DOCSLIB.ORG

Aceh Under Martial Law: Human Rights Under Fire a Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 5, 2002

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Aceh Under Martial Law: Human Rights Under Fire a Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 5, 2002 Aceh Under Martial Law: Human Rights Under Fire A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 5, 2002 After the collapse of peace talks on May 19, 2003, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed Presidential Decree 28, authorizing Indonesia’s security forces to launch full-scale military operations against the armed, separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM).1 Aceh province was placed under martial law. This ended a six-month ceasefire with GAM that had resulted in a marked decrease in civilian deaths and a return to normality in most parts of the province. Senior Indonesian military officers have stated publicly that they intend to use military force against GAM to “crush” the separatist movement. The United States, European Union, Japan and others have called on the Indonesian government to seek a political solution, but Indonesia has pressed on with its military campaign. Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned about the consequences of military action for the civilian population in Aceh. Human Rights Watch has documented serious abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law by both sides in a series of reports over the last decade. Human Rights Watch urges the Indonesian government and GAM to abide by their international legal obligatio ns to protect civilians and noncombatants. They are strictly prohibited from attacking or threatening civilians, and must ensure that the basic rights of the population are respected and that humanitarian assistance reaches the population at risk. Reports to date offer major reasons for concern on each of these fronts. Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) announced on June 2 that it would investigate more than twenty cases involving murder, rape and forced displacement in Aceh since the conflict began. Commission member M.M. Billah stated that, “Both warring sides have violated the humanitarian law as stated in the Geneva Convention and the human rights law as well ... We call on both parties to end hostilities and reopen peace talks, and this time the talks should involve civilians.”2 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has also voiced concern, stating on May 29 “deep concern about the impact of the renewed hostilities on civilian populations in Aceh, Indonesia, particularly by the reports of extrajudicial killings and widespread burning of schools.”3 This briefing paper details seven areas of concern: a reported upsurge in extrajudicial executions, school burnings, possible forced relocation of civilians, renewed flows of displaced people in need of humanitarian assistance, crackdowns on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and on the press, and use of externally supplied weapons for counter-insurgency operations. Separate sections below discuss each of these issues and include recommendations for steps Indonesia and GAM should take now to prevent further deterioration of conditions. An immediate imperative is removing far-reaching restrictions on access to Aceh. Since the fighting began, the Indonesian government has succeeded in severely limiting the flow of information from the province. It has denied access to Aceh to diplomats, independent international observers, and international human rights NGOs. It has advised U.N. humanitarian agencies and foreign humanitarian NGOs to leave the province. Indonesian NGO workers 1 The decree authorizes operations for six months, but this is likely to be extended if the Indonesian military (TNI) has not completed its intended task within this time period. 2 “Komnas HAM to probe Aceh violations, ” The Jakarta Post, June 3, 2003. 3 “Indonesia: Annan deeply concerned about hostilities' effect on civilians in Aceh,” UN News service, May 29, 2003. attempting to monitor the situation have been detained by the police. Without offering proof, several have been listed as suspected GAM sympathizers. Local phone service has been disrupted and a series of military checkpoints now controls movement along the main highway in and out of Aceh (from Banda Aceh to Medan in North Sumatra). Human Rights Watch fears that the lack of access and monitoring by independent observers could create a climate in which military forces on both sides believe they can act with impunity and commit abuses, unreported and away from the public eye. Lack of access to humanitarian agencies may also foreshadow a humanitarian disaster as supplies run short in the province. The government has insisted that aid be funneled through the government, but donors are concerned about possible corruption and the ability of the government to undertake this difficult logistical task. Until independent monitors are allowed access to the province, reports of human rights violations will remain difficult to verify. Human Rights Watch welcomes the decision to allow a team from the Jakarta office of Komnas HAM, to Aceh to carry out investigations into alleged human rights violations.4 This is a step in the right direction, but is not sufficient. Human Rights Watch urges the Indonesian government to allow immediate access to the province for international human rights groups and observers. Lack of access will only fuel rumors and fear. If Indonesia has nothing to hide, it should immediately open the province to international and national observers. Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned about the following developments in Aceh in its first two weeks under a state of military emergency: 1. Extrajudicial Executions Newspaper and NGO reports have detailed numerous extra-judicial executions of civilians by the Indonesian military (TNI) in the first week of hostilities. The most widely reported took place on May 21, when Indonesian soldiers reportedly dragged a group of men and boys out of their hut in the village of Mapa Mamplam. According to eyewitnesses, the soldiers lined the victims up and shot each one dead, execution style. Among those killed were three boys, aged eleven, thirteen, and fourteen.5 The TNI immediately rejected these reports and set up a team composed of two soldiers and two Indonesian journalists to verify the allegations. After this investigation, the military claimed that all the villagers, including the three boys, were GAM spies.6 Even if true, it would not of course justify the summary execution of the villagers. The TNI was also reportedly responsible for the summary execution of ten civilians in Bieureun district, two in Pata Mamplam, two in Pulo Raboe, and six in Cot Raboe, including two twelve- year old boys.7 4 “Rights body to go to Aceh despite government’s reservation,” The Jakarta Post, May 29, 2003. 5 “Youths massacred in Aceh Village,” BBC News World Edition, May 23, 2003; “Indonesia sends hundreds more troops to Aceh, says 29 rebels killed,” Agence France-Presse, May 22, 2003; “Young Blood,” Time Asia, June 2, 2003. 6 “Military inquires into Aceh shootings,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 26, 2003; “Indonesian army claims shot boys were spies,” South China Morning Post, May 28, 2003. 7 “Indonesian troops accused of massacre,” The Guardian, May 22, 2003; “Children massacred by military in Aceh,” The Age, May 23, 2003. 2 In separate media reports villagers told reporters that on May 25, 2003 government troops had killed three civilians in Peusangan and one civilian in Bukit Sudan.8 On May 23 and 24, five men were reportedly shot and killed by Indonesian soldiers in the village of Seunade.9 2. School Burnings UNICEF has reported that 425 schools were burned down from May 19 to May 28 (207 in Pidie, 131 in Bireuen, 28 in Great Aceh, 31 in East Aceh Timur, 15 in Aceh Jaya, the rest in four other districts). UNICEF reported that the school burnings have already affected the education of at least 60,000 children.10 The Indonesian military and the GAM have accused each other of the arson attacks. Until an independent and impartial investigation is carried out, it will be unclear who should be held accountable for these acts. Eyewitness accounts have consistently stated that the school burnings were undertaken by men in civilian clothing. International humanitarian law provides that buildings normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as schools, are protected during armed conflict when not used for military purposes. Deliberate attacks on schools is a serious violation of customary international humanitarian law. Human Rights Watch condemns the burning of schools and urges the government of Indonesia and GAM to provide adequate protection to secure all educational facilities in areas of the province under their respective control. 3. Forced Relocation of Civilians In an effort to identify GAM members, the Indonesian military has reportedly engaged in operations to physically separate civilians from suspected armed separatists. Human Rights Watch has received credible accounts from Banda Aceh of the creation of camps for this purpose. General Endriartono Sutarto, the commander of Indonesia’s armed forces, has publicly stated that hundreds of thousands of Acehnese may be forced from their homes and interned in camps. He is reported as stating that local government officials were already preparing such facilities, but with an allegedly benign motive: “Our first priority is to separate GAM from the people, because we don't want any people to get hurt. If we have to move them to win this war, we will, but that’s a last resort.”11 Up to 200,000 people may be moved from their homes and placed in special camps under military guard. Indonesia’s Minister of Social Affairs is reported to have said: “We are waiting for an order from the military administration. Should they want to comb a certain area, we will move people from their homes.”12 8 “Indonesia Army Denies Targeting Civilians,” Associated Press, May 25, 2003. 9 “Summary executions become routine in Aceh as Jakarta’s generals break their promises,” The Independent (UK), May 26, 2003. 10“Humanitarian assistance urgently needed for children in Aceh,” UNICEF, May 23, 2003; Indonesia: OCHA Consolidated Report 24 May – 29 May.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Indonesia Beyond Reformasi: Necessity and the “De-Centering” of Democracy
