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4/2013 Iranian Kurds 4/2013 ENG Iranian Kurds On Conditions for Iranian Kurdish Parties in Iran and KRI, Activities in the Kurdish Area of Iran, Conditions in Border Area and Situation of Returnees from KRI to Iran 30 May to 9 June 2013 Copenhagen, September 2013 Danish Refugee Council Danish Immigration Service Borgergade 10, 3rd floor Ryesgade 53 1300 Copenhagen K 2100 Copenhagen Ø Phone: 00 45 33 73 50 00 Phone: 00 45 35 36 66 00 Web: www.drc.dk Web: www.newtodenmark.dk E-mail:[email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Overview of Danish fact finding reports published in 2012 and 2013 Update (2) On Entry Procedures At Kurdistan Regional Government Checkpoints (Krg); Residence Procedures In Kurdistan Region Of Iraq (Kri) And Arrival Procedures At Erbil And Suleimaniyah Airports (For Iraqis Travelling From Non-Kri Areas Of Iraq), Joint Report of the Danish Immigration Service/UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission to Erbil and Dahuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), conducted 11 to 22 November 2011 2012: 1 Security and human rights issues in South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia, 30 January to 19 February 2012 2012: 2 Afghanistan, Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum Determination Process, Rapport from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Kabul, Afghanistan, 25 February to 4 March 2012 2012: 3 Chechens in the Russian Federation – residence registration, racially motivated violence and fabricated criminal cases, Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service’s and Danish Refugee Council’s fact finding mission to Moscow and St Petersburg, the Russian Federation from 23 May to 5 June 2012 2012: 4 Update on security and human rights issues in South- and Central Somalia, including Mogadishu, Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service’s and the Norwegian Landinfo’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia, 17 to 28 October 2012 2013: 1 Iran - On Conversion to Christianity, Issues concerning Kurds and Post-2009 Election Protestors as well as Legal Issues and Exit Procedures, Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service, the Norwegian LANDINFO and Danish Refugee Council’s fact-finding mission to Tehran, Iran, Ankara, Turkey and London, United Kingdom, 9 November to 20 November 2012 and 8 January to 9 January 2013 2013: 2 Security and protection in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia, Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service’s and the Norwegian Landinfo’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 16 April to 7 May 2013 2013: 3 IRANIAN KURDS Front page photo: Border point at Awisar resort on Halabja (Iraq)-Paveh (Iran) border. The photo is taken inside Iranian soil, spring 2013. Photo by Fazel Hawramy of Kurdishblogger.com 2 IRANIAN KURDS CONTENTS INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................... 7 1) KURDISH POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE KURDISH AREA OF IRAN ............................ 9 1.1. STATUS AND REPUTE OF KURDISH PARTIES AMONG KURDS IN THE KURDISH AREAS OF IRAN ......................................................... 9 1.2. ACTIVITIES OF KURDISH POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN ............................................................................................................ 13 1.3. CONSEQUENCES OF CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES FOR THE KURDISH POLITICAL PARTIES .................................................................. 15 1.3.1. Consequences for party members .................................................................................................................. 16 1.3.2. Consequences for party sympathizers ............................................................................................................ 17 1.3.3. Consequences of carrying and distributing political materials, particularly flyers ........................................ 18 1.3.4. Risks to family members of persons associated with a Kurdish party ............................................................ 21 1.4. EXTENT AND WAYS OF MONITORING BY THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... 23 1.5. OCCURRENCE OF NON-KURDS SUPPORTING THE KURDISH PARTIES ....................................................................................... 24 1.6. ACCESS TO INTERNET IN THE BIG CITIES IN THE KURDISH AREA OF IRAN .................................................................................. 24 2) KDPI AND KDP-IRAN ......................................................................................... 26 2.1. KDPI ....................................................................................................................................................................... 26 2.1. 1. Party organisation of KDPI ............................................................................................................................ 26 2.1.2. Activities by KDPI ............................................................................................................................................ 27 2.1.2.1 Democratic Youth Union of Iranian Kurdistan ............................................................................................................28 2.1.2.2. Communication means used by KDPI, use, production, storage and distribution of flyers by KDPI ..........................29 2.1.3. Recruitment to and membership of KDPI ....................................................................................................... 30 2.1.4. Membership cards issued by KDPI .................................................................................................................. 32 2.1.5. Letters of recommendation issued by KDPI .................................................................................................... 32 2.1.6. Recruitment and training of peshmargas by KDPI ......................................................................................... 33 2.2. KDP-IRAN................................................................................................................................................................. 35 2.2.1. Party organization of KDP-Iran ...................................................................................................................... 35 2.2.2. Aktivities by KDP-Iran ..................................................................................................................................... 35 2.2.2.1. Communication means used by KDP-Iran ..................................................................................................................35 2.2.2.2. Use, production, storage and distribution of flyers by KDP-Iran ................................................................................35 2.2.3. Recruitment to and membership of KDP-Iran ................................................................................................ 36 2.2.4. Membership cards issued by KDP-Iran ........................................................................................................... 38 2.2.5. Letters of recommendation issued by KDP-Iran ............................................................................................. 38 2.2.6. Recruitment and training of peshmargas by KDP-Iran................................................................................... 39 3) KOMALA PARTIES ............................................................................................. 40 3.1. KOMALA, SKHKI ........................................................................................................................................................ 40 3.1.1. Party organisation of Komala, SKHKI ............................................................................................................ 40 3.1.2. Activities by Komala, SKHKI ............................................................................................................................ 40 3.1.2.1. Communication means used by Komala, SKHKI .........................................................................................................41 3.1.2.2. Use, production, storage and distribution of flyers by Komala, SKHKI .......................................................................42 3.1.3. Recruitment to and membership of Komala, SKHK ........................................................................................ 43 3.1.4. Membership cards issued by Komala, SKHKI .................................................................................................. 43 3.1.5. Letters of recommendation issued by Komala, SKHKI .................................................................................... 43 3.1.6. Activities by Komala, SKHKI in KRI .................................................................................................................. 43 3.1.7. Recruitment and training of peshmargas by Komala, SKHKI ......................................................................... 44 3 IRANIAN KURDS 3.2. KOMALA, KZK ........................................................................................................................................................... 44 3.2.1. Party organization of Komala, KZK ................................................................................................................ 44 1.3.4. Activities by Komala, KZK ..............................................................................................................................
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