are near about Rs. 15 per square yard. For commercial lease rates, the present market rate has been considered and Rs. 100 per square yard is positively lower than the present market rate. 6. If the budget is scaled down to Rs. 9 million hardly any area improve ment and physical development would be possible" (KMC 1978, pp.10-11). The Public Objections Hearing Committee (POHC) considered objections and technical comments and decided that the proposed lease rates of Rs.15 and Rs.100 had to be upheld, but noted that CPT would present a more detailed lease rate schedule at a later stage. A second objection (raised three times) concerned the widening of the existing road which connects SITE with the area north of Baldia. The point was made in the letters that widening of the road to 54 feet would mean demolition of a number of houses and even a school. The letters suggested reducing the proposed width to 30 feet. The Physical Planning Section gave the following comment: "The road network of Baldia is such that roads interconnecting several mohallahs in the (north-south) direction hardly exist. Earlier KDA had made a reservation for a 200 feet wide road passing through the area. This alignment in the unplanned portion (would have) affected several houses. Therefore, in the revised planning by KMC this road has been re-al igned after a detailed survey. The new alignment is an extension of an existing road. In fact, it is the only possible proposal (and it) affects a minimum

86 In the Physical Planning Section a draftsman modifies the detailed plans according to the decisions of the Public Objections Hearing Committee. of houses. The houses are partially affected and the proposed width is 54 feet. This is the minimum width and reduction of width is not recommended, unless there is a possibility of having the northern loop road at an earlier stage" (Ibid. pp.1-2). The POHC rejected the objection. An objection raised twice concerned widening of the Hub River Road, which forms the western boundary of Baldia. Both letters suggested that if the road had to be widened, this should be done on the other side, where the Pakistan Air Force Base is located. The Physical Planning Section commented: "Since the Hub River Road is a part of the RCD Highway, an,Y modification in its alignment is not possible without thorough examination of the proposal in consultation with the Highway Department (Government of Sind) and the Master Plan Department (KDA). It is for this reason that for the time being (maintenance of) the status quo has been proposed in the concept plan, for encroachers on the highway" (Ibid.p.12). The POHC requested CPT to discuss the proposal with the Highway Department and the Master Plan Department.

87 The Anjuman-e-Ittehad raised an objection to the proposed open sewerage system and suggested a closed system "for better environment and sanitation" CPT's comment were that "a closed sewer system is expensive. Moreover, at present the supply of water is short and it is not advisable to lay a closed system. In the future, when the supply of water reaches to about 15 gallons per head (per day) it would be possible to have a closed system" (Ibid. pp.5-6). The POHC rejected the objection. Finally, there were public proposals for a hospital, 2 maternity homes, 2 colleges and 2 high schools, and a children's playground in specific mohallahs ("taken into consideration"). There were requests for an im mediate improvement of the water supply to Baldia ("taken into considera tion"), for removal of obnoxious industries ("to be done according to regulations"), and for proper relocation of affected families ("will be done"). One letter expressed the scepticism of a resident of Baldia concerning the project and KMC's intentions: "What is the guarantee that people wi 11 get a lease after making the proposed payments ?" At the end of the meeting the POHC approved the concept plan of Baldia Township and requested KMC to send the plan to the Government of Sind for final approval.

5.4 Detailed planning

Once the Public Objections Hearing Committee had approved the concept plan of Baldia Township, the physical planners of CPT started the detailed planning of the area. Detailed regularization plans serve primarily as a legal basis for leasing, and therefore show location. dimensions and land use of the individual plots, in addition to details of proposed infra structural improvements (see map 3). For the detailed planning Baldia Township was subdivided into 26 planning units, which coincided with the mohallahs of the settlement wherever possible. As first mohallah to be planned CPT selected Muslim Mujahid Colony (MMC). The selection of this mohallah had tht'ee reasons. Firstly, MMC has a rather regular street pattern and a low building density, and consequently planning is easy and demolition is hardly necessary.

88 Secondly, the vice-president of the Anjuman-e-Ittehad lives in MMC, and he is one of the best-known leaders of Baldia. Thirdly, MMC is situated in the centre of Baldia, and a successful operation in this mohallah could have a positive effect on the cooperation of residents in surrounding mohallah. Muslim Mujahid Colony has a rectangular shape and an almost perfect grid-pattern of roads. The mohallah covers about 33 acres and has an estimated population of 2700 persons (400 families). The mohallah is bounded by Baldia's main east-west road (in the south), the access road from SITE (in the east), a nallah (in the north) and a local road (in the west). From east to west MMC is intersected by an internal road which divides the mohallah into two parts. In the northern part the population consists mainly of Katchis, while the southern part is mainly inhabited by Pathans from NWFP. Contacts between Pathans and Katchis are rather limited.

o 5 10 15 20 25 m I I I

3. Detail of the Muslim Mujahid Colony regularization plan.

89 As an experiment, CPT decided to involve the residents of MMC as much as possible in the planning of their mohallah. For this purpose the local leader of MMC was approached and asked if he was willing to take on the detailed planning of MMC together with the residents, but without direct CPT involvement. The leader firmly declined the offer, obviously because he did not want to run the risk of being held responsible by the people for the consequences of the planning work. He requested CPT to carry out the planning together with him and the residents. CPT agreed. The physical planners of CPT prepared a map of MMC (scale 1:500) on the basis of the Baldia physical survey maps. On the map they marked land use and dimensions of each plot, the location of vacant land and existing amenities, and all elements of the approved concept plan of Baldia related to MMC (such as road pattern and stOrm-water drains). Also, they prepared a list of issues to be settled for the detailed planning of MMC: roads to be metalled and designed for traffic; the location of a pedestrian bridge over the nallah; and the site for a school, a clinic, a park and/ or a playground. The Community Relations Officers handed two copies of the map and the list of issues over to the local leader and requested him to discuss these with the residents as preparation for a meeting with the CPT planners. Two weeks later (on February 17, 1978) the local leader of MMC, the president of the Anjuman-e-Ittehad, and the Community Relations Section organized a meeting between CPT planners and MMC residents to discuss plans and issues. The meeting was held on a block-maker's ground in MMC and was open to everybody. About 50 people were present, both Katchis and Pathans. Since MMC has a rather regular street pattern, the mohallah required little planning for regularization. Concerning the various issues listed by CPT, agreement between residents and planners could also be easily reached. In fact, most residents were merely interested to know whether their house would be affected by the regularization and improvement of MMC. According to the plan, only a few houses would be slightly affected. After this meeting the physical planners returned to their office and prepared the detailed regularization plan of MMC according to the wishes and suggestions of the residents. On August 7, 1978, KMC officially invited public objections to the plan. The objection period lasted two weeks, and during this period two letters of objections were received.

90 The meeting of the Public Objections Hearing Committee for the MMC de tailed regularization plan was held on November 22, 1978. Only KMC officers attended the meeting: Director Land & Estate, Planning Coordinator Lyari, Land Use Controller Lyari, Planning Coordinator CPT, and Senior Physical Planner CPT. The two objections received concerned a. occupied plots which had been shown as one vacant plot on the plan; b. an open plot and a street which had been shown as an occupied plot on the plan. The second objection was accepted by the POHC; the first objection was kept pending the applicants' evidence of their claim to the land.

5.5 Issuing of leases

CPT also prepared detailed regularization plans for other planning units/mohallahs besides Muslim Mujahid Colony. Simultaneously with MMC, KMC invited public objections to the detailed regularization plan of Sector 3 of Baldia Township. This plan had been prepared without people's participation, as it was identical to the KDA plan of 1965. On the new CPT plan only some roads had been narrowed, so that the space which became available could be auctioned as a commercial zone. The previously planned 200-foot-wi~e access road from SITE, for instance, had been narrowed for this purpose. After t1uslim rVlujahid Colony and Sector 3, physical planners of CPT prepared detailed regularization plans of the western part of Rashidabad and of Kokan Colony (with residents' participation along lines similar to the planning of MMC), and of the eastern part of Sector 5 (a plan identical to the original KDA plan). Public objections to the detailed regularization plans of Rashidabad and Sector 5 (both partly) were invited in the period of November 20 - 30, 1978. The meeting of the Public Objections Hearing Committee for the detailed plans of Rashidabad and Sector 5 and the public objections period for Kokan Colony fell outside the DAM project period, i.e., after June 1979. In early December 1978 the Governor of Sind indicated that he would like to distribute lease documents to residents of a katchi abadi in Karachi within a week, like the Governor of the Punjab had done in Lahore

91 a week before. Since Muslim Mujahid Colony and Sector 3 were the katchi abadis in the most advanced stage of planning, KMC decided to ask the Governor to distribute leases in these mohallahs. Because the approval procedure for the detailed plans of the two mohallahs had not yet been completed, and consequently no resident had applied for a lease nor made a payment, all necessary arrangements had to be completed in a great hurry. What usually takes months, was now done in a couple of days. On December 21, 1978, Lt.Gen.S.M.Abassi, Governor of Sind and Martial Law Administrator Zone "C", distributed the first 21 lease documents to residents of Muslim Mujahid Colony and Sector 3 of Baldia Township.

An unmetalled side-lane with semi-pacca houses. Compound walls conceal the girles and women working in the courtyard from the glances of the passer-by.

92 6 Financing Baldia's improvement

6.1 pc I Baldia (part 1)

In the PC I Baldia the cost of the improvement project had been estimated at Rs.47 million, to be fully recovered from the beneficiaries - the resi dents of Baldia Township - mainly through leasing of plots and auctioning of vacant commercial lots by KMC. In order to be able to start the im provement work, KMC needed funds from the revolving SUA Improvement Fund. However, the Fund had not been established, since IDA had withdrawn from the Lyari improvement project. Therefore, the PC I Baldia made reference to a contribution by the Government of the Netherlands to the SUA Improve ment Fund to the amount of 70% of the estimated cost of the Baldia project. KMC and the Government of Sind would each contribute 15% of the project cost. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs had informed DAM that probably 50% of the contribution would be grant-in-aid and 50% would be soft-loan (2,5% interest, repayable over a period of 30 years after a "grace"period of 8 years). The exact terms and conditions would have to be discussed during the annual bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and the Netherlands regarding their financial and technical assistance programma. However, for inclusion in the agenda of the bilateral negotia tions, the PC I had to first be approved by the Government of Sind and the Government of Pakistan. On December 7, 1977, KMC had sent the proposed Baldia Township Regulari zation and Improvement Scheme to the Department of Housing, Town Planning, Local Government & Rural Development (HTPLG & RD) of the Government of Sind for approval. On February 1, 1978, KMC received a letter from the HTPLG & RD Department. The Department was ready to approve the project, provided KMC would modify its proposal for an open sewerage/drainage system. According to the letter,disposal of human waste through open drains longer than 300 feet was unacceptable for sanitary and environmental reasons; main and intercepting drains had to be converted into closed sewers. CPT accepted the objection of the Department, and the Engineering Section started the design of an alternative human-waste disposal system.

93 The system now designed consisted of open drains in the house access lanes, septic tanks for each group of houses along one lane, and a piped sewerage system from the septic tank to the existing city sewer network. However, the idea was not fully developed by the CPT engineers, as it met opposition from DAM: the system would become rather expensive, while the health hazards for the residents would hardly be reduced. CPT and DAM therefore decided to get in touch with sanitation engineers in other parts of the world and examine their solutions for human waste disposal in low-income areas. One of the engineers would be invited to come to Karachi and make a study of the possibilities of a human waste disposal system for Baldia Township. It became clear to CPT and DAM that whatever system would be designed, the funds in the project budget allocated for the combined open sewerage/ storm-water drainage system would be insufficient to finance an adequate human waste disposal system for Baldia Township. When it appeared that the improvement of the Hub River Road would also have to be (partly) financed out of project funds, it was decided to raise the project budget from Rs.47 million to Rs. 59 million. This cost increase obviously had its consequences. On the one hand, the proceeds of leasing of plots in Baldia had to be enhanced, if the principle of complete cost recovery from the beneficiaries was to be maintained. On the other hand, it was desirable - if not necessary - to raise the seed capital in the SUA Improvement Fund and consequently the contributions by the Government of the Netherlands, the Government of Sind, and KMC.

6.2 The lease rate schedule At this stage the Economic Planning Section prepared a definitive lease rate schedule for Baldia Township. After a careful study of land use and plot size distribution in Baldia, rates for various land use types and size categories of plots were fixed. Five types of land use were distinguished: public land, residential land, residential-cum-commercial land, commercial land, and industrial land. For the decision on the plot-size categories the plot-size, distribution in Baldia as well as the required level of lease

94 proceeds were taken into account. Two methods of calculating lease charges for various size categories of plots were considered. DAM preferred a system of rates increasing for increments in plot size as had been proposed for the Lyari Project (KMC 1977b, p.31 and Annexure A). Under this system the lease rates for the first 120 square yards of all residential plots would amount to Rs.15 per square yard. For plots exceeding 120 square yards the rate for each square yard over and above 120 square yards but under 200 square yards would be Rs. 20, etc. This system avoids abrupt discontinuities in the pricing of land, and thereby limits fraud. Kt1C considered this system too compl icated and proposed fixed lease rates for the various plot-size categories. The following is the lease rate schedule as officially proposed by KMC for Baldia Township (in rupees per square yard) 1:

1and use plot-size: o - 80 81 - 120 121 - 200 201 sq.yds. sq.yds. sq.yds. sq.yds. and more public land 1 1 res i den t i a 1 land 15 15 20 20 residential-cum- commerci a 1 1and 30 30 45 60 commercial land 100 100 100 100 industrial 1and 100 150 150 300

On June 1, 1978, KNC invited public objections to the proposed lease rate schedule. The public objections period lasted four weeks, and during those weeks the schedule was displayed at the KMC site office in Baldia Township, the KMC Head Office and the CPT office. Simultaneously, the lease rate schedule was published in some Urdu and English newspapers. During the public objections period KMC received six objections to the lease rates: from the Baldia Retailer &General Merchant Group, the Anjuman Falah-wa-Bahbood Musalmannon-e-Punjab Rashidabad, the Rashidabad Welfare Committee, the Supreme Council Baldia Welfare Organization, the Anjuman-e-Ittehad Baldia Township, and from one individual person. All objection letters rejected the proposed lease rates and asked for a rate of Rs. 5 per square yard for at least the smallest residential plots. They reminded KMC of the KDA rates for Baldia, of the promises made by

95 Prime-Minister Bhutto, and of the lease rates in Lyari. The meeting of the Public Objections Hearing Committee was held on November 22, 1978, when the detailed regularization plans of Muslim Mujahid Colony and Sector 3 of Baldia also had to be discussed. Besides the KMC officers mentioned in the previous chapter, three representatives from Baldia Township attended the meeting: the president and joint secretary of the Anjuman-e-Ittehad (both members of the Jamaat-e-Islami) and the chairman of the Baldia Retailer & General Merchant Group (a PPP leader of Baldia, released from prison earlier in 1978). After a long discussion in which the PPP leader was the main advocate of a reduction of the lease rates, KMC and the Baldia representatives reached an agreement on the lease rate schedule. The above schedule was accepted with the following modifications (italics):

1and use plot-size: o - 80 81 - 150 151 - 200 201 sq.yds sq.yds. sq. yds. sq. yds. and more res i denti a 1 land 15 15 uucc 50 residential-cum- conmerci al land 30 30 50 70

The plot-size category of the smallest residential plots was widened from o - 120 square yards to 0 - 150 square yards, so that more people would have to pay only Rs. 15 per square yard. As compensation the lease rate of the largest residential and residential-cum-commercial plots was raised. Subsequently, the Baldia lease rate schedule was sent to the HTPLG & RD Department of the Government of Sind for final approval and official Gazette notification. Some time later the rates were actually approved by the Department, but they had not yet been gazetted at the end of the DAM project in June 1979. Why the lease rates were not gazetted immediately remained unclear; but in personal contacts with local leaders in Baldia it frequently appeared that not all of them had accepted the outcome of the POHC meeting, and many still had the hope of reverting the decision. The national political situation seemed to influence the attitude of the various local leaders. In 1978 some parties had broken away from the PNA, when the Alliance decided to accept president Zia-ul-Haq's offer to join a cabinet under military rule. The Jam.aat-e-Islami and the Jamiat ul-Ulema-e-Is~am remained the only influential parties in the Alliance.

96 ROPOLITAfI" CORPORATION !tHE 01 KnOll AH"l 1737

.... £ASK fORJ'1.0T BY REGULARIZATION Or UHAUtHORIS£O POSSESSION

t!:tlt! JpbttltJn:e made at K;WH;bi P.~I.Hta" davof ",itt" I 19,..,.'; hUtiJh'

!llerernafh;r ~alkd "Ihe l,,"see" whidl IOrs, aJmini'tralors anJ "'''31\,) thc

• l' .btrtl~ •• large number of riM, .. ,., under UtI11tHIlOn",d m /'/"7

AND WHEREAS unJ<1 Martlal L,w Olde, "H. I jH.!;ucv ;t:).I:d'i'1;l t Ita.'

OtftJ de..::kfcd to rt'j:u~a,n;ffi~ r"O-S"t""~t1n and )lh!nt It.~e hoOld Og!th hI ihc f,h~t tloidto t.~-n permallen. bluis rH' 9iJ ! ea" ,>11 pa)!l\l "r prc",,,b«l k.M ...nt in.M$~,IO,!be Ut"<'tm"flll appr"v~l ,,,je Ihne 'i.u"'I~)G 4IIttJ ~4.fl.'\ .- , " ,I While the JI seemed to accept the outcome of the POHC meeting, the JUI remained opposed to a lease rate of Rs. 15 per square yard for the smallest residential plots. It argued that it could hardly defend a rate of Rs. 15 when the previous PPP government had proposed regularization and Rs. 5 per square yard. CPT and DAM's counter-argument was that the PPP government had promised regularization at Rs. 5 per square yard, but had not leased any plot or made any improvement in the settlement. With a lease rate of Rs. 15 for the smallest residential plots and a contribution to the SUA Improvement Fund by the Dutch Government, Baldia Township could be really regularized and improved. No argument could convince the local leaders of the former PNA parties. They seemed to reject any decision by the government;they even threatened to hinder the distribution of lease documents to the residents of Muslim Mujahid Colony and Sector 3 by the Governor of Sind, but they did not carry out their threat. The PPP leaders of Baldia kept quiet or had to keep quiet, although the PPP leader in the meeting of the Public Objections Hearing Committee had been the most active of the Baldia representatives, and only thanks to him had lease rates been reduced somewhat.

6.3 PC I Baldia (part 2)

In the meantime (February 1978) the Department of HTPLG & RD had approved the PC I Baldia and had sent the proposal to the Department of Planning & Development of the Government of Sind for inclusion in the agenda of the Provincial Development Working Party (PDWP). This Working Party decides on all development project proposals for the Province of Sind.

