<> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 1 of 8

UnitedÿStatesÿCourtÿofÿAppeals FORÿTHEÿDISTRICTÿOFÿCOLUMBIAÿCIRCUIT ArguedÿOctoberÿ6,ÿ1994ÿÿÿÿÿDecidedÿDecemberÿ9,ÿ1994

No.ÿ93-7140

URIÿGELLER, APPELLANT

v.

JAMESÿRANDI, A/K/AÿADAMÿJERSIN, A/K/AÿDONALD, A/K/AÿTRUTH'SÿBODYGUARD, A/K/AÿTHEÿAMAZINGÿRANDI, A/K/AÿRANDALLÿJAMESÿZWINGE; ÿCOMMITTEEÿFORÿTHE SCIENTIFICÿINVESTIGATIONÿOFÿCLAIMSÿOFÿTHEÿPARANORMAL, APPELLEES

AppealÿfromÿtheÿUnitedÿStatesÿDistrictÿCourt forÿtheÿDistrictÿofÿColumbia 91cv01014

RichardÿW.ÿWinelander arguedÿtheÿcauseÿandÿfiledÿtheÿbriefÿforÿappellant. LeeÿLevine argued the cause for appellees. Withÿhimÿo nÿt heÿbriefÿwasÿ James E. Grossberg.ÿÿR. Darryl Cooper enteredÿanÿappearanceÿforÿappelleeÿCommitteeÿforÿtheÿScientificÿInvestigationÿof ClaimsÿofÿtheÿParanormal.ÿÿMichaelÿJ.ÿKennedy enteredÿanÿappearanceÿforÿappelleeÿJamesÿRandi.

BeforeÿWALD,ÿSENTELLE,ÿandÿROGERS,ÿCircuitÿJudges.

