The Managerial Mistakes That a CEO Must Avoid
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Criminal Law
Criminal Law CASES AND MATERIALS Fourth Edition 2021 SUPPLEMENT Stephen A. Saltzburg John L. Diamond Kit Kinports Thomas Morawetz Rory Little CAROLINA ACADEMIC PRESS Durham, North Carolina Copyright © 2021 Carolina Academic Press, LLC All Rights Reserved Carolina Academic Press 700 Kent Street Durham, North Carolina 27701 Telephone (919) 489-7486 Fax (919) 493-5668 E-mail: [email protected] www.cap-press.com Copyright © 2021 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved. CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW [A] THE CORE AND PERIPHERY OF CRIMINAL LAW [1] THE FAMILIARITY OF CRIMINAL LAW Page 3: Add to the end of the section: Society’s perception of criminal law has potentially and hopefully been transformed by the police killing of George Floyd in May 2020 and the mostly peaceful demonstrations that followed worldwide. There is increased recognition of the systemic racism embedded in the criminal justice system and the country’s failure to provide equal justice for all. Movements such as Black Lives Matter have attempted to address these injustices and advance solutions. As you study criminal law, please keep in the forefront of your mind how your generation of lawyers can work to bring to our country a criminal justice system that reflects the kind of society our ideals aspire to. Below is the prepared statement presented by George Floyd’s bother, Philonise, before the House Judiciary Committee on June 10, 2020. Chairman Jerrold Nadler and members of the Committee: Thank you for the invitation to be here today to talk about my big brother, George. The world knows him as George, but I called him Perry. -
Media Coverage of Ceos: Who? What? Where? When? Why?
Media Coverage of CEOs: Who? What? Where? When? Why? James T. Hamilton Sanford Institute of Public Policy Duke University [email protected] Richard Zeckhauser Kennedy School of Government Harvard University [email protected] Draft prepared for March 5-6, 2004 Workshop on the Media and Economic Performance, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Center on Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. We thank Stephanie Houghton and Pavel Zhelyazkov for expert research assistance. Media Coverage of CEOs: Who? What? Where? When? Why? Abstract: Media coverage of CEOs varies predictably across time and outlets depending on the audience demands served by reporters, incentives pursued by CEOs, and changes in real economic indicators. Coverage of firms and CEOs in the New York Times is countercyclical, with declines in real GDP generating increases in the average number of articles per firm and CEO. CEO credit claiming follows a cyclical pattern, with the number of press releases mentioning CEOs and profits, earnings, or sales increasing as monthly business indicators increase. CEOs also generate more press releases with soft news stories as the economy and stock market grow. Major papers, because of their focus on entertainment, offer a higher percentage of CEO stories focused on soft news or negative news compared to CEO articles in business and finance outlets. Coverage of CEOs is highly concentrated, with 20% of chief executives generating 80% of coverage. Firms headed by celebrity CEOs do not earn higher average shareholder returns in the short or long run. For some CEOs media coverage equates to on-the-job consumption of fame. -
A Case of Corporate Deceit: the Enron Way / 18 (7) 3-38
NEGOTIUM Revista Científica Electrónica Ciencias Gerenciales / Scientific e-journal of Management Science PPX 200502ZU1950/ ISSN 1856-1810 / By Fundación Unamuno / Venezuela / REDALYC, LATINDEX, CLASE, REVENCIT, IN-COM UAB, SERBILUZ / IBT-CCG UNAM, DIALNET, DOAJ, www.jinfo.lub.lu.se Yokohama National University Library / www.scu.edu.au / Google Scholar www.blackboard.ccn.ac.uk / www.rzblx1.uni-regensburg.de / www.bib.umontreal.ca / [+++] Cita / Citation: Amol Gore, Guruprasad Murthy (2011) A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY /www.revistanegotium.org.ve 18 (7) 3-38 A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY EL CASO ENRON. Amol Gore (1) and Guruprasad Murthy (2) VN BRIMS Institute of Research and Management Studies, India Abstract This case documents the evolution of ‘fraud culture’ at Enron Corporation and vividly explicates the downfall of this giant organization that has become a synonym for corporate deceit. The objectives of this case are to illustrate the impact of culture on established, rational management control procedures and emphasize the importance of resolute moral leadership as a crucial qualification for board membership in corporations that shape the society and affect the lives of millions of people. The data collection for this case has included various sources such as key electronic databases as well as secondary data available in the public domain. The case is prepared as an academic or teaching purpose case study that can be utilized to demonstrate the manner in which corruption creeps into an ambitious organization and paralyses the proven management control systems. Since the topic of corporate practices and fraud management is inherently interdisciplinary, the case would benefit candidates of many courses including Operations Management, Strategic Management, Accounting, Business Ethics and Corporate Law. -
