32 TACTICSIN THEFRANCO.PRUSSIAN WAR FROMOPENING SHOTS TO TIIE BATTTEOF SEDAN By Mikelohnson "shell" INTRODUCTION 3. French wasonlyeffectiveat certainpre-set ranges. 4. TheFrench Mitrailleuse was not aslethal as expected due to Although an in€reasingnumber of books are coming forward thes€arcity of mentrained to operateand service the weapon regarding the €ampaignsand battles of the Franco-Prussian and its very narrow coneof fire. War, and thereare now someexcellent sets of rulescoverins this fascinaringconflicr. whose duthors clearly have an insighi Iwould alsolike to makeafew pointson the diagramswhich into thisperiod,I find that neithersource of informationseems youwill find in thesearticlesl to dealconcisely with tacticsused and formarionsadopted by 1nThe diagmmsmainly depict formations. I havenor "clutteredthem bothsides. up" withcavalryandtoo many units In my opinion this is why the period, althoughenjoying asthe roleofthese latter arms is best explained in the textas popularitya few yearsago fuelled by the releaseof some a supplementto the diagrams. astoundingranges of figuresnotably in 15and 25mm (and now 2. The essentialinfantry fighting unit on borh sideswas the in 10mn),has never really broken intothe NineteenthCentury "big battalion.In realitymany more battalions would participare Period's league"which is dominatedby Napoleonicsand in the eflgagementthan the diagramswould suggest, but as ACW. All the other ingredientsare there spectacular wargamingis all aboutrecreating history in miniatwe- in uniforms,battles with momentsof dramaand pivotal tension, organisationalas well as visualscale - by deployingyour andweaponsofdauntinglethality. Without an understandingof 15mmor 25mmbattalions as depicred in th€ diagramsyou "feel" tacticsand formationsthose lovinglypainted armies are all will €apturethe of thesedesperate battl€s in the dressedupwithnowhere togo, andleft tolanguishonthe shelf "ForSale" Imperialphase of thewar. Ifyou fightin 6or 2mm(ye gods!) or edgeever nearer to the columnofthis masazine. youcan pour in morebattalions, but stillfollow the batralion ln theseanicles I hopeto changeall rhatl leveltactics. Suffice it to say that researchedrules will reflect the You will seethat in the text and in the diagams,I referto developmentsin weapontechnology in thisperiod, the salient "" "Prussians". onesofwhich can be summarisedas follows: and Thisis becausethewaris DoDularlv knownlrn thi\ countD at leasr)as the Franco-Prus:ran War. In l The FrenchChassepot in the mainoutranged those of fact, as a quick perusalof any Order oI Battle will show,a theirGerman counterpa(s. considemblenumber of troopsfrom Prussia'sGerman Allies 2. The German Krupps artillery outrangedand was more (forexanple "shell" Bavaria)fought alongside rhe Prussians and their effectivethan Frenchartillery, mainlydue ro the organisationchiefly followed by the Prussianpattem. So, for rounds being fitted with percussionfuses, leading to Prussia.read "Prussia andher cermanAlies". explosionon impactat allranges. Enoughof the preliminaries,to battle . . . PART1: FRENCH TACTICAL DOCTRINE "furia 1. INFANTRYTACTICS circumstancesof battledid not warant a francese"sryle ot attack.rhen orher radics would be implemenleda\ ihe Until 1869French infantry tactics had been steeped in the vatue Commanderthought f'r. ideally(o crearethe circumsrances of offensiveaction, relying heavilyon French6lan and the where such an attack would meet with success.In shorr, inesistiblemomenrum of the bayonetcharge - tacticswhich dynamism venatility. "fuia ' and came to be known as francese (French Fury). These And then camethe 1869Drillbook. In 1867(in the lishr of werethe tacticswhich had beenadopted in the Crimeaand Pru\sia\crulhing deteat ot Ausrnain a mere6 seek\rh; year morerecently in Austriaand Italy. Refarringto DiagrarnA1, an before) Committeeswere establishedby NapoleonIII to attack " would commencewith a probe by a thin screenof re-evaluatethe tacticsof futia francese". mey h^d ro examine skirnishers(typically a Pi€d if theywere available, if just howsuccessful such tactics would be when pitted aAainst a not Zouavesor Tirailleu^ Algeriens- the dreadedTurcos) modern(and recenrlyvicrorioust army equippad *irh breech- designedto draw fire on themselvesand protectrhe massed loadingartillery and brcechloading . The reportsofthese tbrmationsmoving up behindthem. These skirmishenwere to c-ommitteeswere not unanimousin their recommendations. thin out the enemyranks, and wefe certainlynot to be€ome Although the t^ctics of futia tancese" still enjoyed nuch boggeddown.in long rangefiring. Forwardmotion was all. suppon(especially in the rank and file and junior NCO'Sof Behind them the battalionswould be advancingdeployed, France'slmperial amy, as well as among those in high wherethe gound permitted,altemately in Iineand in column. command)there was a movementtowards adopting a more Whenthe columnswere within charging distance (see Diagram