The Shrinking Realm of Sovereign Immunity in Kentucky by Douglas Hallock in Kentucky, Sovereign Immunity Originates in Section 231 Douglas J

Local Government Law News Salmon P. Chase College of Law Kentucky Department for Local Government Northern Kentucky University

Volume 1, Issue 3 November 1998

The Shrinking Realm of Sovereign Immunity in Kentucky by Douglas Hallock In Kentucky, sovereign immunity originates in Section 231 Douglas J. Hallock, Associate of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides that the Gen- Frost & Jacobs eral Assembly may “direct in what manner and in what courts 1100 Vine Center Tower suit may be brought against the Commonwealth.” Unfortu- Lexington, Kentucky 40507 nately, sovereign immunity protection in Kentucky is nei- ther automatic nor absolute. The framers of our State Con- Mr. Hallock is a litigation attorney with a practice focused in stitution specifically reserved to the General Assembly the general civil, commercial and insurance litigation, including authority to alter or reduce this protection. Additionally, professional negligence defense, school board defense, personal through the appropriate role of constitutional interpreta- injury and wrongful death defense, workers’ compensation, tion and construction, the judiciary has imposed certain re- lender liability and insurance coverage disputes. He also has strictions on both the applicability and the scope of sover- prior experience in family law, criminal law, probate law and eign immunity. Accordingly, any attempt to assess the viabil- corporate formation matters. He received his B.A. in English/ ity of a sovereign immunity defense in civil litigation neces- Professional Writing, with distinction, from the University of sarily requires a two part analysis: Kentucky in 1991, and graduated from the University of Ken- 1. Is the entity or agent within the class of governmen- tucky College of Law in 1994. Mr. Hallock is admitted to prac- tal agencies generally entitled to sovereign immu- tice in State and Federal Courts in Kentucky as well as the nity protection? United States Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit. He is a member of 2. If so, has the General Assembly or the judiciary acted the Fayette County, Louisville and Kentucky Bar Associations. to limit or reduce the protection under the given facts or circumstances? Who is entitled to sovereign immunity protection? The doctrine of sovereign immunity has taken many twists Not every quasi-governmental agency is entitled to the and turns through the Kentucky courts and legislature over protection of sovereign immunity. To the contrary, the terms the years. Most recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the University of Kentucky did not waive sovereign immunity by the purchase of liability insurance. Will that deci- continued on page 3 sion apply to public elementary and secondary schools and counties? What if the entity has purchased commercial insurance rather than using a self-insured fund? These and a r t i c l e s i n t h i s i s s u e other issues, as well as a brief explanation and history of the sovereign immunity doctrine are outlined herein. Recent Developments ...... page 2 The doctrine of sovereign immunity generally protects and exempts state and local government, agencies, and oc- Recent Kentucky Supreme Court Decision casionally their agents, from liability in civil litigation alleg- Simplifies Standard for Punitive ing tortious conduct or breach of contract. When immunity Damage Awards ...... page 7 protection is available, the governmental entity or agent is usually entitled to a complete dismissal of the litigation. New Property Tax Penalties and Fees ..... page 7 Historically, this protection was premised upon the monar- Cities Task Force Discusses Louisville-Jefferson chial proclamation that “the King can do no wrong.” In more Compact ...... page 8 recent times, however, sovereign immunity continues to exist, but is now intended to prevent undue distraction in the OAG Opinions ...... page 8 performance of public service and to otherwise limit the extent of claims which can be asserted against public funds, Cumulative Newsletter Index ...... page 11 public property and other public resources.1 Recent Developments

Chase Local Government Law county judges/executive, magistrates, com- Chase SBA Earns Top Honors Center missioners and county attorneys. For the first time this year, the Department is hold- Chase received a very significant honor The Chase Local Government Law Cen- ing its training sessions in conjunction with recently at the American Bar Association ter has several projects in progress this se- the County Attorney’s Association. The Law Student Division annual conference mester. First, the Law Center is working training session will be held at the Holiday in Toronto, Canada. Chase won the SBA with the Kentucky General Assembly’s Task Inn Fern Valley Road, Louisville, Kentucky. (Student Bar Association) of the Year Force on Local Government Organization. Some of the sessions currently scheduled Award for the Mid-west Region for the This task force plans to study the organi- include: 1) Requirements for newly elected 1997-98 academic year. Accepting the zation and efficiency of local government officials; 2) Personnel Administration; 3) award on behalf of Chase were William in Kentucky. The next meeting is sched- Debt Management; 4) Budgeting and Pur- Roberts, incoming SBA President, and uled for October 27 in Frankfort. chasing; 5) County attorney’s responsibili- Blaine Hamilton, Chase’s ABA/Law Stu- Second, the Law Center’s clinical pro- ties to the fiscal court; 6) Disaster and dent Division Representative. According gram is in full swing. Approximately twelve Emergency Services; 7) Property Taxation; to Mr. Roberts, special recognition goes Chase College of Law students are intern- 8) County Administrative Code, and 8) to Elizabeth Combs Risner, a 1998 Chase ing with local government attorneys across Grants available to Local Governments. graduate, who served as SBA President for Kentucky. Guest lecturers for the program Modified one day training sessions for the 1997-98 school year, for her substan- include Rep. Jim Callahan, David Jones, newly elected county judges/executive, tial contributions toward earning this Executive Director, Kentucky Medical magistrates, commissioners and county at- award. Examiner’s Office, Tamra Gormley, Direc- torneys are planned for: The Mid-west region includes all law tor, Victims’ Advocacy Division, Office of January 14, 1999 at Kentucky Dam Village; schools in the following states: Kentucky, the Attorney General, and Susan Blake, January 15, 1999 at University Plaza Hotel Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Indi- Special Assistant Attorney General. in Bowling Green; ana, Minnesota, South Dakota, North Da- Also, the Law Center is currently com- January 19, 1999 at Sheraton Suites, Rich- kota, Nebraska, Missouri and Iowa. piling data for the Statute Reviser, Legis- mond Road in Lexington; and Some of the criteria used in determin- lative Research Commission. The Law January 20, 1999 at Jenny Wiley State Park. ing the recipient of this award were: the Center is determining which local govern- Special training sessions for newly SBA’s budget, the relationship established ments have adopted the Uniform Residen- elected county clerks and county sheriffs between the ABA Law Student Division tial Landlord-Tenant Act. This informa- on: and the SBA at the school, and public in- tion will assist communities that are con- December 14, 1998 at Kentucky Dam Vil- terest work performed by the SBA. sidering adopting a landlord-tenant ordi- lage; The Chase SBA made a genuine com- nance. December 15, 1998 at the University Plaza mitment to public service during the 1997- Finally, the Law Center has completed Hotel in Bowling Green; 98 year. In the fall of 1997, the SBA orga- its Model County Administrative Code. December 16, 1998 at the Bluegrass Area nized students and faculty to work with Anyone interested in receiving a copy, Development District; and ReSTOC, and organization that assists low please contact our office. December 18, 1998 at Jenny Wiley State income families. Our students and faculty Kathleen Gormley Hughes Park worked in the Over-the Rhine area along- Interim Director TRAINING FOR NEWLY ELECTED CITY side families who are now living in the OFFICIALS buildings. Mealtimes were spent serving Additional Attorney Hired at In addition to the training already set food in a soup kitchen. The SBA spon- the Department for Local up for newly elected county officials the sored a canned food drive in November, Government DLG will be working the Kentucky League and a holiday gift project in December. of Cities in preparation for training for Earlier in the school year, William Rob- The Department for Local Government newly elected city officials. Stay tuned for erts was named ABA/Law Student Divi- (DLG) would like to announce the addi- further information regarding city official sion Representative of the Year for the tion of a new attorney to the DLG legal training. 