Multi-Platform Access to Digital Content
Hemant K. Bhargava
Graduate School of Management
University of California Davis
July 16, 2013
Abstract
Distribution and consumption of media, entertainment, software, and other forms of information goods goods has been transformed in the last two decades. Increas- ingly, consumers want to access content on multiple platforms. Content providers have adopted widely different strategies for providing such access, ranging from indepen- dent pricing on each platform to single price for access to all platforms. How should content providers manage, and price, multi-platform demand? I frame the multi- platform design problem in terms of a choice between pure bundling (one price gets both platforms), mixed bundling (price each platform separately, and offer discount for getting both) and partial bundling (one platform is sold separately and is bundled with the second). When one platform is considered superior by all customers, then offering multi-platform discounts helps the firm if higher-value customers have greater propensity for multi-platform access; the choice of bundling strategy depends on certain ratios of valuations and contingent valuations for the two platforms. When consumer valuations for the traditional and emerging platforms are mutually independent with demand profiles, then full mixed bundling is optimal when the demand profiles for the two platforms are relatively similar; otherwise the superior platform included access to the weaker one which is also priced separately. When platforms behave more like substitutes, then such partial bundling is less likely to be optimal. Introduction p.1 of 25
Multi-Platform Access to Digital Content
1 Introduction
Distribution and consumption of media, entertainment, software, and other forms of informa- tion goods has been transformed in the last two decades. Print products are now distributed and consumed digitally. For instance, traditional readers of The Economist or Wall Street Journal value accessing these products online despite having the print version. Digital con- tent such as Netflix streaming and Kindle ebooks, previously accessed on television sets and computers, is now consumed on smartphones or tablets. Software previously installed on enterprise data centers now runs over the Internet cloud (e.g., Adobe Creative Cloud). This transformation was initially spurred by availability of inexpensive desktop computing in the 1980s, and then accelerated with the emergence and widespread adoption of the Internet and World Wide Web in the 1990s and the last decade. More recently, the “anytime, anywhere” computing enabled by proliferation of smartphones and tablets has again disrupted estab- lished patterns for consuming information, entertainment, and computing products. Another transformation is around the corner in the form of wearable computers such as eyeglasses and wrist watches. I study this phenomenon using the economic lens of product bundling. Two distinct component products 1 and 2 (here, access to the product via the two channels or two platforms) can either be sold and priced individually (separate component sales at prices p1, p2 respectively), only as a bundle of both products (pure bundle), or both individually and as a bundle (mixed bundle); the last also admits the special case of partial bundling where only one component is sold separately, in addition to the bundle. The bundle price is denoted with pB and, as depicted in Fig.1, and the relation between the three prices reflects the selling strategy in use. There are several mechanisms by which bundling can raise producer profits: lowering the dispersion in consumers’ valuations (Stigler 1963; Adams
Multi-Platform Access to Digital Content July 16, 2013 Introduction p.2 of 25 and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee 1984; McAfee et al. 1989), providing supply-side economies of scope (Evans and Salinger 2005; Suroweicki 2010), lowering consumer transaction costs or creating other demand-side conveniences and network effects (Lewbel 1985; Prasad et al. 2010), and creating strategic leverage (Burstein 1960; Carbajo et al. 1990; Eisenmann et al. 2011).
S2 S12 SEPARATE Platform Platforms SALES 2-only 1-only, 2-only price p2. prices p1, p2.
PB PB1 PB2 MB Platform 1-2 bundle Platform 1-2 bundle Platform 1-2 bundle Bundle-only BUNDLING plus Platform 1-only plus Platform 2-only plus 1-only, 2-only price pB. prices p1, pB. prices p2, pB. prices p1, p2, pB.
(p1 pB,p2 pB) (p