New Evidence on North Korea in 1956

Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 New Evidence on North Korea in 1956 Introduction by James F. Person ew events since the end of the 1950-1953 Korean War contrast, concludes that the attack on Kim Il Sung’s policies at have had such enduring political relevance in the 60-year the August Plenum “was a desperate attempt to turn the tide Fhistory of the North Korean party-state as the three-year rather than a serious challenge to Kim’s rule.”5 dispute in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) over development The documentary evidence on post-war North Korea has strategies that culminated in the summer of 1956. Yet, due to the been greatly enhanced recently through the release of docu- secretive nature of the regime and the paucity of documentary ments at the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History evidence from Korean and other archives, little has been known (RGANI), the post-Stalin Central Committee archive. These about this pivotal event until recently. While accounts of the epi- documents, some of which are presented below, originated sode have appeared in many histories of modern Korea,1 they with the Central Committee Department for Relations with have largely focused on the August 1956 Plenum of the KWP International Communist Parties, the Communist Party of the Central Committee (CC), which is generally portrayed as the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) own foreign policy organ.6 Some of climax of a decade-long power struggle between four factions: the documents were also analyzed by Japanese scholar Nobuo the so-called “Soviet faction” composed of ethnic Koreans who Shimotomai, who accessed them in microfilm copy at the Slavic lived in the Soviet Union and were sent to serve in administra- Research Center in Hokkaido, Japan. As I argue in CWIHP tive positions in northern Korea after 1945; the “Yan’an faction,” Working Paper No. 52,7 the new documents reveal that contrary made up of those Koreans who lived in China during Japan’s to the common wisdom on factional power struggles, a myriad colonial rule over Korea; the “domestic faction” of veteran com- of factors and motivations played into the pivotal events of 1956. munist Bak Heonyeong; and Kim Il Sung’s own “Gapsan fac- Kim and his opponents did not simply compete for raw power, tion” of former anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters. According to the they also had clear ideological and practical preferences and dif- standard narrative, following the purge of Bak and his support- ferences. Indeed, as the newly available materials seem to sug- ers in 1953 for allegedly attempting to seize power, only Kim Il gest, the precipitating cause of events at the August 1956 Plenum Sung’s group and the foreign supported “Soviet” and “Yan’an” was not a factional power struggle or Kim Il Sung’s prolonged factions remained. Mirroring to a certain degree North Korea’s absence from the country during the summer of 1956; rather, official historiography, the August 1956 Plenum is generally after a three-year dispute over socialist development strategies, portrayed as an abortive coup d’etat orchestrated by the “Soviet” opponents of Kim Il Sung’s vision for modernizing the DPRK and “Yan’an” factions.2 made a final, desperate attempt to convince the North Korean Recent accounts by Russian scholar Andrei Lankov and leader to adopt post-Stalin Soviet-style “New Course” economic Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai have shed additional light reforms. Moreover, they sought to rid the party of nationalist on the actions of key actors in the weeks and months before the elements hostile to foreign influences, and place limits on the August Plenum.3 Drawing on newly released materials from growing personality cult in North Korea. the Soviet and Hungarian archives, both scholars describe the In light of the new documentary evidence, the events of clandestine efforts of the “Soviet” and “Yan’an” factions to 1956 can no longer be examined with a narrow focus on a challenge the KWP leadership, hastily organized during North power struggle between groups with diverse revolutionary Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s absence from the country while on backgrounds. Such an approach to a large degree mirrors North a month-long trip to fraternal communist countries. Their con- Korea’s official historiography in that it is narrated “in terms of clusions about the severity of the threat to Kim Il Sung, howev- Kim Il Sung’s supremacy over all […] political challenges, from er, differ rather sharply. Lankov argues that from the beginning, within and without.”8 Factional rivalries, the documents suggest, Kim’s opponents sought to unseat him.4 Despite agreeing with were exaggerated by Kim Il Sung as a pretext to purge policy Lankov about the factional origins of the conflict, Szalontai, by opponents. Rather than a factional power struggle, the events of James F. Person is the coordinator of the North Korea International Documentation Project (History and Public Policy Program) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is currently completing a PhD in Korean history at the George Washington University, working on a dissertation on North Korea’s relations with the Soviet Union and China from 1953-1962. 