1997-98 year for the 6th Circuit, which staff. Mr. Richard Ornstein was hired by The DLG hopes you will attend some includes all law schools in Kentucky, Ohio the Department on June 16, 1998. You can of the many training opportunities avail- and Michigan. reach Tom Troth or Rich Ornstein by call- able to local officials in the coming “We are very proud of our student body ing (502) 573-2382. months. When you are in Frankfort, please and our student government’s commit- stop by and see us as 1024 Capital Center ment to service,” acknowledged Dean Training of Newly Elected Drive, or visit us at our web-site: http:// David C. Short. “The commitment of www.state.ky.us./agencies/local_gov./ Chase’s students to public service should County and City Officials Thank you for your continued coopera- be commended. From Paducah to COUNTY JUDGES/EXECUTIVE, MAGIS- tion as we work together to advance the Pikeville and Perry County, they continue TRATES, COMMISSIONERS AND interests of local governments throughout to set standards for excellence in public COUNTY ATTORNEYS the Commonwealth. service,” said Dean Short. On December 9-11, 1998, the DLG is Thomas M. Troth, Counsel Kelly Beers, Associate Dean for sponsoring training for newly elected Department for Local Government Enrollment Management

2 Local Government Law News continued from page 1 However, an act is not necessarily taken out of of Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution strictly refer to the class styled “ministerial” because the officer suits against the Commonwealth. The Constitution provides performing it is vested with a discretion respect- 12 no express protection to local and county entities.2 Despite ing the means or method to be employed. this apparent limitation, the Courts can and often do review Additionally, the Courts have consistently stated that offi- the specific claims filed against quasi-governmental entities cial immunity is no defense to claims grounded in constitu- 13 to determine whether the suit may be legitimately classified tionally impermissible misconduct. as one “brought against the Commonwealth,” thereby fall- Based upon these limitations, the Courts have found po- ing within the protection of sovereign immunity.3 In this re- lice officers personally liable for negligent operation of their 14 spect, the Courts have determined that an entity is entitled vehicles; university doctors personally liable for negligent 15 to immunity only if it is both under “the direction and con- treatment of patients; and governmental agents person- 16 trol of the central State government,” and . . . “supported by ally liable for civil rights violations, even though their gov- monies which are disbursed by authority of the Commis- ernmental employers were protected from liability under sioner of Finance out of the State treasury.”4 the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under this test, the Courts have applied sovereign immu- In summary, governmental entities are entitled to immunity protection to various state and even county entities that nity only if they are under “the direction and control of the perform “integral” functions of state government,5 local central State government,” and . . . are “supported by mon- boards of education,6 and universities and university medi- ies which are disbursed by authority of the Commissioner of cal centers.7 On the other hand, when an entity performs Finance out of the State treasury.” Additionally, claims against proprietary functions, such as the operation of a golf course individual governmental agents or employees are barred or center for performing arts, the Courts have found that under the doctrine of qualified immunity if the alleged li- such activities are not “integral” to the function of state gov- ability results from the performance of discretionary functions ernment, and therefore are beyond the applicable scope of within the general scope of the agent’s official authority, and sovereign immunity protection.8 Furthermore, municipal does not otherwise involve constitutionally impermissible corporations have been characterized as local entities cre- conduct. ated by act of the General Assembly, yet they do not per- If an allegation of civil liability falls within these stated form services of central state government, and therefore do parameters, the Court will extend sovereign immunity pro- not qualify for sovereign immunity.9 In essence, an entity tection to the governmental entity or agent, unless the Gen- qualifies for sovereign immunity protection only if it can eral Assembly has otherwise waived or limited immunity satisfy both prongs of the Berns Test. through legislative enactment. In addition, sovereign immunity occasionally protects in- General Assembly Waiver of Sovereign Immunity dividual governmental agents and officers from personal liability.10 The doctrine of official immunity protects public Protection under the Authority Provided by agents from such liability only when the alleged liability re- Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution? sults from the performance of discretionary functions within As noted above, Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitu- the general scope of the agent’s official authority.11 Unfor- tion accords the Commonwealth absolute immunity from tunately, the distinction between discretionary functions suit until the General Assembly acts to reduce or limit this (which are protected under sovereign immunity), and min- protection. Accordingly, to determine whether sovereign im- isterial functions (which are beyond the protection), is nei- munity protection applies to a particular claim, one must ther exact nor easily discernable. The Courts, however, have additionally determine whether the Legislature has acted attempted to provide some guidance in this regard: to waive or limit the protection. Commonwealth v. Frost, 295 Ky., 137, 172 S.W.2d BOARD OF CLAIMS ACT: The Courts of this State have 905 (1943), stated that . . . [t]he essence of a dis- consistently ruled that the General Assembly partially waived cretionary power is that the person or persons the Commonwealth’s immunity through the enactment of exercising it may choose which of several courses the Board of Claims Act, KRS Chapter 44.17 Thus, to a lim- will be followed. The power to exercise an hon- ited extent, the Commonwealth is subject to suit and liabil- est discretion necessarily includes the power to ity for the negligence of its officers and agents, as specifi- make an honest mistake of judgment. Citing cally set forth under the terms of the Act. This waiver, how- Bancamerica-Blair Corp. v. State Highway Com’n, et ever, is limited in several respects. First, the Act waives im- al., 265 Ky. 100, 95 S.W.2d 1068 (1936). munity and subjects municipalities to suit for “ordinary torts,” . . . but preserves immunity protection for claims arising from Discretionary or judicial duties are such as nec- the “exercise of legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or essarily require the exercise of reason in the ad- quasi-judicial functions.”18 Additionally, the Act only serves aptation of means to an end, and discretion in as a partial waiver of immunity, by specifically limiting the determining how or whether the act shall be done amount and types of damages which plaintiffs may recover. or the course pursued. Discretion in the manner Finally, the Courts have specifically stated that the Act does of the performance of an act arises when the act not apply to claims against counties or local governments.19 may be performed in one of two or more ways, STATUTES ALLOWING THE PURCHASE OF LIABIL- either of which would be lawful and where it is ITY INSURANCE: In the recent past, the law concerning left to the will or judgment of the performer to sovereign immunity waiver as it relates to the purchase of determine in which way it shall be performed. liability insurance, was seemingly fraught with inconsistency. 