OpinionÿforÿtheÿCourtÿfiledÿbyÿCircuitÿJudge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE,ÿCircuit Judge: AppellantÿUriÿGellerÿchallengesÿtheÿdistrictÿcourt'sÿawardÿof monetary sanctions under Rule 11 of the FederalÿRulesÿofÿCivilÿProcedureÿ("Ruleÿ11")ÿinÿfavorÿof appellee Committee for the Scientific Investigation ofClaims ofthe Paranormal. Gellerÿcontendsÿthat the district courtÿerredÿwhenÿitÿtreatedÿaÿmotionÿforÿRuleÿ11ÿsanctionsÿasÿconcededÿbyÿGeller under localÿrulesÿandÿthusÿawardedÿsanctions.ÿÿBecauseÿweÿholdÿthatÿtheÿdistrictÿcourtÿdidÿnotÿabuseÿit s discretionÿinÿsanctioningÿappellantÿunderÿRuleÿ11,ÿweÿaffirm. I.ÿBACKGROUND Appellant Uri Geller, a citizen of Israel and a permanent residentÿof England,ÿisÿa self-proclaimed psychic who uses his putative "powers" to accomplish such remarkableÿfeatsÿas <> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 2 of 8 reading minds or bending spoons and suspending cable-cars in mid-air with nothing but sheer mental force. Gellerÿhasÿbuiltÿaÿcareerÿandÿreputationÿonÿattemptedÿdemonstrationsÿofÿtheseÿpsychicÿ"skills," appearingÿonÿnumerousÿtelevisionÿprograms such as "The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson"ÿand being featured in countless newspaper and magazine articles. AmongÿGeller'sÿcriticsÿisÿJamesÿRandi, an accomplished magician, author and lecturer, better knownÿasÿ"TheÿAmazingÿRandi."ÿÿRandiÿwas aÿfoundingÿmemberÿofÿtheÿCommitteeÿforÿtheÿScientificÿInvestigationÿofÿClaimsÿofÿtheÿParanormal ("CSICOP"), an organization dedicatedÿtoÿi nvestigating,ÿamongÿotherÿthings,ÿclaimsÿofÿpsychic phenomena such as those made by Geller. SinceÿGeller'sÿriseÿtoÿprominenceÿinÿtheÿearlyÿ1970's,ÿRandi hasÿsetÿaboutÿexposingÿvariousÿGellerÿfeatsÿasÿtheÿfraudulentÿtricksÿofÿaÿconfidenceÿman. In an Aprilÿ9,ÿ1991,ÿarti cleÿinÿt heÿInternational Herald Tribune, Randi discussed Geller's claimed psychicÿabilities,ÿstatingÿthatÿGellerÿ"trickedÿevenÿreputableÿscientists"ÿwithÿtricks that "are the kind that used to be on the back of cereal boxes when I was a kid. Apparentlyÿscientistsÿdon'tÿeat cornflakesÿanymore."ÿ Based solely upon these statements, Geller filedÿsuit againstÿbothÿRandiÿand CSICOP in United States District Court, alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and tortiousinterference with prospective advantage. Theÿoriginalÿcomplaintÿdidÿnotÿattributeÿanyÿspecific conductÿtoÿCSICOP;ÿÿhowever,ÿGellerÿamendedÿhisÿcomplaint to allegeÿthatÿ"DefendantÿRandiÿwas acting individually on his own behalf and/or as a duly authorized actual and/or apparent agent, servant,ÿemployeeÿand/orÿrepresentativeÿofÿtheÿDefendant,ÿCSICOP." On January 15, 1992, eight months afterÿGellerÿfiledÿsuitÿinÿdistrictÿcourt,ÿCSICOPÿfiled motions for summary judgment and Ruleÿ11ÿsanctionsÿagainst Geller. Inÿsupportÿofÿitsÿmotionÿfor sanctions, CSICOP argued that Geller could not have reasonablybelieved that his complaint was well grounded in fact or warranted by law and that the complaint was filed for purposesÿof harassing CSICOP. GellerÿrespondedÿonÿJanuaryÿ29,ÿ1992,ÿbyÿfilingÿaÿmotionÿforÿextensionÿofÿtimeÿtoÿoppose CSICOP'sÿmotions—presumablyÿinÿorderÿtoÿgiveÿGellerÿadditionalÿtimeÿforÿdiscovery.ÿÿTheÿdistrict court granted Geller's motion and ordered him to respond to CSICOP's motions by March 13, 1992. When the deadline arrived on March 13, Geller filed another motion for an extension oftime until ten days after he received a transcript of a depositionÿofÿCSICOP'sÿcorporateÿrepresentative conducted <> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 3 of 8 thatÿday.ÿÿTheÿdistrictÿcourtÿneverÿruled on that motion. Instead,ÿattorneysÿforÿbothÿpartiesÿagreed at a later deposition attended by Geller that Geller's request for a ten-day extension of timeÿwould lapse on April 29, 1992. Gellerÿdidÿnotÿfileÿaÿresponseÿbyÿthatÿdate.ÿÿOnÿMayÿ28,ÿ1992,ÿCSICOPÿfiled a motionfor leave to file a supplemental memorandum in support ofits motions. CSICOPÿservedÿthis motionÿandÿtheÿaccompanyingÿmemorandumÿuponÿGeller,ÿwhoÿagainÿfailedÿtoÿrespond. After Geller failed to respond to either the summary judgment or sanctions motion, CSICOP movedÿonÿJuneÿ10,ÿ1992,ÿforÿexpedited consideration of both motions. Again,ÿCSICOPÿservedÿits motion upon Geller's counsel, who neither opposed it nor took any further steps with respect to the underlying motions for summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions. OnÿJulyÿ2,ÿ1992,ÿtheÿdistrictÿcourt granted all of CSICOP's motions, including the Rule 11 sanctions motion, as "unopposed." Shortly thereafter, Geller filed successive motions for reconsideration, arguing that it was "inappropriate" to respond to CSICOP's motions because the district court had not ruledÿonÿi tsÿsecondÿmotionÿfor extension of time. Theÿdistrictÿcourtÿdeniedÿbothÿmotionsÿforÿreconsideration,ÿnotingÿthatÿitsÿfailure to rule on the second motion for extension of time did not relieve Geller's counsel of the duty to file opposition within the time required by local and federal rules. Theÿdistrictÿcourtÿexplainedÿthatÿwhen Geller failed to respond to the summary judgment and sanctions motions, both motions were properly treated as conceded under D.C. Local Rule 108(b), which provides that a motion may be treated as conceded ifÿit isÿnotÿansweredÿwithinÿ11ÿdaysÿofÿtheÿdateÿofÿservice.ÿÿD.D.C.ÿR.ÿ108(b).ÿÿBecause Gellerÿhadÿnotÿadequatelyÿexplainedÿhisÿfailureÿtoÿrespond,ÿheÿwasÿnotÿentitledÿtoÿreconsideration. After denying Geller's second motion for reconsideration on July 27, 1993, the court entered judgment against Geller in the amount of$149,000, representing fees and costs incurred by CSICOP inÿdefendingÿthisÿaction.ÿÿGellerÿappealsÿfromÿthisÿentryÿofÿjudgmentÿofÿRuleÿ11ÿsanctions. II.ÿDISCUSSION A.ÿJurisdiction Although both parties correctly agree that this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, CSICOP argues that, inÿlight of Geller'sÿpost-judgmentÿconduct,ÿweÿshouldÿdeclineÿtoÿexerciseÿthat jurisdiction. CSICOPÿassertsÿthat,ÿsinceÿentryÿofÿjudgmentÿbyÿtheÿdistrictÿcourt,ÿGellerÿhasÿneither <> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 4 of 8 satisfied the judgment nor posted an appropriate bond, and that he hasÿsecreted his assets abroad in anÿattemptÿtoÿabuseÿjudicialÿprocesses.ÿÿConsequently,ÿbecause Geller has allegedlyÿfloutedÿjudicial authority,ÿheÿshouldÿnotÿbeÿallowedÿtoÿprosecuteÿthisÿappeal. In support of itsÿargument,ÿCSICOPÿanalogizesÿtoÿtheÿdoctrineÿofÿ"fugitiveÿdisentitlement," in which fugitive criminal defendants have been denied an appeal for failure to submit themselves to lawful criminal authorities. ÿSee Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (discretionary refusal by appellate court to entertain appeal of fugitive convict); InÿreÿAssetsÿof Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1356 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("[I]f a defendant is not willing to suffer the penalties of the crime, then an appellate court shouldÿnotÿaffordÿtheÿdefendantÿanÿopportunityÿtoÿimproveÿhisÿor her position by challenging the validity of the conviction."). Relyingÿonÿthisÿ"simpleÿprincipleÿofÿmutuality,"ÿCSICOPÿarguesÿthat this court should exercise discretion not to hear Geller's appeal because he has not satisfied the lower court'sÿsanctionsÿjudgmentÿandÿhasÿplacedÿhimselfÿandÿhisÿassetsÿbeyondÿtheÿreachÿofÿtheÿdist rict court'sÿauthority. Although CSICOP's argument appears to have at least facial appeal, weÿneedÿnotÿdecide whetherÿweÿpossessÿtheÿdiscretionÿsupposedÿbyÿCSICOP.ÿÿCSICOP'sÿargumentÿisÿnotÿtruly jurisdictional; indeed,ÿasÿbothÿpartiesÿconcede,ÿthisÿcourtÿhasÿjurisdictionÿoverÿthisÿcaseÿunderÿ28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) (appeals from final orders of the district court). Becauseÿweÿhaveÿcrossedÿthe jurisdictional threshold, we may reachÿtheÿm eritsÿofÿthisÿdisputeÿwithoutÿconsideringÿappellee's invitationÿtoÿdeclineÿjurisdictionÿin our supposed discretion; andÿbecauseÿtheÿmeritsÿofÿthisÿcaseÿso clearly favor CSICOP, the party inviting this court to decline jurisdiction,ÿweÿneedÿnotÿdetai n ourselvesÿwithÿCSICOP'sÿinvitation,ÿandÿturnÿinsteadÿtoÿtheÿmeritsÿofÿGeller'sÿappeal. 1 B.ÿRuleÿ11ÿSanctions Although Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was revised effective December 1, 1993, the district court imposed sanctions under the pre-revision rule; thus,ÿourÿreviewÿisÿlimitedÿto