The Great Telecom Meltdown for a Listing of Recent Titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, Turn to the Back of This Book
The Great Telecom Meltdown For a listing of recent titles in the Artech House Telecommunications Library, turn to the back of this book. The Great Telecom Meltdown Fred R. Goldstein a r techhouse. com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the U.S. Library of Congress. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Goldstein, Fred R. The great telecom meltdown.—(Artech House telecommunications Library) 1. Telecommunication—History 2. Telecommunciation—Technological innovations— History 3. Telecommunication—Finance—History I. Title 384’.09 ISBN 1-58053-939-4 Cover design by Leslie Genser © 2005 ARTECH HOUSE, INC. 685 Canton Street Norwood, MA 02062 All rights reserved. Printed and bound in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks have been appropriately capitalized. Artech House cannot attest to the accuracy of this information. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark. International Standard Book Number: 1-58053-939-4 10987654321 Contents ix Hybrid Fiber-Coax (HFC) Gave Cable Providers an Advantage on “Triple Play” 122 RBOCs Took the Threat Seriously 123 Hybrid Fiber-Coax Is Developed 123 Cable Modems -
Principles of Management
Principles of Management [AUTHORS REMOVED AT REQUEST OF ORIGINAL PUBLISHER] UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LIBRARIES PUBLISHING EDITION, 2015. THIS EDITION ADAPTED FROM A WORK ORIGINALLY PRODUCED IN 2010 BY A PUBLISHER WHO HAS REQUESTED THAT IT NOT RECEIVE ATTRIBUTION. MINNEAPOLIS, MN Principles of Management by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License, except where otherwise noted. 7.5 Organizational Change 317 7.6 Planning and Executing Change Effectively 328 7.7 Building Your Change Management Skills 334 Chapter 8: Organizational Culture 8.1 Organizational Culture 337 8.2 Case in Point: Google Creates Unique Culture 339 8.3 Understanding Organizational Culture 342 8.4 Measuring Organizational Culture 346 8.5 Creating and Maintaining Organizational Culture 356 8.6 Creating Culture Change 370 8.7 Developing Your Personal Skills: Learning to Fit In 375 Chapter 9: Social Networks 9.1 Social Networks 379 9.2 Case in Point: Networking Powers Relationships 381 9.3 An Introduction to the Lexicon of Social Networks 383 9.4 How Managers Can Use Social Networks to Create Value 389 9.5 Ethical Considerations With Social Network Analysis 400 9.6 Personal, Operational, and Strategic Networks 408 9.7 Mapping and Your Own Social Network 414 Chapter 10: Leading People and Organizations 10.1 Leading People and Organizations 421 10.2 Case in Point: Indra Nooyi Draws on Vision and Values to Lead 424 10.3 Who Is a Leader? Trait Approaches to Leadership 427 10.4 What Do Leaders -
The Enron Fraud and Scandal and What It Means to Business Today
The Impact of the Crooked “E” The Enron Fraud and Scandal And What It Means to Business Today Ed Ferrara MIS5208 – Project 1 – Examples of Corporate Fraud [email protected] Agenda § Facts About Enron – Company History § The Players – The Executives § Enron – So Many Dimensions of Fraud § A Chronology of Enron’s Collapse § The Aftermath § What It Means § References § Appendix A – Other perpetrators The Enron Players – The Executives Ken Lay – Enron Chairman and CEO David Duncan – Andersen Partner – Enron Convicted on 29 criminal counts including Partner responsible for Enron. Fired for failure to conspiracy, securities and wire fraud. Dies in exercise “due professional care and the necessary Aspen Colorado on July 5 2006 while awaiting skepticism”. Pled guilty to obstruction of justice – sentencing for his convictions.1 later rescinded plea, and struck deal with SEC.4 Jeffrey SkillinG – Enron CEO Sherron Watkins – Enron VP Internal Audit Convicted for fraud, conspiracy, insider trading and Watkins, who has never been charged with insider lying to auditors in the largest corporate fraud in trading, sold almost $50,000 in stock after her history. More than 4,000 Enron employees lost August 2001 meeting with Lay — and before Enron their jobs, many lost their life savings, when Enron shares became worthless months later. “No,” she declared bankruptcy in 2001. Investors lost billions told prosecutor John Hueston when he asked her if of dollars.2 her stock sales were proper. “I had more information than the marketplace did.”5 Andrew Fastow Charged with 78 counts of fraud due to his role in Theft using off-balance sheet entities that did business (Misappropriation) with Enron. -