447 New Evidence on North Korea 1956 have to be seen in the context of the broader theme of com- peting visions for socialist modernization, both inside the North A NOTE ABOUT THE REVISED Korean party-state and throughout the communist bloc. Another ROMANIZATION OF KOREAN factor we must be mindful of is Kim Il Sung’s determination to limit the influence of those he felt did not fully appreciate the CWIHP has adopted the Revised Romanization of Korean realities of life in North Korea, i.e. the Soviet and Chinese par- (2000), the official Korean language Romanization sys- ties, and their minions inside the KWP. This necessitates a com- tem in South Korea. Among the notable changes to the prehensive reexamination of the DPRK’s history from the end Romanization of Korean words and names, the breve has of the Korean War in 1953 through the August Plenum of 1956. been eliminated and aspirated consonants (as in k’, t’, p’, The debate over development strategies in North Korea ch’) have no apostrophe. Moreover, the “k,” “t,” “p,” and began within weeks of the 1953 armistice that brought an end to “ch” are now with letters that are voiced in English: g, d, hostilities in the Korean War, when two policy lines (gyeyeoul) b, and j. With the exception of Kim Il Sung, the surname emerged in the wake of the Sixth Plenum of the KWP CC. On the Kim is now rendered Gim. The surname Lee is now one hand, Kim Il Sung and his supporters advocated the Stalin- rendered as Yi or Li, and Pak (or Park) is written as Bak. inspired development of heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer goods, and the rapid collectivization of Pak Hon-yong — Bak Heonyeong agriculture. His opponents, on the other hand, most of who were P'yongyang — Pyeongyang Soviet-Koreans or those who spent time in China during the Pak Chong-ae — Bak Jeongae period of Japanese colonial rule, encouraged the development Kim Sung-hwa — Gim Seunghwa of light industry and consumer durables. The latter, given the appellation the “consumer goods group,” vigorously encouraged Kim Il Sung to mechanically replicate modernization strategies goods group” added to its list of criticisms and openly ques- promoted by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership in other fraternal tioned the advisability of disregarding fraternal experiences with socialist countries. Moreover, members of the “consumer goods de-Stalinization while continuing to encourage “New Course” group” supported North Korea’s further integration into the economic reforms advocated by the post-Stalin Soviet leader- international division of labor through the reinvigorated Council ship. They also began to meet with the staff of the Soviet and for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Chinese embassies to encourage foreign communist leaders to Kim Il Sung had very practical reasons for rejecting these intervene on their behalf and to admonish Kim Il Sung and the appeals of his policy opponents, however. First, he equated KWP leadership during “friendship visits” to the Soviet Union, industrialization with strength at a time when South Korean Eastern Europe, and Mongolia in June and July. president Syngman Rhee continued to engage in saber-rattling During his trip throughout Eastern Europe in June and July and the Republic of Korea witnessed a massive influx of US 1956, Kim Il Sung admitted to the correctness of the comradely aid. Moreover, he was certain a strong DPRK would appeal to advice in the presence of fraternal leaders. Yet, upon returning left-leaning South Koreans. Furthermore, Kim recognized that to Pyeongyang in mid-July, he was reluctant to comply with the integrating the DPRK’s economy into the international division recommendations of Khrushchev and other foreign communist of labor meant foregoing industrial development since North officials. His reluctance to make changes, at least at the pace his Korea was expected to simply export its natural resources and critics considered necessary, convinced members of the “con- marine products to COMECON member countries. Kim Il Sung sumer goods group” of the need to make one last appeal during was first and foremost a nationalist, and with Korea emerging the August plenum. Far from an attempted coup d’état, members from a centuries-old Sino-centric system of relations and 35 of the “consumer goods group” attempted to bring their case years of Japanese colonial rule, he would not willingly subju- directly to the Central Committee, stressing the need to learn gate his country by entering into a new suzerain system of “serv- from the experiences of fraternal communist parties and imple- ing the great” (sadae) with the Soviet Union.

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