ÿ1Whileÿweÿdoÿnotÿdecideÿtheÿapplicabilityÿofÿtheÿfugitiveÿdisentitlementÿdoctrineÿinÿtheÿcivil context,ÿweÿnoteÿthatÿourÿpositionÿhereÿisÿnotÿinconsistentÿwithÿtheÿSecondÿCircuit'sÿdetermination notÿtoÿdeclineÿjurisdictionÿwhereÿaÿlitigantÿhadÿneitherÿcompliedÿwithÿanÿorderÿofÿtheÿdistrictÿcourt norÿsoughtÿaÿstay of theÿorderÿbecauseÿtheÿlitigantÿhadÿnotÿfledÿtheÿjurisdiction.ÿÿ SeeÿInÿreÿFaitÿ& Drexler,ÿInc., 760ÿF.2dÿ406,ÿ413-14ÿ(2dÿCir.ÿ1985).ÿÿ <> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 5 of 8 thatÿformerÿrule,ÿwhichÿprovided,ÿinÿrelevantÿpart: Everyÿpleading,ÿmotion,ÿandÿotherÿpaperÿofÿaÿparty represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least oneÿattorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated....ÿÿTheÿsi gnatureÿofÿanÿattorney orÿparty constitutesÿa certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,ÿinformation,ÿandÿbeliefÿformedÿafter reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argumentÿforÿthe extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it isÿnotÿi nterposedÿforÿanyÿimproperÿpurpose,ÿsuchÿasÿtoÿharassÿorÿtoÿcause unnecessary delayÿorÿneedl essÿincreaseÿinÿtheÿcostÿofÿlitigation....ÿÿIfÿaÿpleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signedÿit,ÿaÿrepresented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which mayÿincludeÿanÿorderÿtoÿpayÿtoÿthe other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filingÿofÿtheÿpleading,ÿmotion,ÿorÿotherÿpaper,ÿincludingÿaÿreasonableÿattorney'sÿfee.