    INDONESIA BEYOND REFORMASI: NECESSITY AND THE “DE-CENTERING” OF DEMOCRACY Leonard C. Sebastian, Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSITIONAL POLITICS IN INDONESIA ......................................... 2 R II. NECESSITY MAKES STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT FOR DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA .................... 7 R III. NECESSITY-BASED REFORMS ................... 12 R A. What Necessity Inevitably Entailed: Changes to Defining Features of the New Order ............. 12 R 1. Military Reform: From Dual Function (Dwifungsi) to NKRI ......................... 13 R 2. Taming Golkar: From Hegemony to Political Party .......................................... 21 R 3. Decentralizing the Executive and Devolution to the Regions................................. 26 R 4. Necessary Changes and Beyond: A Reflection .31 R IV. NON NECESSITY-BASED REFORMS ............. 32 R A. After Necessity: A Political Tug of War........... 32 R 1. The Evolution of Legislative Elections ........ 33 R 2. The Introduction of Direct Presidential Elections ...................................... 44 R a. The 2004 Direct Presidential Elections . 47 R b. The 2009 Direct Presidential Elections . 48 R 3. The Emergence of Direct Local Elections ..... 50 R V. 2014: A WATERSHED ............................... 55 R * Leonard C. Sebastian is Associate Professor and Coordinator, Indonesia Pro- gramme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of In- ternational Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
    [Show full text]
  • Redalyc.Democratization and TNI Reform
    UNISCI Discussion Papers ISSN: 1696-2206 [email protected] Universidad Complutense de Madrid España Marbun, Rico Democratization and TNI reform UNISCI Discussion Papers, núm. 15, octubre, 2007, pp. 37-61 Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=76701504 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 15 (Octubre / October 2007) ISSN 1696-2206 DEMOCRATIZATIO A D T I REFORM Rico Marbun 1 Centre for Policy and Strategic Studies (CPSS), Indonesia Abstract: This article is written to answer four questions: what kind of civil-military relations is needed for democratization; how does military reform in Indonesia affect civil-military relations; does it have a positive impact toward democratization; and finally is the democratization process in Indonesia on the right track. Keywords: Civil-military relations; Indonesia. Resumen: Este artículo pretende responder a cuatro preguntas: qué tipo de relaciones cívico-militares son necesarias para la democratización; cómo afecta la reforma militar en Indonesia a las relaciones cívico-militares; si tiene un impacto positivo en la democratización; y finalmente, si el proceso de democratización en Indonesia va por buen camino. Palabras clave: relaciones cívico-militares; Indonesia. Copyright © UNISCI, 2007. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI. Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores, y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de U*ISCI.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance
    Policy Studies 23 The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance Marcus Mietzner East-West Center Washington East-West Center The East-West Center is an internationally recognized education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen understanding and relations between the United States and the countries of the Asia Pacific. Through its programs of cooperative study, training, seminars, and research, the Center works to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia Pacific community in which the United States is a leading and valued partner. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government, private foundations, individuals, cor- porations, and a number of Asia Pacific governments. East-West Center Washington Established on September 1, 2001, the primary function of the East- West Center Washington is to further the East-West Center mission and the institutional objective of building a peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community through substantive programming activities focused on the theme of conflict reduction, political change in the direction of open, accountable, and participatory politics, and American understanding of and engagement in Asia Pacific affairs. The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance Policy Studies 23 ___________ The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance _____________________ Marcus Mietzner Copyright © 2006 by the East-West Center Washington The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance by Marcus Mietzner ISBN 978-1-932728-45-3 (online version) ISSN 1547-1330 (online version) Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C.
