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The Duma Committee and the Monarchy

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The Duma Committee and the Monarchy chapter 23 The Duma Committee and the Monarchy Rodzianko and the Monarchy The Duma Committee was confronted with three crucial issues on the problem of power.The first was what to do with the monarchy, second, what government should be formed, and third, what relations the new government was to have with the Petrograd Soviet. And all these questions were closely connected with the power struggle within the Duma Committee. Two ambitious men, Rodzianko and Miliukov, struggled for the position of power, while Kerenskii, using his popularity among the insurgents, quietly extended his influence.1 Guchkov, though himself not officially a member of the Duma Committee, kept constant and close contact with the Duma Committee members, and sought to achieve his goal of a palace coup, taking advantage of the pressure of the revolution. Eventually at the crucial meeting on the night of 1–2 March, the Duma Committee made three critical decisions: first, it decided to seek Nicholas ii’s abdication, second, it decided to form a provisional government separate from the Duma Committee and the State Duma, and third, it decided to gain the support of the insurgents by gaining the approval of the Soviet Executive Committee for the Provisional Government. In the previous chapter, we saw the result of negotiations between the Duma Committee and the Soviet Executive Committee on the conditions of ‘transfer of power’. In this chapter, we will examine the question of the monarchy, and we will turn to the formation of the Provisional Government in Chapter 27. At the beginning Rodzianko, as chairman of the Duma as well as the head of the Duma Committee, enjoyed unquestioned leadership. He pursued his policy in the name of the Duma and the Duma Committee without consult- ing other members. All the proclamations and orders of the Duma Committee were issued in the name of Rodzianko, chairman of the Duma. At first, his colleagues accepted his leadership, since they found his authority useful in extending the prestige of the Duma Committee, whose legitimacy was ques- tionable without its parent body of the State Duma. But as the revolution developed further in the capital, Rodzianko’s influence slipped considerably, 1 For the rivalry between Miliukov and Rodzianko see Katkov 1967, pp. 291–3. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi: 10.1163/9789004354937_024 the duma committee and the monarchy 475 and Miliukov replaced Rodzianko as the Duma Committee’s spokesman. With this shift of power, the Duma Committee’s policy toward the monarchy took a dramatic twist. His personal ambition and conservative desire to avoid a drastic political change guided Rodzianko’s conduct during the February Revolution, although he appears to have accepted the necessity of staging a palace coup to remove the empress’s influence from the emperor.2 He thought of himself as a logical candidate to head a ministry of confidence. In fact, his name was often men- tioned for the post of the chairman of the Council of Ministers in a list of a possible ministry of confidence circulated among liberal opposition circles.3 But Rodzianko never acquired popularity among a majority of the liberals, not to mention the radical liberals. The Kadets did not trust him, suspecting him too eager to compromise with the bureaucracy.Thus, in August 1915, when vari- ous opposition circles circulated a list of a possible ministry of confidence, the Kadets supported Prince L’vov rather than Rodzianko. In 1916, when public opinion was radically polarised, the liberal opposition appeared to be divided into two groups. The first group considered Prince L’vov a more suitable can- didate for the head of a ministry of confidence, while the more conservative group gravitated to Rodzianko as the last hope of bridging the gap between the liberals and the bureaucracy. Realising his slipping popularity with the liber- als, Rodzianko tried to mobilise the support of the aristocracy to bolster his strength at the end of 1916 and at the beginning of 1917.4 When the insurrection triumphed in Petrograd and all governmental author- ity disappeared, many considered the Duma to be the only organ that could restore order in the streets. Ironically, it was the revolution that thrust Rodzi- anko’s prestige to its pinnacle. When the British military attaché, Sir Alfred Knox, visited Rodzianko on 26 February, and suggested that Krivoshein might be a good choice to head a government that could allay the dissatisfactions of the people, Rodzianko did not agree with Knox. When asked if Rodzianko him- self would take on the job, he answered without hesitation that he would.5 Until 28 February, Rodzianko’s proposed solution was the formation of a ministry of confidence. He did not entertain the possibility of the slightest change in the fundamental political structure; in fact, he was convinced that the prestige of the Duma was the last salvation of Russia from the uncontrol- 2 Rodzianko interview, Lyandres 2013, p. 106; Lyandres 2013, pp. 284–5. 3 See Chapter 2. 4 See Chapters 7 and 9. 5 Knox 1921, vol. 2, p. 531..
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