defensiveposture. It has to be saidthat rhe resultof all the A2) the skirmishline would part like a curtain,allowint the reports,counter-reports and obseNationswas inconclusive. lt column,lo chargeforqard. supporredb) rhevo eysof rheir wasnot until 1869that a new infantryDrillbook appeared. It comradesin line who would rhen advanceeeneraltv to waslhe worst of all worlds,neither reinstating the racticsof "furia consohdarethe gainedground. The columns.tayonets 6iea tancese", nor comprehensively adopting the new andsometimes in echelon,would sweep all beforethem. The defensivetactics.In hindsight, j ust when France needed a clear tactr€was not universallysuccessfut, but wasideally suited to statementof tacticaldoctrine, there wasconfusion. The damase thefrench lemperament wdsdone, and Francewenr ro war qirh her confidencein rie Another hallmarkof Frenchtactical doctdne prior to the bayonetcharge severely shaken. oulbrealo[ lhe Franco-Pru!:idnWar wd, fiexibitiry.It rhe The operingengagement of the War - the Frenchatrack at "A ": Flg, t Fu.laFrance8e ffi KEEPWARGAMING t Dirscuonol FrsnchAltack ffi PaulandTeresaBailey Fffie TheKe€p I ffiE& LeMarchant Barracks, London Road, tt "*'1:i'#l':i;!"d.1!l3A'Ju' ttatall, ffiffi W.3h.ll b€.r th.lollowing 3|jos in rlr. ndrftnlE: - Leionary,kmourh E nourh Coll€re,GiDry lan. 10th/1ilhS€Dlomb.r C.lou6,n@dins l3r2ndocrohsrF&f,tfr!ii'0.*n,0,*.o, Asomblv Rom. -l-l-l- stMnh frober Shmlsh, Chipp€nhan 16rhOclob€r SElwG, cwd.l P3l.€, London w..c n& edino HasM ol.d'c rcr4.trorrnh tuiim'i Mfthbd, ^llfir; 8d.ll e Plo@ n@ d-h*. nddardod E*ilroim ou' 'rno€dsrodifiidhiGin obt iFins Hrcuon.otafl endtthMwrwnorviciou'.hoDo' u*odma'lotd.'sdiotOur "A2": dixri ao ano.qdrh€ mocqtmDBhonli6 'n rh. bu.ih* Fq tulld@ilt $ndtn Flg, FurlaFranc6e s-A"E.or2Fc5@rho!bdr.dd'4ddins,ilFosiblayout'aorhffi u.'*.*,n"*, ^,'r'##Hoi ?5mm6na6&8arPanha H.rch3 & F@ FiouG t Rund*.y Mi.iaM6 - r[ nouE 6ns6 Dixon!Minirto6-All 15mm&25FFEns6.MLR-!.rd.d E^gd t t Tdton,D*6- sldod Enq6. N.fu

t'h.tc|(nt Mll.hborshid6; Aitf! nd.ll; tujimi f, Hee!.wr' Vrdc Wr DalmeiL'i6: w!r F.atuB Filmt€lq I T cdrdG.ntRul- TurnReaEhsytuh{Dftidnouohlel.l Enshihc6mpd€rw.tlahe. s;r.af,ub waElm6 R.*rch GouD: Trbl@o G!m6: Nsbury 3ul.r: i (}6D';M.ndramq Elia;V.^su.td&Gnp6i0ns.riE: Fa'ft r; olua$lededrid6lromm.nydh.rDubli$e6. Tdln & Mod.lalndhF K&MT@: Hddclcinlj M!inlvMilibrylcinl, rn.Drum(6i^): "ilna HrddorD6ionl@'dl:D6ts'Modalcll5mm tpol@nicardb{ildinss) Saarbrucken - saw the French using the favoured fiatcese" tacti6, but ftankly as the French attacked in such overwhelming numbers, almost any tactical formation *ould still haveresulted in a Frenchvictory. However, the subsequent en, where time allowed the French infanfy adopted the batdes of those fateful days of August 1870and the Battle of defensive tactics (notably at Spicheren and Froeschwiler), Sedanat the beginning of Sept€mberbore witnessto the fact though when hard-pressedthey simply had to cope with the tlat the defensive tactics had become prcmineot in French Fig. "Bl " r French "Defemlve" thinldng, and had become"the official line". So let us tak€ a €loser look at these defensivetactics. They En€myAilack stressedtbe desirability of solid defensive positions giving a good field of fire for the French Chassepot rifles. Such "positio6 magnifiques" t}?ic.aly comprised ridges, hills and prominent spuis, upon the top and facing slopesof which the French infantry would be lessdensely d€ploy€d than before, \Z lying prone in line fomation. Where time allowed, shelter ..laaaa5ri. trenches(mercly "scrape$') and other rudimentary earthworks were prepar€d. Vilages and walled farms were swiftly trans- e formed into loopholed bastionsto form strongholdsin the line of defence. Woods and vineyardstoo would be defended.As can be seenfrom Diagram 81, behind this solid line and on the revers€slope the r€serveswould be formed up in clos€column. How€ver, in front of this seeminglyimpregnable line would be Key: swarmsof skirnishers (again, Chasseursa Pied, Zouaves and nnirety 'Jful,afdncrs€" fiifiEiffi* Turco6,but in grcater numbersthan the tactics) "82": "Delenslve" using cover wherever possible and picking off enemy gunners Fig. French and infantry The whole idea was that the enemywould break itself by attempting to storm such a position, and would then (seeDiagam 82) be ddven off by a counter-attackcomprised of open oder formations screenedby skirmishersor, i{ the enemy werc sufficiently d€moralised, by deep columns (as Diagram 82 shows).To the detriment of the Frcnch, in practice suchcount€r-attacks were too localisedand too ftontal for their + succ€ssto be sustainedand developed,as there appeaNto have beenlittle wil left in those in high commandto launch flank or generalcounter-attack, or for neighbouringfiiendly forces to abandontheir own '?osrtions magnifiques" and march to the soundof the guns. In summary,apart from their opening gambit at Saarbruck- SOUTH EAST LONDON WARGAMES GROUP PRESENT

