Against Compatibilism

1. The Dilemma: Harry Frankfurt claims to have proposed a view of free will that is compatible with determinism (where agents lack the ability to do otherwise). But, Laura Ekstrom (a famous philosopher of free will right here at W&M‼) critiques this claim.

Ekstrom identifies two strategies by which we might refute Frankfurt. Note that, in Election Day, Frankfurt does not specify whether determinism is true. But, either way, it seems that Frankfurt is mistaken.

We stated Frankfurt’s argument as follows (assume that we’re talking about the version of Election Day where the neurosurgeon does NOT intervene):

1. In Election Day, Jones could not do otherwise. 2. In Election Day, Jones is responsible for his action. 3. Therefore, being responsible for one’s action does not require the ability to do otherwise (i.e., PAP is false).

Philosopher John Martin Fischer puts it this way:

“[There is] a dilemma: the Frankfurt-type stories presuppose either that causal determinism is true or that it is false. If the former, then the claim that the relevant agent is morally responsible is question-begging, and if the latter, then the claim that the agent lacks alternative possibilities is false.” (My Way, 2006)

Ekstrom argues for this dilemma, claiming that premise 1 is false if indeterminism is true, and premise 2 is false if determinism is true.

2. Indeterminism; P1 is false; Jones DOES have the ability to do otherwise: In Election Day, Frankfurt says, if Jones votes for Trump without the interference of the neurosurgeon, he DOES act freely even though he could not have done otherwise.

But, as Frankfurt sets up the story, the neurosurgeon will only intervene if he observes Jones STARTING to form the intention to vote for the wrong candidate. Now, imagine that determinism is false, and that Jones COULD HAVE started to vote for Clinton, but he doesn’t (and the neurosurgeon never intervenes). While it is true that he “couldn’t have done otherwise” if we mean “he couldn’t have voted for anyone but Trump.” But, in another sense, he DOES still seem to have alternate possibilities available to him. Namely, he can either (i) form the intention to vote for Trump, and then vote for Trump without intervention, or he can (ii) form the intention to vote for Clinton and then vote for Trump WITH intervention. But, then, Frankfurt has NOT refuted PAP.

1 In Ekstrom’s version, Jones is deciding whether or not to kill someone (Smith). If he tries not to, Black will intervene and force Jones to do so anyway. She writes:

“still he could have tried to decide otherwise … [meaning] he could have gone some way toward deciding not to kill Smith. After all, presumably … Black’s device is triggered by the occurrence of some event, an event that could be described as Jones’s trying to decide, or beginning to decide, in an alternate way than as Black desires. And the presence of this indeterminacy or a “flicker of freedom” at this point … shows that Jones’s being morally responsible for his act does not conflict with the truth of P.A.P.” (283)

3. Determinism; P2 is false; Jones is NOT morally responsible for his action: When we think about Election Day, we ARE inclined to feel that Jones is responsible for his action. But, we are probably smuggling in the idea that Jones COULD HAVE tried to decide to vote for Clinton (which, we have already shown, would not refute PAP). But, now really, vividly imagine that determinism is true, so that Jones COULD NOT HAVE even TRIED to decide to vote for Clinton. Is it still so obvious that he is responsible for his action? Ekstrom puts the worry beautifully (284-285):

“perhaps, we think that Jones committed his act freely, of his own accord, if he was not pushed into killing Smith by anything or anyone. And since, by hypothesis in this case, Black did not intervene, so that Black did not push Jones into killing Smith, we conclude that Jones committed his act freely and hence we conclude that Jones is morally responsible for killing Smith. But now, focus our attention on the fact that causal determinism might be true. If it is true, then past events together with the laws of nature are together sufficient for Jones's making the particular decision he makes. A perfect predictor—a being with knowledge of all of the relevant facts about the past and of the laws of nature—could tell us with certainty what Jones will decide, based on her knowledge of the past and the laws. So Jones's subjective perception of available options is irrelevant; in fact, the past pushes him into one particular decision state, the only state physically possible at the time, given the past and the laws of nature. Thus the incompatibilist argues that, if determinism is true, then Jones was, in fact, pushed into killing Smith: he was pushed by the past and the laws of nature to kill Smith, since the past and the laws being what they were causally necessitated Jones's action of killing Smith. Focusing on the fact that Jones was pushed by the past and the laws into making precisely the decision he made, makes clear that his responsibility is undermined, the incompatibilist argues. In the actual circumstances, given the truth of determinism, Jones could do no other than kill Smith. Hence, to hold that Jones killed Smith freely and so is morally responsible for killing him in the Frankfurt-type case begs the question against the incompatibilist. In fact, according to the incompatibilist, if determinism is true, Jones should not be judged as morally responsible for his decision and his act, given the pushing feature of determinism. Hence Jones does not have available alternatives for action in the Frankfurt case, if determinism is assumed to hold, yet Jones is not morally responsible, so P.A.P. is not defeated.”