Observations of the PDWP

PDWP discussed the PC I in its meeting of May 5, 1978, and it noted the following observations: a. The Planning & Development Department is reluctant to include this project of Rs. 59 million in the Annual Development Budget of the Government of Sind. It fears that inclusion of the project will create a precedent for all other katchi abadis of Sind. People from all katchi

98 abadis will ask for regularization and improvement of their settlement, and this is financially impossible. Therefore, the Department suggests that KMC sets up a revolving fund for katchi abadi improvement and proposes to keep the foreign aid component of the project outside the Annual Development Budget of the Government of Sind. b. The Planning & Development Department is not convinced that the Govern ment of Sind can afford to contribute an amount of Rs.9 million (15% of the project cost) over a period of three years. c. KMC does not own the land on which Baldia Township has been erected. The administrative control over the land has been transferred from the Board of Revenue (BOR) to KDA in 1965 and from KDA to KMC in 1974, but the Board of Revenue is still the legal owner of the land. Before leasing in Baldia can start, the land has to be transferred to KMC. So, KMC is requested to contact the Board of Revenue to discuss the price of the land.

The observations of PDWP came rather as a surprise to DAM (and to KMC ?). The first observation was obviously based on a misunderstanding. KMC re quested the Government of Sind and the Government of the Netherlands to provide funds as seed capital for a revolving SUA Improvement Fund. From the Fund the improvement of Baldia Township would be financed as a first project. The lease proceeds from Baldia would be deposited in the Fund and utilized for improvement of other katchi abadis. Thus, the Sind Government and the Government of the Netherlands were requested for a one-time con tribution only.

~~C could only note PDWP's second observation, that it preferred to keep the foreign-aid component of the project outside the Annual Development Budget of Sind, and that it was not convinced that Sind could contribute Rs.9 million to the project. It showed that katchi abadi upgrading in Karachi did not have priority for the Government of Sind. With regard to the ownership of the Baldia land, CPT and DAM had received conflicting and confusing information. According to some sources land of sectors 1 - 5 in Baldia Township had already been transferred to KMC; other sources had said that the land had not yet been transferred, but that a legal ownership transfer would not create any problems. The original PC I Baldia had stated that the Baldia land was already in possession of KMC,

99 but this had to be interpreted as: KMC has administrative control over the land, but does not own it. So, transfer of legal ownership of the Baldia land from the Board of Revenue to KMC still had to be arranged, but what shocked CPT and DAM was the reference made by PDWP to a discussion about the price of the land. The assumption had always been that if KMC would have to acquire land, this could be done free of cost or for a nominal price. Negotiations with BOR. Following the PDWP meeting in May, discussions started between KMC and BOR; they taught that BOR was ready to cede the Baldia land to KMC ... at market price, although BOR did not exactly know what the market value of the land was. To KMC, market prices - in fact anything but a nominal price -

were completely unacceptable. Kt~C itself did not have the funds to pay for the land, and it could not pass the cost of land on to the residents of Baldia. The lease rates had already been fixed and they did not allow for any additional allocation for the purchase of land. Eventually CPT and DAM came with a new proposal for financing the Baldia Improvement Scheme. According to this proposal, the total cost of the project would be raised to Rs. 81 million. The cost increase would include, first of all, the price of the Baldia land fixed at Rs.13 million (viz., Rs. 5 per square yard, the KDA lease rate for Baldia Town ship) for 544 acres of leasable land in the project area. Secondly, it was considered justifiable to include in the project budget all expenditures on the physical improvement of Baldia Township by KMC in previous years. These expenditures amounted to approximately Rs. 9 million. The total project cost of the Baldia Scheme would thereby come to Rs.81 million. The transfer of land by BOR to KMC at a price of Rs. 13 million would have to be considered as the contribution of the Government of Sind to the project and would have to be dealt with by book value adjustment. Neither the price of land nor the expenditures made by KMC in the past would be recovered from the residents of Baldia Township; however, these expenditures had to be considered as subsidies to the project. The Govern ment of the Netherlands would contribute Rs. 51 million (62% of the project cost) to the revolving SUA Improvement Fund. KMC's contribution (22% of the project cost) would consist of Rs. 9 million on past expenditures and Rs. 8 million for new improvements (an amount equal to the normal KMC allocation for Baldia over three years).

100 The adjusted PC I Baldia with the revised budget was again submitted to the Government of Sind in October 1978, awaiting the next meeting of the Provincial Development Working Party.

6.4 PC I Baldia (part 3) On February 26, 1979, a meeting was held at the Department of Planning & Development to discuss the transfer of the Baldia land from BOR to KMC. In the meeting BOR maintained its view that KMC had to pay the market price of the land and pass the cost of the land on to the beneficiaries, the residents of Baldia Township. In BOR's view leasing of illegally occupied land at rates as proposed by KMC would merely result in more encroachments and squatter settlements. Prices of land had to be fixed at such a level that they would discourage squatters to occupy land illegally. Obviously, KMC did not share BOR's view, and no agreement could be reached about the price of land. At the end of the meeting the representatives of the Department of Planning & Development requested KMC to prepare a summary of the project proposal for submission to the t,1artial Law Administrator Zone "c" (the Governor of Sind). The Department suggested that KMC should propose in this summary to keep the foreign aid component of the project outside the Annual Development Budget of the Province of Sind, and should ask the Martial Law Administrator for a decision on the price KMC would have to pay for a transfer of the Baldia land. CPT immediately prepared a summary of the project proposal for the Martial Law Administrator and submitted it to the Department of HTPLG & RD for transmission to the Martial Law Ad ministrator via the Department of Planning & Development. The summary was still at the Planning & Development Department when the next PDWP meeting was held on April 3, 1979. In this meeting PDWP examined the revised version of the PC I Baldia. The PC I had been revised along the lines explained in the previous section, but the two main issues had not yet been settled. The Government of Sind still wanted to keep the foreign aid component of the project outside the Annual Development Budget, and BOR and KMC had not yet reached an agreement on the price of land. The Planning and Development Department defended the exclusion of the foreign aid component from the Development Budget with the argument that urbanization is a national problem. Squatter settlements are

101 the result of rural-urban migration provoked by investments in Karachi by the Government of Pakistan as well as the Government of Sind. So, the Government of Pakistan also has to take its responsibility of providing funds for the improvement of the squatter settlements; upgrading of katchi abadis in Karachi could not be undertaken at the cost of other development projects in the Province of Sind. Eventually PDWP approved the PC I Baldia on two conditions. An agreement had to be reached between KMC and BOR about the price of the Baldia land, and the foreign aid component of the project had to be kept outside the Annual Development Budget of the Province of Sind. Four weeks later the Martial Law authorities of Sind announced their decision to fix the price of the Baldia land at 10% of the lease charges(inclusive of development charges). The price would be treated as a contribution from the owner of the land, BOR, towards the development of Baldia Township. BOR did not agree to the decision and appealed to the Martial Law authorities, but its appeal was rejected and the land transfer issue was settled2. As the PC I had been approved in principle by PDWP, it was forwarded to the Central Government in Islamabad on June 10, 1979, for inclusion in the agenda of the Central Development Working Party (CDWP), which decides on all development project proposals before they can be submitted to a foreign donor. The Working Party discussed the PC I Baldia in its meeting of September 9, 1979, and as could have been expected, it referred the project back to the Government of Sind, because it had not been included in the Annual Development Programme of the Province of Sind. Thus, in September 1979 the project was back at the point where it had been for the last year and a half. Negotiations in Pakistan about an approval of the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme came into a deadlock, and during the bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and the Netherlands in 1980 no Pakistani request for a Dutch loan to KMC was made. In the meantime, the (first) term of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project had come to an end in June 1979.

102 INTERLUDE

The case of Bhutta Village

1 Introduction

Besides assisting CPT in preparing regularization and improvement plans for Baldia Township, one of DAM's tasks was to evaluate and refine methods and techniques of data collection. The socio-economic data required for physical, financial and engineering planning by CPT are mostly collected through a survey among (5% of) the population of the katchi abadi to be regularized and improved. The survey is normally conducted for CPT by some outside research institute (usually Joint Research Project IV) before the physical planners start their work on that katchi abadi. In order to be able to advise CPT about methods and techniques of data collection, DAM considered it useful to conduct at least one socio-economic survey of a katchi abadi departmentally, so that CPT and DAM could see for themselves what the problems and difficulties of data collection in a katchi abadi are. The selection of Bhutta Village, a spontaneous settlement in the southwestern part of Karachi near the port, as one of the next areas to be regularized and improved besides Baldia Township seemed to offer the right opportunity for such a departmentally conducted survey. This chapter deals with the problems the Community Relations Section had to face while organizing the Bhutta Village survey. The problems were not so much of a technical or methodological nature, but were rather associated with the bureaucratic organization of KMC. The case, therefore, sheds some light on the internal functioning of the Metropolitan Corporation. The basis for the reconstruction of "the case of Bhutta Village" are the note sheets used by CPT and KMC for internal correspondence. On the original note sheet, the Community Relations Section had pre sented its proposal for a departmentally conducted survey in Bhutta Village. Subsequently, the remarks of the various KMC officials who examined the proposals were added. On the basis of these remarks, which are signed and dated, it was possible to retrace the itinerary of the original note sheet, which gradually grew into a file of 21 pages.

103 2 Approval of the budget

It all started when in March 1978 the Community Relations Section and the Economic Planning Section discovered that the Physical Planning Section had started the preparation of plans for Bhutta Village without informing the two sections and without a socio-economic survey having been conducted, The Community Relations (CR) Section and the Economic Planning Section1 immediately drafted a note for the Planning Coordinator CPT, requesting him to approve the departmental execution of a socio-economic survey in Bhutta Village. The note was submitted on March 25, and had the following purport. Introducti on. For the regularization and improvement planning of Bhutta Village a physical survey has been carried out by .. , Surveyors in 1976. (They) al so collected some information about the socio-economic characteristics of the population of that area, and on the basis of these data a first concept plan of Bhutta Village is being prepared. In the next planning stage the Economic Section has to calculate lease rates, the Engineering Section has to prepare an improvement plan and the CR Section has to approach the community. After discussion with .. , Surveyors it appeared that the available data are not sufficiently reliable to base further planning on. These data have to be collected through reconnaissance and socio-economic surveys ( .. ). Through the socio-economic survey, data have to be collected on: - population (size, age- and sex-distribution, marital status, household size, migration pattern, etc.), as it is expected that many men live in Bhutta Village without a family, in rented houses and deras (inns,YKS). - income and employment (in order to define the paying capacity of the population). - housing conditions (rented or owned houses, deras, etc.) - priorities for improvement. In principle the socio-economic surveys for CPT are carried out by a contractor (JRP IV), but as a lengthy tendering procedure is required, and the planning of Bhutta Village is in an advanced stage, it is proposed to have the socio-economic survey carried out by CPT itself. Proposal. The number of plots in Bhutta Village is estimated at 7000. A sample of 5% out of these 7000 plots (350 plots) can be considered sufficient to collect reliable information. If 5 interviews can be completed per interviewer per day (dependent on the length of the questionnaire and the availability of the interviewees), the whole survey can be carried out by four interviewers in three weeks. The survey can be organized and supervised by the CR Section, and also the processing of the data can be done within CPT; but CPT does not have interviewers at its disposal. So, 4 interviewers may be hired at Rs. 20 (+ Rs, 5 for conveyance) per interviewer per day, which comes to a total of about Rs, 2000. Interviewers can be hired from among graduate students of the Karachi

104 University; but for the sake of reference and checking, it may be advantageous to have the interviews carried out after office hours (and perhaps on Fridays) by the junior CPT staff (technical assistants). For your information and consideration, please. Because the Planning Coordinator of CPT did not want to take a decision without consulting the Senior Physical Planner, head of the Physical Plan ning Section of CPT, the note was forwarded to him with a request for comments. The Senior Physical Planner passed the note on to Physical Planner II, who had been put in charge of concept planning of Bhutta Village, and asked him to give a resume of the information already collected by the physical surveyors. Then. for four weeks. nothing happened. When the Physical Planner II was asked when he would submit his resume to the Planning Coordinator, he replied that someone had told him to put the note in the drawer and to keep it there. The Senior Physical Planner and the Planning Coordinator did not reply at all; they probably believed that a socio-economic survey would only create delays in the planning work. In early Maya meeting was arranged between all section heads of CPT and all DAM advisers to discuss the progress in the planning work. In the meeting it appeared that the physical planning of Bhutta Village had come to a standstill for reasons unknown to DAM, and that it had to be resumed immediately. Since they had not recei.ved any reply to their note of March 25. the Community Relations and Economic Planning Sections asked the Planning Coordinator for a decision about departmental execution of the survey in Bhutta Village. Because the original notesheet could not be found (it still was in the drawer of Physical Planner II). the Planning Coordinator requested the CR Section to write a new proposal. The proposal was submitted to the Planning Coordinator on May 5, Following the submission of the second note, a discussion took place between the Planning Coordinator and the Community Relations Officer I about the recruitment of interviewers: graduate students from Karachi Uni versity or junior staff of CPT. Because interviewing requires some ex perience, it was decided to hire graduate students, Suddenly, the first note prepared by the Community Relations Section and the Economic Planning Section reappeared on the desk of the Planning Coordinator CPT. The comments of Physical Planner lIon the note sheet carried no date, but implied that Physical Planner II considered the

105 available information insufficient. The Senior Physical Planner had added his comments, too; he advised to conduct the survey. Having received the comments of the Physical Planning Section, the Planning Coordinator agreed to ask the Administrator KMC for Rs. 2000 to conduct a socio-economic survey in Bhutta Village. The Administrator KMC is the highest executive officer in the Metro politan Corporation, but he does not take a decision without consulting the Chief Officer, who is responsable for the internal functioning of the Corporation. On May 15, the Bhutta Village file was sent to the Chief Officer, and a week later the file was returned to CPT because the Chief Officer had two questions. First of all, a typographical error had been made while typing the note from the Planning Coordinator to the Chief Officer. Instead of 4 interviewers, a request had been made for 20 interviewers, while in the budget the sum of Rs, 2000 had been retained. Secondly the Chief Officer asked for a copy of the questionnaire and inquired about the time it would take to complete the questionnaire. The Planning Coordinator being abroad, the file went first to the Senior Physical Planner, who passed it on to the Community Relations Officer I. The latter corrected the mistake, mentioned on the note sheet that an interview would take about 25 minutes, and added a copy of the questionnaire to the file. Via the Senior Physical Planner the file was returned to the Chief Officer. Satisfied with the reply of the CR Section, the Chief Officer sent the file to the Administrator with the advise to approve the proposal for a socio-economic survey in Bhutta Village and the allocation of Rs. 2000 to hire 4 interviewers, On June 2, the Administrator gave his approval and on June 6, the CR Section received its note sheets back, with the Administrator's signature. More than two months after the first note had been written by the Community Relations and Economic Planning Sections, the Administrator had approved the proposal. Now, the socio-economic survey could start.

106 3 Processing of the bill

vlh i 18 the reques t for approva 1 of the survey was under di scuss i on, all preparations for the survey had been completed. Four interviewers had been approached; the questionnaire had been finalized and tested; the sample had been drawn. Consequently, the fieldwork could start only a couple of days after approval had been obtained: that is, on June 11. But although the Admi n i s trator K~1C had approved the survey budget, the two thousand rupees were not immediately available; first, a bill had to be processed. For this purpose Community Relations Officer I sent the complete Bhutta Village file to CPT's Technical Assistant II, who was responsible for accounts and payments within CPT. Technical Assistant II prepared a payslip for Rs. 2000.

The office of the Central Planning Team, later renamed Planning, Evaluation & Monitoring Wing and now called Directorate of Katchi Abadis & Evaluation.

107 In order to avoid misuse of public funds, cash payments to KMC officers for official purposes have to be considered as salary advances to these officers, so that they feel responsible for those funds. Following govern ment regulations, Community Relations Officer I had to sign a declaration that he accepted the amount of Rs. 2000 as advance on his salary, and the declaration was attached to the payslip. On June 13 Technical Assistant II sent the Bhutta Village file to the Assistant Director Local Finance Auditing (ADLFA). The ADLFA is a representative of the Government of Sind posted at the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation to examine the KMC accounts and approve payments made by KMC. About a week later Community Relations Offtcer I asked Technical Assis tant II if he had received any reply from the ADLFA on the request for Rs. 2000; he had not. After two weeks there was still no reply, and the Community Relations Section started to worry. The CPT register of outgoing mail showed that the file had left CPT on June 13, and the ADLFA register of i ncomi ng mails howed tha t the fi 1e had reached there the same day. According to the ADLFA, he had returned the file the next day because he needed some additional information; which information, he did not remember. The register of outgoing mail at the ADLFA office indeed indicated that the file had left the office on June 14, and this was confirmed in the register by the signature of CPT's Technical Assistant II, who had signed for receipt. According to Technical Assistant II, the file had been returned to him, but he had immediately supplied the necessary information and had sent it to the ADLFA. Instead of asking a peon to bring the file, he had brought it himself, and that was the reason it had not been recorded in the register of incoming mail at the ADLFA's office. But looking for the file in the ADLFA's office and in CPT office did not produce results. Since his signature was the last one, Technical Assistant II was held responsible for the disappearance of the file. Some days later, after being told by the Community Relations Section that it would send a letter of complaint to the Administrator KMC, Technical Assistant II suddenly returned to the CPT office with the Bhutta Village file. He explained that someone in the Finance Department was angry with Community Relations Officer I, because the latter had refused to give the former a tip when the salaries for the preceding month had been paid. Th1s person had therefore thrown the complete file into the

108 dustbin. Technical Assistant II had found it there and brought it to CPT. Only the payslip was missing. There could have been some element of truth in this story. About four weeks earlier Community Relations Officer I had signed a new contract with K~~C. Usually all salary payments to KMC officers are made through banks, but since the Community Relations Officer had signed a new contract, his first salary had been paid to him in cash, like is being done to the lower KMC staff. It appeared that in instances of salary payments to lower KMC staff, the man who actually pays the salaries, asks and normallv receives 10~£ of the salary as a tip. The same man had also asked Community Relations Officer I for a tip (Rs. 30), but the officer had refused and it had come to a scuffle between the two. The man who had paid the salary and had asked for a tip was .... Technical Assistant II. Moreover, in the initital proposal for the Bhutta Village survey the Community Relations Section had suggested hiring the junior CPT staff, i.e., the technical assistants, as interviewers. Subsequently, the Section had changed its mind and had hired graduate students, but the technical assistants had been aware of the original suggestion. So, there was more than one reason for Technical Assistant II to thwart the plans of the Community Relations Section. The commotion around the disappearance of the file had not escaped notice of the Planning Coordinator CPT, but he had not given orders to track down the file, neither had he confronted Technical Assistant II. He was forced to take action, however, when the Community Relations Section wrote him an offical note to complain about Technical Assistant II's behaviour and asked for disciplinary measures. The Planning Coordinator passed the letter on to the Executive Engineer, and nothing has been heard about it since. At any rate, the file had been found; only the payslip was missing, and processing of the bill had to start allover again. The Planning Coordinator asked the Executive Engineer to supervise the processing of the bill. On July 4 the Executive Engineer sent the file to Technical Assistant I and instructed him to process the bill. Technical Assistant prepared a duplicate payslip and submitted the file to the ADLFA. On July 6 the file was back at the CPT office with the following remarks of the ADLFA.