Former Enron Broadband Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Rice Sentenced on Securities Fraud Charge
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CRM MONDAY, JUNE 18, 2007 PH: (202) 514-2007 WWW.USDOJ.GOV/ TDD: (202) 514-1888 Former Enron Broadband Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Rice Sentenced on Securities Fraud Charge WASHINGTON – Kenneth Rice, a former chief executive officer of Enron Broadband Services (EBS), was sentenced to 27 months in prison and ordered to forfeit approximately $15 million to be used to compensate victims of the Enron fraud, Assistant Attorney General Alice S. Fisher of the Criminal Division announced today. Rice was sentenced today at a hearing before Judge Vanessa Gilmore at U.S. District Court in Houston. Rice pleaded guilty on July 20, 2004 to the securities fraud charge, and cooperated with the government’s investigation into the collapse of Enron. Rice admitted that while he was at EBS, a unit of the now-defunct Enron Corp., he and others made a series of false statements about the products, services and business performance of EBS in order to mislead investors and others about the success of the company and to inflate artificially the price of Enron stock. Rice admitted that while serving as EBS’s CEO, he conspired with others to make false statements about the company’s development of various software capabilities and its fiber-optic network. Rice admitted that he falsely portrayed EBS as a commercial and business success, and falsely claimed that network control software developed by EBS was “up and running” – when in fact the software had not progressed beyond the internal development stage. These and other misrepresentations, including a failure to disclose to the investing public that the company stood to sustain operating losses in 2001, contributed to a sharp rise in Enron’s stock price. -
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT Managing Corporate Reputation and Risk.Pdf
Managing Corporate Reputation and Risk Developing a Strategic Approach to Corporate Integrity Using Knowledge Management This Page Intentionally Left Blank Managing Corporate Reputation and Risk Developing a Strategic Approach to Corporate Integrity Using Knowledge Management D N Amsterdam Boston Heidelberg London New York Oxford Paris San Diego San Francisco Singapore Sydney Tokyo Butterworth–Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier. Copyright © , Dale Neef. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Recognizing the importance of preserving what has been written, Elsevier Science prints its books on acid-free paper whenever possible. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Neef, Dale, – Managing corporate reputation and risk / Dale Neef. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN --- . Corporate image. Corporations—Moral and ethical aspects. Business ethics. Integrity. Risk management. Knowledge management. I. Title. HD..N .–dc British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The publisher offers special discounts on bulk orders of this book. For information, please contact: Manager of Special Sales Elsevier Science Wheeler Road Burlington, MA Tel: -- Fax: -- For information on all Butterworth–Heinemann publications available, -
A Theory of Corporate Legal Compliance
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law Volume 8 Issue 2 Article 1 5-15-2015 “Because That's Where the Money Is”: A Theory of Corporate Legal Compliance William C. Bradford Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons Recommended Citation William C. Bradford, “Because That's Where the Money Is”: A Theory of Corporate Legal Compliance, 8 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 337 (2015) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol8/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. “BECAUSE THAT’S WHERE THE MONEY IS”: A THEORY OF CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE WILLIAM C. BRADFORD I. Introduction .................................................................................................... 341 II. Toward a Theory of CLC ............................................................................. 345 A. Personality Theory ........................................................................... 345 1. General Premises and Assumptions .......................................... 345 2. Personality Constructs .............................................................. -
Lessons from Enron: an Oversight Hearing on Gas Prices and Energy Trading”