FED.ÿR.ÿCIV.ÿP.ÿ11ÿ(1993). In reviewing the district court's imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, our review is limited to a determination ofÿwhetherÿtheÿdistrictÿcourtÿabusedÿitsÿdiscretion.ÿÿ Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1989). Inÿthisÿcase,ÿtheÿdistrictÿcourtÿimposedÿRuleÿ11ÿsanctionsÿbyÿdefault underÿLocalÿRuleÿ108(b),ÿwhichÿprovides: Within 11 days of the date of service or at such other time as the court may direct, an opposing party shall serve andÿf ileÿaÿmemo randumÿofÿpointsÿandÿauthoritiesÿin oppositionÿtoÿtheÿmotion.ÿÿIfÿsuchÿaÿmemorandumÿisÿnotÿfiledÿwithinÿtheÿprescribed time,ÿtheÿcourtÿmayÿtreatÿtheÿmotionÿasÿconceded. D.D.C. R. 108(b). Theÿcourtÿtreatedÿtheÿm otionÿforÿsanctionsÿasÿconcededÿwhenÿGellerÿfailedÿto respondÿtoÿtheÿmotionÿwithinÿtheÿtimeÿperiodÿprescribedÿbyÿtheÿrule. Geller claimsÿt hatÿtheÿdi strictÿcourtÿabusedÿitsÿdiscretionÿinÿtreatingÿCSICOP'sÿsanctions motion as conceded because a plain reading of Rule 11 indicates that sanctions should not be granted by default or concession. Ruleÿ11ÿrequiresÿaÿ"pleading,ÿmotionÿorÿotherÿpaper"ÿtoÿbeÿfiledÿinÿviolation of the rule before sanctions can be granted.ÿÿGellerÿmaintainsÿthatÿthisÿrequirementÿisÿnotÿmetÿhere because no such paper or motion was filed, but that, in fact, he was sanctioned because he failed to file a response to CSICOP's motion. Geller'sÿargumentÿmischaracterizesÿtheÿdistrictÿcourt'sÿdecision, however.ÿÿInÿsupportÿofÿitsÿinitialÿmotionÿforÿsanctions,ÿCSICOPÿcomplainedÿthat "Geller has not a shred of factual or legal support for the allegations in his Complaint that CSICOP can be held legally responsible for statements made by Randi without its knowledge or authorization." Joint Appendix, <> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 6 of 8