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posilion as it presenteditself. The battle of Sedanis a stunning theory) at a respectfuldistance. In this way the French infantry example,as the French amongstorden, counter-ordersand the would still enjoy artillery support, thereby bolstering their resultant disorder, held on for as long as possible, partially relieved by localisedcounter-attacks, until pelted inro submis- A point which should not be missed was that the French sion by the Prussian artillery wbich had dominated the artillery had to limber up and with&aw to the rear tin€s (usualy surounding hills. becominginqeasingly congested)in order to be resupplied. It wasmade absolutely clear to battery commandenthat their 2. FRENCHARTILLERY TACTICS prime target wasthe enemyinfantry, Counter-battery fire was only to take place to support French infantry attacks, or if the The French Mitrailleuses rrere attached to the anillerv battery commander was aware that the enemy baftery in balteries.altbough on a fe* occasionsthey were detacbed and question was beginning to break his immediate infantry used foNard with the infantry, sometimeswith remarkable support. It is readily apparentthat the burden of silencingthe success.There seems to have been very little attempt to enemy artillery was to fall on th€ French infantry and camouflageor concealthem. Whereverthey were located, onc€ . the Prussiangunnen had found their range, they were swiftly silenced. As to the artillery proper, the mainstaywas the canon de 4. 3. FRENCHCAVALRY TACTICS Tlte canon.le 12 batteies werc held back in the Corps artillery In a word, French reconnaissancewas appalling. The rcsefle and were only to be us€dto fiI gapsor support najor tendency was for reconnaissanceto be undertaken by a €fforts. The result wasthat the reserveartilery often cloggedup combined arms forc€ (say a squadron or two of cavalry, a the roadsto the rear, and arrived on the scenetoo late - if at all - battalion of Tucos or Cbasseursa Pied and a troop of anillery) to play any influential role. Incidentally, the referenceto "4" which had the effect of reshicting its movement io the roads, "12" and deodtesweight of shot in kilogams, not pounds. and reducingits speedand ranee. From historical accounts it appean that there was little On the actual battlefield, the c.avalrybrigades were often concertedaction as battery commanden tended to go into and plac€dunder an infantry commander. out of action very much as they pleased, whether to confuse Again and aeain in the early battles, they were formed up in Prussianrangefinders or to minimiseany risk of the gunsbeing close oder, and used for shock action in desperatecounter- lost to enemyinfantry or cavalry aftacks. lndeed aJterthe first attacks even against unshaken infantry and over unrccon- "frontier battles", experiencedbattery commanders,who werc noitred ground, These magnificent were almost painJuly aware of the potency of the Prussianeuns, would invariably cut to piecesby the hail of artillery fire and small arms deliberately deploy on a revene slope and have their guns fire into which they rushedheadlong, and were then ddven off hand-pushed forwad to d€liver canister to approaching by fiesh Prussiancavalry. It seemsthal there was never any Prussianinfantry. Another tactic would be to have the guns rcalistic prospectof their heroism alld sacrificebuying victory, positioned higher than and behind the Frcnch infantry, whos€ rather they bought time for hard-pressedFrcnch inJantryto fall Chassepotrifles would keep the Prussiangunners (at least in back and re-gloup. TACTICSIN THEFRANCO.PRUSSIAN WAR FROMOPENING SHOTS TO THEBATTTE OF SEDAN PART2: PRUSSIANTACTICAL DOCTRINE By Mikelohrcon

(As mentioned before in these articles, the States alied to Fig."Cl": PrusslanPosldonal Stage 1 Prussiawould haveclosely followed the Prussiansystem, either through similaritiesin training or through beingsubordinated to Prussiancommand-) tI I 1. INT'ANTRYTACTICS v Prussian infantry, supported by their artillery, were used aggressively,at times recklessly. Their main function was

Due to their numerical superiority in most of the initial battles,and to theirsuperior command and control, they would pin the enemyfrontally whilstexpanding either or bothof their of the enemy'sflank. own flanks in order to find the extr€mities "C2":Pru€ai.n Positional 2 That flank would then be poundedmercilessly by their artillery Flg. Sta96 beforethe Prussianinfantry wassent in- Thesesimple principles @ werenot alwaysfollowed-most notablyin the case of theattack by the PrussianGuard at St. Privat, to which I wil refer againat fte endofthissection. \.". u. In diagramsC1 andC2I haveattempted to showthe gradual .i, 6 o d _r.s build-up of Prussianforces prior to the attack. It will be seen that the Prussianswould first send out a sqeen of skirmishers (Jaeger, p.3:.+.