3 Over the years, the courts have increasingly concluded that sembly also changed the statute to specifically state that “the statutes which authorize a governmental entity to purchase purchase of liability insurance or the establishment of a fund insurance are sufficient to constitute a legislative waiver of for self-insurance by the Commonwealth, its cabinets, de- immunity, to the extent the entity ultimately purchases such partments, bureaus, or agencies or its agents, officers, or insurance.20 Accordingly, the Courts would impose liability employees thereof for a government related purpose or duty against governmental entities that had purchased liability shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity or insurance, but permit immunity protection if the entity sim- any other immunity or privilege thereby held.” KRS ply refused or neglected to purchase such coverage. 44.073(14). Therefore, it appeared that through the 1986 The Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., Ky., 167 S.W.2d 700 Amendments, the General Assembly had clarified and seem- (1942), opinion appears to be the first case to address the ingly resolved that the purchase of liability insurance by a effect of authorized liability insurance on the doctrine of state agency did not act as a waiver of sovereign immunity. sovereign immunity. Kentucky courts had initially held that Unfortunately, the courts were slow to follow the legisla- suits sounding in tort against boards of education were gen- tive mandate. The first case to directly address the 1986 erally barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In Amendments and their effect on the doctrine of sovereign 1940, however, the General Assembly enacted KRS 160.310, immunity was not decided until ten years later.21 In Board of which permitted a board of education to set aside state funds Educ. of Rockcastle County. v. Kirby, Ky., 926 S.W.2d 455 to purchase liability insurance against the negligence of the (1996), the Kentucky Supreme Court relied upon the ear- drivers or operators of school buses. Two years later, the lier rationale of Taylor, and ruled that a school board was Court in Taylor held that the enactment of KRS 160.310 ef- still subject to liability under KRS 160.160(1), if the board fectuated a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for district had purchased a policy of general liability insurance. In school boards in regard to claims arising out of the negli- so holding, the Court erroneously stated that “[t]he im- gent driving. pact of Berns, supra, is to the effect that the Board of Claims Following the Taylor line of cases, the Kentucky Supreme is not the only method of statutorily waiving sovereign im- Court extended the immunity waiver theory to other state munity.” Kirby, 926 S.W.2d at 456. The Berns case, however, agencies and statutes authorizing the purchase of insurance. clearly failed to address the applicability of the 1986 amend- In Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Student Health Servs. Clinic, ments in regard to alleged waiver of immunity. “The mean- Ky., 716 S.W.2d 219 (1986), the Court held that any state ing of the 1986 statutory changes remains undecided for agency which obtains liability insurance pursuant to statute, another day when the statutory entity involved qualifies for waives sovereign immunity to the extent of the insurance sovereign immunity . . . .”22 coverage. Finally, in 1997 the Kentucky Supreme Court attempted In direct response to the 1986 Dunlap decision, the Ken- to resolve this apparent conflict. In Withers v. University of tucky General Assembly immediately amended the Board Kentucky23 the Court unambiguously and conclusively held of Claims Act to overrule the Court’s holding. The amended that sovereign immunity, “. . . is not lost or diminished or statute reads as follows: affected in any manner by the purchase of liability insur- Legislative intent as to sovereign immunity in neg- ance or the establishment of an indemnity fund, whether ligence claims.–. . . . The Commonwealth thereby directed or authorized by statute or merely undertaken with- waives the sovereign immunity defense only in out authorization. . .” The Court further stated as follows: the limited situations as herein set forth. It is fur- We now believe that any construction of other stat- ther the intention of the General Assembly to oth- utes to result in a waiver of immunity which dif- erwise expressly preserve the sovereign immunity fers from the language of the Board of Claims of the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, depart- Act is untenable. In various places throughout ments, bureaus or agencies or any of its officers, the Board of Claims Act, waiver of immunity is agents or employees while acting in the scope of alluded to and in every instance an express waiver their employment by the Commonwealth or any is required. of its cabinets, departments, bureaus or agencies As noted by the Court, the General Assembly used spe- in all other situations except where sovereign cific and express language where it intended to waive sover- immunity is specifically and expressly waived as eign immunity within the context of the Board of Claims set forth by statute. . . . Act. Furthermore, the Court specifically advised that the con- KRS 44.072 (effective July 15, 1986). The General Assem- struction of “other statutes” which results in a waiver of im- bly then enacted a limited waiver at KRS 44.073(2), which munity contrary to the language of the Board of Claims Act states as follows: is “untenable.” The Withers Court clarified that waiver of im- The Board of Claims shall have primary and ex- munity could occur only through the express and unam- clusive jurisdiction over all negligence claims for biguous language of legislative enactment. the negligent performance of ministerial acts The general impact of this decision on the doctrine of against the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, sovereign immunity in Kentucky, and its particular effect on departments, bureaus, or agencies, or any offic- the status of sovereign immunity for boards of education ers, agents, or employees thereof while acting and other governmental entities not otherwise included within the scope of their employment by the Com- within the express Board of Claim waiver, was to restore im- monwealth or any of its cabinets, departments, munity to such entities. bureaus, or agencies. The Withers decision was recently reiterated in the Ken- KRS 44.073(2) (effective July 15, 1986). The General As- tucky Supreme Court’s decisions in Franklin County v. Malone, 4 Local Government Law News Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195 (1998) and Ammerman v. Board of Educ. will likely result in the assertion that claims of negligent en- of Nicholas County, 1998 Ky. Lexis 48 (April 16, 1998). In trustment or vicarious liability are now outside the protec- Malone, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that “the ma- tion of sovereign immunity under the new law. Of course, jority of the Supreme Court determined that a clear leg- claims of vicarious liability against governmental entities are islative intent to preserve the defense of sovereign immu- often prohibited.25 However, with the recent change in sov- nity unless expressly waived was announced by the General ereign immunity, there are now no specific prohibitions Assembly and that the legislature abrogated the decision of against negligent entrustment claims against such entities Dunlap.” Because the legislature had not expressly waived or governmental employers. the county’s immunity from suit, the plaintiff’s complaint As an additional complicating factor, in the context of was dismissed. school board liability, it must be noted that KRS 160.310 in Unfortunately, the Malone decision once again muddied no way authorizes the Board to purchase automobile liabil- the waters by implying that the purchase of commercial in- ity or indemnity insurance for the Board’s alleged negligent surance would effectively