Vol. 1, at 90-91. Asÿthisÿallegationÿmakesÿclear,ÿCSICOP'sÿrequestÿforÿsanctionsÿwasÿdirectedÿatÿthe filing of Geller's initial complaint. WhenÿGellerÿfailedÿtoÿrespondÿtoÿtheÿsanctionsÿmotion,ÿtheÿtrial court concluded that he had effectively conceded under Local Rule 108(b) that his original complaint was not well grounded in fact or warranted by law. Consequently,ÿtheÿsanctionsÿwereÿnotÿbasedÿupon Geller's failure to answer; rather,ÿthey wereÿbasedÿuponÿGel ler'sÿfilingÿo fÿaÿfrivo lousÿcomplaint. Rather thanÿfindingÿGeller'sÿfailureÿtoÿanswerÿtoÿbeÿaÿsanctionableÿact,ÿtheÿcourt,ÿat most, treated it asÿaÿconcessionÿthatÿheÿhad,ÿinÿfact,ÿfiledÿsuchÿaÿcomplaint. Rule 11 expressly authorizes sanctions for groundless complaints when it statesÿthatÿifÿ"a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court ... shall impose upon the party who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993) (emphasis added); ÿsee Cooter &Gell, 496 U.S. at 409 (affirming sanctions against law firm for filing of frivolousÿantitrust complaint). WeÿfindÿnothingÿinÿtheÿRuleÿthatÿlimitsÿitsÿapplicabilityÿinÿcasesÿin whichÿaÿpartyÿfailsÿtoÿrespondÿtoÿaÿmotionÿforÿsanctions.ÿÿOnÿtheÿcontrary,ÿweÿconcludeÿthat,ÿunder DistrictÿofÿColumbiaÿlocalÿrules,ÿaÿpartyÿcanÿbeÿsanctionedÿfor a Rule 11 violation ifÿthatÿparty fails to respond to a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. ÿSee D.D.C. R. 108(b). LocalÿRuleÿ108(b)ÿisÿaÿruleÿof neutralÿapplicability;ÿÿitÿisÿnotÿqualifiedÿinÿany way by the language of Rule 11 of theÿFederalÿRules of CivilÿProcedure—itÿappliesÿequally when a party fails to respond to a Rule 11 motion. Weÿthink it would be absurd to allow a party to concede an entire case byÿdefault while restricting the same party's ability to concede a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. ÿSee Moy v. Howard Univ., 843 F.2d 1504, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (dicta) (party may concede a motion for summary judgment under Local Rule