    [Show full text]
  • Peace Without Justice? the Helsinki Peace Process in Aceh Edward Aspinall
    Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue rAprile 2008port Peace without justice? The Helsinki peace process in Aceh Edward Aspinall Report The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is an independent and impartial foundation, based Contents in Geneva, that promotes and facilitates dialogue to resolve Acknowledgement armed conflicts and reduce civilian suffering. Introduction and overview 5 114, rue de lausanne ch-1202 geneva 1. The centrality of human rights and justice issues in Aceh 7 switzerland [email protected] 2. Aceh in its Indonesian setting 9 t: + 41 22 908 11 30 f: +41 22 908 11 40 www.hdcentre.org 3. Limited international involvement 12 © Copyright Henry Dunant Centre for 4. Justice issues in the negotiations 16 Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007 Reproduction of all or part of this 5. Implementation of the amnesty 19 publication may be authorised only with written consent and 6. Compensation without justice 22 acknowledgement of the source. Broad definition and difficulties in delivery 23 Edward Aspinall (edward,aspinall@ Compensation or assistance? 24 anu.edu.au) is a Fellow in the Department of Political and 7. Debates about the missing justice mechanisms 27 Social Change, Research School Human Rights Court 27 of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. He Truth and Reconciliation Commission 29 specialises in Indonesian politics and is the author of Opposing 8. The Aceh Monitoring Mission: could more have 31 Suharto: Compromise, Resistance been done? and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford University Press, 2005). His new book on the history Conclusion 36 of the Aceh conflict and peace process, provisionally entitled Islam References 39 and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia, will also be published by Stanford University Acronyms and abbreviations 43 Press.
    [Show full text]
  • Indonesia Says Drive Against Separatists Will Not End Soon
    July 9, 2003 Indonesia Says Drive Against Separatists Will Not End Soon By JANE PERLEZ JAKARTA, Indonesia, July 8 — The Indonesian military has now declared that its tough offensive against rebels in the northern province of Aceh, originally supposed to last six months, would last much longer, maybe even 10 years. That statement Sunday by Gen. Endriartono Sutarto to Indonesian reporters followed the first public rebuke by Washington for Indonesia's conduct of the war, and a meeting between a senior Bush administration official and President Megawati Sukarnoputri in which she was urged to end the nearly 30-year-long conflict. Washington's public and private diplomacy — including meetings between the president and a National Security Council official, Karen Brooks, and a meeting between Ms. Brooks and General Endriartono — appear to have had little impact on the conduct of the military in Aceh. According to estimates by the Indonesian military, tens of thousands of civilians have been forced from their homes by the army and placed in relocation camps. The number of civilians killed is estimated by the Indonesian police to be about 150. Western officials assert that the civilian death toll is considerably higher. At a time when the power of the Indonesian military is on the rise again, the United States appears to have little influence among the officers whose cooperation it wants for the campaign against terrorism, Indonesian and Western officials said. The Indonesian police have been the most important force in rounding up suspected terrorists. Those officials said the Army chief of staff, Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, argued at a recent meeting of his generals that training for Indonesian officers in the United States would be unnecessary, and even counterproductive.