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Reply: The compatibilist will quickly point out that this is unfair. The “push” of determinism is importantly different from the push of Black, the neurosurgeon. If determinism is true, then the “push” is merely our own beliefs, desires, values and so on. But, don’t we WANT these things to be the things that “push” us to action?

On compatibilism + determinism, we simply act for reasons that we find compelling. This is not at all like being shoved by a stranger.

Rebuttal: But, Ekstrom points out, whether the pusher is inside or outside of one’s head, it is pushing nonetheless. For, if determinism is true, then my very beliefs, desires, reasons, values THEMSELVES have been determined since before my birth. Sure, Jones “wants” to vote for Trump (and he identifies with/approves of this desire), but all of that is just a product of the laws of nature! He could not have wanted anything else. So, what does it matter to freedom that I act according to my desires IF THOSE DESIRES THEMSELVES ARE DETERMINED?

Pereboom’s Four Case Argument: Derk Pereboom puts this last thought nicely (well, not really. His article is super complicated and boring, which is why I assigned Beebee’s summary of it instead). Pereboom considers four cases, where in each of them, Professor Plum kills Ms. White:

Plum1: Neuroscientists have controlled every aspect of Professor Plum’s brain since birth, and they manipulate him with remote control to kill Ms. White.

Clearly, Plum1 is not morally responsible for his action. How could he be? Everything he does is merely a product of the scientist’s complete and utter control.

Plum2: Neuroscientists do not control Professor Plum’s brain moment to moment, but programmed his brain at birth to generate throughout his life the sorts of desires (first and second order) that result in him killing Ms. White.

Plum2 doesn’t seem to be responsible for his action either. For, his action is still the result of the scientist’s mind control. The only difference is that, in Plum2, they input ALL of the orders at birth rather than inputting them moment to moment (as in Plum1).

Plum3: Rather than neuroscientists programming Professor Plum from birth, instead he is rigorously trained and conditioned by others from birth to behave and react to situations in very specific ways. These shape his character so thoroughly, and from such an early age, that he is unable to form the intention to question or go against his conditioning. One of the ways that he is conditioned to behave results in him killing Ms. White.

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The only difference between Plum2 and Plum3 is that, rather than neuroscientists programming his brain directly at birth, instead he is “programmed” by his rigorous training and conditioning at birth (and through childhood). Pereboom thinks this is irrelevant to moral responsibility, and so it is clear that Plum3 is not responsible for his action.

Plum4: Determinism is true. Professor Plum is just a normal human being who, because of the initial conditions of his birth and genetics which shaped how he would behave and react to various situations, plus the circumstances that he found himself in (all of which were determined by the laws of nature long before his birth), he kills Ms. White.

The only difference between Plum3 and Plum4 is that his behavioral conditioning was the result of the laws of the universe, rather than people. His “programming” was simply the laws of nature (such that his act was determined since the beginning of the universe), rather than the programming of other agents. But, Pereboom thinks this is irrelevant to moral responsibility. So, Plum4 is not morally responsible for his action.

Conclusion: Pereboom’s conclusion is that, contrary to what compatibilists say, we can NOT be free or morally responsible for our actions if determinism is true.

In effect, he is saying that Jones manipulated into voting by the neurosurgeon is in the same situation as Jones living in a deterministic universe manipulated by no one. Neither are morally responsible for their actions. Pereboom is in agreement here that, when we assign moral responsibility to Jones, we are not imagining the fact of determinism vividly enough. Plum1 - Plum4 are designed to take us there in baby steps.

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