Senate Democratic Policy Committee Hearing “Lessons from Enron: An Oversight Hearing on Gas Prices and Energy Trading” Robert McCullough Manager McCullough Research May 8, 2006 Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. Six years ago, market prices for electricity and natural gas in western markets literally exploded. Prices quickly increased to multiples of comparable prices elsewhere in the United States and Canada. Although it is the sole responsibility of California’s Independent System Operator to declare any system-wide emergencies, the integrated nature of the energy markets rapidly communicated the enormity of the crisis from Alberta to West Texas. Market manipulators – even today – blamed the economic catastrophe on a drought in the Pacific Northwest and a capacity shortage. In fact, the drought occurred after the crisis, while investigations have been unable to document the shortage. In reality, physical withholding in gas and electricity deprived California of needed – and readily available – capacity. Fraudulent schedules and trading schemes shipped power out of California until the state declared a crisis, and then miraculously returned it at far higher prices. Imaginary loads and resources congested critical transmission lines, and imaginary transactions established contractual prices. Enron occupied a central role in this western crisis. Its boastful traders used recorded phone lines and email in a casual fashion, and created detailed instructional presentations about their fraudulent schemes. Demonstrating a keen understanding of the western markets’ lack of regulation, attorneys retained by Enron to judge the legality of one of its schemes observed: The Contemplated Transaction, though questionable on business, political, and social grounds, does not appear to be prohibited under current law. -
Download the Worldcom Case
Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative University of New Mexico http://danielsethics.mgt.unm.edu WorldCom’s Bankruptcy Crisis INTRODUCTION The story of WorldCom began in 1983 when businessmen Murray Waldron and William Rector sketched out a plan to create a long-distance telephone service provider on a napkin in a coffee shop in Hattiesburg, Miss. Their new company, Long Distance Discount Service (LDDS), began operating as a long distance reseller in 1984. Early investor Bernard Ebbers was named CEO the following year. Through acquisitions and mergers, LDDS grew quickly over the next 15 years. The company changed its name to WorldCom, achieved a worldwide presence, acquired telecommunications giant MCI, and eventually expanded beyond long distance service to offer the whole range of telecommunications services. WorldCom became the second-largest long-distance telephone company in America, and the firm seemed poised to become one of the largest telecommunications corporations in the world. Instead, it became the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history at the time and another name on a long list of those disgraced by the accounting scandals of the early 21st century. ACCOUNTING FRAUD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Unfortunately for thousands of employees and shareholders, WorldCom used questionable accounting practices and improperly recorded $3.8 billion in capital expenditures, which boosted cash flows and profit over all four quarters in 2001 as well as the first quarter of 2002. This disguised the firm’s actual net losses for the five quarters because capital expenditures can be deducted over a longer period of time, whereas expenses must be subtracted from revenue immediately. -
Why Companies Fail Ceos Offer Every Excuse but the Right One: Their Own Errors
Why Companies Fail CEOs offer every excuse but the right one: their own errors. Here are ten mistakes to avoid. By Ram Charan and Jerry Useem Reporter Associate Ann Harrington May 27, 2002 (FORTUNE Magazine) – How many more must fall? Each month seems to bring the sound of another giant crashing to earth. Enron. WorldCom. Global Crossing. Kmart. Polaroid. Arthur Andersen. Xerox. Qwest. They fall singly. They fall in groups. They fall with the heavy thud of employees laid off, families hurt, shareholders furious. How many? Too many; 257 public companies with $258 billion in assets declared bankruptcy last year, shattering the previous year's record of 176 companies and $95 billion. This year is on pace, with 67 companies going bust during the first quarter. And not just any companies. Big, important, Fortune 500 companies that aren't supposed to collapse. If things keep going like this, we may have trouble filling next year's list. Why do companies fail? Their CEOs offer every excuse in the book: a bad economy, market turbulence, a weak yen, hundred-year floods, perfect storms, competitive subterfuge--forces, that is, very much outside their control. In a few cases, such as the airlines' post-Sept. 11 problems, the excuses even ring true. But a close study of corporate failure suggests that, acts of God aside, most companies founder for one simple reason: managerial error. We'll get to the errors in a moment. But first let's acknowledge that, yes, failures usually involve factors unique to a company's own industry or culture.