Defending Husserlian Phenomenology from Terry Eagleton's Critique
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Advances in Literary Study 2013. Vol.1, No.2, 10-13 Published Online April 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/als) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/als.2013.12003 Defending Husserlian Phenomenology from Terry Eagleton’s Critique Bailan Qin Institute of Cross-Cultural Studies, School of International Studies, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China Email: [email protected] Received February 12th, 2013; revised March 14th, 2013; accepted April 9th, 2013 Copyright © 2013 Bailan Qin. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribu- tion License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. This article develops, illustrates, and defends Husserlian Phenomenology from a critique in Terry Eagle- ton’s Literary Theory: An Introduction second edition (1996). Husserlian Phenomenology is construed as a methodology of philosophical hunt for certainty and universal essences by pure perception through “phenomenological reduction”. Eagleton’s charge that Husserlian Phenomenology is a form of methodo- logical idealism necessarily committed to a science of subjectivity and an imaginary solution to the world that leads to the sacrifice of human history. But Husserlian phenomenology insists that meaningful and potentially efficacious certainty must be connected to relevant entity and consciousness internal to the culture or social order at which the criticism is directed. Thus, to our defense, the complaint that pheno- menological demand will likely limit actual historical background where criticism is denied, and the abil- ity of Husserlian Phenomenology to develop from pure phenomenon to unphenomenological thinking is defended and demonstrated. Keywords: Terry Eagleton’s Critique; Historical Construct; Husserlian Phenomenology; Unphenomenological Thinking Introduction with two points: a simplified review of how Hussserl’s phe- nomenology, while at times richly significant, can itself be Terry Eagleton (born 22 February 1943, Salford) (hereinafter criticized for being an overly deterministic rendering of human E) is perhaps the most influential British literary theorist of the thought, i.e. idealism; and a call for phenomenologists to re- living literary critics. For over 30 years he has unveiled a steady think the doomed drawbacks referred as “sacrifice of human stream of publications developing his particular take on social history”. Following this to begin our argument, some of the or historical theory that was informed by works of Marxists, as problems with his critique are examined in light of the work of well as his mentor Raymond Williams who was a left-wing Edmund Husserl. Thus, to develop our defense against E’s criti- literary critic at Cambridge. In literary critiques, E’s thought que, the following sections are to focus on: 1) essence of phe- seems to have become especially influential, often critically, in nomenology (a more detailed and thorough literature review of a number of literary and theoretical works. This article sets out Husserlian Phenomenology); 2) defending Husserlian Pheno- to examine and critically evaluate E’s critique of phenomenol- menology (a step-by-step defense from E’s elaborate critique). ogy as presented in his Literary Theory: An Introduction sec- ond edition (1996). Since it is not possible to properly under- stand E’s critique without situating it within the context of his Essence of Phenomenology broader theoretical orientation, the introduction begins with a Phenomenology is portrayed as the study of essences (Mer- brief exploration of some of the key concepts underpinning his leau, 1962), the science of phenomena (van Manen, 1997), and version of Marxism-flavored critique. Of particular importance the exploration of human experience (Polkinghorne, 1989). for this article is his notion of social and historical stance util- Spiegelberg (1982) opined that phenomenology is a moving ized in 1996 book. E recognized social and historical back- philosophy with a dynamic momentum, determined by its in- ground as what is continuously offered as neutral, natural, uni- trinsic principles and the structure of the territory it encounters, versal and obviously proper form of expression as writing or composed of several parallel currents, related but not homoge- cultural production. As he announces this theme that dominates neous, with a common point of departure but not a definite and his first chapter, The Rise of English, thus: the so-called literary predictable joint destination. Discussions of the work of Hus- canon, the unquestioned great tradition of the national literature, serl, Heidegger, and Merleau Ponty, must recognize that phe- has to be recognized as a construct, fashioned by particular nomenology changed considerably within each philosopher’s people for particular reasons at a certain time (p. 11). work, as well as across the different philosophers (Cohen, Having reviewed E’s central social or historical construct, 1987). However, when examining phenomenology, one par- the article turns to discuss his critique of phenomenology in the ticular point we need to pay attention is though phenomenol- next two sessions. For E’s critique, to be brief, it concludes ogical philosophy melds into methodology in many above dis- 10 Copyright © 2013 SciRes. B. L. QIN cussions, it may not be completely delineated from method. sion and conversation, argument, and debate. But to our argu- And the methodological consideration is especially typical ment, “against natural attitude” and “seek for essences” serve, within basic argument in Husserl’s pioneer attempt, which at- often contradictorily, on one hand to explain or justify its unin- tracts loads of continuing criticism. And this article focuses tuitive nature, while on the other hand to criticize it by arguing thus on the main components of the phenomenological stances its fatally intuitive characteristic which results in irrationalism, of Husserl. an authoritarian theory, and a consoling doctrine. Such expla- Husserl rejected the extreme idealist position (the mind cre- nations and normative arguments take for granted the rational- ates the world) and the extreme empiricist position (reality ity and/or normative worth of the assumptions, beliefs, and exists apart from the passive mind). He sought to forge a path principles he deploys. Hence apparently, E’s critique is inher- that would ground and confirm the objectivity of human con- ently conventional and conservative because it regards his tar- sciousness as it relates to the life world (Kearney & Rainwater, get as valuable, but deploys directly, historically dominant un- 1996). He stated that sciences of experience were sciences of derstandings and norms to pinpoint the so-called drawbacks. As fact in his effort to develop a science of phenomena, of es- noted earlier, Husserl’s phenomenology is to some point resis- sences as they appear through consciousness (Husserl, 1913/ tant to E’s form of critique, for his project is focused upon ex- 1952). For Husserl (1913/1952), the World existed prior to con- plicitly using the phenomenological reduction (epoche) to pe- sciousness and his phenomenology encompassed notions of netrate the unquestioned acceptance of the “natural attitude” in pure consciousness: “It is then to this world, the world in which order to reveal the fundamental structures of consciousness that I find myself and which is also my world-about-me, that the underlie it. In other words, Husserl attempts to use the phe- complex forms of my manifold and shifting spontaneities of nomenological reduction in the service of determining the gen- consciousness stand related” (p. 103). Husserl’s goals were erative structures of consciousness that underpin an individual’s strongly epistemological, and he considered experience the fun- taken-for-granted world of lived experience. It is therefore damental source of meaning, of knowledge. Three key concepts theoretically and practically inserted well into E’s opposite opi- of Husserlian phenomenology included essences, intentionality, nion, thus E’s argument is actually self-blinded. When valuable and phenomenological reduction (bracketing). He stated that connotation in norms like essences and intentionality are vio- phenomenology should return “to the things themselves”, to the lated, or when worthwhile practices like phenomenological re- essences that constitute the consciousness and perception of the duction are debased, appeals to just historical arguing—to self- human world, the very nature of a phenomenon that makes a prevailing Marxism values and standards. The ideas in Marx- some “thing” what it is—and without which it could not be ism are often helpful reminders, and effective correctives to E’s what it is (Husserl, 1913/1952). Husserl spoke of a division argumentation. without any real separation “between two different sections of In order to address E’s critique, and mostly importantly, in our inquiry, the one bearing on pure subjectivity, the other on order to develop an adequate account of Husserlian Phenome- that which belongs to the constitution of objectivity as referred nology, it will prove helpful to begin by drawing once more on to its subjective source... the intentional reference of experi- the salience of social and historical consideration bracing all ences to objects” (p. 234). In Husserl’s transcendental approach, E’s deduction. “Historical roots” is identified at the preface of he believed that the mind is directed toward