109 "Received ( .. ) and returned with remarks. - under orders of Government ( .. ) advance payment cannot be made unless sanction of the Government is therefore obtained; - as the budget estimate for 1978/1979 has not yet been sanctioned, the payment will be made after the sanction of the budget; - non-payment certificate may be obtained from Administrative Officer (KMC), as the bill is a dupl icate".

Although Technical Assistants I and II, Executive Engineer CPT and Planning Coordinator CPT must have known all the time that advance payments on salaries for this purpose were no longer allowed without Government sanction, they had nevertheless processed the bill without informing the Community Relations Section that payment could not be made. However, more serious than the impossibility of advance payments was ADLFA's second comment. Much time had been lost while looking for the file, and on July 1, KMC had submitted its new budget to the Government of Sind. Payments from this new budget could not be made before the Sind Government would have approved the KMC budget, and this could take weeks. The third remark of the ADLFA was only a procedural matter. Fortunately, the problem of advance payment could be avoided, as the four interviewers had already completed the fieldwork of the Bhutta Village survey in the meantime. They could now submit a bill to CPT/KMC and ask to be paid, so that payment could be made directly as soon as the KMC budget would be approved. So, on July 24 the four interviewers presented a letter to the Community Relations Section requesting ~1C to pay their fees for interviewing 350 households in Bhutta Village. The Community Relations Officer I added a letter which certified that the work had been completed to the full satisfaction of the Section, and the Community Relations Ad viser countersigned the certificate. There was one problem, however. Because interviewing in Bhutta Village had taken seven days more than had been anticipated originally, the four interviewers asked Rs. 2700 (or Rs. 675 each) instead of Rs. 2000. A new request for approval of this extra payment to the interviewers was sent to the Planning Coordinator, who immediately complied with the request without asking a question. On August 7 the entire file was again sent to the ADLFA for approval, but since the KMC budget had not yet been approved by the Sind Government, the ADLFA waited about two weeks before looking into the matter. On August 21 the ADLFA returned the file to the Planning Coordinator CPT with

110 this comment: "The bill is not available". The Planning Coordinator passed the file on to the Executive Engineer, who sent it to Technical Assistant I with the same question: "Where is the bill ?". Technical Assistant I went to the Community Relations Officer I and asked him where the bill of the four interviewers was, The Community Relations Officer had to tell him that the four interviewers were not a surveying firm, but four individual persons, and that their letter of July 24 had to be considered as their bill. Technical Assistant I accepted this clarification, and via the Executive Engineer and the Plan ning Coordinator the file went back to the ADLFA. On August 27 the ADLFA approved payment of Rs. 2700 to four interviewers for surveying in Bhutta Village. Having approved the payment, the ADLFA passed the file on to the Ad ministrative Officer for forwarding to the KMC cashier. However, he did not inform the Community Relations Section that payment had been approved, Only on August 31, when he accidently visited the office of the ADLFA, the Community Relations Adviser heard that the money could be collected at the KMC pay-desk. But there it appeared that the cheque of Rs.2700 had been prepared in the name of Community Relations Officer I. Although he obviously was not Community Relations Officer I, the Community Relations Adviser could collect the cheque by merely saying that he was a colleague of the Community Relations Officer. On september 2, 1978, the four inter viewers received their fee for 350 interviews conducted in Bhutta Village in June and July of that year.

4 The results of the survey

As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the intention of the Community Relations Section was to assess the problems and difficulties of executi ng surveys in katch i abadi s. The survey in Bhutta Vill age had come up to expectations; it had been instructive in many respects, By early August the survey report of Bhutta Village was completed and a copy of the report was sen t to the Pl ann i ng Coord ina tor CPT, who now was called "Coordinator Planning, Evaluation and Monitoring Wing (Finance Department KMC)" since the reorganization of CPT in Juli.

111 Coordinator PEM Wing asked the Community Relations Section to send one copy of the report to his new superior, the Financial Adviser KMC, who

had been appoi nted by the Governmen t of Sind to make KI-1C I s fi nanci a 1 situation more sound. Coordinator PEM Wing added the following note: "The report on the socio-economic situation in Bhutta Village (Keamari) is the first socio-economic survey carried out departmentally by the Communi ty Re 1a ti ons Secti on of the PEr1 Wi ng KMC. Until recently all socio-economic surveys were carried out by the outside contractors on behalf of PEM WING KMC, because PEM WING did not have suitable support staff for this work. Moreover, the areas taken up for planning (Lyari, Baldia Township, Golimar/Gulbahar) were too large to be surveyed by PEM Wing staff itself. In Bhutta Vill age a fi rst attempt has been made to carry out a soci 0- economic survey departmentally. Bhutta Village is a medium size area (156 acres) and it was thought that the necessary professional expertise is available. Only for the fieldwork four interviewers had to be hired. Organization, supervision and processing were all carried out by the Community Relations Section. Departmental execution of surveys in small and medium size areas may be both time and money saving for KMC. No lengthy tender procedures are required and no overhead costs have to be paid to contractors. Survey of Bhutta Village was carried out in two months. The total cost involved is much less than the actual expenditures. Submitted for information and perusal, please". Two days later Coordinator PEM Wing received his note back. The Financial Adviser had added two remarks. "Para 4(A) - This is not very encouraging if it means what it says. - What Pakistani staff was involved in this survey?" Coordinator PEM Wing referred the file to Community Relations Officer I. "Do you ha ve the corrected draft as th.ere appea rs a typi ng mi stake in para 4? Regarding the second observation of the Financial Adviser, please give a brief on the activities undertaken by your section in the survey". The reply of the Community Relations Officers read "The socio-economi c survey of Bhutta Vi llage was done by the Community Relations Section and the Community Relations Officers were involved right from the beginning in: i. preparation of questionnaire ii. sample marking in the field iii, supervision iv. organization v. processing and tabulation of date. Submitted for information and perusal, please". Next, Coordinator PEM Wing prepared his reply to the Financial Adviser.

112 "Discrepancy pointed out by Financial Adviser at para 4-A was a typing error wh i ch is very much regretted. I n fact, the cos t i ncu rred on the socio-economic survey of Bhutta Village taken up departmentally is much less than the expenditure which would have been incurred, in case this assignment was given to any private organization. Regarding involvement of Pakistani staff, the two Community Relations Officers had supervised the entire operation of field collection of data and had prepared the report in collaboration with the Dutch adviser, after analysis of the data collected by the interviewers engaged on work charge basis. This is for information, please". However, the Financial Adviser was still not satisfied with the answer. He wrote Coordinator PEM Wing: "Please name them". So, Coordinator PEM Wing had to write: "There are only two Community Relations Officers working in this office. Their names are 1. Mr ... . 2. Mr .. .. For information, please". Coordinator PEM Wing's answers seemed to be unable to satisfy the Financial Adviser. In the correspondence which followed, the issue of the socio-economic survey was completely pushed into the background. The Financial Adviser wrote Coordinator PEM Wing:

"Seen. The note-sheet contai n i ng pa ras 1 ~. lOin had not been tagged at the correct order". This admonition by the Financial Adviser lead Coordinator PEM Wing to write to his Office Superintendent immediately: "Who is responsible for the discrepancy pointed out at 13n ? This shows of carelessness on the part of the concerned staff. Please check up and report". And the Office Superintendent reported in his own peculiar style: "Regarding discrepancy it is stated that files always checked before its issues, but in this case the file was checked by the Community Relations Officer I and Technical Assistant r, as informed by dispatcher, while I was on leave. Submitted for information, please". Thereupon Coordinator PEM Wing issued the following instruction: "Please instruct the dispatch clerk to check the note-sheets and enclosure before dispatch of letter".

The Office Superintendent passed the file on to the dispatch clerk, WhD wrote beneath Coordinator PEM Wing's instruction IINoted", and thereby

113 closed the Bhutta Village file. Neither Coordinator PEM Wing nor the Financial Adviser commented on the departmental execution of the socio-economic survey in Bhutta Village, on its short duration or its results. Neither of them showed any satis faction with the extremely low cost of the survey, In fact, the survey report was hardly used by CPT, for soon after the completion of the survey, planning work on Bhutta Village came again to a standstill. The only tangible result, small but positive, was that since the execution of the survey in Bhutta Village the dispatch clerk has been more attentive to tag note sheets in the correct order.

5 Summary and conclusion

In order to find out how data collection for physical, financial and engineering planning might be improved, the Community Relations Section conducted a socio-economic survey in Bhutta Village departmentally. It took two months before approval of the survey was obtained, and it took three months before the fees could actually be paid to the four inter viewers who had undertaken the survey. According to the remarks on the note sheets, the Bhutta Village file had passed at least 64 desks during those five months. The fieldwork itself was completed in four weeks, while preparing the survey report took another month. The cost of the survey (excluding overheads} amounted to Rs, 2750 (or US$ 275), while the cost incurred if the survey had been conducted by some outside research institute can be estimated at Rs, 50.000 (or USS 5000). In order to be able to pay the four interviewers, the Community Relations Officers and the Community Relations Adviser had to spend many man-hours writing and sending notes, tracking down misplaced documents and carrying files from one desk to another. They even had to threaten a KMC employee with a letter of complaint to the Administrator KMC. In the end, the effects of the Bhutta Village survey on data collection for CPT were negligible. However interesting the subject may be, this is not the place to write a treatise on bureaucracy in Pakistan. The intention of this chapter was

114 merely to present an illustration of the functioning of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and the Central Planning Team, the counterpart organizations of the Dutch Advisory Mission. Yet, we would like to make some observations regarding the bureaucracy of KMC, since they may be relevant to an understanding of the problems DAM had to face in the Karachi Slum Improvement Project and which are discussed in the following chapters. The development of the bureaucracy within government bodies like the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation probably started long before Pakistan gained independence. Pakistanis often blame the British, who central ized decision-making and refused to delegate powers out of mistrust of their local subordinates (Cf. Heginbotham 1975, pp.34-44). The same Pakistanis blame themselves for taking over this bureaucratic system after in dependence without first critically examining it. However, those presently in power probably raise the same argument as their British predecessors did: centralization of decision-making is necessary to prevent misuse of public funds, favouritism, bribery, etc. As a result of centralized decision-making, almost all requests, proposals, applications and the like have to pass the highest authority in the organization, viz., the Administrator KMC; and any decision is eventually taken by him after consultation of his subordinates. This is all the more true for such non-routine proposals as the departmental execution of a survey. But in an organization like KMC, where thousands of cases have to be dealt with simultaneously, this system requires an enormous organization employing many petty offidals who merely have to collect, process and forward files without being authorized to take even the most insignificant decision. When a file has to pass so many officials before a decision is even tually taken or executed, some form of social control is attained, which is expected to stop any single official from taking advantage of his position. But while it is already questionable as to whether or not the system really prevents misuse of funds, favouritism, etc., it creates at the same time many opportuniUes for another form of abuse. In a bureaucracy like that of KMC, quick decisions are a scarce good, because many cases have to pass many petty officials before they reach someone who is authorized to make a deci.sion. Consequently, petty offi ci a 1scan eas ily i nfl uence th.e progress and even the outcome of a

115 case by merely slowing down or speeding up its handling. Even the most unimportant KMC employee is thereby in a position to render services in this regard and is prepared to see that a file reaches its destination quickly or slowly, if he is compensated for his "efforts". Payment of gratuities for a quick (or slow) handling of a case has almost become routine in Kt~C, but at least public funds are not (directly) at stake. From the above may be concluded that if those who handled the Bhutta Village case could have extracted some personal benefits from a quick approval and/or execution of the survey, the decision to conduct the survey and to allocate Rs. 2750 would not have taken so much time and energy. Unfortunately, the opposite was true. Tendering procedures and signing of contracts with outside firms happen to be the opportunities par excellence for certain officials to make some personal benefits. These officials would definitely lose by a departmental execution of surveys, as it would deprive outside research institutes of new assign ments and contracts. Moreover, CPT's junior staff knew itself to be deprived of an oppor tunity to earn some extra money when the Community Relations Section decided to hire graduate students instead of the junior staff of CPT to conduct the interviews in Bhutta Village. They did not even get a chance to ask the interviewers for a tip upon payment of thei r fees, as the Community Relations Section i.nsisted on making the payment itself. But more amazing than the attempts of some petty officials to make some small personal benefits was the unwillingness of some senior officials, who did not seem to draw any benefit from the case, to inter fere. Although the Government of Sind was exerting pressure on KMC to improve its financial situation, and although the departmental execution of the survey saved KMC a considerable amount of money, these officials stood aloof when th.e Bhutta Village file was misplaced and payment of interviewers was delayed. It is most likely that for those in charge in KMC, their own position and their relationship with other KMC officials are much more important than the execution of any established policy of KMC or the Government of Sind, or any damage to any of KMC's interest. Those who now benefitted from the situation definitely appreciated the non.interference by other KMC officials in their affairs, and they will certainly show this appreciation on other appropriate occasions. In the end, the only loser in such a situation is KMC, but who cares about KMC ? 116 C AN ANALYSIS

7 An assessment of the project

7.1 The end of Karachi Slum Improvement Project

In February 1979 a joint evaluation mission of the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of Pakistan reviewed the Karachi Slum Improvement Project to assess the progress made in regularizing and improving katchi abadis in Karachi, and to prepare a report for the respective governments about a possible extension of the project. In accordance with the views of the Dutch advisory team, the evaluation mission came to the conclusion that apart from completion of the Baldia concept plan and some mohallah regularization plans for Baldta Township and Gulbahar1, progress in planning (in particular improvement planning) and implementation had been minimal during the preceding one and a half years (Report 1979). KMC imputed the slow progress in planning and implementation to the delay in approval of the PC I Baldia by the Government of Sind (GOS) and the consequent lack of funds for improvement of Baldia Township. However, the lack of progress could also at least partly be attributed to slackness on KMC's side. The delay in approval of the PC I may be an indication of the low priority the Government of Sind attached to katchi abadi regularization and improvement in Karachi; but KMC ignored its responsibilities for the creation of favourable conditions for an approval of the PC I and a prompt execution of the project, too. In early 1977 (still within the framework of the Lyari Project), KMC had drafted the Sub-standard Urban Area Improvement Rules, which were intended to regulate administration and operation of the revolving SUA Improvement Fund. The Rules had been submitted to the Government of Sind for approval, but GOS had referred them back to KMC with some questions and objections. In the same year CPT and DAM had revised the Rules, but KMC had not been prepared to submit the revised Rules again to GOS. Pending the approval of the Rules and the establishment of the Fund, KMC had also not been willing to open a separate account for katchi abadi regularization and improvement, although proceeds from

117 leasing in Baldia Township and Gulbahar were meanwhile becoming available. KMC had, in addition, withheld approval of a new and simplified lease procedure and had not made the necessary arrangements for an expeditious leasing of plots, when issuing of titles in Baldia Township and Gulbahar had already started. In fact, leasing in Baldia had come to a standstill after the distribution of 21 lease titles to residents of Muslim Mujahid Colony and Sector 3 by the Governor of Sind, because the Registrar had refused to lease plots in Baldia until the land had been transferred to KMC. Moreover, the lease rates for Baldia, approved by the Public Objections Hearing Committee and the Department of Housing, Town Planning, Local Government & Rural Development, had still not been officially published in the Gazette. On the basis of their experiences in planning Baldia Township, Gulbahar and Bhutta Village CPT and DAM had revised the Improvement Policy for Sub standard Urban Areas, The new draft was ready for review by KMC and subsequent transmi ss i on to GOS, but KMC had refused to take any action. In view of all this, the Government of the Netherlands decided to suspend the Karachi Slum Improvement Project in June 1979 and to withdraw the advisory team. The project would remain suspended until KMC and GOS would have made up their minds about the above issues, and until the Government of the Netherlands would have received a request for inclusion of the Baldia Regularization and Improvement Scheme in the bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and the Netherlands.

7.2 Extenuating circumstances

There are, of course, extenuating circumstances which account for the delays in decision-making and plan implementation. It remains to be seen, however, who can lay a claim to these circumstances: GOS, KMC, CPT, DAM?

The fall of Bhutto and the PPP. The basis for the Karachi Slum Improvement Project had been laid as early as 1975, when the World Bank and the Government of Pakistan requested the Amsterdam Free University for a team of advisers to assist

118 KMC in the execution of a new policy for regularization and improvement of katchi abadis in Karachi. When the Dutch team finally arrived in Karachi in June 1977, the Lyari Improvement Project had already collapsed, the World Bank had withdrawn from the project, and the political situation in Pakistan had become chaotic as a result of the national elections of March 7. Four weeks after the arrival of the first team members, the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by the armed forces. And although the coup d'etat did not have any direct consequences for the project and the planning work - except for an interruption of site visits and fieldwork - some events in the aftermath of Bhutto's fall definitely did. Almost immediately after the military came to power, newspaper in Pakistan started to publish stories about misuse of public funds, abuse of power, corruption and repression by the previous government and the PPP. Newspapers as well as political parties which had opposed the PPP government and had welcomed the military seizure of power demanded that politicians and government officials would be held "accountable" for their activities under the previous regime. Following Bhutto's removal from office, numerous government officials were arrested, dismissed or transferred. Although his transfer had already been expected for quite some time and therefore could not only be connected to the anti-PPP purge, the Administrator KMC was also transferred to some relatively unimportant post in the Province of Sind. With his departure CPT and DAM were deprived of the most prominent advocate of the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas within KMC and the founder of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project. By losing him the project also definitely lost considerable political weight in the Corporation. The Government of Sind appointed a retired army brigadier as new Administrator of KMC.

Reorganization of KMC. The transfer of the Administrator was followed by more reshuffling with KMC, by a power struggle between the various officers immediately subordinate to the Administrator, and by the formation of new fractions and alliances. One of the victims of these incidents was the Central Planning Team. In July 1978 CPT was dissolved and revived as "Planning,

119 Evaluation & Monitoring Wing" (PEM Wing) in the Finance Department of KMC. Until that time CPT had been one of KMC's departments directly sub ordinated to the Administrator KMC, and the Planning Coordinator CPT had been directly responsible to the Administrator only. Now, the PEM Wing was placed in the Finance Department under the Financial Adviser to the Administrator. As a result, officers of the former CPT had to give more time to assignments other than katchi abadi regularization and improvement (such as the preparation of the KMC budget), and direct contacts with the Administrator became rare, In February 1979 the Planning,Evaluation & Monitoring Wing was. however, again placed directly under the Administrator Kt~C and was renamed "Directorate of Katchi Abadis & Evaluation". It goes without saying that these reorganizations did not contribute to a smooth functioning of the department or an increase in output from the planning work. The lack of output by the department and the loss of support within KMC for regularization and improvement of katchi abadis after the transfer of the former Administrator had again con sequences for the staffing of the department. It became rather difficult for CPT to replace officers who were posted elsewhere in KMC following regular transfers, or those who had resigned. The lack of new personnel further slowed down the department's output.