waive immunity, while participa- hiring, training or supervision of bus drivers. The statute tion in a self-insurance fund would not. The court noted only permits the purchase of automobile liability coverage that “it may be appropriate to exempt commercial insur- to protect against the negligence of drivers or operators of ance companies from the protection of sovereign immunity school buses, which arguably protects the driver directly, and and require such companies to pay a proper claim. How- the Board through vicarious liability. The proper inquiry ever, in a self-insurance group, the funds have not been ex- then becomes whether the new statutory waiver provision pended until a claim is made and such funds could be used effectively waives sovereign immunity in situations where a to reduce contributions or make refunds in the following school system or governmental entity purchases automobile years.” By limiting its decision to self-insurance groups, the insurance, which by the contractual terms of the insurance Kentucky Supreme Court once again generated confusion policy, extends protection for the entity’s own negligent hir- regarding the status of the waiver issue, the same issue which ing, training or supervision of drivers. KRS 160.310 does not was previously resolved in Withers. appear to specifically authorize such coverage, as a negli- Most recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Ammer- gent entrustment claim is a direct allegation of negligence man v. Board of Education of Nicholas County, held that those against the Board, separate and apart from the independent aggrieved by sovereign immunity should seek express legis- negligence of drivers or operators. It is difficult to antici- lative waiver. Absent such waiver, the “Court must apply the pate how the courts will resolve this specific issue, however, Constitution and Statutes as they are written.” Ammerman, it could be argued that the purchase of “unauthorized” cov- 1998 Ky. Lexis at p. 7. Unfortunately, the Court failed to erage does not act as a waiver of immunity. clarify or even address the confusion created by the Malone As a final consideration, some may also question the con- Court’s distinction between the purchase of commercial in- stitutionality of the legislative attempt to waive sovereign surance and the participation in self-insurance funds. immunity through a budget act. There is a very real possibil- Perhaps as a final attempt to resolve this confusing and ity that the attempted partial waiver of sovereign immunity conflicting line of case law, the General Assembly has quite through the 1998 Executive Budget Act may violate §51 of recently tucked a provision well into House Bill 321, the the Kentucky Constitution. That constitutional mandate pro- “1998 General Assembly Executive Budget Act,” at Section vides as follows: 35, which reads as follows: No law enacted by the General Assembly shall “35. Notwithstanding any provision of the Ken- relate to more than one subject, and that shall tucky Revised Statutes to the contrary, to the ex- be expressed in the title, and no law shall be re- tent that any governmental agency purchases vised, amended, or the provisions thereof ex- motor vehicle liability insurance, sovereign im- tended or conferred by the reference to its title munity shall be waived to the extent of the insur- only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, ance coverage.”24 extended or conferred, shall be re-enacted and Although this change in the current status of immunity published at length. law would appear to have little impact on the ultimate expo- This constitutional mandate contains two separate pro- sure in most claims, it is difficult to fully appreciate how the scriptions. One directs that an act of the General Assembly Courts will interpret the provision. This new change will likely shall only relate to one subject and requires that the subject cause confusion regarding application of immunity protec- be expressed in the title of the act.26 The other directs that tion in “negligent entrustment” actions against school boards no existing law shall be revised, amended or its provisions and other governmental employers charged with the duty conferred or extended by referring to its title only, but rather of selecting, training or supervising qualified drivers to op- when such action is intended, the law is required to be re- erate vehicles on behalf of governmental entities. As a gen- enacted at length. eral rule, an entity or employer must exercise reasonable Although it has been declared that the General Assembly care while entrusting a vehicle to a qualified and experi- may repeal or modify existing statutes through enactment enced driver, and to the extent this duty is violated and an of a budget bill, the courts have recognized that any such unqualified driver causes an accident, the employer could budgetary legislation must still comply with the mandatory suffer liability under a negligent entrustment theory. Such requirements of §51 of the Kentucky Constitution.27 claims are often within the coverage terms of standard auto- Accordingly, the first necessary inquiry is whether the title mobile insurance policies. to the 1998 Executive Budget Act provides “a clue” to the Therefore, the recent statutory change in immunity law General Assembly and the public at large, that the Act in- 5 tended to waive sovereign immunity under certain circum- This is often referred to as the Berns Test. stances. Although a copy of the 1998 Act’s title is unavail- 5 Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County, Ky., 641 S.W.2d 51 (1982); able at this time, most budget acts in the past have employed Moores v. Fayette County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 412 (1967); Kenton County Public Parks Corp. v. Modlin, Ky. App., 901 S.W.2d 876 (1995). the same or similar title language, to wit: 6 Clevinger v. Board of Educ. of Pike County, Ky., 789 S.W.2d 5, 10 (1990); “AN ACT relating to appropriations for the op- Wallace v. Laurel County Bd. of Educ., Ky., 153 S.W.2d 915 (1941), eration, maintenance, support, and functioning Knott County Bd. of Educ. v. Mullins, Ky., 553 S.W.2d 852, 854 (1977). of the government of the Commonwealth of Ken- 7 Frederick v. University of Kentucky Medical Center, Ky. App., 596 S.W.2d tucky and its various officers, cabinets, depart- 30 (1980), Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 ments, boards, commissions, institutions, subdi- (1997). 8 Kenton County Public Parks Corp. v. Modlin, Ky. App., 901 S.W.2d 876 visions, agencies, and other state supported ac- (1995); Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 327, tivities.” 331 (1991). To the extent the 1998 Budget Act uses this same language, 9 Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer there will be a viable argument that the legislation fails to Dist., Ky., 805 S.W.2d 133 (1991). adequately provide “a clue” that it modifies the doctrine of 10 This is often referred to as “official immunity” or “qualified immunity.” sovereign immunity, thereby violating the subject/title pro- 11 visions of §51 of the Kentucky Constitution. Additionally, it Gould v. O’Bannon, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 220 (1989). 12 Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195 (1997); also citing appears as though the General Assembly arguably violated Upchurch v. Clinton County, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 428 (1959). the publication and re-enactment provisions of §51 of the 13 Board of Trustees of University of Kentucky v. Hayse, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 609 Kentucky Constitution by failing to publish and re-enact KRS (1989). 44.073(14) which currently states: 14 Speck v. Bowling, Ky. App., 892 S.W.2d 309 (1995). The Court noted The filing of an action in court or any other fo- that “an ‘individual officer is often left with hard choices in carry- rum or the purchase of liability insurance or the es- ing out his duties,’ [yet] we disagree that an officer is free to oper- ate his vehicle negligently or to put others on the roadways in dan- tablishment of a fund for self-insurance by the Com- ger in carrying out those duties. . . .