-. Schutzen or battalions), behind which the main force would be moving forward in line formation, in close ordei. The battalions on the extreme flanks would be moving outwards,with the skirmisherscreen exaending in front of them, Fig."C3": PrusslanAltack StaEe1 whilst the rcsefles would be following up behind, initially in columnformation and then changingto line to occupythe "gap" @ createdin the centre by the outward movementof the flanks. In diagan Cl, one of the reservebattalions has rernainedin columnas it hasreceived orders that it will soonbe reouired '"",y olher rhanat rhecenlre! Accordingly. the pictureemerges of the main tactic being a seriesof infantry battalionsin line, with s""""' skimisherstothefront, andarelativelyweak reservebehind. \,--"/ ln diagram C2, the French right flank has been found, and e "Ol": already the Prussianinfantry is beginning to €nvelopeit. The Flg. PrusslanAttack reservebattalion has been rapidly moved in column to support the impending attack. The remainder of the Prussianforce would occupythe French to their front, either by spidted in{antry attacksin their own right, or by small armsfire from the skirmishercor the lines behind, in both casessupported by a " delugeof Prussianartillery fire. " """, Thesefomations would readily adapt to the defence,say in z, the face of a French couoter-attack.The skirmisherswould be ,,-;rt' pulledin to alow the Prussianbattalions in linetoparalyse the circumstances,in particular the degree of rcsistance being French attack by voley fire, whilst the tu(hermost Prussian offered by the French, the columns would be of full battalion battalionswould move in on tle flanks of the French thrust. streneth (4 companiet, half battalion sfength or a series of DiagramsC3 and C4 ilustrate the coupde Bruce , the Prussiatr strength (about 250 men) columns, the latter being assaulton the French right flank. For those of us who have a refened to in variousaccounts as company columns. Flexibility limited sizetable, or only say an hour or two availablebefore is the key. If there wasa considembleamount of Frcnch anillery being calledoff to other duties,the tabletop encountermay well and rifle fire to contendwiah, then the Prussiancommander may commenceat this Doint. have opted for any particular battalion to attack by say 2 ln DiagramsCJ and C4, precededand then accompaniedby companies in separate single company columns, lvith the an artillery barrage on the French lines, the skimish screen remaining 2 companies of the battalion thrcwn forward in movesforward with the main attacking battalions behind Gee skirmishorder. This would increasehis mobility and lessenthe Diagram C3). These battalions would either remain in close size of the target they presentedto any enemy with sufricient order line or, if the French were judged to be suficiently energyleft to rcsist.On the other hand,the impactof each broken. would advancein column, There is someconfusion as column of only 250men wasfar lessthan a column madeup of to how thesecolumns were constituted.Depending on the the entirebattalion (1000 men). In Diagam C4, the Frcnch flank beginsto disintegrateand the Prussianattack goesin. First the skirmisherswithdraw, to allo* the main punch to be delivered, in this case by two battalions in column and one in line. In practic€, pockets of enemyresistance would often force attackingPrussian columns to brcak down; they would then be urged to rnove forward in ]HIII,IMACULA'II CON\TMION open order and usingcover where available.Prussian weight of a g!,aay B-,h t11.nb.r1994, rtrb5pn_ numben would normally eDsurethat the momentum of the t'e Cintrallinlon G anes Cr nu efi,jtnl attack was maintained. As the French flank breaks under the ChelseaOld Town HaI, Kings Road onslaught,the rest of the Prussianfront in that sector moves Chebea-LondoD- SW3 foNard and the processof rolling up the French line begins. klat tA uth. d^r,tl clnaeia$anAt adzte And lvhat of the PrussianGuard at St. Privat? Due to the impatienceoftheir commander,they wereodered to attack the ua'@ae.bfuEPb.fu6|@. village of that name, acrossopen ground with a slight uphill @'bgfud,..b',u*aw* gradient, in closeorder line (some formations were initially in half-battalion columns, but changedto close order line as the ^4, ttu i F u.n *a c, oaat'a a attack progessed), but without any significant wxen.ndn-te,;'*.i e@) 'd eto. . scre€n and, most importantly of all, without prcliminary Ma4 t *'er'.yA 4v6 h.r1@. Fe zdzu rtb6'd fr.Js irta. si * E u anillery bombardmentof the enemy, who were essentiallyin trtro1r.-r', o.vt N, ?a aa 15, r}'4a4 5!r.!, Kfzrn. had cover in the village. The French Chassepotrifles cut them o.4B' a7.5t'1ott6td. r,!'dtb Etli! En to ribbons. The Prussianattack faltered and they were pinned do*n and wereonly able to resumetheir attack oncethe belated artilery bombardmenthad done its work on the French lines and oncethe French were in dangerof being totally outflanked by an attack, in this cas€by Saxons,coming in from the far side of the villase.