108(b) by failing to respond);ÿÿ see also FED. R. CIV. P. 55 (governing default judgments). Consequently, the district court properly treated CSICOP's sanctions motion as conceded by Geller underÿLocalÿRuleÿ108(b). Turning to the underlying complaint, Geller arguesÿthatÿth eÿcomplaint wasÿindeedÿwell grounded in fact and warranted by existing law under a theory of"apparent agency." Basedÿuponÿour discussion ofLocal Rule 108(b), however, we need not reach this argument. Regardlessÿofÿtheÿmerit of this claim, Geller cannot raise it now. TheÿproperÿtimeÿforÿGellerÿtoÿhaveÿraisedÿthisÿdefenseÿwould <> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 7 of 8 have been in responding to CSICOP's motion for summary judgment. ÿSee Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concession of motionÿunderÿLocalÿRuleÿ108(b)ÿactsÿasÿwaiver;ÿÿparty cannot raise conceded argument on appeal). WhenÿGellerÿfailedÿtoÿrespond,ÿheÿconcededÿaÿviolation of Ruleÿ11ÿunderÿLocalÿRuleÿ108(b);ÿÿheÿcannotÿnowÿargueÿtheÿmeritsÿofÿhisÿRuleÿ11ÿdefense. Finally, Geller complains that the district court's imposition ofsanctions should be overturned because it is not adequately supported by findings of fact. Weÿagreeÿthat,ÿinÿcasesÿinÿwhichÿaÿmotion for sanctions is opposed, our review is aided when a trial court supports a sanctions order by "explicit findings of fact onÿeitherÿtheÿexactÿbasisÿunderlying the sanctions or the reasonableness of the exact sanction chosen." ÿConfederate Memorial Ass'n v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under these circumstances, however, we areÿunwillingÿtoÿmandateÿsuchÿfindingsÿofÿfactÿtoÿsupportÿthe district court's order. Inÿthisÿcase,ÿtheÿdistrictÿcourt'sÿbasisÿforÿimposingÿsanctionsÿisÿobvious.ÿÿInÿits sanctionsÿorder,ÿtheÿdistrictÿcourtÿhandwroteÿtheÿword "unopposed" inÿitsÿdescriptionÿofÿCSICOP's sanctions motion. Later,ÿinÿit sÿdenialÿofÿGeller'sÿmotionÿforÿreconsiderat ion,ÿtheÿdi strictÿcourt explained that it had treated the motion as conceded underÿLocal Ruleÿ108(b).ÿÿThus,ÿtheÿcourt treated the allegations in support of CSICOP's motion as true. Theÿdistrictÿco urt'sÿrelianceÿupon Local Rule 108(b) provides us a basis to determine the sanctions order to be reasonable. The reasonablenessÿofÿtheÿspecificÿsanctionÿlevelledÿagainstÿGellerÿwasÿconcededÿbyÿhim. We find ample support for the district court's imposition of sanctions against Geller. Ruleÿ11 expresslyauthorizes the imposition ofsanctions against a "represented party" for violation ofthe rule. AsÿtheÿadvisoryÿcommitteeÿnotesÿtoÿRuleÿ11ÿstate, "Even though it is theÿattorney whoseÿsignature violatesÿthe rule, it may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case to imposeÿaÿsanctionÿon the client." Fed.ÿR.ÿCiv.ÿP.ÿ11ÿadvisoryÿcommitteeÿnotesÿtoÿ1983ÿamendmentÿ(citingÿ Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560ÿF.2dÿ1078ÿ(2dÿCi r.ÿ1977)).ÿÿGi venÿGeller's litigious history, we find no abuse of discretion in thisÿdirectÿimpositionÿofÿsanctions.ÿÿTheÿdistrict court properly treated the sanctions motion as conceded by Geller underÿLocal Ruleÿ108(b). Although the size of the sanction is substantial, we find no abuseÿofÿdiscreti onÿhere,ÿgivenÿthe aggravatedÿfactsÿbeforeÿtheÿdistrictÿcourt.ÿÿAccordingly,ÿtheÿjudgmentÿofÿtheÿdistrictÿcourtÿis <> USCA Case #93-7140 Document #89561 Filed: 12/09/1994 Page 8 of 8

Affirmed.