[W]e hold Speck’s actions were monwealth, its cabinets, departments, bureaus, ministerial and that, as he was not engaged in a discretionary gov- or agencies or its agents, officers, or employees ernmental function at the time he collided with the appellee, he is thereof for a government related purpose or duty not entitled to assert a qualified immunity.” shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immu- 15 Gould v. O’Bannon, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 220 (1989). “The administration nity or any other immunity or privilege thereby held. of medical care is a ministerial function by employees, including doctors. Compliance with the applicable standard of care does not (Emphasis added). involve a discretionary governmental function.” Based upon these constitutional deficiencies, the new 16 See fn. 13. statutory waiver provision should be invalidated. Unfortu- 17 Cabinet For Human Resources Com. v. Poore, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 498 nately, any constitutional challenge to the provision will likely (1986). result in a mere temporary cure. Because the perceived con- 18 Gas Service Company, Inc. v. City of London, Ky., 687 S.W.2d 144 (1985); stitutional deficiencies are procedural in nature, any suc- Cabinet For Human Resources Com. v. Poore, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 498 cessful challenge will ultimately result in a re-enactment of (1986). 19 Ginter v. Montgomery County, Ky., 327 S.W.2d 98 (1959). “Clearly, our the waiver through constitutionally appropriate methods. Board of Claims statute does not completely abrogate the doctrine Accordingly, after numerous judicial and legislative at- of immunity even as to the state government, and as to local gov- tempts to clarify the status of immunity law, it now appears ernments it does not purport to waive any immunity.” as though the purchase of automobile insurance will once 20 Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Student Health Services Clinic, Ky., 716 again act as a limited waiver of immunity. While it is difficult S.W.2d 219 (1986), held that legislative authority to purchase li- to fully and accurately predict how the Courts will interpret ability insurance constitutes a partial waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of available insurance coverage. See also Taylor v. Knox and apply the new statutory waiver, based upon the recent County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.2d 700 (1942); Green legislative and judicial response to the fluctuating scope of River District Health Department v. Wigginton, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 475 sovereign immunity, we should only expect a continued re- (1989); Kestler v. Transit Authority of Northern Kentucky, Ky., 758 S.W.2d duction in immunity protection. 38 (1988). 21 The case of Green River Dist. Health Dep’t v. Wiggington, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 475 (1989), which was also decided after the 1986 Amendments, addressed the issue of sovereign immunity waiver and, relying on 1 72 Am. Jur. 2d States §100 (1974). Taylor and Dunlap, held that there was a limited waiver for the pur- 2 Wood v. Board of Education of Danville, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 877 (1967); chase of liability insurance. However, the injury at issue in Wiggington Rooks v. University of Louisville, Ky.App., 574 S.W.2d 923 (1978). occurred prior to the 1986 Amendments and because the 1986 3 The determination of whether an entity is entitled to protection by Amendments were not retroactive, they were not at issue in that the constitutional principle of sovereign immunity is for the judi- case. ciary. “The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, 22 Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 33 (1991). interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, sentences and sec- 23 Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997). tions of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the contro- 24 This provision of H.B.321 is effective July 15, 1998. versies before it. It is solely the function of the judiciary to so do. 25 Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195 (1997). This duty must be exercised even when such action serves as a check 26 In this respect, however, the Courts have declared that the title of on the activities of another branch of government or when the the legislation need only furnish general notification of the gen- court’s view of the constitution is contrary to that of other branches, eral subject in the act. If the title furnishes a “clue” to the act’s or even that of the public.” Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., contents, it passes constitutional muster. Talbott v. Laffoon, 257 Ky. Ky., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (1989). 773, 79 S.W.2d 244 (1935) 4 Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 327, 331 (1991). 27 Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 709 S.W.2d 437 (1986).

6 Local Government Law News Recent Kentucky Supreme Court Decision Simplifies Standard for Punitive Damage Awards by Douglas Hallock, Frost & Jacobs 1100 Vine Center Lexington, Kentucky 40507 A recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision has partially Ruling In Williams v. Wilson invalidated KRS 411.184, the Kentucky punitive damage statute, thereby reducing the standard of proof necessary to sup- In Williams v. Wilson, the Court addressed the constitu- port punitive damage awards at trial. As a result of the Court’s tional validity of the “malice” requirement, and limited its April 16, 1998 ruling in Williams v. Wilson, No. 96-SC-1122- decision in that regard. The Court noted that under that DG, (Ky. 1998), which became final on September 3, 1998, provision of the statute, punitive damages could only be litigants will be entitled to punitive damages upon an objec- awarded if the plaintiff could first prove, by clear and con- tive finding of gross negligence. vincing evidence, that the defendant intended to cause injury, or otherwise acted with a subjective awareness that death Prior Statutory Standard for Punitive Damages or bodily harm would result. In contrast, the well established In 1988, the Kentucky General Assembly considered a common law standard for awarding punitive damages prior broad tort reform proposal, and from that enacted KRS to the enactment of KRS 411.184, was “gross negligence,” 411.184, which was intended to modify the common law stan- which is conduct specifically lacking in intent or actual knowl- dard for punitive damage awards. Under that statute, a liti- edge of the result.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that gant is entitled to an award of punitive damages only “upon the “malice” provision of the statute imposes a more strin- proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defen- gent burden on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, thereby dant from whom such damages are sought acted toward the violating Sections 14, 54 and 241 of the Kentucky Constitu- plaintiff with oppression, fraud or malice,” defined as follows: tion, which limit the power of the General Assembly to alter (a) “Oppression” means conduct which is specifically in- or diminish common law rights to recover for personal intended by the defendant to subject the plaintiff to cruel and jury or death. unjust hardship. As a result of the Court’s ruling, punitive damages will (b) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, de- now be awarded in Kentucky upon a mere showing of gross ceit, or concealment of material fact known to the defendant negligence, without any reference to or proof of the and made with the intention of causing injury to the plaintiff. defendant’s actual intent or subjective knowledge. For pro- (c) “Malice” means either conduct which is specifically cedural reasons, the Court declined to address the validity intended by the defendant to cause tangible or intangible of the remaining aspects of the punitive damage statute in injury to the plaintiff or conduct that is carried out by the this matter. However, it is anticipated that the Court will ul- defendant both with a flagrant indifference to the rights of timately invalidate the “clear and convincing proof” require- the plaintiff and with a subjective awareness that such con- ment as well as the “intent” element contained within the duct will result in human death or bodily harm. respective definitions of oppression and fraud.