2. PRUSSIANARTILLERY TACTICS Therc is absolutelyno doubt at all that the Prussiansused their artillery as an infantry suppon weapon.It wasalways deployed as rapidly as possibleand pushedwel forward with the main infantry line. Whether in atta€kor defence,its first priority would normally be to silence enemy battedes and Mitrailleuse positions. It would th€n pound the enemyinfantry. WARRIORMINIATURES Unlike their French counterparts, Prussianbattedes would 14 Tlverton Av., Glasgow G32 9NX Scotland. invariably be groupedaogether and would act in conc€rt. New catalosue f1.50 plus a stahped addrelr€d envelope. It is worth noting that the resupplycaissons came up closeto Pl€@ stateint€rerts for .mdq 24 hou dseetphone, mobil€ T.l, 04l-7743125 the batteries to replenish their ammunition, thereby ensuring Wea@etvle. A..4 Matt r@dd. continuity of fire - lhere wasno needIor the batteriesto retire to lsmABiIIESo y i9.95 + 11,50 pot Cn@ nm, Fench d Brfti5h the rear for that purpose. N.po|furn6, nohds, ECWRolalist d Padimabn.n. ACWNodh ad Sdlh. 181hC€Ifiny, C.lonial zur6 6d BritiCL Fe!..y Go.d d EvlL Furthermore,if batterieswere to limber up to mover closerto Mhmm of 100pi€6 in 6ch .ny p&lc crc,t Value the enemy lines, it was usual for say haff of the batt€ries to 25bD NAPOIIOMC AAIiIES o.b fi6.95 + 12.75 D6t rm pi66, move, wiahthe remainder maintainingtheil fire. Once the fiIst BftGh, Fren.h. PiBid, RKiu, Au.iia SMiEIL 25@ AnMtES onlr at9,50 + 13.00 rct Grek, Ro@ P6i.r, batteries were in their new position and firing, the r€mainder ThFcid, Mac.donie, Ninme, Smu!.t, MasoL, bnd.LN.hr3, would fo ow. M€d€uL dc Full ddailr ot.ll frguc ln d 6uF ntu dralogle The Prussiansrecognised very early on that the power of their 25m ngttEfrob 25p, l6bmnod 10D,A!nad€ nomiopqlal y.nd9- artill€ry was neededto counter the fire superiority of French Nd20@ SpDr.b Cl! wr, vternu ed tloda USA, inJantry. When that power was not used, the Prussianinfantry l5@ EqrlDoat 256d J..obltc.35D a.n, suffercd heavily - as the PrussianGuard found to its cost at St. Privat.

tc rnti .jti-u., >Painted15nmAmies 3. PRUSSIANCAVALRY TACTICS > knaissanceand Fantasy castrngs It has to b€ said that Prussiancavalry was occasionallyus€d in bold atrdaggressive reconnaissance patrols, but the practicewas sendS.A.E. for intormation and sample not widespread,and often the opposingarmies would be only a ligure- !1.00for painted sample/s short distanceapan, without knowing. l3:leEuslon Road, ilor6cemha, Lanas Similarly, there appearsto havebeen a limited useof cavalry T6l:{052{){1312{ Ior what should have been a relendesspursuit of a beaten foe. Notably after Froeschwi er, MacMahon's mauled almy was allowedto slip awayand the Prussiansactually lost track of it. As with the French cavalry, the main preserveof the cavalry chargebreakiDg the Frenchgun line, principally due to its useof was shock aclion, involving massedcavalry charging boot to the lie of the land, circumventingwoods and using undulations boot in line formation. Von Brcdow's "Death Ride", involving to block the French line of sight. Without these factors the PrussianCuirassiels and lnncels, was a suc.essful(if costly) chargewould undoubtedlyhave failed at evenmore sever€cost. Bt IlikeJoltrtson

In thi! irrticle.I $i\h to highlighr$nr. ot rhe \atic.r Iioinrs sktrmlshformation tbensc]\cs to moic rhroughrhe pinncd .. I \.. r.le. r.r.,..' I, skirmisher\cr..n) or if rhcir norale brcrk\ and rhc) disp.rs. hos thc\ ml\ be relLct.d in \ouf rulcs. (lc!\ing lor c\rmtle den\c colLrmnsbchind ro rhc merc\ or I rm rlsunrin.s Ih.rt\ou \ illrlre.rd\hr\circces\roxrrclstore lact oflI olcncm\ masscdrille ttrc).In defence.rkirmishcrs di thc hrll dozeno. !o rulebook\for this period $hich $rtl \houldalain bc u\edas I \crcenro pturccrthe lorcc! posirioncd xmpL\ co\er Iormxtion!.lirepo$er. mo.al!L nnd comm!nd S.r h.hind. to s.ipc rt en.m\ gunncrs.i) bre.rt up nlr.rcki.g shxt ftrllo$sis m ll]crxn rddirionalh\ cr ol opio al .uLc..tind ''rrps ro gi\. !ddiriondlfl!\our rc \our battl.\. lanhfutto the rrcr'cs!ctuaLl\ cnrplo\.d. 2. lrench Inrrtia Your rulesshould rcllecl Forrr\ pan I usc1116 D;.rl Fof C1o,1rul.s (TDFG) adaprcd rh. rctuclanccot Frenchcurrd units. n)ruse$rrh15mmligLrressolhrrth.