An unstable political situation, In addition, the national political situation in Pakistan did not develop favourably for a prompt resolution of delicate issues as land transfer and foreign loans. Inmediately after the coup d'etat in July, Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia-ul-Haq had announced new elections in October 1977. Shortely before this date, the general changed his mind and promised elections in March 1978, but he postponed these elections, too. The repeated announcement and subsequent cancellation of the elections created an atmosphere of poEtical uncertainty in the country. With all ministers removed from office and mi 1itary rulers in power who were unable to fully deal with daily matters, bureaucrats in the central and provincial governments were practically ruling Pakistan. But without a ministerial government to take the political responsibility, these bureaucrats moved very carefully and were reluctant to take certain

120 major decisions. They feared that in the politically unstable situation with the possibility of another government after the promised elections or a new coup d'etat, the demand for accountability might not limit itself to the Bhutto government. Also, the end of the Lyari project was still fresh in everybody's memory. Under these circumstances delays in decision-making and plan implemen tation for katchi abadi regularization and improvement in Karachi were inevitable, as no government official was prepared to risk his career - and more - for katchi abadi residents. However unexpected such develop ments may be, they simply happen and are probably an element in the context of all projects. Yet, as a result of the instability of the political situation and the irresolution in the national political centre, the Provinces, viz., the bureaucrats in the provincial governments ,could simultaneously increase their power vis-a-vis the central government. They seized this opportunity to define their own policies more and more, and emphasized their own priorities. The bureaucrats in the Government of Sind, for instance, could gradually shift their priorities from the development of Karachi to the development of the (rural) interior of Sind. Since independence, Karachi has always been a "fremdkorper", an alien body to Sind and the Sindis, a city inhabited by Pathans, Punjabis and Muhajirs (refugees from India), but not by Sindis. Although it could not neglect Karachi completely, the Government of Sind now tried to concentrate its attention more and more on the development of the rural areas and smal·j towns of Sind -. to the detriment of Karachi. The proposal of GOS to exclude the Baldia project from the Annual Development Budget of Sind and to pass the financial burden of katchi abadi improvement in Karachi on to the central government probably has to be seen in this light. It also showed the low priority GOS attached to katchi abadi im-· provement in Karachi.

7.3 Irretrievable consequences It is often said that things move slowly in Third World countries and that it takes time and patience to bring about real changes. It is said to be wrong to expect that something substantial can be achieved in two years' time. Besides, the situation of the katchi abadis and the

121 122 position of the katchi abadi population in Karachi has improved visibly over the last ten years. One may argue that progress can only be made step by step and that the delay in plan implementation in the Karachi Slum Improvement Project is not all that serious. The suspension of the project will enable the authorities in Pakistan to make up their minds and put affairs in order so that after the resumption of the project the policy can be executed without impediment. Although these observations are definitely true, and it often takes time to change policies and mentalities, one should also realize that in some fields developments occur very rapidly. The population of Pakistan grows fast; rural-urban migration is substantial; there is a high rate of urbanization, and spontaneous settlements spread rapidly. A katchi abadi upgrading programme is per se always one step behind the events, and delays in decision-making and plan implementation do not only have quantitative but also qualitative effects. If implementation of plans is delayed, data collected before the start of the planning work as well as plans prepared for immediate inplementation may easily become outdated. The socio-economic survey of Bhutta Village, for instance, was conducted in June 1978, and since then hardly any progress in the planning of Bhutta Village has been made. Very soon all socio-economic information about the population of this settlement will need updating, but will the residents in Bhutta Village still be prepared to answer the questions if they do not see any result? As said earlier, katchi abadis are physically dynamic settlements, permanently subjected to changes: open plots are occupied; houses are turned into shops and shops into houses; people extend their plot by encroaching on roads and vacant land. All this happens for many reasons, not the least of which is anticipation of regularization. At the same time, however, these changes jeopardize the implementation of the plans; and the longer implementation is delayed, the more difficult it will be to implement the plans. Two examples will demonstrate the irretrievable consequences of delays in plan implementation for the Baldia upgrading project.

(previous page) When KMC announced the regularization of Baldia Township, many people felt sufficiently secure to buy plots and construct pacca houses immediately on vacant land near Rashidabad. These photographs were taken with six-month intervals in 1978 and 1979. 123 Encroachments on the loop road. Since the start of the planning work for Baldia Township many squatters have built their houses on the fringes of the settlement, as they expect regularization of the entire area soon and hope to benefit by this pro gramme too. In particular in the hills east of Baldia Township, where in the concept plan a loop road has been proposed as an alternative to a 200-foot-wide road proposed by KDA, many new houses have been constructed. As the squatters know that it is unlikely that KMC will pull down dwellings of good quality, they have immediately built semi-pacca and pacca (i.e., solid and permanent) houses. Furthermore, the authorities of the adjacent SITE area have started the development of a housing scheme for labourers exactly on the spot where CPT has planned the approach to the loop road. Although the Baldia concept plan, including the loop road, has been approved by the Government of Sind, SITE officials declare that since their housing scheme is a regular project, illegally constructed houses in Baldia should be sacri ficed for the construction of the loop road.

The feasibility of cost-recovery. The financial chapter of the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas is based on the assumption that residents of spontaneous settlements are eager to have complete security of tenure and therefore are ready to pay for a lease title to their plot. The Policy says: "Self-financing improvement plans are required, because KMC can not afford to improve large areas without additional revenues. ( .. ) Fortunately, recent research clearly shows that people are ready to pay for land and for improvements they cons ider important" (KMC 1977b. p.14). In the course of 1978, Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia-ul Haq repeatedly announced that all katchi abadis created before January 1, 1978, would be regularized and improved, provided regularization would not be in violation of existing plans and the settlement would not be liable to flood hazards or other dangers. Earlier, Prime-Minister Bhutto had made similar announcements. Although nothing legally changed in the katchi abadis, these announcements undoubtedly raised the feeling of security of tenure in the spontaneous settlements. Even without a lease title, people started to feel more and more safe. At the same time, they were very much aware that under the precarious political conditions of

124 the moment, the Martial Law authorities needed all the popular support they could get and would never dare to change their minds and clear the areas. The residents knew that time would run in their favour. In areas like Baldia Township and Gulbahar, where KMC had already started the planning for regularization and improvement and where in some mohallahs lease titles had already been distributed, security of tenure reached a level which can probably only be exceeded by a complete de jure regularization. Thus, the eagerness of residents to apply and pay for a lease title diminished, and despite all attempts to bridge the credibility gap between residents and authorities by involving residents in the planning work, mistrust by the residents in the intentions of the authorities grew as a result of the delays. As mistrust grows, the willingness of residents to pay lease charges is further reduced. A high percentage of defaults in payment of lease charges will destroy the financial basis of the project, jeopardizing the functioning of the revolving fund and thereby the execution of the entire programme. In fact, the Improvement Policy will generally undermine its own financial foundations unless it is executed promptly and the concerned residents are kept motivated, because the mere announcement of regularization provides sufficient security of tenure to many people in the katchi abadis and reduces their eagerness to obtain a lease title. Because of the decreasing motivation of residents to pay lease charges as a result of the delays in decision~making and plan implementation, the Metropolitan and Provincial authorities also began to openly question the feasibil ity of the pol icy. This growing scepticism on the part of the authorities was reflected in a proposal by the Government of Sind to start implementation of improvement plans only after a certain percentage of the total expected lease proceeds has been paid. DAM rejected this idea of GOS as unrealistic in view of the mistrust of the residents in the real intentions of the authorities and insisted on a prompt implementation of the plans instead. So, the argument that delays in policy decision~making and plan imple mentation can be retrieved once the suspension of the project has enabled the authorities in Pakistan to make up their minds and put their affairs in order, may well prove to be false. The delay may have irretrievable consequences for the execution of the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard

125 Urban Areas in general and the implementation of the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme in particular.

7.4 Conflicts of interests

Delays in the execution of the Improvement Policy cannot merely be explained by some political events in Pakistan, however radical they might have been. The delays are so striking and the slackness of the authorities to create the necessary conditions for a prompt execution of the policy are so obvious that one cannot help but conclude that there is a general lack of willingness at various levels of the government to execute the policy. This lack of willingness on the part of the government to execute the policy is not just an isolated phenomenon. It has to be seen in the context of the present informal housing delivery system, viz., the creation and development of katchi abadis in Karachi. Four categories of people playa role in this system: government officials, politicians, local leaders and common residents; and each category draws its own bene fits from the system. The common resident of a spontaneous settlement is an outlaw at the mercy of the municipal authorities unless he is protected by local leaders and politi cans. The local leaders have often founded the settlement after having obtained support from powerful politicians and protection from government officials. They have allotted and sold the plots, and they have arranged the provision of the first amenities provided by KMC to the settlement by employing the good relationship between a politician and government officials in favour of their settlement. Once the settlement has been establ tsbed, piecemeal improvement of its living conditions by KMC allows for discretion on the part of the concerned officials as to when and where to provide the amenities. The decision is negotiable and therefore becomes the outcome of an exchange of information, support, influence and money in a transaction between government officials, local leaders, politicians and katchi abadi residents. The Improvement Policy is an attempt by KMC to get a firmer grip on the process of katchi abadi creation and development by formalizing and insti-

126 Under the protection of political parties, private persons are creating new katchi abadis, like Ittehad Town, on government land by demarcating plots and selling these to people in search for a house. tutionalizing this - up to now - informal system. But it is self-evident that interference in this informal system by the authorities puts the interests of the various people involved in the system at stake. For obvious reasons each category reacts to the policy in its own way and tries to manipulate its execution to protect and safeguard its own interests.

Selection of areas. In several instances in the preceding chapters (Lyari, Baldia Township, in a way 52 Jhuggies and perhaps also Bhutta Village) we have seen that the initiative to request KMC to regularize and improve a certain katchi abadi was taken by a politician. The request is sometimes - but not always - supported by the population of the concerned settlement and is usually passed on to CPT by some important government official with his personal

127 recommendations. Instead of selecting katchi abadis for regularization according to a fixed set of criteria formulated in the policy, KMC usually decides to start regularization and improvement planning after such urgent demands by a politician. The more powerful the politician, the higher the priority of the settlement proposed by him. In this way, Lyari was selected as the first karchi abadi to be regularized and improved according to the new policy: it was a mainly PPP oriented area which had the attention of Prime-Minister Bhutto and his People's Party. Likewise, Baldia Township was selected after the Lyari project had collapsed, because it formed part of the constituency of the Minister of Health and Social Welfare at that time, who expected new elections and hoped to gain support for his candidacy. Once KMC has decided to regularize and improve a katchi abadi and has started the planning work, the concerned politician usually loses interest very quickly (later on, we shall see why). He is succeeded by another po litician who comes to plead with KMC for regularization and improvement of another area, because he has a client group in that settlement. If this man is also a powerful politician and has the support of important govern ment officials, and if the first politician quickly loses interest in the progress of the planning of his favourite katchi abadi, KMC easily shifts its attention from the first to the second settlement. Consequently, there is a continuous change of priorities. During the Karachi Slum Improvement Project the succession of politicians coming to KMC to ask for regularization and improvement of "their" katchi abadi was all the more abrupt because of the overthrow of the PPP govern ment. Overnight, all PPP politicians lost most of their (formal) power; although political activities were banned during the first months of Martial Law, PNA politicians who initially supported the military rulers gained influence, and this was noticeable within KMC. The rise of certain PNA leaders was reflected in the selection of katchi abadis to be planned: Lyari and Baldia Township lost priority, and Golimar/Gulbahar as predomi nantly PNA areas gained importance. However, even Goliman/Gulbahar could not maintain their priority very long, because the PNA could not really reinforce its position under Martial Law. In fact, the only constant pressure group was the Dutch Advisory Mission,

128 which permanently urged KMC to continue to give priority to Baldia Town ship and to speed up its regularization and improvement.

Piecemeal or planned improvement. To KMC officials it makes no difference whether they plan regularization and improvement of one katchi abadi or another. They are first of all bureaucrats who have to maintain good relationships with all politicians and political parties, as nobody knows who will be the next minister and when he will come into office. Their device is, therefore, to give attention to as many katchi abadis as possible, but never too much atten tion to one katchi abadi in particular. It is possible to give attention to many katchi abadis simultaneously, because neither KMC officials nor politicians are really interested in seeing a katchi abadi regularized and improved under the katchi abadi upgrading programme. The status of a politician is to a large extent based on his personal contacts with other politicians and government officials. These contacts enable him to grant favours and provide services - such as amenities in spontaneous settlements - to clients and client groups in return for political support. Actual regularization and improvement of katchi abadis in a systematic way, as the Improvement Policy advocates, undermines this power base of the politician in the katchi abadis. The type of amenity to be provided, its location and the time of provision are no longer negotiated between politician and government official, but are fixed in a plan. In this respect piecemeal improvement of illegal settlements is much more lucrative for politicians, government officials and also local leaders, than a systematic and planned improvement of regularized settle ments according to an established policy (Cf.Drakakis-Smith 1979, p.251.

Regularization or improvement. Most residents in a katchi abadi have only one plot with a house, which they use as a permanent residence. Since th.e government announcements about regularization of katchi abadi s, they have a strong feel ing of security of tenure; and this feeling is further reinforced if some politi cian can persuade KMC to announce the actual regularization of their settlement. Once this has been done, they are incl ined to give more priori-· ty to the improvement of their living conditions in their area than to

129 its regularization. On this issue they may differ in opinion and interest with the local leaders of their settlement (w~o are representing them in the contacts with KMC ~). Local leaders often earn an (additionall income as landlord and property broker. Being among the founders of the settlement, they usually possess several plots, houses and shops, which they rent to other families. Some times they make money by speculating with houses and plots or they 1ive as rack-renters. Regularization of the settlement will enable them to capital ize on thei r property, as regularization increases t~e val ue of plots and houses. This is the beginning of what Burgess called the penetration of the capitalist system in the legalized squatter settlements. In order to maximize their profits local leaders may demand regularization at such low lease rates that financing the improvement of the settlement out of the lease proceeds will become impossible. But this probably does not bother them too much, as they know they can arrange a (piecemeal) improve ment of the regularized settlement along other, informal lines. Further more, regularization at low lease rates may well increase their following in the arei. To some politicians and government officials a programma of regulari zarion without (immediate) improvement also seemed rather attractive, as it satisfies the common residents as well as the local leaders, while it simultaneously preserves the prerogative "to sell piecemeal improvements". Perhaps this had been the attitude of the PPP leaders when they announced the extremely low lease rates for Lyari during the 1977 election campaign. When approval of the PC I Baldia failed to materialize, some KMC officials also tried to persuade DAM to agree to an immediate regularization of Baldia Township with improvement at a later stage. DAM rejected the idea on several grounds. Most residents would doubt KMC's commitment to improve Baldia at a later stage and would consequently refuse to pay lease charges unless the rates would be substantially reduced. A high rate of defaults in payment of lease charges or low lease proceeds because of reduced rates would make it financially impossible for KMC to improve the settlement. This would result in a continuation of the piecemeal improvements financed from KMC's general revenues and for which the katchi abadi residents would have to pay to the middlemen. The idea to ask lease charges now and development charges later, when the improvement work is carried out', was considered by DAM to be completely unrealistic.

130 Towards a new equilibrium. While regularization (at reduced rates) without immediate improvement appeared attractive to some politicians and government officials, it was probably unacceptable to others. They would most likely prefer to strike a balance between the interests of the katchi abadi population and the interests of those groups in society which oppose legalization of settle ments on illegally occupied land at any price. This balance may be found in a complete de facto regularization (together with piecemeal improvement), which satisfies most demands of the katchi abadi population without a de jure regularization that would antagonize opponents of regularization because of its consequences (e.g., for presently vacant land). This balance situation was probably attained for Baldia Township during the second year of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project. Perhaps it had been wrong from the very start to think that the adoption of the Improvement Po 1i cy for Sub-s tanda rd Urban Areas by KMC was an indication that KMC had decided to legalize and improve all katchi abadis in Karachi which meet the criteria for regularization formulated in the Improvement Policy. The Improvement Policy may well have been adopted by KMC under pressure of politicians who wanted to present government officials with instruments to grant favours to certain katchi abadis upon their instigation. It may never have been the intention of these politicians to establish a general policy applicable to all katchi abadis and to be executed in a planned and systematic way.

131 8 Marxist critique reconsidered

8.1 Capital interests and housing policy

In his "Critique of John Turner's Views on Housing Policy" Burgess states: "The housing problem in the Third World societies can best be understood as the product of the general conditions of capitalist development rather than the product of particular technological or organizational systems, as theories of the Turner type would have us believe. ( .. ) More specifically, the determining elements of the housing problem must be sought in the commodity status of housing objects which are produced and exchanged by the capitalist mode of production. ( .. ) Moreover, as long as policies are suggested that do not get beyond these general conditions, and which leave them intact, then these policies must also be analysed as proposals for the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production. Thus Turner's recommendations represent nothing less than the now traditional attempts of capital interests to palliate the housing shortage in ways that do not interfere witn the effective operation of those interests" (Burgess 1978, p.1l26). If Burgess' analysis of the policies of guided self-help housing and spontaneous settlement upgrading is correct, then how can one explain the reluctance - the unwillingness - of the Government of Sind to create the necessary conditions for an execution of the Improvement Policy and an implementation of the Baldia Improvement Scheme. Is it, as Peattie jestingly wonders, because the capitalist class has not read or not assimilated the debate between Turner and the Marxists? (Peattie 1979, p.1020). In general, capitalists know very well how to serve their interests. Burgess himself provides a possib.le clue when he writes: "If a State is seen as representing the interests of the various fractions of capital tied to housing and urban development (e.g., industrial, finance, landed and property capital), and if the relations between these different fractions are seen in terms of domination and subordination, then housing and urban policies will reflect tne interests of the dominant fraction or fractions. Similarly, changes in the political weight of these fractions wi 11 lead to changes in these pol i cies" (Burgess 1978, p.1127) . While Burgess discusses at length the various reasons why capital fractions would patronize Turner's recommendations for a policy of lega lization of spontaneous settlements (viz., capitalist valorization of urban land and the penetration of the capitalist mode of production), he does not go into very much detail about reasons why capital fractions

132 would reject such a policy. He only argues that we cannot expect the interests of industrial, financial, landed and property capital to legislate against themselves to guarantee access to resources for low income groups (Ibid. p.1119). While discussing the policy of the Brazilian authorities to clear squatter settlements in Rio de Janeiro, Peattie is more explicit in this respect: "Government pol i cy on hous i ng has to res pond to vari ous confl i cti ng interests. On the one hand, there is the interest central to the Marxist argument in keeping a pool of labour available at minimum cost; this would argue for ignoring the growth of squatter settlements. Further more, the members of such settlements are voters or potential sources of unrest; this may lead to moves to actively legitimize their presence. On the other hand, such considerations may be counter-balanced by pressure from real estate interests, which want to displace the squatters to use the land for more profitable developments, At a still more general level, a government which is committed to preserving private property interests in land, can hardly allow squatting to become so general as to cloud the security of land ownership generally. It often seems that much of the zigging and zagging of government policies towards such settlements is explicable in terms of irreconciable com petition between the policies suggested by these two sets of pressures" (Peattie 1979, pp.1020-1021). Two points in the above observations of Burgess and Peattie are im portant for a proper understanding of the political context of any squatter settlement upgrading policy. First of all, the capital fractions appear to be no monolithic block with regard to legalization and upgrading of squatter settlement, but rather have different and sometimes even opposing interests. Secondly, the State, or the Government, is not merely promoting the inter ests of capital fractions in a restricted sense, but has to take into account such factors as voting behaviour and political unrest, through which squatters can express and impose their demands to some extent.