New Property Tax Penalties and Fees by Debra Eucker There is also a new 10% sheriff’s fee which is added to Debra Eucker is the Director of the Department of Property the tax bill at the beginning of the 10% penalty period. This Valuation, Division of Local Valuation within the Kentucky fee will be collected up to the date of the sheriff’s delin- Revenue Cabinet. quent tax bill sale. After the tax claim sale, the sheriff’s 10% add-on fee is no longer collectible, however, a 10% clerk’s House 568, the “Collections Bill,” has made several sig- fee and a 20% county attorney’s fee will be imposed. These nificant changes to the property tax collection process. Most add-on fees will be paid by the delinquent taxpayer. Prior to of these changes are effective for the collection of the 1998 the passage of HB 568, these fees were deducted from the property tax bills. One of the most significant changes con- taxing districts’ revenues. cerns the penalties and fees which are imposed when a tax Fliers which describe these new add-on fees have been bill becomes delinquent. made available to all sheriffs for insertion with tax bills, and Prior to the passage of HB 568, there was a 2% penalty the sheriffs have been instructed to include an explanation which was added to the unpaid tax bill when it became de- of the new fees in their newspaper advertisements. linquent on January 1 (or 60 days after the issuance of the Should you need any further information about HB 568, bill, if the tax calendar had been delayed.) For 1998, the 2% please contact the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, Division of penalty has been increased to 5%. Local Valuation at (502) 564-8338. 7 Cities Task Force Discusses Louisville-Jefferson Compact by Rebecca Mullins Reprinted from the September 1998 issue of the Legislative Record Twelve years ago the City of Louisville and Jefferson County opment (OED) which has benefited from shared taxes un- signed an agreement which froze the land annexation to der the compact. The 1998 compact also created an Eco- protest the autonomy of small cities on Louisville’s out-skirts nomic Growth Fund which will be funded with $2 million in and protect revenue sources of county and city governments. city and county funds each year for the next five years. The That agreement, called the Louisville/Jefferson County business arm of the OED, according to the 1998 proposal, Compact, was renewed for 10 years in July by the county’s has been fused with the Louisville area Chamber of Com- two largest governments. Although the compact is not “a merce for greater efficiency. perfect solution” to government inefficiencies and duplicated “We wanted people to have one-stop shopping,” services, it has worked. Jefferson County Deputy County Judge Traughber said. Executive Bruce Traughber told members of the Special Task The approximately 135,000 people who live in Jefferson Force on Local Government in Counties Containing a City County’s small cities also benefit from services offered by of First Class July 29. Louisville and Jefferson County, but the services those cities Louisville Deputy Mayor Tina Heavrin agreed, stating that provide–policing, garbage pickup, public works such as road- the compact has created financial equality. In the 1980s. work–help alleviate the county’s financial burden. Louisville and Jefferson County’s occupational tax revenue If residents in the small cities want an “urban level of ser- only grew by $1 million from 1976 to 1986. That changed vice,” Traughber said it is difficult to provide that service with- from 1986 to 1997 under the compact, when city and county out small suburban governments. shared tax revenue grew by $36 million, according to the The cities and the county are currently discussing creation 1998 compact proposal. of a merged police force, merged inspection service and Heavrin said that today, 86 percent of local tax dollars ex- shared responsibility for licenses and permits. The small cit- cluding school taxes are split between the city and county ies will present their view of merged services at future task government, and that small cities receive 8.8 percent of total force meetings. tax dollars. The county’s 21 fire districts share five percent. Traughber said although the compact streamlines govern- “The main reason the annexation has caused a big prob- ment, both cities and the county provide important services lem for this community is because of the way the occupa- to their residents. Jefferson County provides jail service, youth tional tax is structured,” Heavrin said. “Now, the city and detention, animal and air pollution control, public works and county both benefit from increased revenues in the commu- human services while funding emergency services and financ- nity,” Heavrin told members. ing county administration. The City of Louisville’s operational Local government officials from Louisville and Jefferson costs include safety and emergency services, sanitation, capi- County and state legislators sitting on the task force lis- tal building projects, the zoological gardens, housing and tened as Traughber and Heavrin discussed the renewed urban development. compact for shared services between the two governments, “The goal of the compact was to have the city and county and how the compact affects the more than 90 small cities get more tax revenue,” Heavrin told the task force. “The only in Jefferson County. way to do that was to share the occupational taxes.” Louisville and Jefferson County share funding of the metro The task force was created by the 1998 General Assembly parks system, the library and an Office of Economic Devel- to address issues in Louisville-Jefferson County.