    [Show full text]
  • Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia
    INDONESIA’S TRANSFORMATION and the Stability of Southeast Asia Angel Rabasa • Peter Chalk Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution unlimited ProjectR AIR FORCE The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rabasa, Angel. Indonesia’s transformation and the stability of Southeast Asia / Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. “MR-1344.” ISBN 0-8330-3006-X 1. National security—Indonesia. 2. Indonesia—Strategic aspects. 3. Indonesia— Politics and government—1998– 4. Asia, Southeastern—Strategic aspects. 5. National security—Asia, Southeastern. I. Chalk, Peter. II. Title. UA853.I5 R33 2001 959.804—dc21 2001031904 Cover Photograph: Moslem Indonesians shout “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great) as they demonstrate in front of the National Commission of Human Rights in Jakarta, 10 January 2000. Courtesy of AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (AFP) PHOTO/Dimas. RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover design by Maritta Tapanainen © Copyright 2001 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying,
    [Show full text]
  • Indonesia 249 at This Writing, the Legislature Had Not Yet Enacted Enabling Legislation to Imple- INDONESIA Ment the New Constitution
    248 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2003 Indonesia 249 At this writing, the legislature had not yet enacted enabling legislation to imple- INDONESIA ment the new constitution. Corruption n October 12, two car bombs exploded in Kuta, South Bali, killing at least As in previous years Jakarta courts and prosecutors showed little willingness to O188 civilians. Most of those killed were foreign tourists but an estimated take on major corruption cases. The Jakarta Supreme Court overturned the convic- quarter of the fatalities were Indonesian. The bombs and the aftermath dominated tion and three year jail term of Central Bank governor Syahril Sabirin,who had been national and international news for much of the remainder of the year. In response indicted for misuse of $80 million of bank funds in the 1999 “Bank Bali” scandal. to international pressure, mainly by the United States, President Megawati issued In September, speaker of the House of Representatives and chairman of the two presidential decrees in lieu of legislation to address terrorism in Indonesia and Golkar party, Akbar Tandjung, was sentenced to three years in prison by the Cen- to facilitate the investigations into the Bali attack. Prominent Muslim cleric Abu tral Jakarta District Court, making him the highest public official ever tried and Bakar Ba’asyir was arrested in the wake of the attack but was charged for the sepa- convicted for corruption. Tandjung was found guilty of misappropriating roughly rate Christmas Eve bombings of 2000 and other crimes. The suspected terrorist U.S.$4 million (Rp 40 billion) in state funds from the State Logistics Agency organization which many believe he heads, Jemaah Islamiyaah, was designated a (Bulog), allegedly to fund Golkar’s 1999 election campaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Indonesia in 2002: the Rising Cost of Inaction
    INDONESIA IN 2002 The Rising Cost of Inaction Michael S. Malley Abstract During 2002, communal conflicts abated in Indonesia, the government and rebels in Aceh signed a ceasefire agreement, major economic indicators improved, and a four-year-long constitutional reform process came to a successful conclusion. Yet, serious challenges remain for the country, including rampant corruption, economic weakness, and terrorism. Weak leadership and the frag- mentation of political power make concerted action to resolve these problems unlikely before a new government is elected in 2004. On October 12, 2002, Indonesia suffered the world’s deadliest terrorist incident since the attacks on Washington and New York on September 11, 2001. Nearly 200 people, mainly foreign tourists, were killed when bombs exploded outside two popular nightclubs on the island of Bali. That same evening, smaller bombs exploded near the U.S. consulate in Bali and the Philippine consulate in Manado, the Indonesian city closest to the Philippines, but neither caused any casualties. Despite frequent and increasingly insistent warnings from the United States and neighboring countries, Indonesia had not taken action to forestall a terrorist attack. The reasons why Jakarta failed to act preemptively resemble those that have prevented it from addressing a wide range of serious chal- lenges, including rampant corruption, slow economic growth, and military autonomy from civilian control. One line of explanation emphasizes Presi- dent Megawati Soekarnoputri’s lack of leadership ability; the other refers to the fragmented nature of power in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto in 1998 after more than three decades of authoritarian rule. Michael S.