8.2 Regularized plots as commodity

With regard to the Karachi Slum Improvement Project in general and the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme in particular, it is rather difficult to discern any open conflict between the advocates of the Improvement Policy and the fractions of landed, property, finance or industrial capital. In fact, there have been no directly visible signs

133 of interference by capital fractions in the project during the project period; but this does not mean, of course, that such interference has not been there. Manifestations of interference by capital fractions can rather be found in Lyari during and after regularization. In this centrally located slum area pressure on the land - in particular on land near the city centre - is considerable. According to unconfirmed information private building promotors are offering loans to poor residents of Lyari for payment of lease charges for their plot, provided they allow the building promotor to construct a multi-storied apartment building at the site. The original resident is given one of the apartments in the building free of charge. In regularized parts of Lyari near the city centre, many multi-storied apartment buildings have been erected on relatively small plots as a result of the above arrangements, or because the original occupants just sold their plot to building promotors. While at present KMC issues leases for residential plots in Lyari at a rate of Rs. 4 per square yard, market values in the area, e.g., near Lea Market, range from Rs. 1000 to Rs. 2000 per square yard (ISP 1977,p.84). Thus,it is likely that large-scale speculation takes place in Lyari and that the valorization of urban land in Lyari has started. In May 1978 the Martial Law Administrator Zone "C" (Province of Sind) issued ~~artial Law Order 67 called "Regularization and Development of Katchi Abadis" Order. One of the articles of the Order read: "The develop ment and regularization of abadis shall include the following: a, (.,); b. giving of long-term (99 years) lease rights to individuals with the clause of another lease for 99 years at leasee's request. Such leases shall be non-transferahle, except by inheritance" (my italics, YKS)l The motive for inclusion of this article in the Martial Law Order is obvious: An attempt was made to minimize professional squatting and speculation in regularized plots by making leases non-transferable. DAM appreciated the attempt to minimize professional squatting and speculation, but it considered non-transferability of leases an un feasible and counter-productive means. The non-transferability clause can easily be evaded, as is shown in the above example from Lyari, and the authorities lack the instruments to check observance of the Order. Besides, mortgaging of the regularized plot is also made impossible; this could hamper one of the bas i c aims of the po 1icy, namely, the improvement of

134 houses in regularized katchi abadis. In short, it would reduce the moti vation of katchi abadi residents to apply for a lease. While DAM did not completely agree to the clause of non-transferability in Martial Law Order 67, the strongest opposition came from the katchi abadis to be regularized and improved. Residents from Baldia Township (and especially the local leaders !) refused to send lease applications to KMC on the occasion of the distribution of lease documents by the Governor of Sind in December 1978, unless the clause be removed from the lease document. By ad hoc decision the 21 lease documents for Muslim Mujahid Colony and Sector 3 of Baldia Township were amended in this respect. There was also strong opposition from Lyari residents against this clause, and residents' organizations in Lyari requested KMC and the Martial Lawautho rities to remove Lyari from the list of katchi abadis, so that Martial Law Order 67 would not be applicable to their settlement. In January 1980, Martial Law Order 67 was reconstituted as Martial Law Order 110. Article 9 (4) of the Order reads: "A lease granted under this paragraph shall not be transferable for a period of 5 years from the date of execution of the lease, except by inheritance or mortgage by the House Building Finance Corporation or a scheduled bank for raising house building loans approved by the Government" (my italics, YKS)2. Although opposition against the non-transferability of leases was definitely related to the commodity status of plots and houses in regula rized katchi abadis and capitalist valorization of urban land, it would be exaggerated to see it as a manifestation of interfe~ence by the fraction of landed capital in the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas of KMC. Van der Linden's thesis on the bastis in Karachi provides a more striking example of "capitalist interest" opposing regularization of spontaneous settlements. Van der Linden (1977, p.306) quotes a high government official, who declared with regard to the regularization of a katchi abadi :"We cannot allot the area to the inhabitants; this land is pure gold". This statement is significant, because it probably typifies the situation in Karachi, which is in some regard different from the situation in many other Third World cities faced with a squatter problem.

135 8.3 Land ownership in Karachi

The fraction of landed capital is probably the most concerned with and opposed to regularization and upgrading of squatter settlements in Third World cities. In the Karachi Metropolitan Area, however, about 80% of the land is publicly owned, and as a consequence, most spontaneous settlements have been erected on public land. According to Van der Linden (1977, p.82), only 27 out of 251 katchi abadis in Karachi (or about 10%) are located on privately owned land; in population figures the percentage must be even much lower. Although most land is publicly owned, land ownership and land control in Karachi are quite fragmented. In the Metropolitan Area land is owned and/ or controlled by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), the Karachi Development Authority (KDA), the Karachi Cantonment Board (KCB), the Karachi Port Trust (KPT), Pakistan Railways (PR), the Sind Industrial Trading Estate (SITE), the Public Works Department (PWD), and the Board of Revenue (BOR), while vast areas of land have been given on lease to private Cooperative Housing Societies. All the government agencies are faced with the problem of spontaneous settlements on their land, but the attitude of the agencies - and thereby the position of the settlements on their land - varies considerably. It has always been an established policy of the Cantonment Board, Pakistan Railways, Port Trust, SITE and the Public Works Department neither to legalize nor improve spontaneous settlements on their land and eventually evict the residents and demolish their dwellings (Ibid. p.83). Their argumentation for this policy is similar to that of private land owners: as specialized government agencies they have specific plans for the (sti 11 vacant) land they own, and squatter settlements obstruct imple-· mentation of these plans. One example is provided by the katchi abadis on Pakistan Railways' land along the railway lines. One may dispute the necessity to reserve such wide strips of land along railway lines, but Pakistan Railways will always main tain that spontaneous settlements on those strips hamper the future expan sion of the national railway network and therefore cannot be regularized.

136 Another example is the vast area of land owned by the Cantonment Board right in the heart of Karachi 3. Although settlement on this land has provided shelter for many low-income families for many years (and although the land not occupied by squatters could be utilized for better purposes than parade grounds and military barracks), KCB refuses to discuss a trans fer of this land to KMC or KDA for katchi abadi regularization or urban development. The Karachi Development Authority would in principle also fit into this category of agencies with a specialized function. KDA is responsible for regulating land development and undertaking new developments. In this function KDA owns or controls vast areas of (vacant) land on the periphery of the city, extremely liable to squatting. In theory KDA should therefore oppose squatting and the regularization of squatter settlements, because they hamper the execution of many of its plans. However, the facts are different. Spontaneous settlements do not always develop as spontaneously as their name seems to suggest. We have seen in Chapter 7.4 that in most cases government officials know beforehand when and where a katchi abadi will arise, and sometimes officials are actively involved in its develop ment. In this way the officials can guide, not to say plan, the spontaneous growth of the city, and this enables them to divert squatter movements to some extent from the occupation of valuable land. This guidance is obviously in the interests of both the squatters and the government officials. Usually squatters can only occupy a vacant piece of land and stay there if (through mediation of some politician) they have obtained the protection of some government official(s). And the latter only will and can provide protection if more powerful groups have no designs upon the land, and if expensive development projects are not jeopardized by the occupation. So, as long as it can rrore or les s gui de the growth of spontaneous settlements on its land in the periphery of Karachi, KDA wi 11 probably not too strongly oppose the development of these settlements. Moreover, as long as low-income groups take care of the provision of shelter on their own in spontaneous settlements, pressure on KDA to develop low cost housing schemes (which are usually financially defaulting to KDA) wi 11 remain low.

137 With regard to regularization and improvement of spontaneous settlements, KDA's position is likely to be more ambivalent. Not all spontaneous settlements can be controlled, and sometimes valuable land is occupied by squatters, resulting in considerable losses in revenues for KDA. Perhaps KDA therefore prefers ad hoc decisions for regularization of specific katchi abadis, rather than an established policy like KMC's Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas. The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation is responsible for the provision and maintenance of municipal services in the Metropolitan Area. Its development assignments are minimal. Consequently it does not own or control much vacant land, and it is faced with another side of the squatter problem. KMC continuously receives innumerable requests from katchi abadi residents for provision of municipal services in their neighbourhood, and under political pressure it is often forced to respond, albeit in many cases only with a token gesture. It is rather comprehensible. therefore. that among the government organizations KMC is the most eager to see that the katchi abadis on its land are regularized and improved, though maybe not by its own depart ment4. Regularization of katchi abadis will increase the tax revenues of the Metropolitan Corporation. while its work load will hardly be en hanced and in the long run may even be reduced as the result of improvements carried out in the regularized katchi abadis. Finally, there is the Board of Revenue (BOR). the main opponent of KMC in the land transfer issue of the Baldia Regularization and Improvement Scheme. BOR owns some land within but mainly land outside the Metropolitan Area. As Karachi in the north borders on the desert of Sind, most land owned by BOR is vacant land without any agricultural activity. As a result of the rapid expansion of Karachi. however. more and more of this desert land is being urbanized and incorporated in the Metropolitan Area. For new urban developments. BOR usually transfers ownership and/or control of the land to KDA, which prepares and executes the development projects. The creation of spontaneous settlements on the periphery of the city on land owned by BOR and for which KDA has not yet prepared a development plan may cause a serious financial loss to BOR; it can no longer transfer this land for a good price to KDA for development. It is therefore understandable that BOR strongly opposes regularization of katchi abadis

138 in Karachi at subsidized rates with the argument that this will only encourage further squatting on vacant land (owned by BOR).

Rashidabad, inhabited mainly by Pathans from North West Frontier Province, is one of the more recently created mohallahs of Baldia.

Thus, with regard to policies on land and spontaneous settlements in Karachi, we may paraphrase Burgess' statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter as follows: If the Government of Sind is seen as representing the interests of the various government agencies tied to land and spontaneous settlements (e.g., KMC, KDA, BOR, etc.) and of the various fractions of capital tied to housing and urban development (e,g .• finance, industrial, landed and property capital) ,and if the relations between these different agencies and fractions are seen in terms of a permanent conflict of interests, then housing and urban policies will reflect the interests of the most influential agency or agencies and fraction or fractions.

139 Similarly, changes in political weight of these agencies and fractions will lead to changes in these policies.

8.4 Katchi abadi upgrading and political pressure

The most essential point of difference between the above statement and the one made by Burgess in his critique of Turner's views is not so much the fact that in Karachi government agencies which influence policy making on provincial level act as a kind of "fraction of public landed capital". More important is that government agencies, contrary to private capital fractions, are restricted in their activities as fractions of public landed capital, although some more so than others. Government agencies are susceptible to public pressure exercised directly by the population or indirectly through political leaders. It is in the nature and the interest of government agencies to take public opinion into account when defining policies, even if it runs counter to their interests as land owners. Consequently, government policies on land and housing are not just a reflection of the interests of public and private landed capital; they are also influenced by other groups and classes in society, as, for instance, the katchi abadi popu- 1a ti on. The following examples illustrate such influence: the announcement by Prime-Minister Bhutto of the regularization of katchi abadis in Pakistan; the adoption of the Improvement Policy for Sub-·standard Urban Areas by KMC; the proclamation of the de facto regularization of all katchi abadis in Pakistan created before January 1, 1978, by the Chief Martial Law Administrator; and the issuing of Martial Law Orders 67 and 110 (Regulari zation and Development of Katchi Abadis Order) by Martial Law Administrator Zone "C". The katchi abadi population (in Karachi more than 1.6 million people) constitutes an important political force. Some electoral constituencies consist almost entirely of katchi abadis, and since regularization of their occupancy and environmental upgrading of their neighbourhood are among the first priorities of the residents of these settlements, politicians and election 'candidates just have to urge the government to give attention to

140 these areas. Secondly, some katchi abadis are politically highly sensitive areas, and their population is easily mobilized in times of political crises. Post-election riots in the spring of 1977, which eventually lead to the overthrow of the Bhutto government, started in some of these katchi abadis. The announcements of katchi abadi regularization and improvement may therefore indeed be considered as attempts by successive governments (and in particular Martial Law authorities) to win the katchi abadi population over to their side. But after these announcements had been made, the governments have only reluctantly yielded to the demands of the katchi abadi population to convert the announcements into a general policy for katchi abadi upgrading. It is, therefore, not improper to say that the katchi abadi population has gained the policy through direct actions and political pressure on politicians and the government. The political pressure the katchi abadi population can exert is con siderable, but at the same time rather diffuse. It is strong enough to press the government into making announcements of a regularization and improvement of katchi abadis and into formulating a general pol lCY, but it is not sufficiently converged towards the common purpose in order to force the government into a systematic execution of the policy, i.e., approval and implementation of regularization and improvement plans for consecutive areas. The political pressure the population can exert also varies for different agencies. KMC is normally headed by an elected mayor with an elected council. It is continuously in touch with the people and it has to deal with the overwhelming majority of the Karachi population. There fore, it is much more liable to public pressure than agencies like Pakistan Railways or the Board of Revenue. The picture is further compl icated by the fact that for lack of adequate "democratic channels" (in particular under Martial Law), people have to exert pressure on the government mainly through individual local leaders. politicians and government officials. We have already seen that these are simultaneously putting pressure on the government in defense of their own interests. Consequently, contrary to Burgess' analysis, which rather presents "the State" as an instrument in tne hands of the rul ing capitalist class, the various levels of government in Pakistan are subject to permanent pressure by many groups and classes in society. all trying

141 to influence policies and legislation with regard to land, housing and spontaneous settlements. Although not directly visible, pressure is undoubtedly exercised by capital fractions, which want to protect and promote their specific interests with regard to land, housing, labour, etc. However, as Burgess and especially Peattie rightly observed, the interests of the various fractions can differ considerably. While industrial capital may see spontaneous settlements as cheap housing for its labourers, landed capital will consider them mainly as illegal encroachments on valuable vacant land. Since the government itself is the main land owner in Karachi, pressure on higher government bodies (in particular the Government of Sind) is also exercised by the various lower government agencies, such as KDA and KMC in defence of their interests as agency or as land owner. As land owner, the interests of these agencies may run parallel to those of certain pri vate capi ta 1 fracti ons. Government officials exercise pressure which is definitely not always in harmony with - and sometimes even in opposition to - the policies and interests of their respective agencies. These officials have personal interests in policies and legislation which provide them with opportuni ties to make financial benefits, grant favours and render services. In this respect their interests may run parallel to those of certain politicians and local leaders. Last but not least, pressure is exercised by the population (of katchi abadis) directly or indirectly through local leaders and politicians. The pressure is usually directed towards those agencies which are most sensitive to public pressure, like K/~C. In particular in times of an unstable political situation, when the government does not have a firm seat and needs all the support it can get, the population -. by its sheer number - can strongly i nfl uence the po 1; cy of the governmen t as government and as land owner. In order to explain the failure of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project, several hypotheses about changes in the political weight of government agencies and pressure groups in society shortly before and during the project have al ready been presented in the preceding chapters. For instance, the fall of the Pakistan People's Party, the transfer of the former Adminis trator KMC and the ban on political activities have definitely reduced

142 KMC's influence on the Government of Sind. On the other hand, the weakness of the national political centre has enhanced the power of the provincial authorities, while the absence of a ministerial government has strengthened the position of the bureaucrats. Most of the power struggle between government agencies, capital fractions and pressure groups and the extent of their influence on the policy and decision-making of the Government of Sind remain, unfortunate ly, too obscure to draw final conclusions. One conclusion may nevertheless be formulated. For a prompt execution of the katchi abadi regularization and improvement policy in Karachi, it is essential that the influence of the katchi abadi residents on the policy of KMC and the Government of Sind be drastically augmented.

143 9 Organizing katchi abadi communities

9.1 The need for public participation

While during the first year of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project DAM's attention had been concentrated mainly on advising and assisting CPT in planning the regularization and improvement of Baldia Township, DAM spent the second project year increasingly on detecting and analyzing the obstacles for an early implementation of the plans, and on devising ways to remove those obstacles. After two years of endeavouring to gain approval of the PC I Baldia by Sind Government and to create the necessary conditions for an expeditious implementation of the plans by KMC, DAM had to recognize that on its own it was apparently unable to convince KMC and the Government of Sind of the foremost necessity of a prompt execution of the Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas. Gradually it occurred to DAM that it had to look for other ways besides urging the authorities to execute the policy, in order to achieve the goals of the project, and that those ways would bring DAM outside the realm of KMC, its proper counterpart. The Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas provided the clue in this respect. In its paragraph on "Invol ving the People" the Improvement Pol i cy says that: "KMC cannot provide improvement to them (the katchi abadi residents, YKS), but they can achieve improvement with KMC help. They, the people, and not KMC are the improvers, the motive force for improvement" (KMC 1977b,p.21). "In response to the initiative of the people in a SUA, the KMC will coor dinate its improvement, and will provide the essential technical and legal capacities, which a SUA as such does not have ( .. ). To use this service efficiently, the community must speak with one voice"(Ibid.p.19). "It is probable that many communities will not have, at the outset, the necessary level of organization to act. In such cases, KMC may approach some th i rd party to act as communi ty organ i zer. KMC i tse If wi 11 not di rect ly undertake that task, as doing so will handicap its future dialogue with the community. There is here a positive role for either political leadershi.p or professional assistance or both" (Ibid.p.19). It is clear that the authors of the policy document had based their views on the assumption that initiative and initial request to KMC for regularization and improvement of a certain katchi abadi would come from the katchi abadi community itself. ~~C'S involvement would be restricted basically to corrmunity assistance: guided self-help. Initiative and initial

144 request as such would be the expression of the community's interest to upgrade its settl ement and of its moti va ti on to coopera te wi th KMC in planning and implementation. Organizing the community, if necessary at all, would merely be the formalization of the community's motivation and ·willingness to cooperate.

Before public objections are invited, the Community Relations Officers organize a meeting to explain the detailed plans to the local leaders and residents of the mohallah and to listen to their remarks and suggestions.

In fact, the position of the katchi abadi residents vis~·a-·vis KMC is quite different. The original request is usually made by some outside politician, with or without direct support from the population of the settlement; the request thereby becomes a pol itical issue. Although all residents in the settlement like to see their katchi abadi regularized and improved, it is unlikely that they will all unite behind the politician for that purpose. Community organization therefore also becomes a political issue, which divides rather than unites the population.