OAG Opinions

Opinions of the Attorney General are legal opinions that government issues. Portions are reprinted directly from the the Attorney General’s Office provides to public officials. OAGs. If you would like a copy of a complete OAG, please These opinions clarify Kentucky law for public officials, and contact our office. represent the official position of the Attorney General’s Of- OAG 98-10: Vehicles transporting primary forest fice. Although these opinions do not have the force of law, they are persuasive and may be cited in court. products OAGs are called formal opinions. The Attorney General’s Issue: Whether the 10% weight tolerance limits for vehicles Office may also issue letters to public officials providing in- transporting primary forest products is available to all com- formal advice or information. These letters do not receive mercial vehicles transporting primary forest products or the same review as OAGs, and are not considered legal au- only those registered exclusively for transporting such prod- thority. Therefore, this newsletter will not publish informal ucts; KRS 189.222; KRS 186.050. opinion letters. Requested by: Sen. Richard Sanders Following is an overview of selected formal OAGs issued Date: July 27, 1998 from July 1, 1998 to September 30, 1998, which discuss local Synopsis: KRS 189.222 sets forth height, length and weight 8 Local Government Law News limits for motor vehicles, including limits for vehicles regis- Executive Branch Ethics Commission tered pursuant to KRS 186.050 and engaged in transporta- Advisory Opinion tion of primary forest products. This statute allows a 10% weight tolerance for any vehicle registered for transporting The Commission issued the following opinion on its own primary forest products. KRS 186.050 allows a 25% discount initiative: in annual registration fees for commercial vehicles exclu- Issue: Whether a County Detention Center employee’s vol- sively used for transporting primary forest products. unteer activity for the Sheriff’s Office presents a conflict of The Attorney General stated that the statutes are clear interest. and unambiguous. To receive the reduction in annual fees, Date: September 3, 1998 the vehicle must be exclusively used for transporting pri- Synopsis: A youth worker trainee at the Breathitt County mary forest products. To receive the 10% weight tolerance, Detention Center requested approval to volunteer at the the vehicle must be properly registered for transporting pri- Breathitt County Sheriff’s Office. The Ethics Commission mary forest products. addressed whether a conflict of interest existed because of the Sheriff’s Office possibly becoming involved with juve- OAG 98-11: Public disclosure of bid documents niles also served through the Detention Center. Issue: Whether documents tendered as part of a competi- The Ethics Commission ruled that volunteer activities tive sealed bidding become public record if the bids are are not prohibited unless the volunteer activity conflicts with rejected; KRS 45A.080; KRS 45A.085; KRS 45A.090; OAG official duties. No conflict exists in this situation because the 85-68. employee’s responsibilities at the Detention Center do not Requested by: Rep. Robert R. Damron involve the Sheriff’s Office. However, the Detention Center’s Date: July 27, 1998 in-house policies may preclude the volunteer activities. Synopsis: Pursuant to KRS 45A.080(4) bid documents sub- Open Meeting Decisions and Open Records mitted to the Commonwealth through competitive sealed Decisions bidding become public records when bids are opened. Bid documents submitted through competitive negotiations The Office of the Attorney General issues opinions on open become public record at the time the contract is awarded. meeting complaints and open records complaints. These KRS 45A.085(6); OAG 85-68; 200 KAR 5:307 Section 4. opinions review citizens’ complaints that a public agency im- When sealed bids are rejected, competitive negotiations properly denied review of public documents or access to an may occur. Therefore, the following questions are raised: open meeting. These opinions are legally binding. Pursuant to KRS 61.880, if these opinions are not appealed within thirty 1) Can public disclosure of bid documents associated (30) days, the opinions have the effect and force of law. with a competitive sealed bid be delayed until a determination is made as to whether the contracting 98-OMD-125 agency will move to competitive negotiation? In re: Georgia Williams/Hardin County Planning and De- 2) If a decision is made to move to a competitive velopment Commission negotiation, can the original documents be considered Date: August 10, 1998 part of the negotiation process and remain closed until a Issue: Whether the Commission violated the Open Meetings contract is awarded or negotiations are canceled? Act at its December 10, 1996 regular meeting when a pro- The Attorney General answered no to both questions. posed map amendment was approved to permit a two-lot The competitive sealed bidding process and the competi- mobile home park on rural residential property. tive negotiation process are two successive processes, not Synopsis: The complainant alleged that she received notice simultaneous processes. of an earlier meeting, at which time a vote on a map amendment ended in a tie. The Commission did not individually OAG 98-12: Concealed deadly weapons notify her of a second meeting, at which time the Commis- Issue: Whether employers may prohibit duly licensed em- sion voted and passed the amendment. The Attorney Gen- ployees from keeping concealed deadly weapons in per- eral ruled that although the Commission did not follow sonally owned vehicles parked on employer’s premises; KRS procedural requirements, the Commission did not violate 237.110 (13) the Open Meetings Act by not sending individual notice of Requested by: Rep. Bob Heleringer its December 10 meeting. Date: September 9, 1998 The Commission procedurally violated the Opens Meet- Synopsis: KRS 237.110 allows employers to prohibit employ- ings Act by issuing a response on the fourth day following ees from carrying concealed weapons on the employer’s receipt of the complaint. This violation is mitigated by the property. An employer may not prohibit an employee from fact that the complainant addressed the complaint to the carrying a concealed weapon in the employee’s vehicle. wrong individual. Also, the Commission did not include This opinion addresses the issue of employee-owned ve- the requisite statement stating its position or how the stat- hicles parked on the employer’s property. ute applies. The Attorney General, using canons of statutory con- However, substantively, the Commission’s failure to indi- struction, stated that, generally, an employer may prohibit vidually notify Ms. Williams of the December 10 meeting weapons on the premises. However, the statute provides did not violate the Open Meetings Act. The Act does not an exception for weapons located in employee-owned ve- require individual notice of regular or special meetings, but hicles parked on the premises. does require public notice. The December 10 meeting was 9 a regular meeting and the Commission satisfied the public 98-OMD-147 notice requirement. In re: The Sebree Banner/City of Sebree 98-ORD-133 Date: September 3, 1998 Issue: In re: Dennis F. Janes/Bullitt County Public Schools Whether Sebree City Council violated the Open Meetings Act when it went into closed session at its Au- Date: August 18, 1998 Issue: Whether the school system properly denied Mr. Janes’ gust 6, 1998 meeting to discuss proposed or pending liti- request for documents relating to his client’s former em- gation and the future acquisition or sale of real property. ployment with the school system, particularly his accumu- Synopsis: lated sick leave. Although the City’s response to the complaint was Synopsis: Although the school system was procedurally defi- procedurally deficient, its position was legally correct. CSX Railroad offered to purchase a strip of land on the cient in its response, it substantively complied with the Open Records Act. east side of the railroad. The City Council went into closed The school system responded to Mr. Janes’ request by send- session to discuss proposed litigation against the City of Sebree by CSX and the sale of property. The City Council ing him one document, the only document on record. Ap- parently, the school system lost or misplaced the personnel determined that public discussion of the property would file. Because the school system has an obligation to properly affect its price. The Attorney General agreed that the City Council properly went into closed session. maintain records, the mismanagement of the records constitutes a procedural violation of the Act. The City of Sebree procedurally violated the Open Meet- However, the school system substantively complied with ings Act by failing to respond to the complaint in writing within three business days. the Act by disclosing all documents on record. A public agency has no obligation to compile data or generate documents 98-ORD-147 that do not exist. In re: Randy Skaggs/Boone County Animal Shelter 98-ORD-140 Date: September 3, 1998 In re: The Kentucky Post/City of Covington Issue: Whether the animal shelter properly denied access to Date: August 31, 1998 copies of all of the shelter’s dog licensee’s to be included in Issue: Whether the City properly denied a reporter’s request Mr. Skaggs’ mailing database. for the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development’s re- Synopsis: Mr. Skaggs sought the names and addresses of the port on the Covington housing department, and all written shelter’s Kentucky dog licensees. He wanted to include responses by the City of Covington. them in his mailing database. The Attorney General reaf- Synopsis: The City properly denied the request because the firmed 95-ORD-153 and held “that the privacy interest of HUD report is a draft which is excluded from the Open dog license holders in their names and home addresses Records Act by KRS 61.878(1)(i) and (j). All responses are outweighs the non-Open Records Act related public inter- exempt because the city “has not determined what action, if est in disclosure which [Mr. Skaggs] articulates.” The in- any, will be taken based on that report. . . .” The responses are formation sought revealed nothing about the operation of not final action, and are preliminary reports which set forth the shelter, and great weight is given to the right of privacy opinions and formulate policies. in one’s address. Recent Change of Address or a New Local Official? Please keep us informed. If you have a new local official in your city, county, or special district, or if you have recently changed your address, please let us know. Simply complete this form and mail it to us at Chase Local Government Law Center, Chase College of Law, 406 Nunn Hall, Highland Heights, Kentucky 41099. Thank you for helping us keep our records up to date.