    [Show full text]
  • Aid Burnishes U.S. Image but Other Concerns Persist
    U.S.-Southeast Asian Relations: Aid Burnishes U.S. Image but Other Concerns Persist Sheldon W. Simon Arizona State University A massive U.S. relief effort led by the U.S. Navy for the tsunami-devastated north Sumatran coast has burnished America’s image in Indonesia, which had sunk to a record low after Washington’s invasion of Iraq. Even large Indonesian Muslim organizations that previously voiced anti-American views have praised U.S. humanitarian activities in Banda Aceh. The Bush administration has seized the new positive spirit of Indonesian- U.S. relations to press Congress for the restoration of training and education programs for the Indonesian military that had been suspended since 1992. On the anti-terrorist front, the U.S. expressed disappointment at an Indonesian court’s acquittal of radical Jemaah Islamiyah cleric Abu Bakar Bashir on allegations of involvement in the 2002 Bali and 2003 Jakarta Marriott bombings. Bashir received a relatively light 30-month sentence – half of which has already been served – for knowing about the terrorists’ plans. The U.S. State Department’s annual Human Rights Report criticized the Thai government killings of southern Thai Muslims during efforts to suppress secession activities. Tsunami Relief Provides Opportunities for Washington Speaking at a March 8 press conference with former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton at his side, the current President Bush enthused that the U.S. has shown “the good folks of Indonesia ... a different America now ... a country which, of course, will defend our security, but a country which also cares deeply about suffering people, regardless of their religion...” And, indeed, the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Indonesia Backgrounder: a Guide to the 2004 Elections
    INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: A GUIDE TO THE 2004 ELECTIONS 18 December 2003 Asia Report N°71 Jakarta/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. ELECTORAL REFORM .............................................................................................. 2 A. THE OLD SYSTEM .................................................................................................................2 B. DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT ...................................................................................2 C. ELECTION OF LEGISLATURES ................................................................................................4 D. MORE OF THE SAME?............................................................................................................5 III. PARTIES .........................................................................................................................6 A. PDI-P ...................................................................................................................................6 B. GOLKAR................................................................................................................................7 C. PKB .....................................................................................................................................9 D. PPP.......................................................................................................................................9
    [Show full text]
  • National Political Evolution Over the Next Five to Ten Years
    CRM D0006866.A1/Final September 2002 Indonesia's Political Evolution Over the Next 5-10 years Richard W. Baker 4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 Project Asia is The CNA Corporation’s focal point for Asian security studies. This ongoing project’s work is contained in several types of products, including: regional assessments, country profiles, occasional papers, monographs, and conferences on important security topics. Project Asia’s overall analytic approach seeks to synthesize the work of CNAC researchers, policy analysts, regional experts, and other sources of information with what is being said and written in the region; thus, it can provide the context necessary for policy makers to make decisions relevant to the region. Although the focus is on practical near-term issues, longer-term trends are not neglected. Project Asia falls under the Center for Strategic Studies of The CNA Corporation (CNAC). The Center for Strategic Studies combines in one organizational entity regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategic and force assessment work. Such a center allows CNAC to join the global community of centers for strategic studies, and share perspectives on major security issues that affect nations.There is a continuing need for analytic and assessment work that goes beyond conventional wisdom. The Center for Strategic Studies is dedicated to providing a deeper level of expertise, and work that considers a full range of plausible possibilities, anticipates a range of outcomes, and does not
    [Show full text]
  • Indo 80 0 1132335826 123
    C urrent Data on the Indonesian M ilitary Elite1 The Editors The current listing identifies the holders of key positions at TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Military) Headquarters, as well as at the army's central and regional commands between March 1, 2003 and August 31, 2005. As noted in the last update of current military data in 2003, we have had difficulty in systematically updating personnel changes at the Korem (Military Resort Command), largely due to the absence of the TNI-owned daily newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata, since the financial crisis of 1997.2 We now rely mainly on the official letters of TNI Commander-in-Chief and general newspapers, both national and local, in collecting data regarding officer corps and their posts. Although the information on Korem commanders is not very satisfactory, it is still possible to analyze macro-trends in leadership transformation at the local level. The period covered in this update, i.e., from March 2003 to August 2005, has seen significant developments in post-reformasi civil-military relations. We have seen: 1) the all-out war in Aceh under martial law (May 2003-May 2004); 2) parliamentary elections in April 2004; 3) direct presidential elections in July and September 2004 for the first time in Indonesian history; and 4) the birth of a new government led by a retired army general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in October 2004. How did they shape Indonesia's civil-military relations? The war in Aceh greatly empowered those TNI officers who had demanded that the military take on a larger role in internal security.
    [Show full text]