145 Under these circumstances (see Chapter 3.4 ) KMC prefers to undertake the planning work under its own responsibility, rather than to advise and assist a community divided on a political issue in upgrading its settle ment on a self-help basis, as the Improvement Policy proposes. As a result, the relationship between the katchi abadi population and KMC is dominated by the latter and it is KMC which decides when and how to involve the residents in the planning for regularization and improvement of their settlement. Moreover, organizing katchi abadi residents to become a united (and thereby strong) participant in the planning dialogue is obviously not in the interest of KMC. Instead of approaching some "third party" to act as community organizer, KMC sees to it that the population of the katchi abadi is involved in the planning work to the extent of meeting legal demands and appeasing possible discontent among the residents only. Unlike the Improvement Policy anticipated (Ibid. p.2), it is KMC and not the katchi abadi commu nity which sets the pace in planning and implementation for regularization and improvement of the settlement. Th is makes it poss ib 1e for KMC offi ci a 1s to disregard the interests of the katchi abadi residents and execute the policy insofar as their own interests are served. This notion brought DAM to the conclusion that one way to force KMC into executing its policy was to increase the involvement of the katchi abadi residents in the planning work for their settlement - not only to improve the quality and practicability of the plans prepared by CPT, but also to enhance the influence of the residents in the decision-making process within KMC. Close involvement of residents in the work of CPT would make it possible for them to check the progress in planning and implementation and to point out to KMC where it fails to take its respon sibilities and neglects its duties. Keeping this in mind DAM started to look for some "third party". The idea was not so much to have this third party act as a community organizer trying to establish some over..,all katchi abadi community organization, which would probably only rouse the opposition of the local political leaders and existing local organizations. In DAWs opinion the third party would rather have to assist katchi abadi residents to intervene in the planning work for thei r settlement in the defense and protection of their interests. It could help the residents primarily to fully exploit all opportunities provided under the Improve-

146 ment Policy to influence planning and decision-making of KMC with regard to their settlement. In this respect its assignments would be manifold, as KMC and CPT hardly seem to be interested in pointing out rights and duties to the residents of katchi abadis under planning. a. As soon as the selection of a katchi abadi for regularization and improvement is announced in the newspapers, the population needs to be informed and instructed about the approach KMC will follow in the planning process. In particular the rights and duties of both KMC and the residents have to be explained, and local leaders and residents have to be prepared for their respective roles in the planning dialogue. b. When KMC officers approach the local leaders and residents to present and discuss proposals for the settlement, the population will need technical assistance to understand and examine these proposals on their merits and consequences. Although it is surprising to see how much (often illiterate) people do understand about plans for their mohallah, some technical details still need to be translated into common language. c. The "Public Objections Period" is probably the only official opportuni ty for the population to come forward with objections to CPT proposals, but the initiative to raise objections is left to the individual residents. In order to grasp this opportunity, many residents may need help to formulate their objection in the right wording and to send it to the right KMC department. d. It is almost impossible for katchi abadi residents to find out if and when the Public Objections Hearing COlIDJittee meets to discuss the objections, and subsequently to come to know what the outcome of the discussion has been. CPT officials say that all those who have raised an objection recei ve a wri tten rep ly by mail stating the deci s i on of the Publ ic Objections Hearing ComrJittee; but residents in Baldia who had actually sent thei r objecti ons to KMC declared that they had never received any reply. e. It is sometimes even difficult to obtain information about when and how to apply for a lease, pay the lease charges and collect the lease document. KMC's lease procedure is rather complicated and not adapted to the real ity of the spontaneous settlement. It demands evidence, which a squatter by definition cannot supply, such as a property right document, and it requires frequent visits to lease offices of KMC.

147 If some third party could only point out all these opportunities for involvement of residents in the KMC work to the katchi abadi population, CPT and KMC would probably be less inclined to ignore the katchi abadi residents and their interests. However, in DN~'s opinion this third party could do more than just point out opportunities for participation and involvement to residents of katchi abadis.

9.2 Community assisting organization

To gain access to information and basic services is probably one of the main problems katchi abadi residents face besides economic problems such as income and unemployment. This does not only apply to the regulari za ti on and i mprovemen t programme of Kf\1C, but also to servi ces offered by other public and private institutions like the Gas Company, the Electric Supply Corporation, health and educational institutions, banks, etc. Katchi abadi residents often even lack the information on where to obtain information and where to apply for the provision of basis services. And if they know where to go, they usually have to wait for hours before they are admitted, and are put off with useless and incorrect information or have to pay for the advice they received. Consequently, there is an obvious need to collect all information likely to be relevant to katchi abadi residents, to extend this information to the katchi abadi population in a comprehensible form, and to help these people gain access to these servi ces. a. The Improvement Policy assumes that regularization and the provision of infrastructure will stimulate katchi abadi residents to improve their own houses and its direct surroundings. People may need advice on how to improve their houses in an inexpensive manner. To finance house improvements, KMC's Improvement Policy suggested the provision of loans to occupants of regularized plots by the House Building Finance Corporation or a bank (Cf.Chapter 3.1 and Chapter 8.2); but the psychological threshold to approach a bank for a loan may be prohibitive for squatters unless they get some assistance and support. b. The Improvement Policy will only be successful if the population of the regularized katchi abadi is instructed on how to properly

148 utilize the infrastructure provided. Information campaigns about the proper use of the water supply and sanitation systems are therefore necessary and ought to be supplemented by health-education campaigns. An important activity related to an overall improvement of sanitary conditions in a settlement is the cleaning of roads, streets and drains. In principle, cleaning of roads, streets and drains as well as the colleciton of garbage from public dustbins in the area is the responsibility of the sanitary staff - the sweepers of KMC. The Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme proposed to improve garbage collection in Baldia by purchasing two more sanitation vans and constructing additional dustbins. But even an improved col lection system will be inadequate unless residents have learned to throw their garbage into the dustbins instead of in nallahs or on vacant land. c. It may even be feasible to organize mohallah communities in order to carry out minor infrastructural improvement works which KMC will not undertake, or which can temporarily improve the living conditions in the mohallah until KMC makes the definitive arrangements under the improvement programme. These activities may become an important vehicle for community development in general, although it should always be kept in mind that such community activities must never provide KMC with an excuse to put aside its own responsibilities to improve the living conditions in that katchi abadi.

Assistance to katchi abadi residents in the planning process for upgrading of their settlement, efforts to gain access to public and private institutions for katchi abadi residents, educational and informa tion campaigns and self-help activities by katchi abadi communities to improve living conditions in their settlement - all these will remain fut i 1e, however, un less KMC s imu ltaneous ly executes its Improvement Pol icy for Sub-standard Urban Areas. Therefore, one of the continuous and per haps main tasks of any community-assisting organization will probably be to help katchi abadi residents in exerting pressure on KMC and other government bodies to not only announce, but also promptly execute, the upgrading programme for katchi abadis. The above ideas are obviously an elaboration of John Turner's recommendation that the Government should guarantee access to basic

149 resources for low-income groups, so that these groups can improve their living conditions autonomously. Burgess objected to this recommendation, reasoning that we cannot expect the interests of industrial, landed, financial and property capital to legislate against themselves. We believe that sometimes laws and policies already provide opportunities for low-income groups to gain access to resources and basic services, perhaps because the interests of certain capital fractions are served by such access. The problem is that underprivileged groups like katchi abadi residents are unable to grasp these opportunities without some outside assistance. If these opportunities do not exist, sufficiently well-organized public pressure by these low-income groups may nevertheless force government agencies into legislation against the interests of capital fractions. In this respect, attention should be called to an article in the monthly magazine "HOW" called "The Urban Poor and Organization" (Singh 1979, pp.3-6). According to this article a slum-dwellers organization, BSDUF (Bombay Slum Dwellers United Front) has successfully launched an organized slum-dwellers movement in Bombay, India. "When in June 1979 the BSDUF came into being, a widespread campaign was launched which exposed the true nature of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands Act and stressed the need for United Front action against the Black Law (the Act as well as the Law facilitated eviction of squatters from public land, YKS). This gave the existing discontent among the slum-dwellers an outlet and direction. It made people conscious of the need to defend their rightful place in the city. The movement launched was widespread and the new awareness that was created motivated numerous local organizations to take part in joint protests and local level demonstrations against the legislations pro mulgated and the demand made for facilities" (Ibid. p.4). An organization in Karachi similar to the BSDUF in Bombay would definitely have had considerable influence on the decision and policy making process in KMC and the Government of Sind, but it proved to be quite difficul t for DAM to identify even an organi zati on whi ch could per form the tasks DAM had in mind with regard to katchi abadi community assi stance. It is self-evident that from the start such an organization should have good contacts with and easy access to relevant public and p!ivate organizations as well as katchi abadi residents, local leaders and existing community organi zations. The organization wi II have to work very care-

150 fully, because information and access to institutions are scarce in katchi abadis and, thereby, are valuable goods normally marketed by local leaders and politicians. It should therefore cooperate with local leaders and in volve them whenever possible, rather than compete with them for the support of residents and for access to institutions. Most local social welfare organizations in katchi abadis have been established on an ethnic basis and/or are linked to specific political parties. Therefore, they are unfit to unite the population of a katchi abadi and do not even have equal access to all groups and people in an area. Besides, the founders of such welfare organizations often rather have an eye for personal interests and a political career than for the interests of the katchi abadi population as a whole; and from experience most common katchi abadi residents are aware of this. For these reasons the local organizations often consist of board members only and do not have any local support (Siddiqui 1975, pp.84-85). Social welfare organizations outside the katchi abadis are in general either unfit for this type of activities, because they are socially too remote from the katchi abadi population, or they are afraid to get involved in politics (Bos 1970, p.15 and p.27). DAM excluded the idea to set up a completely new organization for this purpose, as it would probably require a large foreign input initially, which DAM was unable to give, Eventually, DAM reached the conclusion that there was no suit able organization in Karachi which could perform the tasks DAM had in mind. DAM's only hope was to link the idea of a community-assisting organi zation to another component of the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme, which needed support and assistance from the outside: the upgrading of sanitary conditions in Baldia Township through the introduction of improved soak-pits.

151 9.3 The soak-pit project and beyond

As explained in Chapter 7.1, the PC I proposal of a (partly) open sewerage system for Baldia Township had incited many critical reactions. After objections to the proposal of a completely open system by the Housing, Town Planning, Local Government & Rural Development Department of the Government of Sind, CPT engineers had designed a partly open, partly closed sewerage system with open drains in the house access lanes and a septic tank for each group of houses along one lane, from where the effluent would be disposed of by a piped underground system.

-----'-~-J..--- 8' -----t a. Traditional soak-pit in use in Baldia Towhship (left) and b. Improved soak-pit presently introduced in the area (right)

This design could not get the approval of all parties concerned and it was therefore decided to ask a consultant on sanitary engineering to design a suitable human-waste disposal system for Baldia Township. The consultant started his work in December 1978 and completed the assignment in February 1979. His study consisted of a survey of physical conditions and existing excreta disposal methods in Baldia as well as the design of a dry, on-site excreta treatment system.

152 The consultant's study (Pickford & Reed 1979, pp.15-19) and a survey conducted in Baldia Township in 1979 (Schuringa et al.1979, pp.57-58) indicated that about 60% of the households in Baldia are presently using a soak-pit latrine, i.e., a pit in the ground connected to the latrine by a pipe. The pit is usually dug in the street and filled with stones to prevent it from collapsing. Liquid from the latrine soaks away into the ground, and the solid material remains in the pit until it is filled and has to be emptied (figure a). About 35% of the households in Baldia use a bucket latrine. A bucket - usually an old battery box - is placed under the latrine, and excreta fall into this box. Regularly, hopefully once a day, a sweeper comes to empty the bucket. For this purpose the sweeper does not enter the plot, but he removes the bucket by hand from underneath the latrine through a hole in the compound wall from the street side. He throws the contents of the bucket into two barrels he has attached to his bicycle. A marginal number of households in Baldia has a septic tank or another type of latrine facility. The remaining households do not have a latrine at all. They defaecate in the fields or on their plot on a stone or a newspaper which they throwaway in the street. It was the intention of DAM and CPT to first of all replace the unhygienic bucket latrines and provide latrine facilities to those households which at present do not have a facility at all. In view of the present and possibly also future shortage of water in Baldia Township and the limited funds available for a human waste disposal system, the consultant proposed the introduction of an improved soak-pit for Baldia Township (Pickford & Reed 1979, p.20). Instead of digging the pit in the street next to the latrine, it would be dug under neath the latrine. If the pit is dug 16 feet deep and 5 feet in diameter, a household of nine persons can use it for 15 - 20 years before emptying is required. To prevent collapsing of the pit, it is to be lined with cement blocks ins tead of fill ed with stones, which merely reduce the volume of the pit. To avoid smells and breeding of flies and mosquitos, the toilet pan is provided with a water seal (figure b). When the proposal was submitted to KMC, its engineers raised several objections. According to the engineers, water supply to Baldia would definitely be increased in the future, once the Third Phase of the Karachi Bulk Water Supply Project will have been completed. Furthermore,

153 they feared that a large number of soak-pits in Baldia would pollute the groundwater to an unacceptable level. and they assumed that people in Baldia would prefer some kind of underground sewerage system to a system of soak-pits. In answer to KMC's objections. DAM emphasized that even a doubling of the water supply to Baldia Township in the coming years would be in sufficient to operate a waterborne underground sewerage system. Secondly. nowhere in Baldia is groundwater being used for drinking. as it is brack ish and unfit for human consumption. Thirdly. DAM pointed out to KMC that 60% of all households in Baldia Township already have a soak-pit latrine. though of inferior design. The final argument of KMC against the construction of improved soak-pits in Baldia within the framework of the Baldia Township Regula rization and Improvement Scheme was the limitation of KMC's responsibili ty for human waste disposal to puhlic' systems. The proposed soak-pit latrine was considered to be a private, on-the-plot improvement. which could therefore not be undertaken by KMC. This formal argument settled the issue for KMC. Convinced of the necessity to improve the sanitary conditions in Baldia Township and of the absence of any feasible alternative to the proposed soak-pit latrine, DAM went looking for an organization whi ch could implement the proposal outside KMC's Baldia improvement project. DAM hoped that the two assignments - construction of soak-pits and as sistance to the Baldia community - could be carried out by one and the same organization, perhaps even as one project. Through the UNICEF representative in Karachi. DAM got in touch with the Pakistan Jaycees, the national branch of an international organization involved in social welfare activities. In a meeting of the Social Welfare Directorate of the Government of Sind, the Jaycees had heard about the soak-pit project from KMC representatives and had immediately declared that they were willing to implement this project in Baldia Township. After some local fund-raising, and with financial assistance from UNICEF and technical assistance from DAt1, the Pakistan Jaycees started to construct soak-pits in Muslim Mujahid Colony in August 1979. By August 1980 they had constructed some 60 pits in this mohallah, for which they also obtained funds from NOVIB, a Dutch private joint-financing organization1.

154 As explained above, DAM had hoped to find an organization which would introduce the improved soak-pits in Baldia Township and at the same time would be able to organize and assist the Baldia community or communities, so that the population of Baldia could better perform its role in the planning dialogue with KMC. The construction of soak-pits would in fact be only a first step for this organization to have an introduction in Baldia Township. Soak-pit latrines can only function well if they are properly used and maintained; the mere construction of s.oak-pits will not be sufficient to improve the overall sanitary conditions in Baldia Township unless it is followed by some educational campaign about public and private health and hygiene. Moreover, a human waste disposal system is not the only determinant of public health conditions; so are the garbage collection system, the presence or absence of pools of stagnant water on unmetalled roads, and the lack or shortage of clean drinking water. Thus, sooner or later, any organization which tries to improve the sanitary conditions in Baldia by providing soak-pits to households in the area must come to realize that its work remains futile unless KMC observes its responsibili ty towards the Baldia residents and carries out the Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme. Although DAM appreciated the activities of the Pakistan Jaycees in Baldia Township for the construction of soak~pits, it did not believe that the Jaycees would become the organization which could assist the Baldia residents in the ways described above. The Jaycees meet many of the requirements of the community--assisting organizations DAM had in mind for the katchi abadis. They have good contacts and easy access to in fluential people and relevant institutions; they can easily find their way through the bureaucracy of the government; they have a good reputation; they are above suspicion of corruption and will not easily become involved in local politics. Their main deficiency, however, is their social remote ness from the population of the katchi abadis, which sometimes made it difficult for them to work with the people of Baldia. The only hope left for DAM is that the r1arxist analysis of the inter ests of the industrial capital fraction in squatters settlements and squatter settlement upgrading will prove valid. Jaycees originally meant "Juni or Chamber of Commerce", and many Jaycee members are personally related to owners and managers of factories in SITE, where numerous Baldia

155 residents are employed. According to the Marxist analysis, industrial capital interests will back an upgrading programme for squatter settle ments on a self-help basis, as it reduces the pressure on wages and creates a pool of cheap labour.