{roundscalcj\doubl.dut andan\ Frenchinfa.rr\unirs$hich a.e.ntrenched or occup\a Io l' to 15 r:rrd\ .,i:.. hrl.rop.rmore ..,nr1, rpr. I t.rr.,r ..r.,.,,, fricndl!Lrnn in troublc.I suslcsrrhrr the\ $illonl\ makc\uch r 1. The Skirnrilh Scrren mo\. ri! lor.rlon r D6i\ lhu\n Ihru$p.rrete\antuniipcr \\'hcthcr Frcnch or f.us\ir.. use lighr infxntr! (Cha\scurs. Zou.r\.\. Turlo s. Jaegcr.SchL{zent lbr rhc rote \hich the\ l. .lrtiller) In Supporl sere dcss..d to pl,r\.Th.\ \crc designrdLo probe. lo b. an /\dd +i Io r. inhrrtf\ irrnant.roshicld rhe forccs nro\in! up behi.dthcm and lodra\r unirs morrl. if iriendh ! i11e.\i! FIRING Nrlhin cafshLnrhlr nro\e. tire l$:r\ trom rholeiorccs. In rf itftircl.orcounrer-rtrack. at EaAhoit I suggr\tsilhin 100\ irfds(8 . al I' to 15!ards) Ihe opnmum montenl rh.\ $crc ro like a cunarn. to io rher.xr or on rirhcrltant. ''c\xrurlrc fart . ro rllo\\ rh. iirrcesbehind them tu moic for$ard 1. Ntitrailleuseln Support to fu fil theart.rck Timing is all. In t!rticular. rh. cnrirearlack Add +l to F.cnchinfanrr\ units nlorelcifFrench Uitrailtcu!. sill becomcdi!loc ed il rhoscskinnishers arc pinned do$. fo' batteric\ar. Fllil\(l \\ilhir er^hot rhar mo\. Ear\horfor .. .e\_, ,r .r. _rr t.,, f..e. ,,,rro\. iar , \irlrailleus.lI sLrssen$itbin 15(rI xrds(6 . at l to15\.a.ds)to 1i3 the rearoron eitherflank.This is in additiontoany increment thesetended only to be usedwhen moving up to the front line und€r3. above. out of rangeor out of sightfrom theenemy, or in a finalassault againstpoor or brokentroops. In 5. PosiaionbgofFrench Mitraileu$ Batteri€s TDFG the lowestPrussian Befor€battle commences roll a D6 per Mitrailleusebattery' A infantryunit is a battalionof20figuresrepresenting 1000 men in the field.However,I would make this rule flexible to allowalso roll of l meansthat the batterycan be placed as an independent for half-battalioncolumns (10 figures) or company (5 battery,for examplewell forward with the infantry. A roll of 2-6 columns figures),with the followingrules: means that it must be assignedto a specific artillery battery throughoutthe gameand will bepositioned and will movewith 10.1 Haf-Battalion Columns: it at all times, and furthermore must fire on the same target minus1 onfirst moveofmelee unlessprevented by reasonof range. but savingthrows for artillery casualtiesonly (a 6 on a D6, throwper casualty). 6. Fbing Frcnch Arlillcry ard Mitrailleuse Batteries As mentioned,the priority target was infantry, and there had to 10.2Corhpany Colunns: bea compellingreason forbatteries to actin concertand aim at - minus1on first moveofmelee the sametarget. Ac€ordingly: - but savingthrows for artillerycasualties (a5 ora6on a D6, per (a 6.1 Where the ht€nded terget is enemyartillerJ batteries,this throw casualty)and rifle fire casualties 6 on a per will only be permitted: D6, throw casualty). - to support French in{antry or artillery attacks on the 10-3 WhetherHalf-Battalion or CompanyColumns sr€ us€d: target battery; OR - whenin attackthe remainingfigures of the battalion - iI the target battery is causingmorale checksto inlantry whichare not themselvesin columnformation must be or cavalry within 200yards (8" at 1" to 25yards) to the front thrownforward in skinnishorder within 12"(300 yards at oronaflank. l":25 yards)of thefront of the columns. - 6.2 Wh€rethe intendedlarget is €nemycavrlry' this wil only be ifcompanycolumns are used, there mustbe a minimum permrtEd: oftwo perbattalion. This prevents the wily Prussianplayer putting - if the cavalryis actuallythreatening that battery; OR from three-quartersof his into - iJ the cavalry is threateninga friendlyunit within 200 skinnishformation! yards(8"asabove) to thefrontorona flank. ll. Frcnch or PrussianColumns - wh€nthe atrack is Halt€d Wlere pinned(in 6.3 Where 2 or more batteries are requir€d to fire on same a columnhas been TDFG this meansit has in the case of a beenforced to goprone having re€eived at least4casualtiesthat tsrget, this is always REQUIRED - Mitrailleusebattery (subject to range)which is wishingto tum tuomrifle or Mitrailleusefire) then if it is orderedto fire onthe sametarget as the artillerybatterytowhich it has resumeforward movenent-a D6 mustbe rolled.Ifthe resulth (not beenassigned. In the caseof separateartillery batteies or lowerthan the TOTAL numberofcasualties for that unit aDindependent Mitrailleuse battery wishing to fire on the iusttheones received in that tum) the unitcanresumeforward movementin whichever sametarget, this is only