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10 Local Government Law News Cumulative Newsletter Index

ADULT ENTERTAINMENT Assembly” SB 45: Local government 98-4: Health insurance coverage for COUNTIES budgets and escrow accounts; retired state employees Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General Amends KRS 68.260 and KRS 371.160 SALARIES Assembly” HB 432: Powers of fiscal Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.6: “1998 General Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General court; Amends KRS 67.083; EMER- Assembly” SB 103: Fiscal court Assembly” HB 230: Payroll deductions GENCY ACT organizations; Amends 67.050 for local governments; Amends KRS ANNEXATION JUDGE EXECUTIVES (seePUBLIC OFFICIALS) 65.158 CITIES EDUCATION PUBLIC OFFICIALS Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General SCHOOLS COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE Assembly” HB 610: Annexation of a Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.14: “Recent Vacancies sixth class city by a third, fourth, or OAGs” 97-25: Length of school term Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General fifth class city; Creates a new section Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.14: “Recent Assembly” SB 326: Vacancy in County of KRS Ch. 81A OAGs” 97-26: Compulsory school Judge/Executive Office: Amends KRS BAIL BONDS attendance law 67.705 FILING FEES Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.14: “Recent FELONIES Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.15: “Recent OAGs” OAGs” 97-28: Paying school employ- Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.14: “Recent OAGs” 97-32: Filing fee of bail bonds ees for unused sick leave 97-30: Ouster of an official who has BOUNDARY CHANGES Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.15: Recent OAGs” pleaded guilty to a felony ANNEXATION 97-35: Acting superintendent may IMMUNITY (see IMMUNITY) Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.1: “Basic Prin- not fill the position of superinten- SEWERS ciples of Annexation” dent CITIES BUDGETS Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.15: Recent OAGs” Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General SPECIAL DISTRICTS (see SPECIAL DISTRICTS) 97-36: Residency requirements for Assembly” HB 201: Joint sewer CHASE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW school superintendents agencies; Creates a new section of CENTER EMERGENCY SERVICES KRS Ch. 76 CLINICAL PROGRAMS PERSONNEL SPECIAL DISTRICTS Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.12: “Chase Local Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General BUDGETS Government Law Center Develops Assembly” SB 288: Emergency service Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General Legal Clinical Program” personnel: Amends KRS 65.156, KRS Assembly” HB 127: Special districts; Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.5: “Local 72.415, and KRS 189.920 Amends KRS Ch. 65 Government Clinical Program ETHICS TAXATION FEES & FINES Successfully Concludes Summer GIFTS INSURANCE TAX Program” Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.8: “Recent OAGs” Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.15: “Recent OAGs” LEGAL SERVICES Executive Branch Ethics Commission 97-33: Municipal taxation of life Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.1: “The NEW Chase Advisory Opinion insurance premiums Local Government Law Center” JUDICIAL ETHICS CODE TECHNOLOGY CITIES Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.4: “Kentucky INTERNET BOARD OF ALDERMEN Supreme Court Rules Judges’ Wives Vol 1, Issue I, 5/98 p.13: “Internet Discipline on Payroll Permissible Under Judicial Assistance for Local Governments” Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.8: “Recent OAGs” Ethics Code” TELECOMMUNICATIONS 98-6: The authority of the President FINANCE COUNTIES (see Counties) CELLULAR TOWERS of the Board of Alderman to IMMUNITY Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General discipline board members KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND Assembly” HB 168: Cellular telecom- CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARDS WILDLIFE (see WILDLIFE) munications facilities; Creates new GENERALLY LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY sections of KRS Ch. 100 Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.5: “Local UTILITIES Assembly” HB 697: Local Govern- Legislators Absolutely Immune from CABLE FRANCHISE ment Code Enforcement Boards; Liability in Enacting Ordinances” Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.2: “Cable Fran- Amends sections of KRS Ch. 65 MINIMUM WAGE chise Renewal Process – An Overview” COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS GENERAL CABLE TV Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.2: “Cable Fran- Assembly” SB 114: Community Assembly” HB 305: Minimum wage; chise Renewal Process – An Overview” foundations; creates a new section of Amends KRS 337.275 MUNICIPAL UTILITIES KRS Ch. 65 PAYROLL DEDUCTION Salaries COUNTIES Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General FINANCE Assembly” HB 230: Payroll deductions Assembly” SB 269: municipal utilities; Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.6: “1998 General for local governments; Amends KRS Amends KRS 96.530 and KRS 95.520 Assembly” SB 43: County financial 65.158 WILDLIFE management; Amends KRS 68.275 PERSONNEL REINTRODUCED WILDLIFE FISCAL COURT - AUTHORIZATION RETIREMENT Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.8: “Recent OAGs” Adult Entertainment Hazardous Duty 98-8: Liability for reintroduced Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.7: “1998 General Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.8: “Recent OAGs” wildlife Assembly” HB 432: Powers of fiscal 98-7: Retirement benefits for ZONING OPERATIONS court; Amends KRS 67.083; EMER- hazardous duty employees who are HOG OPERATIONS GENCY ACT members of CERS and KERS Vol 1, Issue I 5/98 p.15: “Recent OAGs” FISCAL COURT Health Insurance 97-31: County regulation of industrial- Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.6: “1998 General Vol 1, Issue II 8/98 p.8: “Recent OAGs” scale hog operations 11 The Chase Local Government Law Center

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