9.4 Summary and conclusions

Basing himself on experiences in Latin America and in particular in Peru, John Turner framed the hypothesis that there exists a direct cor relation between what he calls environmental security and housing input by squatters. The hypothesis led him to the conclusion and policy recom mendation that governments should rather provide security of tenure to low-income groups - so that they can construct and improve their houses themselves - than provide completely constructed housing units which are too expensive and consequently have low security of tenure. "If ( .. ) policy is based on the provision of elements of environmental security ( .. ) rather than the direct construction of buildings, housing investments by the urbanizing masses will be maximized, while over crowding and squatting will be minimized. In addition, the burdens of costly and unproductive public works pro grammes can be sloughed off and development will be stimulated by the mobilization of the savings and initiative of the common people and by orderly city growth" (Turner 1967, p.122). Van der Linden tested Turner's hypothesis for the spontaneous settle ments of Karachi by determi n i ng both the 1eve 1 of securi ty of tenure of 251 spontaneous settlements as perceived by the residents, and the housing conditions in those settlements. He observed that housing conditions generally improve with an increased level of security of tenure. He concluded (1977, p.116) that: "Stating that there is a correlation between security of tenure and the spontaneous physical development of a basti is almost a truism ( .. ). Nevertheless the point has to be emphasized, firstly because in our view it is here that one of the main keys to the slum problem in Pakistan can be found; and second ly, because not everyone seems to be convinced of these facts". Proceed i ng from the results of his study, Van der Linden came to lthe conclusion that there is an enormous potential for improvement in the spontaneous settl ements of Karach i, and that any government po 1 icy aimed

156 at improvement of the settlements would evoke positive reactions from the residents in terms of investment of people's savings in houses (Ibid. p.299). He emphasized that an indispensable step in the process of improvement of spontaneous settlements is the provision of security of tenure - in whatever form - to the katchi abadi residents. If security of tenure and basic infrastructure would be provided, improvement of individual dwellings could be left to the residents themselves (Ibid. pp.299-300) . Van der Linden finally observed that the informal system, through which at present housing needs of low-income groups in Karachi are met, works reasonably well under the circumstances and probably works better than any alternative system. He therefore suggested that the authorities accept the system and try to guide it rather than oppose it. He wrote (Ibid. p.301): liThe acceptance of the system gives a basic guideline not only for up grading of existing settlements, but also for planning of the future settlement of low-income groups ". In his view, the role of the Government in the provision of housing to low-income groups should not be to compete with middlemen, who presently see to it that low-income groups find shelter, nor to leave them com pletely on their own, but rather to cooperate with them even more than is presently being done in an informal way. In 1976-1977 KMC formulated its Improvement Pol icy for Sub-standard Urban Areas, based on - among other things - Van der Linden's study of the bastis of Karachi. The Improvement Policy proposed a two~pronged approach to the katchi abadis: - provision of security of tenure to the residents through legalization of their occupancy; - upgrading of overall conditions in Ute settlement through provision of basic infrastructure. In addition KMC established a separate department for regularization and improvement of katchi abadis and requested the Government of the Netherlands and the Amsterdam Free University to provide technical as sistance in the Karachi Slum Improvement Project. The project did not succeed in its first and main assignment: the regularization and improvement of Baldia Township. In Ute preceding chapters, several causes for the failure of the project have been

157 suggested. On the whole, these causes seem to confirm Burgess' observation that we cannot expect the Government to legislate against its own inter ests, although the reasons are not the same as Burgess suggested. We have tried to show in the previous two chapters that the middlemen in the spontaneous settlement process (local leaders, politicians, govern ment officials), rather than capital fractions, opposed the execution of the Improvement Policy, and that the landed capital fractions were in fact represented by government agencies owning or controlling vast areas of vacant land. We have tried to make clear that in our opinion at least some of the land-owning or controlling government agencies (in particular KMC) are probably as much susceptible to pressure by katchi abadi resi dents as to pressure by private capital fractions. This "fortunate" circumstance may provide an opportunity to katchi abadi residents to force the Government into legislation and policy execution against certain other interests of government agencies and capital fractions. Community organizations and public pressure on the most susceptible agencies may be the answer of the katchi abadi population to obstruction of the policy execution by the Government. The dilemma, however, is how to organize katchi abadi communities without competing with the middlemen. This leads us back to Turner's views and Burgess' critique. We have to confirm Burgess' statement that Turner's analysis of the housing question is "de-pol iti cized", and that squatter settlement upgrading is a political issue. We think that the Karachi Slum Improvement Project has clearly proved this point. However, this does not imply, in our opinion, that Turner's views are of no value and that squatter settlement upgrading projects should be abandoned for that reason. In the preceding chapter we have tried to indicate ways to pOliticize upgrading programmes and give them a more emancipating character by emphasizing the community organizing component. In fact, squatter settlement regularization is already largely poli tical and emancipatory, insofar as it confirms (though up to now only ex post facto) the access of low-income groups to urban land, one of the most valuable resources in society, and thereby confirms their "right to the city". In the wake of regulari.zation and improvement programmes, access to all sorts of other services and influence on public decision making processes may be gained for low-income groups through organized

158 political pressure - although this will not directly lead to the revo lutionary abolishment of the capitalist mode of production. Rather than being occupied by the matter of possible appeasing effects of squatter settlement upgrading programmes, we should be concerned about the eventuality of a take-over of regularized and improved katchi abadis by higher-income groups, resulting in the dislocation of the original low-income residents. In the Karachi Slum Improvement Project we have explored ways to impede and minimize such consequences of regularization and improvement. Furthermore, efforts are being made to closely monitor, examine and measure these effects in Baldia Township through a series of longitudinal evaluation surveys (Schuringa et al.1979). Should we observe that despite all precaution regularization and improvement inevitably lead to dislocation of low-income families from regularized katchi abadis, then our conclusion may have to be that the interests of low-income groups in housing are better served by a non-· interference of government bodies in spontaneous settlements in Karachi. Like Van der Linden said: The present informal system works reasonably well under the circumstances and probably works better than any alter native system.

159 Notes *

Chapter 2

1. In the preceding and foll owing text, the words "squatter settlement", "spontaneous settlement", "autonomous settlement" and even "slum" are alternatively used to indicate settlements constructed on vacant land without official approval by the proprietor and/or building authorization by the government. On the Indian subcontinent, the word "basti" (or "bustee") is often used to designate such areas. In the KMC policy document (KMC 1977), the expression "sub-standard urban area" (SUA) is being used, so that other areas than squatter settlements with inadequate infrastructure can be included. In Pakistan, these settlements are nowadays usually called "katchi abadi(e)s", which means "provisional, not-well-established settlements". 2. While existing statutes provide for an elected Mayor and Council of Karachi, these have been replaced by an Administrator (appointed by the Government of Sind) from 1971 until the end of 1979. The Admini~ strator was the chief executive of KMC. Chapter 3

1. Daily "Dawn", February 20, 1977 2. Dai ly "Dawn", February 21, 1977. 3. In an audacious mood, DAM even proposed CPT to grant the lease title to tenants, rather than their landlords. CPT's only reaction was "But this is pure communism !". 4. This implies, of course, that housing is not the basic problem, but poverty as a result of the economic conditions is. Chapter 4 1. Daily "Dawn", February 20, 1977. Chapter 5 1. RCD Higway: This highway had been placed under the aegis of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCDl, a former economic alliance between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Chapter 6 1. The disadvantages of this system of lease charge calculation can be easily illustrated by an example. An occupant of a residential plot of 200 square yards has to pay a lease charge for his plot of (200xRs.20 =L Rs.4000. An occupant of a residential plot of 201 square yards has to pay (201xRs.40=1 Rs.8040,

160 i.e. more than twice the charges of the first occupant for only one square yard more. It is obvious that the second occupant will exert heavy pressure on the KMC surveyor who comes to measure the plot before leasing, in order to keep his plot within the plot-size category of 121 - 200 square yards. The system preferred by DAM would have avoided this problem, as the second occupant in the above example would have had to pay (200xRs.20 + 1xRs.40=) Rs.4040, i.e. only Rs.40 more for one square yard more. Besides this lease-charge calculation problem, a number of other problems can be expected, for instance with regard to the defining of the land use of a plot. A commercial plot can be as easily converted into a residential-cum commercial plot when its land use has to be determined as it can be reconverted into a commercial plot, once the title has been granted. In terms of lease charges the difference between residential-cum commercial and purely commercial plots can be substantial; in terms of land use the difference is just one bed. On all these problems, hardly any decision could be taken during the project. 2. The decision of the Martial Law authorities was confirmed by Martial Law Order 110 ("Regularization and Development of Katchi Abadis Order) of December 1979, which stated in Article 9(3]: "Ten percent of the lease money inclusive of development charges shall be paid as the price of land payable to the Federal Government or Provincial Government or Local Authority, as the case may be, and such price shall be treated as a contribution from the owners of the land towards the development of the katchi abadis in the form of a soft loan to the Directorate of Kateni Abadis (the Central Planning Team of KMC, YKS) on the terms and conditions approved by the Government". Interlude 1. For the organizational chart of the Central Planning Team and the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, see Appendix 1. Being a representative of the Government of Sind and not a KMC official, the ADLFA has not been included in the chart. DAM has not been included, either. om advisers were counterparts to the Planning Coordinator, Senior Physical Planner, Senior Economic Planner and Community Relations Officer I.

2. In July 1978 the Central Planning Team WaS transferred to the Finance Department of KMC and placed under the Financial Adviser. Its name was changed into Planning, Evaluation & Monitoring Wing. Chapter 7 1. Under pressure of some PNA politicians CPT also started planning the regularization and improvement of the Golimar/Gulbahar area. Because a coopera t i ve hous ing soci ety and a group of katchi abadi res i dents disputed the right on part of the land in that area. CPT did not dare to prepare a concept plan for Gulbanar, out of fear of becoming in volved in the dispute which was sub judice since many years. Only for some "harmless" mohallahs were detailed regularization plans being prepared, but improvement planning had not even started and funds

161 for improvement were not available. 2. An indication of the peculiar position of local leaders in the KMC regularization and improvement programme also came from the Baldia Evaluation Survey of 1979. In this survey respondents were asked if they knew the (approved) lease rate for the smallest residential plots in Baldia Township and where they had obtained this information. The answers to the two questions are presented in the table below. The answers to the question about the lease rate have been divided into two categories: "right anser" (Rs.15 per square yard) and "wrong answer" (all other answers). About 47% of the respondents answered "I don't know".

Source of information newspaper KMC neighbours local leaders others total Ri ght answer 78% 71% 41% 36% 19% 43% Wrong answer 22% 29% 59% 64% 81% 57% Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

In the category "wrong answer" often a lease rate of Rs.5 per square yard was mentioned. An inquiry revealed that at least in Muslim Mujahid Colony local leaders had urged the residents not to give the correct answer, but to give a lower rate (Schuringa et al.1979, pp.66-67). Chapter 8 1. Martial Law Order 67: Regularization and Development of Katchi Abadis Order (In: Daily "Dawn", May 18, 1978). Martial Law Order 67 was a formalization for the Province of Sind of the announcements by the Chief Martial Law Administrator that all katchi abadis created before January 1,1978, were to be regularized and improved. The order stipulated certain conditions for katchi abadi regularization and improvement, which had not been fixed in KMC's Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas. The effect of the issuing of the Martial Law Order on the overall progress of work in the Central Planning Team was minimal. 2. Martial Law Order 110: Regularization and Development of Katchi Abadis Order. 3. "Cantonments are permanent military stati.ons and contain military administrative offices. barracks, parade grounds, rifle ranges and even an airfield" (Kureshy 1977, p.84). "The cantonments (of Karachi) when they were established in 1940 were expected to be well outside the uroanizable area. They now lie in the heart of the metropol is and in the path of its growth to the west, the north-east and the south-east. The 29,000 square acres of cantonment

162 and other lands under defense control accommodate approximately 2.250.000 population, plus industry and other urban uses" (MPD 1974, p.299). 4. This does not imply, of course, that KMC aims at regularization of all katchi abadis irrespective of their location. Some katchi abadis under KMC jurisdiction have been constructed in riverbeds, They are extremely liable to flood hazards and obstruct the normal flow of the river. Every year during the monsoon season, these settlements create problems for KMC, and that is why KMC insists on strict conditions for regularization. However, political interests may demand regularization of these katchi abadis as well. Chapter 9. 1. Also in August 1979 students of the Social Work Department of the Karachi University initiated a similar project in another part ot the Baldia Township with financial assistance from UNICEF. This project seemed to have better prospects to develop into a real community development programme for Baldia, but unfortunately little can be said about its achievements, as the project started after DAM had left Pakistan (Adhami & Laiq Azam 1980).

163 Bibliography

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Bos, A. (1970) Structure of social Welfare services: A descriptive study of voluntary welfare agencies and urban community development projects in Karachi, Pakistan. Karachi. Burgess, R. (1978) Petty commodity housing or dweller control? A critique of John Turner's views on housl'ng policy. In: World Development, Vol. 6, No.9-10). Burney, LH. (1977) March '77 elections. An analysis. In: Pakistan Economist, July 23, 1977. Chaudry Mohammed Ali (1973) The emergence of Pakistan. Lahore. Chugtai, R.A. et al. (1975) Miran Naka. An interdisciplinary study of a slum in Karachi. Karachi CPT (Central Planning Team) (1977) PC I Form Baldia Township Regularisation and Improvement Scheme. Karachi (mimeograph). CR (Community Relations) Section (1977) Reconnaissance survey of Baldia Town. Karachi (mimeograph). DAM (Dutch Advisory Missi on) (1977) Baldia Improvement Project. Preliminary report. Karachi. DAM/KMC (Dutch Advisory Mission/Karachi Metropolitan Corporation) (1979) A place to live. Katchi abadi improvement in Karachi, Pakistan. Karachi. Drakakis-Smith, D. (1979) Low-cost housing provision in the Third World: some theoretical and practical alternatives. In: Housing in Third World countries. Perspectives on policy and practice. Murison, H.S. & J.P.Lea (eds.). London. Engels, F. (1962) Zur Wohnungsfrage {I872). In: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Werke. Band 18. Berl in.

Heginbotham, S.J. (1975) Cultures in conflict. The four faces of Indian bureaucracy. New York.

164 Imam, M. (n.d.) Prevailing market value of open residential plots in Baldia Township. Karachi (mimeograph).

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Janssen, R. (1978) Wij hebben zelfs geen recht op de stad. Vogelvrij wonen in Bogota. Amsterdam.

JRP (Joint Research Project) IV (1975) Report on socio-economic survey of Lyari. Karachi.

JRP (Joint Research Project) IV (1978) Socio-economic survey of Baldia Township. Karachi.

KMC (Karachi Metropolitan Corporation) (1976) Revised PC II. Dutch assistance to KMC in SUA improvement. Karachi (mimeograph). KMC (Karachi Metropolitan Corporation} (1977a) PC I Lyari Improvement Scheme. Karachi (mimeograph)

KMC (Karachi Metropolitan Corporation) (1977b1 An Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Areas. Karachi. KMC (Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (19781 Public objections document. Karachi (mimeograph).

Kureshy, K. U. (1977) A geography of Pah~tan. Karachi. Lea, J.P. (1979a) The politicization of housing policy in developing countries. Paper presented at the Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. September 24th - 28th, 1979 (mimeographl. Lea, J.P. (1979b) Self-help and autonomy in housing: theoretical critics and empirical investigators. In: Housing in Third World countries: Perspectives on policy and practice, Murison, H.S. & J.P.Lea (eds.). London. Michl. S. (1973) Urban squatter organization as a national government tool: the case of Lima, Peru. In: Latin American urban research, Vol.3. Rabinovitz, F.F. & F.M.Trueblood (eds.). Beverly Hills.

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Peattie, L. (1979) Housing policy in developing countries: Two puzzles. In: WOY'ld Development. Vol. 7. Pickford, J. and Reed, B (1979) Sanitation for Baldia Township, Karachi. Loughborough. 165 Population Census of Pakistan 1972 (1977)District Census Report Karachi. Is 1amabad.

Report Evaluation Mission. Karachi Slum Improvement Implementation Unit. (1979) Karachi. Rivas, D.R. (1977) Development alternatives for the Peruvian barriada. In: Third World urbanization. Abu Loghod, J. & R.Hay Jr. (eds.). Chicago. Schoorl, J.W., J.J.van der Linden & K.S.Yap (eds.) (1982) Between basti dmellers and bureaucrats. Oxford (in press). Schuringa,M. et al. (1979) Baldia Evaluation Survey Report. A study on improvement of living conditions in a katchi abadi. Karachi. Segaar, T.J. (1979) Karachi en de basti. Een studie over de positie van de lagere klasse in Karachi op macro en micro niveau. Amsterdam. Siddiqui, I. (1970) Role of social welfare agencies in Azam Basti. (A case study). Karachi. Singh, R. (1979) Bombay slum-dwellers organise. In: HOW, November 1979. Turner, J.F.C. (1967) Uncontrolled urban settlement: problem and policy. In: Ekistics. Vol. 23. Turner, J.F.C. (1968) Housing priorities, settlement pattern and urban development in modernizing countries. In: Journal of the American Institute of Planners, No. 34. Turner, J.F.C. (1976) Housing by people. Towards autonomy in building environment. London. Turner, J. F. C. and Fichter, R. (eds.) (1972} Freedom to build. New York. Turner, J. F. C. and Goetze, R. (1967) Environmental security and hous i ng input. In: Ekistics. No. 23. Van der Linden, J .J. (1977) The bastis of Karachi. Types and dynamics. Amsterdam. Vernez, G. and Valenzuela, J. (1974) Construcci6n popular y estructura del IIJercado de vivi enda: e 1 caso de Bogota. In: Revista Interamericana de Planeaci6n. Wegelin, E.A. (1979) Slum Improvement in Karachi; Look back in despair. In: Pakistan Economist, Vol. 19, No.26. Wright Mills, C. (1963) The Marxists. London. Yap Kioe-Sheng (1979) Resident's partictpation in katchi abadi improvement. In: Pakistan Economist, Vol.19, No.2,

166 Appendix 1

Organizational chart of the Central Planning Team of KMC

Administrator KMC

Fi nanci a 1 Chief Chi ef Adviser Offi cer Engineer ._------, I Planning Coordinator CPT

Executive Senior Engineer Physical Planner Community Senior Relations Economic I Offi cer I Pl anner Phys i ca 1 Planner I Assistant Executive Engi neer I Community Jom,e Physical Relations Pl anner I Pl anner I I Officer II I EconomlcI . Physical Planner II Pl anner III Offi ce Superintendent

Technical Technical Assistant Assistant II Clerk

At a certain moment during the Karachi Slum Improvement Project several divergent organizational charts of KMC were simultaneously in circulation. The main point of difference was tfle pos tti'on of the three most senior KMC officials: Financial Adviser, Chief Engineer and Chief Officer. They themselves kept an "organigram" whicn snowed them as sole inter~ mediaries between the Administrator and the KMC departments and each as responsible for one part of KMC. KMC officials like the Planning Coordinator KMC and the Planning Coordinator Lyari maintained a chart in which they,

167 though less influential than the three KMC officials mentioned above, were directly subordinate to the Administrator KMC. In July 1978 the Central Planning Team was officially placed in the Finance Department of KMC under the Financial Adviser; some six months later it was dissociated from the Finance Department and placed directly under the Administrator KMC.

168 Appendix 2

List of abbreviations ADLFA Assistant Director Local Finance Auditing AFU Amsterdam Free University ASIWP Area Self-Improvement Working Party BaR Board of Revenue, Government of Sind BSDUF Bombay Slum Dwellers' United Front CDWP Central Development Working Party CPT Central Planning Team CR Section Community Relations Section DAM Dutch Advisory Mission GaS Government of Sind HBFC House Building Finance Corporation HTPLG & RD Housing, Town Planning, Local Government & Department Rural Development Department, Government of Sind IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association JI Jamaat-e-Islami JRP IV Joint Research Project IV JUI Jami a t-ul-Ul ema-·e~Is 1am JWP Joint Working Party KCB Karachi Cantonment Board KDA Karachi Development Authority KMC Karachi Metropolitan Corporation KPT Karachi Port Trust LIPT Lyari Improvement Planning Team MMC Muslim Mujahid Colony. Baldia Township NOVIB Nether 1ands Organ iza tion for Interna ti ona 1 Development Cooperation NWFP North West Frontier Province PC Planning Commission PDWP Provincial Development Working Party PEM Wing Planning, Evaluation and Monitoring Wing PNA Pakistan National Alliance POHC Public Objections Hearing Committee PPP Pakistan People's Party

169 PR Pakistan Railways PWD Public Works Department. Government of Sind RCD Regional Cooperation for Development Rs Rupee SITE Sind Industrial Trading Estate SUA Sub-standard Urban Area UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

List of Urdu words used baldia municipal basti settlement chowkidar watchman crore ten mill ions dera inn for single living men dhobi washerman jamaat association j amiat association jhuggi hut katcha provisional, unripe, not well-established Katchi inhabitant of the region of Katch, north of Bombay katchi abadi not well-established settlement, squatter settlement mohallah neighbourhood muhaj i r refugee nallah canal, drain paan bete 1 nut pacca solid, well-established

List of maps and figures

Map 1. Karachi (design: J.ter Haar) 2. Baldia Township (design: CPT/KMCj 3. Detail of the Muslim Mujahid Colony regularization plan

170 Figure a. Traditional soak-pit in use in Baldia Township (from: Pickford & Reed, 1979, p.4) b. Improved soak-pit presently introduced in Baldia Township (design: H.Meijerink).