permitted: formationis chosen.whether column - if the targetunit threatensboth batteries; OR orotherwise.Ifthe resultis higher,the unitMUST resunethe - to suppo( French infantry or cavalry attack on the targetunit; OR 12. Fr€nchor Prussirn Cavalry Charg€s - a rollof6on a D6 (to reflectcoincidence l) AND IN ALL 12.1 Recaling a Charge. Once orde$ are acted on for cavalry CASES: to charge,theycannot easily be recalled.Accordingly the - therelevant tests in 6.1 and6.2 ar€ satisfied. chargewill continueuntil: 7. Firing PrussianArtillery Theobjective is attained;or Thereare NO RESTRICTIONSon the typeof targelor on a The cavalry wins .he nexr rnelee (for examplewh€re the numberof batteriesselecting the sametarget- As a matterof cavalry has been counter-chargedbefore it reachesits practice,to ensuresurvival and to maintainthe upPerhand, objective);or Prussian gunners usually silenced the enemy anillery and The cavalry is forced to retire in any event due to failing Mi[ailleuse batteries fi]st, afld then tumed on the enemy moraleor losinga melee, inJantry(or cavalryif it presenteditselo. 12.2 Chargingorer unreconnoitrcdgrcund. Eachcharge move, 8. ResupplyingArtil€ry and Mitraileoses roll two D6. In TDFG thercare two operationsper tum, 8.1 Frenchartilery andMitrailleuse batteries must limber up, so if cavalryis chargingin both operationsthen the dice withdraw off-table and remain off'table Ior a full move to will haveto be rolled for eachoperation. lf a double4, 5 or rcsuppry. 6 is thrownyour cavalryhas problems as it indicatesthat 8.2 Prussianartillery batteries must limber up and withdraw the ground over which th€y are €hargingis seriously onemoye only.It thentakesafull nove to beresupplied. pitted,for examplewith unseendrainage ditches, rabbit 8.3 Whilstbatteries are being resupplied they cannot fire, and warrensandso on. Youwill nowneed to roll a furtherD6 onceresupplied rememberthat they are tirnbered uP. withthe followingconsequences for yourcavalry: 9. The French- Furia Franceseor D€f€nsive? A m of I or 2: Irse 1 figure as a casualty (in TDFG 1 For the openingbattles, the generalrule shouldbe for the fisure = s0 nen) French to 6ght using the defensivetactics, occupying ridges, A roll of3 or 4: Lose I figure as a casualty and 1 figule hillsand farmhouses - and usualy outnumbered by 3:2at least. movesat halfspeedand lags behind However,why not add somevariety by allowingthe army commanderor oneofthe divisionalor brigadeconmanders to A roll ofs or 6: Whathappens here depends on whether go "Furia Francese"(through an excessof cognacand the chargemove is the one which brings your cavalry into nostalgial)? contactwith theenemy: 10. Prulsian Infrntry Columns If the move in question IS the one which brings your Whetherfull battalion,half'battalion or companycolumns, charging cavalry into contact with the enemy, the 19

TABLETOP GAMES WARGAMESRULES FROM TTC 29 BERESFORDAVENUE. SKEGNESS, MODERNPERIOD NAPOLFONIC& 18Ih CENTIJRY f3.15 LINCOLNSHIRE,PE25 3JF. ChillMg.r 20{0 El.s at6 D!.s .l (Etr op€:n LGG) f2.95 43.15 lcEac Raas' uK l0%(Mir 30pJ Die6r 5 (Re$ or wo.ld Liss) orb (tM 15% (Su'fa€) 60% (Ai.) Iirdd.h Equipmdr hnk .,/p !3.75 Crcdit Card Ord6 : (0?5J) ?677?9 Mod.D Aimn Hddbek €3.5 !3.75 Adion Under Sail .&n Ed. 13.75 SENDS.A.E, FOR NEW Baul.an6(Sftmnos) e2.15 C.Ar Comand.r t3.95 Md l3rh C.nbry d!.s 12.95 W.R.G RULES & BOOKS An & sd (an avallMdhg l3dr c.nbry Any Lnb e7.15 PIa$ norc rh.t wc r€ mw a 42,95 t2.?5 ORDERrim d y bur *. *iU siill b. t3.75 Bddyomt (vicham skidhh) €2.95 .ncniling dr sh.ws 6 nm.l. Pnhsuh (Mod sub cmbrr) f3.50 ANCIENT PERIOD ACTION TJNDER sIEcE (Ar. & Med siegs) 7 YEARSWAR GUIDES SAIL {h sdttion Nol ThcBrirlsh 8795 No2 The Ftrch E!.25 Swod & Shicld(Skimish) f2.15 NapoleonicNaval Rules t2_25 No3 The Ausdi,rs 12.95 Rudis (Cldi2bB & OwioG) t7j5 D'.ftusims t3.75 By steve Bemie f3.75 MEDIEVAL PERIOD No.l t3.95 No5 nE Swc.,.s 82.15 IN TTIE t7_95 No6 The llarcvenms 43.25 GRAND RENAISSANCE PERIOI) No7 The Sdom 12.15 MANNER A.C.W. aATTLE CUIDES t195 d, R.vis.d l95c20l)l) Rules Swod & Pisbl (Skimhh) t2.15 Peter Gildes Napoleonic tul€s f2.95 c.tlysburg S{ond aul Run w.R.G.BOOI$ Stoffi Riv.. Antibn for 25m, figues by ReiSate Fird Bull Run WilsonCE.l wdsans Grcup Fftfly { l/Jt}Ih sc{lc) !3.95 f2.50 Cdnhinedtum I 1,3lJ0Scale) l!.95 c.d.rMountain FEdoi.k$urg wwll LhG & Or3.nisltids [3.95 fll.95 WwlI Baarams (S.trriot ll.?5 Tacric.lComm{d.r (Sttm) '2.95 Rules for Naporons crmp6igE KoAs Col)rlrtrdr (Div Scalc)!3.95 VO FLAGS in EulG bv A w.hon {3.75 TEnrh (wwl TEnchwarhrc) 12.25 The full 6nge of Revo Flags K6icftosh (w\M Skimish) t3.50 dd TE sfe6 also sl@ked arsicds t3.75 Dogfigh over F|and.6 (An) $.25 (2 WE NOW STOCK H & ROS sends a.E. IRCS)fd r opy CHALLf,NGER 2(|OO t2)5 WWN TANKS & EQUIPMENT f3.a W NEW I99'I CATALOCUE Rcvis.{tNtod.n Rrl6 14.25 Rry w"E llndhn FiCbdng)