171 Index

Abassi, Lt.Gen.S.11., see Martial Law concept plan, 33, 72-73, 77, 80-88, 90, Administrator Zone 'C' 104,117,124 Abrams, Ch., 11 consolidator, 15-21 access, 14-18, 20, 148-151, 158 convivialists, 12, 17, 19, 25 ADLFA, 108-111, 161, 169 Administrator KMC, 36, 53-54, 68-69, Delhi Colony, 65, 71 106-107, 115, 119-120, 142, 160, 167-168 dera, 104, 170 Ahmed Khan, Z., 17 -18 detailed regularization plan, 47, Amsterdam Free University (AFU), 7, 29, 36, 88-91, 117, 145, 161 118, 157, 169 development charges, see lease charges/ Anjuman-e-Ittehad Baldia Township, rates 83-85, 88-90, 95-96 Dhobi Ghat, 55 Annual Development Budget Sind, 98-102, Directorate of Katchi Abadis and Evaluation, 121 see Central Planning Team appropriate technology, 16-17, 44-45 Dutch Advisory Mission (DAM), 8-9, Area Self-Improvement Working Party 37,64, 77, 128-129, 144, 161, 169 (ASIWP), 33-35, 80, 169 dwellers' control, 14-16, 32 autoconstruction, see autonomous housing Dwyer, D.J., 17-18 autonomous housing, 12, 14, 16, 19-22, 30, 31, 49 Economic Planning Section, 36, 76, 86, 94, 104-106 Baldia Colony, see Baldia Township elections, 38, 40, 63, 64, 69, 83, 119, 120 Baldia Evaluation Survey, 9, 162 encroachment, 46, 47, 56, 57, 75, 142 Baldia Township, 9, 26, 29, 37, 38, Engels, F., 19 43, 49, 58, 62, 64-72, 112, 117-118, Engineering Section, 36, 72, 76, 93, 104 121, 124, 127-129, 131, 139, 151-159 Evacuee Property Trust, 55, 57, 60 Baldia Township Regularization and Improvement Scheme, 8, 72-78, 93-102, Financial Adviser (FA), 112-114, 120, 117-118, 121, 126, 130, 132-133, 138, 161, 167-168 144, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155 Benninger, Chr., 18 Golimar/Gulbahar, 37,64,112,117,118, Bhutta Village, 8, 37, 64, 103-116, 118, 125, 128, 161 123, 127 government officials, 46, 115-116, 119- Bhutto, Z.A., 30, 38, 53, 61, 63, 64, 121, 126-131, 137, 142, 158 96, 118-119, 121, 124, 140-141 Government of Pakistan (GOP), 30, 78, Board of Revenue (BOR), 65, 68, 136-139, 102, 117-118 141, 169 Government of Sind (GOS), 39, 53, 61, Bogota, 22 68, 78, 84, 93, 94, 98, 99, 101, Bombay Slum-Dwellers' United Front (BSDUF), 108, 117, 121, 132, 135, 139, 142, 150, 169 143, 169 bridge-header, 15-21 Government of the Netherlands, 7, 36, 93,94, bucket latrine, 71, 153 98-100, 117, 118, 157 bureaucracy, 103, 114-115 Governor of Sind, see Martial Law Adminis Burgess, R., 20-26, 130, 132-133, 139- trator Zone 'c' 142, 150, 158 Gulbanar, see Golimar/Gulbahar capitalism, 12, 19-25, 130, 132, 159 health, 18, 33, 44, 79, 149, 155 Central Development Working Party (CDWP), Highway Department, 87 102, 169 House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC), Central Planning Team (CPT), 7, 8, 30, 39, 135, 148, 169 33-34, 35-37, 107, 111, 115, 119-120, Housing, Town Planning, Local Government & 161, 167-168, 169 Rural Development Department (HTPLG&RD), Chief Martial Law Administrator, 61, 78, 93, 96, 98, 101; 118, 152, 169 96, 120, 124, 140, 162 Hub River Road, 65, 71, 74, 75, 81,82, community assistance/development/ 87,94,160 organization, 22, 144-146, 149-151, human waste disposal, 39, 41, 44, 154-155, 158 71-75, 79, 88, 93, 94, 152-155 Community Relations (CR) Section, 36, 54, 57, 60, 69, 83-84, 90, 103-116, 145, 169

172 improvement charges/rates, see lease Lyari Improvement Planning Team (LIPT), charges/rates 35, 41, 169 Improvement Policy for Sub-standard Urban Lyari Improvement Scheme, 38-45, 62, 64, Areas, 7, 8, 30-35, 41-48, 52, 57, 62, 77, 79, 93, 95, 119,121 78, 80, 117, 119, 124-126, 129, 131, Lyari River, 17-18, 55, 58, 75 133, 135, 138, 140, 144, 146, 148, 149, 157, 162 ' Martial Law Administrator Zone 'C', incremental improvement, 31, 44, 45, 50-51 10, 91-92, 98, 101, 134, 135, 140 International Development Agency (IDA), I~artial Law Order 67, 134, 135, 140, 162 see World Bank t1artial Law Order 110, 135, 140, 161, 162 India, 18, 27, 55, 70, 121 r'1aster Plan, see Karachi Development Pl an Islamabad, 27 I·laster Plan Department KDA, 80, 87 Ittehad Town, 10, 127 Marxists, (Neo-), 8, 12, 19-26, 132, 133, 155-156 Jacob Lines, 29 11etrovi 11 e, 29, 49, 50 Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), 83, 96, 97, 169 :'1i ch 1, S., 23 Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), 10, 96, migrants, 11, 13, 18,27, 29, 49, 81, 102 97, 169 mini-slum, 56 Janssen, R., 20-22, 25 I~uhajir, 27, 55,56,121,170 Jatoi, G.~., 38-43, 68 rluh~j i r Camp, see Baldi a Towns hi p jhuggi, 30, 71, 170 Muslim r~ujahid Colony (Mr'1C), 88-92, 96, 52 Jhuggies, 8, 53-62, 127 98, 118, 135, 154, 162, 169 Joint Research Project (JRP) IV, 7, 29, 39-41, 70-72, 103-104, 169 non-transferability of leases, 51, 134-135 Joint Working Party (JWP), 33, 80, 85, NOVIB, 154, 169 169 Odongo, J., 24 Karachi, 7, 12, 13, 17-18, 27-33, 121, open-plot development, 29 136, 140, 156 Orangi, 10, 29, 66, 81, 86 Karachi Cantonment Board (KCB), 136, 137, 169 Pakistan Jaycees, 154, 155 Karachi Development Authority (KDA), 10, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 10, 38, 29, 33, 49, 50, 65, 66, 68, 81, 85, 61, 63-64, 83-84, 96-97, 128, 161, 169 86, 99, 136-137, 139, 169 Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 10, 30, 38, Karachi Development Plan, 33-34, 80, 81 40, 41, 45, 53, 61, 63-64, 68, 83-84, Karachi Improvement Trust, see Karachi 96-97, 119, 128, 130, 169 Development Authority Pakistan Railways, 136, 141, 170 Karach i Metropol itan/i1un i ci pa 1 Corpora ti on Partition, 27, 53, 55, 56,60 (KI~C), 29-30, 35-37, 39, 65, 68-69, 85, Patel, H.Q.A" 64, 68-69 93, 99, 100, 101, 103, 115-116, l17-120, paying capacity, 41, 44-45, 51 136-140, 143, 161, 162, 167, 169 Payne, G.K., 18 Karachi Slum Improvement Project (KSIP), PC I Baldia, see Baldia Township 7, 8, 25, 26, 117-118, 128, 131, 133, Regularization and Improvement Scheme 142, 144, 157-159, 167, 169 Peattie, L., 132-133, 142 Korangi, 29 people's participation, 31, 32, 45-48, 91, 144-148 land transfer, 33, 57, 60, 99-102, 138 Physical Planning Section, 36, 72, 80, 86- Lea, J.P., 12, 24 87, 104 lease charges/rates, 38-45, 48, 50, pit-latrines, see soak-pits 58, 66, 68, 77, 84, 86, 94-101, 104, Planning and Development Department, 98-101 124-125, 130, 131, 134, 147, 160, Planning Coordinator CPT/PEM Wing, 36, 37, 161, 162 54, 85, 91, 104-114, 167 Lima, 23 Planning, Evaluation and Monitoring (PEM) local leaders, 33, 54, 83-85, 90, 96, Wing, see Central Planning Team 97, 126, 129, 130, 135, 142, 145, politicians, 46, 126-131, 140-142, 145, 151, 147, 150, 151, 158 158 location, 15, 18, 56 Provincial Development Working Party (PDWP), low-cost housing, 29, 65 98-102, 169 Lyari, 29-31, 35-36, 38-44, 58, 65, 112, public objections, 80, 85-88, 90, 95, 145, 127, 128, 130 147 Public Objections Hearing Committee (POHC), 85-91, 96, 97, 118, 147, 169 Public Works Department, 136, 170

173 Qasbah, 2B, 66 Rashidabad, 71, 91, 121-122, 139 RCD Highway, see Hub River Road reconnaissance survey, 69, B3 refugees, see Muhajirs relocation, II, 29, 57-59, BB Rivas, D.R., 20-22, 25 rural-urban migration, see migrants

Scheme 29, BO-Bl Sector 3, 66,71,81-B2,91-92,96,98, lIB, 135 Sector 5, 66,71,B1-B2,91 security of tenure, 12,15,17,lB,40,43, 44,52,56,61,62,124-125,129,156-157 self-financing, 31-32,39-40,42,124-125 self-help, 46-47,79,144,146,149,156 self-help housing,see autonomous housing self-help school,see convivialists septic tank, 72,94,153 sewerage,see human waste disposal SITE, ~5, 71, 75, 81, B2, B6,' 91, 136, 155, 170 site-and-services project, 12, 25, 29, 49, 50 Slum Improvement Revolving Fund, see SUA Improvement Fund soak-pits, 42, 72, 151-155, 163 socio-economic survey, 33, 54, 57, 70, 72, 103-116, 123 standards, 14, 26, 31-34, 41, 44-45, 51, 79 State, 20, 23, 132, 133, 141 status-seeker, 15, 1B, 21 SUA Improvement Fund, 34, 73, 77, 93,94,99-100,117,125 sub-standard urban area (SUA), 30, 33, 42, 160, 170 tenants, 1B, 160 Turner, J.F.C., 12-26, 29, 31-32, 49-50, 79, 132, 140, 149, 156, 15B UNICEF, 154, 163, 170 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 7, 30, 35-36, 170 University of Karachi, 7, 29, 104-105, 163 upgrading, 7, B, 12, 22-26, 29-33, 52, 123, 132, 156-159 Van der Linden, J.J., 11, 56, 135, 136, 156-157, 159 World Bank, 7, 29-30, 35, 39-41, 77, 93, 118-119, 169

174 BIJDRAGEN TOT DE SOCIALE GEOGRAFIE EN PLANOLOGIE

1. R.B.Jobse, Ed F.Nozeman, W.J.A.Nelissen and H.Schmal, Wonen, werken en verkeer in Amsterdam 1880-1980. 1980 *

2. ISBN 90-6631-008-1 S.Musterd and F.M.Dieleman, De Huisvest;ngssituatie in Tilburg, uitgewerkt naar bewonersgroepen en naar ruimtelijke eenheden. 1981 Hfl.10.--**

3. ISBN 90-6631-051-0 Mr.A.F.Lammens, Bijdragen tot de Kennis van de Kolonie Suriname, tijdvak 1816 tot 1822. (G.A.de Bruijne, ed.l. 1982 Hf1.11.50**

4. ISBN 90-6631-060-x Yap Kioe-Sheng, Leases, Land and Local Leaders. An analysis of a squatter settlement upgrading programme in Karachi.

5. ISBN 90-6631-065-0 P.Nientied, E.Meijer and J.v.d.Linden, Karachi Squatter Settlement Upgrading: improvement and displacement ?***

* sold out ** + handling and postage *** to be published in october 1982

These publications may be ordered by writing to the Institute of Geography and Urban and Regional Planning, Free University, P.O.Box 7161, 1007 MC AMSTERDAM, attention Mr. R.A.Lamur. An invoice for tile publication and handling and postage (surface mail or air mail) will be included with the sh i pment. Payment can be made in Dutch Guilders or in any convertable currency, by international money order or bank transfer. Other recent publications from the Institute of Geography and Urban and Regional Planning include the series GEOGRAFISCHE EN PLANOLOGISCHE NOTITIES

1. J.Buit, L.Bak and Ed F.Nozeman, De distributieplanologie in de toekomst. March 1981. ISBN 90-6631-008-1 Hfl. 5.50 * 2. J.Post, Stadsomvang en ruimtelijk beleid in ontwikkelings landen. March 1981. ISBN 90-6631-010-3 Hfl. 4.-- 3. M.C.Deurloo, Grafische voorstellingen en ruimtelijke gegevens per computer: handleiding voor het programmapakket GEOKART. March 1981. ISBN 90-6631-011-1 Hfl. 9.50 * 4. J.J.Boon, Werken buiten de stad; een onderzoek naar het Amsterdams woonforensisme. Aprtl 1981. ISBN 90-6631-012-X Hfl. 9.50 5. C.Beeker e.a., Wonen en werken in steden in ontwikkelings landen. June 1981. ISBN 90-6631-013-8 Hfl. 9.50 6. J.van Weesep, Condomania: The Proliferatton and Impact of Condominiums in the U.S.A. April 1981. ISBN 90-6631-014-6 Hfl. 6.25 7. H.J.M.Mennen. De regio Tunis, June 1981. ISBN 90-6631-015-4 Hfl. 5.-- 8. H.J.M.Mennen, Het ruimtegebruik in het District Tunis. May 1981. ISBN 90-6631-016-2 Hfl. 5.-- 9. G.A.Hoekveld, Stedelijk wonen. August 1981. ISBN 90-6631-017-0 Hfl. 5.-- 10. W.A.V.Clark, Some Observations on the Structure of Recent Research on Migration and Mobility. August 1981. ISBN 90-6631-018-9 Hfl. 6.-- 1l. J.van Weesep, Production and Allocation of Housing. The case of the Netherlands. January 1982 ISBN 90-6631-019-7 Hfl. 3.50 12. M.C.Beeker, Het Cissin model nader bekeken. February 1982. ISBN 90-6631-052-9 Hfl. 7.-- 13. G.J.van Apeldoorn, Equity for Food; Socio-economic considerations in the formulation and implementation of a food and nutrition policy for Nigeria. March 1982. ISBN 90-6631-053-7 Hfl. 3.-- 14. E.Frederiks, Pider; een aanzet tot een kwalitatieve evaluatie van een integraal ruraal ontwikkelingsprogramma in Mexico. April 1982. ISBN 90-6631-054-5 Hfl. 7.50 15. B.C.de Pater and H.Schmal, Reistijden, reiskosten en forensisme op Amsterdam in de periode 1855-1980; een tijdgeografische studie. Apri 1 1982. ISBN 90-6631-055-3 Hfl. 6.-- 16. P.C.J.Everaers, Verhuispatronen in middelgrote Nederlandse gemeenten: Deventer. April 1982. ISBN 90-6631-056-1 Hfl. 8.25

17. H.J.Scholten and L.van Wissen, r~odellen als hulpmiddel voor de analyse van binnenstedelijke migratie; een op de praktijk gerichte introductie. April 1982. ISBN 90-6631-057-X Hfl. 6.-- 18. J.Buit, De relatie bedrijven - ruimtelijke ordening; ontwikkeling en perspectieven. May 1982. ISBN 90-6631-058-8 Hfl. 4.75 19. D.Foeken, Verklaringen inzake de opdeling van Afrika, 1880-1944. June 1982. ISBN 90-6631-061-8 Hfl. 4.75

* sold out

These publications may be ordered by writing to the Institute of Geography and Urban and Regional Planning, Free University, P.O.Box 7161, 1007 MC AMSTERDAM, attention Mr.R.A.Lamur. An invoice for tile publ ication and handling and postage (surface mail or air mailL will be included with the sh i pment. Payment can be made in Dutcn Gu il ders or in any convertab 1e currency, by in ternat i ona 1 money order or bank trans fer. LEASES, LAND AND LOCAL LEADERS

For many years local government in Karachi unavailingly attempted to solve the housing crisis of the urban poor by demolishing their illegally constructed settlements and relocating the squatters in expensive low-cost housing projects. In 1975 the Karachi Metropolitan Cor poration (KMC) modified its policy and started to regularize occupancy and to provide basic infrastructure in squatter settlements, where presently almost two million people in Karachi have found shelter.

In this book the author reviews KMC's squatter settlement regularization and upgrading programme, in which he participated as Community Relations Adviser from 1977 through 1979 under the Dutch technical assistance programme for Pakistan.

The first part of the book opens with an account of the theoretical basis of squatter settlement regularization, namely, Turner's autonomous housing theory. Next, it reviews the debate be&o.veen Turner and the Marxist critics, who label self-help and upgrading projects as capitalist exploitation of the urban poor. The first part ends with a description of KMC's upgrading policy and the organizational structure of the upgrading programme.

In the second part, the author portrays one particular project in the programme, viz., the regularization and improvement of Baldia Township, a squatter settlement of 150.000 in habitants. He gives an account of the physical planning procedure and the type of infra structure provided, the composition of the budget and the role of people's participation in planning; and he describes the search for funds to implement the plans.

The third part of the book analyzes the obstacles which hampered the implementation of the upgrading plans in Baldia Township. As main impediments to implementation, the author identifies the political and financial interests of parties involved in squatter settlement creation and development: government agencies and officials, politicians, local leaders and residents. He stresses the importance of involving squatter settlement residents more intensively in upgrading planning and implementation.

This book contributes not only to the growing practical experience of squatter settlement regularization and upgrading projects, but also to the theoretical debate on the role of squatter settlements and upgrading projects in Third World housing and urbanization.

Yap Kioe-Sheng studied Development Sociology at the Amsterdam Free University. Following two years of research in Tunisia on rural-urban migration, he obtained his Ph.D.degree in 1976. From 1977 through 1979 he worked as a sociologist in the Karachi Slum Improvement Project. He visited South Korea, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Tunisia, Senegal and Upper Volta for various Dutch and international organizations. He is presently working with UNCHD (Habitat) in Nairobi, Kenya.

ISBN 90-6631-060-X

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