ditch/rabbit warens are deemedto be within a few yards fuchard Holmes. Secondly,the writings of StepbenShann vrho of the target unjt and will lhereforecause maxinum cenainly has a graspfor the period. Thirdly, as an insight for disruption. Accordingly, your unit will lose 1 figure as a what it meant to the everydayFrench Line inlantryman in this casualtyand 1 figure movesat half speedand lagsbehind pei,od, The Debacleby Emile Zola, an English translation is AND 30% of the charginefigures making contact suffer availablein the PenguinClassic series. It is worth reading for -l in theresultant melee. the descriptionof the battle of Sedanand the graphic portmyal If the move in questionIS NOT the one which brings your of the Bavariaoattack on Bazeilles. charging cavalry into contact with the enemy, then your cavalryhas managed to negodarethe tenain difficulty and sO,MO+SECONDIIAND WARGAMES FIGIJRES there is no efJecton its pedormance. Alwaysin stock.AII scales.Most manufactur€rs. SAE statingintercsts for lbts to: A.J. Dumelow, CONCLUSIONAND SO{JRCES 53Stanton Road, Stapenhill, I hope these articles prove to be useful and will help to give a Burton-on-Trert,StalIs DEIS 9RP, framework for youl Franco-Prussianbatdes, and in particular Telephone:(02t3) 530556. witi iUustrarethe powerslrugglewhich was waged berween rhe FrenchChassepot rifle and the PrussianKrupps breech-loading artillery. There is no doubt about it, tbe Fr€nchhave an uphill struggle SCHEMATICASOFTWARE to beat their more numerous Prussianadversaries. but siven Ruleson Diskforlhe Atari,Amiga & IBM/rc good useofterfain and deploynenr oflighr infantrytheF;nch NRVDr5X5, MW mrr,l^Ts fORTHrrtrTui,rN. ^ NrWStrrn Of 0r5r5t$NCtNC rOU are well able to keep the Prussianartill€ry at bay and to stun if ECmNCr sLfrO?ACnONAr,$rOrD Bttmc6, Nlrouo\r( - ^rrrFb oJN,pok n( wrrr,€ (sed 6 ,sI b, paid ra rndr not repel the Prussianinfantry. 4"ry''J|i4F'Jnipor|yfoo( vrrcr]^r w ff rI- qnc{,^qii:Ffdh*,.rI n6rro\cl tL|*€id'oB Which bringsme on to a widerissue why w€ wargameat all. 5!hbelor:ry *ioi rcmPru$nn b hdianwrB o y f19.99 For me the enjolment is not in actually wiDning (fairly rare rrc ANo $Or - CNiis rheGE6ni.e ton Lib Medielrd,,.trlborcqi roll*ii8 ri€ ri* ad dmiQ ot i\e riG, Kpde fie rnlrr or fi. Rmiere ror fl9-95 occasionsan'way!) but in rccreating the style of warfare in $^$ tt r! ^NotM nvts rln +1ts nr^ ro rl. 4rly $dFdl piod ' o.". "feel" d"prdtu.irddim 4 {m 1r' mF md i 4,h s&port hl m, r6p \F rr9 $ miniature and recapturing the of a Franco-Pnssian Al de.bow.r,on!l-'! Iry kF n bodqL rnd4nh. tl ,6. r]lc battle, in recognition of the hardshipsbome by the of ,,to M,hbb CrO$ ACnONleiro, e$ll, M|crO rN$ ^rvribdry @nbarvr00, !r1 1 NAVtf nr sY,nMrfror,nrrldRp$.ddrdhl,ilrDrrv rff9,irsH,uNlvtrt{ the day a]ndthe esptit de cotps and camaruileriewh]'ch WriIJlg s||tr,{$R, nrlL cle rdion I r iihbh tor:ry peidd La youd!.ide wa@n .iFbiiiE, C lt{GN WOttD coE a coidr ror )oo hbdoo baik . Uo ro 20.osbi6, im mry from that commonexp€rience. l€drs b n t2.95 o' tl4 95'it 016m d&!or.hoke ^l irhe6rhi d !r9.9r Pnri As to sources,I would just like pay indu{k U.K.pdF, t!mE +10*, REtol i\e wo'ld + l5*. lBrirc o'de^ .bt diel.ize rd to tribute to three in $e loo{bh or Hisi oeisiry).ch€q6 dc. ro particular. Firsdy, me Ro,'.l to Sedan, a marv€[ous book 3,no( 5?&{N$orro[ H^DnnD,ru published for the Royal Historical Society, the author being RAPIDFIRE! FastPIay Rules for WorldWar ll In20mm or 15mm byreg ular Wl contributars ColinRumford & RichardMarsh A4format.76pp.+ 8pp. ofcolour photographs.Including 8 scenarios, 1940-1942 Now aYalleble lrom StratagemPubllcatlons Ltd 18 LoveisLane ewark otts NG241HZ Englahd . €9.95 + 7Opp&p ffnate enqulrles welcomet AYa eble ln florth Amerlce Jrom TheEllt€ crou! 2625Forest cten Tratl Rlverwoorls . 50015 u.s.A. $24.9spostage patd (Dlst butor & Irealerlnqulrles welcome.)